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Introduction 
 
 
The problem of whether a non-owner can validly transfer ownership is a key 
issue in property law, both from a practical and from a theoretical perspective. 
The possibility that an authorized non-owner may validly transfer ownership 
grants agility to everyday transactions by reducing the need of the physical 
presence of the owner. Moreover, it enables the property of those who cannot 
dispose over their goods – such as a bankrupt society or a lunatic – to be 
adequately administered by someone else. From a dogmatic perspective, the 
subject offers the peculiar complexity of being a crossroads between the law of 
property and the law of obligations, where numerous elements interplay in order 
to determine whether ownership is transferred or not. 
 Considering the significance of this subject, it is no wonder to find in Roman 
law abundant cases in which a non-owner may transfer ownership. This rich case 
law has been dealt with in several studies, such as the monographic works of 
Alberto Burdese1, María Victoria Sansón Rodríguez2 and Geert Potjewijd3. 
Burdese and Sansón moreover confronted their viewpoints in a series of articles 
between 2009 and 20124. A doctoral dissertation regarding the subject in 
Byzantine law was also defended in 1989 by Nebrera5, but was never 
commercially published and can only be found in a couple of Catalonian libraries 
under the Greek title “Ἡ τραδιτίων κατὰ γνώμην τοῦ δεσπότου”, escaping – 
somehow – the attention of scholars so far. Other authors such as Miquel6 and 
Wieling7 have also made valuable contributions to the understanding of this 
subject, the former one being moreover closely connected with the research 
done by Sansón and Nebrera8. It is worth noting that most of these studies offer 
the remarkable feature of being generally unaware of each other, due to the 
relatively close – or even simultaneous – date of publication, which grants a high 
level of independence to their approach to the problem. Finally, there are 
                                                 
1  Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949); Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950). 
2  Sansón, Potestas alienandi (1988), p. 227-338; Sansón, La transmisión (1998). 
3  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998). 
4  Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009); Burdese, Agire per altri (2010), p. 3-23; Sansón, 
Representación (2012), p. 1-20. 
5  Nebrera, Ἡ τραδιτίων (1989). 
6  Miquel, Exceptio rei voluntate (1988), p. 675-690; Miquel, Traditio rei alienae (1993), p. 269-
283; Miquel, Patris iussu (1993), p. 559-563. 
7  Wieling, Drittwirkungen (1993), p. 235-267. 
8  In the case of Sansón, as her Doktorvater; regarding Nebrera, suggesting her the subject for 
her research, as shown in Nebrera, Ἡ τραδιτίων (1989), p. ix-x. It is therefore no wonder 
that the views of these three authors are often strongly related. 
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283; Miquel, Patris iussu (1993), p. 559-563. 
7  Wieling, Drittwirkungen (1993), p. 235-267. 
8  In the case of Sansón, as her Doktorvater; regarding Nebrera, suggesting her the subject for 
her research, as shown in Nebrera, Ἡ τραδιτίων (1989), p. ix-x. It is therefore no wonder 
that the views of these three authors are often strongly related. 
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numerous works which grant considerable attention to the transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner when discussing other legal institutions9. 
 Despite the contributions just mentioned, there is still much to be said about 
this subject, which to a great extent remains understudied, unlike its much more 
popular relative, the acquis i t ion  of ownership through another person. Burdese 
would in fact begin his monographic study of 1950 by pointing out the limited 
research on the subject10, an observation which he could repeat sixty years later11. 
The present work attempts therefore to tackle this problem in a comprehensive 
way, focusing mainly on Roman law, to which the first and most extensive part 
is dedicated. A fundamental point which runs through most of the present study 
is the critical revision of certain views inspired by anachronistic dogmatic 
conceptions with which modern scholars have approached Roman sources. An 
overview of the current literature on the subject shows that the works of the 19th 
century Pandectist scholars had a decisive influence in the understanding of the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner, providing accurate concepts which have 
been a cornerstone for the interpretation of Roman sources by modern scholars. 
Among these concepts that of ‘direct representation’ has had a decisive impact on 
the study of Roman sources, and particularly the idea that Roman law knew a 
fundamental prohibition on direct representation which was only gradually 
overcome by jurists. This theory has served as a starting point for most 
contemporary scholars when approaching the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner, which is why its reassessment can help to understand numerous problems, 
including the legal grounds – and even the possibility – of the traditio nomine 
alieno, the possibility of transferring Quiritary ownership by a non-owner, the 
significance of the various praetorian defences on the subject, the nature of the 
delivery performed by the nuntius or the curator furiosi or the possibility for a non-
owner to perform the mancipatio, among others. 
 Another key point of the present study regards the systematization of the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner. The subject has only been studied 
incidentally until now, and therefore the current work attempts to shed some 
light on certain systematic issues which are decisive to understand the place of the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner in Roman law, such as the exceptional 
character of the traditio by a non-owner within the requirements to transfer 
                                                 
9  See e.g. Kaser, Verfügungsakte (1950), p. 59-85; Claus, Gewillkürte Stellvertretung (1973), 
p. 306-315, 332-333, 362-363; Jahr, Begriff des Eigentums (1984), p. 69-102; Wacke, Libera 
administratio peculii (2006), p. 251-316; Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 94-
110; 222-235; 276-290; Miceli, Rappresentanza (2008), p. 162-188. 
10  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 7: “Nella letteratura romanistica il regime della 
alienazione eseguita, mediante traditio, dal terzo estraneo su autorizzazione del domino della 
cosa, non ha mai trovato, a nostro modo di vedere, esauriente trattazione: per lo più o lo si 
è ignorato del tutto, o ci si è limitati alla generica affermazione dell’accoglimento del 
principio della rappresentanza diretta in tema di traditio, ovvero ancora si sono 
occasionalmente analizzati singoli testi sul tema”. A similar criticism, specifically for the 
transfer of ownership through a slave, is made by Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 1.  
11  Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009), p. 17. 
ownership, the role of the nemo plus rule or the relation between the voluntas 
domini at the delivery and the problem of the iusta causa traditionis.  
 The second part of this study traces the evolution of the transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner from the glossators to our days. The main reason for studying 
the reception of Roman law is that the doctrines of Pandectist scholars 
concerning the transfer of ownership by a non-owner were equally decisive for 
the development of modern private law in Europe as they were for the study of 
Roman law, since in both cases the notion of direct representation played a key 
role. Since German scholars had Roman sources as a starting point to develop 
their theories, a reassessment of the significance of the doctrine of direct 
representation in Roman sources inevitably invites for a critical approach to the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner in modern private law. The emphasis in 
this second part is therefore placed on problems of legal systematization, and 
particularly on the nemo plus rule and the significance of the doctrine of direct 
representation.  
 Having a broad historical basis for the analysis of modern law, attempts have 
been made to offer a wide comparative analysis, including recent developments 
such as the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). The aim has not been 
to offer exhaustive references to legal scholarship and case law, but rather to 
illustrate the main lines of evolution of the subject in different jurisdictions. 
Central to this analysis are the developments which took place in Germany in the 
course of the 19th century, which spread rapidly into the private law of different 
European jurisdictions. Other legal systems were less influenced in this point by 
German scholarship, offering a model for the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner which to a great extent remained closer to the Roman sources. The 
contrast between these various jurisdictions invites therefore to draw a 
comparison in order to determine the dogmatic and practical consequences 
which follow from the different approaches to the problem. 
 Since this study deals with topics of both Roman and modern private law, 
attempts have been made to make the texts quoted available to a wide audience. 
Accordingly, all sources reproduced in the body of the text and which are 
originally written in a language other than English have been translated. In the 
case of Greek and Latin sources, the editions and translations which have been 
used can be found at the Bibliography under the title “Editions of Greek and 
Latin sources”.  
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Chapter 1. Potestas alienandi: terminological and 
systematic starting points 
 
1. ‘Direct representation’ in the analysis of Roman sources 
 
There is one notion in particular which runs through the analysis of most 
modern authors dealing with the transfer of ownership by a non-owner: the 
concept of ‘direct representation’. The fact that modern scholarship feels 
comfortable describing Roman law by resorting to a notion which only appeared 
in relatively recent times immediately raises a methodological concern. This 
concern could appear to be of limited importance, considering that Roman law 
scholars have learnt to live with the use of rather anachronistic notions. Roman 
sources offer a limited amount of dogmatic concepts, and it was particularly the 
job of the 19th century German Historical School to reduce the enormous mass 
of Roman case law to a systematically organized body with clear-cut concepts. 
Considering the Roman inspiration of this system, it would seem reasonable to 
make use of the concepts built by the Historical school to approach Roman law, 
which moreover helps the scholar to bring his ideas across in a simple way 
through clear technical notions1. Nonetheless, the use of anachronistic notions in 
legal history is a serious methodological issue, which is normally addressed when 
a concept belonging to modern legal thought is used to approach the Roman 
sources, as is for instance the case with notions such as ‘subjective rights’2 or 
‘human rights’3. Scholars often declare that Roman law scholarship should avoid 
referring to modern legal categories, scorning those who do so as ‘Pandectists’ or 
‘neo-Pandectists’4. However, the problems of working exclusively with ancient 
notions prove most of the time to be unsurmountable for the modern scholar5. 
This is why some authors admit the use of present-day notions when describing 
ancient legal institutions, especially in a heuristic function, providing the scholar 
                                                 
1  It is because of the lack of technical vocabulary in ancient legal sources that Feenstra, RHD 
31 (1953), p. 300-301 and Hoetink, Notions anachroniques (1955), p. 16-17 agree that 
anachronistic notions are a necessary tool for legal historians. 
2  An overview on the way scholars approach this notion in Roman law is given by Megías, 
El derecho subjetivo (2003), p. 35-54. 
3  See Giltaij/Tuori, Human rights in Antiquity (2015), p. 39-63; Trisciuoglio, Diritti umani 
(2015), p. 57-61. 
4  Bretone, La ‘coscienza ironica’ (1997), p. 187-201. Critical of Bretone’s views is Behrends, 
Die Person (1998), p. 26-60, who discards that the reference to modern legal institutions 
necessarily involves a form of ‘neo-Pandectism’ (p. 58). 
5  Hoetink, Notions anachroniques (1955), p. 6-7: “la question de la légitimité des concepts 
anachroniques n’est pas résolue par la remarque par trop simpliste que l’historien doit 
reproduire fidèlement et objectivement la réalité du passé. […] Dès qu’on reconnaît que 
l’histoire ne s’efforce pas à reproduire le passé, mais à construire une image du passé à l’aide 
des matériaux que le passé nous a laissés, on est amené à admettre que l’histoire peut faire 
usage des notions qui comme telles n’étaient pas présentes dans le passé”. 
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with a basic starting point of analysis and a working hypothesis6. The legal scholar 
should nonetheless realize that he makes use of an anachronistic notion and 
accordingly should apply it in a way which does not by itself explain the ideas or 
actions of the past7. In this way, the proper justification of the use of modern 
notions would prevent these concepts from bringing along a distortion in the 
understanding of history by explaining past ideas or actions in a conceptual 
framework which is alien to the past. If this methodological starting point is not 
observed, the study of history would lose its meaning by merely reflecting 
modern institutions8, which is even more true concerning Roman law: if the 
study of Roman jurisprudence simply becomes a Latinized restatement of 
modern law, not only will modern scholarship offer an artificial image of ancient 
institutions, but the resulting outlook will present no value for the critical analysis 
of modern law. 
 Scholars dealing with the transfer of ownership by a non-owner since the 
second half of the 20th century have in many cases kept an attentive eye for 
modern law. For example, the works of Potjewijd and Sansón dedicate 
considerable attention in their introductory chapters to the systematization of the 
problem in modern private law9. The fact that modern law is used by these 
authors as a reference point for their analysis cannot be criticized, as it was said in 
the previous paragraph10. More arguable is the use of modern technical notions in 
order to explain Roman law, as if Roman jurists had worked with an analogous 
conceptual framework in order to reach their solutions. For example, Miquel 
declares that the Dutch concept of ‘beschikkingsbevoegdheid’ (faculty to dispose) as 
it appears in the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek would accurately render the Roman 
notion of potestas alienandi11, or that the German notions of ‘Ermächtigung’ and 
                                                 
6  Hoetink, Notions anachroniques (1955), p. 10 and especially 16. 
7  Hoetink, Notions anachroniques (1955), p. 15-16: “… les notions anachroniques ne sont 
jamais permises à titre d’explication causale ou psychologique des gestes de des pensées des 
hommes d’autrefois, parce que là nous nous mouvons dans l’orbite de la réalité du passé, 
que nous essayons de reconstruire”. Later on (p. 17) the author asks: “Mais, a-t-on dit, 
pour expliquer d’une façon juridique la cohérence et les rapports entre les règles et les 
institutions d’un droit appartenant au passé l’historien du droit peut-il se passer des termes 
et des notions empruntés à la dogmatique moderne?” to which he responds: “Je crois 
qu’en effet il ne peut pas s’en passer absolument, mais qu’il ne faut pas en faire usage sans 
qualification expresse”. 
8  Hoetink, Notions anachroniques (1955), p. 13: “Il y a un grand danger à ne porter sur le 
passé qu’un reflet de la lumière du présent”. 
9  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 1-8; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 7-15, 25-
27. 
10  Winkel, Regulae Iuris (2001), p. 414: “We could even say that legal history can fulfil its role 
as a critical form of comparative law only if it is constantly linked with actual legal 
problems”. 
11  Miquel, Savigny y el nacimiento (2003), p. 5768. 
 
‘Stellvertretung’ can be used to approach the solutions given by Roman jurists12. In 
the course of the present study, it will be shown that the use of such modern 
terms is often misleading when approaching the Roman sources. 
 Particularly problematic in relation to the use of modern legal terminology is 
the way in which modern scholars have described the evolution of the notion of 
‘direct representation’ in Roman legal thought. The basic outlook on this point 
since the second half of the 19th century has been that Roman law initially 
forbade any possible form of direct representation13. If a person wanted to 
perform any act which brought along a legal consequence for him, he had to do 
it himself. This state of affairs is normally attributed to a series of general features 
of the primitive law of the Romans, such as its formal character, the peculiar 
structure of the Roman family and the condition of free men. Accordingly, the 
prohibition of direct representation was a sort of ‘negative principle’ in pre-
classical Roman law, as Coppola Bisazza critically observes14. However, the 
expansion of trade and the subsequent need to act through intermediaries, among 
other factors, would have led Roman jurists to develop a series of mechanisms to 
avoid this general principle, such as the so-called actiones adiecticiae qualitatis. This 
and other mechanisms which allow a third party to carry out a legal act are 
therefore regarded by modern scholars as exceptions to the general prohibition of 
direct representation in Roman law. 
 To properly determine the value of the traditional view regarding direct 
representation in Roman law, it is essential to identify its origins. Coppola 
Bisazza claims that the idea of a ‘prohibition of direct representation’ is to be 
found for the first time in the works of the Glossators15, and particularly in the 
gloss Nihil agit of Accursius to Inst. 3,19,416. Accursius declares that this text 
contains a general rule, namely that no one can stipulate on behalf of another 
person, but he proceeds to offer a list of sixteen exceptions in which this is 
indeed possible. Although Accursius does present a general rule and the 
exceptions to it, Coppola Bisazza goes too far when declaring that the idea of a 
‘general prohibition of direct representation’ can be identified in the Accursian 
gloss, particularly since the concept of direct representation itself had not yet 
come into existence. This does not mean that the text is of no meaning for the 
evolution of the problem, since it indeed shows that already at an early stage of 
the reception of Roman law jurists were deriving general conclusions from the 
analysis of the Corpus Iuris Civilis regarding the possibility to act on behalf of 
someone else, which in the case of the stipulatio meant that such a possibility was 
                                                 
12  Miquel, Exceptio rei voluntate (1998), p. 677. This distinction is also to be found in 
Jörs/Kunkel/Wenger (1949), p. 102-103 and Rabel, Grundzüge (1955), p. 182-192. More 
subtle is Jörs/Kunkel/Wenger (1987), p. 113 n. 5. 
13  The modern views on the subject are described in detail by Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum 
domini (2008), p. 3-10. 
14  Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 3. 
15  Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 355. 
16  Inst. 3,19,4: “Si quis alii, quam cuius iuri subiectus sit, stipuletur, nihil agit…” 
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representation in Roman law, it is essential to identify its origins. Coppola 
Bisazza claims that the idea of a ‘prohibition of direct representation’ is to be 
found for the first time in the works of the Glossators15, and particularly in the 
gloss Nihil agit of Accursius to Inst. 3,19,416. Accursius declares that this text 
contains a general rule, namely that no one can stipulate on behalf of another 
person, but he proceeds to offer a list of sixteen exceptions in which this is 
indeed possible. Although Accursius does present a general rule and the 
exceptions to it, Coppola Bisazza goes too far when declaring that the idea of a 
‘general prohibition of direct representation’ can be identified in the Accursian 
gloss, particularly since the concept of direct representation itself had not yet 
come into existence. This does not mean that the text is of no meaning for the 
evolution of the problem, since it indeed shows that already at an early stage of 
the reception of Roman law jurists were deriving general conclusions from the 
analysis of the Corpus Iuris Civilis regarding the possibility to act on behalf of 
someone else, which in the case of the stipulatio meant that such a possibility was 
                                                 
12  Miquel, Exceptio rei voluntate (1998), p. 677. This distinction is also to be found in 
Jörs/Kunkel/Wenger (1949), p. 102-103 and Rabel, Grundzüge (1955), p. 182-192. More 
subtle is Jörs/Kunkel/Wenger (1987), p. 113 n. 5. 
13  The modern views on the subject are described in detail by Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum 
domini (2008), p. 3-10. 
14  Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 3. 
15  Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 355. 
16  Inst. 3,19,4: “Si quis alii, quam cuius iuri subiectus sit, stipuletur, nihil agit…” 
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generally excluded. However, it must be noted that scholars did not always offer 
a uniform view on the problem of obligations concluded through a third party17, 
and accordingly the ideas of Accursius cannot be seen as definitive on this point. 
 The origin of the idea of a primitive prohibition of direct representation is 
rather to be found in the writings of the 19th century German Historical School18, 
in the context of the consolidation of a technical notion of direct representation. 
It should be borne in mind that during the first half of the 19th century this 
concept still had a very vague meaning, and German legal scholars gradually 
began to apply the notion of Stellvertretung to describe certain problems in 
Roman law, such as the actiones adiecticiae qualitatis or the acquisition of ownership 
through a non-owner. Inevitably this resulted in a more uniform approach to 
various problems involving acts concluded by a person on behalf of someone 
else. This uniform approach eventually led to a historical reconstruction of the 
evolution of direct representation in Roman law by Mühlenbruch as early as 
181719. According to this author, numerous texts, including D. 50,17,73,4, 
D. 41,1,53, C. 4,27,1pr, Inst. 2,9,5 and D. 50,17,123pr, showed that the general 
principle in pre-classical Roman law was that each person could only carry out 
acts affecting himself20. These quotations are especially eloquent since some of 
them are expressed in a succinct way which gives them the appearance of an 
essential truth, including the rules “alteri stipulari nemo potest”21 – no one can 
stipulate on behalf of another – “per extraneam personam nobis adquiri non posse”22 – 
no one can acquire through a person outside the family – and “nemo alieno nomine 
lege agere potest”23. The idea that originally Roman law did not allow another 
person to conclude acts which directly affect another one found moreover 
support in the fact that some scholars considered that the mancipatio could only be 
performed by a non-owner fiduciae causa, i.e. if he first became owner himself24. 
However, according to Mühlenbruch, such a general prohibition on direct 
representation would have soon some become problematic for commerce, and 
numerous exceptions would have accordingly been introduced to it. Having lost 
most of its practical application, the primitive rule remained of importance in 
two groups of cases: (1) legal acts belonging to the ius civile, such as the stipulatio 
or the mancipatio, which could only be performed personally due to the ancient 
                                                 
17  See Bayer, Vertrag zugunsten Dritter (1995), p. 5-56; Hallebeek/Dondorp, Contracts for a 
Third-Party (2008), p. 21-91. 
18  Miceli, Rappresentanza (2008), p. 15. 
19  Mühlenbruch, Cession (1817), p. 28-34. His ideas on the subject are still found in the 
expanded third – and final – edition of 1836 (p. 41-47) which is further quoted here. 
20  Mühlenbruch, Cession (1836), p. 43-44: “Den in diesen und andern Stellen enthaltenen 
Bestimmungen lag ursprünglich ein Hauptgedanke zum Grunde, der nämlich: dass Jeder 
für sich in Person handeln müsse”. 
21  Inst. 3,19,4 and 19; D. 45,1,38,17; D. 50,17,73,4. 
22  Gai 2,95; Inst. 2,9,5; D. 45,1,126,2; C. 4,27,1pr. 
23  D. 50,17,123pr (Ulp. 14 ed.): “No one can legally act on behalf of another” (transl. 
Watson). 
24  See Chapter 5, Section 1 below. 
 
ban on direct representation; (2) the acquisition of rights through another person, 
which could not take place through a free person, who could only gain 
possession on behalf of someone else. 
 At around the same time Savigny developed his own ideas concerning direct 
representation in Roman law, which would decisively influence both the 
understanding of Roman law and that of modern private law25. His ideas on the 
evolution and application of direct representation were first briefly presented in 
181426, being further expanded in his System27 and later in detail in his 
Obligationenrecht28. The greatest contribution of his ideas was to add a practical 
angle to this problem, which would favour the acceptance of direct 
representation in German private law. During the first half of the 19th century 
there was in fact an ongoing debate in Germany concerning whether direct 
representation was admissible in legal practice29. Savigny would contribute to 
solve this problem through a detailed account of the evolution of direct 
representation in Roman law, which follows the ideas of Mühlenbruch to a great 
extent by taking as a starting point the idea of a pre-classical prohibition of direct 
representation. According to Savigny, the reason behind the prohibition of direct 
representation in Roman law was the formalistic nature of the old ius civile, 
which would have required that anyone who wanted to carry out an action 
which would bring along legal consequences to himself should perform it 
personally. The main practical relief to this situation was the structure of the 
Roman family, since the acts of those individuals under the domestic power of 
the paterfamilias would lead to a direct patrimonial increase – never decrease – of 
the later. The general ban of direct representation, however, should have soon 
become an obstacle for trade and therefore Roman jurisprudence came up with a 
series of exceptions which reduced its practical scope. Despite such exceptions, 
the general principle forbidding direct representation would have continued to 
apply in traditional and formal acts such as the stipulatio, precisely due to the fact 
that their formal character prevented the application of these innovative 
remedies. Savigny would find a confirmation of this theory in D. 41,1,53, where 
Pomponius declares that one may acquire according to the ius civile through 
persons in potestate, like when a stipulatio is concluded by one of them, while 
possession can be acquired naturaliter by any person30. According to Savigny, this 
would prove the decisive distinction made by Roman law between formal legal 
acts of the ius civile, regarding which direct representation was not allowed and 
                                                 
25  Regarding the ideas of Savigny on direct representation see Müller, Die Entwicklung (1969), 
p. 156; Mohnhaupt, Savignys Lehre (1979), p. 60-77; Hölzl, Savignys Lehre (2002). 
26  Savigny, Vom Beruf (1814), p. 102-103. 
27  Savigny, System (1840) III, p. 90-98. 
28  Savigny, Das Obligationenrecht (1853) II, p. 21-88. 
29  Müller, Die Entwicklung (1969), p. 155. 
30  D. 41,1,53 (<Pomp.> 14 ad Quintum Mucium): “Ea quae civiliter adquiruntur per eos, qui 
in potestate nostra sunt, adquirimus, veluti stipulationem: quod naturaliter adquiritur, sicuti 
est possessio, per quemlibet volentibus nobis possidere adquirimus”. 
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generally excluded. However, it must be noted that scholars did not always offer 
a uniform view on the problem of obligations concluded through a third party17, 
and accordingly the ideas of Accursius cannot be seen as definitive on this point. 
 The origin of the idea of a primitive prohibition of direct representation is 
rather to be found in the writings of the 19th century German Historical School18, 
in the context of the consolidation of a technical notion of direct representation. 
It should be borne in mind that during the first half of the 19th century this 
concept still had a very vague meaning, and German legal scholars gradually 
began to apply the notion of Stellvertretung to describe certain problems in 
Roman law, such as the actiones adiecticiae qualitatis or the acquisition of ownership 
through a non-owner. Inevitably this resulted in a more uniform approach to 
various problems involving acts concluded by a person on behalf of someone 
else. This uniform approach eventually led to a historical reconstruction of the 
evolution of direct representation in Roman law by Mühlenbruch as early as 
181719. According to this author, numerous texts, including D. 50,17,73,4, 
D. 41,1,53, C. 4,27,1pr, Inst. 2,9,5 and D. 50,17,123pr, showed that the general 
principle in pre-classical Roman law was that each person could only carry out 
acts affecting himself20. These quotations are especially eloquent since some of 
them are expressed in a succinct way which gives them the appearance of an 
essential truth, including the rules “alteri stipulari nemo potest”21 – no one can 
stipulate on behalf of another – “per extraneam personam nobis adquiri non posse”22 – 
no one can acquire through a person outside the family – and “nemo alieno nomine 
lege agere potest”23. The idea that originally Roman law did not allow another 
person to conclude acts which directly affect another one found moreover 
support in the fact that some scholars considered that the mancipatio could only be 
performed by a non-owner fiduciae causa, i.e. if he first became owner himself24. 
However, according to Mühlenbruch, such a general prohibition on direct 
representation would have soon some become problematic for commerce, and 
numerous exceptions would have accordingly been introduced to it. Having lost 
most of its practical application, the primitive rule remained of importance in 
two groups of cases: (1) legal acts belonging to the ius civile, such as the stipulatio 
or the mancipatio, which could only be performed personally due to the ancient 
                                                 
17  See Bayer, Vertrag zugunsten Dritter (1995), p. 5-56; Hallebeek/Dondorp, Contracts for a 
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19  Mühlenbruch, Cession (1817), p. 28-34. His ideas on the subject are still found in the 
expanded third – and final – edition of 1836 (p. 41-47) which is further quoted here. 
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ban on direct representation; (2) the acquisition of rights through another person, 
which could not take place through a free person, who could only gain 
possession on behalf of someone else. 
 At around the same time Savigny developed his own ideas concerning direct 
representation in Roman law, which would decisively influence both the 
understanding of Roman law and that of modern private law25. His ideas on the 
evolution and application of direct representation were first briefly presented in 
181426, being further expanded in his System27 and later in detail in his 
Obligationenrecht28. The greatest contribution of his ideas was to add a practical 
angle to this problem, which would favour the acceptance of direct 
representation in German private law. During the first half of the 19th century 
there was in fact an ongoing debate in Germany concerning whether direct 
representation was admissible in legal practice29. Savigny would contribute to 
solve this problem through a detailed account of the evolution of direct 
representation in Roman law, which follows the ideas of Mühlenbruch to a great 
extent by taking as a starting point the idea of a pre-classical prohibition of direct 
representation. According to Savigny, the reason behind the prohibition of direct 
representation in Roman law was the formalistic nature of the old ius civile, 
which would have required that anyone who wanted to carry out an action 
which would bring along legal consequences to himself should perform it 
personally. The main practical relief to this situation was the structure of the 
Roman family, since the acts of those individuals under the domestic power of 
the paterfamilias would lead to a direct patrimonial increase – never decrease – of 
the later. The general ban of direct representation, however, should have soon 
become an obstacle for trade and therefore Roman jurisprudence came up with a 
series of exceptions which reduced its practical scope. Despite such exceptions, 
the general principle forbidding direct representation would have continued to 
apply in traditional and formal acts such as the stipulatio, precisely due to the fact 
that their formal character prevented the application of these innovative 
remedies. Savigny would find a confirmation of this theory in D. 41,1,53, where 
Pomponius declares that one may acquire according to the ius civile through 
persons in potestate, like when a stipulatio is concluded by one of them, while 
possession can be acquired naturaliter by any person30. According to Savigny, this 
would prove the decisive distinction made by Roman law between formal legal 
acts of the ius civile, regarding which direct representation was not allowed and 
                                                 
25  Regarding the ideas of Savigny on direct representation see Müller, Die Entwicklung (1969), 
p. 156; Mohnhaupt, Savignys Lehre (1979), p. 60-77; Hölzl, Savignys Lehre (2002). 
26  Savigny, Vom Beruf (1814), p. 102-103. 
27  Savigny, System (1840) III, p. 90-98. 
28  Savigny, Das Obligationenrecht (1853) II, p. 21-88. 
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where only the intervention of a person alieni iuris was possible, and the 
innovative applications introduced by jurisprudence regarding informal legal 
acts31. It should moreover be noted that Savigny did not study the problem of 
direct representation exclusively in the field of the law of obligations, but 
considered this doctrine to apply generally to patrimonial acts inter vivos32, which 
is why he thinks that problems such as the acquisition of possession should also 
be approached as a matter of direct representation, along with the conclusion of 
contracts through a third party, the acquisition of rights in general and the 
transfer of ownership. 
 This elaborate historical outlook served a very practical purpose in Savigny’s 
time, since it provided him with the grounds for the acceptance of direct 
representation in German private law33. He observed in the first place that the 
prohibition of direct representation concerned mainly acts of the old ius civile, 
which were no longer in use in the 19th century34. Accordingly, there was no 
reason to uphold the old prohibition. Moreover, since modern law did not grant 
the paterfamilias the possibility of acting through slaves or sons-in-power, Savigny 
considered it all the more important to plainly accept direct representation in 
modern law. Therefore, his historical considerations regarding Roman law 
allowed him to introduce this doctrine with an unlimited scope of application 
into the legal system of his time. 
 Some of the ideas of Savigny regarding direct representation have been 
rendered obsolete by later scholarship35. However, his historical reconstruction of 
the evolution of direct representation in Roman law was an immediate success, 
being closely followed by scholars throughout the 19th century36. The main 
commonplaces which are to be found in the writings of that period dealing with 
this topic are: (1) that the old ius civile knew a general prohibition of direct 
                                                 
31  Savigny, Das Obligationenrecht (1853) II, p. 42-48. 
32  Savigny, Das Obligationenrecht (1853) II, p. 41: “Zum richtigen Verständniss dieser 
wichtigen Stelle muss aber voraus daran erinnert werden, dass sowohl der alte, strenge 
Grundsatz, als dessen neuere Umbildung, keinesweges allein auf die Entstehung der 
Obligationen, also auf die Verträge, sich bezog, sondern auf alle Rechtsgeschäfte 
überhaupt, die das Vermögen zum Gegenstand haben; also auch im Eigenthum, und den 
Rechtsinstituten, die sich dem Eigenthum anschliessen (…)”. See also Savigny, System 
(1840) III, p. 91-92. 
33  Savigny, System (1840) III, p. 98; Savigny, Das Obligationenrecht (1853) II, p. 51, 68-73. 
34  Savigny, System (1841) III, p. 98: “Was ist nun von diesem Justinianischen System der 
Vertretung noch übrig in unsrem heutigen Recht? Wir haben keine Stipulationen und 
keine Sklaven mehr. Daher besteht für uns nur noch: die unbeschränkte Zulassung der 
freien Vertretung, indem in unsrem Recht alle Handlungen naturale sind, und indem die 
nothwendige Vertretung durch Sklaven nicht mehr vorkommen kann”. 
35  See Hölzl, Savignys Lehre (2002), p. 221 ff. Critical on Savigny’s interpretation of the 
sources is Kreller, Stellvertretung (1948), p. 221. 
36  Wächter, Handbuch (1842) II, p. 676-679 (§ 88); Puchta, Institutionen (1842) II, p. 330-336 
(§ 203); Buchka, Stellvertretung (1852), p. 1-120; Exner, Rechtserwerb durch Tradition (1867), 
p. 125-127; Pernice, Labeo (1873) A, p. 488 ff.; Mitteis, Stellvertretung (1885), p. 9-77; 
Sohm, Institutionen (1908), p. 256-262. 
 
representation, which encompassed all patrimonial acts, including the transfer of 
ownership; (2) this prohibition was gradually overcome through juristic 
innovations, and mainly by the activity of the praetor; (3) such innovations did 
not affect the old acts of the ius civile, where the prohibition remained in force. A 
definitive formulation on the evolution of direct representation would be offered 
by Mitteis37, whose opinions have remained as the main reference point for legal 
scholars since the 20th century and up to this day when approaching this subject. 
Subsequent works dealing with direct representation in Roman law have 
therefore seldom departed from the main guidelines developed in the 19th 
century regarding the origins and evolution of this institution38.  
 One of the main problems which arise from the traditional reconstruction of 
the evolution of direct representation is that it is not clear what a general ban of 
direct representation would imply. This uncertainty is intimately related to the 
fact that ‘direct representation’ is a modern notion, which does not find an even 
remote equivalent in Roman sources. Considering that the notion of direct 
representation was unknown to the Romans, it is certainly awkward to declare 
that Roman law ‘forbade’ it39. Scholars since the 19th century have been aware of 
the dangers of resorting to the notion of ‘direct representation’ to approach the 
Roman sources, but have nonetheless yielded to the fascination of resorting to it. 
In order to cope with the evident methodological problems this involves, 
numerous authors have in fact proposed various distinctions when introducing 
the idea of ‘direct representation’ in the analysis of Roman sources which serve as 
a guideline to evaluate the existence of this institution in Roman law40. This 
approach, however, far from resolving the methodological problems, introduces 
further complications, since it is ultimately left to each author to determine 
whether Roman law can be seen as acknowledging direct representation based 
on the features which are considered more representative of this institution. Due 
to the use of this vague starting point to approach ancient sources, Roman law 
                                                 
37  Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 203-213.  
38  See e.g. Siber, Römisches Recht (1928) II, p. 411-416; Riccobono, Lineamenti (1930), 
p. 389-447; Betti, Diritto romano (1935), p. 400-405; Voci, Modi di acquisto (1952), p. 81-
91; Rabel, Grundzüge (1955), p. 182-192; Bonfante, Corso (1968) II/2, p. 210-214; Kaser, 
RPR (1971) I, p. 260-267; Claus, Gewillkürte Stellvertretung (1973), p. 9-13; Hamza, 
Rappresentanza (1980), p. 193 ff.; Plescia, Development of agency (1984), p. 171-190; 
Jörs/Kunkel/Wenger (1987), p. 111-114; Nebrera, Ἡ τραδιτίων (1989), p. 283 ff.; Flume, 
Das Rechtsgeschäft (1992), p. 751; Zimmermann, The law of obligations (1996), p. 34-35, 47-
54; Finkenauer, Direkte Stellvertretung (2008), p. 442-448. 
39  Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 10: “In realtà, nell’ordinamento giuridico 
romano non vi poteva essere nessun divieto di rappresentanza diretta, dal momento che 
non solo il nome ma neppure l’idea di questo istituto erano noti”. Similarly Hamza, 
Rappresentanza (2010), p. 2-4, who stresses the anachronism behind the use of this notion 
to describe Roman sources. 
40  Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 204; Arias, Representación (1941), p. 4-6; Kreller, 
Stellvertretung (1948), p. 221-222; Röhrmann, Stellvertretung im altgriechischen Recht (1968), 
p. 1-2; Claus, Gewillkürte Stellvertretung (1973), p. 1-5; Finkenauer, Direkte Stellvertretung 
(2008), p. 441-442. 
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where only the intervention of a person alieni iuris was possible, and the 
innovative applications introduced by jurisprudence regarding informal legal 
acts31. It should moreover be noted that Savigny did not study the problem of 
direct representation exclusively in the field of the law of obligations, but 
considered this doctrine to apply generally to patrimonial acts inter vivos32, which 
is why he thinks that problems such as the acquisition of possession should also 
be approached as a matter of direct representation, along with the conclusion of 
contracts through a third party, the acquisition of rights in general and the 
transfer of ownership. 
 This elaborate historical outlook served a very practical purpose in Savigny’s 
time, since it provided him with the grounds for the acceptance of direct 
representation in German private law33. He observed in the first place that the 
prohibition of direct representation concerned mainly acts of the old ius civile, 
which were no longer in use in the 19th century34. Accordingly, there was no 
reason to uphold the old prohibition. Moreover, since modern law did not grant 
the paterfamilias the possibility of acting through slaves or sons-in-power, Savigny 
considered it all the more important to plainly accept direct representation in 
modern law. Therefore, his historical considerations regarding Roman law 
allowed him to introduce this doctrine with an unlimited scope of application 
into the legal system of his time. 
 Some of the ideas of Savigny regarding direct representation have been 
rendered obsolete by later scholarship35. However, his historical reconstruction of 
the evolution of direct representation in Roman law was an immediate success, 
being closely followed by scholars throughout the 19th century36. The main 
commonplaces which are to be found in the writings of that period dealing with 
this topic are: (1) that the old ius civile knew a general prohibition of direct 
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representation, which encompassed all patrimonial acts, including the transfer of 
ownership; (2) this prohibition was gradually overcome through juristic 
innovations, and mainly by the activity of the praetor; (3) such innovations did 
not affect the old acts of the ius civile, where the prohibition remained in force. A 
definitive formulation on the evolution of direct representation would be offered 
by Mitteis37, whose opinions have remained as the main reference point for legal 
scholars since the 20th century and up to this day when approaching this subject. 
Subsequent works dealing with direct representation in Roman law have 
therefore seldom departed from the main guidelines developed in the 19th 
century regarding the origins and evolution of this institution38.  
 One of the main problems which arise from the traditional reconstruction of 
the evolution of direct representation is that it is not clear what a general ban of 
direct representation would imply. This uncertainty is intimately related to the 
fact that ‘direct representation’ is a modern notion, which does not find an even 
remote equivalent in Roman sources. Considering that the notion of direct 
representation was unknown to the Romans, it is certainly awkward to declare 
that Roman law ‘forbade’ it39. Scholars since the 19th century have been aware of 
the dangers of resorting to the notion of ‘direct representation’ to approach the 
Roman sources, but have nonetheless yielded to the fascination of resorting to it. 
In order to cope with the evident methodological problems this involves, 
numerous authors have in fact proposed various distinctions when introducing 
the idea of ‘direct representation’ in the analysis of Roman sources which serve as 
a guideline to evaluate the existence of this institution in Roman law40. This 
approach, however, far from resolving the methodological problems, introduces 
further complications, since it is ultimately left to each author to determine 
whether Roman law can be seen as acknowledging direct representation based 
on the features which are considered more representative of this institution. Due 
to the use of this vague starting point to approach ancient sources, Roman law 
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scholarship does not offer a uniform, clear view of what the primitive ban of 
direct representation would imply, and there is a great variety of opinions 
concerning the existence of direct representation in Roman law, which in the 
end depend essentially on the willingness of each author to identify this modern 
institution in classical sources by focusing on particular aspects. For instance, 
some authors tend to approach direct representation as a typically modern legal 
phenomenon, and therefore claim that Roman law would have only accepted 
forms of indirect representation41. This also leads some scholars to claim that only 
a messenger (nuntius) could perform acts on behalf of the principal and produce 
direct and binding effects for him42. However, others seem to understand that the 
gradual exceptions which Roman jurists formulated to the primitive ban on 
direct representation would imply that Roman law did know cases in which 
someone acted in a way equivalent to a modern direct representative, even when 
this was exceptional43. This ambivalent approach is also found regarding other 
laws in Antiquity, and therefore scholars occasionally discuss the existence of 
direct representation in Greek or Egyptian law44. 
 Considering the problems which follow from the use of the notion of ‘direct 
representation’ to describe Roman sources, it seems advisable to ban this concept 
altogether from the study of Roman law. Scholars have always acknowledged 
that this notion finds no equivalent institution in Rome, which is why it is 
difficult to see what advantage may follow from its use. Instead, the 
misunderstandings and ambiguities deriving from its application are evident. This 
is why in the 20th century some isolated voices such as that of Buckland45 and 
Cappellini46 urged scholars to avoid approaching direct representation in Roman 
law as a uniform phenomenon, and the recent studies of Coppola Bisazza and 
Miceli have stressed that the way in which this problem is dealt with in Roman 
law must be deeply revised47. Only once the uniform approach to direct 
representation in Roman law is abandoned will scholars be able to gain a clear 
insight into the institutions now analysed within this framework. 
 The artificial character of the uniform approach to the problem of direct 
representation in Roman law is not only evident because of the lack of an even 
remotely analogous notion in classical sources, but particularly due to the absence 
                                                 
41  See e.g. Mühlenbruch, Cession (1836), p. 46; Zimmermann, The law of obligations (1996), 
p. 49-54; Schäfer, Spitzenmanagement (1997), p. 21-26. 
42  Zimmermann, The law of obligations (1996), p. 50. 
43  See e.g. Arias, Representación (1941), p. 6-18; Arangio-Ruiz, Mandato (1949), p. 49; 
Finkenauer, Direkte Stellvertretung (2008), p. 440-497.  
44  See e.g. Röhrmann, Stellvertretung im altgriechischen Recht (1968); Förster, Stellvertretung in 
koptischen Texten (2010), p. 328-335; Velissaropoulos-Karakostas, Droit Grec (2011) II, 
p. 119-125 refers instead to “L’assentiment de tiers” (the consent of the third person), 
which is certainly a better starting point to address the sources. 
45  Buckland, Main institutions (1931), p. 161. 
46  Cappellini, Rappresentanza (1987), p. 442. 
47  Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 3-14; Miceli, Rappresentanza (2008), p. 12-
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of evidence regarding the existence of a primitive prohibition of direct 
representation. Since the works of Mühlenbruch and Savigny, scholars have 
assumed from a handful of texts that the general rule governing legal acts in 
Roman law is that no one could perform acts which would directly affect a third 
person. Among these texts, the ones more commonly regarded to express this 
ancient view are the rules alteri stipulari and the per extraneam personam. However, 
none of these texts seems to have had an overarching validity in Roman law: the 
alteri stipulari rule would apply specifically to the stipulatio, while the per extraneam 
personam rule would in turn be referred to the acquisition of possession and, 
consequently, ownership. Moreover, the scope of both rules has been clearly 
delimited by later scholarship, which has shown that they have a relatively 
reduced field of application. On the one hand, since an influential study by 
Ankum the alteri stipulari rule is considered by most authors to have been relevant 
only in the context of the stipulations involving an obligation of dare48, and even 
those who do not explicitly agree with this reconstruction acknowledge 
nonetheless its limitations through the considerable number of exceptions it 
faces49. Regarding the per extraneam personam rule, it should be noted that it was 
not completely excluded to acquire ownership through an authorized sui iuris – 
provided some requirements were met – but that this rule rather stresses that in 
such case the acquisition of ownership did not take place in the same automatic 
and inevitable way as regarding the alieni iuris50. The rule “nemo alieno nomine lege 
agere potest” is also usually mentioned as proof of the primitive prohibition of 
direct representation, but it has in fact a rather restricted scope of application 
since it does not apply to every actus legitimus, but refers specifically to the 
possibility of acting through another person in the legis actiones51. This is why the 
text is to be found within the Palingenesia among matters dealt within 
centumviral courts52, where the legis actiones continued to be used (Gai 4,31). 
Therefore, none of these rules can be seen as proclaiming a general prohibition of 
direct representation, which shows that scholars tried to draw far-reaching 
conclusions out of a few texts that had only a limited scope of application, 
granting them an overarching validity in order to favour their own views.  
                                                 
48  Ankum, Alteri dari stipulari (1970), p. 21-29; Kaser, Zur Interessenbestimmung (1975), p. 75-
87; Kaser, RPR (1975), p. 339 n. 30; Zimmermann, The law of obligations (1996), p. 35-40; 
Hallebeek, Contracts for a Third-Party (2008), p. 8-14. Against this view Weimar, 
Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 566. 
49  Finkenauer, Direkte Stellvertretung (2008), p. 493. 
50  Numerous studies have confirmed this view: Roby, Roman Private law (1902) I, p. 400-
401; Corbino, La ‘pro Caecina’ (1982), p. 278, 283; Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2267-
2271; Klinck, Erwerb durch Übergabe (2004), p. 356-358; Briguglio, Studi sul procurator 
(2007), p. 538-551; Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 209-222; Miceli, 
Rappresentanza (2008), p. 265-277. Other authors still prefer to grant this rule the status of 
a general prohibition of direct representation, such as Zimmermann, The law of obligations 
(1996), p. 34 and 47. 
51  Roby, Roman Private law (1902) I, p. 404-405. 
52  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 494. 
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 Despite the limited scope of texts such as the alteri stipulari rule, one can 
understand that jurists in the 19th century could get the impression that Roman 
law had a general ban on direct representation, particularly considering that in 
general terms Roman sources exclude the possibility that the agreement between 
two individuals may create obligations regarding a person who did not intervene 
in such an act. In this sense, apart from the rule alteri stipulari one can identify 
other general claims stressing this point, such as the rule nemo factum alienum 
promittere potest53. Even the per extraneam personam rule is applied occasionally to 
indicate that one cannot become obliged through the acts of another person54. 
Such texts should however be approached in the framework of the law of 
obligations – where they moreover face countless exceptions – and not be seen as 
applying to every possible act within patrimonial law. It is also worth noting that 
these general rules did not have such dramatic practical consequences as it is 
usually thought, not only because of the possibility of acting through slaves and 
sons-in-power, but also due to the existence of flexible rules regarding procedural 
representation which allowed for instance that one person appointed cognitor or 
procurator in rem suam may sue for an obligation concluded by someone else55. 
Similarly, the rules regarding the delegatio would enable to conclude a wide 
variety of acts through another person, despite the fact that jurists approached 
them as two separate acts – one between the person giving the order and the one 
receiving it, another between the person who received the order and the third 
party56.  
 Outside the framework of the law of obligations, there are no general 
statements which ban acts that could be seen as cases of ‘direct representation’, 
besides the per extraneam personam rule – which, as already mentioned, did not 
have an absolute validity concerning the acquisition of ownership. There are in 
fact countless cases in which a third party may carry out a legal act which directly 
affects another person57. Despite the fact that no general rules are to be found 
forbidding ‘direct representation’ in these cases, the traditional model of the 
evolution of direct representation viewed them as exceptions to the original ban, 
including under this category the cases in which ownership was transferred by a 
non-owner. Savigny had to fit the problem of the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner within his general theory, which is why he presented it as one of the 
                                                 
53  See on this rule Finkenauer, Direkte Stellvertretung (2008), p. 445. See also D. 44,7,11 (Paul 
12 Sab.). 
54  D. 45,1,126,2. 
55  See on these institutions Gehrich, Kognitur und Prokuratur (1963); Rozwadowski, 
Trasferimento dei crediti (1973), p. 27 ff.; Quintana/Blanch, Nuevas consideraciones (1998), 
p. 321-353. 
56  Regarding delegatio, see in particular the recent and detailed works of Alonso, Delegación 
(2001-2002) and Zandrino, Delegatio (2010-2014). On the distinction concerning 
procedural representation and delegatio see Zimmermann, The law of obligations (1996), 
p. 60-61 and Alonso, Delegación (2001) I.1, p. 38-71. 
57  See Chapter 1, Sections 2(b) and 2(c) below. For some basic distinctions on this point see 
Kreller, Stellvertretung (1948), p. 222. 
 
exceptions that jurists had to introduce to meet the needs of commerce58. Such 
claim fits adequately with his general theory, but has no basis in the texts 
regarding the transfer of ownership considering that at no point do the sources 
indicate that the transfer of ownership by a non-owner was an innovation with 
regard to a previous state of affairs. On the contrary, several texts show that the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner would normally take place within the 
framework of the ius civile59. In fact, Savigny claimed that the per extraneam 
personam rule would originally have been “per extraneam personam nihil adquiri 
(neque alienari) potest”, and that only at a later stage was this rule applied only to 
acts of the ius civile60, which shows to what extent his theories lacked a solid basis 
in the sources. At this point it becomes clear how far Savigny was willing to take 
his theory on the evolution of direct representation in Roman law, since he not 
only assumes that rules such as the nemo stipulari had an overarching application 
within their corresponding fields, but also that they would express a principle that 
would govern every aspect of private law, covering even those problems where 
no analogous ‘ban on direct representation’ may be found in the sources. That 
Savigny would uphold his theory despite the lack of evidence shows that we are 
not dealing with a careful reconstruction by an antiquarian, but rather with an 
instrumental interpretation of classical sources which had a very practical purpose: 
to show that the ‘general prohibition of direct representation’ in Roman sources 
was in fact a phenomenon which should be understood under circumstances 
specific to ancient Rome that were not to be extended to 19th century Germany, 
particularly since Roman jurists had themselves already overcome such a 
prohibition to a large extent. Having fulfiled a relevant practical function in the 
law of its time, this model is however unsuitable to describe the evolution of 
Roman law and must therefore be discarded. 
 The uniform approach to the evolution of direct representation in Roman 
sources has had far-reaching consequences for the study of several aspects of the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner. Several modern ideas concerning the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner in Roman law find their origin in 
Savigny’s reconstruction and will accordingly be revised in the following 
chapters. For instance, numerous scholars since the 19th century list the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner among the exceptions which Roman jurists 
                                                 
58  Savigny, System (1840) III, p. 94: “Ein so beschränkender Grundsatz konnte sich nicht 
erhalten, sobald der Verkehr lebendiger und vielseitiger wurde. Man fieng daher an, in 
einzelnen Fällen auch eine freie Stellvertretung zuzulassen. (…) Sehr natürlich wurde dann 
auch bei der Veräusserung durch Tradition, eben so wie bei der Erwerbung durch 
dieselbe, die Vertretung zugelassen, die dabei durch eigene Sklaven und Kinder eben 
sowohl als durch freie Menschen bewirkt werden konnte”. See also Savigny, Das 
Obligationenrecht (1853) II, p. 23 n. (e); p. 47. 
59  See on this point Chapter 2, Section 1(a). 
60  Savigny, Vom Beruf (1814), p. 102-103. 
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developed against the general prohibition of direct representation61. This in turn 
led to an intense debate concerning the possibility that a non-owner may transfer 
ownership through mancipatio or in iure cessio62. The root of this discussion is that, 
according to Savigny’s theory, such acts could not be performed by someone 
other than the owner, since they were archaic modes to transfer ownership 
belonging to the ius civile63. Moreover, Savigny’s ideas have provided the ground 
for another disagreement among contemporary scholars: whether or not the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner can be performed in the name of the 
owner, in what we would nowadays label as a case of contemplatio domini64. These 
varying interpretations show the misunderstandings which take place when 
taking the notion of ‘direct representation’ as a starting point for the analysis of 
Roman sources. 
 In order to overcome the traditional notions regarding the existence of direct 
representation in Roman law, the current research attempts to offer a fresh view 
through a more source-oriented approach. This implies avoiding the reference to 
a general and uniform Roman notion of ‘direct representation’, and instead assess 
on their own merits the cases where the acts of an individual affect the legal 
sphere of another one who did not take part in the act. This piece-meal approach 
follows therefore the general methodological guidelines of the works of 
Cappellini, Coppola Bisazza and Miceli65. It is moreover worth noting that there 
have already been attempts to revise the convenience of the use of the notion of 
direct representation regarding the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in 
Roman law, as can be seen by the objections made by Burdese to the distinctions 
that Sansón proposed regarding the significance of the contemplatio domini for the 
transfer of ownership66. This and other problems which have traditionally been 
taken over by general preconceptions will be reviewed, including the origins of 
the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, the possibility of a non-owner to act 
nomine alieno and to transfer ownership through mancipatio and in iure cessio. This 
latter point moreover involves revising other more specific issues, such as the 
significance of the nemo plus iuris rule. 
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2. ‘Potestas alienandi’ and similar legal institutions 
 
As declared in the previous section, this work attempts to study the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner on its own, not as part of an overarching problem of 
direct representation. This in turn brings along other methodological remarks 
concerning the framework and boundaries of this topic which will be studied in 
the present section, namely: (a) Is it acceptable to approach the different cases of 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner as part of a common notion of ‘potestas 
alienandi’?; (b) What is the relationship between this problem and other cases in 
which an individual experiences other forms of patrimonial decrease through the 
intervention of an authorized non-owner?; (c) And finally, is it possible to equate 
the acquisition and the transfer of ownership through a non-owner? 
 
a. Terminological issues: ‘potestas alienandi’ as conceptual framework. 
 
When studying the cases in which a non-owner may transfer ownership in 
Roman law, a first inconvenient refers to the absence of a clear concept which 
encompasses such cases. Modern Roman law scholarship has coined the term 
‘potestas alienandi’ based on the text of Gai 2,62: “Accidit aliquando, ut qui dominus 
sit, alienandae rei potestatem non habeat, et qui dominus non sit, alienare possit”67. It 
should however be noted that this does not introduce a clear-cut concept, but 
simply explains that the general rule – i.e. that only the owner may transfer 
ownership – may be subject to exceptions, in which case the ‘alienandae rei 
potestas’ or faculty to dispose is either denied to the owner or bestowed upon 
someone else. The expression ‘potestas alienandi’ is found scattered throughout 
Roman sources68 and appears to be interchangeable with a wide range of equally 
general expressions, such as ‘potestas abalienandi’69, potestas distrahendi’70, ‘potestas 
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70  CTh 8,18,2 (interpretatio); CTh 10,19,1; CTh 16,2,27pr; NMai 7; C. 8,17,8. 
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developed against the general prohibition of direct representation61. This in turn 
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owner, in what we would nowadays label as a case of contemplatio domini64. These 
varying interpretations show the misunderstandings which take place when 
taking the notion of ‘direct representation’ as a starting point for the analysis of 
Roman sources. 
 In order to overcome the traditional notions regarding the existence of direct 
representation in Roman law, the current research attempts to offer a fresh view 
through a more source-oriented approach. This implies avoiding the reference to 
a general and uniform Roman notion of ‘direct representation’, and instead assess 
on their own merits the cases where the acts of an individual affect the legal 
sphere of another one who did not take part in the act. This piece-meal approach 
follows therefore the general methodological guidelines of the works of 
Cappellini, Coppola Bisazza and Miceli65. It is moreover worth noting that there 
have already been attempts to revise the convenience of the use of the notion of 
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‘facultas vendendi’79, ‘ius alienandi’80, ‘ius distrahendi’81, ‘ius donandi’82, ‘ius vendendi’83, 
‘libertas donandi’84, ‘alienandi licentia’85, ‘donandi licentia’86, ‘transferendi licentia’87 or 
‘vendendi licentia’88. These expressions are used quite freely when describing the 
situations in which an owner may be prevented from transferring ownership or 
where a non-owner may transfer ownership, being only possible to attach a more 
distinctive value to those terms which refer to a particular iusta causa traditionis, 
which is particularly the case when reference is made to the donatio. On the other 
hand, the reference made to the ‘venditio’ in expressions such as ‘ius vendendi’ 
seems to cover a broad field of cases of alienation, not only those which take 
place in the context of a sale, which can be explained by the fact that the term 
‘venditio’ can be used to refer in general to the alienation89. Leaving aside these 
minor differences, the expressions mentioned here are applied in an 
interchangeable way, although it is possible to identify certain general trends 
regarding the context or period in which each of them is used. There are 
moreover other more general terms, such as ‘facultas dandi’90, ‘ius dandi’91, ‘licentia 
dandi’92, ‘potestas dandi’93, ‘ius concedendi’94 and ‘potestas concedendi’95, which are only 
occasionally used in the context of the transfer of ownership96, being however 
more commonly applied to indicate a wide array of other faculties. 
 The variety of expressions related to the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner presents the terms ius, facultas, potestas and licentia as interchangeable. This 
does not mean that these terms are synonyms, but they do appear to overlap to a 
certain extent, particularly when describing the general capacity or possibility to 
perform certain acts. This in turn makes it possible to dismiss some objections of 
                                                                                                                   
78  C. 4,41,1; C. 8,10,6,1. Similarly CTh 2,17,1,4 (interpretatio); C. 1,2,14pr. 
79  CTh 3,1,6; CTh 10,12,1pr; CTh 16,5,40,4; C. 1,5,4,3; C. 4,42,2,1; C. 10,3,1; D. 24,3,57; 
D. 7,1,9,7. 
80  CTh 5,19,1; D. 30,114,12. 
81  D. 30,41,7; D. 49,14,5,1; C. 8,18,2pr; C. 8,29,1pr. On the use of this expression in the 
context of the pledge see Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 32-34. 
82  CTh 16,5,65,3; D. 2,14,28,2; D. 50,17,163. 
83  C. 2,12,16; C. 7,26,1; D. 38,5,1,12; D. 50,16,109; D. 50,17,163. The expression can also 
be found in Frontinus, De aquaeductu 95 (ius dandae vendendaeve aquae). 
84  CTh 3,18,2. 
85  CTh 8,18,1,1; CTh 8,18,2; NT 14,5 = C. 5,9,5,3; C. 5,12,29pr; C. 6,61,4,3. 
86  CTh 10,19,11; CTh 16,5,58,4. 
87  CTh 10,19,11; C. 11,78,2pr. 
88  CTh 8,4,10; CTh 10,19,11. 
89  See on this point Chapter 2, Section 4(a) below. 
90  C. 3,3,1; C. 5,12,14; D. 43,8,6; D. 45,1,137,4. 
91  CTh 4,9,1; C. 3,38,2; C. 7,10,7pr; D. 5,1,12,2; D. 5,1,81; D. 26,5,3; D. 26,5,13pr; 
D. 27,8,1,1; D. 35,1,43,2; D. 40,9,15pr; D. 43,20,1,42; D. 49,1,23,1; D. 49,4,1,1; 
Inst. 1,24,4. 
92  C. 3,3,2,1. 
93  C. 3,1,5; C. 3,3,2pr; D. 1,18,6,8; D. 47,10,17,20. 
94  D. 43,24,3,4; D. 47,10,20; D. 48,19,8,1; D. 50,17,163. 
95  C. 7,32,7; D. 47,10,20. 
96  See e.g. C. 5,12,14; D. 45,1,137,4; C. 7,32,7; D. 50,17,163. 
 
modern scholars, such the allegations of interpolation regarding texts containing 
expressions such as ‘ius vendendi’ based on an allegedly post-classical origin, since 
they would reflect an approach to the notion of ius akin to the modern 
‘subjective rights’97. Such a claim fails not only considering the inclusion of the 
notion of ius vendendi in various texts, including De Aquaeductu of Frontinus98, 
but also because of the dynamic and versatile significance of the word ‘ius’ in 
Roman jurisprudence, which covers the power to transfer ownership as well. 
Accordingly, the contrast which the notion of ‘ius’ offers in relation to facultas 
and potestas in other contexts99 plays no role on this point. 
 Despite the lack of terminological uniformity and the modest dogmatic scope 
of most of the above-mentioned expressions, jurists have been keen to build 
general systematizations by using expressions such as the above-mentioned. 
Donellus, for instance, mentions among the general requirements to transfer 
ownership by traditio that the transferor must have the potestas rei transferendae, the 
faculty to transfer the object100, in order to encompass under one requirement the 
traditio by the owner, the possibility of legal prohibitions to dispose and the 
possibility of transferring by a non-owner. More recently, Roman law scholars 
such as Miquel began using the term ‘potestas alienandi’ in order to formulate with 
accuracy one of the requirements to transfer ownership, instead of simply 
declaring that the transferor must be the owner. The expression was adopted by 
authors such as Sansón, Nebrera and recently even by Burdese101. Considering 
the modest position of this expression in Roman law, it may be argued that the 
introduction of the term ‘potestas alienandi’ forces the Roman sources too much, 
generating a conceptual framework which does not fit Roman jurisprudence. In 
other words, Roman law scholars could be artificially building an accurate 
concept where Roman sources are just discussing a series of abnormal cases. 
 The methodological concerns around the notion of ‘potestas alienandi’ are not 
unsurmountable if one considers that the term is introduced with a consciously 
instrumental value: to convey more accurately the personal circumstances under 
which the tradens may transfer ownership, avoiding the general claim that the 
tradens must be the ‘owner’. Miquel does in fact present the term with great 
methodological caution, emphasizing that although this concept is more accurate 
and accordingly more adequate as a general requirement for traditio in the eyes of 
                                                 
97  D’Ors, Concepto de ius (1953), p. 298. 
98  Frontinus, De aquaeductu 95: “(…) ius dandae vendendaeve aquae (…)” 
99  See on this point D’Ors, Concepto de ius (1953), p. 293-294 (ius and potestas) and 295 (ius 
and facultas). 
100  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 3 (I, col. 731). 
101  Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009), p. 18; Burdese, Agire per altri (2010), p. 3. Other authors 
who make use of this notion are Cuena Casas, Poder de disposición (1996), p. 33-35; Belda 
Mercado, Presupuestos (2001), p. 34-39; Miceli, Rappresentanza (2008), p. 171; Alonso, 
Bibliotheke enkteseon (2010), p. 11-16. The term is also used in the work of Koutsouradis, 
entitled “La restriction de l’alienandi potestas contractuelle en droit romain” (Acta legalia 
quotannis edita a schola iurisprudentiae 3 [1991], p. 439-463), which has however 
remained inaccessible in the course of this research.  
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tradens must be the ‘owner’. Miquel does in fact present the term with great 
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97  D’Ors, Concepto de ius (1953), p. 298. 
98  Frontinus, De aquaeductu 95: “(…) ius dandae vendendaeve aquae (…)” 
99  See on this point D’Ors, Concepto de ius (1953), p. 293-294 (ius and potestas) and 295 (ius 
and facultas). 
100  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 3 (I, col. 731). 
101  Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009), p. 18; Burdese, Agire per altri (2010), p. 3. Other authors 
who make use of this notion are Cuena Casas, Poder de disposición (1996), p. 33-35; Belda 
Mercado, Presupuestos (2001), p. 34-39; Miceli, Rappresentanza (2008), p. 171; Alonso, 
Bibliotheke enkteseon (2010), p. 11-16. The term is also used in the work of Koutsouradis, 
entitled “La restriction de l’alienandi potestas contractuelle en droit romain” (Acta legalia 
quotannis edita a schola iurisprudentiae 3 [1991], p. 439-463), which has however 
remained inaccessible in the course of this research.  
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a modern legal scholar, Roman jurists would normally simply demand the tradens 
to be the owner102. The expression retains therefore the merely descriptive value 
it has in the Institutes of Gaius, having an instrumental function in describing the 
requirements to transfer ownership in a more simple and clear way, and does not 
introduce relevant distortions in the analysis of Roman sources as long as this 
instrumental role is borne in mind. 
 It should moreover be noted that the fact that the term ‘potestas alienandi’ is 
presented as merely descriptive and instrumental does not imply that Roman 
jurists approached the cases in which ownership is transferred by a non-owner as 
a host of situations which were unrelated to one another. Even when there is not 
a uniform concept to describe the topic, it is evident that the existence of a series 
of general expressions to address it – potestas alienandi, ius vendendi, etc. – shows 
indeed that Roman jurists approached the cases which fall under such terms as a 
common phenomenon. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that different 
cases of alienation by a non-owner are often grouped together when discussing 
specific issues103. It is therefore no wonder that Roman jurists did in fact apply a 
relatively uniform set of rules to determine the outcome of different cases in 
which a non-owner would transfer ownership. The problem of the potestas 
alienandi can therefore be dealt with as a whole without forcing the sources. 
 The only serious concern one may formulate against the notion of ‘potestas 
alienandi’ is that it has a certain level of ambiguity, since Gai 2,62 introduces two 
different problems: on the one hand, the cases in which a legal prohibition to 
dispose affects the owner (qui dominus sit, alienandae rei potestatem non habeat) 
illustrated by the case of the fundus dotalis of Gai 2,63; on the other hand, it also 
addresses the cases in which someone different from the owner may alienate (qui 
dominus non sit, alienari possit), serving as examples in Gai 2,64 the guardian of the 
lunatic, the procurator, and the creditor of pledged property. In other words, if 
one simply states that someone does not have ‘potestas alienandi’ it is not 
immediately clear whether a non-owner is simply not authorized to dispose – 
e.g. a non-authorized procurator – or whether someone faces an actual legal 
prohibition to dispose – e.g. a husband who alienates the fundus dotalis without 
the consent of his wife. This ambiguity is also to be found in the use of other 
mentioned expressions – potestas alienandi, ius vendendi, etc. – since they are used 
alternatively to describe either a case of authorization to dispose or the existence 
of a prohibition to dispose. In order to avoid this terminological ambiguity the 
                                                 
102  Miquel, Compraventa y transmisión (1993), p. 106-107. 
103  See e.g. Gai 2,64, (procurator, curator furiosi, pledge creditor), D. 18,1,15,2, D. 50,16,109 
(procurator, tutor), D. 44,3,15,2-4 (mandatarius, slave, son-in-power, tutor, curator furiosi) or 
D. 6,1,41,1 (slave, son-in-power, procurator); D. 41,1,35 (procurator, tutor); D. 17,1,5,3-4 
(mandatarius, slave); D. 18,1,63pr (slave, freeman); D. 20,6,7,1 and C. 2,12,16 (procurator, 
servus actor). Special attention is given in Chapter 2, Section 3 to the comparison in 
D. 39,5,9,2 (Pomp. 22 Sab.) between the alienation by a son-in-power iussu domini or 
voluntate domini, and to the alienation performed by the owner himself or by a sui iuris 
authorized by him. 
 
term ‘potestas alienandi’ is used in the present work to generally describe the 
faculty to validly transfer ownership by the owner himself – who is normally the 
person entitled to dispose over his property – and particularly by an authorized 
non-owner as those described in Gai 2,64. This is in fact the core subject of the 
present work, which can be rendered into a number of equivalent expressions 
such as ‘authorization to dispose’, ‘faculty to dispose’, ‘power to alienate’ or 
‘power to dispose’. On the other hand, the term ‘legal prohibition to dispose’ 
will be reserved to describe the cases in which someone is prevented from 
transferring ownership due to the existence of a legal prohibition, as is the case in 
Gai 2,63. 
 
b. Cases of patrimonial loss caused by a non-owner. 
 
Having established that the term ‘potestas alienandi’ is an acceptable conceptual 
framework to deal with the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, the next 
obstacle is to determine whether other cases in which a non-owner carries out a 
legal act which negatively affects someone else’s patrimony should be analysed 
together with the problem of the potestas alienandi. Wieling, for instance, when 
dealing with the traditio by a non-owner, brings up a text concerning the 
manumission by a non-owner, thereby implying a close link between both 
problems104. Sansón also deals sporadically with cases in which an object is 
consecrated to the gods by a non-owner or where a non-owner pledges someone 
else’s property. Potjewijd goes even further, and deals simultaneously throughout 
his study not only with the cases in which ownership is transferred but also with 
those in which a non-owner constitutes a right of pledge, addressing occasionally 
other forms of alienation105. In all of these cases, the owner’s patrimony is 
negatively affected: in the case of the manumissio and the consecration, the effects 
for the owner are as serious as in the cases in which ownership is transferred to 
someone else, while in the case of the pledge the owner may only eventually lose 
his property. Considering that the transfer of ownership by a non-owner is only 
one of the cases in which an individual experiences a patrimonial decrease 
through the acts of an authorized third person, one may wonder whether all such 
cases should be dealt jointly in order to gain a proper understanding of them. 
 The similarities between the cases presented above are all the more evident 
due to the continuous reference to the owner’s intent (voluntas domini), since it is 
common that the acts which are performed over assets of an individual who has 
authorized them will have the same effects as if performed by the owner himself. 
There are in fact texts where it is explicitly laid down that a non-owner can only 
make the owner’s position worse if authorized by him, as does Gaius in the 
context of the payment by a non-owner: 
                                                 
104  Wieling, Drittwirkungen (1993), p. 236. 
105  E.g. Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 138 n. 64, where he mentions the faculty 
to render a piece of ground a locus religiosus. 
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D. 3,5,38(39) (Gai. 3 de verborum obligationibus): Solvendo quisque 
pro alio licet invito et ignorante liberat eum: quod autem alicui 
debetur, alius sine voluntate eius non potest iure exigere. Naturalis 
enim simul et civilis ratio suasit alienam condicionem meliorem 
quidem etiam ignorantis et inviti nos facere posse, deteriorem non 
posse106. 
 
In this text, Gaius declares the general validity of a payment performed without 
the consent or the knowledge of the debtor. This case is contrasted with the 
situation in which someone attempts to collect someone else’s debt without the 
creditor’s consent, which according to Gaius would be unacceptable. The reason 
for this distinction is declared in categorical and abstract terms: “For the 
principles of both natural justice and the civil law are in favour of our being able 
to improve another’s position, even without his knowledge and agreement, but 
not of our being able to make it worse” (transl. Watson). The final sentence of 
this text cannot be seen as a universal rule which perfectly described how Roman 
law approaches acts affecting the legal sphere of another individual. It is for 
instance not true that anyone may acquire possession for a person – an act which 
can be seen as improving the position of the latter – who is invitus vel ignorans of 
this acquisition. There is also no reference to acts conducted by persons such as 
legal guardians, regarding which the owner’s will or knowledge plays no relevant 
role, but where the improvement or worsening of the position of the owner 
which follows from his own acts does play a relevant role107. Despite these 
imperfections, Gaius considers so convincing that one may improve another’s 
position without his knowledge and agreement, but not make it worse, that he 
even considers this idea as agreeing with both the naturalis and civilis ratio. 
Another well-known text offering a similar general thought comes from the 
work of Ulpian: 
 
D. 39,3,8 (Ulp. 53 ed.): In concedendo iure aquae ducendae non 
tantum eorum, in quorum loco aqua oritur, verum eorum etiam, ad 
quos eius aquae usus pertinet, voluntas exquiritur, id est eorum, 
quibus servitus aquae debebatur, nec immerito: cum enim minuitur 
ius eorum, consequens fuit exquiri, an consentiant. Et generaliter 
                                                 
106  D. 3,5,38(39): “Anyone paying on behalf of someone else, even without his knowledge 
and agreement, frees him from liability, but another person cannot lawfully demand 
payment of what is owing to anyone without his consent. For the principles of both 
natural justice and the civil law are in favour of our being able to improve another’s 
position, even without his knowledge and agreement, but not of our being able to make it 
worse” (transl. Watson).  
107  See Chapter 3 below. 
 
sive in corpore sive in iure loci, ubi aqua oritur, vel in ipsa aqua 
habeat quis ius, voluntatem eius esse spectandam placet108. 
 
This fragment deals with the constitution of a servitude which affects the owners 
of other lands, and will be dealt in further detail in the context of the in iure 
cessio109. For the time being it is worth noting that Ulpian claims in general terms 
that, whenever someone’s rights are diminished, the person affected must grant 
his consent (cum enim minuitur ius eorum, consequens fuit exquiri, an consentiant). The 
text offers therefore an additional confirmation that Roman jurists would offer a 
basic guideline when dealing with the different cases of patrimonial loss carried 
out by a non-owner. 
 There are numerous texts which follow the basic guidelines offered above, 
especially when someone performs an act which involves an object belonging to 
someone else. In the context of the transfer of ownership, it is often indicated 
that ownership will pass if the non-owner acts according to the owner’s 
authorization (voluntate domini)110. Moreover, the appropriation of someone else’s 
object will only be considered furtum if it is performed invito domino111. It should 
also be noted that numerous legal acts concerning a particular object will only be 
validly performed if the owner grants his consent to them, the pledge112 by an 
authorized non-owner being a well-documented example which has been 
studied in detail113. The same can be said about the constitution of iura in re 
aliena114 or the manumission115 of slaves by a non-owner. The consequences of 
the conmixtio will also be different if the owner of the goods involved grants his 
authorization116. Another eloquent case is the consecration of objects to the 
gods117, which could also be validly performed by an authorized non-owner 
                                                 
108  D. 39,3,8: “In a matter of concession of the right to carry water across land, the consent 
must be sought not only of those on whose property the water originated but also of those 
who have a right to use the water, that is, those to whom a servitude on the water is 
owing. This is not unjustified since, when their rights are being diminished, one must 
necessarily inquire whether they are agreeable. As a general rule, it is agreed that 
consideration must be given to the consent of anyone who has an interest in the land itself 
on which the water originates or in the rights pertaining to that land or in the water itself” 
(transl. Watson). 
109  See Chapter 5, Section 5 below. 
110  See Chapter 2 below. 
111  See Chapter 2, Section 2 below. 
112  See e.g. D. 13,7,20. 
113  Wubbe, Res aliena (1960); Apathy, Verpfändung (1984), p. 1-15; Ankum, Verpfändung 
(2009), p. 35-44; Potjewijd, Tekst & Uitleg (2014), p. 77-81. 
114  E.g. the right to carry water across land (D. 39,3,8; 39,3,10; C. 3,34,4). 
115  D. 23,2,51,1. 
116  D. 41,1,7,8-9 and 12 (Gai 2 rer. cott.). 
117  D. 1,8,6,4 (Marcianus 3 inst.) / Inst. 2,1,9: “in alienum locum concedente domino licet 
inferre”. Note that the general rule, according to which the land must belong to the 
person burying the body, is given by Gai 2,7: “Religiosum vero nostra voluntate facimus 
mortuum inferentes in locum nostrum, si modo eius mortui funus ad nos pertineat”. On 
the faculty of an authorized non-owner to render a place locus religiosus by burying 
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despite its evident archaic and sacred character. This shows once again that 
Roman law knew no such thing as a general ban on legal acts affecting another 
person. Numerous other cases can be named where the voluntas domini plays a 
decisive role in order to determine the way in which an individual is affected by 
the acts of another one. Concerning damages in general, for instance, if the act 
which causes them was authorized by the owner of the damaged object, the 
person causing it will not be held liable118. All of these solutions show that, 
generally speaking, the voluntas domini is required in a series of cases to determine 
whether an act which is detrimental to an individual may affect him directly119.  
 The above-mentioned cases do not allow identifying a general theory 
elaborated by Roman jurists concerning the acts which may directly affect 
another person, but there are some basic guidelines which helped the jurists to 
determine the outcome of different cases. It is moreover noteworthy that Roman 
jurists often compare various cases in which an individual affects the position of 
the other in order to determine the scope of the faculties of the third person, as it 
can be seen in the following text: 
 
D. 12,2,17,2 (Paul 18 ed.): Si tutor qui tutelam gerit aut curator 
furiosi prodigive iusiurandum detulerit, ratum id haberi debet: nam 
et alienare res et solvi eis potest et agendo rem in iudicium 
deducunt120. 
 
In order to determine whether the oath given by a legal guardian when 
exercising his office would be valid, Paul resorts to an argument a fortiori, 
presenting other cases in which the position of the individual is affected even 
more radically by the intervention of his legal guardian, since the latter also has 
the power to alienate his property, receive payments addressed to him and sue on 
his behalf. This shows to what extent the various cases in which the position of 
an individual is made worse by the activity of another are approached by Roman 
jurists, to a great extent, as part of a common problem, despite the great 
conceptual differences between them. This joint analysis of different cases where 
the owner’s position is made worse is moreover to be found in several other 
texts121. 
                                                                                                                   
someone see Kaser, Pfandrecht (1976), p. 265 n. 199; Kaser, Grabrecht (1978), p. 35 n. 86. 
See moreover D. 21,2,51,2 (Ulp. 80 ed.). 
118  See e.g. D. 39,3,19 (Pomp. 12 ad Quintum Mucium); D. 43,16,1,12 (Ulp. 69 ed.); 
Inst. 4,4,11. 
119 For other contexts where the voluntas domini plays a relevant role see e.g. D. 39,5,6; 
C. 3,38,2. 
120  D. 12,2,17,2: “An oath tendered by a tutor in the exercise of guardianship or by the curator 
of a lunatic or spendthrift is to be considered good, since they are able to pass property in 
goods and receive payment, and when they sue, the matter is validly brought into issue”. 
121  See e.g. Gai 3,154b (mancipatio or manumission by one of the co-owners); D. 27,10,17 
(manumission and donation by the curator furiosi). 
 
 The similar treatment between the different cases in which the position of the 
owner is made worse can also be observed in the fact that many of these cases can 
even be covered by the same word: alienatio. This term has indeed a very wide 
scope, which may refer in general to any loss of a right or an object, while the 
most restricted sense of it refers to the transfer of ownership122, as shown in 
C. 5,23,1123. Particularly famous regarding the scope of this expression is the 
definition of ‘alienatio’ provided by Paul, which covers cases such as the toleration 
of the acquisition by usucapion by someone else or the loss of a servitude due to 
the lack of use of it124, but there are other texts which grant this expression a 
similarly wide scope125. Justinian moreover includes under the prohibitions to 
alienate not only the impossibility to transfer ownership, but also to perform acts 
such as the manumission of slaves, the constitution of a servitude, usufruct or 
pledge, among other similar acts126, which in fact are often referred to in other 
contexts as alienations127. 
 At this point it becomes evident that there are important similarities in the 
way Roman jurists approach the transfer of ownership by a non-owner and other 
cases in which the condition of the owner is somehow made worse: not only 
does the owner’s authorization play a decisive role in such cases, but they are 
often dealt with jointly and even under the general term ‘alienatio’. Accordingly, 
there seems to be nothing wrong in Potjewijd’s choice to deal simultaneously 
with cases of transfer of ownership and of constitution of a pledge, since in 
practical terms the rules given by the Roman jurists on these subjects have a 
common ground and operate similarly on numerous occasions. Despite the 
similarities between the different cases where a non-owner authorizes an act 
which affects his patrimony, the current research deals exclusively with the cases 
in which a non-owner transfers ownership over an asset to someone else. The 
main motivation behind this choice is that, while there are some general 
guidelines which apply to most cases of patrimonial loss performed by a non-
                                                 
122  See Heumann/Seckel, Handlexikon (1926), p. 27, s.v. Alienatio. 
123  C. 5,23,1 (Severus/Antoninus, 213): “… Est autem alienatio omnis actus, per quem 
dominium transfertur”. 
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utendo amisit servitutes. Qui occasione adquirendi non utitur, non intellegitur alienare: 
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125  See e.g. D. 23,5,1pr (Paul 36 ed.), regarding the missio in possessionem that takes place due 
to the omission by the owner of granting a cautio damni infecti, which is qualified by Paul as 
a non-voluntary alienation (alienatio non est voluntaria). 
126  C. 4,51,7 (Justinian, 531): “Sancimus, sive lex alienationem inhibuerit sive testator hoc 
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mancipiorum manumissionem esse prohibendam, sed etiam usus fructus dationem vel 
hypothecam vel pignoris nexum penitus prohiberi: similique modo et servitutes minime 
imponi nec emphyteuseos contractum, nisi in his tantummodo casibus, in quibus 
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interdixit aliquid tale fieri permiserit”. 
127  See e.g. D. 37,12,2 (Gai. 15 ed. prov.), with reference to the manumission. 
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despite its evident archaic and sacred character. This shows once again that 
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 The above-mentioned cases do not allow identifying a general theory 
elaborated by Roman jurists concerning the acts which may directly affect 
another person, but there are some basic guidelines which helped the jurists to 
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conceptual differences between them. This joint analysis of different cases where 
the owner’s position is made worse is moreover to be found in several other 
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owner, there are several features which are only found in the context of the 
transfer of ownership. For instance, the problem of the iusta causa is absent in the 
context of the pledge and the manumission, which is why all the problems 
related to the structure of traditio are non-existent in these cases. The sources 
require moreover a certain agreement between the transferor and the acquirer in 
certain contexts at the moment of the delivery, which is completely absent in 
unilateral acts such as the manumission. Furthermore, some general rules may not 
apply to every case of patrimonial loss, such as the nemo plus iuris rule 
(D. 50,17,54). This rule can be used to approach the transfer of ownership or the 
constitution of a pledge, but plays no role regarding manumission, where nothing 
is transferred to someone else128. Moreover, the various cases of patrimonial 
decrease can have completely different outcomes, as happens in cases where a 
manumission and a traditio by a bonitary owner take place: in the former case the 
slave will not be considered to be free, while in the latter the acquirer will gain a 
bonitary ownership which will grant the transferee the same unassailable position 
of his predecessor. Accordingly, by focusing on the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner on its own, it is intended to avoid an excessive abstraction of a 
subject which was approached in a mainly casuistic way by Roman jurists. All of 
this, however, does not mean that sources dealing with other cases of authorized 
patrimonial loss will be neglected altogether, since they do offer interesting points 
of comparison and therefore will be brought up in order to ratify or clarify the 
results obtained in the study of the potestas alienandi, particularly regarding the 
significance granted to the voluntas domini, which is the main common element 
among these various cases. 
 This brief overview of the different applications which the voluntas domini has 
in Roman law shows how inadequate it is to have the modern concept of ‘direct 
representation’ as a starting point for the analysis of Roman sources. For acts 
which make the position of another person worse, the general guideline to 
follow is that the owner will be directly affected as long as the other person is 
authorized by him (voluntas domini) or by the law, as happens with legal 
guardians. The underlying idea behind these solutions is not so much that a non-
owner will perform an act on beha l f  of the owner, but rather that he will be 
authorized by the latter to do something which is in itself detrimental to the 
position of the owner, as it is to manumit, pledge, destroy, consecrate, alienate, 
etc. For instance, if ownership is transferred through a non-owner acting voluntate 
domini, he is being authorized to perform an act which in itself negatively affects 
the position of the owner, since he will lose an asset. Whether this loss may 
involve a subsequent gain for the owner – e.g. the price of the sale – is 
conceptually independent from this initial act, which is why one cannot approach 
both as a whole by describing them through the concept of direct representation. 
                                                 
128  Medieval jurists would nonetheless apply this rule in the context of manumission. See 
Chapter 7, Section 4. 
 
In fact, there may be no positive consequence for the owner following the 
authorization given by him for an act which will have a negative impact on his 
patrimony, which is why the general reference to the voluntas domini in this 
context is rather to be seen as an abdicative act rather than a case of direct 
representation. Moreover, the reference to the notion of ‘direct representation’ 
to describe Roman sources can be completely misleading, since it introduces a 
uniform approach to problems which are dealt in a casuistic way by classical 
jurists. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that none of the provisions mentioned here 
regarding the voluntas domini can be framed within the idea of a primitive 
prohibition of direct representation in Roman law, since they all seem to bear 
direct consequences for the ius civile. The traditional reconstruction of the 
evolution of Stellvertretung in Antiquity can accordingly be discarded, not only 
because there were numerous cases in which the intervention of an authorized 
non-owner would bear direct consequences for the person issuing the 
authorization, but further due to the lack of proof that all of these cases were 
introduced as exceptions to a primitive ban on direct representation.  
 
c. Acquisition and payment by a third person. 
 
The transfer of ownership by a non-owner has traditionally not only been studied 
in close correlation with other cases in which an owner experiences a patrimonial 
loss through the acts of an authorized non-owner, as shown in the preceding 
section, but also with other situations in which the owner is directly benefited by 
the acts of another person, as happens when someone acquires an object on his 
behalf or pays a debt of his. The former case in particular receives significant 
attention when dealing with the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, 
particularly since the evolution of both problems is usually assumed to be 
identical and authors at times fill in the missing information in one topic by 
resorting to the other one. The reason behind such an approach is by no means 
evident. One may suspect that it has something to do with a symmetrical way of 
thinking, according to which one could expect that similar rules apply to 
institutions which appear to be two sides of the same coin, as happens with the 
acquisition and transfer of ownership. Behind these thoughts, one could 
moreover distinguish the influence of the doctrine of direct representation, 
which would cover both problems and thereby grant them a uniform treatment, 
as is the case in several contemporary legal systems. Such a uniform approach, 
however, does not suit the Roman sources129. 
 The problem of the acquisition of ownership through a third party has been 
the subject of extensive studies, which shows the complexity of this topic. The 
rule per extraneam personam plays a key role in determining whether the 
                                                 
129  See Buckland, Main institutions (1931), p. 161 ff. 
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acquisition of ownership takes place in a necessary way, since everything which a 
person alieni iuris acquires will automatically become part of the patrimony of the 
paterfamilias due to the former’s lack of independence. The acquisition may also 
take place through an independent person (sui iuris), but in this case the dominus 
negotii will only become owner if a series of requirements related to the 
acquisition of possession are met, such as the explicit declaration of the agent of 
acquiring the possession on behalf of someone else. Only if the agent acquires the 
possession for the dominus negotii will the latter obtain ownership over the object. 
 Compared to this problem, the transfer of ownership by a non-owner appears 
to be relatively simple. There is in fact no general principle according to which 
the acts of alienation performed by sui iuris will automatically affect the owner, 
which is evident considering that the ratio behind the per extraneam personam rule 
only covers the cases in which the patrimony of the paterfamilias is increased: 
everything which a person who is legally subordinate to another acquires 
automatically increases the latter’s patrimony. No equivalent ground can be 
found to declare that every transfer of ownership by an alieni iuris automatically 
affects the owner, which is why there is no justification for distinguishing 
between the transfer of ownership performed by a sui iuris and an alieni iuris.  
 Despite some conceptual similarities one may identify between the acquisition 
and the transfer of ownership through a third person, it seems clear that both 
topics are completely different. This circumstance becomes evident if one 
considers a structural difference: in the case of the acquisition of ownership 
through a third person, the patrimony of the dominus negotii increases, whereas in 
the transfer of ownership it decreases. Both situations bear therefore only an 
apparent similarity, being in fact largely opposite. This is why, as mentioned 
above, the rule per extraneam personam applies naturally to the acquisition of 
ownership, but has no equivalent significance for the transfer of ownership. This 
in turn shows that the rule per extraneam personam cannot be seen as shedding any 
light on the evolution of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, as if both 
were part of a common development. The sources themselves often stress the 
vital differences between both problems. Ulpian, for example, declares in the 
second book of his Institutes (D. 1,3,41) that every ius consists in either 
acquiring, keeping or diminishing130, which in turn implies distinguishing how 
something may come to be somebody’s and how he may alienate or lose it, 
thereby setting both issues on different systematic levels. Some authors have 
indicated that this text may be the result of the generalization by Justinian’s 
                                                 
130  D. 1,3,41 (Ulp. 2 inst.): “Totum autem ius consistit aut in adquirendo aut in conservando 
aut in minuendo: aut enim hoc agitur, quemadmodum quid cuiusque fiat, aut 
quemadmodum quis rem vel ius suum conservet, aut quomodo alienet aut amittat” (Every 
ius [right] consists either in acquiring, keeping or diminishing; for the question is either 
how something may come to be somebody’s or how a person may keep a thing or keep 
his ius or how he may alienate or lose it [transl. Watson, modified]).  
 
commissioners of a more specific problem, such as the iura praediorum131, but even 
if that were the case it would still show that Roman jurisprudence approached 
problems of acquisition and alienation separately. Moreover, one cannot discard 
that this text was originally intended to cover the acquisition, conservation and 
loss of ownership and other rights, especially considering that Ulpian refers his 
tripartite division to “things and rights” (rem vel ius). This broad expression 
resembles the general systematization offered by Gaius in his Institutes, in which 
he covers under the concept of ‘res’ both ownership (res corporales) and various 
iura (res incorporales). 
 Other texts explicitly distinguish the way in which one must approach acts 
that increase the patrimony of another person and those that decrease it. In the 
previous section D. 3,5,38(39) was mentioned, where Gaius claims in general 
terms that “the principles of both natural justice and the civil law are in favour of 
our being able to improve another’s position, even without his knowledge and 
agreement, but not of our being able to make it worse” (Naturalis enim simul et 
civilis ratio suasit alienam condicionem meliorem quidem etiam ignorantis et inviti nos 
facere posse, deteriorem non posse [transl. Watson]). There is even a similar regula iuris 
which is also the work of Gaius, being however exclusively applied to the acts 
through slaves: D. 50,17,133 (Gai. 8 ed. Prov.): “Melior condicio nostra per servos fieri 
potest, deterior fieri non potest”132. It becomes therefore clear that one cannot apply 
the rules of one group of cases to the other simply because in both groups an act 
is concluded through another person. 
 Because of the significant differences between the transfer and the acquisition 
of ownership through a third person, the latter problem will not be dealt with in 
this study. Moreover, an attempt will be made to revise the points in which 
scholars have derived conclusions for the transfer of ownership by drawing 
analogies from the acquisition of ownership. An interesting example of this is 
found in the work of Burdese133, who considers that the power to dispose of 
slaves and filii stems from their particular status in relation to the paterfamilias – an 
allegation which, as mentioned above, is rather to be applied exclusively to the 
acquisition of ownership. To the same line of thought belongs Potjewijd134, who 
decides – unlike Burdese – to exclude from his research the transfer of ownership 
performed by filii and slaves, adducing that in the case of an alieni iuris the ground 
for the validity of the alienation would be related to their particular status. The 
application of features corresponding to the acquisition of ownership to the study 
of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner is also found in the work of 
Sansón135. This author, when faced with the scanty evidence concerning whether 
                                                 
131  D’Ors, Concepto de ius (1953), p. 298-299. 
132  D. 50,17,133: “Our condition can be improved but not worsened by our slaves”. 
133  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 21. This idea is followed by Perani, Pignus distrahere 
(2014), p. 52. 
134  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 124 and 126. 
135  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 68 n. 118; p. 72-74; p. 96 n. 247. 
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acquisition of ownership takes place in a necessary way, since everything which a 
person alieni iuris acquires will automatically become part of the patrimony of the 
paterfamilias due to the former’s lack of independence. The acquisition may also 
take place through an independent person (sui iuris), but in this case the dominus 
negotii will only become owner if a series of requirements related to the 
acquisition of possession are met, such as the explicit declaration of the agent of 
acquiring the possession on behalf of someone else. Only if the agent acquires the 
possession for the dominus negotii will the latter obtain ownership over the object. 
 Compared to this problem, the transfer of ownership by a non-owner appears 
to be relatively simple. There is in fact no general principle according to which 
the acts of alienation performed by sui iuris will automatically affect the owner, 
which is evident considering that the ratio behind the per extraneam personam rule 
only covers the cases in which the patrimony of the paterfamilias is increased: 
everything which a person who is legally subordinate to another acquires 
automatically increases the latter’s patrimony. No equivalent ground can be 
found to declare that every transfer of ownership by an alieni iuris automatically 
affects the owner, which is why there is no justification for distinguishing 
between the transfer of ownership performed by a sui iuris and an alieni iuris.  
 Despite some conceptual similarities one may identify between the acquisition 
and the transfer of ownership through a third person, it seems clear that both 
topics are completely different. This circumstance becomes evident if one 
considers a structural difference: in the case of the acquisition of ownership 
through a third person, the patrimony of the dominus negotii increases, whereas in 
the transfer of ownership it decreases. Both situations bear therefore only an 
apparent similarity, being in fact largely opposite. This is why, as mentioned 
above, the rule per extraneam personam applies naturally to the acquisition of 
ownership, but has no equivalent significance for the transfer of ownership. This 
in turn shows that the rule per extraneam personam cannot be seen as shedding any 
light on the evolution of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, as if both 
were part of a common development. The sources themselves often stress the 
vital differences between both problems. Ulpian, for example, declares in the 
second book of his Institutes (D. 1,3,41) that every ius consists in either 
acquiring, keeping or diminishing130, which in turn implies distinguishing how 
something may come to be somebody’s and how he may alienate or lose it, 
thereby setting both issues on different systematic levels. Some authors have 
indicated that this text may be the result of the generalization by Justinian’s 
                                                 
130  D. 1,3,41 (Ulp. 2 inst.): “Totum autem ius consistit aut in adquirendo aut in conservando 
aut in minuendo: aut enim hoc agitur, quemadmodum quid cuiusque fiat, aut 
quemadmodum quis rem vel ius suum conservet, aut quomodo alienet aut amittat” (Every 
ius [right] consists either in acquiring, keeping or diminishing; for the question is either 
how something may come to be somebody’s or how a person may keep a thing or keep 
his ius or how he may alienate or lose it [transl. Watson, modified]).  
 
commissioners of a more specific problem, such as the iura praediorum131, but even 
if that were the case it would still show that Roman jurisprudence approached 
problems of acquisition and alienation separately. Moreover, one cannot discard 
that this text was originally intended to cover the acquisition, conservation and 
loss of ownership and other rights, especially considering that Ulpian refers his 
tripartite division to “things and rights” (rem vel ius). This broad expression 
resembles the general systematization offered by Gaius in his Institutes, in which 
he covers under the concept of ‘res’ both ownership (res corporales) and various 
iura (res incorporales). 
 Other texts explicitly distinguish the way in which one must approach acts 
that increase the patrimony of another person and those that decrease it. In the 
previous section D. 3,5,38(39) was mentioned, where Gaius claims in general 
terms that “the principles of both natural justice and the civil law are in favour of 
our being able to improve another’s position, even without his knowledge and 
agreement, but not of our being able to make it worse” (Naturalis enim simul et 
civilis ratio suasit alienam condicionem meliorem quidem etiam ignorantis et inviti nos 
facere posse, deteriorem non posse [transl. Watson]). There is even a similar regula iuris 
which is also the work of Gaius, being however exclusively applied to the acts 
through slaves: D. 50,17,133 (Gai. 8 ed. Prov.): “Melior condicio nostra per servos fieri 
potest, deterior fieri non potest”132. It becomes therefore clear that one cannot apply 
the rules of one group of cases to the other simply because in both groups an act 
is concluded through another person. 
 Because of the significant differences between the transfer and the acquisition 
of ownership through a third person, the latter problem will not be dealt with in 
this study. Moreover, an attempt will be made to revise the points in which 
scholars have derived conclusions for the transfer of ownership by drawing 
analogies from the acquisition of ownership. An interesting example of this is 
found in the work of Burdese133, who considers that the power to dispose of 
slaves and filii stems from their particular status in relation to the paterfamilias – an 
allegation which, as mentioned above, is rather to be applied exclusively to the 
acquisition of ownership. To the same line of thought belongs Potjewijd134, who 
decides – unlike Burdese – to exclude from his research the transfer of ownership 
performed by filii and slaves, adducing that in the case of an alieni iuris the ground 
for the validity of the alienation would be related to their particular status. The 
application of features corresponding to the acquisition of ownership to the study 
of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner is also found in the work of 
Sansón135. This author, when faced with the scanty evidence concerning whether 
                                                 
131  D’Ors, Concepto de ius (1953), p. 298-299. 
132  D. 50,17,133: “Our condition can be improved but not worsened by our slaves”. 
133  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 21. This idea is followed by Perani, Pignus distrahere 
(2014), p. 52. 
134  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 124 and 126. 
135  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 68 n. 118; p. 72-74; p. 96 n. 247. 
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the alienation by a non-owner should be performed nomine alieno, resorts to the 
rules concerning the acquisition through a third party and concludes that it is 
relevant that the agent acts on behalf of the dominus negotii. In this case the 
analogy between the acquisition and transfer of ownership appears once again to 
be inadequate, since the need to act nomine alieno has a specific ground in the 
context of the acquisition of possession which is completely absent in order to 
transfer ownership136. These problems will be studied in further detail in the 
following chapters. 
 A similar problem to that of the acquisition by a third person takes place 
regarding the payment done by someone who is not the debtor, which is often 
studied closely to the transfer of ownership by a non-owner137. One may 
understand that both problems could be set side by side, since they could even 
coincide in a specific case, such as the payment carried out by a third person who 
pays with the owner’s money and following his instructions. In such case, the 
non-owner would be simultaneously transferring ownership and paying a debt 
which is not his own. Nonetheless, most of the discussion of the payment by a 
non-owner falls outside the problem of the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner, since the most controversial cases are precisely those in which the third 
person pays with his own money and without the owner’s authorization. In such 
cases, as noted above138, Roman jurists would offer a solution which was only 
applicable to cases in which the owner derives a benefit from the conduct of the 
third person, namely that the act conducted by the latter would directly affect his 
position even if he had not authorized it. The solution is completely different 
regarding the cases in which the owner would suffer a patrimonial loss as a result 
of the acts of the non-owner. In such situations the owner’s authorization was 
indispensable, as highlighted by Gaius in D. 3,5,38(39)139. Accordingly, just as in 
the case of the acquisition by a non-owner, the payment by a non-debtor cannot 
be regarded as an institution closely linked to the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner, being in fact approached by Roman jurists as an opposite problem, in 
which the principal does not lose something, as happens in the traditio, but rather 
becomes richer. 
 It is important to keep in mind the fundamental distinction between the way 
the solutio by a non-debtor and the traditio by a non-owner operate in order to 
avoid extrapolating to the transfer of ownership features which only apply to the 
payment. This is particularly the case regarding the need to act nomine alieno. In 
the case of the payment by a third person, it is of course essential that he indicates 
precisely whose debt is he paying, in order that this precise debt is extinguished. 
                                                 
136  See Buckland, Main institutions (1931), p. 170. 
137  Regarding the payment by a procurator see Apathy, Procurator und solutio (1979), p. 65-88. 
138  Chapter 1, Section 2(b). 
139  Chapter 1, Section 2(b) above. The idea according to which one may pay without the 
knowledge or authorization of the debtor is also laid down in D. 46,3,53 (Gai. 5 ad edictum 
provinciale) and Inst. 3,29pr. 
 
The main texts dealing with the payment by a third person stress that the 
knowledge or authorization of the debtor is not needed for the validity of the 
payment, it being however essential that he acts on behalf of the debtor. When 
conveying this solution it is explicitly indicated that this applies to the cases 
where the condition of the principal is improved by the acts of the third person, 
and not to those where his patrimony is diminished, as happens with the delivery 
of his ownership. Accordingly, peculiar features of the payment by a non-owner 
such as the need to act nomine alieno cannot be considered to apply instantly to 
the problem of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
 
3. Ownership and potestas alienandi, systematic considerations 
 
As it was mentioned in the previous section140, the Roman sources often use 
expressions such as potestas alienandi or ius vendendi to succinctly declare that 
someone may be entitled to transfer ownership. However, the existence of such 
expressions does not imply that Roman jurists would generally declare that one 
of the requirements for the transfer of ownership is the potestas alienandi of the 
tradens. Instead, Roman sources usually have as a more simple starting point that 
the tradens must be owner141. To name just a few: D. 18,1,74 declares that if the 
transferor is not the owner usucapion will start at once142, which implies that 
ownership is not transferred; D. 41,1,20pr and D. 50,17,54143 categorically 
establish that one cannot transfer what one does not have, which in the first text 
means that only the owner can transfer ownership; D. 18,1,28144 determines that 
the sale by a non-owner is valid as such, but that it will not transfer ownership. 
Particularly interesting is moreover the opening text of Gaius dealing with the 
transfer of ownership by traditio: 
 
Gai 2,18-20: (18) Magna autem differentia est inter mancipi res et 
nec mancipi. (19) Nam res nec mancipi ipsa traditione pleno iure 
alterius fiunt, si modo corporales sunt et ob id recipiunt traditionem. 
(20) Itaque si tibi vestem vel aurum vel argentum tradidero sive ex 
                                                 
140  Chapter 1, Section 2(a). 
141  Whether he must be a dominus ex iure Quiritium will be discussed in the following sections. 
142  D. 18,1,74 (Pap. 1 def.): “Clavibus traditis ita mercium in horreis conditarum possessio 
tradita videtur, si claves apud horrea traditae sint: quo facto confestim emptor dominium et 
possessionem adipiscitur, etsi non aperuerit horrea: quod si venditoris merces non fuerunt, 
usucapio confestim inchoabitur”. See on this text Miquel, Contrato real abstracto (2003), 
p. 5764. 
143  See on this text Chapter 6 below. 
144  D. 18,1,28 (Ulp. 41 Sab.): “Rem alienam distrahere quem posse nulla dubitatio est: nam 
emptio est et venditio: sed res emptori auferri potest”. 
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the alienation by a non-owner should be performed nomine alieno, resorts to the 
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relevant that the agent acts on behalf of the dominus negotii. In this case the 
analogy between the acquisition and transfer of ownership appears once again to 
be inadequate, since the need to act nomine alieno has a specific ground in the 
context of the acquisition of possession which is completely absent in order to 
transfer ownership136. These problems will be studied in further detail in the 
following chapters. 
 A similar problem to that of the acquisition by a third person takes place 
regarding the payment done by someone who is not the debtor, which is often 
studied closely to the transfer of ownership by a non-owner137. One may 
understand that both problems could be set side by side, since they could even 
coincide in a specific case, such as the payment carried out by a third person who 
pays with the owner’s money and following his instructions. In such case, the 
non-owner would be simultaneously transferring ownership and paying a debt 
which is not his own. Nonetheless, most of the discussion of the payment by a 
non-owner falls outside the problem of the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner, since the most controversial cases are precisely those in which the third 
person pays with his own money and without the owner’s authorization. In such 
cases, as noted above138, Roman jurists would offer a solution which was only 
applicable to cases in which the owner derives a benefit from the conduct of the 
third person, namely that the act conducted by the latter would directly affect his 
position even if he had not authorized it. The solution is completely different 
regarding the cases in which the owner would suffer a patrimonial loss as a result 
of the acts of the non-owner. In such situations the owner’s authorization was 
indispensable, as highlighted by Gaius in D. 3,5,38(39)139. Accordingly, just as in 
the case of the acquisition by a non-owner, the payment by a non-debtor cannot 
be regarded as an institution closely linked to the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner, being in fact approached by Roman jurists as an opposite problem, in 
which the principal does not lose something, as happens in the traditio, but rather 
becomes richer. 
 It is important to keep in mind the fundamental distinction between the way 
the solutio by a non-debtor and the traditio by a non-owner operate in order to 
avoid extrapolating to the transfer of ownership features which only apply to the 
payment. This is particularly the case regarding the need to act nomine alieno. In 
the case of the payment by a third person, it is of course essential that he indicates 
precisely whose debt is he paying, in order that this precise debt is extinguished. 
                                                 
136  See Buckland, Main institutions (1931), p. 170. 
137  Regarding the payment by a procurator see Apathy, Procurator und solutio (1979), p. 65-88. 
138  Chapter 1, Section 2(b). 
139  Chapter 1, Section 2(b) above. The idea according to which one may pay without the 
knowledge or authorization of the debtor is also laid down in D. 46,3,53 (Gai. 5 ad edictum 
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where the condition of the principal is improved by the acts of the third person, 
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of his ownership. Accordingly, peculiar features of the payment by a non-owner 
such as the need to act nomine alieno cannot be considered to apply instantly to 
the problem of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
 
3. Ownership and potestas alienandi, systematic considerations 
 
As it was mentioned in the previous section140, the Roman sources often use 
expressions such as potestas alienandi or ius vendendi to succinctly declare that 
someone may be entitled to transfer ownership. However, the existence of such 
expressions does not imply that Roman jurists would generally declare that one 
of the requirements for the transfer of ownership is the potestas alienandi of the 
tradens. Instead, Roman sources usually have as a more simple starting point that 
the tradens must be owner141. To name just a few: D. 18,1,74 declares that if the 
transferor is not the owner usucapion will start at once142, which implies that 
ownership is not transferred; D. 41,1,20pr and D. 50,17,54143 categorically 
establish that one cannot transfer what one does not have, which in the first text 
means that only the owner can transfer ownership; D. 18,1,28144 determines that 
the sale by a non-owner is valid as such, but that it will not transfer ownership. 
Particularly interesting is moreover the opening text of Gaius dealing with the 
transfer of ownership by traditio: 
 
Gai 2,18-20: (18) Magna autem differentia est inter mancipi res et 
nec mancipi. (19) Nam res nec mancipi ipsa traditione pleno iure 
alterius fiunt, si modo corporales sunt et ob id recipiunt traditionem. 
(20) Itaque si tibi vestem vel aurum vel argentum tradidero sive ex 
                                                 
140  Chapter 1, Section 2(a). 
141  Whether he must be a dominus ex iure Quiritium will be discussed in the following sections. 
142  D. 18,1,74 (Pap. 1 def.): “Clavibus traditis ita mercium in horreis conditarum possessio 
tradita videtur, si claves apud horrea traditae sint: quo facto confestim emptor dominium et 
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venditionis causa sive ex donationis sive quavis alia ex causa, statim 
tua fit ea res, si modo ego eius dominus sim.145 
 
The basic rule is clear: the delivery which follows a iusta causa will transfer 
ownership if it is done by the owner of the delivered thing, and it will not 
transfer ownership if performed by a non-owner. The owner alone has the 
power to alienate. Moreover, when discussing the acquisition through usucapion, 
Gaius shows once again that it is essential for the transfer of ownership that the 
transferor is the owner. This is in turn emphasized by the description of the 
content of the good faith of the acquirer as the belief that it was the owner who 
performed the traditio: 
 
Gai 2,43: Ceterum etiam earum rerum usucapio nobis conpetit, 
quae non a domino nobis traditae fuerint, sive mancipi sint eae res 
sive nec mancipi, si modo eas bona fide acceperimus, cum 
crederemus eum, qui tradet, dominum esse.146 
 
All of these texts could give the impression that for Roman jurists only the true 
owner would be able to transfer ownership. However, several other texts, while 
maintaining as the basic starting point that the transferor must be owner, 
introduce further clarifications which narrow down in a more accurate way the 
requirements to transfer ownership. Particularly eloquent in this regard is 
Gai 2,62-64, which is introduced with the phrase: “Accidit aliquando, ut qui 
dominus sit, alienandae rei potestatem non habeat, et qui dominus non sit, alienare 
possit”147. The wording of the text shows that we are dealing with cases which 
depart from the general rule, since it “sometimes happens” that someone 
different than the owner can transfer ownership, or that the owner cannot 
transfer ownership. The starting point or general rule is clearly that the tradens 
must be owner, but this notion can be subject to clarifications148. Miquel stressed 
that the text of Gai 2,62-64 should therefore be interpreted as the last part of a 
sequence of texts, narrowing down the general notions laid down in Gai 2,20 
                                                 
145  Gai 2,18-20: “(18) Now, there is a great difference between res mancipi and nec mancipi. (19) 
For res nec mancipi become the full property of someone else by the very act of delivery, 
provided that they are corporeal and so capable of delivery. (20) And so, if I deliver to you 
clothing or gold or silver, whether on the basis of a sale or a gift or on any other basis, it 
immediately becomes yours, provided that I am owner of it” (transl. Gordon/Robinson, 
modified). 
146  Gai 2,43: “But we can also usucapt things which have not been delivered to us by the 
owner, whether they are mancipi or nec mancipi, provided that we receive them in good 
faith, in the belief that the person who delivered them was owner” (transl. 
Gordon/Robinson). 
147  Gai 2,62: “It sometimes happens that an owner does not have power to alienate and that a 
non-owner does” (transl. Gordon/Robinson). 
148  Buckland, Interpolations (1941), p. 1309; Zulueta, Institutes of Gaius (1953) II, p. 74; 
Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 9-10. 
 
and Gai 2,43, according to which the transferor should be the owner149. 
Gai 2,62-64 ends the general analysis of the acquisition of ownership by traditio 
and usucapion with a more accurate criterion which narrows down the previous 
general statements on the subject. 
 While discussing the systematic role of Gai 2,62-64, it must be pointed out 
that the position of this fragment within the work of Gaius was a controversial 
matter in the editing history of the Institutes. The first editions located the 
passage in its current place150, following the original order of Gaius’ exposition, 
where the text is divided between f. 102v and f. 85r of the Veronese 
palimpsest151. In 1834, however, Heimbach pointed out that the location of this 
fragment could be questioned for two reasons152. First of all, the topic seemed to 
be intimately related to the alienations by the mulier and pupillus located in 
Gai 2,80-85. Therefore, it would be more reasonable to place Gai 2,62-64 before 
Gai 2,80-85. Additionally, Heimbach argues that the words “Ergo ex his quae 
diximus” at the beginning of Gai 2,65 could be properly referred to the topics 
covered in Gai 2,22-61, but would not fit with the additional topic of Gai 2,62-
64. Heimbach’s considerations were accepted by Huschke153, who adds as an 
additional argument that the topics dealt with in Gai 2,62-64 and Gai 2,80-85 are 
set side by side in the Institutes of Justinian (Inst. 2,8, “Quibus alienare licet vel 
non”). According to Huschke, the juxtaposition of these texts in Justinian’s 
Institutes would in this way demonstrate the original order of Gaius’ text. 
 The opinion of Heimbach and Huschke found some initial resistance, being 
criticized by Böcking154 in his first editions of the Institutes. It was also refuted by 
Mommsen in his Epistula Critica which precedes the first edition of the Institutes 
by Krüger and Studemund155. Mommsen considered that Gai 2,62-64 was related 
                                                 
149  Miquel, Compraventa y transmisión (1993), p. 101-107; Miquel, Traditio rei alienae (1993), 
p. 272-273. 
150  Göschen, Gaii Institutionum (1820), p. 91-92; Lachmann, Gaii Institutionum (1841), p. 69-
70. 
151  See the recent photomechanical reproduction of the manuscript in Briguglio, Gai Codex 
Rescriptus (2012), p. 229 and 266. 
152  Heimbach, Ueber Ulpians Fragmente (1834), p. 34-35. 
153  Huschke, Iurisprudentiae anteiustinianae (1861), p. 149, n. 42. This opinion is maintained in 
later editions of his Iurisprudentiae anteiustinianae: cfr. Huschke, Iurisprudentiae anteiustinianae 
(1867), p. 159-160, n. 45; Huschke, Iurisprudentiae anteiustinianae (1886), p. 234 n. 5 
already records Mommsen’s observation (quidquid Mommsenus commendandi vel 
excusandi eius gratia in ed. Kr. 2 contra dicat) but does not accept it. Only in the 
posthumous sixth edition by Seckel and Kübler (Huschke/Seckel/Kübler, Iurisprudentiae 
anteiustinianae [1903], p. 66) did the fragment return to its traditional position. 
154  Böcking, Gaii Institutionum (1841), p. 65 n. 1. 
155  Krüger/Studemund, Gai Institutiones (1877), p. XIX-XX, now in Mommsen, Emendationes 
Gaianae (1905 [1877]), p. 41-42: “Displicet transpositio Heimbachiana. Gaiana dispositio 
commoda magis quam accurata hic eo nititur, quod primum agitur de rerum alienatione, 
ad quem tractatum usucapio quoque redigitur utpote iustae alienationis legitimum 
supplementum, deinde transitur ad rerum adquisitionem eam, quae non ab alienatione 
pendet, qualis est occupatio et specificatio. Locus autem, quaenam res recte alienentur a 
non domino vel alienari nequeant a domino, aperte prioris tractatus appendix est, quo ipso 
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venditionis causa sive ex donationis sive quavis alia ex causa, statim 
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transfer ownership if performed by a non-owner. The owner alone has the 
power to alienate. Moreover, when discussing the acquisition through usucapion, 
Gaius shows once again that it is essential for the transfer of ownership that the 
transferor is the owner. This is in turn emphasized by the description of the 
content of the good faith of the acquirer as the belief that it was the owner who 
performed the traditio: 
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sive nec mancipi, si modo eas bona fide acceperimus, cum 
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All of these texts could give the impression that for Roman jurists only the true 
owner would be able to transfer ownership. However, several other texts, while 
maintaining as the basic starting point that the transferor must be owner, 
introduce further clarifications which narrow down in a more accurate way the 
requirements to transfer ownership. Particularly eloquent in this regard is 
Gai 2,62-64, which is introduced with the phrase: “Accidit aliquando, ut qui 
dominus sit, alienandae rei potestatem non habeat, et qui dominus non sit, alienare 
possit”147. The wording of the text shows that we are dealing with cases which 
depart from the general rule, since it “sometimes happens” that someone 
different than the owner can transfer ownership, or that the owner cannot 
transfer ownership. The starting point or general rule is clearly that the tradens 
must be owner, but this notion can be subject to clarifications148. Miquel stressed 
that the text of Gai 2,62-64 should therefore be interpreted as the last part of a 
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 While discussing the systematic role of Gai 2,62-64, it must be pointed out 
that the position of this fragment within the work of Gaius was a controversial 
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fragment could be questioned for two reasons152. First of all, the topic seemed to 
be intimately related to the alienations by the mulier and pupillus located in 
Gai 2,80-85. Therefore, it would be more reasonable to place Gai 2,62-64 before 
Gai 2,80-85. Additionally, Heimbach argues that the words “Ergo ex his quae 
diximus” at the beginning of Gai 2,65 could be properly referred to the topics 
covered in Gai 2,22-61, but would not fit with the additional topic of Gai 2,62-
64. Heimbach’s considerations were accepted by Huschke153, who adds as an 
additional argument that the topics dealt with in Gai 2,62-64 and Gai 2,80-85 are 
set side by side in the Institutes of Justinian (Inst. 2,8, “Quibus alienare licet vel 
non”). According to Huschke, the juxtaposition of these texts in Justinian’s 
Institutes would in this way demonstrate the original order of Gaius’ text. 
 The opinion of Heimbach and Huschke found some initial resistance, being 
criticized by Böcking154 in his first editions of the Institutes. It was also refuted by 
Mommsen in his Epistula Critica which precedes the first edition of the Institutes 
by Krüger and Studemund155. Mommsen considered that Gai 2,62-64 was related 
                                                 
149  Miquel, Compraventa y transmisión (1993), p. 101-107; Miquel, Traditio rei alienae (1993), 
p. 272-273. 
150  Göschen, Gaii Institutionum (1820), p. 91-92; Lachmann, Gaii Institutionum (1841), p. 69-
70. 
151  See the recent photomechanical reproduction of the manuscript in Briguglio, Gai Codex 
Rescriptus (2012), p. 229 and 266. 
152  Heimbach, Ueber Ulpians Fragmente (1834), p. 34-35. 
153  Huschke, Iurisprudentiae anteiustinianae (1861), p. 149, n. 42. This opinion is maintained in 
later editions of his Iurisprudentiae anteiustinianae: cfr. Huschke, Iurisprudentiae anteiustinianae 
(1867), p. 159-160, n. 45; Huschke, Iurisprudentiae anteiustinianae (1886), p. 234 n. 5 
already records Mommsen’s observation (quidquid Mommsenus commendandi vel 
excusandi eius gratia in ed. Kr. 2 contra dicat) but does not accept it. Only in the 
posthumous sixth edition by Seckel and Kübler (Huschke/Seckel/Kübler, Iurisprudentiae 
anteiustinianae [1903], p. 66) did the fragment return to its traditional position. 
154  Böcking, Gaii Institutionum (1841), p. 65 n. 1. 
155  Krüger/Studemund, Gai Institutiones (1877), p. XIX-XX, now in Mommsen, Emendationes 
Gaianae (1905 [1877]), p. 41-42: “Displicet transpositio Heimbachiana. Gaiana dispositio 
commoda magis quam accurata hic eo nititur, quod primum agitur de rerum alienatione, 
ad quem tractatum usucapio quoque redigitur utpote iustae alienationis legitimum 
supplementum, deinde transitur ad rerum adquisitionem eam, quae non ab alienatione 
pendet, qualis est occupatio et specificatio. Locus autem, quaenam res recte alienentur a 
non domino vel alienari nequeant a domino, aperte prioris tractatus appendix est, quo ipso 
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to the subjects treated earlier in Book 2 and therefore it would be correct to keep 
this passage after Gai 2,61. Mommsen deems that the position of this text could 
be explained by considering Gai 2,62-64 to be an appendix of the preceding 
topics added afterwards by Gaius, thereby breaking with the original, more fluid 
sequence. His opinion would however not be followed by Krüger and 
Studemund, who followed Heimbach’s opinion in that same edition containing 
Mommsen’s Epistula Critica, placing Gai 2,62-64 before Gai 2,80156. In 
subsequent editions Krüger and Studemund quoted Mommsen’s observation, but 
never abandoned their position157, a decision which was criticized by 
Gradenwitz158. Heimbach’s transpositio would prevail for the rest in the 19th 
century, as can be seen in later editions by Böcking159, Gneist160, Polenaar161 and 
Poste162. 
 Despite the merits of Heimbach’s theory, it had an inherent speculative nature 
which makes its results dubious163. It is therefore no wonder that during the 20th 
century the tendency was reversed and most editions of the Institutes of Gaius 
located Gai 2,62-64 in its original position, without much discussion on the 
point164. Some scholars focused their attention on determining which parts of the 
text of the Veronese palimpsest could be signalled as later additions to the original 
text. This would explain the arrangement of the contents of Book 2, and in this 
context both Gai 2,62-64 and Gai 2,65-79 were suspected – by different authors 
– to have been added to at a later stage165. Regarding these allegations, Nelson 
has observed that the insertion of texts at a later stage cannot be discarded, but 
that the structure of Book 2 can be better explained considering the existence of 
previous systematic models followed by Gaius166. There are in any case good 
reasons to preserve the text of Gai 2,62-64 in its original position. Firstly, 
                                                                                                                   
loco in Gai libro legitur. Postea eum adiectum videri a Gaio et aliquando § 61 et § 65 
continuo se excepisse sane probabile est”. 
156  Krüger/Studemund, Gai Institutiones (1877), p. 50 and 53. 
157  Krüger/Mommsen/Studemund, Gai Institutiones (1923), p. 56. 
158  Gradenwitz, Natur und Sklave (1900), p. 176 n. 1. 
159  Böcking, Gaii Institutionum (1866), p. 89-90. 
160  Gneist, Institutionum (1880), p. 78. 
161  Polenaar, Syntagma Institutionum (1876), p. 53, n. 1. 
162  Poste, Gai Institutiones (1904), p. 168. 
163  This becomes obvious when reading the imaginative ways to explain how the original text 
was altered, such as Böcking’s colourful narration of a drowsy scribe (somniculosus homo) 
whose clumsiness led him to copy one folium before another and to keep silence after 
noticing it. See Böcking, Gaii Institutionum (1866), p. 90. 
164  See e.g. Seckel/Kübler, Gai Institutiones (1939), p. 67-68; David/Nelson, Gai Institutionum, 
Text (1960), p. 79; Girard/Senn, Textes de Droit Romain (1967), p. 75 n. 9; FIRA (1968) II, 
p. 57-58; Manthe, Gaius Institutiones (2004), p. 132. 
165  See on this point Gradenwitz, Natur und Sklave (1900), p. 176-177; Krüger, Zur Stellung 
(1901), p. 49-51; Kniep, Gai Institutionum (1912) II, p. 204-205, 221-222 and 233-234; 
Fuhrmann, Zur Enstehung (1956), p. 145-148; Liebs, Rechtsschulen (1976), p. 231 
166  Nelson, Überlieferung (1981), p. 382 n. 68. See moreover p. 296-297, where a parallel is 
drawn between the arrangement of the topics in Book 2 of the Institutes and in the Res 
Cottidianae. 
 
Bizoukides and Nelson have indicated that the arrangement of the topics under 
discussion in the Institutes of Justinian does not prove anything regarding the text 
of Gaius, especially considering that the compilers could modify the content and 
sequence of the text167. Nelson also claims that Studemund and Krüger went too 
far when altering the position of Gai 2,62-64, since these texts fit adequately with 
the general treatment of the different modes of acquiring indicated in Gai 2,65168. 
It has moreover been observed that Gai 2,62-64 does fulfil a meaningful role in 
its original context by drawing a limitation to the general guidelines on the 
transfer of ownership presented before169. As mentioned above, the text 
complements in the first place the notions on the transfer of ownership as 
expressed in Gai 2,20, showing that the faculty to transfer ownership not always 
corresponds to the owner. It is moreover significant that Gai 2,62-64 is not 
located right at the beginning of the study of the voluntary transfer of ownership, 
closer to Gai 2,20, but at the end of the study of the acquisition of ownership 
through usucapion, since it helps as well to narrow down the scope of texts such 
as Gai 2,43. Through the clarification of Gai 2,62-64 we become aware that one 
should consider whether the transferor has potestas alienandi or is subject to a 
prohibition to dispose in order to determine if the usucapion will take place. 
Additionally, the notion of potestas alienandi offers a more accurate content of the 
good faith of the acquirer: he may be aware that he is not dealing with the 
owner, but rather with someone with potestas alienandi, in which case he would 
be in good faith as well170. Such clarification can even be found in the definition 
of ‘purchaser in good faith’ given by Modestinus: 
 
   D. 50,16,109 (Mod. 5 pandectarum): Bonae fidei emptor esse videtur, 
qui ignoravit, eam rem alienam esse, aut putavit eum, qui vendidit, 
ius vendendi habere, puta procuratorem aut tutorem esse171. 
 
As it is common among Roman jurists, the starting point is that the owner must 
be directly involved in the transfer of ownership, which implies that the good 
faith of the acquirer would consist in the belief of receiving the object from the 
owner. However, a subsequent clarification in the second part of the text shows 
that the good faith may as well refer to the ius vendendi of the transferor, as would 
                                                 
167  Bizoukides, Gaius (1938) II, p. 68; Nelson, Überlieferung (1981), p. 382 n. 68. 
168  Nelson, Überlieferung (1981), p. 382 n. 68. 
169  Zulueta, The Institutes of Gaius (1953) II, p. 74: “(…) in Gaius the natural place for the 
subject of power to alienate is the present, after modes of alienation with their supplement 
usucapion (…)”. See moreover Nelson, Überlieferung (1981), p. 382; Miquel, Compraventa y 
transmisión (1993), p. 101-107; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 31-40. 
170  Miquel, Compraventa y transmisión (1993), p. 107. 
171  D. 50,16,109: “A purchaser in good faith seems to be someone who did not know that the 
thing belonged to someone else or thought that the seller had the right to sell, for instance, 
a procurator or tutor” (transl. Watson). On this definition see Hausmaninger, Die bona fides 
(1964), p. 10-12. 
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to the subjects treated earlier in Book 2 and therefore it would be correct to keep 
this passage after Gai 2,61. Mommsen deems that the position of this text could 
be explained by considering Gai 2,62-64 to be an appendix of the preceding 
topics added afterwards by Gaius, thereby breaking with the original, more fluid 
sequence. His opinion would however not be followed by Krüger and 
Studemund, who followed Heimbach’s opinion in that same edition containing 
Mommsen’s Epistula Critica, placing Gai 2,62-64 before Gai 2,80156. In 
subsequent editions Krüger and Studemund quoted Mommsen’s observation, but 
never abandoned their position157, a decision which was criticized by 
Gradenwitz158. Heimbach’s transpositio would prevail for the rest in the 19th 
century, as can be seen in later editions by Böcking159, Gneist160, Polenaar161 and 
Poste162. 
 Despite the merits of Heimbach’s theory, it had an inherent speculative nature 
which makes its results dubious163. It is therefore no wonder that during the 20th 
century the tendency was reversed and most editions of the Institutes of Gaius 
located Gai 2,62-64 in its original position, without much discussion on the 
point164. Some scholars focused their attention on determining which parts of the 
text of the Veronese palimpsest could be signalled as later additions to the original 
text. This would explain the arrangement of the contents of Book 2, and in this 
context both Gai 2,62-64 and Gai 2,65-79 were suspected – by different authors 
– to have been added to at a later stage165. Regarding these allegations, Nelson 
has observed that the insertion of texts at a later stage cannot be discarded, but 
that the structure of Book 2 can be better explained considering the existence of 
previous systematic models followed by Gaius166. There are in any case good 
reasons to preserve the text of Gai 2,62-64 in its original position. Firstly, 
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164  See e.g. Seckel/Kübler, Gai Institutiones (1939), p. 67-68; David/Nelson, Gai Institutionum, 
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166  Nelson, Überlieferung (1981), p. 382 n. 68. See moreover p. 296-297, where a parallel is 
drawn between the arrangement of the topics in Book 2 of the Institutes and in the Res 
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Bizoukides and Nelson have indicated that the arrangement of the topics under 
discussion in the Institutes of Justinian does not prove anything regarding the text 
of Gaius, especially considering that the compilers could modify the content and 
sequence of the text167. Nelson also claims that Studemund and Krüger went too 
far when altering the position of Gai 2,62-64, since these texts fit adequately with 
the general treatment of the different modes of acquiring indicated in Gai 2,65168. 
It has moreover been observed that Gai 2,62-64 does fulfil a meaningful role in 
its original context by drawing a limitation to the general guidelines on the 
transfer of ownership presented before169. As mentioned above, the text 
complements in the first place the notions on the transfer of ownership as 
expressed in Gai 2,20, showing that the faculty to transfer ownership not always 
corresponds to the owner. It is moreover significant that Gai 2,62-64 is not 
located right at the beginning of the study of the voluntary transfer of ownership, 
closer to Gai 2,20, but at the end of the study of the acquisition of ownership 
through usucapion, since it helps as well to narrow down the scope of texts such 
as Gai 2,43. Through the clarification of Gai 2,62-64 we become aware that one 
should consider whether the transferor has potestas alienandi or is subject to a 
prohibition to dispose in order to determine if the usucapion will take place. 
Additionally, the notion of potestas alienandi offers a more accurate content of the 
good faith of the acquirer: he may be aware that he is not dealing with the 
owner, but rather with someone with potestas alienandi, in which case he would 
be in good faith as well170. Such clarification can even be found in the definition 
of ‘purchaser in good faith’ given by Modestinus: 
 
   D. 50,16,109 (Mod. 5 pandectarum): Bonae fidei emptor esse videtur, 
qui ignoravit, eam rem alienam esse, aut putavit eum, qui vendidit, 
ius vendendi habere, puta procuratorem aut tutorem esse171. 
 
As it is common among Roman jurists, the starting point is that the owner must 
be directly involved in the transfer of ownership, which implies that the good 
faith of the acquirer would consist in the belief of receiving the object from the 
owner. However, a subsequent clarification in the second part of the text shows 
that the good faith may as well refer to the ius vendendi of the transferor, as would 
                                                 
167  Bizoukides, Gaius (1938) II, p. 68; Nelson, Überlieferung (1981), p. 382 n. 68. 
168  Nelson, Überlieferung (1981), p. 382 n. 68. 
169  Zulueta, The Institutes of Gaius (1953) II, p. 74: “(…) in Gaius the natural place for the 
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be the case if he receives from a procurator or tutor, thereby making the text more 
accurate. 
 There are other texts which, in a similar way to Gai 2,62 and D. 50,16,109, 
offer a further clarification to the criterion according to which the transferor must 
be the owner. For instance, C. 4,51,6 indicates that the alienation of certain 
objects carried out by a non-owner cannot be detrimental to the owner, inserting 
however in the middle of the text the proviso “not pledged to him or over 
which he has no power of sale by reason of his office” (transl. Blume)172. The 
vendendi potestas mentioned in this text fulfils the same role as the potestas alienandi 
of Gai 2,62 and the ius vendendi of D. 50,16,109, i.e. to show that other people 
different than the owner may transfer ownership was well. A similar clarification 
is found in the writings of Venuleius regarding the accessio possessionis in 
D. 44,3,15 (Venul. 5 interdictorum): while he initially declares that the accessio 
possessionis will only take place if an object is received by someone who had the 
possession over the object (D. 44,3,15,1), he then clarifies that one must also 
consider that this possession can be granted through someone acting under a 
contract of mandate (D. 44,3,15,2), by a filius or slave duly authorized or acting 
within their peculium (D. 44,3,15,3), or by a tutor or curator (D. 44,3,15,4). 
Considering that Venuleius discusses the transfer of possession, it is no wonder 
that he avoids general terms referring to the transfer of ownership such as potestas 
alienandi or ius vendendi. 
 At this point it should be noted that the texts in which it is declared in 
abstract terms that a non-owner may transfer ownership are rather exceptional. 
As shown at the beginning of this section, Roman jurists are comfortable in most 
cases with declaring that the transfer of ownership should be carried out by the 
owner. Miquel has observed that for modern scholars it would be better to more 
accurately state that ownership must be transferred by someone with potestas 
alienandi, but that this is not the approach of Roman jurisprudence, which rather 
uses ‘ownership’ as a starting point which is narrowed down through notions 
such as potestas alienandi173. Roman jurists appear therefore to tolerate a certain 
degree of inaccuracy for the sake of simplicity, which implies that one should not 
take some texts too literally. When Roman sources demand the transferor to be 
‘owner’ they do not imply, for instance, that every transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner should be considered as performed by the owner himself, or that 
only the owner can transfer ownership. Such considerations play a decisive role 
when approaching the nemo plus rule (D. 50,17,54) in Chapter 6 below. 
  
                                                 
172  C. 4,51,6 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 294): “Nemo res ad te pertinentes non obligatas sibi 
nec ex officio vendendi potestatem habens distrahendo quicquam tibi nocere potuit”. 
173  Miquel, Compraventa y transmisión (1993), p. 106-107. 
 
4. Grounds for the potestas alienandi 
 
a. General distinctions on the source of the potestas alienandi. 
 
From what has been studied so far, the cases in which a non-owner has the 
potestas alienandi seem to be nothing but a group of exceptional cases. If this was 
the case, one would not be able to assume that the different cases in which a 
non-owner transfers ownership have an inner connection or a common way to 
operate. They could simply be individual exceptions to the general rule, having 
further nothing in common. There are however clear similarities among the 
different cases, which allows to group them in two main categories: those in 
which the ground for the potestas alienandi is the owner’s authorization (voluntas 
domini) and those in which it stems from a legal provision, where the owner’s 
intent plays no relevant role. Most authors dealing with the transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner have in fact worked with this basic distinction174. The analysis of 
Roman sources quickly shows that in a large group of cases the voluntas domini is 
explicitly signaled as a decisive element to determine the transfer of ownership, as 
will be seen in further detail in Chapter 2. Next to this group, there are other 
cases which are more difficult to label as a group because they seem to have little 
in common apart from the fact that the voluntas domini plays no relevant role in 
them, as happens with the alienations carried out by legal guardians. Maybe the 
most adequate way to describe this group, apart from the negative feature of the 
absence of the voluntas domini, is by highlighting that in such cases the potestas 
alienandi is derived from a legal provision. 
 Gai 2,64 is often signaled as indicative of the central position of the voluntas 
domini in order to distinguish the different cases of potestas alienandi, showing 
moreover the convenience of distinguishing the cases of transfer of ownership by 
a non-owner by attending to the source of the authorization: 
 
Gai 2,64: Ex diverso agnatus furiosi curator rem furiosi alienare 
potest ex lege XII tabularum; item procurator < ca. 22 > est; item 
creditor pignus ex pactione, quamvis ea res non sit. Sed hoc forsitan 
ideo videatur fieri, quod voluntate debitoris intellegitur pignus 
alienari, qui olim pactus est ut liceret creditori pignus vendere, si 
pecunia non solvatur175. 
                                                 
174  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 8 (I, col. 733-734); 
Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 11-23; Angelini, Il procurator (1971), p. 149 n. 229; 
Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2262; Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 143; 
Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 40-49. 
175  Gai 2,64: “On the other hand, under the Twelve Tables the agnatic curator of a lunatic can 
alienate the lunatic’s property; also a procurator < 22 missing letters >; again, a creditor, 
under his agreement, can alienate a pledge despite not being its owner. But here the 
explanation is perhaps that he alienates the pledge with the assent of the debtor, he having 
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be the case if he receives from a procurator or tutor, thereby making the text more 
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be the owner. For instance, C. 4,51,6 indicates that the alienation of certain 
objects carried out by a non-owner cannot be detrimental to the owner, inserting 
however in the middle of the text the proviso “not pledged to him or over 
which he has no power of sale by reason of his office” (transl. Blume)172. The 
vendendi potestas mentioned in this text fulfils the same role as the potestas alienandi 
of Gai 2,62 and the ius vendendi of D. 50,16,109, i.e. to show that other people 
different than the owner may transfer ownership was well. A similar clarification 
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D. 44,3,15 (Venul. 5 interdictorum): while he initially declares that the accessio 
possessionis will only take place if an object is received by someone who had the 
possession over the object (D. 44,3,15,1), he then clarifies that one must also 
consider that this possession can be granted through someone acting under a 
contract of mandate (D. 44,3,15,2), by a filius or slave duly authorized or acting 
within their peculium (D. 44,3,15,3), or by a tutor or curator (D. 44,3,15,4). 
Considering that Venuleius discusses the transfer of possession, it is no wonder 
that he avoids general terms referring to the transfer of ownership such as potestas 
alienandi or ius vendendi. 
 At this point it should be noted that the texts in which it is declared in 
abstract terms that a non-owner may transfer ownership are rather exceptional. 
As shown at the beginning of this section, Roman jurists are comfortable in most 
cases with declaring that the transfer of ownership should be carried out by the 
owner. Miquel has observed that for modern scholars it would be better to more 
accurately state that ownership must be transferred by someone with potestas 
alienandi, but that this is not the approach of Roman jurisprudence, which rather 
uses ‘ownership’ as a starting point which is narrowed down through notions 
such as potestas alienandi173. Roman jurists appear therefore to tolerate a certain 
degree of inaccuracy for the sake of simplicity, which implies that one should not 
take some texts too literally. When Roman sources demand the transferor to be 
‘owner’ they do not imply, for instance, that every transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner should be considered as performed by the owner himself, or that 
only the owner can transfer ownership. Such considerations play a decisive role 
when approaching the nemo plus rule (D. 50,17,54) in Chapter 6 below. 
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moreover the convenience of distinguishing the cases of transfer of ownership by 
a non-owner by attending to the source of the authorization: 
 
Gai 2,64: Ex diverso agnatus furiosi curator rem furiosi alienare 
potest ex lege XII tabularum; item procurator < ca. 22 > est; item 
creditor pignus ex pactione, quamvis ea res non sit. Sed hoc forsitan 
ideo videatur fieri, quod voluntate debitoris intellegitur pignus 
alienari, qui olim pactus est ut liceret creditori pignus vendere, si 
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174  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 8 (I, col. 733-734); 
Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 11-23; Angelini, Il procurator (1971), p. 149 n. 229; 
Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2262; Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 143; 
Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 40-49. 
175  Gai 2,64: “On the other hand, under the Twelve Tables the agnatic curator of a lunatic can 
alienate the lunatic’s property; also a procurator < 22 missing letters >; again, a creditor, 
under his agreement, can alienate a pledge despite not being its owner. But here the 
explanation is perhaps that he alienates the pledge with the assent of the debtor, he having 
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In this text, Gaius presents three cases of non-owners with potestas alienandi, along 
with a short description of them. In the first place, he mentions the curator furiosi, 
whose faculty to dispose stems from statute, namely the Twelve Tables. Gaius 
presents afterwards the procurator, a typical case where the owner grants his 
authorization for the delivery, but a lacuna in the Veronese palimpsest denies us 
more information on the point. Finally, the case of the pledge creditor is 
presented, regarding which Gaius doubts whether the power to dispose follows 
from the debtor’s authorization (voluntas debitoris) or not. This places the voluntas 
domini at the base of the distinction between the grounds for the potestas alienandi. 
 While Gai 2,64 would appear to offer a neat distinction between cases where 
the authorization to dispose stems from a legal provision and from the owner’s 
consent, there is an element in the wording of the text which introduces some 
uncertainty on the general sense of the text, namely that Gaius, when explaining 
the alienation by a pledge creditor, seems to draw a contrast with what has been 
said before by saying “Sed hoc forsitan ideo videatur fieri, quod voluntate debitoris 
intellegitur pignus alienari…” Gaius could therefore be seen as claiming that in this 
case, unlike the previous ones, the ground for the transfer of ownership would be 
the voluntas domini. However, this interpretation cannot be accepted. The main 
reason for this is that there are numerous texts in classical jurisprudence where 
the procurator is explicitly mentioned as transferring ownership voluntate domini176. 
The exact scope of the phrase “Sed hoc forsitan ideo videatur fieri…” may have well 
related to whatever Gaius said in the lacuna “item procurator < … > est”, and the 
lack of information on this point inevitably casts a shadow of doubt on the exact 
meaning of the rest of the text. Only a clear lecture of this passage would offer 
the prospect of solution on this point177. Until this may happen, assuming that 
the delivery by the procurator was not regarded as performed voluntate domini 
appears to be one of the least probable conjectures. Much more likely is that 
Gaius simply was explaining what exactly “ex pacto” in the previous phrase 
meant, including the alienation by a pledge creditor among the cases in which 
the transfer of ownership takes place voluntate domini178. Accordingly, the text 
shows some hesitation regarding the ground for the transfer of ownership by a 
pledge creditor, without attempting to draw a sharp contrast with the cases listed 
before. Nonetheless, the reference to the voluntas debitoris in the context of the 
                                                                                                                   
previously agreed that the creditor should have power to sell the pledge, if the debt were 
not paid” (transl. Gordon/Robinson, modified). 
176  See e.g. D. 6,1,41,1 (Ulp. 17 ed.); D. 6,2,14 (Ulp. 16 ed.); C. 2,12,16 (Diocletian/ 
Maximianus, 293). There is moreover a famous text of Gaius, D. 41,1,9,4 (Gai. 2 rer. cott.), 
where someone who has the libera negotiorum administratio is regarded to act voluntate domini, 
and while it is not self-evident that the text refers specifically to a procurator, it does seem 
applicable to this case as well. 
177  Böhm, Gaiusstudien (1977) XV, p. 12-19 offers a reconstruction of Gai 2,64 – and not only 
of the lacuna regarding the procurator – that attempts to solve some of the odd features of the 
traditional text of Studemund, but which cannot be seen as definitive. 
178  Similar views are offered by Angelini, Il procurator (1971), p. 149 n. 229. 
 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner would bear a different systematic 
significance in Justinianic times, as it is shown below179. 
 The fact that Gaius hesitates to label the case of the pledge creditor seems to 
be grounded in the curious nature of this institution, which offers very peculiar 
features with regard to other cases where a non-owner may transfer ownership, 
particularly considering that the transferor does not act in the interest of the 
owner180. The reference to a voluntas domini may nonetheless have appeared to be 
adequate at the time of Gaius, since the creditor could only sell the pledge if he 
had agreed explicitly on this point with the debtor181. In the event that the latter 
could not pay his debt, he would therefore be seen as approving of the sale on 
account of the previous pactum concluded with the creditor. The voluntas domini 
would therefore only be relevant at the time the pactum de vendendo was 
concluded, which is why his subsequent opposition to the sale would be 
irrelevant for the transfer of ownership182 – unlike the rest of the cases where a 
non-owner alienates voluntate domini183. This tension between the original pactum 
de vendendo and the intent of the debtor at the time of the sale by the creditor are 
expressed by Cervidius Scaevola, who declares that the creditor may sell in the 
terms of the agreement even if the object was sold against the debtor’s will (licere 
ex pacto pignus vendere idque vendiderim… licet invito te pignora distracta sint), since the 
latter agreed to the sale by the previous pactum in the event of noncompliance 
(iam enim illo in tempore, quo contrahebas, videri concessisse venditioni, si pecuniam non 
intulisses). Considering these peculiarities surrounding the transfer of ownership of 
the pledged object, it is no wonder that Gaius may have had some hesitation 
when defining the legal grounds for the transfer of ownership in such case184. 
 The significance of the voluntas domini in the context of the alienation of the 
pledge evolved towards the end of the 2nd century AD, when the possibility to 
sell the object was regarded as tacitly included in every pledge unless explicitly 
excluded. This implied that the delivery would be regarded to take place voluntate 
domini even if there was no explicit pactum de vendendo185. Eventually, the 
possibility to sell the object became an essential part of the pledge, and could not 
                                                 
179  Chapter 6, Section 4 below. 
180  Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 42, 101. 
181  See D. 20,1,35 (Labeo 1 pithanon a Paulo epitomarum); D. 47,2,74 (Jav. 15 ex Cassio). 
182  D. 44,3,14,5 (Scaev. libro singulari quaestionum publice): “Item si mihi pignori dederis et 
convenerit, nisi pecuniam solvisses, licere ex pacto pignus vendere idque vendiderim, 
emptori accessio tui temporis dari debebit, licet invito te pignora distracta sint: iam enim 
illo in tempore, quo contrahebas, videri concessisse venditioni, si pecuniam non intulisses”. 
In the same sense C. 8,36(37),1 (Severus/Antoninus, 207): “Cum creditor pignus vendit, 
non potest videri litigiosae rei emptio contrahi, etsi debitor interdicat, ne venditio 
perficiatur”. See moreover Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 24 ff., 123-124. 
183  See Chapter 2, Section 1(b) below. 
184  See Buckland, Per liberam personam (1939), p. 208-210. 
185  See D. 13,7,4 (Ulp. 41 Sab.); C. 8,27,7 (Gordianus, 238). See on this evolution Bueno 
Delgado, Pignus gordianum (2004), p. 109 ff.; Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 31-32. 
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be excluded by the parties186. Justinian would claim in Inst. 2,8,1 to have made 
things more clear on this point for creditors and debtors187, referring to a 
constitution (C. 8,33,3)188 of the year 530 in which he established a procedure 
for selling the pledge in case there was no particular agreement on the subject. 
These developments, however, do not imply that the voluntas of the debtor was 
rendered irrelevant, since any conditions which had been agreed for the 
alienation of the pledge would be decisive to determine the ius distrahendi of the 
creditor. Jurists would therefore continue to regard the voluntas domini as the legal 
basis for the transfer of ownership by a pledge creditor even after the need for an 
explicit pactum de vendendo was suppressed. 
 
b. The libera administratio peculii, a sui generis ground for the alienation. 
 
Having sketched the two general grounds for the potestas alienandi, the libera 
administratio peculii189 appears to be a case which has a place of its own within 
classical sources, and which is often sharply distinguished from the much more 
general reference to the voluntas domini, as the following text shows: 
 
D. 6,1,41,1 (Ulp. 17 ed.): Si servus mihi vel filiusfamilias fundum 
vendidit et tradidit, habens liberam peculii administrationem, in rem 
actione uti potero. Sed et si domini voluntate domini rem tradat, 
idem erit dicendum: quemadmodum cum procurator voluntate 
domini vendidit vel tradidit, in rem actionem mihi praestabit190. 
 
As it will be shown below191, Roman jurists make use of a wide array of 
expressions when dealing with the authorized transfer of ownership by a non-
owner, all of which inevitably fall under the overarching concept of voluntas 
                                                 
186  PS 2,5,1. See Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 34-38. 
187  Inst. 2,8,1 i.f.: “sed ne creditori ius suum persequi impedirentur neque debitores temere 
suarum rerum dominium amittere videantur, nostra constitutione consultum est et certus 
modus impositus est, per quem pignorum distractio possit procedere, cuius tenore utrique 
parti creditorum et debitorum satis abundeque provisum est”. 
188  C. 8,33,3,1 (Justinian, 530): “Sancimus itaque, si quis rem creditori suo pignoraverit, si 
quidem in pactione cautum est, quemadmodum debet pignus distrahi, sive in tempore sive 
in aliis conventionibus ea observari, pro quibus inter creditorem et debitorem conventum 
est. Sin autem nulla pactio intercesserit, licentia dabitur feneratori ex denuntiatione vel ex 
sententia iudiciali post biennium, ex quo attestatio missa est vel sententia prolata est, 
numerandum eam vendere”. 
189  This topic has been studied in detail by Wacke, Libera administratio peculii (2006), p. 251-
316. 
190  D. 6,1,41,1: “If a slave or a son in parental power, having free management of his peculium, 
has sold and delivered land to me, I can bring an action in rem for it; and if he delivers his 
principal’s thing with his principal’s consent, the same applies. So also when a procurator has 
sold and delivered with his principal’s consent, that will give me an action in rem” (transl. 
Watson). 
191  Chapter 2, Section 3. 
 
domini, being the owner’s authorization the decisive element behind the transfer 
of ownership. This is however not the case when a son-in-power or a slave 
receives the free administration of his peculium, which Ulpian distinguishes as a 
different legal basis for the potestas alienandi to that of the voluntas domini. The 
ground for this distinction would appear to be that the filius or slave who has the 
libera administratio peculii acts in an autonomous way. The voluntas of the pater or 
owner has therefore no part to play in this context. This does not imply, 
however, that in other contexts the filius or slave cannot transfer ownership 
voluntate domini, since Ulpian explicitly mentions this possibility, declaring that 
the consequence of such a traditio would be identical (idem erit dicendum). 
Accordingly, it seems convenient to separate the libera administratio peculii and the 
voluntas domini as legal grounds for the transfer of ownership192. The fact that 
Ulpian sets the cases of delivery by a non-owner who has the libera administratio 
peculii apart from those where the delivery is performed voluntate domini shows 
that he is dealing with a rather sui generis case. 
 There are numerous other texts which stress the autonomous position of the 
filius or slave who have the libera administratio peculii, as well as the distinction of 
this case as a ground for the transfer of ownership in relation to the acts carried 
out voluntate domini. A clear example is to be found in D. 44,3,15,3193, where 
Venuleius declares that the buyer will have the accessio possessionis of the previous 
owner, when the acquirer receives from a filius or slave: (1) if the alienation was 
performed with the authorization of the pater or owner (voluntate patris dominive); 
(2) or if the slave or filius, having the (libera) administratio, sold an object 
belonging to his peculium. From a systematic perspective it is moreover 
noteworthy that the author deals separately with the delivery which takes place in 
the context of a contract of mandate (D. 44,3,15,2) and that which is performed 
by a tutor or curator (D. 44,3,15,4). Another similar distinction is to be found in 
the following constitution of the year 294 AD: 
 
C. 4,26,10pr-1 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 294): (pr) Si liberam 
peculii administrationem habentes equas cum fetu de peculio servi 
venumdederunt, reprobandi contractum dominus nullam habet 
facultatem. (1) Quod si non habentes liberam peculii 
                                                 
192  Andrés Santos, Subrogación real (1997), p. 189-194; Wacke, Libera administratio peculii (2006), 
p. 251-316; Coppola Bisazza, Sostiuzione volontaria (2007), p. 529; Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, 
p. 633; Samuel, Le statut de l’esclave (2013), p. 300 ff. 
193  D. 44,3,15,3 (Venul. 5 interdictorum): “Sed et si a filio vel servo rem emero, accessio 
temporis et quo apud patrem aut dominum fuit ita danda est mihi, si aut voluntate patris 
dominive aut cum administrationem peculii haberet vendidit”. See on this text Buckland, 
Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 378; Wacke, Libera administratio peculii (2006), p. 290. A 
similar distinction is also to be found in D. 41,2,14pr (Paul 68 ed.): “Si servus vel filius 
familias vendiderit, dabitur accessio eius, quod penes me fuit, scilicet si volente me aut de 
peculio, cuius liberam peculii administrationem habuerunt, vendiderunt”. See on this text 
Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 377; Wacke, Libera administratio peculii (2006), 
p. 290. 
GROUNDS FOR THE POTESTAS ALIENANDI
57
 
54 
be excluded by the parties186. Justinian would claim in Inst. 2,8,1 to have made 
things more clear on this point for creditors and debtors187, referring to a 
constitution (C. 8,33,3)188 of the year 530 in which he established a procedure 
for selling the pledge in case there was no particular agreement on the subject. 
These developments, however, do not imply that the voluntas of the debtor was 
rendered irrelevant, since any conditions which had been agreed for the 
alienation of the pledge would be decisive to determine the ius distrahendi of the 
creditor. Jurists would therefore continue to regard the voluntas domini as the legal 
basis for the transfer of ownership by a pledge creditor even after the need for an 
explicit pactum de vendendo was suppressed. 
 
b. The libera administratio peculii, a sui generis ground for the alienation. 
 
Having sketched the two general grounds for the potestas alienandi, the libera 
administratio peculii189 appears to be a case which has a place of its own within 
classical sources, and which is often sharply distinguished from the much more 
general reference to the voluntas domini, as the following text shows: 
 
D. 6,1,41,1 (Ulp. 17 ed.): Si servus mihi vel filiusfamilias fundum 
vendidit et tradidit, habens liberam peculii administrationem, in rem 
actione uti potero. Sed et si domini voluntate domini rem tradat, 
idem erit dicendum: quemadmodum cum procurator voluntate 
domini vendidit vel tradidit, in rem actionem mihi praestabit190. 
 
As it will be shown below191, Roman jurists make use of a wide array of 
expressions when dealing with the authorized transfer of ownership by a non-
owner, all of which inevitably fall under the overarching concept of voluntas 
                                                 
186  PS 2,5,1. See Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 34-38. 
187  Inst. 2,8,1 i.f.: “sed ne creditori ius suum persequi impedirentur neque debitores temere 
suarum rerum dominium amittere videantur, nostra constitutione consultum est et certus 
modus impositus est, per quem pignorum distractio possit procedere, cuius tenore utrique 
parti creditorum et debitorum satis abundeque provisum est”. 
188  C. 8,33,3,1 (Justinian, 530): “Sancimus itaque, si quis rem creditori suo pignoraverit, si 
quidem in pactione cautum est, quemadmodum debet pignus distrahi, sive in tempore sive 
in aliis conventionibus ea observari, pro quibus inter creditorem et debitorem conventum 
est. Sin autem nulla pactio intercesserit, licentia dabitur feneratori ex denuntiatione vel ex 
sententia iudiciali post biennium, ex quo attestatio missa est vel sententia prolata est, 
numerandum eam vendere”. 
189  This topic has been studied in detail by Wacke, Libera administratio peculii (2006), p. 251-
316. 
190  D. 6,1,41,1: “If a slave or a son in parental power, having free management of his peculium, 
has sold and delivered land to me, I can bring an action in rem for it; and if he delivers his 
principal’s thing with his principal’s consent, the same applies. So also when a procurator has 
sold and delivered with his principal’s consent, that will give me an action in rem” (transl. 
Watson). 
191  Chapter 2, Section 3. 
 
domini, being the owner’s authorization the decisive element behind the transfer 
of ownership. This is however not the case when a son-in-power or a slave 
receives the free administration of his peculium, which Ulpian distinguishes as a 
different legal basis for the potestas alienandi to that of the voluntas domini. The 
ground for this distinction would appear to be that the filius or slave who has the 
libera administratio peculii acts in an autonomous way. The voluntas of the pater or 
owner has therefore no part to play in this context. This does not imply, 
however, that in other contexts the filius or slave cannot transfer ownership 
voluntate domini, since Ulpian explicitly mentions this possibility, declaring that 
the consequence of such a traditio would be identical (idem erit dicendum). 
Accordingly, it seems convenient to separate the libera administratio peculii and the 
voluntas domini as legal grounds for the transfer of ownership192. The fact that 
Ulpian sets the cases of delivery by a non-owner who has the libera administratio 
peculii apart from those where the delivery is performed voluntate domini shows 
that he is dealing with a rather sui generis case. 
 There are numerous other texts which stress the autonomous position of the 
filius or slave who have the libera administratio peculii, as well as the distinction of 
this case as a ground for the transfer of ownership in relation to the acts carried 
out voluntate domini. A clear example is to be found in D. 44,3,15,3193, where 
Venuleius declares that the buyer will have the accessio possessionis of the previous 
owner, when the acquirer receives from a filius or slave: (1) if the alienation was 
performed with the authorization of the pater or owner (voluntate patris dominive); 
(2) or if the slave or filius, having the (libera) administratio, sold an object 
belonging to his peculium. From a systematic perspective it is moreover 
noteworthy that the author deals separately with the delivery which takes place in 
the context of a contract of mandate (D. 44,3,15,2) and that which is performed 
by a tutor or curator (D. 44,3,15,4). Another similar distinction is to be found in 
the following constitution of the year 294 AD: 
 
C. 4,26,10pr-1 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 294): (pr) Si liberam 
peculii administrationem habentes equas cum fetu de peculio servi 
venumdederunt, reprobandi contractum dominus nullam habet 
facultatem. (1) Quod si non habentes liberam peculii 
                                                 
192  Andrés Santos, Subrogación real (1997), p. 189-194; Wacke, Libera administratio peculii (2006), 
p. 251-316; Coppola Bisazza, Sostiuzione volontaria (2007), p. 529; Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, 
p. 633; Samuel, Le statut de l’esclave (2013), p. 300 ff. 
193  D. 44,3,15,3 (Venul. 5 interdictorum): “Sed et si a filio vel servo rem emero, accessio 
temporis et quo apud patrem aut dominum fuit ita danda est mihi, si aut voluntate patris 
dominive aut cum administrationem peculii haberet vendidit”. See on this text Buckland, 
Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 378; Wacke, Libera administratio peculii (2006), p. 290. A 
similar distinction is also to be found in D. 41,2,14pr (Paul 68 ed.): “Si servus vel filius 
familias vendiderit, dabitur accessio eius, quod penes me fuit, scilicet si volente me aut de 
peculio, cuius liberam peculii administrationem habuerunt, vendiderunt”. See on this text 
Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 377; Wacke, Libera administratio peculii (2006), 
p. 290. 
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administrationem rem dominicam eo ignorante distraxerunt, neque 
dominium, quod non habent, in alium transferre possunt neque 
condicionem eorum servilem scientibus possessionis iustum adferunt 
initium (…)194 
 
This text draws a clear distinction between the acts performed by slaves within 
their peculium and outside it in case they have the libera administratio. In both cases, 
the slaves transfer goods belonging to the owner, but the results are very 
different. On the one hand, if they sell and deliver assets of their peculium, the 
owner is seen as having no faculty to condemn such an act. On the other hand, if 
they sold goods outside their peculium without the authorization of the owner, 
ownership will not be transferred. The text refers specifically to the ignorance of 
the owner (rem dominicam eo ignorante) but it will be shown below that scientia and 
voluntas are used in an interchangeable way in the context of the transfer of 
ownership195. 
 Some scholars tend to identify a tacit authorization or a general consent by 
the owner when he grants the libera administratio peculii196, an idea which blurs the 
distinction between libera administratio peculii and the voluntas domini as grounds for 
the transfer of ownership. Such idea, however, does not agree with the 
systematic perspective of the above-mentioned texts, at least in the context of the 
transfer of ownership. Moreover, admitting such a tacit authorization stretches 
the idea of voluntas domini to such an extent that it almost deprives it of meaning. 
A comparison with the situation of the procurator omnium bonorum at this point is 
interesting, since he may as well administer a portion of someone else’s 
patrimony. As shown below197, the procurator is seen as acting voluntate domini only 
concerning the transfer of ownership of things that are normally sold according 
to the nature of the administered patrimony. For further alienations, he inevitably 
needs a special authorization from the owner. This limitation shows that Roman 
jurists were not willing to stretch the concept of voluntas domini too much. 
Moreover, the sources do not cover the libera administratio under the general 
requirement of the voluntas, nor do they set both ideas on the same level, but 
instead offer a continuous contrast between them, as the above-quoted texts 
show. Against these considerations, it may be argued that the will of the dominus 
                                                 
194  C. 4,26,10pr-1: “If slaves who have free management of their peculium have sold mares 
heavy with foals, the master has no right to annul the sale. (1) But if slaves who do not 
have free management of their peculium sell the master’s property without his knowledge, 
they cannot transfer ownership which they do not have to another, not does such a transfer 
give a lawful beginning of possession (so as to set the statute of limitation in motion) to 
those who know the servile condition of the seller. Hence, it is clear that a defence of 
possession during the prescriptive period cannot avail such possessors, and persons 
therefore, who buy such movable property (from such a slave) are liable, in an actio furti” 
(transl. Blume, modified).  
195  Chapter 2, Section 3. 
196  Buti, Studi sulla capacità (1976), p. 97 n. 58. 
197  Chapter 2, Section 4(b) below. 
 
or pater granting the libera administratio peculii does not seem to be completely 
irrelevant, considering that the filius or slave cannot donate the goods within their 
peculium, since these assets are not granted with the aim of being wasted away. 
This can in turn be discarded by noting that in this case there is no reference to 
the actual intent of the owner, but rather an objective criterion which jurists do 
not relate to the voluntas domini.  
 The distinction between the cases where the owner grants the libera 
administratio peculii and those where the slave or son-in-power acts voluntate domini 
should be borne in mind when approaching the acts concluded with regard to 
the peculium. When a slave delivers an object which does not belong to his 
peculium, it is essential for the transfer of ownership to take place that he acts 
according to the voluntas domini. However, when the slave is granted a peculium, 
he may carry out several basic acts of administration over it, regarding which the 
delivery seems to take place voluntate domini. This in turn implies that those 
conveyances performed by the slave within his peculium will in principle transfer 
ownership and affect the person of the principal, as the following text dealing 
with the actio tributoria shows: 
 
D. 14,4,5,18 (Ulp. 29 ed.): Sed si dedi mercem meam vendendam et 
exstat, videamus, ne iniquum sit in tributum me vocari. Et si 
quidem in creditum ei abiit, tributio locum habebit: enimvero si 
non abiit, quia res venditae non alias desinunt esse meae, quamvis 
vendidero; nisi aere soluto vel fideiussore dato vel alias satisfacto, 
dicendum erit vindicare me posse198. 
 
The text discusses whether the owner of the slave, who handed over to him an 
object in order to sell it, should be treated simply as a concurrent creditor 
regarding the claims on the peculium. The basic problem at this point is to 
determine whether the object entered into the slave’s peculium, which is in fact 
the case according to Ulpian if the owner was credited for the value of the 
object. If the object becomes part of the peculium, the owner is treated simply as a 
concurrent creditor, but if that is not the case he will be able to recover it 
through the rei vindicatio (dicendum erit vindicare me posse). 
 Despite the fact that having a peculium grants the son-in-power or slave a 
certain potestas alienandi over the goods which conform it, the existence of a 
peculium does not always imply that the owner grants a libera administratio over it. 
Accordingly, a distinction should be made between the mere concessio peculii and 
                                                 
198  D. 14,4,5,18: “If I hand over property for sale and it is still in physical existence, it may 
seem hard that I should be called into the distribution. Distribution will be appropriate if I 
have become a mere creditor, but otherwise I should be able to claim the goods as my 
property, since even if I had sold them, they would only cease to be mine if the price had 
been paid or security given or satisfaction provided in some other manner” (transl. 
Watson). 
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the (libera) administratio peculii199, since the faculy to dispose is much broader in 
the latter case. 
 
c. Fiducia and delegatio. 
 
Besides the cases mentioned so far, it is worth noting that there are some 
institutions which fulfil the same practical function as the delivery by a non-
owner, but where the potestas alienandi of the transferor actually derives from his 
ownership over the transferred goods. In other words, the transferor is not an 
authorized non-owner, but rather the owner himself. This is particularly the case 
regarding the transfer of ownership by fiducia, where the original owner may 
transfer ownership to a friend asking him to convey the object to another person 
(fiducia cum amico). Similarly, the owner may transfer ownership to his creditor in 
order to secure a debt (fiducia cum creditore)200. Both applications resemble the 
transfer of ownership in the context of a contact of mandate and pledge 
respectively, and these institutions in the course of time would in fact replace the 
fiducia. Since this is not an actual case of transfer of ownership by a non-owner, 
and considering that the fiducia takes place exclusively in the context of formal 
ways to transfer ownership, only incidental reference will be made to this 
institution when dealing with the mancipatio by a non-owner201. 
 Another case in which the intermediary has the position of an owner takes 
place in the context of the delegatio, particularly when a person orders another 
one to deliver an object belonging to himself to a third person (delegatio 
tradendi)202. Normally the context of the delegatio in this case would be the 
existence of a debt between the person giving the order and the one receiving it, 
according to which the former would agree that the delivery to the third person 
would amount to the delivery to himself. The main objective behind this kind of 
delegatio is to simplify legal relations by avoiding a double delivery, and from the 
perspective of the law of obligations, jurists regard the case of the delegatio tradendi 
as a double delivery which could extinguish the obligations between the 
contractual parties. However, the situation is different from the point of view of 
the law of property, since the person who received the order to deliver remained 
owner of the delivered object, and therefore the traditio would take place a 
domino203. Only in specific cases do jurists claim that one should regard the person 
                                                 
199  Andrés Santos, Subrogación real (1997), p. 189-194; Wacke, Libera administratio peculii (2006), 
p. 259 ff. 
200  On the different applications of the fiducia see Noordraven, Die Fiduzia (1999), p. 42 ff.; 
Dunand, Le transfert fiduciaire (2000), p. 84-88. 
201  See Chapter 5, Section 2 below. 
202  See on this subject Betti, La attuazione (1933), p. 143-281 and Betti, Sul carattere causale 
(1936), p. 127-130, who approached the delegatio dandi in the broader context of the 
classical system of transferring ownership, in order to test his ideas concerning the 
significance of the agreement at the delivery. 
203  Alonso, Delegación (2001) I.1, p. 128-139; Zandrino, Delegatio (2014), p. 47-48. 
 
who ordered the delivery to become owner at least for a moment, but according 
to modern scholarship these have an exceptional nature204. Despite the fact that 
the delegatio tradendi fulfils a similar practical function to the cases of transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner, it has a completely different theoretic framework 
and – unlike the fiducia – there is no practical superposition between these 
different problems, which is why this institution will receive no further attention 
and will only be brought up when it may clarify a particular problem concerning 
the transfer of ownership by a non-owner205. 
 
                                                 
204  See on this point Alonso, Delegación (2001) I.1, p. 210-224; Zandrino, Delegatio (2014), 
p. 63-73. 
205  This is particularly the case regarding the error in dominio, which is studied in Chapter 2, 
Section 6(b) below. 
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Chapter 2. Voluntas domini as basis for the  
potestas alienandi  
 
 
1. General features of the traditio voluntate domini 
 
a. Voluntas domini and the ius civile. 
 
Since the general theory concerning the evolution of direct representation in 
Roman law suggests that the possibility of transferring ownership was part of a 
series of innovations which overcame the limitations of the ius civile1, it is 
appropriate to examine in the first place the consequences which the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner brought along, and particularly whether Quiritary 
ownership could be transferred in this way. Concerning this point, the sources do 
not suggest that we are dealing with an innovative solution. In fact, already at an 
early stage the authorization of the owner (voluntas domini) appears as a 
widespread legal basis to determine the transfer of ownership by a non-owner2. 
The relevance of this authorization can be found in works of Alfenus, regarding 
the case of the co-owner who can dispose of his share, being able to transfer 
ownership over the common object only if he is authorized by the other co-
owners3. In this case, we are told that the scientia4 of the brothers or their 
ratihabitio will enable the co-owner to transfer ownership over a common object. 
If he does not obtain such consent, the co-owner will only transfer ownership 
over his share. Other institutions show the importance of the voluntas domini at 
the delivery among early jurists, and namely the rules concerning furtum, 
regarding which at least since Sabinus it is explicitly stated that theft will only 
take place when the object is lost invito domino. Concerning the transfer of 
ownership, this implies that any delivery performed without the owner’s 
                                                 
1  See e.g. Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 86: “Dall’insieme delle documentazioni testuali 
in materia, risulta dunque pienamente riconosciuto dalla giurisprudenza classica l’effetto 
traslativo del negozio di traditio effettuato dal terzo dietro autorizzazione ad hoc del dominus. 
Ci si potrebbe chiedere come si sia pervenuti ad una siffatta estensione, al semplice estraneo 
autorizzato, della legittimazione a tradere, chè indubbiamente ciò rappresenta una 
innovazione rispetto a quello che dovette essere il primitivo regime, ispirato al criterio della 
legittimazione del solo dominus o di soggetti aventi una posizione personale giuridica 
equiparata”. In the same sense Kaser, RPR (1971) I, p. 267 n. 59: “Die Zustimmung wirkt 
offenbar nur honorarrechtlich”; Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 504. 
2  Regarding the much earlier alienation by one of the co-owners in the consortium ercto non 
cito, see Chapter 5, Section 2 below. 
3  D. 24,1,38,1 (Alf. 3 dig. a Paulo epitomatorum): “Idem iuris erit, si ex tribus fratribus unus 
uxorem haberet et rem communem uxori donasset: nam ex tertia parte mulieris res facta 
non est, ex duabus autem partibus reliquis, si id scissent fratres aut posteaquam donata esset 
ratum habuissent, non debere mulierem reddere”. 
4  On the significance of this term see Chapter 2, Section 3 below. 
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authorization will not only not transfer ownership, but will moreover render the 
object delivered a res furtiva5. 
 Apart from the antiquity of specific provisions and opinions, the sources 
continuously stress that the traditio voluntate domini produces the same effects as 
the delivery performed by the owner himself, which in turn seems to imply that 
the non-owner can transfer the dominium ex iure Quiritium6, as will be shown 
below. Considering that such a delivery produces effects according to the ius 
civile, the sharp distinction which Savigny attempts to build between the old ius 
civile and later innovations regarding ‘direct representation’ is nowhere to be seen. 
 As will be shown below, numerous texts bring up the voluntas domini in 
concrete cases to determine whether ownership is transferred7, but there are a 
few which are particularly interesting due to the general way in which this 
criterion is presented, including the following text from Gaius’ Res cottidianae: 
 
D. 41,1,9,4 (Gai. 2 rer. cott.). Nihil autem interest, utrum ipse 
dominus per se tradat alicui rem, an voluntate eius aliquis. Qua 
ratione si cui libera negotiorum administratio ab eo, qui peregre 
proficiscitur, permissa fuerit, et is ex negotiis rem vendiderit et 
tradiderit, facit eam accipientis8. 
 
In this text, Gaius draws an equivalence between the effects of the traditio 
performed by the owner himself or by someone acting with his authorization. 
The emphatic “it is of no consequence” (Nihil autem interest) used when 
introducing both cases indicates that the result of the delivery in either situation 
would be the same. Gaius presents as an example the case of a non-owner to 
whom the free administration of the affairs of the owner was given, which would 
take place in the context of a general mandate and/or the appointment of a 
procurator9. For the time being it is enough to note that Gaius equates the effects 
of the transfer of ownership performed by the owner himself to the delivery 
voluntate domini by a non-owner. Similar ideas are also found in D. 6,1,41,110, 
                                                 
5  See Chapter 2, Section 2 below. 
6  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 47 
7  See also Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 130-131. 
8  D. 41,1,9,4: “It is of no consequence whether the owner delivers the thing personally or 
through someone acting on his behalf. Hence, if that other has been given free 
administration of the affairs of the owner, who is going on a journey, and he sells and 
delivers something, he makes it the property of the recipient” (transl. Watson).  
9  Traditionally scholars assumed that this fragment referred specifically to a procurator. See 
Miceli, Rappresentanza (2008), p. 178 n. 138. However Angelini, Il Procurator (1971), 
p. 124 highlights that the text does not mention this institution, being nonetheless 
applicable to it. Concerning the libera administratio in this text see Chapter 2, Section 4(b) 
below. 
10  D. 6,1,41,1 (Ulp. 17 ed.): “Si servus mihi vel filiusfamilias fundum vendidit et tradidit, 
habens liberam peculii administrationem, in rem actione uti potero. Sed et si domini 
 
which has been studied above11. The case refers to the transfer of ownership of 
provincial land12, where the acquirer is shown as having an actio in rem13 after 
receiving the object from a non-owner with potestas alienandi. The text presents 
two different grounds for the potestas alienandi: on the one hand, the libera 
administratio of a slave or son-in-power who acts within his peculium, and on the 
other hand the voluntas domini, which can underlie the delivery performed by a 
sui iuris as well as by an alieni iuris. This text not only shows that the libera 
administratio peculii and the voluntas domini are different grounds for the transfer of 
ownership, but it also puts the different cases on the same level14: in the first case, 
the acquirer will become owner, having accordingly an actio in rem to recover it 
(in rem actione uti potero). This is the same consequence which follows if the slave 
or son-in-power acts voluntate domini (idem erit dicendum) or if a procurator does so 
(in rem actionem mihi praestabit). 
 The idea that the non-owner acting voluntate domini can transfer ownership in 
the same terms as the owner is emphasized in another text of Ulpian: 
 
D. 50,17,165 (Ulp. 53 ed.): Cum quis possit alienare, poterit et 
consentire alienationi. Cui autem donare non conceditur, 
probandum erit nec, si donationis causa consenserit, ratam eius 
voluntatem habendam15. 
 
This text shows that the equivalence between the transfer of ownership by an 
owner and by an authorized non-owner also implies that the disadvantages which 
the owner faces cannot be avoided through the intervention of an agent: while 
the owner may consent that someone else transfers ownership, his intention will 
not be held valid if he himself could not transfer ownership. 
 All the texts presented so far indicate that the traditio voluntate domini has the 
same consequences as that performed by the owner himself16, which would 
suggest that Quiritary ownership could also be transferred in this way. This 
conclusion is ratified by the Institutes of Gaius. In Gai 2,20 we are told that the 
owner who delivers a res nec mancipi with a iusta causa traditionis transfers 
ownership immediately (statim tua fit ea res), which shows that the acquirer will 
                                                                                                                   
voluntate domini rem tradat, idem erit dicendum: quemadmodum cum procurator 
voluntate domini vendidit vel tradidit, in rem actionem mihi praestabit”. 
11  Chapter 1, Section 4 above. 
12  See Chapter 5, Section 2 below. 
13  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 42-47 discusses which actio would be dealt with in this 
text. 
14  Hernanz, Iussum (1993), p. 78-80; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 44, 46-47. 
15  D. 50,17,165: “Anyone who can alienate can also consent to alienation. Anyone who is 
not allowed to give must prove his case, and if he grants it for the sake of giving, his 
intention is not to be regarded as valid” (transl. Watson). 
16  See moreover D. 12,4,3,8 (Ulp. 26 ed.) i.f.; D. 17,1,5,3 (Paul 32 ed.); D. 24,1,5pr (Ulp. 32 
Sab.). Concerning the pledge see also D. 20,1,21pr (Ulp. 73 ed.) and CTh 2,30,2. 
GENERAL FEATURES OF THE TRADITIO VOLUNTATE DOMINI
65
 
62 
authorization will not only not transfer ownership, but will moreover render the 
object delivered a res furtiva5. 
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civile and later innovations regarding ‘direct representation’ is nowhere to be seen. 
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not have to wait the period prescribed for the acquisition by usucapio17. Since the 
text of Gai 2,62-64 serves to clarify the previous statements in Gai 2,20 and 
Gai 2,43 regarding the ownership of the tradens18, one is drawn to assume that a 
non-owner with potestas alienandi will as well transfer ownership statim19.  
 Leaving aside the texts which draw an equivalence between the delivery by 
an owner and by an authorized non-owner, one can also obtain valuable 
information on the transfer of Quiritary ownership from the analysis of praetorian 
defences. If the traditio voluntate domini did not grant Quiritary ownership, one 
should expect the acquirer to have a mere praetorian defence against the owner 
in case the latter reclaimed the object. A defence based on the owner’s 
authorization is indeed to be found in the following text of Ulpian: 
 
D. 6,2,14 (Ulp. 16 ed.): Papinianus libro sexto quaestionum scribit: 
Si quis prohibuit vel denuntiavit ex causa venditionis tradi rem, quae 
ipsius voluntate a procuratore fuerit distracta, et is nihilo minus 
tradiderit, emptorem tuebitur praetor, sive possideat sive petat rem. 
Sed quod iudicio empti procurator emptori praestiterit, contrario 
iudicio mandati consequetur: potest enim fieri, ut emptori res 
auferebatur ab eo, qui venire mandavit, quia per ignorantiam non 
est usus exceptione, quam debuit opponere, veluti ‘si non auctor 
meus ex voluntate tua vendidit’20. 
 
This text will be studied in further detail when dealing with the equitable 
remedies granted to correct the general criterion of the voluntas domini21, but for 
now it is enough to observe the attribution of property on the first part of the 
fragment. In this case, the owner of an object orders his procurator to sell and 
deliver it to another person, but after the sale has been concluded the owner 
forbids the procurator to deliver the object. We are then told that, if the procurator 
decides to deliver the object despite the owner’s prohibition, the buyer will be 
protected by the praetor (emptorem tuebitur praetor) whether he defends himself 
                                                 
17  Miquel, Compraventa y transmisión (1993), p. 102. ‘Statim’ can however also be linked with 
the controversy regarding payment and the transfer of ownership. See Honoré, Sale and 
Transfer (1983), p. 57-58.  
18  Chapter 1, Section 3 above. 
19  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 38-40. 
20  D. 6,2,14: “Papinian, in the sixth book of his Questions, writes: Where, at “A’s” request, 
something of his has been sold by his procurator and “A” then forbids delivery of the thing 
sold, or notifies to that effect, but the procurator nevertheless delivers it, the praetor will 
protect the buyer, whether he is in possession or is suing for the thing. If the procurator 
incurs liability to the buyer in an action on the sale, he may sue “A” by actio contraria on 
the mandate. It may happen that the principal who gave the mandate to sell recovers the 
thing from the buyer, because the latter, through ignorance, has failed to raise a defence 
which he ought to have pleaded, such as ‘unless the seller to me sold at your request’” 
(transl. Watson). 
21  Chapter 4, Sections 1 and 2 below. 
 
from the owner or if he has to recover the object. This protection would stem 
from the abusive behaviour of the owner, who induces his procurator to conclude 
a contract of sale – being therefore personally bound towards the buyer – and 
afterwards seeks to prevent him from fulfiling the contractual obligations which 
stem from it.  
 The existence of the voluntas domini at the moment of the sale and its absence 
at the moment of the delivery is the central problem of the text. The fact that the 
buyer has the bonitary ownership reveals that the lack of voluntas domini at the 
delivery prevented the acquisition of the dominium ex iure Quiritium, which 
remains therefore in the hands of the dominus negotii. As Quiritary owner, the 
dominus negotii can even seek to reclaim the object from the buyer, being in fact 
successful if the latter does not resort to the praetorian exception “unless the 
seller to me sold at your request” (si non auctor meus ex voluntate tua vendidit). This 
shows that the decisive element for the transfer of Quiritary ownership is the 
existence of a voluntas domini at the time of the delivery; since this authorization is 
lacking at the time of the delivery, the acquirer will only obtain bonitary 
ownership, having an exceptio on account of the intent of the owner at the time 
the sale was concluded (si non auctor meus ex voluntate tua vendidit). 
 The reference to the authorization of the principal is also to be found in 
D. 41,4,7,622, where Julian presents the case of a procurator who is authorized in 
general terms to sell a piece of land, and who asks for less than a third of the price 
which he could have obtained in order to cause loss to the owner. The acquirer 
will not become owner, and will only be able to usucapt23 the object as long as 
he is in good faith, which will be excluded in case he colluded with the seller to 
obtain an uneconomic price. In the latter case he could attempt to use the exceptio 
rei voluntate eius venditae, making thereby reference to the original authorization 
by the owner, but that a replicatio doli would discard his pretension on the object. 
The case will be analysed further below24, but for now it is only relevant to 
observe that ownership is not transferred due to the abusive conduct of the seller, 
even when his actions formally fell within the voluntas domini. Just as in D. 6,2,14, 
the transferee may resort to an exception which makes reference to the voluntas 
domini, but in this case it will be unsuccessful due to the existence of dolus on his 
side.  
                                                 
22  D. 41,4,7,6 (Jul. 44 dig.): “Procurator tuus si fundum, quem centum aureis vendere 
poterat, addixerit triginta aureis in hoc solum, ut te damno adficeret, ignorante emptore, 
dubitari non oportet, quin emptor longo tempore capiat: nam et cum sciens quis alienum 
fundum vendidit ignoranti, non interpellatur longa possessio. Quod si emptor cum 
procuratore collusit et eum praemio corrupit, quo vilius mercaretur, non intellegetur 
bonae fidei emptor nec longo tempore capiet: et si adversus petentem dominum uti 
coeperit exceptione rei voluntate eius venditae, replicationem doli utilem futuram esse”.  
23  The compilers modified the original reference to the usucapion: Lenel, Paling. I (1889), 
col. 439; Levy/Rabel, Ind. Itp. (1935) III, col. 212. 
24  Chapter 2, Section 4(c) and Chapter 4, Sections 1 and 2 below. 
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 It is noteworthy that only in these two cases (D. 6,2,14 and D. 41,4,7,6) an 
exception is built on the reference to the voluntas domini, which implies that 
Quiritary ownership is not transferred and that a praetorian remedy would be 
used in an attempt to challenge the claim of the owner. There is, on the other 
hand, no evidence of such an exception in case the delivery indeed took place 
voluntate domini and without any form of abusive conduct. If the previous owner 
attempts to recover the object, it will be enough for the acquirer simply to prove 
that the delivery was indeed performed voluntate domini. In other words, the trial 
would revolve around the proof of the claim of the plaintiff – whether he is 
indeed the owner – and there will be no need to resort to a particular exceptio. 
This can be seen in the following imperial constitution from the time of 
Alexander Severus: 
 
C. 7,26,4 (Alexander, 224): Venditioni ancillae consensum dedisse 
diversam partem si probaveris, retractando contractum, quem ipsa 
ratum habuit, non audietur. Sed et hac probatione cessante, si bona 
fide emptam ancillam a venditore bona fide distrahente temporis 
spatio usuceperis, intentio proprietatem vindicantis tenere non 
potest25. 
 
In this case, we are told that an acquirer is being sued by the previous owner. 
The buyer argues that the previous owner authorized the sale, and if he proves 
this fact, the latter will not be heard. In case the acquirer cannot prove the 
existence of this authorization (Sed et hac probatione cessante) he will be able to 
acquire ownership through usucapion. There is no mention of an exceptio which 
refers to the owner’s previous authorization, as is the case in D. 6,2,14 and 
D. 41,4,7,6. The reason for this is that we are dealing with a rei vindicatio, where 
the only point which must be ascertained is whether the plaintiff is dominus ex 
iure Quiritium. If the principal did authorize the delivery, he will lose the rei 
vindicatio on account of the acquisition of Quiritary ownership by the buyer. The 
whole trial revolves around a problem of the ius civile, and therefore the praetor 
does not have to provide any particular remedy concerning the authorization of 
the owner. It will be left to the iudex to determine who was the dominus ex iure 
Quiritium. The same can be seen in other texts dealing with the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner which stress the importance of proving the 
                                                 
25  C. 7,26,4: “If you have proved that the other party gave his consent to the sale of the 
female slave, he shall not be heard in order to revoke the contract which he himself 
ratified. If, however, you cannot produce this proof, but you bought the slave in good 
faith from a seller who transferred in good faith, you will have acquired her by usucapion 
on the ground of lapse of time, and the attempt of the claimant to hold the property will 
be of no avail” (transl. Blume, modified). 
 
authorization of the owner26. This explains why the only known cases of 
exceptions which refer to the owner’s authorization refer to specific situations in 
which Quiritary ownership was not transferred, and where the praetor would in 
principle protect the acquirer on account of the original authorization of the 
owner (D. 6,2,14 and D. 41,4,7,6). The fact that normally the voluntas domini 
would deserve particular attention apud iudicem instead of in iure explains why 
there are so few cases dealing with the exceptio rei voluntate eius venditae. 
 Finally, a text of Javolenus eloquently shows in D. 39,5,25 that the 
authorization of the owner at the delivery was a relevant element of the old ius 
civile27. This text – which is analysed in further detail below28 – presents the case 
of a non-owner who was instructed to make a gift in the name of the principal. 
The agent, however, decides to disobey this instruction by making the gift in his 
own name. The disobedience of the owner’s instruction inevitably implies that 
ownership cannot be transferred, since the delivery did not take place voluntate 
domini. Nonetheless, Javolenus is willing to grant the acquirer an exceptio doli 
against the principal if he attempts to recover the object. At this point a clear 
contrast is drawn between the strict application of the ius civile, which prescribes 
that ownership should not be transferred (quantum ad iuris suptilitatem accipientis 
facta non est), and the possibility to offer a more liberal solution through a 
praetorian defence (sed benignius est, si agam contra eum qui rem accepit, exceptione doli 
mali me summoveri). The fact that an early classical jurist as Javolenus indicates that 
it is in accordance with a rigid application of the law that ownership should not 
pass in such a case unequivocally shows that the voluntas domini is a decisive 
element for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner according to the ius civile.  
 Since the sources show that the voluntas domini at the delivery would produce 
effects according to the ius civile, the reference to this authorization can be seen as 
sufficient proof for the possibility of transferring Quiritary ownership. This is 
particularly relevant concerning the delivery by a pledge creditor, which 
according to Weimar could only grant bonitary ownership to the acquirer29. This 
author indicates that modern scholars have paid little attention to determine 
whether the voluntas domini at the delivery may be enough to transfer Quiritary 
ownership30, which led him to study the problem specifically in the context of 
the delivery by a pledge creditor. Facing the lack of conclusive evidence on this 
                                                 
26  See e.g. C. 8,15,2 (Severus/Antoninus, 204): “Si probaveris praesidi hortos de quibus 
agebatur tuos esse, intellegis obligari eos creditori ab alio non potuisse, si non sciens hoc agi 
in fraudem creditoris ignorantis dissimulasti”. See also C. 7,26,1 (Antoninus, 213). 
27  D. 39,5,25 (Jav. 6 epistolarum): “Si tibi dederim rem, ut Titio meo nomine donares, et tu 
tuo nomine eam ei dederis, an factam eius putes? Respondit: si rem tibi dederim, ut Titio 
meo nomine donares eamque tu tuo nomine ei dederis, quantum ad iuris suptilitatem 
accipientis facta non est et tu furti obligaris: sed benignius est, si agam contra eum qui rem 
accepit, exceptione doli mali me summoveri”. 
28  Chapter 2, Section 5 and Chapter 4, Section 5 below. 
29  Weimar, Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 551-569. 
30  Weimar, Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 553. 
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 It is noteworthy that only in these two cases (D. 6,2,14 and D. 41,4,7,6) an 
exception is built on the reference to the voluntas domini, which implies that 
Quiritary ownership is not transferred and that a praetorian remedy would be 
used in an attempt to challenge the claim of the owner. There is, on the other 
hand, no evidence of such an exception in case the delivery indeed took place 
voluntate domini and without any form of abusive conduct. If the previous owner 
attempts to recover the object, it will be enough for the acquirer simply to prove 
that the delivery was indeed performed voluntate domini. In other words, the trial 
would revolve around the proof of the claim of the plaintiff – whether he is 
indeed the owner – and there will be no need to resort to a particular exceptio. 
This can be seen in the following imperial constitution from the time of 
Alexander Severus: 
 
C. 7,26,4 (Alexander, 224): Venditioni ancillae consensum dedisse 
diversam partem si probaveris, retractando contractum, quem ipsa 
ratum habuit, non audietur. Sed et hac probatione cessante, si bona 
fide emptam ancillam a venditore bona fide distrahente temporis 
spatio usuceperis, intentio proprietatem vindicantis tenere non 
potest25. 
 
In this case, we are told that an acquirer is being sued by the previous owner. 
The buyer argues that the previous owner authorized the sale, and if he proves 
this fact, the latter will not be heard. In case the acquirer cannot prove the 
existence of this authorization (Sed et hac probatione cessante) he will be able to 
acquire ownership through usucapion. There is no mention of an exceptio which 
refers to the owner’s previous authorization, as is the case in D. 6,2,14 and 
D. 41,4,7,6. The reason for this is that we are dealing with a rei vindicatio, where 
the only point which must be ascertained is whether the plaintiff is dominus ex 
iure Quiritium. If the principal did authorize the delivery, he will lose the rei 
vindicatio on account of the acquisition of Quiritary ownership by the buyer. The 
whole trial revolves around a problem of the ius civile, and therefore the praetor 
does not have to provide any particular remedy concerning the authorization of 
the owner. It will be left to the iudex to determine who was the dominus ex iure 
Quiritium. The same can be seen in other texts dealing with the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner which stress the importance of proving the 
                                                 
25  C. 7,26,4: “If you have proved that the other party gave his consent to the sale of the 
female slave, he shall not be heard in order to revoke the contract which he himself 
ratified. If, however, you cannot produce this proof, but you bought the slave in good 
faith from a seller who transferred in good faith, you will have acquired her by usucapion 
on the ground of lapse of time, and the attempt of the claimant to hold the property will 
be of no avail” (transl. Blume, modified). 
 
authorization of the owner26. This explains why the only known cases of 
exceptions which refer to the owner’s authorization refer to specific situations in 
which Quiritary ownership was not transferred, and where the praetor would in 
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owner (D. 6,2,14 and D. 41,4,7,6). The fact that normally the voluntas domini 
would deserve particular attention apud iudicem instead of in iure explains why 
there are so few cases dealing with the exceptio rei voluntate eius venditae. 
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ownership cannot be transferred, since the delivery did not take place voluntate 
domini. Nonetheless, Javolenus is willing to grant the acquirer an exceptio doli 
against the principal if he attempts to recover the object. At this point a clear 
contrast is drawn between the strict application of the ius civile, which prescribes 
that ownership should not be transferred (quantum ad iuris suptilitatem accipientis 
facta non est), and the possibility to offer a more liberal solution through a 
praetorian defence (sed benignius est, si agam contra eum qui rem accepit, exceptione doli 
mali me summoveri). The fact that an early classical jurist as Javolenus indicates that 
it is in accordance with a rigid application of the law that ownership should not 
pass in such a case unequivocally shows that the voluntas domini is a decisive 
element for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner according to the ius civile.  
 Since the sources show that the voluntas domini at the delivery would produce 
effects according to the ius civile, the reference to this authorization can be seen as 
sufficient proof for the possibility of transferring Quiritary ownership. This is 
particularly relevant concerning the delivery by a pledge creditor, which 
according to Weimar could only grant bonitary ownership to the acquirer29. This 
author indicates that modern scholars have paid little attention to determine 
whether the voluntas domini at the delivery may be enough to transfer Quiritary 
ownership30, which led him to study the problem specifically in the context of 
the delivery by a pledge creditor. Facing the lack of conclusive evidence on this 
                                                 
26  See e.g. C. 8,15,2 (Severus/Antoninus, 204): “Si probaveris praesidi hortos de quibus 
agebatur tuos esse, intellegis obligari eos creditori ab alio non potuisse, si non sciens hoc agi 
in fraudem creditoris ignorantis dissimulasti”. See also C. 7,26,1 (Antoninus, 213). 
27  D. 39,5,25 (Jav. 6 epistolarum): “Si tibi dederim rem, ut Titio meo nomine donares, et tu 
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28  Chapter 2, Section 5 and Chapter 4, Section 5 below. 
29  Weimar, Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 551-569. 
30  Weimar, Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 553. 
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specific point, Weimar studies some texts which in his opinion prove that the 
pledge creditor can only grant bonitary ownership. However, his claims are far 
from convincing. For example, he claims that the phrase “ne melioris condicionis 
emptor sit, quam fuerit venditor” in D. 16,1,32,131 would show that the pledge 
creditor cannot transfer Quiritary ownership, since he does not have the 
dominium ex iure Quiritium himself32. According to Weimar, this would be an 
application of the nemo plus rule. The author thus draws a distinction that is far 
from clear or relevant in the text, which is formulated in very general terms. 
That this is a forced interpretation can be seen not only from the fact that the 
nemo plus rule does not stand in the way of the transfer of ownership by an 
authorized non-owner33, but especially because an analysis of the cases of transfer 
of ownership voluntate domini shows that the delivery by a non-owner will 
produce effects according to the ius civile. Weimar also brings in support of his 
thesis the general claim according to which the pledge creditor could not 
mancipate34, which he uses to determine the significance of the reivindication in 
D. 13,7,13pr35. Such a belief, however, is grounded exclusively on the general 
theories concerning the impossibility of direct representation affecting the actus 
legitimi36. Considering that the author subscribes to the traditional theories on the 
evolution of direct representation in Roman law37, one can suspect that his 
findings are driven by the thought that the transfer of ownership by a non-owner 
would be an exception to the primitive prohibition of direct representation, and 
would accordingly not be approved by the ius civile38. These preconceptions 
decisively affect the author’s approach to the sources. A broader analysis of the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner shows that the traditio voluntate domini 
could in fact grant Quiritary ownership to the acquirer. The fact that the delivery 
by a pledge creditor was regarded as taking place voluntate domini can therefore be 
                                                 
31  D. 16,1,32,1 (Pomp. 1 senatus consultorum): “Si mulier rem a se pignori datam per 
intercessionem recipere velit, fructus etiam liberos recipit et, si res deterior facta fuerit, eo 
nomine magis aestimetur. Sed si creditor, qui pignus per intercessionem acceperit, hoc alii 
vendidit, vera est eorum opinio, qui petitionem dandam ei putant et adversus bonae fidei 
emptorem, ne melioris condicionis emptor sit, quam fuerit venditor”. 
32  Weimar, Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 561. 
33  See Chapter 6, Section 3 below. 
34  Weimar, Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 566-567. 
35  D. 13,7,13pr (Ulp. 38 ed.): “Si, cum venderet creditor pignus, convenerit inter ipsum et 
emptorem, ut, si solverit debitor pecuniam pretii emptori, liceret ei recipere rem suam, 
scripsit Iulianus et est rescriptum ob hanc conventionem pigneraticiis actionibus teneri 
creditorem, ut debitori mandet ex vendito actionem adversus emptorem. Sed et ipse 
debitor aut vindicare rem poterit aut in factum actione adversus emptorem agere”. 
36  See Chapter 5, Section 2 below for further references. 
37  Weimar, Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 551-553. 
38  Weimar, Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 569 declares in fact that he suspects that the transfer 
of ownership by a non-owner in general would only grant bonitary ownership, which is 
why the scope of the actio Publiciana in classical Roman law would be much broader than it 
is suspected. 
 
regarded in itself as conclusive evidence that in this case Quiritary ownership 
could be transferred as well39. 
 The significance for the ius civile of the voluntas domini at the delivery shows 
why it was possible for Roman jurists to accept that the pledge creditor could 
transfer ownership. Modern scholars have often felt puzzled at the fact that the 
pledge creditor could have the same faculty to dispose as the owner. The fiducia is 
perceived to be more adequate to a primitive legal mind-set, according to which 
one must become owner in the first place in order to be able to transfer 
ownership40. Following this line of reasoning, it seems anomalous that jurists 
would be willing to accept that the non-owner could transfer ownership41. 
Considering the traditional theories on direct representation, it is no wonder that 
some scholars developed theories according to which the pledge creditor would 
alienate as an owner42. Particularly interesting are the ideas of Manigk and Kaser, 
who suggested the notion of Verfallspfand, according to which the creditor would 
become owner when the debtor failed to fulfil his obligations43. A related idea, 
offered by Koschaker and Kaser – in an earlier contribution – is that there would 
have been a divided ownership (geteiltes Eigentum) between the owner and the 
pledge creditor44. Both theories would successfully explain why the pledge 
creditor might alienate as an owner, but they are nowadays completely 
abandoned. Modern scholars now highlight that the authorization of the owner – 
first through a pactum de vendendo, later implicit in the pledge – would be the 
legal basis for the transfer of ownership, which would pass directly from the 
debtor to the acquirer45. One should add at this point that there is nothing 
anomalous in the transfer of ownership by the pledge creditor in the context of 
the ius civile. The fact that the pledge was developed at a later stage than the 
fiducia does not necessarily mean that the possibility of a non-owner to transfer 
ownership was also introduced in a late stage. On the contrary, Roman jurists 
seem to have resorted to an element of the ius civile – the validity of the traditio 
                                                 
39  The possibility of the pledge creditor to transfer Quiritary ownership is also acknowledged 
by Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 89-91. 
40  See e.g. Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 131-132; Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 51. 
41  Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 132; Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 20. 
42  It is also worth noting that De Francisci, Trasferimento (1924), p. 256 ff. offered a concept 
of derivative modes of acquisition according to which the alienation by the pledge creditor 
would in fact be understood to be done by the debtor. Contrary to this construction are 
Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 133-134 and Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 21-22, 
101-103. 
43  Manigk, Pignus (1941), p. 1248 ff.; Kaser, Pfandrecht I (1976), p. 244-247. Critical on this 
notion are Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 132; Frezza, Le garanzie (1963) II, p. 82-84; 
Noordraven, D. 13,7,6pr (1980), p. 249-251; Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 20-21, 
104-105. 
44  Koschaker, SZ 63 (1943), p. 439; Kaser, Fremdbesitz (1944), p. 391-394. 
45  See Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 134-139; Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 23 ff., 
91, 105, 127, 143 ff. 
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specific point, Weimar studies some texts which in his opinion prove that the 
pledge creditor can only grant bonitary ownership. However, his claims are far 
from convincing. For example, he claims that the phrase “ne melioris condicionis 
emptor sit, quam fuerit venditor” in D. 16,1,32,131 would show that the pledge 
creditor cannot transfer Quiritary ownership, since he does not have the 
dominium ex iure Quiritium himself32. According to Weimar, this would be an 
application of the nemo plus rule. The author thus draws a distinction that is far 
from clear or relevant in the text, which is formulated in very general terms. 
That this is a forced interpretation can be seen not only from the fact that the 
nemo plus rule does not stand in the way of the transfer of ownership by an 
authorized non-owner33, but especially because an analysis of the cases of transfer 
of ownership voluntate domini shows that the delivery by a non-owner will 
produce effects according to the ius civile. Weimar also brings in support of his 
thesis the general claim according to which the pledge creditor could not 
mancipate34, which he uses to determine the significance of the reivindication in 
D. 13,7,13pr35. Such a belief, however, is grounded exclusively on the general 
theories concerning the impossibility of direct representation affecting the actus 
legitimi36. Considering that the author subscribes to the traditional theories on the 
evolution of direct representation in Roman law37, one can suspect that his 
findings are driven by the thought that the transfer of ownership by a non-owner 
would be an exception to the primitive prohibition of direct representation, and 
would accordingly not be approved by the ius civile38. These preconceptions 
decisively affect the author’s approach to the sources. A broader analysis of the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner shows that the traditio voluntate domini 
could in fact grant Quiritary ownership to the acquirer. The fact that the delivery 
by a pledge creditor was regarded as taking place voluntate domini can therefore be 
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why the scope of the actio Publiciana in classical Roman law would be much broader than it 
is suspected. 
 
regarded in itself as conclusive evidence that in this case Quiritary ownership 
could be transferred as well39. 
 The significance for the ius civile of the voluntas domini at the delivery shows 
why it was possible for Roman jurists to accept that the pledge creditor could 
transfer ownership. Modern scholars have often felt puzzled at the fact that the 
pledge creditor could have the same faculty to dispose as the owner. The fiducia is 
perceived to be more adequate to a primitive legal mind-set, according to which 
one must become owner in the first place in order to be able to transfer 
ownership40. Following this line of reasoning, it seems anomalous that jurists 
would be willing to accept that the non-owner could transfer ownership41. 
Considering the traditional theories on direct representation, it is no wonder that 
some scholars developed theories according to which the pledge creditor would 
alienate as an owner42. Particularly interesting are the ideas of Manigk and Kaser, 
who suggested the notion of Verfallspfand, according to which the creditor would 
become owner when the debtor failed to fulfil his obligations43. A related idea, 
offered by Koschaker and Kaser – in an earlier contribution – is that there would 
have been a divided ownership (geteiltes Eigentum) between the owner and the 
pledge creditor44. Both theories would successfully explain why the pledge 
creditor might alienate as an owner, but they are nowadays completely 
abandoned. Modern scholars now highlight that the authorization of the owner – 
first through a pactum de vendendo, later implicit in the pledge – would be the 
legal basis for the transfer of ownership, which would pass directly from the 
debtor to the acquirer45. One should add at this point that there is nothing 
anomalous in the transfer of ownership by the pledge creditor in the context of 
the ius civile. The fact that the pledge was developed at a later stage than the 
fiducia does not necessarily mean that the possibility of a non-owner to transfer 
ownership was also introduced in a late stage. On the contrary, Roman jurists 
seem to have resorted to an element of the ius civile – the validity of the traditio 
                                                 
39  The possibility of the pledge creditor to transfer Quiritary ownership is also acknowledged 
by Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 89-91. 
40  See e.g. Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 131-132; Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 51. 
41  Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 132; Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 20. 
42  It is also worth noting that De Francisci, Trasferimento (1924), p. 256 ff. offered a concept 
of derivative modes of acquisition according to which the alienation by the pledge creditor 
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43  Manigk, Pignus (1941), p. 1248 ff.; Kaser, Pfandrecht I (1976), p. 244-247. Critical on this 
notion are Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 132; Frezza, Le garanzie (1963) II, p. 82-84; 
Noordraven, D. 13,7,6pr (1980), p. 249-251; Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 20-21, 
104-105. 
44  Koschaker, SZ 63 (1943), p. 439; Kaser, Fremdbesitz (1944), p. 391-394. 
45  See Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 134-139; Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 23 ff., 
91, 105, 127, 143 ff. 
CHAPTER 2. VOLUNTAS DOMINI AS BASIS FOR THE POTESTAS ALIENANDI
72
 
70 
voluntate domini – to introduce through the pactum de vendendo at the pledge the 
possibility of transferring ownership over the pledge. 
 The study of the sources conclusively shows that there is no evidence to claim 
that the traditio by a non-owner would have been an exception to a general 
prohibition on direct representation of the ius civile. On the contrary, it is 
perfectly clear that a non-owner acting voluntate domini would transfer ownership 
according to the ius civile. One may therefore discard the idea according to which 
the transfer of ownership by a non-owner was an innovation which went against 
the basic principles of the ius civile, which shows that the traditional theory on the 
evolution of direct representation fails completely in the context of the transfer of 
ownership. Despite the lack of evidence regarding an original prohibition of 
direct representation in the context of the alienation by a non-owner, modern 
scholars have stood by this reconstruction. The lack of attention for the voluntas 
domini at the delivery as a characteristic feature of the ius civile may have been 
favoured by the fact that modern scholarship, during a considerable part of the 
20th century, approached with mistrust the references to subjective elements such 
as the animus or the voluntas in Roman sources. Such subjective references, it was 
argued, were typically postclassical and would have been characteristic of 
Byzantine scholarship, not of classical Roman law46. Numerous doctrines found 
in classical sources were revised from this viewpoint. It was for instance claimed 
that the animus furandi was alien to the classical sources47, as well as the animus 
novandi, animus possidendi or the affectio maritalis48. Dieter Simon described the 
evolution of this portrait of an ‘animus-obsessed’ late period, which has been 
progressively abandoned by contemporary scholars49. There are however certain 
fields in which this historical reconstruction was particularly influential, which is 
the case regarding the transfer of ownership. Fritz Pringsheim, one of the lead 
defenders of the so-called animus theory, explicitly applied this historical 
reconstruction to describe the evolution of the animus transferendi domini at the 
delivery, which he considered a typically Byzantine innovation50. In the same 
line Riccobono, when dealing with the evolution of direct representation, 
approached the references to the voluntas domini in the context of the traditio – 
including some cases of delivery by a non-owner – as latter innovations of the 
                                                 
46  See e.g. Gradenwitz, Interpolationen (1887), p. 170 ff.; Pringsheim, Animus (1933), p. 43-60, 
379-412; Schulz, Geschichte (1961), p. 155-157, 373. 
47  See Chapter 2, Section 2 below. 
48  For an account of the different applications of the animus theory see Apathy, Animus 
novandi (1975), p. 15-20. The problem of the animus in the Roman law of marriage is 
particularly discussed by Simon, Die animusbesessene Spätzeit (1995), p. 253 ff. 
49  Simon, Die animusbesessene Spätzeit (1995), p. 253-283. A more recent contribution 
concerning the significance of the animus in different contexts within classical Roman law 
is offered by Sicari, Ancora su animus (2007), p. 393-444. 
50  Pringsheim, Animus (1933), p. 55-60. In p. 381 the author applies his ideas also to a case of 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner, which in his opinion could not have direct 
consequences in Classical Roman law. 
 
“domma della volontà”51. Moreover, modern Roman law scholars gradually 
subscribed to the view that classical law knew a causal transfer system in which 
only the intent expressed at the iusta causa traditionis was relevant, as it will be 
shown below52. This historical reconstruction seems to leave no room for a 
particular intent at the delivery, which is why scholars may have not been too 
keen to elaborate on the idea of the voluntas domini as part of the ius civile, 
especially when approaching the transfer of ownership. Instead, scholars adhered 
to the traditional view, according to which direct representation was unknown to 
the old ius civile, and that the transfer of ownership by a non-owner voluntate 
domini would have been one of the many innovations introduced at a later stage 
of development to cope with the needs of commerce. However, these theories 
are not in accordance with the Roman sources, which show the central 
importance of the voluntas domini in the analysis of the potestas alienandi for the ius 
civile. 
 
b. Significance of the voluntas domini: revocation, death and ratification. 
 
The fact that the voluntas domini was decisive for the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner in the context of the ius civile does not mean that this was a static 
element which classical jurists simply had to apply in a mechanical way. For 
example, it has been indicated that jurists introduced innovations concerning the 
voluntas domini in the context of the pledge, considering that the pledge creditor 
would be authorized to sell even if there was no explicit pactum de vendendo53. 
This shows that the scope and significance of the voluntas domini at the delivery 
was not a rigid element, but was open for the interpretation of jurists. Moreover, 
Roman jurists would draw different conclusions and offer various interpretations 
concerning the significance of the owner’s authorization for the transfer of 
ownership. Perhaps one of the most widespread features of this voluntas is its 
revocable and informal nature, which implies that the authorization of the owner 
may be withdrawn or disappear after it has been granted54. Accordingly, if the 
owner changes his mind, or if he is no longer able to agree to the transfer of 
ownership – due to death, mental inability, etc. – the non-owner will no longer 
be seen as acting voluntate domini. In other words, it is not enough for the owner 
to have agreed to an alienation, since his authorization must hold until the 
moment of the delivery. Potjewijd expresses this circumstance by claiming that 
normally the delivery is the moment in which the faculty to dispose is tested55. 
This can be clearly seen in the above-studied case of D. 6,2,14, where the owner 
                                                 
51  Riccobono, Lineamenti (1930), p. 437-443. 
52  See on this point Chapter 2, Section 6(a). 
53  Chapter 1, Section 4(a) above. 
54  An exception to this is the voluntas domini in the context of the pledge, which cannot be 
revoked by the owner of the object. See Chapter 1, Section 4(a) above. 
55  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 70, 152-153. 
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voluntate domini – to introduce through the pactum de vendendo at the pledge the 
possibility of transferring ownership over the pledge. 
 The study of the sources conclusively shows that there is no evidence to claim 
that the traditio by a non-owner would have been an exception to a general 
prohibition on direct representation of the ius civile. On the contrary, it is 
perfectly clear that a non-owner acting voluntate domini would transfer ownership 
according to the ius civile. One may therefore discard the idea according to which 
the transfer of ownership by a non-owner was an innovation which went against 
the basic principles of the ius civile, which shows that the traditional theory on the 
evolution of direct representation fails completely in the context of the transfer of 
ownership. Despite the lack of evidence regarding an original prohibition of 
direct representation in the context of the alienation by a non-owner, modern 
scholars have stood by this reconstruction. The lack of attention for the voluntas 
domini at the delivery as a characteristic feature of the ius civile may have been 
favoured by the fact that modern scholarship, during a considerable part of the 
20th century, approached with mistrust the references to subjective elements such 
as the animus or the voluntas in Roman sources. Such subjective references, it was 
argued, were typically postclassical and would have been characteristic of 
Byzantine scholarship, not of classical Roman law46. Numerous doctrines found 
in classical sources were revised from this viewpoint. It was for instance claimed 
that the animus furandi was alien to the classical sources47, as well as the animus 
novandi, animus possidendi or the affectio maritalis48. Dieter Simon described the 
evolution of this portrait of an ‘animus-obsessed’ late period, which has been 
progressively abandoned by contemporary scholars49. There are however certain 
fields in which this historical reconstruction was particularly influential, which is 
the case regarding the transfer of ownership. Fritz Pringsheim, one of the lead 
defenders of the so-called animus theory, explicitly applied this historical 
reconstruction to describe the evolution of the animus transferendi domini at the 
delivery, which he considered a typically Byzantine innovation50. In the same 
line Riccobono, when dealing with the evolution of direct representation, 
approached the references to the voluntas domini in the context of the traditio – 
including some cases of delivery by a non-owner – as latter innovations of the 
                                                 
46  See e.g. Gradenwitz, Interpolationen (1887), p. 170 ff.; Pringsheim, Animus (1933), p. 43-60, 
379-412; Schulz, Geschichte (1961), p. 155-157, 373. 
47  See Chapter 2, Section 2 below. 
48  For an account of the different applications of the animus theory see Apathy, Animus 
novandi (1975), p. 15-20. The problem of the animus in the Roman law of marriage is 
particularly discussed by Simon, Die animusbesessene Spätzeit (1995), p. 253 ff. 
49  Simon, Die animusbesessene Spätzeit (1995), p. 253-283. A more recent contribution 
concerning the significance of the animus in different contexts within classical Roman law 
is offered by Sicari, Ancora su animus (2007), p. 393-444. 
50  Pringsheim, Animus (1933), p. 55-60. In p. 381 the author applies his ideas also to a case of 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner, which in his opinion could not have direct 
consequences in Classical Roman law. 
 
“domma della volontà”51. Moreover, modern Roman law scholars gradually 
subscribed to the view that classical law knew a causal transfer system in which 
only the intent expressed at the iusta causa traditionis was relevant, as it will be 
shown below52. This historical reconstruction seems to leave no room for a 
particular intent at the delivery, which is why scholars may have not been too 
keen to elaborate on the idea of the voluntas domini as part of the ius civile, 
especially when approaching the transfer of ownership. Instead, scholars adhered 
to the traditional view, according to which direct representation was unknown to 
the old ius civile, and that the transfer of ownership by a non-owner voluntate 
domini would have been one of the many innovations introduced at a later stage 
of development to cope with the needs of commerce. However, these theories 
are not in accordance with the Roman sources, which show the central 
importance of the voluntas domini in the analysis of the potestas alienandi for the ius 
civile. 
 
b. Significance of the voluntas domini: revocation, death and ratification. 
 
The fact that the voluntas domini was decisive for the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner in the context of the ius civile does not mean that this was a static 
element which classical jurists simply had to apply in a mechanical way. For 
example, it has been indicated that jurists introduced innovations concerning the 
voluntas domini in the context of the pledge, considering that the pledge creditor 
would be authorized to sell even if there was no explicit pactum de vendendo53. 
This shows that the scope and significance of the voluntas domini at the delivery 
was not a rigid element, but was open for the interpretation of jurists. Moreover, 
Roman jurists would draw different conclusions and offer various interpretations 
concerning the significance of the owner’s authorization for the transfer of 
ownership. Perhaps one of the most widespread features of this voluntas is its 
revocable and informal nature, which implies that the authorization of the owner 
may be withdrawn or disappear after it has been granted54. Accordingly, if the 
owner changes his mind, or if he is no longer able to agree to the transfer of 
ownership – due to death, mental inability, etc. – the non-owner will no longer 
be seen as acting voluntate domini. In other words, it is not enough for the owner 
to have agreed to an alienation, since his authorization must hold until the 
moment of the delivery. Potjewijd expresses this circumstance by claiming that 
normally the delivery is the moment in which the faculty to dispose is tested55. 
This can be clearly seen in the above-studied case of D. 6,2,14, where the owner 
                                                 
51  Riccobono, Lineamenti (1930), p. 437-443. 
52  See on this point Chapter 2, Section 6(a). 
53  Chapter 1, Section 4(a) above. 
54  An exception to this is the voluntas domini in the context of the pledge, which cannot be 
revoked by the owner of the object. See Chapter 1, Section 4(a) above. 
55  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 70, 152-153. 
CHAPTER 2. VOLUNTAS DOMINI AS BASIS FOR THE POTESTAS ALIENANDI
74
 
72 
arbitrarily decides to forbid his procurator to deliver the object, a prohibition 
which in fact prevents the transferee from acquiring Quiritary ownership. The 
fact that the owner originally consented to the sale is only relevant to the praetor, 
who creates a defence based on this fact. This defence is however not infallible, 
as shown in D. 41,4,7,6.  
 The need for the voluntas domini at the delivery can also be seen in cases 
where there is no delivery by a non-owner, but where there is a preceding iusta 
causa traditionis and the delivery is pending. In such circumstances, despite the 
existence of iusta causa, it is still necessary for the owner to agree to the delivery, 
which implies that the transferee cannot become owner by snatching the object 
without the owner’s consent, as can be seen in the following text by Paul: 
 
D. 41,2,5 (Paul 63 ed.): Si ex stipulatione tibi Stichum debeam et 
non tradam eum, tu autem nanctus fueris possessionem, praedo es: 
aeque si vendidero nec tradidero rem, si non voluntate mea nanctus 
sis possessionem, non pro emptore possides, sed praedo es56. 
 
In this case, an owner stipulated that he would deliver the slave Stichus, and since 
the owner does not do so, the transferee decides to take the slave himself, 
without the owner’s consent (non voluntate mea). This qualifies the transferee as a 
robber (praedo), preventing not only the immediate transfer of ownership, but 
even an eventual acquisition through usucapion, as will be seen in the following 
section. Particularly relevant at this point is to observe that the owner’s voluntas 
cannot be simply derived from a preceding stipulatio, according to which he was 
bound to transfer ownership. The owner must grant his consent, the absence of 
which will prevent the transfer of ownership, and in this particular case – due to 
the conduct of the transferee – will prevent the usucapion from taking place as 
well. 
 The informal and revocable nature of the voluntas domini grants this element a 
relatively volatile nature, since the original authorization may suddenly disappear, 
which is particularly noticeable in the cases where the owner dies before the 
delivery takes place: 
 
D. 12,1,41 (Afr. 8 quaest.): Eius, qui in provincia Stichum servum 
kalendario praeposuerat, Romae testamentum recitatum erat, quo 
idem Stichus liber et ex parte heres erat scriptus: qui status sui 
ignarus pecunias defuncti aut exegit aut credidit, ut interdum 
stipularetur et pignora acciperet. Consulebatur quid de his iuris 
esset. (…) Quas vero pecunias ipse credidisset, eas non ex maiore 
                                                 
56  D. 41,2,5: “If I owe you Stichus on a stipulation and do not deliver him but you obtain 
possession of him, you are a robber; equally, if I sell a thing and do not deliver it, but you 
obtain possession of it without my consent, you do not possess it as purchaser but you are a 
robber” (transl. Watson). 
 
parte, quam ex qua ipse heres sit, alienatas esse: nam et si tibi in hoc 
dederim nummos, ut eos Sticho credas, deinde mortuo me ignorans 
dederis, accipientis non facies: neque enim sicut illud receptum est, 
ut debitores solventes ei liberentur, ita hoc quoque receptum, ut 
credendo nummos alienaret. Quare si nulla stipulatio intervenisset, 
neque ut creditam pecuniam pro parte coheredis peti posse neque 
pignora teneri. (…)57 
 
Africanus discusses in this long text – only partially reproduced here – the fate of 
the business activities conducted by the slave Stichus after the death of his master, 
having moreover been freed by the latter in his will and even named co-heir. 
Being ignorant of these circumstances, he carries on with his activities as a 
moneylender, which poses the problem of the consequences of such acts. 
Regarding the transfer of ownership over the money which Stichus handed over, 
Africanus considers that he only can be seen as transferring ownership in 
proportion to his share in the inheritance. This implies that the intent of the 
master is no longer to be considered, but only that of the new co-owners. As 
already mentioned, if one of the co-owners transfers ownership without the 
authorization of the others, he will only be transferring ownership in proportion 
to his share58. Africanus moreover stresses this point by introducing a 
hypothetical case, in which someone gives money to his slave in order to lend it 
to Stichus, dying before the money is delivered without the slave knowing it. In 
such circumstances, says Africanus, the property does not pass to the recipient, 
being even more evident in this case – due to its simplicity – that the lack 
voluntas domini stands in the way of the transfer of ownership59. The same rule 
applies moreover to other problems, such as the constitution of a pledge, as can 
be seen in the final sentence of the text quoted. 
                                                 
57  D. 12,1,41: “Out in a province a moneylender put a slave, Stichus, in charge of his 
account book, an then, when his will was read at Rome, it turned out that Stichus was 
made free and, as to part, his heir. Unaware of his status, Stichus called in and lent out the 
dead man’s money, sometimes taking stipulations and receiving pledges. The questions was 
asked as to the law on these facts. (…) As for the money he himself had lent out, no 
property in it had passed larger than his own share in the estate; for even if I give you coins 
for the very purpose of your lending them to Stichus and then I die and you hand them 
over in ignorance of my death, the property in the coins does not pass to the recipient. For 
the holding that debtors who paid him were released did not entail the further proposition 
that he validly alienated the coins he lent out. Hence, in the absence of a stipulation a co-
heir could not, according to his share, make a claim as for money lent, and the pledges 
were not binding. (…)” (Transl. Watson). 
58  See D. 24,1,38,1 (Alfenus 3 dig. a Paulo epitomatorum), studied in Chapter 2, Section 1(a) 
above. 
59  Lenel, Afrikans Quästionen (1931), p. 35 n. 7 considers the text nam… facies to be the result 
of a later gloss, since the reference to Stichus does not really play any role in the example 
given. However, the reference to the death of the owner of the other slave does round up 
nicely the argument of Africanus, which is why Lenel’s claim may be too rash. 
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arbitrarily decides to forbid his procurator to deliver the object, a prohibition 
which in fact prevents the transferee from acquiring Quiritary ownership. The 
fact that the owner originally consented to the sale is only relevant to the praetor, 
who creates a defence based on this fact. This defence is however not infallible, 
as shown in D. 41,4,7,6.  
 The need for the voluntas domini at the delivery can also be seen in cases 
where there is no delivery by a non-owner, but where there is a preceding iusta 
causa traditionis and the delivery is pending. In such circumstances, despite the 
existence of iusta causa, it is still necessary for the owner to agree to the delivery, 
which implies that the transferee cannot become owner by snatching the object 
without the owner’s consent, as can be seen in the following text by Paul: 
 
D. 41,2,5 (Paul 63 ed.): Si ex stipulatione tibi Stichum debeam et 
non tradam eum, tu autem nanctus fueris possessionem, praedo es: 
aeque si vendidero nec tradidero rem, si non voluntate mea nanctus 
sis possessionem, non pro emptore possides, sed praedo es56. 
 
In this case, an owner stipulated that he would deliver the slave Stichus, and since 
the owner does not do so, the transferee decides to take the slave himself, 
without the owner’s consent (non voluntate mea). This qualifies the transferee as a 
robber (praedo), preventing not only the immediate transfer of ownership, but 
even an eventual acquisition through usucapion, as will be seen in the following 
section. Particularly relevant at this point is to observe that the owner’s voluntas 
cannot be simply derived from a preceding stipulatio, according to which he was 
bound to transfer ownership. The owner must grant his consent, the absence of 
which will prevent the transfer of ownership, and in this particular case – due to 
the conduct of the transferee – will prevent the usucapion from taking place as 
well. 
 The informal and revocable nature of the voluntas domini grants this element a 
relatively volatile nature, since the original authorization may suddenly disappear, 
which is particularly noticeable in the cases where the owner dies before the 
delivery takes place: 
 
D. 12,1,41 (Afr. 8 quaest.): Eius, qui in provincia Stichum servum 
kalendario praeposuerat, Romae testamentum recitatum erat, quo 
idem Stichus liber et ex parte heres erat scriptus: qui status sui 
ignarus pecunias defuncti aut exegit aut credidit, ut interdum 
stipularetur et pignora acciperet. Consulebatur quid de his iuris 
esset. (…) Quas vero pecunias ipse credidisset, eas non ex maiore 
                                                 
56  D. 41,2,5: “If I owe you Stichus on a stipulation and do not deliver him but you obtain 
possession of him, you are a robber; equally, if I sell a thing and do not deliver it, but you 
obtain possession of it without my consent, you do not possess it as purchaser but you are a 
robber” (transl. Watson). 
 
parte, quam ex qua ipse heres sit, alienatas esse: nam et si tibi in hoc 
dederim nummos, ut eos Sticho credas, deinde mortuo me ignorans 
dederis, accipientis non facies: neque enim sicut illud receptum est, 
ut debitores solventes ei liberentur, ita hoc quoque receptum, ut 
credendo nummos alienaret. Quare si nulla stipulatio intervenisset, 
neque ut creditam pecuniam pro parte coheredis peti posse neque 
pignora teneri. (…)57 
 
Africanus discusses in this long text – only partially reproduced here – the fate of 
the business activities conducted by the slave Stichus after the death of his master, 
having moreover been freed by the latter in his will and even named co-heir. 
Being ignorant of these circumstances, he carries on with his activities as a 
moneylender, which poses the problem of the consequences of such acts. 
Regarding the transfer of ownership over the money which Stichus handed over, 
Africanus considers that he only can be seen as transferring ownership in 
proportion to his share in the inheritance. This implies that the intent of the 
master is no longer to be considered, but only that of the new co-owners. As 
already mentioned, if one of the co-owners transfers ownership without the 
authorization of the others, he will only be transferring ownership in proportion 
to his share58. Africanus moreover stresses this point by introducing a 
hypothetical case, in which someone gives money to his slave in order to lend it 
to Stichus, dying before the money is delivered without the slave knowing it. In 
such circumstances, says Africanus, the property does not pass to the recipient, 
being even more evident in this case – due to its simplicity – that the lack 
voluntas domini stands in the way of the transfer of ownership59. The same rule 
applies moreover to other problems, such as the constitution of a pledge, as can 
be seen in the final sentence of the text quoted. 
                                                 
57  D. 12,1,41: “Out in a province a moneylender put a slave, Stichus, in charge of his 
account book, an then, when his will was read at Rome, it turned out that Stichus was 
made free and, as to part, his heir. Unaware of his status, Stichus called in and lent out the 
dead man’s money, sometimes taking stipulations and receiving pledges. The questions was 
asked as to the law on these facts. (…) As for the money he himself had lent out, no 
property in it had passed larger than his own share in the estate; for even if I give you coins 
for the very purpose of your lending them to Stichus and then I die and you hand them 
over in ignorance of my death, the property in the coins does not pass to the recipient. For 
the holding that debtors who paid him were released did not entail the further proposition 
that he validly alienated the coins he lent out. Hence, in the absence of a stipulation a co-
heir could not, according to his share, make a claim as for money lent, and the pledges 
were not binding. (…)” (Transl. Watson). 
58  See D. 24,1,38,1 (Alfenus 3 dig. a Paulo epitomatorum), studied in Chapter 2, Section 1(a) 
above. 
59  Lenel, Afrikans Quästionen (1931), p. 35 n. 7 considers the text nam… facies to be the result 
of a later gloss, since the reference to Stichus does not really play any role in the example 
given. However, the reference to the death of the owner of the other slave does round up 
nicely the argument of Africanus, which is why Lenel’s claim may be too rash. 
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 Similar solutions in case the owner dies before transferring ownership are to 
be found in the writings of Julian60, which would indicate that Africanus was 
reproducing the opinions of his master. One may however identify differences of 
opinion among classical jurists concerning the significance of the delivery after 
the death of the owner, since Pomponius considers that ownership will be 
transferred if the agent did not know about the death of the owner or the 
opposition of the heirs61. Ulpian would not take into account the opinion of the 
owner, but simply the fact of the death and the subsequent lack of voluntas 
domini. In D. 23,3,9,162 this jurist analyses a case where an owner delivers an 
object under the condition to serve as a dowry after the marriage. However, the 
owner dies before the marriage takes place. In these circumstances, it is argued 
that ownership cannot be transferred, since the new owner – the heir – cannot 
be dispossessed without his consent (a quo discedere rerum non posse dominium 
invito)63. Similar notions can be found in D. 27,9,1,364, where an owner is 
presented as having some objects on sale, dying afterwards without leaving any 
particular instructions in his will concerning such sale. Ulpian decides that the 
sale should not be carried out after his death, referring to the absence of a clear 
intent by the owner in that sense: “for one who wanted to sell himself did not 
necessarily want them sold after his death” (non enim utique qui ipse voluerit vendere, 
idem etiam postea distrahenda putavit). Equally important is to bear in mind that 
only the heirs have now the power to dispose, and therefore it is their intent 
which is decisive for the transfer of ownership. 
                                                 
60  See D. 39,5,2,6 (Jul. 60 dig.), discussed in Chapter 2, Section 3. 
61  D. 41,2,33 (Pomp. 32 Sab.): “Fundi venditor etiamsi mandaverit alicui, ut emptorem in 
vacuam possessionem induceret, priusquam id fieret, non recte emptor per se in 
possessionem veniet. Item si amicus venditoris mortuo eo, priusquam id sciret, aut non 
prohibentibus heredibus id fecerit, recte possessio tradita erit. Sed si id fecerit, cum sciret 
dominum mortuum aut cum sciret heredes id facere nolle, contra erit”. 
62  D. 23,3,9,1 (Ulp. 31 Sab.): “Si res alicui tradidero, ut nuptiis secutis dotis efficiantur, et 
ante nuptias decessero, an secutis nuptiis dotis esse incipiant? Et vereor, ne non possint in 
dominio eius effici cui datae sunt, quia post mortem incipiat dominium discedere ab eo qui 
dedit, quia pendet donatio in diem nuptiarum et cum sequitur condicio nuptiarum, iam 
heredis dominium est, a quo discedere rerum non posse dominium invito eo fatendum est. 
Sed benignius est favore dotium necessitatem imponi heredi consentire ei quod defunctus 
fecit aut, si distulerit vel absit, etiam nolente vel absente eo dominium ad maritum ipso 
iure transferri, ne mulier maneat indotata”. See on this text Potjewijd, Beschikkings-
bevoegdheid (1998), p. 79 and 259; Stagl, Favor dotis (2009), p. 197 ff. 
63  In the end Ulpian decides that the thing should be nonetheless given to the husband as 
dowry on account of the favor dotis, and therefore the heir should be constrained to agree 
to the act of the deceased (imponi heredi consentire ei quod defunctus fecit) or otherwise 
ownership should be granted to the husband ipso iure. It should however be borne in mind 
that, as the text itself indicated, this is an exceptional solution. See on this text Stagl, Favor 
dotis (2009), p. 197 ff. 
64  D. 27,9,1,3 (Ulp. 35 ed.): “Si defunctus dum viveret res venales habuerit, testamento 
tamen non caverit, uti distraherentur, abstinendum erit venditione: non enim utique qui 
ipse voluerit vendere, idem etiam postea distrahenda putavit”. 
 
 It is also worth noting that the voluntas domini seems to operate in a similar 
way regarding other legal acts which involve a patrimonial loss for the owner, 
although the outcome may vary according to the particular features of each act. 
For instance, Julian discusses the importance of the voluntas patris when the 
paterfamilias gives authorization for the manumission to his son but dies before it 
takes place, determining that according to the favor libertatis the slave should 
become free if the owner did not change his mind65. Otherwise, the 
manumission is not seen as taking place voluntate patris. The owner’s death seems 
to prevent the act from taking place voluntate domini, which is also to be seen in 
the way Paul conveys Julian’s opinion in another passage66. However, the 
peculiarities of the manumission lead Julian to accept a different outcome by way 
of exception through the reference to the favor libertatis. It is moreover 
noteworthy that in the case of the manumission both texts consider that the 
voluntas domini is regarded to be extinguished by the mere change of mind of the 
owner, even if it was not communicated to the person performing the act before 
carrying it out67. All of this shows that, while jurists could apply similar notions 
when dealing with different acts involving patrimonial loss, the solutions could 
vary significantly. It is moreover significant to find again in the context of the 
developments of the voluntas domini the name of Julian, since it could indicate 
that some of the innovative interpretations considering this element found their 
origin in the works of this jurist. 
 Returning to the voluntas domini in the context of the transfer of ownership, it 
should be borne in mind that the fact that the voluntas domini is tested at the 
traditio implies not only that the extinction of the original consent – due to the 
express prohibition, death or other cause – prevents the transfer of ownership 
from taking place, but also that if the owner gains knowledge of the sale of an 
object belonging to him concluded by someone else and authorizes the delivery, 
ownership will be transferred through the subsequent traditio performed by the 
authorized non-owner:  
 
                                                 
65  D. 40,2,4pr (Jul. 42 dig.): “Si pater filio permiserit servum manumittere et interim 
decesserit intestato, deinde filius ignorans patrem suum mortuum libertatem imposuerit, 
libertas servo favore libertatis contingit, cum non appareat mutata esse domini voluntas. Sin 
autem ignorante filio vetuisset pater per nuntium et antequam filius certior fieret, servum 
manumisisset, liber non fit. Nam ut filio manumittente servus ad libertatem perveniat, 
durare oportet patris voluntatem: nam si mutata fuerit, non erit verum volente patre filium 
manumisisse”. 
66  D. 40,9,15,1 (Paul 1 ad legem Iuliam): “Iulianus ait, si postea, quam filio permisit pater 
manumittere, filius ignorans patrem decessisse manumisit vindicta, non fieri eum liberum. 
Sed et si vivit pater et voluntas mutata erit, non videri volente patre filium manumisisse”. 
67  D. 40,2,4pr: “…Sin autem ignorante filio vetuisset pater per nuntium et antequam filius 
certior fieret, servum manumisisset, liber non fit…”  
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the death of the owner, since Pomponius considers that ownership will be 
transferred if the agent did not know about the death of the owner or the 
opposition of the heirs61. Ulpian would not take into account the opinion of the 
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that ownership cannot be transferred, since the new owner – the heir – cannot 
be dispossessed without his consent (a quo discedere rerum non posse dominium 
invito)63. Similar notions can be found in D. 27,9,1,364, where an owner is 
presented as having some objects on sale, dying afterwards without leaving any 
particular instructions in his will concerning such sale. Ulpian decides that the 
sale should not be carried out after his death, referring to the absence of a clear 
intent by the owner in that sense: “for one who wanted to sell himself did not 
necessarily want them sold after his death” (non enim utique qui ipse voluerit vendere, 
idem etiam postea distrahenda putavit). Equally important is to bear in mind that 
only the heirs have now the power to dispose, and therefore it is their intent 
which is decisive for the transfer of ownership. 
                                                 
60  See D. 39,5,2,6 (Jul. 60 dig.), discussed in Chapter 2, Section 3. 
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62  D. 23,3,9,1 (Ulp. 31 Sab.): “Si res alicui tradidero, ut nuptiis secutis dotis efficiantur, et 
ante nuptias decessero, an secutis nuptiis dotis esse incipiant? Et vereor, ne non possint in 
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that, as the text itself indicated, this is an exceptional solution. See on this text Stagl, Favor 
dotis (2009), p. 197 ff. 
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authorized non-owner:  
 
                                                 
65  D. 40,2,4pr (Jul. 42 dig.): “Si pater filio permiserit servum manumittere et interim 
decesserit intestato, deinde filius ignorans patrem suum mortuum libertatem imposuerit, 
libertas servo favore libertatis contingit, cum non appareat mutata esse domini voluntas. Sin 
autem ignorante filio vetuisset pater per nuntium et antequam filius certior fieret, servum 
manumisisset, liber non fit. Nam ut filio manumittente servus ad libertatem perveniat, 
durare oportet patris voluntatem: nam si mutata fuerit, non erit verum volente patre filium 
manumisisse”. 
66  D. 40,9,15,1 (Paul 1 ad legem Iuliam): “Iulianus ait, si postea, quam filio permisit pater 
manumittere, filius ignorans patrem decessisse manumisit vindicta, non fieri eum liberum. 
Sed et si vivit pater et voluntas mutata erit, non videri volente patre filium manumisisse”. 
67  D. 40,2,4pr: “…Sin autem ignorante filio vetuisset pater per nuntium et antequam filius 
certior fieret, servum manumisisset, liber non fit…”  
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D. 41,3,44,1 (Pap. 23 quaest.): Constat, si rem alienam scienti mihi 
vendas, tradas autem eo tempore, quo dominus ratum habet, 
traditionis tempus inspiciendum remque meam fieri68. 
 
This text by Papinian is particularly clear, stressing that the traditio is the moment 
at which it is relevant that the owner authorizes the transfer of ownership: “it is 
the time of delivery to which we look” (traditionis tempus inspiciendum). It is in 
principle only relevant for the transfer of ownership that the non-owner is 
authorized by the owner at the moment of the traditio. A contract of sale 
concluded by a non-owner without the owner’s consent will not be in itself 
invalid. This is why the terms used in expressions such as ‘ius vendendi’ should not 
be literally understood as ‘the right to sell’, since the sale itself can be concluded 
even by an unauthorized non-owner. This idea agrees with the general notions 
concerning the transfer of ownership in Roman law, since in several texts it is 
laid down that the sale of an object belonging to someone else is valid69, but that 
the subsequent delivery will not transfer ownership. The text just quoted 
exemplifies this general approach, but the opinion normally quoted as the 
conclusive demonstration of this point is the following: 
 
D. 18,1,28 (Ulp. 41 Sab.): Rem alienam distrahere quem posse nulla 
dubitatio est: nam emptio est et venditio: sed res emptori auferri 
potest70. 
 
Scholars have pointed out that the text is a generalization, the original text 
dealing exclusively with a case of pledge, as its palingenetic location shows71. 
Nonetheless, Daube has indicated that this generalization only aimed at 
expressing an idea which “went without saying”72 for classical jurists, and 
accordingly one cannot question its validity in classical Roman law. 
                                                 
68  D. 41,3,44,1: “It is settled that if you sell me someone else’s thing, I being aware of the 
fact, but you deliver it only once the owner has ratified the transaction, it is the time of 
delivery to which we look, and the thing becomes mine” (transl. Watson). 
69  Concerning the sale see the account of Talamanca, Vendita (1993), p. 337 ff. Regarding 
the stipulation the text of D. 45,1,137,4 (Venonius 1 stipulationum) is particularly 
interesting. These rule may have been different for other iustae causae, such as the donatio, as 
shown by D. 39,5,9,3 (Pomp. 38 Sab.): “Donari non potest, nisi quod eius fit, cui 
donatur”. 
70  D. 18,1,28: “There is no doubt that one can sell a third person’s property; there is a valid 
sale and purchase, even though the thing may be taken away from the purchaser” (transl. 
Watson). 
71  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 1167 shows that book 41 of Ulpian’s ad Sabinum dealt with 
theft, which leads Lenel to locate this text within fragment 2874, before D. 13,7,4, which 
dealt with the alienation by a pledge creditor and the fact that he may commit theft if 
exceeding the terms of the agreement. 
72  Daube, Generalizations (1953), p. 191. 
 
 According to the above-mentioned texts, ownership will not be transferred if 
at the moment of the delivery the non-owner is not authorized to transfer 
ownership. It is however possible that a delivery which did not transfer 
ownership due to the lack of voluntas domini is later ratified by the owner. In this 
case, the transfer of ownership takes place due to the ratihabitio (ratification) of 
the owner, which implies that an act which was not originally valid will bear the 
same consequences as if it had been authorized from the beginning, provided the 
person whose authorization was lacking grants it later73. This explains the general 
claim of Ulpian, according to whom the ratihabitio could be equated to a mandate 
(rati enim habitio mandato comparatur)74. Roman jurists apply this doctrine in several 
cases to the transfer of ownership75, granting the same consequences to the 
delivery that was authorized beforehand, which implies that the transferee will 
even be able to acquire the dominium ex iure Quiritium76. All of this shows that the 
voluntas domini has a central role when determining the attribution of property, 
being of secondary importance whether this authorization comes before or after 
it takes place77. It is this close similarity which often leads jurists to deal jointly 
with cases in which the authorization was either given before or after a particular 
act was concluded78. Despite the ratification, it is however worth noting that the 
owner will be able to claim the price from the transferor79, which shows that the 
ratification does not imply that the owner will allow the transferor to retain the 
profits of the act80. 
 The variety of opinions concerning the voluntas domini shows that, while this 
element was decisive for the transfer of ownership according to the ius civile from 
time immemorial, the exact significance of it was open for interpretation. The 
sources in fact offer numerous examples of innovative opinions and 
disagreements among Roman jurists concerning when a non-owner should be 
regarded as acting voluntate domini, as it will be shown in the following sections. 
                                                 
73  Among the general texts dealing with the ratihabitio see D. 46,8,12,1 (Ulp. 80 ed.); 
D. 46,3,12,4 (Ulp. 30 Sab.); D. 50,17,60 (Ulp. 10 disputationum); D. 50,17,152,2 (Ulp. 69 
ed.). 
74  D. 46,3,12,4 (Ulp. 30 Sab.): “Sed etsi non vero procuratori solvam, ratum autem habeat 
dominus, quod solutum est, liberatio contingit; rati enim habitio mandato comparatur”. 
75  The ratihabitio in the case of the transfer of ownership has been studied in detail by 
Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 171 ff.  
76  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 178. 
77  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 166, 174.  
78  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 174 ff. Regarding the transfer of ownership see 
e.g. D. 24,1,38,1 (Alfenus 3 dig. a Paulo epitomatorum). The same principle is moreover 
applied in other contexts: D. 13,7,20; D. 20,1,16,1; D. 39,3,10,1. 
79  C. 3,32,3pr-1 (Alexander, 222): “Mater tua vel maritus fundum tuum invita vel ignorante 
te vendere iure non potuit, sed rem tuam a possessore vindicare etiam non oblato pretio 
poteris. (1) Sin autem postea de ea venditione consensisti vel alio modo proprietatem eius 
amisisti, adversus emptorem quidem nullam habes actionem, adversus venditricem vero de 
pretio negotiorum gestorum exercere non prohiberis”. See on this text Potjewijd, 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 191-192 
80  This point has been recently studied by Isola, D. 3,5,8 (2015), p. 107-125. 
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For the time being it is important to bear in mind that, while the consequences 
of an act performed voluntate domini are already clear among the veteres, later 
jurists will have considerable freedom to determine the significance of this 
concept. This is an essential point in order to understand the Rechtsfindung carried 
out by Roman jurisprudence in the context of the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner. 
 
2. Traditio invito domino, furtum and the possibility of usucapion 
 
Through the set of texts quoted in the previous section, it has become clear that 
the traditio voluntate domini bears the same consequences as the delivery performed 
by the owner himself. One may at this point wonder about the consequences of 
the delivery performed without  the owner’s authorization. Under this general 
label, one can group seemingly different cases, such as the delivery performed by 
someone who had no relation to the owner and the delivery by someone who 
exceeds the owner’s instructions or acts in complete opposition to them. Such 
situations bear in fact completely different consequences from the point of view 
of the law of the obligations, but from the point of view of the transfer of 
ownership they are approached in the same way, since in none of these cases is 
ownership transferred. The acquirer could in principle only eventually acquire 
ownership through usucapion, as shown in the Institutes of Gaius, provided that 
he received the object in good faith: 
 
Gai 2,43: Ceterum etiam earum rerum usucapio nobis conpetit, 
quae non a domino nobis traditae fuerint, sive mancipi sint eae res 
sive nec mancipi, si modo eas bona fide acceperimus, cum 
crederemus eum, qui traderet, dominum esse81. 
 
The good faith regarding the requirement of the potestas alienandi will therefore 
give the acquirer only a possessio ad usucapionem. While in the usucapion of res 
mancipi delivered by traditio (Gai 2,41) the position of the acquirer would be very 
solid due to the praetorian protection – the acquirer having in fact the thing in 
bonis – such protection is much more restricted in the usucapion which follows 
from the delivery by a non-owner: the praetor will protect the transferee in 
specific cases, for instance by granting the exceptio rei voluntate eius venditae 
(D. 41,4,7,6) or the exceptio si non auctor meus ex voluntate tua vendidit (D. 6,2,14), 
as well as the actio Publiciana (D. 6,2,14). The actio Publiciana in such case would 
allow the acquirer to recover his possession against anyone who had a lesser right 
than himself, which meant that he would not succeed in recovering the object 
                                                 
81  Gai 2,43: “But we can also usucapt things which have not been delivered to us by the 
owner, whether they are mancipi or nec mancipi, provided that we receive them in good 
faith, believing that the person who delivered them was owner” (transl. Gordon/ 
Robinson, modified). 
 
from the Quiritary owner, who would defend himself with an exceptio iusti 
dominii (D. 6,2,16-17). 
 At this point, it should be noted that despite these broad general rules, in 
several cases the traditio performed by a non-owner would not lead to the 
acquisition through usucapion due to the prohibition to acquire stolen objects 
(Gai 2,45) and the wide concept of furtum in classical jurisprudence (Gai 2,50), 
which implied that most cases in which the traditio was not authorized would fall 
under the category of furtum. Gai 2,45-51 deals with cases of illegal alienations, in 
which the possessor will not be able to acquire ownership by usucapion even if 
he acquired in good faith82. Regarding objects which were stolen or taken by 
force, there were clear statutory provisions which prevent their acquisition 
through usucapion. The first of them is the Law of the Twelve Tables, which 
forbade the acquisition of stolen goods, being later complemented by the Lex 
Atinia of the 2nd century BC83. According to these regulations, no one could 
acquire ownership over the stolen good (aeterna auctoritas esto). The Lex Iulia et 
Plautia de vi established moreover an analogous prohibition concerning objects 
taken by force. The prohibition concerning objects stolen or taken by force 
implied that the object itself was tainted by a prohibition of usucapion, the good 
faith of the acquirer being accordingly irrelevant to remedy that element. 
Gai 2,49 shows this by declaring that the prohibition does not concern 
exclusively the thief himself – who cannot anyhow acquire through usucapion 
since he is in bad faith – but anyone who subsequently acquires the object84. 
 According to Gaius, the prohibition of acquiring stolen goods would 
significantly limit the scope of application of usucapion because most cases of 
transfer of ownership by an unauthorized non-owner fall under the category of 
furtum, and only some specific cases would escape from the scope of application 
of the mentioned prohibition: 
 
                                                 
82  Gai 2,45: “Sed aliquando etiamsi maxime quis bona fide alienam rem possideat, non tamen 
illi usucapio procedit (…)” (But sometimes usucapion will not work to the advantage of 
the possessor of another’s thing, even although his possession is definitely in good faith 
[transl. Gordon/Robinson]). 
83  Gai 2,45 does not mention the Lex Atinia. Other texts discussing this prohibition mention 
both the Law of the Twelve Tables and the Lex Atinia (Inst. 2,6,3; D. 41,3,33), or just the 
latter text (D. 41,3,4,6; D. 50,16,215). The relationship between both legal texts regarding 
the prohibition to usucapt stolen object has been subject to considerable scholarly debate. 
See on this point Jolowicz, De Furtis (1940), p. lxxxviii-lxxxix; Sirks, Furtum (2013), 
p. 492-493, 500-501. 
84  Gai 2,49: “Quod ergo vulgo dicitur furtivarum rerum et vi possessarum usucapionem per 
legem XII tabularum prohibitam esse, non eo pertinet, ut ne ipse fur quive per vim 
possidet, usucapere possit (nam huic alia ratione usucapio non competit, quia scilicet mala 
fide possidet), sed nec ullus alius, quamquam ab eo bona fide emerit, usucapiendi ius 
habeat”. This irrelevance of the good faith of the acquirer is also stressed in other texts, 
such as C. 7,27,7: “(…) non permittit usucapionem fieri, licet bona fide possideatur”. 
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exclusively the thief himself – who cannot anyhow acquire through usucapion 
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 According to Gaius, the prohibition of acquiring stolen goods would 
significantly limit the scope of application of usucapion because most cases of 
transfer of ownership by an unauthorized non-owner fall under the category of 
furtum, and only some specific cases would escape from the scope of application 
of the mentioned prohibition: 
 
                                                 
82  Gai 2,45: “Sed aliquando etiamsi maxime quis bona fide alienam rem possideat, non tamen 
illi usucapio procedit (…)” (But sometimes usucapion will not work to the advantage of 
the possessor of another’s thing, even although his possession is definitely in good faith 
[transl. Gordon/Robinson]). 
83  Gai 2,45 does not mention the Lex Atinia. Other texts discussing this prohibition mention 
both the Law of the Twelve Tables and the Lex Atinia (Inst. 2,6,3; D. 41,3,33), or just the 
latter text (D. 41,3,4,6; D. 50,16,215). The relationship between both legal texts regarding 
the prohibition to usucapt stolen object has been subject to considerable scholarly debate. 
See on this point Jolowicz, De Furtis (1940), p. lxxxviii-lxxxix; Sirks, Furtum (2013), 
p. 492-493, 500-501. 
84  Gai 2,49: “Quod ergo vulgo dicitur furtivarum rerum et vi possessarum usucapionem per 
legem XII tabularum prohibitam esse, non eo pertinet, ut ne ipse fur quive per vim 
possidet, usucapere possit (nam huic alia ratione usucapio non competit, quia scilicet mala 
fide possidet), sed nec ullus alius, quamquam ab eo bona fide emerit, usucapiendi ius 
habeat”. This irrelevance of the good faith of the acquirer is also stressed in other texts, 
such as C. 7,27,7: “(…) non permittit usucapionem fieri, licet bona fide possideatur”. 
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Gai 2,50: Unde in rebus mobilibus non facile procedit, ut bonae 
fidei possessori usucapio competat, quia qui alienam rem vendidit et 
tradidit, furtum committit; idemque accidit etiam, si ex alia causa 
tradatur. Sed tamen hoc aliquando aliter se habet; nam si heres rem 
defuncto commodatam aut locatam vel apud eum depositam 
existimans eam esse hereditariam, vendiderit aut donaverit, furtum 
non committit; item si is, ad quem ancillae ususfructus pertinent, 
partum etiam suum esse credens vendiderit aut donaverit, furtum 
non committit; furtum enim sine affectu furandi non committitur. 
Aliis quoque modis accidere potest, ut quis sine vitio furti rem 
alienam ad aliquem transferat et efficiat, ut a possessore 
usucapiatur85. 
 
The text shows that the wide concept of furtum which was used in Roman law 
allows usucapion of someone else’s property in those cases where there was no 
intention to steal. Gaius presents as examples fairly specific cases, such as the sale 
by an heir of an object which the deceased person had borrowed, believing that 
the latter was actually the owner. This misconception would even include cases of 
error iuris, as the example of the partus ancillae shows, where the person with a 
usufruct over a female slave sells her offspring under the belief that he is entitled 
to do so. These examples give the impression that usucapion will only rarely take 
place when an unauthorized non-owner delivers an object. This view, however, 
may be misleading, and since the subjective representation of the tradens is 
presented as the decisive element in order to determine whether furtum takes 
place, further analysis on the notion of furtum is needed in order to understand the 
role of the voluntas domini and the intention of the non-owner regarding this 
element. 
 The study of furtum in Roman law has been surrounded by controversy 
regarding which elements were considered relevant and to what extent by classical 
jurists in order to configure this crime, which are generally described as the 
appropriation of the object (contrectatio) done without the owner’s consent (invito 
                                                 
85  Gai 2,50: “And so with moveable things such a possessor cannot often rely on usucapion, 
because someone who sells and delivers another’s property commits theft; the same applies 
even if the delivery is on some other basis. Yet sometimes the result is different. Suppose 
that an heir, in the belief that it forms part of the inheritance, sells or gifts something that 
had in fact been given on loan or hired to or deposited with the deceased; he does not 
commit theft. Again, a person with a usufruct in a female slave who sells or gives away the 
offspring in the belief that they are his does not commit theft. Theft is not committed 
without intent to steal. There are also other ways that someone can transfer a third party’s 
property to another without the taint of theft and leave it possible for the recipient to 
usucapt the thing” (transl. Gordon/Robinson). This text was laid down in similar terms in 
the Res cottidianae, as can be seen in D. 41,3,36 (Gai. 2 rer. cott.). 
 
domino)86 and with a theftuous intent (dolo malo, or with animus furandi)87. The 
subjective position of the owner is traditionally less controversial than the other 
two. Some authors claim, based on Plautus’ comedy ‘Poenulus’, that in the pre-
classical period the owner’s subjective stance was irrelevant, but this isolated 
evidence of the subject seems to be overrated88. Be it as it may, that the furtum 
must be performed invito domino appears in a text by Sabinus brought down to us 
by Gellius: 
 
Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 11,18,20: Verba sunt Sabini ex libro 
iuris civilis secundo: qui alienam rem adtrectavit cum id se invito 
domino facere iudicare deberet, furti tenetur. 
 
Apart from this text, numerous other reference from authors both before and after 
Sabinus stress the importance of the owner’s state of mind89. This element is also 
included in the description of furtum given by Gaius: 
 
Gai 3,195: Furtum autem fit non solum cum quis intercipiendi causa 
rem alienam amovet, sed generaliter, cum quis rem alienam invito 
domino contrectat90.  
 
The unwillingness of the owner is once again clearly presented as an element of 
the furtum with the words ‘invito domino’. This would seem to present the owner’s 
unwillingness as a clear-cut criterion to determine the existence of furtum, but 
there are several other texts which make reference to an additional element, 
which is the dolus, the subjective representation of the non-owner in regard to the 
owner’s will. This element is already clearly sketched in the above-quoted text of 
Sabinus, which does not merely require that the furtum takes place ‘invito domino’, 
but that the non-owner in fact should be considered to act against the owner’s 
will (invito domino facere iudicare deberet). A specific intent is also discernible in 
                                                 
86  In the following paragraphs theft will be generally described as committed by the non-
owner against the owner, despite the fact that in specific cases it is the owner himself who 
commits furtum over his property, as shown for example in Gai 3,200. 
87  Nicholas, Theophilus and Contrectatio (1983), p. 121. 
88  For an analysis of the furtum in the Poenulus see Salomón, Sine vitio (2003), p. 46; 
Stringini, Furtum en Poenulus (2009), p. 1-28. In this play, a pimp was held liable for furtum 
even though the stolen goods were placed under his power by instigation of the owner 
himself. However, the scene would appear to tell us more about the furtum conceptum than 
about the requirements to configure furtum in general, and therefore care should be taken 
not to give it an excessive dogmatic significance regarding this last point. On the complex 
nature of furtum conceptum see Sirks, Furtum (2013), p. 487-492. 
89  See e.g. D. 47,2,92(91) (Lab. 2 pithanon a Paulo epitomatorum); D. 13,1,20 (Tryph. 15 
disput.); D. 24,1,63 (Paul 3 ad Neratium); D. 16,3,11 (Ulp. 41 Sab.); D. 47,2,48,2 (Ulp. 42 
Sab.). 
90  Gai 3,195: “Theft is committed not only when someone removes something belonging to 
another to have it for himself but, more comprehensively, whenever someone handles 
something belonging to another without the owner’s consent” (transl. Gordon/Robinson).  
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Gai 3,195 under the words “intercipiendi causa” (to have it for himself) and it is the 
dominant idea in a subsequent text referring to a case of furtum usus: 
 
Gai 3,197: Placuit tamen eos, qui rebus commodatis aliter uterentur 
quam utendas accepissent, ita furtum committere, si intellegant id se 
invito domino facere eumque, si intellexisset, non permissurum; at si 
permissurum credant, extra furti crimem videri, optima sane 
distinctione, quod furtum sine dolo malo non commititur91. 
 
In this case, the non-owner’s dolus is presented as the decisive element to 
determine whether the borrower did or did not commit theft through the use of 
the borrowed object, which Gaius declares to be an “excellent distinction” 
(optima sane distinctione), adding “since theft cannot be committed without 
wrongful intent” (quod furtum sine dolo malo non commititur). Gaius would highlight 
the importance of the non-owner’s subjective representation in other contexts, 
such as Gai 2,208, where it is stated that “theft depends on intent” (furtum ex 
adfectu consistit), or Gai 4,178, where we are told that “calumny, like the crime of 
theft, lies in the intention” (calumnia enim in adfectu est, sicut furti crimen). 
 The importance of dolus by the non-owner is highlighted in numerous other 
classical texts, such as the famous definition of furtum by Paul, who describes it as 
“contrectatio rei fraudulosa lucri faciendi gratia” (D. 47,2,1,3 [Paul 39 ed.])92, or 
Ulpian’s quotation of Pedius, according to whom “nemo furtum facit sine dolo malo” 
(D. 47,2,50,2 [Ulp. 37 ed.]). The non-owner’s subjective state of mind appears as 
a decisive element to determine the outcome of several cases93, and it is moreover 
mentioned in passing in other contexts, being normally referred to as dolus malus, 
but also through the equivalent expressions affectus / animus furandi, celandi or lucri 
faciendi94. Despite the wide use of these concepts among Roman jurists, its validity 
                                                 
91  Gai 3,197: “But it was accepted that borrowers who put the thing to an extra use only 
commit theft if they know the owner does not consent and would not consent if he knew; 
if they believe he would allow it, they are not liable. This is an excellent distinction, since 
theft cannot be committed without wrongful intent” (transl. Gordon/Robinson, 
modified). The text is reproduced in Inst. 4,1,7. 
92  See also PS 2,31,1: “Fur est qui dolo malo rem alienam contrectat”. Paul’s definition in 
D. 47,2,1,3 is traditionally regarded as altered by the compilers, but scholars have been 
keen to point out that even if this was the case, the elements included in this text remain 
representative of the notion of furtum in classical Roman law. Others consider the passage 
genuine, such as Thomas, Animus furandi (1968), p. 31-32. 
93  See in particular D. 47,2,21,3 (Paul 40 Sab.); D. 47,2,43,1; 43,6; 43,10 (Ulp. 41 Sab.); 
D. 47,2,46,7 (Ulp. 42 Sab.); D. 47,2,48,3 (Ulp. 42 Sab.); D. 47,2,77(76)pr (Pomp. 38 ad 
Quintum Mucium). An account of the texts within D. 47,2 where the intentional element is 
relevant is offered by Milella, Il consenso (1988), p. 391 n. 1. See moreover MacCormack, 
Furtum and contrectatio (1977), p. 132.  
94  A detailed account on the different expressions which convey the intention of the non-
owner is given by Milella, Il consenso (1988), p. 391-392. See further on this point Desanti, 
Dolo nel furto (2010), p. 17 n. 3. Some authors consider these expressions as alternative 
ways to convey the idea of the dolus malus, including Albanese, Furtum II (1957), p. 76 and 
 
in classical jurisprudence has been questioned for a long time. Authors such as 
Huvelin and Albertario considered that references to subjective representations 
regarding furtum were a typically post-classical element which led to the systematic 
modification of classical solutions. Even after the most extreme aspects of this 
reconstruction were abandoned, scholars often approached the references to a 
special animus at the moment of theft with caution95 – particularly the animus lucri 
faciendi – generally claiming that the intention of the non-owner would have had 
a marginal role in the classical Roman law of theft, almost exclusively limited to 
the furtum usus.  
 The suspicions regarding the animus furandi are motivated to a great extent by 
the fact that a particular dolus or animus only seems relevant in specific cases, 
especially when the owner himself handed over the object, and therefore one has 
to determine the state of mind of the owner in order to determine the existence 
of theft. There are, moreover, documented disagreements among classical jurists 
regarding the exact significance of this element and a gradual evolution towards 
more objective solutions can be observed, particularly regarding whether theft can 
be committed solo animo96, or whether a non-owner who erroneously believes to 
act invito domino commits theft97. Despite all of this, it cannot be denied that the 
non-owner’s subjective representation did play a role in the Roman law of theft 
throughout the classical period, even if it was only in specific cases. Scholars have 
moreover traced back this element to Quintus Mucius Scaevola, showing that it 
was not a mere casual innovation of Sabinus which was soon abandoned, but 
rather that it continued to be used by jurists – experiencing, no doubt, certain 
changes – throughout the whole classical period98. Therefore, it may be agreed 
that the dolus malus of the non-owner, as well as other more specific references to 
his state of mind, played a marginal role in the Roman law of theft, being 
nonetheless a decisive element to determine the outcome of certain cases. In 
other words, the irrelevance in most cases of a special subjective representation by 
the thief does not preclude that this element would have been useful to determine 
the outcome in some cases, even outside the scope of the furtum usus99. 
                                                                                                                   
Guzmán, DPR (2013) II, p. 276. Less willing to put these expressions on an equal level are 
Huvelin, Furtum (1915), p. 787 n. 1, and Jolowicz, De Furtis (1940), p. lvii-lviii.  
95  See on this point Watson, Definition of furtum (1960), p. 199; Desanti, Dolo nel furto (2010), 
p. 36-40. 
96  Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 11,19,23; D. 41,2,3,18 (Paul 54 ed.); D. 47,2,1,1-2; 
D. 47,2,52,7; D. 47,2,68(67)pr. See on this point Thomas, Animus furandi (1968), p. 6-7. 
97  Gai 3,198; D. 47,19,6; D. 47,2,44,1 (Pomp. 19 Sab.); D. 47,2,46,8. See on this point 
Jolowicz, De Furtis (1940), p. lvi-lvii; Milella, Il consenso (1988), p. 392-398, 412-414; 
Desanti, Dolo nel furto (2010), p. 32-36. 
98  On the value of this element in classical jurisprudence and its various applications see 
especially Thomas, Animus furandi (1968), p. 1-32; Pugsley, Animus furandi (1984), p. 2425-
2426; Ibbetson, Contrectatio (1994), p. 58-61; Milella, Il consenso (1988), p. 403 ff.; Desanti, 
Dolo nel furto (2010), p. 27-32. 
99  See e.g. the cases discussed by Thomas, Animus furandi (1968), p. 1-32, where only p. 26-
30 deal with the furtum usus. 
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Guzmán, DPR (2013) II, p. 276. Less willing to put these expressions on an equal level are 
Huvelin, Furtum (1915), p. 787 n. 1, and Jolowicz, De Furtis (1940), p. lvii-lviii.  
95  See on this point Watson, Definition of furtum (1960), p. 199; Desanti, Dolo nel furto (2010), 
p. 36-40. 
96  Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 11,19,23; D. 41,2,3,18 (Paul 54 ed.); D. 47,2,1,1-2; 
D. 47,2,52,7; D. 47,2,68(67)pr. See on this point Thomas, Animus furandi (1968), p. 6-7. 
97  Gai 3,198; D. 47,19,6; D. 47,2,44,1 (Pomp. 19 Sab.); D. 47,2,46,8. See on this point 
Jolowicz, De Furtis (1940), p. lvi-lvii; Milella, Il consenso (1988), p. 392-398, 412-414; 
Desanti, Dolo nel furto (2010), p. 32-36. 
98  On the value of this element in classical jurisprudence and its various applications see 
especially Thomas, Animus furandi (1968), p. 1-32; Pugsley, Animus furandi (1984), p. 2425-
2426; Ibbetson, Contrectatio (1994), p. 58-61; Milella, Il consenso (1988), p. 403 ff.; Desanti, 
Dolo nel furto (2010), p. 27-32. 
99  See e.g. the cases discussed by Thomas, Animus furandi (1968), p. 1-32, where only p. 26-
30 deal with the furtum usus. 
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MacCormack has stressed that the components of theft – including the animus lucri 
faciendi – presented in texts such as Paul’s definition of theft should rather be 
approached as “a useful guideline or a convenient summary of the main 
characteristics of furtum than as a statement of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions on the occurrence of furtum”100. Accordingly, one cannot expect the 
animus furandi to be of relevance in every case of furtum, and the scope of this 
element may have been a point of controversy among classical jurists101. Finally, it 
should be noted that authors have been more critical regarding special animi 
(lucrandi, celandi, etc.), but that the fact that a general dolus malus is necessary for 
the existence of furtum is broadly accepted102. 
 Whatever the exact importance of the subjective representation of the non-
owner in classical Roman law, it should be borne in mind that this element is 
particularly relevant when the owner voluntarily hands over an object to the non-
owner, as happens in several cases where the non-owner transfers ownership over 
the object. Accordingly, it is no wonder that the dolus malus or animus furandi 
plays a significant role in cases where an unauthorized non-owner performs the 
traditio in order to determine the existence of furtum. Several cases in which a 
non-owner performs the traditio, either without being authorized at all to do so or 
exceeding the faculties granted to him, would fall under the concept of furtum, 
and accordingly the possibility of acquiring through usucapion will be excluded. 
For instance, we are told that the falsus procurator who received money with the 
instruction to pay a debtor with those specific coins will commit furtum if he 
appropriates them and uses other coins103, just as he who sells nomine proprio, 
having been told by the owner to sell nomine alieno104. An identical outcome is 
found in the case regarding the sale of a pledge by the creditor, since the traditio of 
the pledge without having the owner’s authorization, before the time agreed, or 
violating in any other way the terms of the pactum de distrahendo, would make the 
creditor liable for furtum105. Liability for furtum will arise not only when someone 
exceeds the limits of the authorization to act, but also where there is no 
authorization whatsoever to perform a certain act, as may happen with a slave 
regarding objects of his master106 or a co-owner concerning the common 
property107. In all of these cases the delivery takes place invito domino, precluding 
thereby the transfer of ownership and determining at the same time the existence 
of theft. The fact that in many of these cases there was no room for usucapion can 
be seen by examining the title “De usucapione pro emptore vel transactione” (C. 7,26), 
                                                 
100  MacCormack, Furtum and contrectatio (1977), p. 130; see also p. 142-145. This idea is 
further subscribed by Zimmermann, Law of Obligations (1996), p. 926-927. 
101  See on this point MacCormack, Furtum and contrectatio (1977), p. 130-131. 
102  Thomas, Animus furandi (1968), p. 30; Watson, D. 47.2.52.20 (1969 [1991]), p. 303 n. 3. 
103  D. 47,2,43,1.  
104  D. 39,5,25. 
105  D. 47,2,73; D. 13,7,4; 13,7,5. 
106  D. 47,2,57(56),3; C. 4,26,10,1. 
107  D. 17,2,45. On the need for dolus in this case see D. 17,2,51pr. 
 
which contains mostly cases in which usucapion does not take place due to the 
fact that the object was stolen or taken by force108, thus confirming the statement 
of Gai 2,50 according to which usucapion would not take place easily (non facile 
procedit) in the context of movable things. 
 The possibility of usucapion in cases of unauthorized delivery by a non-owner 
is however not as restricted as it would seem. If the lack of authorization of the 
owner were the only relevant element to determine the existence of furtum, then 
certainly every traditio by an unauthorized non-owner would necessarily 
constitute a case of theft, usucapion being automatically excluded. However, the 
non-owner’s subjective representation adds a fundamental element to the 
equation. As indicated above, Gaius declares in Gai 2,50 that “theft is not 
committed without intent to steal” (furtum enim sine affectu furandi non 
committitur)109, which is almost identical to the statement in Gai 3,197, according 
to which “theft cannot be committed without wrongful intent” (furtum sine dolo 
malo non commititur). The significance of this subjective representation with regard 
to the prohibition of usucapion can only be fully understood by considering the 
broad scope of this element. Gaius gives a rather limited image in Gai 2,50, 
presenting exclusively cases in which the non-owner believes with a great degree 
of certainty to be owner himself. This view, however, can be complemented 
through other numerous references to the scope of the dolus malus of the non-
owner, particularly in cases of furtum usus, which offer as a common feature that 
the non-owner received the object from the owner himself. At this point it is 
interesting to indicate the more lenient approach to the non-owner’s state of 
mind in Gai 3,197, since we are told there that borrowers only commit theft if 
they know the owner does not consent and would not consent if he knew: “if 
they believe he would allow it, they are not liable” (si permissurum credant, extra 
furti crimen videri). As shown in this text, it is not strictly necessary for the non-
owner to think that he acts according to the owner’s intent, but he will even 
escape liability for furtum if, knowing not to be authorized, he believes the owner 
would approve it. Such notion restricts significantly the scope of application of 
furtum, introducing an extremely flexible criterion, which involves the subjective 
evaluation by the non-owner of the owner’s likely subjective response. The same 
idea is conveyed by Sabinus, who appears to be slightly more strict when 
demanding that the non-owner ‘should consider to act against the owner’s will’ 
(invito domino facere iudicare deberet)110, which nonetheless implies a subjective 
representation of the owner’s state of mind. A similar idea is also to be found in 
D. 12,4,15 (Pomp. 22 Sab.) where Pomponius quoted Proculus, who determines 
that someone will be held liable for theft “for he has used property belonging to 
another knowing he was doing so without the owner’s consent or that the owner, 
                                                 
108  C. 7,26,1; 2; 3; 5; 6; 7.  
109  This text is also recorded in D. 41,3,37. 
110  Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 11,18,20.  
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if he knew, would forbid it”111 (transl. Watson). This text again confronts us with 
the possibility that the non-owner may act without an express prohibition by the 
owner, determining that only in case he knew that the owner would forbid his 
acts he would be liable for furtum. This thought is moreover expressed in another 
text of Pomponius: 
 
D. 47,2,77(76)pr (Pomp. 38 ad Quintum Mucium): Qui re sibi 
commodata vel apud se deposita usus est aliter atque accepit, si 
existimavit se non invito domino id facere, furti non tenetur. Sed 
nec depositi ullo modo tenebitur: commodati an teneatur, in culpa 
aestimatio erit, id est an non debuerit existimare id dominum 
permissurum112. 
 
In this case the non-owner actually uses the thing in a different way to that which 
was agreed, but he is nonetheless not considered as committing furtum if he did 
not believe to act contrary to the owner’s intent. A key element of this evaluation 
is presented at the end of the text, where again we are confronted with a 
reference to the non-owner’s subjective representation of the owner’s likely 
response. The need for a high level of certainty on behalf of the non-owner 
regarding the owner’s approval is therefore clearly sketched, and the leniency 
behind this notion would be later expressed even more clearly by Ulpian: 
 
D. 47,2,46,7 (Ulp. 42 Sab.): Recte dictum est, qui putavit se domini 
voluntate rem attingere, non esse furem: quid enim dolo facit, qui 
putat dominum consensurum fuisse, sive falso id sive vere putet? Is 
ergo solus fur est, qui adtrectavit, quod invito domino se facere 
scivit113. 
 
This fragment again emphasizes the importance of the non-owner’s subjective 
representation in order to determine the existence of theft. Particularly 
remarkable is however the flexibility with which this element is applied, since 
                                                 
111  D. 12,4,15 (Pomp. 22 Sab.): “(…) quia re aliena ita sit usus, ut sciret se invito domino uti 
aut dominum si sciret prohibiturum esse”. See on this text Thomas, Animus furandi (1968), 
p. 28-29; Desanti, Dolo nel furto (2010), p. 23-24. 
112  D. 47,2,77,(76)pr: “One who uses a thing which he has borrowed or which was deposited 
with him otherwise than on the terms on which he accepts it, will not be liable for theft, if 
he believes that he is not acting contrary to the owner’s will. In no way will he be liable 
on a deposit. On the question whether he be liable on a loan there will need to be an 
evaluation of fault on his part. Should he not have believed that the owner would allow 
what he did?” (transl. Watson). 
113  D. 47,2,46,7: “It is rightly said that no one who thinks the owner to consent to his dealing 
with the thing is guilty of theft; for how does a person deal dolosely with a thing, when he 
thinks the owner would have been in agreement, whether his belief be sound or 
unfounded? He alone is a thief who tampers with a thing in the knowledge that its owner 
would not consent” (transl. Watson, modified). 
 
Ulpian discards the existence of dolus if the non-owner “thinks the owner would 
have been in agreement, whether his belief was sound or unfounded” (putat 
dominum consensurum fuisse, sive falso id sive vere putet). It is important at this point 
to note not only that the ground of the belief may not be completely sound, but 
that this uncertainty may refer to a consent which the owner has not given, but 
which he may give in the future (dominum consensurum fuisse). The subjective 
requirement exempting the non-owner from liability is therefore significantly 
relaxed, referring thus to a belief – sound or not – that the owner would agree, 
despite the absence of a preceding agreement. In contrast, the subjective 
representation needed to configure the crime is limited to the positive knowledge 
of acting against the owner’s intent: “Is ergo solus fur est, qui adtrectavit, quod invito 
domino se facere scivit”. This positive knowledge is found in other texts dealing with 
furtum, such as D. 13,6,14 (Ulp. 48 Sab.) (tibi scienti nolle me tibi commodari) and 
C. 7,27,7 (Sciens servum alienum contra domini voluntatem venumdans furtum 
committit). The sources therefore show that at some point in the classical period, as 
Jolowicz states it, “nothing less than real dolus is sufficient to justify a 
condemnation for theft”114.  
 At this point it should be noted that it is not completely clear whether classical 
jurisprudence experienced a significant evolution regarding the content of the 
subjective representation of the non-owner. It is commonly held that Sabinus 
would have been stricter on this point, expecting the non-owner to act on a 
reasonable ground, a requirement which would have been gradually relaxed, until 
late classics like Ulpian would have been satisfied even with an unfounded 
belief115. It is however difficult to elucidate this point, especially since most texts 
dealing with the subjective representation of the owner do not elaborate on this 
issue. The text of D. 16,3,11 (Ulp. 41 Sab.)116 could help to solve this problem, 
                                                 
114  Jolowicz, De Furtis (1940), p. lvi. In similar terms Desanti, Dolo nel furto (2010), p. 36: 
“Riguardo al caso del furto d’uso, dunque, ciò significava che la mera convinzione di 
operare invito domino non appariva di per sé sufficiente; il dominus, infatti, doveva risultare 
invitus per davvero; e l’agente, dunque, doveva essere consapevole della sua contrarietà. 
Detto altrimenti, non bastava che egli ‘credesse’, ma era necessario che ‘sapesse’ di usare la 
cosa senza il permesso del proprietario”. 
115  See among others Jolowicz, De Furtis (1940), p. lvi; Zulueta, Institutes of Gaius (1953) II, 
p. 204. 
116  D. 16,3,11 (Ulp. 41 Sab.): “Quod servus deposuit, is apud quem depositum est servo 
rectissime reddet ex bona fide: nec enim convenit bonae fidei abnegare id quod quis 
accepit, sed debebit reddere ei a quo accepit, sic tamen, si sine dolo omni reddat, hoc est, 
ut nec culpae quidem suspicio sit. Denique Sabinus hoc explicuit addendo: ‘Nec ulla causa 
intervenit, quare putare possit dominum reddi nolle’. Hoc ita est, si potuit suspicari, iusta 
scilicet ratione motus: ceterum sufficit bonam fidem adesse. Sed et si ante eius rei furtum 
fecerat servus, si tamen ignoravit is apud quem deposuit vel credidit dominum non invitum 
fore huius solutionis, liberari potest: bona enim fides exigitur. Non tantum autem si 
remanenti in servitute fuerit solutum, sed etiam si manumisso vel alienato, ex iustis causis 
liberatio contingit, scilicet si quis ignorans manumissum vel alienatum solvit. Idemque et in 
omnibus debitoribus servandum Pomponius scribit”. See on this text Albanese, Furtum II 
(1957), p. 59; Milella, Il consenso (1988), p. 400-402. 
TRADITIO INVITO DOMINO, FURTUM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF USUCAPION
89
 
86 
if he knew, would forbid it”111 (transl. Watson). This text again confronts us with 
the possibility that the non-owner may act without an express prohibition by the 
owner, determining that only in case he knew that the owner would forbid his 
acts he would be liable for furtum. This thought is moreover expressed in another 
text of Pomponius: 
 
D. 47,2,77(76)pr (Pomp. 38 ad Quintum Mucium): Qui re sibi 
commodata vel apud se deposita usus est aliter atque accepit, si 
existimavit se non invito domino id facere, furti non tenetur. Sed 
nec depositi ullo modo tenebitur: commodati an teneatur, in culpa 
aestimatio erit, id est an non debuerit existimare id dominum 
permissurum112. 
 
In this case the non-owner actually uses the thing in a different way to that which 
was agreed, but he is nonetheless not considered as committing furtum if he did 
not believe to act contrary to the owner’s intent. A key element of this evaluation 
is presented at the end of the text, where again we are confronted with a 
reference to the non-owner’s subjective representation of the owner’s likely 
response. The need for a high level of certainty on behalf of the non-owner 
regarding the owner’s approval is therefore clearly sketched, and the leniency 
behind this notion would be later expressed even more clearly by Ulpian: 
 
D. 47,2,46,7 (Ulp. 42 Sab.): Recte dictum est, qui putavit se domini 
voluntate rem attingere, non esse furem: quid enim dolo facit, qui 
putat dominum consensurum fuisse, sive falso id sive vere putet? Is 
ergo solus fur est, qui adtrectavit, quod invito domino se facere 
scivit113. 
 
This fragment again emphasizes the importance of the non-owner’s subjective 
representation in order to determine the existence of theft. Particularly 
remarkable is however the flexibility with which this element is applied, since 
                                                 
111  D. 12,4,15 (Pomp. 22 Sab.): “(…) quia re aliena ita sit usus, ut sciret se invito domino uti 
aut dominum si sciret prohibiturum esse”. See on this text Thomas, Animus furandi (1968), 
p. 28-29; Desanti, Dolo nel furto (2010), p. 23-24. 
112  D. 47,2,77,(76)pr: “One who uses a thing which he has borrowed or which was deposited 
with him otherwise than on the terms on which he accepts it, will not be liable for theft, if 
he believes that he is not acting contrary to the owner’s will. In no way will he be liable 
on a deposit. On the question whether he be liable on a loan there will need to be an 
evaluation of fault on his part. Should he not have believed that the owner would allow 
what he did?” (transl. Watson). 
113  D. 47,2,46,7: “It is rightly said that no one who thinks the owner to consent to his dealing 
with the thing is guilty of theft; for how does a person deal dolosely with a thing, when he 
thinks the owner would have been in agreement, whether his belief be sound or 
unfounded? He alone is a thief who tampers with a thing in the knowledge that its owner 
would not consent” (transl. Watson, modified). 
 
Ulpian discards the existence of dolus if the non-owner “thinks the owner would 
have been in agreement, whether his belief was sound or unfounded” (putat 
dominum consensurum fuisse, sive falso id sive vere putet). It is important at this point 
to note not only that the ground of the belief may not be completely sound, but 
that this uncertainty may refer to a consent which the owner has not given, but 
which he may give in the future (dominum consensurum fuisse). The subjective 
requirement exempting the non-owner from liability is therefore significantly 
relaxed, referring thus to a belief – sound or not – that the owner would agree, 
despite the absence of a preceding agreement. In contrast, the subjective 
representation needed to configure the crime is limited to the positive knowledge 
of acting against the owner’s intent: “Is ergo solus fur est, qui adtrectavit, quod invito 
domino se facere scivit”. This positive knowledge is found in other texts dealing with 
furtum, such as D. 13,6,14 (Ulp. 48 Sab.) (tibi scienti nolle me tibi commodari) and 
C. 7,27,7 (Sciens servum alienum contra domini voluntatem venumdans furtum 
committit). The sources therefore show that at some point in the classical period, as 
Jolowicz states it, “nothing less than real dolus is sufficient to justify a 
condemnation for theft”114.  
 At this point it should be noted that it is not completely clear whether classical 
jurisprudence experienced a significant evolution regarding the content of the 
subjective representation of the non-owner. It is commonly held that Sabinus 
would have been stricter on this point, expecting the non-owner to act on a 
reasonable ground, a requirement which would have been gradually relaxed, until 
late classics like Ulpian would have been satisfied even with an unfounded 
belief115. It is however difficult to elucidate this point, especially since most texts 
dealing with the subjective representation of the owner do not elaborate on this 
issue. The text of D. 16,3,11 (Ulp. 41 Sab.)116 could help to solve this problem, 
                                                 
114  Jolowicz, De Furtis (1940), p. lvi. In similar terms Desanti, Dolo nel furto (2010), p. 36: 
“Riguardo al caso del furto d’uso, dunque, ciò significava che la mera convinzione di 
operare invito domino non appariva di per sé sufficiente; il dominus, infatti, doveva risultare 
invitus per davvero; e l’agente, dunque, doveva essere consapevole della sua contrarietà. 
Detto altrimenti, non bastava che egli ‘credesse’, ma era necessario che ‘sapesse’ di usare la 
cosa senza il permesso del proprietario”. 
115  See among others Jolowicz, De Furtis (1940), p. lvi; Zulueta, Institutes of Gaius (1953) II, 
p. 204. 
116  D. 16,3,11 (Ulp. 41 Sab.): “Quod servus deposuit, is apud quem depositum est servo 
rectissime reddet ex bona fide: nec enim convenit bonae fidei abnegare id quod quis 
accepit, sed debebit reddere ei a quo accepit, sic tamen, si sine dolo omni reddat, hoc est, 
ut nec culpae quidem suspicio sit. Denique Sabinus hoc explicuit addendo: ‘Nec ulla causa 
intervenit, quare putare possit dominum reddi nolle’. Hoc ita est, si potuit suspicari, iusta 
scilicet ratione motus: ceterum sufficit bonam fidem adesse. Sed et si ante eius rei furtum 
fecerat servus, si tamen ignoravit is apud quem deposuit vel credidit dominum non invitum 
fore huius solutionis, liberari potest: bona enim fides exigitur. Non tantum autem si 
remanenti in servitute fuerit solutum, sed etiam si manumisso vel alienato, ex iustis causis 
liberatio contingit, scilicet si quis ignorans manumissum vel alienatum solvit. Idemque et in 
omnibus debitoribus servandum Pomponius scribit”. See on this text Albanese, Furtum II 
(1957), p. 59; Milella, Il consenso (1988), p. 400-402. 
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since it discusses whether a person who receives something in deposit from a slave 
will fulfil his contractual obligations by restoring it back to the same slave, and in 
this context the state of mind of the non-owner is discussed in detail, including 
the opinions of Sabinus. Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear where the opinion 
of Sabinus ends and that of Ulpian begins, and therefore it is not possible to 
determine which author requires a “iusta ratio” for the restitution. The elucidation 
of this problem exceeds the margins of the present research, and for the time 
being it is enough to establish that the non-owner’s subjective representation may 
exclude the existence of furtum if he thought that the owner would approve of his 
actions. Moreover, it should be noted that Roman jurists appear at times to be 
quite lenient considering the soundness of that belief, which can be derived not 
only from Ulpian’s “falso id sive vere putet” (D. 47,2,46,7) but also from the fact 
that even an error iuris would be tolerated in this regard, as shown in Gai 2,50117. 
 The flexibility which the non-owner’s subjective representation introduces in 
determining the existence of furtum would allow that several cases in which the 
traditio is actually performed invito domino are not considered as theft, enabling 
therefore the transferee to acquire through usucapion. Gai 2,50 offers two cases in 
which the non-owner actually believes to be the owner, as is the heir who 
delivers an object which the deceased person did not own and the person with a 
usufruct who sells the offspring of a female slave. The field of cases expands if one 
considers as well the cases in which the tradens believed to be acting according to 
the owner’s intent, even when in reality that was not the case. A clear case in this 
regard, already studied in the preceding section, takes place when the owner dies 
before the delivery has been performed, in which case the delivery by a 
previously authorized agent will not transfer ownership, despite his complete 
ignorance regarding the latest developments concerning the owner. The 
ignorance of this circumstance, however, is relevant to preclude the existence of 
furtum, and therefore the transferor will grant the acquirer a possessio ad 
usucapionem due to the absence of dolus which follows from his ignorance of his 
lack of authorization. Papinian offers a solution which shows the significance of 
the subjective representation of the heirs in such case: 
 
D. 17,1,57 (Pap. 10 resp.): Mandatum distrahendorum servorum 
defuncto qui mandatum suscepit intercidisse constitit. Quoniam 
tamen heredes eius errore lapsi non animo furandi, sed exsequendi, 
quod defunctus suae curae fecerat, servos vendiderant, eos ab 
emptoribus usucaptos videri placuit. (…)118 
                                                 
117  See also D. 17,1,57 (Pap. 10 resp.), which will be studied below. 
118  D. 17,1,57: “It was established that a mandate to sell off slaves had lapsed with the death of 
the person who undertook the mandate. However, because his heirs had fallen into error 
and, with the intention not of theft but of carrying out the duty which the deceased had 
assumed, had sold the slaves, it was agreed that those [slaves] appeared to have been 
 
An individual was bound by a contract of mandate to sell a number of slaves, but 
before he could do so he died, which implies the extinction of the contract. The 
heirs, however, in what appears to be a remarkable case of error iuris, think that it 
is their duty to carry out the obligations which the deceased had assumed, and 
proceed to sell the slaves. In this case, the lack of a theftuous intent (non animo 
furandi) excludes the possibility of theft, and accordingly the slaves can be 
usucapted by the buyer (eos ab emptoribus usucaptos videri placuit). 
 There are other situations in which the non-owner may wrongfully think to 
act according to the owner’s authorization, as happens in various cases of error in 
dominio. This problem is analysed below119, but for now it is enough to indicate 
that there are cases in the sources, in which the person who performs the delivery 
does not have the position regarding the object which he thought he had. In 
many of these cases the delivery is performed by an owner who is not aware of 
his condition of owner120, in which case jurists since Marcellus consider that the 
traditio is not performed voluntate domini, but nonetheless do not mention the 
existence of a furtum. In other cases, the delivery is performed by a non-owner 
who wrongfully believes himself to be the owner, at the request of the true 
owner who ignores that he in fact is the owner121. Again, the delivery by the 
non-owner will not be concluded voluntate domini, but there is no indication of 
the existence of furtum, which can easily be explained because of the subjective 
representation of the tradens, who believes to be acting under the owner’s 
authorization.  
 Apart from the cases in which the transferor is unaware that he does not act 
voluntate domini, the broad scope of the subjective representation of the tradens 
excludes the existence of furtum in cases where the non-owner knows that he is 
not acting according to the owner’s authorization, having however reason to 
believe that the latter would approve of his actions. At this point, it should be 
considered that in a number of cases the relationship between owner and the 
tradens is not governed by a contractual regulation which sharply determines the 
boundaries of the owner’s authorization, as will be seen in the following section. 
Moreover, even in some cases where the owner’s authorization is clearly defined, 
the tradens may realize that the owner would have expected him to exceed his 
original instructions in view of particular circumstances, acting therefore as a 
negotiorum gestor122. This makes room for a number of cases in which the non-
                                                                                                                   
usucapted by their buyers. (…)” (transl. Watson). See on this text Thomas, Animus furandi 
(1968), p. 18-19. 
119  Chapter 2, Section 6(b) below. 
120  First case described in D. 17,1,49 (Marcell. 6 dig.); D. 41,1,35 (Ulp. 7 disputationum); 
D. 12,4,3,8 (Ulp. 26 ed.). 
121  Second case described in D. 17,1,49 (Marcell. 6 dig.); D. 18,1,15,2 (Paul 5 Sab.) 
122  Watson, D. 47.2.52.20 (1969 [1991]), p. 306. It is however worth noting that a negotiorum 
gestum could nonetheless be liable for theft, as shown by Finazzi, Negotiorum gestio (2006) 
II.1, p. 62-66, even if such cases would have been rare, as pointed out by the author in 
p. 65. 
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of Sabinus ends and that of Ulpian begins, and therefore it is not possible to 
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that even an error iuris would be tolerated in this regard, as shown in Gai 2,50117. 
 The flexibility which the non-owner’s subjective representation introduces in 
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which the non-owner actually believes to be the owner, as is the heir who 
delivers an object which the deceased person did not own and the person with a 
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considers as well the cases in which the tradens believed to be acting according to 
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before the delivery has been performed, in which case the delivery by a 
previously authorized agent will not transfer ownership, despite his complete 
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ignorance of this circumstance, however, is relevant to preclude the existence of 
furtum, and therefore the transferor will grant the acquirer a possessio ad 
usucapionem due to the absence of dolus which follows from his ignorance of his 
lack of authorization. Papinian offers a solution which shows the significance of 
the subjective representation of the heirs in such case: 
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 There are other situations in which the non-owner may wrongfully think to 
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owner who ignores that he in fact is the owner121. Again, the delivery by the 
non-owner will not be concluded voluntate domini, but there is no indication of 
the existence of furtum, which can easily be explained because of the subjective 
representation of the tradens, who believes to be acting under the owner’s 
authorization.  
 Apart from the cases in which the transferor is unaware that he does not act 
voluntate domini, the broad scope of the subjective representation of the tradens 
excludes the existence of furtum in cases where the non-owner knows that he is 
not acting according to the owner’s authorization, having however reason to 
believe that the latter would approve of his actions. At this point, it should be 
considered that in a number of cases the relationship between owner and the 
tradens is not governed by a contractual regulation which sharply determines the 
boundaries of the owner’s authorization, as will be seen in the following section. 
Moreover, even in some cases where the owner’s authorization is clearly defined, 
the tradens may realize that the owner would have expected him to exceed his 
original instructions in view of particular circumstances, acting therefore as a 
negotiorum gestor122. This makes room for a number of cases in which the non-
                                                                                                                   
usucapted by their buyers. (…)” (transl. Watson). See on this text Thomas, Animus furandi 
(1968), p. 18-19. 
119  Chapter 2, Section 6(b) below. 
120  First case described in D. 17,1,49 (Marcell. 6 dig.); D. 41,1,35 (Ulp. 7 disputationum); 
D. 12,4,3,8 (Ulp. 26 ed.). 
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owner believes to act in the way the owner expects him to do, even if he knows 
that the latter did not explicitly authorize a particular act. The non-owner may 
for instance act in a particular case motivated by amicitia or fides, believing that, 
although the owner did not expressly authorize a particular act, he would do so if 
he were present. Viewed from the perspective of the law of property, such a 
traditio cannot transfer ownership, since there is no voluntas domini, but the tradens 
may well count on the owner’s ratihabitio once the latter gains knowledge of the 
situation. The possibility of furtum, on the other hand, would be completely 
excluded on account of the subjective representation of the non-owner regarding 
the likely attitude of the owner, and therefore the transferee would have gained 
possessio ad usucapionem. 
 There is moreover nothing anomalous in the fact that furtum is excluded due 
to the subjective representation of the non-owner, even if this consists on a vague 
conception of what the owner would expect in a particular situation. Particularly 
in the cases of furtum in which the owner has voluntarily handed over the object, 
the subjective element is of the utmost relevance to determine the existence of 
the crime, since there may be much room for uncertainty, especially if the 
relationship of the parties is governed by social notions such as amicitia and fides123. 
If the non-owner dealing with someone else’s ownership, be it in a clumsy or 
unfounded way, honestly intended to look after the best interest of the owner, it 
would have been excessive to consider such behaviour as theftuous. 
 The distinctions regarding the non-owner’s state of mind may contribute to 
understand some texts traditionally considered as troublesome, as happens with 
the following one of Alfenus: 
 
D. 41,3,34 (Alf. 1 dig. a Paulo epitomatorum): Si servus insciente 
domino rem peculiarem vendidisset, emptorem usucapere posse124. 
 
This text presents the curious case in which a slave sells an object belonging to his 
peculium without the knowledge of the owner (insciente domino), granting thereby 
the acquirer a possessio ad usucapionem. This implies in the first place that we are 
not dealing with a slave who has the libera administratio peculii, since in that case 
the owner’s consent would be irrelevant. While the lack of the owner’s 
authorization prevents the transfer of ownership from taking place, it is clear that 
we are not dealing with a res furtiva, since the prohibition of usucapion does not 
apply. The brevity of the text – belonging precisely to an abridgment, an epitome 
– gives few clues, forcing the interpreter to determine why the lack of voluntas 
domini prevents the transfer of ownership but does not configure a case of furtum, 
or at least does not give place to the prohibition of the Lex Atinia. Numerous 
                                                 
123  Desanti, Dolo nel furto (2010), p. 26-27 and 36-38 highlights this circumstance with regard 
to the commodatum and depositum. 
124  D. 41,3,34: “If a slave, his owner being unaware of the transaction, sells something 
belonging to his peculium, the purchaser can usucapt it” (transl. Watson). 
 
explanations have been offered to that effect. Huvelin, for instance, argues that 
this would be a case of furtum improprium, since there is no subreptio by the slave125, 
but this interpretation fails to explain why other Roman jurists would treat similar 
cases as furtum126. Roth, on the other hand, finding no explanation for this text, 
follows Cuiacius in introducing the word ‘non’ before ‘usucapere’, so that the 
complete opposite – and more predictable – solution is given127. This seems 
however an extreme solution, which finds moreover no support in the text of the 
Basilica, which also allows the usucapio to take place128, as Fargnoli has observed129. 
This latter author considers that the reason why there is no furtum is that a 
delivery insciente domino would not be equivalent to a delivery invito domino, the 
latter qualifying the delivery as a furtum but not the former130. Such a distinction, 
however, finds little support in the sources since, as will be seen in the following 
section, both problems are usually set on a same level by Roman jurists. Labeo, 
for instance, considers that there is no furtum if the owner knew about the actions 
of the non-owner but did not do anything about it131, making therefore 
knowledge and approval equivalent in practical terms. Ulpian even explicitly gives 
ignorance and disapproval the same significance when declaring in D. 47,2,48,3 
(Ulp. 42 Sab.): “Vetare autem dominum accipimus etiam eum, qui ignorat, hoc est, qui 
non consentit”132. The following fragment (D. 47,2,48,4) moreover pictures the 
non-owner’s lack of authorization through the words “inscio aut invito”. 
Accordingly, no structural difference can be seen between an act invito domino and 
insciente domino. 
 Even when the owner’s ignorance does not seem to imply something 
essentially different to his formal disapproval, the reference to the inscientia domini 
may nonetheless contain the key to the understanding this text, pointing to the 
absence of dolus in the seller. The slave, in the administration of his peculium, may 
have considered that the sale of a particular object fell within his powers of 
administration, or that the owner would certainly approve of this particular act if 
he knew about it, thereby delivering the object to the buyer in good faith. He 
may have even experienced some doubts but, according to some of the criteria 
mentioned above, his level of certainty might have been enough to assume that 
the owner would approve if he knew. In this way, the expression ‘insciente domino’ 
indicates that the slave does not act against a clear instruction of the owner (invito 
                                                 
125  Huvelin, Furtum (1915), p. 498. 
126  For other critical remarks on Huvelin’s explanations see Fargnoli, Furtum (2006), p. 46-47. 
127  Roth, Alfeni Digesta (1999), p. 79. 
128  Bas. 50,3,32 = D. 41,3,34 (BT 2349/23). 
129  Fargnoli, Furtum (2006), p. 47 n. 133. 
130  Fargnoli, Furtum (2006), p. 48. 
131  D. 47,2,92(91) (Lab. 2 pithanon a Paulo epitomatorum): “Si quis, cum sciret quid sibi subripi, 
non prohibuit, non potest furti agere”. On this text, as well as on the relation between 
scientia and voluntas, see Milella, Il consenso (1988), p. 398-399. 
132  D. 47,2,48,3: “We regard as a prohibiting owner one who does not know, one, in short, 
who does not actively agree” (transl. Watson). 
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 Even when the owner’s ignorance does not seem to imply something 
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125  Huvelin, Furtum (1915), p. 498. 
126  For other critical remarks on Huvelin’s explanations see Fargnoli, Furtum (2006), p. 46-47. 
127  Roth, Alfeni Digesta (1999), p. 79. 
128  Bas. 50,3,32 = D. 41,3,34 (BT 2349/23). 
129  Fargnoli, Furtum (2006), p. 47 n. 133. 
130  Fargnoli, Furtum (2006), p. 48. 
131  D. 47,2,92(91) (Lab. 2 pithanon a Paulo epitomatorum): “Si quis, cum sciret quid sibi subripi, 
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domino), but rather in the absence of it. If the owner later finds out about the sale 
and disapproves of it, it will become clear that ownership was not transferred, but 
the original subjective representation of the contracting parties remains intact, 
therefore granting the transferee a possessio ad usucapionem despite having acquired 
insciente domino. The only doubt which remains is whether Alfenus in the original, 
unabridged text, would have been more explicit regarding the subjective 
representation of the non-owner, or whether the mere reference to the owner’s 
ignorance would have been enough to make this circumstance evident. If that 
was the case, the sharp distinction between the delivery insciente domino and the 
delivery invito domino made by Fargnoli would have to be adopted, at least 
regarding the solutions of early classical jurists, it being however clear that in most 
cases ignorance and disapproval would be equivalent notions regarding furtum. 
 It is moreover helpful, in order to understand the decision in D. 41,3,34, to 
compare it to a case where the basic facts would appear to be identical, but where 
the slave is liable for furtum: 
 
D. 47,2,57(56),3 (Jul. 22 dig.): Cum autem servus rem suam 
peculiarem furandi consilio amovet, quamdiu eam retinet, condicio 
eius non mutatur (nihil enim domino abest): sed si alii tradiderit, 
furtum faciet133. 
 
In this case, just as in D. 41,3,34, reference is made to a slave who delivers an 
object belonging to his peculium. A significant difference, however, is that Julian 
stresses the theftuous intent (furandi consilium) of the slave. As long as the slave 
does hold the object, his intent alone will not be enough to make him liable for 
theft, which would confirm that furtum cannot be committed solo animo. Only 
once he delivers the object he will become a thief. In principle, both in 
D. 41,3,34 and D. 47,2,57(56),3 a traditio insciente domino takes place, but it is the 
clearly theftuous intent in the second case which configures the existence of 
furtum, an intent which is absent in the text of Alfenus. 
 Another difficult text is discussed by Ulpian, being located under the title 
dealing with the exceptio rei venditae et traditae: 
 
D. 21,3,1,5 (Ulp. 76 ed.): Si quis rem emerit, non autem fuerit ei 
tradita, sed possessionem sine vitio fuerit nactus, habet exceptionem 
contra venditorem, nisi forte venditor iustam causam habeat, cur 
                                                 
133  D. 47,2,56(57),3: “When a slave abstracts with theftuous intent a thing which is part of his 
peculium, so long as he holds it, its legal state is unchanged (for the master loses nothing); 
but if he delivers it to someone else, he commits theft” (transl. Watson). The text is 
discussed by Thomas, Animus furandi (1968), p. 16-17. 
 
rem vindicet: nam et si tradiderit possessionem, fuerit autem iusta 
causa vindicanti, replicatione adversus exceptionem utetur134. 
 
In this text we are told that the owner sold an object but did not deliver it, 
despite which the buyer gained possession of it without any flaw (sine vitio). In 
this circumstance, the praetor will grant the acquirer a defence against the owner, 
which will however not be successful if the latter has a good reason to resort to 
the rei vindicatio. The text poses a riddle for scholars: how can the buyer acquire 
sine vitio if he did not obtain the thing from the seller? This question is all the 
more intriguing considering that the above-studied135 text of D. 41,2,5136 offers 
an identical case, where a slave was owed on account of a stipulation but the 
other party gains possession without the owner’s consent (non voluntate mea 
nanctus sis possessionem), which instantly renders the acquirer a robber (praedo). 
Also in D. 41,2,6pr we are told that if the thing is delivered with the knowledge 
or intent of the owner the acquirer gains a possessio bonae fidei137. Under this 
framework, it seems impossible that a non-owner can acquire a possessio sine vitio 
if the delivery was not authorized by the owner, which is why Sansón and 
Salomón consider that in this case the object was obtained voluntate domini by the 
acquirer138. This claim cannot however be accepted, considering that if the 
delivery was performed by a non-owner voluntate domini – as Sansón thinks139 – it 
seems hardly possible that a classical jurist would consider that the traditio did not 
take place, especially since the traditio by an authorized non-owner was 
consistently placed on the same level as that performed by the owner himself.  
 The meaning of D. 21,3,1,5 only becomes clear if one accepts that a traditio 
invito domino does not instantly render the delivered object a res furtiva, due to the 
decisive role of the intention of the person performing the delivery. One can 
                                                 
134  D. 21,3,1,5: “Put the case that a person buys something which is not delivered to him but 
of which he acquires possession without any flaw in the manner of his acquisition; he will 
have this defence against the vendor unless the later can show good cause why he should 
assert title to the thing; for even if the vendor did himself deliver possession but has good 
ground for asserting his title, he will have an answer to the defendant’s defence” (transl. 
Watson). 
135  Chapter 2, Section 1(b) above. 
136  D. 41,2,5 (Paul 63 ed.): “Si ex stipulatione tibi Stichum debeam et non tradam eum, tu 
autem nanctus fueris possessionem, praedo es: aeque si vendidero nec tradidero rem, si non 
voluntate mea nanctus sis possessionem, non pro emptore possides, sed praedo es”. 
137  D. 41,2,6pr (Ulp. 70 ed.): “Clam possidere eum dicimus, qui furtive ingressus est 
possessionem ignorante eo, quem sibi controversiam facturum suspicabatur et, ne faceret, 
timebat. Is autem qui, cum possideret non clam, se celavit, in ea causa est, ut non videatur 
clam possidere: non enim ratio optinendae possessionis, sed origo nanciscendae exquirenda 
est: nec quemquam clam possidere incipere, qui sciente aut volente eo, ad quem ea res 
pertinet, aut aliqua ratione bonae fidei possessionem nanciscitur. Itaque, inquit Pomponius, 
clam nanciscitur possessionem, qui futuram controversiam metuens ignorante eo, quem 
metuit, furtive in possessionem ingreditur”. 
138  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 183-184; Salomón, Sine vitio (2003), p. 42-43. Other 
scholars simply regard the text as heavily interpolated: Gonvers, L’exceptio (1939), p. 132. 
139  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 183. 
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domino), but rather in the absence of it. If the owner later finds out about the sale 
and disapproves of it, it will become clear that ownership was not transferred, but 
the original subjective representation of the contracting parties remains intact, 
therefore granting the transferee a possessio ad usucapionem despite having acquired 
insciente domino. The only doubt which remains is whether Alfenus in the original, 
unabridged text, would have been more explicit regarding the subjective 
representation of the non-owner, or whether the mere reference to the owner’s 
ignorance would have been enough to make this circumstance evident. If that 
was the case, the sharp distinction between the delivery insciente domino and the 
delivery invito domino made by Fargnoli would have to be adopted, at least 
regarding the solutions of early classical jurists, it being however clear that in most 
cases ignorance and disapproval would be equivalent notions regarding furtum. 
 It is moreover helpful, in order to understand the decision in D. 41,3,34, to 
compare it to a case where the basic facts would appear to be identical, but where 
the slave is liable for furtum: 
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D. 21,3,1,5 (Ulp. 76 ed.): Si quis rem emerit, non autem fuerit ei 
tradita, sed possessionem sine vitio fuerit nactus, habet exceptionem 
contra venditorem, nisi forte venditor iustam causam habeat, cur 
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therefore agree with Sansón in conceiving that in this text the delivery was 
performed by a non-owner140, especially since it is hardly imaginable how else 
the acquirer could have gained possession over the object sine vitio. Moreover, 
that the delivery took place by a non-owner can be derived from the fact that the 
final sentence of the text presents the case where the owner himself performs the 
delivery (nam et si tradiderit possessionem…), which would draw a clear contrast 
with the first case. While the delivery is performed by a non-owner, he cannot 
be regarded as delivering voluntate domini. In this context, the only possibility for 
him not to commit furtum is to exclude the dolus malus or animus furandi at the 
delivery. One can for instance imagine that the owner only wanted to deliver in 
certain conditions, which the non-owner in charge of the delivery ignored, 
delivering the object in a way which conflicted with the owner’s intent but 
without being aware of it.  
 Since several cases of delivery invito domino did not automatically lead to the 
application of the prohibition of usucapion of stolen goods, it becomes clear what 
the scope of the prohibition of usucapion really is. The statement of Gai 2,50, 
according to which usucapion does not take place easily (non facile procedit) in the 
context of the delivery by a non-owner, should therefore not be understood as 
“usucapion hardly ever takes place”, but simply as a warning against the broad 
scope for usucapion which seems to flow from Gai 2,43. The somewhat specific 
examples which he offers allow him to emphasize this idea, but the final sentence 
of Gai 2,50 (Aliis quoque modis accidere potest, ut quis sine vitio furti rem alienam ad 
aliquem transferat et efficiat, ut a possessore usucapiatur141) shows that the possibility of 
usucapion is not so dramatically restricted as it would seem. Moreover, in the Res 
cottidianae we find a text which follows closely on Gai 2,51, discussing the same 
examples, and where it is said that “There are many ways in which it can happen 
that a person, labouring under a misapprehension, may sell or give as his own 
what in fact belongs to another and yet the thing can be usucapted (…)”142 (transl. 
Watson). The fact that in one text we are told that usucapion “non facile procedit” 
and in the other that it “potest pluribus modis accidere” makes it clear that the cases 
of traditio invito domino leading to usucapion were not as restricted as traditionally 
thought. Finally, it is worth noting that also in the eyes of the compilers the scope 
of usucapion was not dramatically limited by furtum, since Theophilus is more 
                                                 
140  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 183. Against this view Gonvers, L’exceptio (1939), p. 58. 
141  Gai 2,50: “There are also other ways that someone can transfer a third party’s property to 
another without the taint of theft and leave it possible for the recipient to usucapt the 
thing” (transl. Gordon/Robinson). 
142  D. 41,3,36pr-1 (Gai. 2 rer. cott.): “(pr) Potest pluribus modis accidere, ut quis rem alienam 
aliquo errore deceptus tamquam suam vendat forte aut donet et ob id a bonae fidei 
possessore res usucapi possit: veluti si heres rem defuncto commodatam aut locatam vel 
apud eum depositam existimans hereditariam esse alienaverit. (1) Item si quis aliqua 
existimatione deceptus crediderit ad se hereditatem pertinere, quae ad eum non pertineat, 
et rem hereditariam alienaverit, aut si is, ad quem usus fructus ancillae pertinet, partum eius 
existimans suum esse, quia et fetus pecudum ad fructuarium pertinet, alienaverit”. 
 
emphatic than Gaius when declaring that he just presented “very few cases” 
where a delivery invito domino will not be regarded as furtum, while there are “very 
many cases” in which this happens as well143. Considering all of this evidence, one 
may dismiss the opinions of those authors144 who consider that usucapion played 
only a minor role concerning movables which were delivered by a non-owner. 
 Apart from the absence of dolus or animus furandi by the tradens, there are other 
cases in which usucapion can take place, even when it is clear that the delivery 
was performed invito domino. This may happen, as Gaius himself tells us, in the 
delivery of immovable property, since most Roman jurists excluded the 
possibility of furtum in such cases, as shown in Gai 2,51145 – an exception which 
however does not apply to things taken by force146. It should moreover be borne 
in mind that only things which have an owner can be stolen147, and accordingly 
there is no furtum, for instance, regarding objects of a hereditas iacens148. It may also 
happen that the voluntas domini is not relevant in the first place to transfer 
ownership, as happens when a son-in-power or slave has the libera administratio 
peculii. In all of these cases, however, the acquirer must be in good faith in order 
to gain possessio ad usucapionem, since otherwise an essential element for the 
acquisition through usucapion will be absent149.  
 Having reviewed the significance of furtum in relation to the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner, it becomes clear that the possibility of usucapion is 
not as restricted as it is usually thought. Nonetheless, it does seem that the 
position of the acquirer is rather unbalanced with regard to that of the owner, the 
latter being in a considerably more solid position than the former. On the one 
hand, the owner can exercise, along with the actio furti, an actio rei persecutoria, 
which can either be the rei vindicatio – in case that the object can still be found – 
or a condictio furtiva. The possibility of success of the owner’s claim concerning the 
acquirer is moreover secured, as long as the object can be found, by the 
prohibition to acquire ownership over the res furtiva, which would only be lifted 
once the object returned to him. The transferee, on the other hand, will not only 
                                                 
143  Theoph. Par. 2,6,6: “Ȁα੿ ਥγઅ μ੻ν ੑȜίγιστȐ σοι εੇπον șȑματα ਲ δ੻ τ૵ν πραγμȐτων 
περίστασιȢ ਥπινοε૙ν δȪναται πȐμποȜȜα ਥν οੈȢ εਫ਼ρεșȒσεται τઁ ਕȜȜότριόν τιȢ ਥκποι૵ν παρὰ 
γνώμην δεσπότου κα੿ FURTIUON α੝τઁ μ੽ ਕποτεȜ૵ν” (It is but a very few cases that I have 
mentioned to you, but circumstances may give rise to very many cases where a man will 
be found alienating, against the owner’s will, a thing belonging to another person, without 
rendering it a stolen thing [transl. Murison]). 
144  E.g. Pampaloni, Furto (1941 [1894]), p. 235 ff.; Schulz, Principles (1936), p. 248. 
145  See also D. 41,3,38 i.f. (Gai. 2 rer. cott.); D. 47,2,25pr (Ulp. 41 Sab.). Concrete examples of 
this can be seen in D. 41,4,7,6, D. 21,3,1pr-1 and D. 44,4,4,32. It should however be 
noted that an early classical jurist as Sabinus did accept the furtum regarding immovable 
property, as can be seen in Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 11,18,13. 
146  Gai 2,51. See also C. 7,26,5. 
147  D. 47,2,43,5 (Ulp. 41 Sab.). 
148  Gai 3,201; D. 9,4,40 (Jul. 22 dig.); D. 25,2,6,6 (Paul 7 Sab.); D. 47,2,69-71 (Marcell. 8 
dig.); D. 47,4,1,15 (Ulp. 38 ed.); D. 47,19,6 (Paul 1 ad Neratium). 
149  See e.g. C. 4,51,1. 
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144  E.g. Pampaloni, Furto (1941 [1894]), p. 235 ff.; Schulz, Principles (1936), p. 248. 
145  See also D. 41,3,38 i.f. (Gai. 2 rer. cott.); D. 47,2,25pr (Ulp. 41 Sab.). Concrete examples of 
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148  Gai 3,201; D. 9,4,40 (Jul. 22 dig.); D. 25,2,6,6 (Paul 7 Sab.); D. 47,2,69-71 (Marcell. 8 
dig.); D. 47,4,1,15 (Ulp. 38 ed.); D. 47,19,6 (Paul 1 ad Neratium). 
149  See e.g. C. 4,51,1. 
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lack in several cases a possessio ad usucapionem, but his possession may even be 
qualified as vicious due to the lack of the owner’s scientia or voluntas150. His good 
faith will moreover be of no importance if the thing received is a res furtiva, since, 
as it was shown above, the prohibition of the Lex Atinia taints the object itself, 
disregarding the representation of the transferee. The subjective conceptions of 
the acquirer can in fact only work to his disadvantage, since in case he receives 
from a non-owner who believes to be acting voluntate domini, while the acquirer 
knows that this is not the case, he will be prevented from acquiring through 
usucapion due to his bad faith regarding the potestas alienandi of the transferor 
(Gai 2,43 and 49). In this sense, Roman law offers a very different outlook to that 
of many modern legal systems, where the subjective good faith of the acquirer in 
itself justifies the acquisition of ownership by a non-owner. The modern 
regulation on this point was motivated by the attempt to protect legal certainty in 
commerce, but for the Romans – who were not indifferent to the interests of 
commerce – such notions are almost completely absent, favouring systematically 
the position of the owner151. Only very isolated cases can be found in Roman law 
which resemble the modern a non domino acquisition of ownership. This is the 
case in a constitution of emperor Zeno (5th century AD) which lays down a 
privilegium fisci according to which everyone acquiring something from the fiscus 
would become owner, even if the fiscus was not actually owner itself152. An 
earlier, more shy example of the protection of legal certainty can be found in 
D. 44,4,4,23 (Ulp. 76 ed.), where Ulpian considers more practical to grant an 
exceptio to the acquirer against a pupillus who attempts to recover an object 
fraudulently alienated by his guardian, adducing, among other elements, that the 
other party could not be aware of the inner relationship between tutor and pupillus 
(unde enim divinat is, qui cum tutore contrahit?)153. 
 
3. Voluntas domini and personal relations between owner, transferor and 
acquirer. The case of the nuntius 
 
The transfer of ownership by a non-owner may involve a series of complex 
personal relationships which arise between the owner and the transferor in the 
first place, and between the transferor and the acquirer. In the latter case, it 
                                                 
150  See on this point D. 41,2,6pr (Ulp. 70 ed.). 
151  See on this point Schulz, Principles (1936), p. 248; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 87; 
Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 44; Kaser, RPR (1971) I, p. 413 and RPR (1975) II, 
p. 276; Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 13; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), 
p. 239-241; Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 81. 
152  C. 7,37,2-3 and Inst. 2,6,14. There are earlier constitutions which indicate that this 
privilege already existed in a similar form at the time of Alexander Severus, being however 
referred to objects in which the fiscus is co-owner. See C. 10,4,1 (Alexander, 225); 
C. 4,52,2 (Gordianus). See on this privilegium fisci Lenz, Privilegia fisci (1994), p. 75 ff.; 
Murillo, Communium rerum alienatione (2008), p. 669. 
153  Knütel, Dolus tutoris (1986), p. 123. See on this text Chapter 4, Section 6. 
 
should be noted that the absence of direct representation in the Roman law of 
obligations implies that the acquirer cannot in principle direct himself against the 
principal who authorized the delivery154. Instead, the non-owner/transferor will 
inevitably be bound towards the other party, as the following text shows: 
 
D. 3,3,67 (Pap. 2 resp.): Procurator, qui pro evictione praediorum 
quae vendidit fidem suam adstrinxit, etsi negotia gerere desierit, 
obligationis tamen onere praetoris auxilio non levabitur: nam 
procurator, qui pro domino vinculum obligationis suscepit, onus 
eius frustra recusat155. 
 
In this case, the person who performed the delivery no longer acts as the owner’s 
procurator, but this circumstance will not excuse him from responding for the 
obligations regarding the buyer, who bought from the procurator and not from the 
owner. Accordingly, the fact that the non-owner assumed an obligation pro 
domino and that he no longer acts as the procurator of the delivered thing is 
completely irrelevant with regard to the purchaser, since the parties which 
concluded the sale will remain contractually bound to each other.  
 That the non-owner/transferor and the acquirer are the only parties to the 
contract can lead to interesting consequences, as is the case in the text of 
D. 6,2,14, where the prohibition to deliver notified by the owner to the seller 
after the sale was concluded leaves the latter in an impossible situation regarding 
the buyer, since the seller will still be obliged to deliver while the owner remains 
unconnected to the sale. The responsibility for the breach of the obligations 
arising from the sale would exclusively affect the seller/non-owner, and the 
owner could only eventually be made accountable through an actio mandati 
contraria for the loss that the seller may suffer. The praetor remedies this situation 
in this particular case in a more straightforward way by simply granting the buyer 
the in bonis protection in case the seller delivers despite the owner’s prohibition. 
 Another text which reflects the consequences of the obligatory link between 
transferor and acquirer and the exclusion of the owner from this relation is 
D. 17,1,49 (Marcel. 6 dig.), where someone sells an object on behalf of a person 
who seemed to be the owner, when in fact the person in charge of selling was 
the owner. This case will be discussed in further detail when dealing with the 
error in dominio156, but for the time being it is worth noting that the seller will 
remain, despite his error, personally bound to protect the buyer against eviction 
                                                 
154  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 125-126. 
155  D. 3,3,67: “A procurator who has given a guarantee against a successful claim for property 
which he has sold, even if he has ceased to act as agent, will still not receive the praetor’s 
help to free him from the burden of his obligation; for it is in vain that a procurator who has 
taken on the bond of an obligation on his principal’s behalf tries to rid himself of his 
burden” (transl. Watson). See on this text Finkenauer, Direkte Stellvertretung (2008), p. 481-
483. 
156  Chapter 2, Section 6(b). 
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(obstrictum emptori), and accordingly will not be able to claim from him the object 
sold.  
 Having as a starting point the strict separation between the owner and the 
transferor concerning the obligations arising from the contract, it should be noted 
that this distinction was significantly softened through the actiones adiecticiae 
qualitatis, by means of which the praetor allowed the third party to direct himself 
not only against the other contracting party, but also against the principal. 
Initially these actions only referred to specific situations, such as when the pater 
grants a peculium to his son-in-power or slave (actio de peculio) or if the dominus 
negotii appoints a manager for his business (actio institoria). Nonetheless, Papinian 
extended this latter remedy even to the acts concluded by a procurator, as shown 
by a well-known text: 
 
D. 19,1,13,25 (Ulp. 32 ed.): Si procurator vendiderit et caverit 
emptori, quaeritur, an domino vel adversus dominum actio dari 
debeat. Et Papinianus libro tertio responsorum putat cum domino 
ex empto agi posse utili actione ad exemplum institoriae actionis, si 
modo rem vendendam mandavit: ergo et per contrarium dicendum 
est utilem ex empto actionem domino competere157. 
 
This famous text represents158 a break-through in legal thinking, being widely 
commented when discussing the historical development of direct representation 
since Papinian extends to the principal the responsibility for the obligations 
concluded by his procurator, signaling thereby the decline of the traditional 
resistance to bind someone to a contract concluded by another person. From the 
perspective of the transfer of ownership there is nothing new here – the 
authorized non-owner, as usual, validly transfers ownership – but from the point 
of view of the responsibility for eviction it improves the position of the acquirer 
in case the owner gave a mandate to sell (si modo rem vendendam mandavit), since 
the purchaser will not have to settle for seeking responsibility only from the 
agent. 
 The existence of the actiones adiecticiae qualitatis shows that the personal 
relationship between the principal and the transferor/non-owner could be 
relevant for the claims which the acquirer could make for any breach of the 
contract. This in turn raises the question of whether the existence of different 
                                                 
157  D. 19,1,13,25: “If a procurator sells and gives a cautio [against eviction] to the buyer, should 
an action be given both to and against the owner [the procurator’s principal]? Papinian, in 
the third book of his Responsa, thinks the owner can be sued on the purchase in an action 
analogous to the model of the action for a business manager’s conduct, provided that he 
mandated the object’s sale. Therefore, conversely it should be ruled that the owner has an 
analogous action on the purchase” (transl. Watson). 
158  Among the extensive literature discussing this fragment, see Briguglio, L’interdipendenza 
(2007), p. 100 ff.; Miceli, L’interdipendenza (2007), p. 111 ff.; Finkenauer, Direkte 
Stellvertretung (2008), p. 479-481. 
 
personal relations between the owner/principal and the non-owner/transferor 
would be relevant for the transfer of ownership. As has been shown, the 
relationship between the transferor and the acquirer was governed by the 
contractual relation binding them, which could eventually affect the dominus 
negotii. On the other hand, the personal relationships between the owner and the 
transferor present a less defined outline. Transactions involving the transfer of 
ownership could be carried out by a variety of persons of different social 
standing, and give place to different consequences from the perspective of the 
law of obligations. In order to transfer ownership it was only essential for the 
delivery to be performed with the owner’s authorization, i.e. voluntate domini. 
The fact that the personal relationship between the parties is of secondary 
importance as long as the existence of the owner’s authorization is there can be 
seen from the fact that in some texts, it is not even clear what the personal 
relationship between the parties is, stressing only the fact that the alienation takes 
place according to the owner’s instructions159.  
 Numerous examples can be found where there is no clear underlying 
contractual relationship, but simply a specific authorization – which is only 
occasionally described as a iussum – to perform a particular act. An example 
which has already been mentioned is the alienation of a common object by one 
of the co-owners who acts with the authorization of the other co-owners. In a 
state of co-ownership, the different individuals involved could agree at the 
beginning of their relationship the circumstances under which the common 
property or each share could be sold160, or could simply grant their approval at a 
later stage to an alienation performed by one co-owner individually. In these 
cases there is no reference to a specific contract between those authorizing and 
the co-owner transferring ownership, but a mere informal authorization suffices 
to transfer of ownership. Similarly, however, those parties which concluded a 
contract of societas can grant authorization to a single individual among them to 
transfer ownership of a common object161. The fact that in this case there is a 
contractual relationship among the parties does not add any additional elements 
to determine the transfer of ownership: the existence of an authorization is by 
itself enough. 
 A similar contrast to that of the co-owners and the partners in a societas can be 
seen in the case of the procurator and the mandatarius. From his origins, the 
procurator appears to have been a rather vague institution within the legal world, 
and in the last decades the opinion which has become dominant is that his 
                                                 
159  See D. 39,5,2,6 (Jul. 60 dig.); D. 39,5,25 (Jav. 6 epistulae); D. 46,3,17 (Pomp. 19 Sab.) 
160  See e.g. D. 8,5,20,1 (Scaev. 4 dig.). 
161  D. 12,1,26 (Paul 32 ed.): “Si socius propriam pecuniam mutuam dedit, omnimodo 
creditam pecuniam facit, licet ceteri dissenserint: Quod si communem numeravit, non alias 
creditam efficit, nisi ceteri quoque consentiant, quia suae partis tantum alienationem 
habuit”. See also D. 17,2,45 (Ulp. 30 Sab.), concerning the theft of the common thing. 
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function had more of a social than a legal content162. Recently, Klinck has even 
claimed that the term ‘procurator’ had no legal significance, except perhaps 
regarding the procurator ad litem163. Contrary to this opinion, there are several 
texts164 where we are told that the procurator could transfer ownership within 
certain limits165, which shows that the sole fact of being procurator did have some 
legal significance, at least regarding the potestas alienandi166. The existence of such 
power to dispose appears to be disconnected from the particular legal framework 
that would govern the personal relations between principal and procurator, which 
is in itself a controverted issue. According to scholars, initially the relationship 
between principal and procurator would have been governed by the actio negotiorum 
gestorum, and only around the time of Julian would jurists have framed this 
institution within the contract of mandate167. While this evolution had relevant 
consequences for the personal claims that may rise between both parties, it 
appears to have been of little significance for the transfer of ownership, where the 
decisive element for the transfer of ownership was the voluntas domini168. This can 
be seen in D. 6,2,14, where the existence of a contract of mandate between 
owner and procurator implies that the latter may sue the principal with the actio 
mandati contraria, but the ground for the transfer of ownership, as the text 
explicitly shows, is that the non-owner transfers voluntate domini169. One can 
therefore discard the opinion of Klinck, who considers that every transfer of 
ownership by a procurator would only be valid due to the existence of a contract 
of mandate170. The existence of a contract of mandate only appears to be relevant 
in this context when the procurator requires a special authorization to transfer 
ownership over some goods, which could be granted through a contract of 
mandate171. 
 Another clear example where there is no underlying contractual relationship 
between the owner and the transferor is that of the alienation performed by a 
slave or a son-in-power. As shown above, the persons alieni iuris could transfer 
ownership in two cases: (1) if they had the libera administratio peculii; (2) if they 
acted voluntate domini. As long as these individuals are duly authorized, the 
                                                 
162  This view was already defended by Schlossmann, but only after the monographic study of 
Angelini did it become widespread among scholars.  
163  Klinck, Procurator (2007), p. 25-52. 
164  E.g. Gai 2,64; D. 6,1,41,1. 
165  On the scope of the power of the procurator see Chapter 2, Section 4(b) below. 
166  See Chapter 2, Section 4(b) below. 
167  See on this point Finazzi, Negotiorum gestio (1999) I, p. 176-190, 215-277; Klinck, 
Procurator (2007), p. 32-41; Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009), p. 19. 
168  This is explicitly declared in D. 6,1,41,1. Also D. 41,1,9,4 makes reference to the voluntas 
domini of someone who has broad powers of administration, although Gaius does not 
explicitly mention that he is dealing with a procurator in this case. 
169  Other texts present the procurator as bound towards the owner by a contract of mandate, 
such as D. 17,1,49 (Marcell. 6 dig.) and C. 4,35,12 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 293). 
170  Klinck, Procurator (2007), p. 42-44. 
171  See on this point Chapter 2, Section 4(b) below. 
 
outcome of the traditio performed by them is identical to that of a person sui iuris. 
Both groups of persons are in fact set on equal ground on this point by the 
above-mentioned text of D. 6,1,41,1 (Ulp. 17 ed.). There is, accordingly, no 
reason to exclude the alienations by a person alieni iuris from the general analysis 
of the potestas alienandi, or to understand that they take place on a different legal 
ground172. The role of the voluntas domini in the delivery by a person alieni iuris is 
highlighted in numerous texts, including the following: 
 
D. 39,5,9,2 (Pomp. 38 Sab.): Quod filiusfamilias patris iussu aut 
voluntate donavit, perinde est, ac si pater ipse donaverit aut si mea 
voluntate rem meam tu nomine tuo Titio dones173.  
 
Pomponius makes it clear that the gift made voluntate domini by the son-in-power 
will have the same consequences as if performed by the owner himself. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the text puts ‘iussum’ on the same level as 
‘voluntas’. This could appear to indicate a different ground for the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner, and in fact Miquel considers that the delivery iussu 
domini is to be distinguished from that performed voluntate domini, the former 
being performed on behalf of the owner and the latter not. However, as will be 
shown below174, such interpretation is not firmly rooted in the sources. These 
expressions should rather be seen as set on an equal ground with each other, as 
well as with the other cases shown in the text, which could therefore be seen as 
indicating that the same result will be achieved: (1) if the gift is done iussu domini; 
(2) if done voluntate domini; (3) if the owner (the pater) makes the gift himself; (4) 
if ‘you’ – we may assume, a sui iuris – perform the gift on your behalf with the 
owner’s authorization. 
 Concerning the person alieni iuris it is also worth noting that the grounds for 
which the pater may be liable for the contracts concluded by them do not 
necessarily coincide with the ground upon which ownership is transferred. In 
other words, it is possible that the pater is liable for the contract concluded despite 
not having authorized the transfer of ownership over a particular object. This is 
for instance the case in the actio de peculio, which is granted against the principal 
merely because of the concession of a peculium to his slave or son-in-power and 
without taking into account whether he authorized a particular act to take 
place175. 
                                                 
172  As claimed by Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 126. 
173  D. 39,5,9,2: “Any gift made by a son-in-power on the instructions of or with the consent 
of his father has the same standing as if the father made the gift himself or as if you gave 
some property of mine to Titius in your own name with my consent” (transl. Watson). 
174  Chapter 2, Section 5. 
175  See Gai 4,72a: “… Licet enim negotium ita gestum sit cum filio servove, ut neque 
voluntas neque consensus patris dominive intervenerit, si quid tamen ex ea re, quae cum 
illis gesta est, in rem patris dominive versum sit, quatenus in rem eius versum fuerit, 
eatenus datur actio…” 
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function had more of a social than a legal content162. Recently, Klinck has even 
claimed that the term ‘procurator’ had no legal significance, except perhaps 
regarding the procurator ad litem163. Contrary to this opinion, there are several 
texts164 where we are told that the procurator could transfer ownership within 
certain limits165, which shows that the sole fact of being procurator did have some 
legal significance, at least regarding the potestas alienandi166. The existence of such 
power to dispose appears to be disconnected from the particular legal framework 
that would govern the personal relations between principal and procurator, which 
is in itself a controverted issue. According to scholars, initially the relationship 
between principal and procurator would have been governed by the actio negotiorum 
gestorum, and only around the time of Julian would jurists have framed this 
institution within the contract of mandate167. While this evolution had relevant 
consequences for the personal claims that may rise between both parties, it 
appears to have been of little significance for the transfer of ownership, where the 
decisive element for the transfer of ownership was the voluntas domini168. This can 
be seen in D. 6,2,14, where the existence of a contract of mandate between 
owner and procurator implies that the latter may sue the principal with the actio 
mandati contraria, but the ground for the transfer of ownership, as the text 
explicitly shows, is that the non-owner transfers voluntate domini169. One can 
therefore discard the opinion of Klinck, who considers that every transfer of 
ownership by a procurator would only be valid due to the existence of a contract 
of mandate170. The existence of a contract of mandate only appears to be relevant 
in this context when the procurator requires a special authorization to transfer 
ownership over some goods, which could be granted through a contract of 
mandate171. 
 Another clear example where there is no underlying contractual relationship 
between the owner and the transferor is that of the alienation performed by a 
slave or a son-in-power. As shown above, the persons alieni iuris could transfer 
ownership in two cases: (1) if they had the libera administratio peculii; (2) if they 
acted voluntate domini. As long as these individuals are duly authorized, the 
                                                 
162  This view was already defended by Schlossmann, but only after the monographic study of 
Angelini did it become widespread among scholars.  
163  Klinck, Procurator (2007), p. 25-52. 
164  E.g. Gai 2,64; D. 6,1,41,1. 
165  On the scope of the power of the procurator see Chapter 2, Section 4(b) below. 
166  See Chapter 2, Section 4(b) below. 
167  See on this point Finazzi, Negotiorum gestio (1999) I, p. 176-190, 215-277; Klinck, 
Procurator (2007), p. 32-41; Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009), p. 19. 
168  This is explicitly declared in D. 6,1,41,1. Also D. 41,1,9,4 makes reference to the voluntas 
domini of someone who has broad powers of administration, although Gaius does not 
explicitly mention that he is dealing with a procurator in this case. 
169  Other texts present the procurator as bound towards the owner by a contract of mandate, 
such as D. 17,1,49 (Marcell. 6 dig.) and C. 4,35,12 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 293). 
170  Klinck, Procurator (2007), p. 42-44. 
171  See on this point Chapter 2, Section 4(b) below. 
 
outcome of the traditio performed by them is identical to that of a person sui iuris. 
Both groups of persons are in fact set on equal ground on this point by the 
above-mentioned text of D. 6,1,41,1 (Ulp. 17 ed.). There is, accordingly, no 
reason to exclude the alienations by a person alieni iuris from the general analysis 
of the potestas alienandi, or to understand that they take place on a different legal 
ground172. The role of the voluntas domini in the delivery by a person alieni iuris is 
highlighted in numerous texts, including the following: 
 
D. 39,5,9,2 (Pomp. 38 Sab.): Quod filiusfamilias patris iussu aut 
voluntate donavit, perinde est, ac si pater ipse donaverit aut si mea 
voluntate rem meam tu nomine tuo Titio dones173.  
 
Pomponius makes it clear that the gift made voluntate domini by the son-in-power 
will have the same consequences as if performed by the owner himself. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the text puts ‘iussum’ on the same level as 
‘voluntas’. This could appear to indicate a different ground for the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner, and in fact Miquel considers that the delivery iussu 
domini is to be distinguished from that performed voluntate domini, the former 
being performed on behalf of the owner and the latter not. However, as will be 
shown below174, such interpretation is not firmly rooted in the sources. These 
expressions should rather be seen as set on an equal ground with each other, as 
well as with the other cases shown in the text, which could therefore be seen as 
indicating that the same result will be achieved: (1) if the gift is done iussu domini; 
(2) if done voluntate domini; (3) if the owner (the pater) makes the gift himself; (4) 
if ‘you’ – we may assume, a sui iuris – perform the gift on your behalf with the 
owner’s authorization. 
 Concerning the person alieni iuris it is also worth noting that the grounds for 
which the pater may be liable for the contracts concluded by them do not 
necessarily coincide with the ground upon which ownership is transferred. In 
other words, it is possible that the pater is liable for the contract concluded despite 
not having authorized the transfer of ownership over a particular object. This is 
for instance the case in the actio de peculio, which is granted against the principal 
merely because of the concession of a peculium to his slave or son-in-power and 
without taking into account whether he authorized a particular act to take 
place175. 
                                                 
172  As claimed by Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 126. 
173  D. 39,5,9,2: “Any gift made by a son-in-power on the instructions of or with the consent 
of his father has the same standing as if the father made the gift himself or as if you gave 
some property of mine to Titius in your own name with my consent” (transl. Watson). 
174  Chapter 2, Section 5. 
175  See Gai 4,72a: “… Licet enim negotium ita gestum sit cum filio servove, ut neque 
voluntas neque consensus patris dominive intervenerit, si quid tamen ex ea re, quae cum 
illis gesta est, in rem patris dominive versum sit, quatenus in rem eius versum fuerit, 
eatenus datur actio…” 
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 Returning to D. 39,5,9,2, the fact that Pomponius explicitly declares that the 
delivery iussu domini produces the same effects as that performed voluntate domini 
is a first sign of the fact that Roman jurists often resort to various terms to refer to 
the owner’s authorization. One may in fact identify cases in which the owner’s 
authorization to transfer ownership is not only rendered through the reference to 
existence – or lack of – voluntas domini176, but also to the scientia177, consensus178, 
praepositio179, iussum180, mandatum181, ratihabitio182, propositum183 or permissum184, to 
name a few185. It is however worth noting that these expressions may also take 
place in other contexts where there is no transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
For instance, similar expressions – iussum/iubere, voluntas, permittere/permissum, 
mandare – are used in the context of the delegatio tradendi186, where the delivery is 
performed a domino187. The terminological coincidence at this point is nothing 
strange, since the authorization given in the context of the delegatio shares several 
features with the voluntas domini in the delivery by a non-owner, as are its 
revocability, informal character, the possibility of ratifying it, etc.188, all of which 
are moreover features which are readily noticeable among different cases where 
someone authorizes a third person to perform an act involving a patrimonial loss. 
Moreover, expressions such as iussum have such a broad meaning that they can 
even indicate the delivery following the intent as manifested by the deceased in 
the testament189. Nonetheless, whenever the above-mentioned expressions are 
used in the context of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner who follows the 
                                                 
176  See e.g. D. 6,1,41,1 (Ulp. 17 ed.); D. 21,2,61 (Marcel. 8 dig.); C. 5,12,14 
(Diocletian/Maximianus, 293); C. 8,20,1 (Caracalla, 214); C. 3,32,3pr (Alexander, 222). 
See on this point Miceli, Rappresentanza (2008), p. 185. 
177  D. 24,1,38,1 (Alf. 3 dig. a Paulo epitomatorum); D. 41,2,6pr (Ulp. 70 ed.) (sciente aut volente); 
C. 4,26,10pr-1 (Diocletian, Maximianus, 294); C. 3,32,3pr (Alexander, 222). 
178  D. 1,19,1,1 (Ulp. 16 ed.); D. 50,17,165 (Ulp. 53 ed.); C. 3,29,8,1 
(Diocletianus/Maximianus, 294); C. 3,32,3,1 (Alexander, 222); C. 4,51,5 (Diocletian, 
294) ; C. 7,32,7 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 293); C. 8,53(54),14 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 
293). 
179  D. 12,1,41 (Afr. 8 quaest.). 
180  D. 18,1,15,2 (Paul 5 Sab.) (iussu meo alii tradideris (…) iussu meo alii tradas).  
181  D. 17,1,57 (Pap. 10 resp.); D. 41,4,14 (Scaev. 25 dig.); D. 44,3,15,2 (Venuleius 5 
interdictorum). 
182  D. 24,1,38,1 (Alf. 3 dig. a Paulo epitomatorum); D. 41,3,44,1 (Pap. 23 quaest.). 
183  D. 18,1,15,2 (Paul 5 Sab.). 
184  D. 12,6,53 (Proc. 7 epistularum) (a domino id permissum non esset). 
185  See e.g. D. 17,1,5,4 (Paul 32 ed.) (praeceperit); D. 20,6,10,1 (Paul 3 quaestionum): “Idemque 
est in omnibus, quibus concessum est rem alienam vendere…”. In contexts outside the 
transfer of ownership there are similar expressions indicating the owner’s authorization, 
such as ‘patientia’, which is to be found in D. 39,3,19 (Pomp. 12 ad Quintum Mucium) 
(damages by an authorized neighbour). 
186  Alonso, Delegación (2001) I.1, p. 27 ff.; Zandrino, Delegatio (2010), p. 57-65. 
187  See on this point Chapter 1, Section 4(c) above. 
188  See on this point Alonso, Delegación (2001) I.1, p. 81 ff. 
189  See e.g. D. 12,6,67pr (Scaev. 5 dig.). 
 
indications of the owner, it is safe to claim that they all have an equivalent 
significance from the perspective of the law of property. 
 Considering the variety of expressions used by Roman jurists, the key issue is 
to determine whether any of them conveys a different significance for the 
purpose of the transfer of ownership, as is the case in the alienation by a son-in-
power or slave with the libera administratio peculii. From the manner in which the 
sources approach this problem, it would appear that most of the expressions 
mentioned here only reflect differences in the particular relationship between the 
owner and the transferor, differences which are however in principle of no 
significance for the transfer of ownership. This is particularly the case with 
references to the existence of a mandate, iussum or praepositio. When approaching 
a problem exclusively from the perspective of the transfer of ownership, the 
expression ‘voluntas domini’ appears to be the most general term used to refer to 
the owner’s authorization, which can be observed by the use of this expression 
by Roman jurists when discussing the transfer of ownership by an authorized 
non-owner in general terms, such as D. 41,1,9,4 or D. 6,1,41,1, as well as by its 
application when solving concrete cases, including D. 6,2,14. However, there are 
other general expressions which can replace ‘voluntas domini’, as happens when 
reference is made to the owner’s scientia, consensus, ratihabitio – before the delivery 
– or permissum. The fact that the different expressions and cases covered here 
have an equivalent significance regarding the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner becomes moreover evident not only by the fact that they all have the 
same consequence, but especially due to the fact that Roman jurists often name 
the different cases side by side when discussing the problem of the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner190. It should be borne in mind that the problem is 
completely different regarding the libera administratio peculii, which is often 
presented as an individual ground for the transfer of ownership, next to the 
traditio voluntate domini, and even leads to different practical results. 
 The outlook offered here illustrates that the different obligatory relationship 
which may arise between owner and transferor/non-owner should not lead to an 
isolated treatment from one another. From the perspective of the transfer of 
ownership, the significance of the voluntas domini remains largely unaltered. 
However, while the consequences from the perspective of the transfer of 
ownership are basically the same in all of these cases, the owner’s authorization 
acquires particular features in each of them. In certain cases, such as the 
praepositio, it appears as a more general agreement for a series of operations, while 
the iussum refers normally to a more specific authorization. In both of these cases, 
moreover, the owner’s authorization to dispose is essentially unilateral, even if it 
takes place in the context of a contract binding the parties191. These differences 
                                                 
190  See Chapter 1, Section 2(a) above. 
191  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 158 regards that the voluntas domini as 
essentially unilateral. This does not mean that the existence of an underlying agreement 
between the parties is irrelevant. For instance, D. 6,2,14 (Ulp. 16 ed.) and D. 17,1,49 
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 Returning to D. 39,5,9,2, the fact that Pomponius explicitly declares that the 
delivery iussu domini produces the same effects as that performed voluntate domini 
is a first sign of the fact that Roman jurists often resort to various terms to refer to 
the owner’s authorization. One may in fact identify cases in which the owner’s 
authorization to transfer ownership is not only rendered through the reference to 
existence – or lack of – voluntas domini176, but also to the scientia177, consensus178, 
praepositio179, iussum180, mandatum181, ratihabitio182, propositum183 or permissum184, to 
name a few185. It is however worth noting that these expressions may also take 
place in other contexts where there is no transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
For instance, similar expressions – iussum/iubere, voluntas, permittere/permissum, 
mandare – are used in the context of the delegatio tradendi186, where the delivery is 
performed a domino187. The terminological coincidence at this point is nothing 
strange, since the authorization given in the context of the delegatio shares several 
features with the voluntas domini in the delivery by a non-owner, as are its 
revocability, informal character, the possibility of ratifying it, etc.188, all of which 
are moreover features which are readily noticeable among different cases where 
someone authorizes a third person to perform an act involving a patrimonial loss. 
Moreover, expressions such as iussum have such a broad meaning that they can 
even indicate the delivery following the intent as manifested by the deceased in 
the testament189. Nonetheless, whenever the above-mentioned expressions are 
used in the context of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner who follows the 
                                                 
176  See e.g. D. 6,1,41,1 (Ulp. 17 ed.); D. 21,2,61 (Marcel. 8 dig.); C. 5,12,14 
(Diocletian/Maximianus, 293); C. 8,20,1 (Caracalla, 214); C. 3,32,3pr (Alexander, 222). 
See on this point Miceli, Rappresentanza (2008), p. 185. 
177  D. 24,1,38,1 (Alf. 3 dig. a Paulo epitomatorum); D. 41,2,6pr (Ulp. 70 ed.) (sciente aut volente); 
C. 4,26,10pr-1 (Diocletian, Maximianus, 294); C. 3,32,3pr (Alexander, 222). 
178  D. 1,19,1,1 (Ulp. 16 ed.); D. 50,17,165 (Ulp. 53 ed.); C. 3,29,8,1 
(Diocletianus/Maximianus, 294); C. 3,32,3,1 (Alexander, 222); C. 4,51,5 (Diocletian, 
294) ; C. 7,32,7 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 293); C. 8,53(54),14 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 
293). 
179  D. 12,1,41 (Afr. 8 quaest.). 
180  D. 18,1,15,2 (Paul 5 Sab.) (iussu meo alii tradideris (…) iussu meo alii tradas).  
181  D. 17,1,57 (Pap. 10 resp.); D. 41,4,14 (Scaev. 25 dig.); D. 44,3,15,2 (Venuleius 5 
interdictorum). 
182  D. 24,1,38,1 (Alf. 3 dig. a Paulo epitomatorum); D. 41,3,44,1 (Pap. 23 quaest.). 
183  D. 18,1,15,2 (Paul 5 Sab.). 
184  D. 12,6,53 (Proc. 7 epistularum) (a domino id permissum non esset). 
185  See e.g. D. 17,1,5,4 (Paul 32 ed.) (praeceperit); D. 20,6,10,1 (Paul 3 quaestionum): “Idemque 
est in omnibus, quibus concessum est rem alienam vendere…”. In contexts outside the 
transfer of ownership there are similar expressions indicating the owner’s authorization, 
such as ‘patientia’, which is to be found in D. 39,3,19 (Pomp. 12 ad Quintum Mucium) 
(damages by an authorized neighbour). 
186  Alonso, Delegación (2001) I.1, p. 27 ff.; Zandrino, Delegatio (2010), p. 57-65. 
187  See on this point Chapter 1, Section 4(c) above. 
188  See on this point Alonso, Delegación (2001) I.1, p. 81 ff. 
189  See e.g. D. 12,6,67pr (Scaev. 5 dig.). 
 
indications of the owner, it is safe to claim that they all have an equivalent 
significance from the perspective of the law of property. 
 Considering the variety of expressions used by Roman jurists, the key issue is 
to determine whether any of them conveys a different significance for the 
purpose of the transfer of ownership, as is the case in the alienation by a son-in-
power or slave with the libera administratio peculii. From the manner in which the 
sources approach this problem, it would appear that most of the expressions 
mentioned here only reflect differences in the particular relationship between the 
owner and the transferor, differences which are however in principle of no 
significance for the transfer of ownership. This is particularly the case with 
references to the existence of a mandate, iussum or praepositio. When approaching 
a problem exclusively from the perspective of the transfer of ownership, the 
expression ‘voluntas domini’ appears to be the most general term used to refer to 
the owner’s authorization, which can be observed by the use of this expression 
by Roman jurists when discussing the transfer of ownership by an authorized 
non-owner in general terms, such as D. 41,1,9,4 or D. 6,1,41,1, as well as by its 
application when solving concrete cases, including D. 6,2,14. However, there are 
other general expressions which can replace ‘voluntas domini’, as happens when 
reference is made to the owner’s scientia, consensus, ratihabitio – before the delivery 
– or permissum. The fact that the different expressions and cases covered here 
have an equivalent significance regarding the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner becomes moreover evident not only by the fact that they all have the 
same consequence, but especially due to the fact that Roman jurists often name 
the different cases side by side when discussing the problem of the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner190. It should be borne in mind that the problem is 
completely different regarding the libera administratio peculii, which is often 
presented as an individual ground for the transfer of ownership, next to the 
traditio voluntate domini, and even leads to different practical results. 
 The outlook offered here illustrates that the different obligatory relationship 
which may arise between owner and transferor/non-owner should not lead to an 
isolated treatment from one another. From the perspective of the transfer of 
ownership, the significance of the voluntas domini remains largely unaltered. 
However, while the consequences from the perspective of the transfer of 
ownership are basically the same in all of these cases, the owner’s authorization 
acquires particular features in each of them. In certain cases, such as the 
praepositio, it appears as a more general agreement for a series of operations, while 
the iussum refers normally to a more specific authorization. In both of these cases, 
moreover, the owner’s authorization to dispose is essentially unilateral, even if it 
takes place in the context of a contract binding the parties191. These differences 
                                                 
190  See Chapter 1, Section 2(a) above. 
191  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 158 regards that the voluntas domini as 
essentially unilateral. This does not mean that the existence of an underlying agreement 
between the parties is irrelevant. For instance, D. 6,2,14 (Ulp. 16 ed.) and D. 17,1,49 
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are largely irrelevant to determine the transfer of ownership, and the only 
possible exception in this regard is that Roman jurists take into account the 
importance of the fides which governs for instance the acts of the procurator, to 
introduce some equitable considerations to the attribution of property, but it is 
not even clear if the decision is inspired in this case on the personal relation as 
such or on objective criteria regarding the best administration of the owner’s 
goods192. Apart from this circumstance, the different forms which the owner’s 
authorization may adopt are only relevant insofar as they show that such 
authorization may present itself in different ways. One of the most curious 
manifestations of this authorization takes place when the owner has a mere 
scientia of the delivery, which will be reviewed in further detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
 The knowledge (scientia) of the owner is referred to in several cases by 
Roman jurists as sufficient for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner to take 
place193. It is interesting at this point to draw a parallel with the law of theft, 
since, as shown in the previous section, the scientia domini is not essentially 
different to the voluntas domini, but it does introduce certain nuances to the latter, 
more general notion, which allow for instance to preclude the existence of furtum 
in case the delivery is performed insciente domino. Similarly, there seems to be an 
equivalence between the traditio invito domino and that insciente domino, since in 
both cases ownership will not be transferred. It is moreover worth noting that in 
different contexts, Roman jurists consider that the lack of objection of someone 
who knows of someone else’s act affecting him can be seen as an authorization, as 
is explicitly declared in the context of mandate194, theft195 and the constitution of 
mortgage196. In the context of manumission, it is also pointed out that the 
ignorance of owning a slave excludes the possibility of the latter being 
manumitted due to the impossibility of a voluntas domini aimed at that 
objective197, which again draws a strong link between knowing and willing. An 
equivalence between these two elements is also to be found in the transfer of 
ownership, specifically a case of co-ownership: 
 
D. 21,2,12 (Scaev. 2 resp.): Quidam ex parte dimidia heres institutus 
universa praedia vendidit et coheredes pretium acceperunt: evictis 
                                                                                                                   
(Marcel. 6 dig.) present some applications of the actio mandati contraria against the owner, 
showing a more bilateral setting for the relationship between owner and transferor. 
192  See on this point Chapter 2, Section 3(d) below. 
193  E.g. D. 24,1,38,1 (Alfenus 3 dig. a Paulo epitomatorum); D. 41,2,6pr (Ulp. 70 ed.). 
194  D. 50,17,60 (Ulp. 10 disputationum): “Semper qui non prohibet pro se intervenire, 
mandare creditur”. 
195  D. 47,2,92(91) (Lab. 2 pithanon a Paulo epitomatorum) 
196  C. 8,15,2 (Severus/Antoninus, 204). 
197  D. 40,12,28 (Pomp. 12 ad Quintum Mucium): “Non videtur domini voluntate servus in 
libertate esse, quem dominus ignorasset suum esse (…)” See on this text Chapter 2, Section 
6(b) below. 
 
his quaero, an coheredes ex empto actione teneantur. Respondi, si 
coheredes praesentes adfuerunt nec dissenserunt, videri 
unumquemque partem suam vendidisse198. 
 
In this case, one heir obtains half of a piece of land, but proceeds nonetheless to 
sell it as a whole, distributing the price obtained among the other coheirs. 
Scaevola wonders about the responsibility of the other heirs in case the buyer is 
evicted, which in turn implies determining whether they approved of such a sale. 
The answer implies that the coheirs were present at the sale but did not actively 
approve nor disapprove (praesentes adfuerunt nec dissenserunt), and under this 
circumstance Scaevola considers that they can be seen as selling their own share. 
The knowledge of an act without objecting it has therefore the same 
consequence as that actively authorized, being considered as performed by the 
owner himself. 
 Despite what has been said so far, the basic equivalence between scientia and 
voluntas in the context of the transfer of ownership does not imply that acts invito 
domino and insciente domino are identical in every aspect. The fact that Roman 
jurists explicitly draw an equivalence between knowing about someone else’s act 
– while tolerating it – and actively approving of it shows that there is a 
substantive factual difference. It seems in fact more serious to act against the will 
of the owner than only without his knowledge, as can be seen in the fact that the 
existence of furtum will be more likely to take place in a delivery invito domino 
than in that insciente domino, as shown in the previous section. Ulpian, for 
example, declares that “Someone who can alienate against the will of others can 
do so all the more if they are in ignorance or absent”199 (D. 50,17,26, transl. 
Watson, modified), which makes it clear that it is worse to alienate against the 
will of the owner than simply without his knowledge. It is worth noting that 
Lenel200 locates this text in the context of the faculties of the co-owners, and 
specifically following D. 10,2,43, which deals with the faculty of a co-heir to ask 
for the division of the inheritance even against the will of the others. It is 
however not entirely clear in which circumstances the co-heir could alienate 
against the will of the others, and it seems more tempting to follow the opinion 
of Fleckner, according to whom the text could originally refer to the 
manumission by a co-owner201. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that the text 
referred to a case of transfer of ownership, perhaps by a legal guardian, especially 
considering that Lenel also considers the first title of Ulpian’s 30th book ad 
                                                 
198  D. 21,2,12: “Someone, being instituted heir as to half, sold land and all the heirs took the 
price; the question is: If there be eviction from that land, are the coheirs generally liable to 
the action on purchase? My reply is that if the co-heirs were present and did not dissent, 
each will be deemed to have sold his own share” (transl. Watson, modified). 
199  D. 50,17,26 (Ulp. 30 Sab.): “Qui potest invitis alienare, multo magis et ignorantibus et 
absentibus potest”.  
200  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 1131. 
201  Fleckner, Antike Kapitalvereinigungen (2010), p. 358 n. 105. 
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are largely irrelevant to determine the transfer of ownership, and the only 
possible exception in this regard is that Roman jurists take into account the 
importance of the fides which governs for instance the acts of the procurator, to 
introduce some equitable considerations to the attribution of property, but it is 
not even clear if the decision is inspired in this case on the personal relation as 
such or on objective criteria regarding the best administration of the owner’s 
goods192. Apart from this circumstance, the different forms which the owner’s 
authorization may adopt are only relevant insofar as they show that such 
authorization may present itself in different ways. One of the most curious 
manifestations of this authorization takes place when the owner has a mere 
scientia of the delivery, which will be reviewed in further detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
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Roman jurists as sufficient for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner to take 
place193. It is interesting at this point to draw a parallel with the law of theft, 
since, as shown in the previous section, the scientia domini is not essentially 
different to the voluntas domini, but it does introduce certain nuances to the latter, 
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in case the delivery is performed insciente domino. Similarly, there seems to be an 
equivalence between the traditio invito domino and that insciente domino, since in 
both cases ownership will not be transferred. It is moreover worth noting that in 
different contexts, Roman jurists consider that the lack of objection of someone 
who knows of someone else’s act affecting him can be seen as an authorization, as 
is explicitly declared in the context of mandate194, theft195 and the constitution of 
mortgage196. In the context of manumission, it is also pointed out that the 
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manumitted due to the impossibility of a voluntas domini aimed at that 
objective197, which again draws a strong link between knowing and willing. An 
equivalence between these two elements is also to be found in the transfer of 
ownership, specifically a case of co-ownership: 
 
D. 21,2,12 (Scaev. 2 resp.): Quidam ex parte dimidia heres institutus 
universa praedia vendidit et coheredes pretium acceperunt: evictis 
                                                                                                                   
(Marcel. 6 dig.) present some applications of the actio mandati contraria against the owner, 
showing a more bilateral setting for the relationship between owner and transferor. 
192  See on this point Chapter 2, Section 3(d) below. 
193  E.g. D. 24,1,38,1 (Alfenus 3 dig. a Paulo epitomatorum); D. 41,2,6pr (Ulp. 70 ed.). 
194  D. 50,17,60 (Ulp. 10 disputationum): “Semper qui non prohibet pro se intervenire, 
mandare creditur”. 
195  D. 47,2,92(91) (Lab. 2 pithanon a Paulo epitomatorum) 
196  C. 8,15,2 (Severus/Antoninus, 204). 
197  D. 40,12,28 (Pomp. 12 ad Quintum Mucium): “Non videtur domini voluntate servus in 
libertate esse, quem dominus ignorasset suum esse (…)” See on this text Chapter 2, Section 
6(b) below. 
 
his quaero, an coheredes ex empto actione teneantur. Respondi, si 
coheredes praesentes adfuerunt nec dissenserunt, videri 
unumquemque partem suam vendidisse198. 
 
In this case, one heir obtains half of a piece of land, but proceeds nonetheless to 
sell it as a whole, distributing the price obtained among the other coheirs. 
Scaevola wonders about the responsibility of the other heirs in case the buyer is 
evicted, which in turn implies determining whether they approved of such a sale. 
The answer implies that the coheirs were present at the sale but did not actively 
approve nor disapprove (praesentes adfuerunt nec dissenserunt), and under this 
circumstance Scaevola considers that they can be seen as selling their own share. 
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domino and insciente domino are identical in every aspect. The fact that Roman 
jurists explicitly draw an equivalence between knowing about someone else’s act 
– while tolerating it – and actively approving of it shows that there is a 
substantive factual difference. It seems in fact more serious to act against the will 
of the owner than only without his knowledge, as can be seen in the fact that the 
existence of furtum will be more likely to take place in a delivery invito domino 
than in that insciente domino, as shown in the previous section. Ulpian, for 
example, declares that “Someone who can alienate against the will of others can 
do so all the more if they are in ignorance or absent”199 (D. 50,17,26, transl. 
Watson, modified), which makes it clear that it is worse to alienate against the 
will of the owner than simply without his knowledge. It is worth noting that 
Lenel200 locates this text in the context of the faculties of the co-owners, and 
specifically following D. 10,2,43, which deals with the faculty of a co-heir to ask 
for the division of the inheritance even against the will of the others. It is 
however not entirely clear in which circumstances the co-heir could alienate 
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of Fleckner, according to whom the text could originally refer to the 
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198  D. 21,2,12: “Someone, being instituted heir as to half, sold land and all the heirs took the 
price; the question is: If there be eviction from that land, are the coheirs generally liable to 
the action on purchase? My reply is that if the co-heirs were present and did not dissent, 
each will be deemed to have sold his own share” (transl. Watson, modified). 
199  D. 50,17,26 (Ulp. 30 Sab.): “Qui potest invitis alienare, multo magis et ignorantibus et 
absentibus potest”.  
200  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 1131. 
201  Fleckner, Antike Kapitalvereinigungen (2010), p. 358 n. 105. 
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Sabinum “De emptione et venditione”202. Whatever the case may be, the text shows 
that classical jurists did not give an identical value to the alienation invito domino 
and insciente domino, and that the compilers emphasized this point by making a 
regula iuris out of it. All of this evidence shows that, while there is a basic factual 
difference between acts performed invito domino and insciente domino, there is no 
relevant difference regarding the transfer of ownership, in which context Roman 
jurists set voluntas and scientia at the same level. 
 The evidence presented so far shows that the scientia domini, despite its 
peculiar features, can be listed among the other expressions which ultimately 
refer to the voluntas domini. Having mentioned the most common manifestations 
of the voluntas domini as legal basis for the delivery, there remains a case where it 
is not clear that the transfer of ownership takes place by virtue of the owner’s 
authorization, namely when the delivery is performed by a messenger (nuntius). 
The figure of the nuntius has remained to a large extent enigmatic for modern 
scholars from a legal point of view, and since the 19th century it is sharply 
distinguished from other forms of intermediation. The reason for this distinction 
lies in the different consequences which follow in the field of the law of 
obligations from the agreements concluded by a messenger, since the sources 
show that the dominus negotii would be bound directly by the agreement 
concluded through a letter or messenger203, unlike any other case of 
intermediation in Roman law. This circumstance, no doubt, sets the nuntius on a 
completely different level from any other case in which a contract is concluded 
through someone else. The reason generally given for this essential difference is 
that the messenger would not conclude the agreement himself, but rather act as 
an instrument to convey the will of the owner. This distinction, however, does 
not necessarily play a relevant role in the context of the transfer of ownership by 
a non-owner, where the personal relationship between owner and transferor is of 
secondary importance, the key issue being the voluntas domini of the owner. One 
could therefore be drawn to think that the nuntius, as every other case of 
authorized delivery by a non-owner, will only transfer ownership if he delivers 
voluntate domini, which would appear to be confirmed by a solution given by 
Julian: 
 
D. 39,5,2,6 (Jul. 60 dig.): Sed si quis donaturus mihi pecuniam 
dederit alicui, ut ad me perferret, et ante mortuus erit quam ad me 
perferat, non fieri pecuniam dominii mei constat204. 
                                                 
202  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 1127. 
203  D. 18,1,1,2 (Paul 33 ed.): “Est autem emptio iuris gentium, et ideo consensu peragitur; et 
inter absentes contrahi potest, et per nuntium, et per litteras”. See also Gai 3,136; 
C. 4,50,9 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 294). 
204  D. 39,5,2,6: “But if someone who intends to make me a gift of money gives it to 
somebody to bring it to me and then dies before this is done, it is established that the 
money does not come into my ownership” (transl. Watson). 
 
In this text the person performing the delivery is not explicitly labelled a 
‘nuntius’, but scholars have traditionally assumed him to be so205, perhaps on 
account of the humble role of the agent, who simply has to bring over (perferre) 
an object. The owner in this case hands over an object to his nuntius, so that the 
latter takes it as a gift to someone else. However, the death of the owner before 
the object has been delivered prevents the transfer of ownership from taking 
place. This case resembles other solutions presented above206, in which the death 
of the owner precludes the existence of a voluntas domini at the delivery and 
therefore the passing of ownership, due to the lack of potestas alienandi 207. 
 The context of the fragment provides vital information in order to understand 
the significance of this text. Within D. 39,5,2, Julian describes several problems 
related to the intervention of an intermediary when making a gift. In 
D. 39,5,2pr-4, he discusses whether the gift itself is valid and who is bound by 
the stipulation concluded by another person. D. 39,5,2,5 and 7, on the other 
hand, focus on the gift made under a condition (condicio), discussing whether 
ownership is transferred or not. D. 39,5,2,5 in particular mentions that ownership 
will be transferred even if the condition was fulfiled after the death or insanity of 
the donor, i.e. even after he could no longer agree to the gift208. Julian appears to 
focus for a moment in D. 39,5,2,6 on the general rules regarding the death of the 
donor, before reassuming the problem of the gift under condition in D. 39,5,2,7. 
The text of D. 39,5,2,5 becomes therefore key for the understanding of 
D. 39,5,2,6, not only because the latter appears to develop a particular point of 
the former, but also because they offer opposite results. The outcome offered by 
Julian in D. 39,5,2,5 is in itself remarkable considering that the jurist sees no 
problem for the transfer of ownership in the fact that after the death of the donor 
ownership lies with another person, who did not agree to the transfer of 
ownership209. Ulpian, as shown above210, would offer in D. 23,3,9,1 (Ulp. 31 
                                                 
205  Siber, Römisches Recht (1928) II, p. 410, 412; Kaser, RPR (1971) I, p. 267 n. 12; Guzmán, 
DPR (2013) I, p. 646. 
206  Chapter 2, Section 1(b). 
207  Nonetheless Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 646 considers that ownership is not transferred 
due to the lack of a iusta causa traditionis: since the nuntius would only bring forward the 
will of the owner in order to make a gift, this author argues that death of the owner would 
prevent the formation of the iusta causa traditionis. One could however hardly expect Julian 
to harbour such thoughts, considering his opinions regarding the need for an agreement on 
the iusta causa traditionis in D. 41,1,36 (Jul. 13 dig.). It seems therefore more likely that 
Julian would approach this case in the context of the lack of voluntas domini of the traditio 
by a non-owner. 
208  D. 39,5,2,5 (Jul. 60 dig.): “Si pecuniam mihi Titius dederit absque ulla stipulatione, ea 
tamen condicione, ut tunc demum mea fieret, cum Seius consul factus esset: sive furente 
eo sive mortuo seius consulatum adeptus fuerit, mea fiet”. 
209  The contrast between both solutions is further discussed by Haymann, Textkritische Studien 
(1920), p. 95-97; Voci, Modi di acquisto (1952), p. 110-111; Masi, Studi sulla condizione 
(1966), p. 142-44; Schiemann, Pendenz (1973), p. 10-12, 97-98; Stagl, Favor dotis (2009), 
p. 197-203. 
210  See Chapter 2, Section 1(b). 
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Sab.) a similar outcome only on account of the favor dotis, considering that in 
principle ownership should not be transferred. The problem behind this case 
refers to the effects of the death of the owner concerning the potestas alienandi 
while the condition is pending. In this context, Julian would bring up the text of 
D. 39,5,2,6 to show that the outcome is different when the death takes place 
before the delivery without there being a pending suspensive condition. That the 
author draws a contrast between this text and the case of D. 39,5,2,5 is shown by 
the introductory word sed211. Accordingly, Julian applies in D. 39,5,2,6 the 
general rule found among Roman jurists concerning the death of the owner 
before the delivery, according to which ownership cannot be transferred unless 
the heirs grant their agreement to the delivery212. 
 The analysis of D. 39,5,2,6 reveals that the delivery by a nuntius does not 
provide a separate legal basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. Just as 
most cases reviewed so far, ownership will be transferred as long as the delivery 
takes place voluntate domini. Moreover, it would appear that the text does not 
specifically discuss the delivery by a nuntius. In fact, the idea of the owner who 
“dederit alicui, ut ad me perferret” can be understood, in light of the contrast 
between the cases presented in D. 39,5,2,5 and D. 39,5,2,6, simply as a general 
reference to the delivery by a non-owner. Whatever the case may be, it is clear 
that the situation of the nuntius does not stand out as having an independent 
ground for the transfer of ownership, and therefore in the context of the transfer 
of ownership it does not have the peculiar status it has in the law of obligations. 
 The fact that the delivery by a nuntius has no special place in the general 
analysis of the potestas alienandi shows that some of the assumptions of modern 
scholars on the subject are not based on the sources. It is indeed often claimed 
that the alienation by a nuntius would have a distinctive character and should be 
set apart from other cases, but it is not clear what would be so peculiar about it. 
Some authors stress that the main difference would be that the nuntius would act 
on behalf of the owner213, something which allegedly would be excluded in 
other cases where ownership is transferred by a non-owner. This idea seems to 
rely on the vague notions regarding the notion of direct representation in Roman 
law, excluding that the alienation by a non-owner in Rome could present 
identical features to that of modern law by resorting to the nuntius. Others 
indicate that the act of the nuntius would consist in merely bringing over an 
object regarding which the parties had already agreed on the iusta causa 
traditionis214. It is at times also assumed that sources where the non-owner is 
simply presented as ‘bringing over’ something would indicate that the non-
                                                 
211  Concerning the differences between D. 39,5,2,5 and D. 39,5,2,6, it is not necessary to 
look for a missing non in the latter text which would harmonize both solutions, as claimed 
by Voci, Modi di acquisto (1952), p. 111. 
212  Stagl, Favor dotis (2009), p. 207. 
213  See e.g. Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 99. 
214  Zulueta, Institutes of Gaius (1953) II, p. 75. 
 
owner acts as a mere nuntius215. There is however no evidence in the sources to 
support any of these claims, while the general categories used by Roman jurists 
appear to be sufficient to determine the legal grounds of the alienation in this 
case: ownership will be transferred because the delivery is performed voluntate 
domini, and as soon as the owner’s authorization is lacking the potestas alienandi of 
the non-owner will vanish. 
 The analysis of the different personal relationships which may exist between 
the owner and the transferor/non-owner shows that, from the perspective of the 
transfer of ownership, the reference to the voluntas domini covers almost every 
case in which the owner authorizes someone else to alienate his property. This 
basic requirement to grant the potestas alienandi to an authorized non-owner is 
therefore either expressed through this or other equally general terms, or through 
the reference to the specific personal or obligatory relationship between owner 
and transferor. The only notable exception on this point is the delivery 
performed by an alieni iuris acting within his libera administratio peculii, which the 
sources explicitly set aside regarding the transfer of ownership. In this context, 
the voluntas domini is approached as a flexible element, which can encompass 
different situations and which is to a considerable extent open to juristic 
interpretation, as becomes clear in the equivalence between scientia and voluntas. 
This overarching and dynamic approach will become even more evident through 
the study of the scope granted by jurists to the potestas alienandi which stems from 
the owner’s authorization, which will be dealt with in the following section. 
 
4. Scope of the potestas alienandi of the authorized non-owner 
 
a. Complying with specific instructions. 
 
When the owner authorizes the transfer of ownership, the more specific his 
instructions are, the easier it becomes to determine the scope of his authorization. 
If the owner gives specific instructions to carry out a business, the noncompliance 
of them by the non-owner will determine that ownership is not transferred at all. 
In other words, regarding the transfer of ownership, exceeding the instructions of 
the owner has the same consequence as not being authorized at all. Numerous 
decisions reflect this basic idea. Paul demands in general terms in D. 17,1,5,1216 
that the limits of the mandate must be respected, applying this idea in 
D. 17,1,5,3217 to a case in which the mandatarius sells for 90 what he was told to 
                                                 
215  Such is the case regarding D. 39,5,2,6, D. 39,5,10 and D. 39,5,25. An account on the 
debate on this point is given by Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 97. 
216  D. 17,1,5,1 (Paul 32 ed.): “Diligenter igitur fines mandati custodiendi sunt; nam qui 
excessit, aliud quid facere videtur”. 
217  D. 17,1,5,3 (Paul 32 ed.): “Item si mandavero tibi, ut fundum meum centum venderes, 
tuque eum nonaginta vendideris, et petam fundum, non obstabit mihi exceptio, nisi et 
reliquum mihi, quod deest, mandatu meo, praestes, et indemnem me per omnia 
conserves”. 
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214  Zulueta, Institutes of Gaius (1953) II, p. 75. 
 
owner acts as a mere nuntius215. There is however no evidence in the sources to 
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transfer of ownership, the reference to the voluntas domini covers almost every 
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basic requirement to grant the potestas alienandi to an authorized non-owner is 
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the reference to the specific personal or obligatory relationship between owner 
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the voluntas domini is approached as a flexible element, which can encompass 
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interpretation, as becomes clear in the equivalence between scientia and voluntas. 
This overarching and dynamic approach will become even more evident through 
the study of the scope granted by jurists to the potestas alienandi which stems from 
the owner’s authorization, which will be dealt with in the following section. 
 
4. Scope of the potestas alienandi of the authorized non-owner 
 
a. Complying with specific instructions. 
 
When the owner authorizes the transfer of ownership, the more specific his 
instructions are, the easier it becomes to determine the scope of his authorization. 
If the owner gives specific instructions to carry out a business, the noncompliance 
of them by the non-owner will determine that ownership is not transferred at all. 
In other words, regarding the transfer of ownership, exceeding the instructions of 
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215  Such is the case regarding D. 39,5,2,6, D. 39,5,10 and D. 39,5,25. An account on the 
debate on this point is given by Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 97. 
216  D. 17,1,5,1 (Paul 32 ed.): “Diligenter igitur fines mandati custodiendi sunt; nam qui 
excessit, aliud quid facere videtur”. 
217  D. 17,1,5,3 (Paul 32 ed.): “Item si mandavero tibi, ut fundum meum centum venderes, 
tuque eum nonaginta vendideris, et petam fundum, non obstabit mihi exceptio, nisi et 
reliquum mihi, quod deest, mandatu meo, praestes, et indemnem me per omnia 
conserves”. 
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sell for 100. The consequence of this transgression is that ownership will not be 
transferred and the owner will be able to recover the sold object. The same 
consequence is prescribed in D. 17,1,5,4218 to the alienation by a slave for a lower 
price than that set by his owner. Likewise, Ulpian quotes Celsus in D. 21,3,1,3219 
when stating that, if a non-owner sells an object at a lower price than that set by 
the owner, the object would not be considered as alienated (non videtur alienata), 
and the owner will recover what belongs to him. There are of course other 
instructions which may be disregarded by the non-owner apart from the price of 
the object to be sold. C. 4,35,12220 generally demands that if specific conditions 
have been laid down in the contract of mandate and the delivery performed by 
the mandatarius over a piece of land contravenes the terms of the contract, 
ownership will not be transferred, unless the owner ratifies the sale. Accordingly, 
any disobedience by the non-owner of the owner’s instructions may prevent the 
transfer of ownership, as happens when he acts nomine proprio221 despite being told 
to alienate on behalf of the owner, or when the pledge creditor sells the pledge in 
a way which exceeds the terms of the pactum de distrahendo222. It is worth noting 
that in these latter cases the sources explicitly mention the existence of furtum, 
and therefore the lack of the voluntas domini signals at the same time the 
impossibility to transfer ownership and the existence of a delict. 
 It is at this point worth noting that Roman jurists offer a rather strict 
interpretation of what the voluntas domini implies for the transfer of ownership by 
traditio. One could in fact think that the non-owner who exceeds the owner’s 
authorization would act validly at least regarding part of the operation, but 
Roman jurists did not see it that way, and the delivery which implies a breach of 
the owner’s instruction is regarded to take place invito domino, just as if there was 
no authorization at all. Only the ius honorarium would correct some of the most 
unfair consequences which could derive from this situation223, but for the ius civile 
there would be no voluntas domini which would allow the transfer of 
ownership224. 
                                                 
218  D. 17,1,5,4 (Paul 32 ed.): “Servo quoque dominus si praeceperit, certa summa rem 
vendere, ille minoris vendiderit, similiter vindicare eam dominus potest, nec ulla 
exceptione summoveri, nisi indemnitas ei praestetur”.  
219  D. 21,3,1,3 (Ulp. 76 ed.): “Celsus ait, si quis rem meam vendidit minoris, quam ei 
mandavi, non videtur alienata, et si petam eam, non obstabit mihi haec exceptio; quod 
verum est”. See on this text Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 105-107, 211-213. 
220  C. 4,35,12 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 293): “Cum mandati negotii contractum certam 
accepisse legem adseveres, eam integram secundum bonam fidem custodiri convenit. Unde 
si contra mandati tenorem procurator tuus ad te pertinentem fundum vendidit nec 
venditionem postea ratam habuisti, dominium tibi auferre non potuit”. 
221  D. 39,5,25 (Jav. 6 epistolarum). 
222  D. 47,2,73; D. 13,7,4 (Ulp. 41 Sab.); D. 13,7,5 (Pomp. 19 Sab.). 
223  See Chapter 4, Section 3 below. 
224  That this solution is by no means intuitive can be seen in the fact that in a scholion to the 
Paraphrase of Theophilus to Inst. 2,1,42, the scholiast indicates that the words κατὰ 
γνώμην (voluntate) imply that the transferee would only become owner if the authorization 
 
 While most texts offer a consistent outlook on the consequences of exceeding 
the instructions of the owner regarding the transfer of ownership, there are a 
couple of divergent opinions, the first of which is the following: 
 
D. 18,1,63pr (Jav. 7 ex Cassio): Cum servo dominus rem vendere 
certae personae iusserit, si alii vendidisset, quam cui iussus erat, 
venditio non valet. Idem iuris in libera persona est, quum perfici 
venditio non potuit in eius persona, cui dominus venire eam 
noluit225. 
 
Javolenus claims in this case that if a non-owner sells to a different person from 
that indicated by the owner, the sale itself will not be valid (venditio non valet). It 
would therefore appear that in the opinion of Javolenus the disregard to the 
owner’s instructions would not only prevent the transfer of ownership, but that 
the sale itself would not be valid. Such an opinion appears to be completely 
inconsistent with everything seen so far, particularly from the perspective of the 
law of obligations, where the owner’s intent is normally considered of no 
significance regarding the sale concluded between the non-owner and the 
purchaser. Moreover, the fact that the sold object would be rendered a res furtiva 
through the disregard of the owner’s instructions cannot by itself make the sale 
invalid, unless both parties knew about it, as shown in D. 18,1,34,3 (Paul 33 ed.). 
If the sale was indeed invalid in the case under discussion, a very odd 
consequence would follow, namely that the parties to the sale would not be 
mutually bound at all and the purchaser would have no ground to sue the seller 
in case of eviction. The awkwardness of this solution has motivated all kinds of 
explanations, including the usual accusations of interpolation. Sansón considers 
that the invalidity of the sale should be explained within the peculiar features of 
the traditio iussu domini226, an idea which is however not shared in the present 
book227. Elsewhere, Sansón considers that Javolenus would declare “venditio non 
valet” in order to stress the fact that the sale will not serve as a iusta causa 
usucapionis due to the fact that the disregard of the owner’s instructions would 
render the object sold a res furtiva228. More plausible seems the explanation of 
Burdese, who considers that Javolenus is plainly saying that ownership will not be 
transferred, without really questioning the validity of the sale itself, as would 
                                                                                                                   
of the previous owner completely covered the acts concluded by the non-owner, quoting 
in this regard D. 17,1,5,3. The scholion is edited by Ferrini, Scolii Gr. Par. 1364 (1929 
[1886]), p. 176, and commented by Nebrera, Ἡ τραδιτίων (1989), p. 96-108. 
225  D. 18,1,63pr: “Suppose a master to direct his slave to sell something to a particular person; 
if he sells to someone other than that person, the sale is null; the same would apply if the 
master asked a freeman to sell it; a sale cannot be brought to completion, if made to 
someone to whom the principal has no intention to sell” (transl. Watson, modified). 
226  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 220. 
227  See on this problem Chapter 2, Section 5 below. 
228  This possibility is moreover acknowledged by Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 108. 
SCOPE OF THE POTESTAS ALIENANDI OF THE AUTHORIZED NON-OWNER
113
 
110 
sell for 100. The consequence of this transgression is that ownership will not be 
transferred and the owner will be able to recover the sold object. The same 
consequence is prescribed in D. 17,1,5,4218 to the alienation by a slave for a lower 
price than that set by his owner. Likewise, Ulpian quotes Celsus in D. 21,3,1,3219 
when stating that, if a non-owner sells an object at a lower price than that set by 
the owner, the object would not be considered as alienated (non videtur alienata), 
and the owner will recover what belongs to him. There are of course other 
instructions which may be disregarded by the non-owner apart from the price of 
the object to be sold. C. 4,35,12220 generally demands that if specific conditions 
have been laid down in the contract of mandate and the delivery performed by 
the mandatarius over a piece of land contravenes the terms of the contract, 
ownership will not be transferred, unless the owner ratifies the sale. Accordingly, 
any disobedience by the non-owner of the owner’s instructions may prevent the 
transfer of ownership, as happens when he acts nomine proprio221 despite being told 
to alienate on behalf of the owner, or when the pledge creditor sells the pledge in 
a way which exceeds the terms of the pactum de distrahendo222. It is worth noting 
that in these latter cases the sources explicitly mention the existence of furtum, 
and therefore the lack of the voluntas domini signals at the same time the 
impossibility to transfer ownership and the existence of a delict. 
 It is at this point worth noting that Roman jurists offer a rather strict 
interpretation of what the voluntas domini implies for the transfer of ownership by 
traditio. One could in fact think that the non-owner who exceeds the owner’s 
authorization would act validly at least regarding part of the operation, but 
Roman jurists did not see it that way, and the delivery which implies a breach of 
the owner’s instruction is regarded to take place invito domino, just as if there was 
no authorization at all. Only the ius honorarium would correct some of the most 
unfair consequences which could derive from this situation223, but for the ius civile 
there would be no voluntas domini which would allow the transfer of 
ownership224. 
                                                 
218  D. 17,1,5,4 (Paul 32 ed.): “Servo quoque dominus si praeceperit, certa summa rem 
vendere, ille minoris vendiderit, similiter vindicare eam dominus potest, nec ulla 
exceptione summoveri, nisi indemnitas ei praestetur”.  
219  D. 21,3,1,3 (Ulp. 76 ed.): “Celsus ait, si quis rem meam vendidit minoris, quam ei 
mandavi, non videtur alienata, et si petam eam, non obstabit mihi haec exceptio; quod 
verum est”. See on this text Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 105-107, 211-213. 
220  C. 4,35,12 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 293): “Cum mandati negotii contractum certam 
accepisse legem adseveres, eam integram secundum bonam fidem custodiri convenit. Unde 
si contra mandati tenorem procurator tuus ad te pertinentem fundum vendidit nec 
venditionem postea ratam habuisti, dominium tibi auferre non potuit”. 
221  D. 39,5,25 (Jav. 6 epistolarum). 
222  D. 47,2,73; D. 13,7,4 (Ulp. 41 Sab.); D. 13,7,5 (Pomp. 19 Sab.). 
223  See Chapter 4, Section 3 below. 
224  That this solution is by no means intuitive can be seen in the fact that in a scholion to the 
Paraphrase of Theophilus to Inst. 2,1,42, the scholiast indicates that the words κατὰ 
γνώμην (voluntate) imply that the transferee would only become owner if the authorization 
 
 While most texts offer a consistent outlook on the consequences of exceeding 
the instructions of the owner regarding the transfer of ownership, there are a 
couple of divergent opinions, the first of which is the following: 
 
D. 18,1,63pr (Jav. 7 ex Cassio): Cum servo dominus rem vendere 
certae personae iusserit, si alii vendidisset, quam cui iussus erat, 
venditio non valet. Idem iuris in libera persona est, quum perfici 
venditio non potuit in eius persona, cui dominus venire eam 
noluit225. 
 
Javolenus claims in this case that if a non-owner sells to a different person from 
that indicated by the owner, the sale itself will not be valid (venditio non valet). It 
would therefore appear that in the opinion of Javolenus the disregard to the 
owner’s instructions would not only prevent the transfer of ownership, but that 
the sale itself would not be valid. Such an opinion appears to be completely 
inconsistent with everything seen so far, particularly from the perspective of the 
law of obligations, where the owner’s intent is normally considered of no 
significance regarding the sale concluded between the non-owner and the 
purchaser. Moreover, the fact that the sold object would be rendered a res furtiva 
through the disregard of the owner’s instructions cannot by itself make the sale 
invalid, unless both parties knew about it, as shown in D. 18,1,34,3 (Paul 33 ed.). 
If the sale was indeed invalid in the case under discussion, a very odd 
consequence would follow, namely that the parties to the sale would not be 
mutually bound at all and the purchaser would have no ground to sue the seller 
in case of eviction. The awkwardness of this solution has motivated all kinds of 
explanations, including the usual accusations of interpolation. Sansón considers 
that the invalidity of the sale should be explained within the peculiar features of 
the traditio iussu domini226, an idea which is however not shared in the present 
book227. Elsewhere, Sansón considers that Javolenus would declare “venditio non 
valet” in order to stress the fact that the sale will not serve as a iusta causa 
usucapionis due to the fact that the disregard of the owner’s instructions would 
render the object sold a res furtiva228. More plausible seems the explanation of 
Burdese, who considers that Javolenus is plainly saying that ownership will not be 
transferred, without really questioning the validity of the sale itself, as would 
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follow from the ambiguous significance of the word ‘valet’229. Despite the 
disbelief of Sansón230, this explanation not only brings the text in harmony with 
the rest of the evidence on the subject – including other opinions of Javolenus 
himself231 – but it does also agree with the scope of the term venditio, which is 
used in the sources not only to refer to the sale as iusta causa traditionis, but also to 
indicate an alienation in general, including at times even cases where ownership 
is not transferred as the result of a sale232. This circumstance is particularly 
relevant in relation to the ‘perfection’ of the sale, since this idea can be used to 
indicate the moment in which the contract becomes binding between the 
parties233, but it is also applied to describe the fulfilment of the obligations arising 
from the contract of sale234. This implies that the words “perfici venditio non potuit 
in eius persona” should not be understood as referring to the validity of the sale 
itself, but rather to the fact that the sale will not produce the same consequences 
with regard to a different person – literally, cannot be brought to completion235 
(perfici) – indicating thereby that ownership cannot be transferred in the context 
of such a sale. Therefore, Javolenus does not say anything new in this text, 
despite the fact that his choice of words could have been better. 
 
                                                 
229  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 16 n. 16 and p. 79-80; Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), 
p. 27 n. 10. For example, the validity of the venditio refers in fact to the alienation in 
D. 20,6,4,2 (Ulp. 78 ed.). 
230  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 108 considers that this idea is hard to believe. 
231  See D. 39,5,25 (Jav. 6 epistolarum). 
232  See on this point Dirksen, Manuale latinitatis fontium (1837), p. 988; Heumann/Seckel, 
Handlexikon (1926), p. 617, s.v. venditio: “auch bedeutet venditio überhaupt s. v. a. 
Veräusserung, Verfügung, Zuwendung (l. 8 § 11 D. 20,6 cf. l. 29 § 1 D. 40,7)”. See e.g. 
D. 40,7,29,1 (Pomp. 18 ad Quintum Mucium): “(…) lex duodecim tabularum emptionis 
verbo omnem alienationem complexa videretur (…)”; D. 20,6,8,11 (Marcianus libro 
singulari ad formulam hypothecariam): “Venditionis autem appellationem generaliter accipere 
debemus, ut et si legare permisit, valeat quod concessit (…)”; D. 17,1,57 (Pap. 10 resp.). 
233  E.g. D. 18,1,35,5 (Gai. 10 ed. prov.); D. 18,6,8pr (Paul 33 ed.); C. 4,50,9 (Diocletian/ 
Maximianus, 294). Pringsheim, Animus (1933), p. 58-59 considers the latter text to be 
referred to the transfer of ownership, which seems however unlikely: the reference to an 
epistula at the perfection of the sale seems to indicate the conclusion of the contract rather 
than the transfer of ownership. 
234  E.g. D. 18,1,57,1 (Paul 5 ad Plautium): “non compellatur emptor perficere emptionem”; 
D. 18,5,8 (Scaev. 2 resp.): “Titius Seii procurator defuncto Seio ab eo scriptus heres, cum 
ignoraret, fundum vendente servo hereditario, quasi procurator subscripsit: quaesitum est, 
an cognito eo, priusquam emptio perficeretur, a venditione discedere possit. (…)” Zedler, 
Universal-Lexicon (1745) XLVI, col. 1173 would accordingly accurately define “venditio 
perfecta” as: “ein vollkommener Verkauf, oder ein solcher, zu dessen Würcklichkeit seit 
weiter nichts fehlt, und bei welchem auch schon die Uebergabe der verkaufften Sache 
erfolget”. Oberländer, Lexicon (1753), p. 708 even focuses exclusively in the need for a 
delivery when explaining the expression ‘venditio perfecta’ in the following terms: “eine 
vollkommene Verkauffung wird genennt, wann die Tradition erfolget ist”. 
235  Hence, the translation offered here reads “a sale cannot be brought to completion”, which 
is preferred to the one offered by Watson, Digest: “a sale cannot stand”.  
 
b. Potestas alienandi of the procurator omnium bonorum. 
 
While the approach of classical sources to the cases in which a non-owner 
exceeds the owner’s authorization is uniform regarding cases where the owner 
gives specific instructions, the general outlook is not so clear when the non-
owner has general powers of administration. This problem has been especially 
debated in the context of the extension of the powers of the procurator omnium 
bonorum, which led in the past to widespread controversy among modern 
scholars. A traditional view, defended by Bonfante and adopted by many others 
after him, was that the procurator had originally unlimited faculties of 
administration and could therefore transfer ownership with considerable 
freedom236. Only in Justinianic times were these faculties restricted, and since that 
time the procurator needed a special mandate from the owner in order to transfer 
ownership over administered goods. This theory relied heavily on the 
interpolationistic method, regarding as postclassical several texts which demanded 
a special mandate so that the procurator could transfer ownership. While these 
notions found some resistance from the beginning, only Angelini would manage 
to refute them in a compelling way by showing that already in classical times the 
potestas alienandi of the procurator omnium bonorum was limited to acts which fell 
within the ordinary powers of administration237. This opinion was soon adopted 
by scholars238, who saw in it a consistent approach of the sources dealing with the 
faculty to dispose of the procurator without having to resort to the 
interpolationistic method. The basic distinction to be made on this point is 
whether the alienation refers to goods which fall within the ordinary 
administration of the procurator or not: if they do, no additional authorization by 
the owner is needed; if they do not, the owner will have to explicitly allow the 
procurator to dispose of them. This basic criterion follows clearly from the 
following text of Modestinus: 
 
D. 3,3,63 (Mod. 6 differentiarum): Procurator totorum bonorum, cui 
res administrandae mandatae sunt, res domini neque mobiles vel 
immobiles neque servos sine speciali domini mandatu alienare 
potest, nisi fructus aut alias res, quae facile corrumpi possunt239.  
 
                                                 
236  Bonfante, Facoltà e decadenza (1921 [1898]), p. 250-261. 
237  Angelini, Il Procurator (1971), p. 17 ff. 
238 Kaser, RPR (1975) II, p. 101; Hamza, Rappresentanza (1980), p. 210; Miquel, Traditio rei 
alienae (1993), p. 273; Wieling, Drittwirkungen (1993), p. 288; Coppola Bisazza, Sostiuzione 
volontaria (2007), p. 528 ff. 
239  D. 3,3,63: “A procurator for the whole of an estate who has been given a mandate for its 
administration cannot, without a specific mandate from his principal, alienate his principal’s 
property whether movables, immovables, or slaves, apart from fruits or other things which 
can easily spoil” (transl. Watson). 
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administration and could therefore transfer ownership with considerable 
freedom236. Only in Justinianic times were these faculties restricted, and since that 
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236  Bonfante, Facoltà e decadenza (1921 [1898]), p. 250-261. 
237  Angelini, Il Procurator (1971), p. 17 ff. 
238 Kaser, RPR (1975) II, p. 101; Hamza, Rappresentanza (1980), p. 210; Miquel, Traditio rei 
alienae (1993), p. 273; Wieling, Drittwirkungen (1993), p. 288; Coppola Bisazza, Sostiuzione 
volontaria (2007), p. 528 ff. 
239  D. 3,3,63: “A procurator for the whole of an estate who has been given a mandate for its 
administration cannot, without a specific mandate from his principal, alienate his principal’s 
property whether movables, immovables, or slaves, apart from fruits or other things which 
can easily spoil” (transl. Watson). 
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This text is as clear as one could expect, limiting the faculty to dispose of a 
procurator who has been given a general administration to the fruits and other 
things which can easily spoil, i.e. objects which are normally expected to be 
alienated by someone in charge of the administration of someone else’s estate. 
For those things which do not fall within this category, no alienation is possible 
unless the owner explicitly authorizes it. The text refers to a special mandate of 
the owner (speciali domini mandatu), which does not however mean that this 
authorization could only be given through a separate contract of mandate, since 
it could also be granted at the time the general powers of administration were 
granted240. That the transfer of ownership is performed speciali mandatu, 
moreover, does not indicate anything different from the requirement for a 
voluntas domini at the delivery, as can be seen in the following text: 
 
C. 2,12,16 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 293): Procuratorem vel 
actorem praedii, si non specialiter distrahendi mandatum accepit, ius 
rerum dominii vendendi non habere certum ac manifestum est. 
Unde si non ex voluntate domini vendentibus his fundum 
comparasti, pervides improbum tuum desiderium esse dominium ex 
huiusmodi emptione tibi concedi desiderantis241. 
 
This constitution not only deals with the procurator, but also with the (servus) actor, 
which is no wonder considering that both individuals may find themselves in a 
similar situation, namely as having broad powers of administration granted by the 
owner. Both individuals are in fact again mentioned side by side in a similar 
context by Gaius, when discussing who may agree to a sale:  
 
D. 20,6,7,1 (Gai. libro singulari ad formulam hypothecariam): 
Videbimus, si procurator omnium bonorum consensit vel servus 
actor, cui et solvi potest et in id praepositus est, an teneat consensus 
eorum. Et dicendum est non posse, nisi specialiter hoc eis 
mandatum est242. 
 
Both in C. 2,12,16 and D. 20,6,7,1, the requirement for these individuals to 
transfer ownership is the same as that mentioned in D. 3,3,63, namely a special 
mandate to transfer ownership. Particularly in C. 2,12,16 we find ourselves in 
                                                 
240  See e.g. D. 17,1,60,4 (Scaev. 1 resp.), which is studied in further detail below. 
241  C. 2,12,16: “It is certain and plain that a procurator or business agent (actor) of a piece of 
land has no right to sell, unless he has received a special mandate to transfer ownership. 
Hence if you purchased the farm from them, who were the vendors, without the consent 
of the owner, you clearly understood that your demand to be declared that the ownership 
be conceded to you pursuant to such purchase, is not honest” (transl. Blume, modified). 
242  D. 20,6,7,1: “We must see whether the consent of a general procurator or a slave who is 
appointed agent to receive payments is effective. It is not held effective unless they face a 
specific authority to consent” (transl. Watson).  
 
familiar ground, with expressions like ius vendendi, which situate the problem 
within the general framework of the potestas alienandi. Even more meaningful is 
that this constitution mentions that if special authorization was given to these 
individuals, the delivery would not take place according to the owner’s intent 
(non ex voluntate domini) and that accordingly ownership would not be transferred. 
This shows that the general problem discussed is always to be approached within 
the framework of the voluntas domini, which serves Roman jurists to determine 
the scope of the potestas alienandi of an authorized non-owner. When general 
powers of administration are granted to a procurator or slave, the voluntas domini 
will only include the alienations which take place as part of the ordinary 
administration. The voluntas domini will only encompass other objects when the 
owner especially authorizes their alienation. The only awkwardness which may 
seem to derive from this distinction is that in the first case the voluntas domini is 
presumed, while in the second it is explicit. Roman jurists, in fact, were willing 
to resort to some objective criteria in order to determine the faculty to dispose of 
the procurator, as can be seen in the following text: 
 
D. 30,39,10 (Ulp. 21 Sab.): Sed et ea praedia Caesaris, quae in 
formam patrimonii redacta sub procuratore patrimonii sunt, si 
legentur, nec aestimatio eorum debet praestari, quoniam 
commercium eorum nisi iussu Principis non sit, cum distrahi non 
soleant243. 
 
When dealing with legacies, Ulpian declares that there is no commercium regarding 
the land of the Emperor which is under the administration of the procurator. The 
fact that in this case we are told that there is no commercium can be explained 
because there can be no usucapion against the Emperor, just as other objects 
previously mentioned in D. 30,39 cannot be acquired in this way. The exception 
to this are the alienations which are authorized by the Emperor (nisi iussu 
Principis). Again, the reference to the iussum of the owner does not mean in itself 
anything else – from the perspective of the transfer of ownership – than the fact 
that the non-owner must be especially authorized. Up this point, the text only 
ratifies the general ideas to be found in D. 3,3,63, D. 20,6,7,1 and C. 2,12,16. 
However, the closing words “cum distrahi non soleant” add a new piece of 
information, since they present a more objective criterion to determine the scope 
of the potestas alienandi when only general powers of administration are given, 
namely that the procurator will only be able to carry out alienations which are 
customary to his administration. In this particular case, since the alienation of 
land is not one of the acts carried out in the course of the normal administration 
                                                 
243  D. 30,39,10: “And if a bequest should be made of estates of Caesar which form part of his 
patrimony and are under a procurator of the patrimony, their value should not be paid 
either, because there can be no commerce in them without the emperor’s consent, as it is 
not the custom to sell them” (transl. Watson). 
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huiusmodi emptione tibi concedi desiderantis241. 
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seem to derive from this distinction is that in the first case the voluntas domini is 
presumed, while in the second it is explicit. Roman jurists, in fact, were willing 
to resort to some objective criteria in order to determine the faculty to dispose of 
the procurator, as can be seen in the following text: 
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When dealing with legacies, Ulpian declares that there is no commercium regarding 
the land of the Emperor which is under the administration of the procurator. The 
fact that in this case we are told that there is no commercium can be explained 
because there can be no usucapion against the Emperor, just as other objects 
previously mentioned in D. 30,39 cannot be acquired in this way. The exception 
to this are the alienations which are authorized by the Emperor (nisi iussu 
Principis). Again, the reference to the iussum of the owner does not mean in itself 
anything else – from the perspective of the transfer of ownership – than the fact 
that the non-owner must be especially authorized. Up this point, the text only 
ratifies the general ideas to be found in D. 3,3,63, D. 20,6,7,1 and C. 2,12,16. 
However, the closing words “cum distrahi non soleant” add a new piece of 
information, since they present a more objective criterion to determine the scope 
of the potestas alienandi when only general powers of administration are given, 
namely that the procurator will only be able to carry out alienations which are 
customary to his administration. In this particular case, since the alienation of 
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of the land of the Emperor, the delivery carried out by the procurator will not 
transfer ownership. Accordingly, the scope of the potestas alienandi of the procurator 
would vary according to the specific features of the administered business.  
 The application of such objective criteria can also be seen in the context of 
the pledge of the owner’s goods in D. 13,7,11,7244 and D. 13,7,12245. In the first 
text, Ulpian declares that a procurator will be able to resort to the actio pigneraticia in 
personam if he received a mandate to give in pledge. This idea is complemented 
by the compilers through the second text, belonging to Gaius, where we are told 
that the procurator who has the administration of the entire property may also give 
in pledge the objects “of people who do usually borrow money against pledges” 
(transl. Watson). This text contains therefore the same objective criterion as that 
of D. 30,39,10, namely that the faculties of administration of a procurator who is 
generally commissioned with the management of someone’s property can be 
determined by the regular way in which such patrimony is administered. 
 The significance granted to the voluntas domini in the context of the transfer of 
ownership by a procurator shows once again that Roman jurists felt free to offer 
innovative views regarding what exactly did this authorization imply. This is why 
the owner’s voluntas could cover different situations, ranging from those in which 
the will is merely presumed to those in which it is explicitly manifested, granting 
all of them an identical legal consequence.  
 There are several other texts which confirm the scope granted to the voluntas 
domini when general powers of administration are granted to a non-owner. For 
instance, it is stated in D. 19,1,13,25 (Ulp. 32 ed.) that an actio ad exemplum 
institoriae will be granted against the owner “si modo rem vendendam mandavit”, 
which once again shows the need for a special authorization in the context of 
alienations performed by a procurator. There are moreover numerous examples of 
general powers to administer in which the faculty to dispose of particular objects 
is explicitly included, showing thereby the importance of these special 
authorizations. Some of these examples can be found in the Digest itself 
(D. 17,1,60,4) but the greater part of them come from papyrological evidence246.  
 Among the abundant texts dealing with the potestas alienandi of the procurator, 
D. 41,1,9,4247 is considered by some authors to be particularly troublesome, since 
no reference is made to a special authorization to dispose. It was in fact this text 
which was considered by scholars such as Bonfante to represent the classical 
doctrine regarding the powers of the procurator, since no limitations are set 
beforehand to his administration. Even among the more recent studies on the 
                                                 
244  D. 13,7,11,7 (Ulp. 28 ed.): “Sed si procurator meus vel tutor rem pignori dederit, ipse 
agere pigneraticia poterit: quod in procuratore ita procedit, si ei mandatum fuerit pignori 
dare”. 
245  D. 13,7,12 (Gai. 9 ed. prov.): “Vel universorum bonorum administratio ei permissa est ab 
eo, qui sub pignoribus solebat mutuas pecunias accipere”. 
246  Angelini, Il Procurator (1971), p. 137 ff. See also Straus, L’achat (2004), p. 21 ff. 
247  See Chapter 2, Section 1(a) above. 
 
subject, the text is regarded with suspicion. Some scholars consider that the 
statement of Gaius could be brought under the guidelines presented so far by 
taking into account the words “is ex negotiis rem vendiderit et tradiderit” – rendered 
in Inst. 2,1,43 “ex his negotiis” – which implies that ownership will be transferred 
as long as the procurator acts “within the framework of his business”, i.e. when 
carrying acts of ordinary administration. Accordingly, the alienations performed 
by the non-owner would take place voluntate domini as long as they take place in 
the context of the ordinary administration248. While this is an interesting 
approach, another relevant element to which little attention has been paid is the 
fact that the owner grants the “libera negotiorum administratio” to the non-
owner249. This expression is not as common in the sources as the “libera peculii 
administratio” of slaves and sons-in-power250, being applied to refer to the 
administration conducted by persons sui iuris who are granted broader faculties 
than those comprised in an ordinary administration. This circumstance is shown 
by D. 3,3,58, where we are told that a procurator who has the libera administratio 
rerum can demand payment, make novations and barter251, all of which are acts 
which would normally require a special authorization. Noteworthy is the 
inclusion among these of the possibility of bartering, which shows that this libera 
administratio allows the transfer of ownership as well, a conclusion which is 
ratified by D. 3,3,59, which adds that such procurator is also seen as authorized to 
pay the creditors252. Considering that the libera administratio implies having 
faculties which would normally have to be granted through a special 
authorization, the Handlexikon of Heumann and Seckel accurately translates the 
word ‘liber’ in contexts such as ‘administratio’ as ‘unlimited’ (unbeschränkt)253. 
Accordingly, in the context of D. 41,1,9,4, the concession of a libera negotiorum 
administratio would imply that the administrator has a broader potestas alienandi, 
despite being limited to that which he has to administer (ex negotiis), which is 
why Gaius selects this case as a prototypical example of an alienation performed 
voluntate domini. In the context of the delivery by a procurator, this libera 
administratio does not imply a different ground for the transfer of ownership, since 
Gaius considers this case to be an example where the delivery takes place voluntate 
domini. This contrasts with the alienations performed by slaves and sons-in-
                                                 
248  Angelini, Il Procurator (1971), p. 127. 
249  Wacke, Libera administratio peculii (2006), p. 307-308. 
250  See Chapter 1, Section 4(b) above. 
251  D. 3,3,58 (Paul. 71 ed.): “Procurator, cui generaliter libera administratio rerum commissa 
est, potest exigere, novare, aliud pro alio permutare”. 
252  D. 3,3,59 (Paul 10 ad Plautium): “Sed et id quoque ei mandari videtur, ut solvat 
creditoribus”. Angelini, Il Procurator (1971), p. 128 highlights that an important feature of 
the payment by an authorized procurator is that it will transfer ownership over the principal’s 
property given in payment. 
253  Heumann/Seckel, Handlexikon (1926), p. 313. The word ‘liber’ plays there a key role, 
which is why the “libera negotiorum administratio” should be distinguished, for instance, from 
the “universorum bonorum administratio” of D. 13,7,12 (Gai. 9 ed. prov.), which only grants 
ordinary powers of administration to the non-owner. 
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power, where the libera peculii administratio is clearly distinguished as a separate 
legal basis for the transfer of ownership from that of the voluntas domini254. It is 
not clear why jurists approached these two cases in such different way, and the 
lack of clear sources regarding the libera negotiorum administratio of the procurator 
prevents us from offering a solution to this problem. 
 
c. Bona fides and potestas alienandi. 
 
Besides determining the significance of the owner’s authorization in the context 
of general acts of administration, Roman jurists developed particular solutions in 
order to avoid abusive or fraudulent conducts by the non-owner which seemed 
to fall within the terms of the authorization. One of the key elements in this 
evolution appears to be the notion of fides, which governs in several cases the 
conduct of an intermediary, as happens with the procurator and the mandatarius. 
Regarding the contract of mandate, the fides played a fundamental role and 
served as a basic guideline concerning the way in which the parties must 
behave255. This is particularly the case regarding the obligations arising between 
the parties, but some texts also take the fides into consideration to determine 
whether ownership is transferred by the mandatarius. C. 4,35,12256, for example, 
requires that the terms laid down by the owner must be complied with in 
accordance to the good faith (bona fides) by the non-owner performing the 
delivery. This text, however, has an odd character, since after requiring that the 
terms of the contract must be complied with according to good faith (secundum 
bonam fidem custodiri convenit) it derives from this idea that if a procurator sells a 
piece of land without following the terms of the mandate, ownership will not be 
transferred. The awkwardness of this line of thought is that the reference to the 
bona fides seems rather superfluous, since the outcome can rather be explained 
due to the absence of the voluntas domini at the delivery, which is why the 
solution is considered non-classical by Burdese257. Despite this opinion, Sansón 
considers that the reference to the bona fides of the procurator may have something 
to do with the possibility of acquiring through usucapion258. The above analysis 
of the traditio invito domino and its relation to furtum shows in fact that the 
intention of the non-owner and his subjective representation of the owner’s 
authorization may be decisive in determining whether ownership is transferred or 
                                                 
254  See Chapter 1, Section 4(b) above. 
255  Schermaier, Bona fides (2000), p. 80. 
256  C. 4,35,12 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 293): “Cum mandati negotii contractum certam 
accepisse legem adseveres, eam integram secundum bonam fidem custodiri convenit. Unde 
si contra mandati tenorem procurator tuus ad te pertinentem fundum vendidit nec 
venditionem postea ratam habuisti, dominium tibi auferre non potuit”. 
257  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 52. Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 132 
even omits commenting the reference to the good faith in this text, assuming that the 
problem revolves around the owner’s authorization. 
258  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 92. 
 
not259. Accordingly, it would not be alien to classical law to signal the non-
owner’s lack of good faith as the reason why ownership is not transferred, 
particularly since it does not only imply that the instructions of the owner were 
not followed, but also that this disobedience was deliberate and therefore there 
would be no room of usucapion on account of the res becoming furtiva.  
 While the text of C. 4,35,12 cannot be considered as essentially non-classical 
or inaccurate, it does not seem to add anything new to what we already know 
about the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. There is however another 
context in which the consideration of the bona fides of the non-owner leads to a 
very innovative outcome, as can be seen in the following text: 
 
D. 17,1,60,4 (Scaev. 1 resp.): Lucius Titius fratris filio commisit 
rerum suarum administrationem ita: Ȉε૘૳ τȑκν૳ Ȥαίρειν ਥγઅ μ੻ν 
κατὰ ĳȪσιν εੇναι νομίȟω τઁ ਫ਼π੻ρ πατρઁȢ κα੿ τ૵ν τοῦ πατρઁȢ υੂ૵ν 
πραγματεȪεσșαι δίȤα τοῦ τινὰ ਥπιτροπικઁν αੁτε૙ν εੁ δ੻ δε૙ κα੿ 
τοιοȪτου τινόȢ ਥπιτρȑπω σοι περ੿ πȐντων τ૵ν ਥμ૵ν ੪Ȣ șȑȜειȢ 
πραγματεȪεσșαι ε੅τε πωȜε૙ν șȑȜειȢ ε੅τε ਫ਼ποτίșεσșαι ε੅τε 
ਕγορȐȗειν ε੅τε ੒τιοῦν πρȐττειν ੪Ȣ κυρί૳ ੕ντι τ૵ν ਥμ૵νǜ ਥμοῦ 
πȐντα κȪρια τὰ ਫ਼πઁ σοῦ γινόμενα ਲγουμȑνου κα੿ μηδ੻ν 
ਕντιȜȑγοντόȢ σοι πρઁȢ μηδεμίαν πρ઼ȟιν Quaesitum est, si quid non 
administrandi animo, sed fraudulenter alienasset vel mandasset, an 
valeret. Respondi eum, de quo quaereretur, plene quidem, sed 
quatenus res ex fide agenda esset, mandasse. Item quaero, an, cum 
Seius magistratu functus debitor exstitisset, Lucius Titius eo nomine 
conveniri possit vel res eius obligatae essent propter verba epistulae 
supra scripta. Respondi neque conveniri posse neque res obligatas 
esse260. 
 
                                                 
259  Chapter 2, Section 2 above. 
260  D. 17,1,60,4 (Scaev. 6 Dig.): “Lucius Titius entrusted the management of his affairs to his 
brother’s son as follows: ‘To Seius the son, greetings. I consider it natural that a son should 
undertake business on behalf of his father and of those connected with his father without 
anyone asking for his authorization. But if there is a need for something of the kind [that 
is, such authorization], I entrust you with the management of all that is mine to deal with 
as you see fit, whether you wish to sell, to pledge, to buy or to do any [other] thing, as 
master of my affairs. All that is done by you will be regarded as authorized by me, and I 
shall not countermand you in any matter’. If [Seius] should have alienated or mandated 
anything fraudulently and not with the intention of [honest] administration, would it hold 
good? I gave the opinion that the person who was the subject of the inquiry had indeed 
given the mandate in very broad terms, but within [the assumption] that his affairs should 
be managed in good faith. Again, when Seius, after undertaking the duty of a magistracy, 
had fallen into debt, could Lucius Titius be sued on that account, or his property made 
subject to a pledge because of the words of the letter quoted above? I gave the opinion that 
he could not be sued and that his property was not subject to pledge” (transl. Watson). 
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power, where the libera peculii administratio is clearly distinguished as a separate 
legal basis for the transfer of ownership from that of the voluntas domini254. It is 
not clear why jurists approached these two cases in such different way, and the 
lack of clear sources regarding the libera negotiorum administratio of the procurator 
prevents us from offering a solution to this problem. 
 
c. Bona fides and potestas alienandi. 
 
Besides determining the significance of the owner’s authorization in the context 
of general acts of administration, Roman jurists developed particular solutions in 
order to avoid abusive or fraudulent conducts by the non-owner which seemed 
to fall within the terms of the authorization. One of the key elements in this 
evolution appears to be the notion of fides, which governs in several cases the 
conduct of an intermediary, as happens with the procurator and the mandatarius. 
Regarding the contract of mandate, the fides played a fundamental role and 
served as a basic guideline concerning the way in which the parties must 
behave255. This is particularly the case regarding the obligations arising between 
the parties, but some texts also take the fides into consideration to determine 
whether ownership is transferred by the mandatarius. C. 4,35,12256, for example, 
requires that the terms laid down by the owner must be complied with in 
accordance to the good faith (bona fides) by the non-owner performing the 
delivery. This text, however, has an odd character, since after requiring that the 
terms of the contract must be complied with according to good faith (secundum 
bonam fidem custodiri convenit) it derives from this idea that if a procurator sells a 
piece of land without following the terms of the mandate, ownership will not be 
transferred. The awkwardness of this line of thought is that the reference to the 
bona fides seems rather superfluous, since the outcome can rather be explained 
due to the absence of the voluntas domini at the delivery, which is why the 
solution is considered non-classical by Burdese257. Despite this opinion, Sansón 
considers that the reference to the bona fides of the procurator may have something 
to do with the possibility of acquiring through usucapion258. The above analysis 
of the traditio invito domino and its relation to furtum shows in fact that the 
intention of the non-owner and his subjective representation of the owner’s 
authorization may be decisive in determining whether ownership is transferred or 
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accepisse legem adseveres, eam integram secundum bonam fidem custodiri convenit. Unde 
si contra mandati tenorem procurator tuus ad te pertinentem fundum vendidit nec 
venditionem postea ratam habuisti, dominium tibi auferre non potuit”. 
257  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 52. Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 132 
even omits commenting the reference to the good faith in this text, assuming that the 
problem revolves around the owner’s authorization. 
258  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 92. 
 
not259. Accordingly, it would not be alien to classical law to signal the non-
owner’s lack of good faith as the reason why ownership is not transferred, 
particularly since it does not only imply that the instructions of the owner were 
not followed, but also that this disobedience was deliberate and therefore there 
would be no room of usucapion on account of the res becoming furtiva.  
 While the text of C. 4,35,12 cannot be considered as essentially non-classical 
or inaccurate, it does not seem to add anything new to what we already know 
about the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. There is however another 
context in which the consideration of the bona fides of the non-owner leads to a 
very innovative outcome, as can be seen in the following text: 
 
D. 17,1,60,4 (Scaev. 1 resp.): Lucius Titius fratris filio commisit 
rerum suarum administrationem ita: Ȉε૘૳ τȑκν૳ Ȥαίρειν ਥγઅ μ੻ν 
κατὰ ĳȪσιν εੇναι νομίȟω τઁ ਫ਼π੻ρ πατρઁȢ κα੿ τ૵ν τοῦ πατρઁȢ υੂ૵ν 
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πραγματεȪεσșαι ε੅τε πωȜε૙ν șȑȜειȢ ε੅τε ਫ਼ποτίșεσșαι ε੅τε 
ਕγορȐȗειν ε੅τε ੒τιοῦν πρȐττειν ੪Ȣ κυρί૳ ੕ντι τ૵ν ਥμ૵νǜ ਥμοῦ 
πȐντα κȪρια τὰ ਫ਼πઁ σοῦ γινόμενα ਲγουμȑνου κα੿ μηδ੻ν 
ਕντιȜȑγοντόȢ σοι πρઁȢ μηδεμίαν πρ઼ȟιν Quaesitum est, si quid non 
administrandi animo, sed fraudulenter alienasset vel mandasset, an 
valeret. Respondi eum, de quo quaereretur, plene quidem, sed 
quatenus res ex fide agenda esset, mandasse. Item quaero, an, cum 
Seius magistratu functus debitor exstitisset, Lucius Titius eo nomine 
conveniri possit vel res eius obligatae essent propter verba epistulae 
supra scripta. Respondi neque conveniri posse neque res obligatas 
esse260. 
 
                                                 
259  Chapter 2, Section 2 above. 
260  D. 17,1,60,4 (Scaev. 6 Dig.): “Lucius Titius entrusted the management of his affairs to his 
brother’s son as follows: ‘To Seius the son, greetings. I consider it natural that a son should 
undertake business on behalf of his father and of those connected with his father without 
anyone asking for his authorization. But if there is a need for something of the kind [that 
is, such authorization], I entrust you with the management of all that is mine to deal with 
as you see fit, whether you wish to sell, to pledge, to buy or to do any [other] thing, as 
master of my affairs. All that is done by you will be regarded as authorized by me, and I 
shall not countermand you in any matter’. If [Seius] should have alienated or mandated 
anything fraudulently and not with the intention of [honest] administration, would it hold 
good? I gave the opinion that the person who was the subject of the inquiry had indeed 
given the mandate in very broad terms, but within [the assumption] that his affairs should 
be managed in good faith. Again, when Seius, after undertaking the duty of a magistracy, 
had fallen into debt, could Lucius Titius be sued on that account, or his property made 
subject to a pledge because of the words of the letter quoted above? I gave the opinion that 
he could not be sued and that his property was not subject to pledge” (transl. Watson). 
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The facts are the following: Lucius Titius entrusts the management of his affairs 
in the broadest possible terms to his nephew Seius, in the context of a contract of 
mandate. Regarding the faculty to dispose, the owner mentions explicitly that 
Seius is authorized to transfer ownership as he sees it fit, authorizing beforehand 
any acts of alienation. The terms of the mandate confirm the need for a special 
authorization in order to transfer ownership over goods which fall outside the 
strict limits of an ordinary administration261, and from the broad terms used by 
the owner in this case it would appear that there is no act of alienation which 
escapes the powers of the non-owner. Seius, however, performs a series of acts 
not with the intention of administering his uncle’s affairs properly, but 
fraudulently (non administrandi animo, sed fraudulenter)262. What “fraudulenter” 
means in this context is not entirely clear, but since Seius was authorized to 
alienate as he pleased one may assume that it refers to acts which cause loss to the 
owner and which could not possibly be seen as part of an honest administration 
of the owner’s affairs263. In this context, Cervidius Scaevola is asked whether such 
alienations should hold. One could expect in principle a positive answer, since 
the owner did in fact grant an absolute power to dispose in the most emphatic 
possible way. Scaevola, however, considers that in such a case the acts carried out 
by the nephew will not hold, since the owner gave such broad authorization in 
the assumption that Seius would manage his affairs according to the good faith 
(res ex fide agenda esset). Accordingly, the jurist manages to introduce an objective 
limitation in the potestas alienandi of the non-owner through an interpretation of 
the voluntas domini in the light of the notion of fides264, which governs a bonae fidei 
contract as that of mandate. In view of the fides, the owner cannot be seen as 
authorizing dishonest or fraudulent acts, which instantly limits the potestas 
alienandi of his trusted nephew. 
 The voluntas domini is thus once more approached by jurists as a flexible 
concept, being adapted in order to avoid an unfair result. In this particular case, 
the interpretation of the owner’s authorization has the additional peculiarity of 
referring to the requirements of the fides, which derives from the personal 
relationship between the parties, thereby making this last element relevant in 
order to determine the extent of the potestas alienandi of the non-owner. That the 
faculties of the contracting parties could be determined through general notions 
such as the fides is not an isolated phenomenon. There are several texts which 
                                                 
261  Angelini, Il Procurator (1971), p. 145; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 93. 
262  Pringsheim, Animus (1933), p. 382 considers the reference to he animus administrandi of the 
non-owner to be of postclassical origin, which would contrast with the objective reference 
to the fides. However, such observation is rooted on his suspicion to any subjective 
references in classical sources. One may in fact explain why the acts of the nephew are 
contrary to the fides precisely because of his underlying intentions. The significance of the 
intent of the non-owner at the delivery has been stressed in Chapter 2, Section 2 above. 
263  Pringsheim, Animus (1933), p. 381 understands fraudulenter as “not in the true interest of 
the owner”. 
264  Miquel, Quaestiones (1992), p. 18 and 163; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 93. 
 
resort to notions such as the fides or the vir bonus in order to limit the way in 
which too general or undetermined powers can be exercised. Stephanus would in 
fact make use of such notions when discussing the boundaries of the contract of 
mandate, including D. 17,1,60,4 in his analysis265. It is nonetheless remarkable 
that Roman jurists would be willing to apply such notions to the transfer of 
ownership as well, thereby making an even more accurate use of the requirement 
of the voluntas domini, according to which not only is it necessary that the non-
owner is explicitly authorized to transfer ownership, since the owner would 
moreover be regarded to expect the transferor to behave according to the fides. 
 Similar considerations also played a role regarding the alienations concluded 
by a procurator. It is not entirely clear why some texts dealing with the transfer of 
ownership are referred to the procurator, while others – such as D. 17,1,60,4 – 
indicate the existence of a mandate. Nonetheless, this distinction does not seem 
to be decisive for the point under discussion, since the sources provide identical 
outcomes, as shown in the following text: 
 
D. 41,4,7,6 (Jul. 44 dig.): Procurator tuus si fundum, quem centum 
aureis vendere poterat, addixerit triginta aureis in hoc solum, ut te 
damno adficeret, ignorante emptore, dubitari non oportet, quin 
emptor longo tempore capiat: nam et cum sciens quis alienum 
fundum vendidit ignoranti, non interpellatur longa possessio. Quod 
si emptor cum procuratore collusit et eum praemio corrupit, quo 
vilius mercaretur, non intellegetur bonae fidei emptor nec longo 
tempore capiet: et si adversus petentem dominum uti coeperit 
exceptione rei voluntate eius venditae, replicationem doli utilem 
futuram esse266. 
 
This decision of Julian shares with the previous one of Scaevola the fact that the 
non-owner does not formally exceed the boundaries of the owner’s 
authorization, since he simply sells for a lower price than that which he could 
have obtained. Additionally, also in this case there is a fraudulent intent on the 
side of the non-owner, since his purpose is to cause loss to the owner (ut te damno 
adficeret). The only problem about this text is that Julian is much more laconic in 
                                                 
265  BS 703/13-24. See on this text De Jong, Mandatum incertum (2012), p. 297-302; De Jong, 
ਝν੽ρ ਕγαșંȢ (2013), p. 351-359. 
266  D. 41,4,7,6: “Suppose that your procurator, who could have obtained a hundred gold pieces 
for the land, asks only thirty for the sole purpose of causing you loss; there can be no doubt 
that, he being unaware of this fact, the purchaser will acquire title by long possession; for 
even when one aware of the facts sells a third person’s land to one who is not, nothing 
prevents long possession. But if the purchaser should be in collusion with the procurator, 
bribing him to sell at an uneconomic price, he will not be held a purchaser in good faith 
and so will not acquire the land through. And if, when the principal sues, the purchaser 
should invoke the defence that the thing was sold with his consent, a replication of fraud 
will be effective against him” (transl. Watson, modified). 
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The facts are the following: Lucius Titius entrusts the management of his affairs 
in the broadest possible terms to his nephew Seius, in the context of a contract of 
mandate. Regarding the faculty to dispose, the owner mentions explicitly that 
Seius is authorized to transfer ownership as he sees it fit, authorizing beforehand 
any acts of alienation. The terms of the mandate confirm the need for a special 
authorization in order to transfer ownership over goods which fall outside the 
strict limits of an ordinary administration261, and from the broad terms used by 
the owner in this case it would appear that there is no act of alienation which 
escapes the powers of the non-owner. Seius, however, performs a series of acts 
not with the intention of administering his uncle’s affairs properly, but 
fraudulently (non administrandi animo, sed fraudulenter)262. What “fraudulenter” 
means in this context is not entirely clear, but since Seius was authorized to 
alienate as he pleased one may assume that it refers to acts which cause loss to the 
owner and which could not possibly be seen as part of an honest administration 
of the owner’s affairs263. In this context, Cervidius Scaevola is asked whether such 
alienations should hold. One could expect in principle a positive answer, since 
the owner did in fact grant an absolute power to dispose in the most emphatic 
possible way. Scaevola, however, considers that in such a case the acts carried out 
by the nephew will not hold, since the owner gave such broad authorization in 
the assumption that Seius would manage his affairs according to the good faith 
(res ex fide agenda esset). Accordingly, the jurist manages to introduce an objective 
limitation in the potestas alienandi of the non-owner through an interpretation of 
the voluntas domini in the light of the notion of fides264, which governs a bonae fidei 
contract as that of mandate. In view of the fides, the owner cannot be seen as 
authorizing dishonest or fraudulent acts, which instantly limits the potestas 
alienandi of his trusted nephew. 
 The voluntas domini is thus once more approached by jurists as a flexible 
concept, being adapted in order to avoid an unfair result. In this particular case, 
the interpretation of the owner’s authorization has the additional peculiarity of 
referring to the requirements of the fides, which derives from the personal 
relationship between the parties, thereby making this last element relevant in 
order to determine the extent of the potestas alienandi of the non-owner. That the 
faculties of the contracting parties could be determined through general notions 
such as the fides is not an isolated phenomenon. There are several texts which 
                                                 
261  Angelini, Il Procurator (1971), p. 145; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 93. 
262  Pringsheim, Animus (1933), p. 382 considers the reference to he animus administrandi of the 
non-owner to be of postclassical origin, which would contrast with the objective reference 
to the fides. However, such observation is rooted on his suspicion to any subjective 
references in classical sources. One may in fact explain why the acts of the nephew are 
contrary to the fides precisely because of his underlying intentions. The significance of the 
intent of the non-owner at the delivery has been stressed in Chapter 2, Section 2 above. 
263  Pringsheim, Animus (1933), p. 381 understands fraudulenter as “not in the true interest of 
the owner”. 
264  Miquel, Quaestiones (1992), p. 18 and 163; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 93. 
 
resort to notions such as the fides or the vir bonus in order to limit the way in 
which too general or undetermined powers can be exercised. Stephanus would in 
fact make use of such notions when discussing the boundaries of the contract of 
mandate, including D. 17,1,60,4 in his analysis265. It is nonetheless remarkable 
that Roman jurists would be willing to apply such notions to the transfer of 
ownership as well, thereby making an even more accurate use of the requirement 
of the voluntas domini, according to which not only is it necessary that the non-
owner is explicitly authorized to transfer ownership, since the owner would 
moreover be regarded to expect the transferor to behave according to the fides. 
 Similar considerations also played a role regarding the alienations concluded 
by a procurator. It is not entirely clear why some texts dealing with the transfer of 
ownership are referred to the procurator, while others – such as D. 17,1,60,4 – 
indicate the existence of a mandate. Nonetheless, this distinction does not seem 
to be decisive for the point under discussion, since the sources provide identical 
outcomes, as shown in the following text: 
 
D. 41,4,7,6 (Jul. 44 dig.): Procurator tuus si fundum, quem centum 
aureis vendere poterat, addixerit triginta aureis in hoc solum, ut te 
damno adficeret, ignorante emptore, dubitari non oportet, quin 
emptor longo tempore capiat: nam et cum sciens quis alienum 
fundum vendidit ignoranti, non interpellatur longa possessio. Quod 
si emptor cum procuratore collusit et eum praemio corrupit, quo 
vilius mercaretur, non intellegetur bonae fidei emptor nec longo 
tempore capiet: et si adversus petentem dominum uti coeperit 
exceptione rei voluntate eius venditae, replicationem doli utilem 
futuram esse266. 
 
This decision of Julian shares with the previous one of Scaevola the fact that the 
non-owner does not formally exceed the boundaries of the owner’s 
authorization, since he simply sells for a lower price than that which he could 
have obtained. Additionally, also in this case there is a fraudulent intent on the 
side of the non-owner, since his purpose is to cause loss to the owner (ut te damno 
adficeret). The only problem about this text is that Julian is much more laconic in 
                                                 
265  BS 703/13-24. See on this text De Jong, Mandatum incertum (2012), p. 297-302; De Jong, 
ਝν੽ρ ਕγαșંȢ (2013), p. 351-359. 
266  D. 41,4,7,6: “Suppose that your procurator, who could have obtained a hundred gold pieces 
for the land, asks only thirty for the sole purpose of causing you loss; there can be no doubt 
that, he being unaware of this fact, the purchaser will acquire title by long possession; for 
even when one aware of the facts sells a third person’s land to one who is not, nothing 
prevents long possession. But if the purchaser should be in collusion with the procurator, 
bribing him to sell at an uneconomic price, he will not be held a purchaser in good faith 
and so will not acquire the land through. And if, when the principal sues, the purchaser 
should invoke the defence that the thing was sold with his consent, a replication of fraud 
will be effective against him” (transl. Watson, modified). 
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his solution than Scaevola, since he simply tells us that the purchaser will only be 
able to acquire through usucapion if he was unaware of the intention of the 
transferor, something which he considers beyond doubt (dubitari non oportet). 
Therefore, much goes unsaid, and particularly why ownership is not transferred 
in the first place, considering that the non-owner did not formally contravene the 
owner’s authorization. Since the outcome is similar to that offered by Scaevola, 
we can only assume that Julian was not willing to cover under the voluntas domini 
acts which are openly dishonest and abusive. Thus, once again this voluntas would 
have a content determined by the jurists. The silence on this point raises the 
question of whether the fides also plays a role in the solution of Julian regarding 
the limitation of the potestas alienandi of the non-owner, as Miquel and Sansón 
think267. Despite the lack of an explicit mention, this seems plausible considering 
that this element also had a central role concerning the acts concluded by a 
procurator268. It is on the other hand undeniable that the dolus of the purchaser 
who bribes the procurator in order to obtain an uneconomic price does play a role 
in determining his position, since his defence against the owner’s claim, based on 
the latter’s authorization of the delivery – exceptio rei voluntate eius [sc. domini] 
venditae – will be met with a replicatio doli which will check his fraudulent 
behaviour. 
  Another solution offering an analogous limitation of the faculty to dispose of 
the procurator comes from Ulpian: 
 
D. 1,19,1pr-1 (Ulp. 16 ed.): Quae acta gestaque sunt a procuratore 
Caesaris, sic ab eo comprobantur, atque si a Caesare gesta sunt. (1) 
Si rem Caesaris procurator eius quasi rem propriam tradat, non puto 
eum dominium transferre: tunc enim transfert, cum negotium 
Caesaris gerens consensu ipsius tradit. Denique si venditionis vel 
donationis vel transactionis causa quid agat, nihil agit: non enim 
alienare ei rem Caesaris, sed diligenter gerere commissum est269. 
 
This text has proven very challenging for modern scholars, who disagree on the 
exact problem addressed by Ulpian. Some claim that it deals with a case of error in 
domino, since the procurator would be mistakenly giving as his own something 
                                                 
267  Miquel, Quaestiones (1992.), p. 24-25, 84-88; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 18, 95. 
268  Cicero, Topica 42: “Si tutor fidem praestare debet, si socius, si cui mandaris, si qui fiduciam 
acceperit, debet etiam procurator”. 
269  D. 1,19,1pr-1: “Whatever acts and deeds are performed by the imperial procurator, they 
obtain the same force and validity from him as if they had been done by the emperor. (1) 
If the imperial procurator makes a conveyance of a piece of property which belongs to the 
emperor as being his own property, then in my opinion he does not transfer ownership. 
For he transfers it in those cases in which he executes the conveyance as Caesar’s agent 
with his express consent. Accordingly, if he should purport to act by way of sale or gift or 
settlement out of court, his act is a nullity. For his commission is not to alienate Caesar’s 
property, but to administer it carefully” (transl. Watson). 
 
which belongs to the Emperor270. There is however no sign of a mistake, which 
is why this position has gradually lost supporters. Others have focused their 
analysis on the need for a special authorization (consensus) of the owner so that the 
procurator may transfer ownership, which led to the claims of interpolation of the 
text and their later refutation once Angelini’s views became dominant271. Sansón, 
moreover, has used this text to support her views regarding the difference 
between the delivery nomine proprio and nomine alieno272. However, the most 
satisfactory approach to this text is given by Burdese, who stresses the fraudulent 
behaviour of the procurator to determine the outcome of the case. Only this 
interpretation successfully explains the obligation to carefully administer (diligenter 
gerere) the Emperor’s property mentioned in the text, an aspect which either goes 
unobserved or is discarded as interpolated by other authors discussing the text. 
 Following Burdese’s approach, it becomes clear what the significance is of the 
fact that the procurator delivers the thing that is the Emperor’s property “as being 
his own” (quasi rem propriam). As will be shown below273, it is largely irrelevant 
whether the delivery by a non-owner takes place nomine proprio or nomine alieno, 
as long as the transferor follows the owner’s instructions274. In D. 1,19,1,1, 
however, there is no reference to a such limitation, and Ulpian just reminds us 
that ownership will only be transferred as long as the procurator follows the 
owner’s consent (cum negotium Caesaris gerens consensu ipsius tradit). Apparently, 
there is no special authorization to transfer ownership in this case, since we are 
told that the procurator was not commissioned to transfer ownership of the 
Emperor’s property (alienare ei rem Caesaris) but rather to administer it carefully 
(diligenter gerere). The fact that this requirement is not met in the present situation 
throws light on the significance of the delivery performed by the procurator of the 
object “as being his own”, since it indicates that there is a fraudulent component 
in his behaviour. In this particular context, one may well assume that the 
procurator alienates to his personal advantage some objects under his 
administration, presenting himself as the true owner when selling, donating or 
settling in court. The main problem to be considered in this context is whether 
he was authorized to conclude any of these acts, which is why Ulpian highlights 
this point. However, the potestas alienandi of the procurator is also limited by the 
fact that he must administer in a careful and faithful way, which is why it is not 
enough to formally adhere to the owner’s instructions; a fraudulent 
administration will just as well set the alienation beyond the limits of his potestas 
alienandi. Both the owner’s formal instructions and the need to administer 
faithfully interact in this case, which is why one may assume that even if some of 
                                                 
270  See e.g. Voci, Modi di acquisto (1952), p. 101-102; Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 650 n. 1073. 
271  See on this evolution Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 71. 
272  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 94. 
273  Chapter 2, Section 5. 
274  This is why the disobedience of the owner’s instructions to deliver on his behalf prevents 
the transfer of ownership in D. 39,5,25 (Jav. 6 epistolarum). 
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his solution than Scaevola, since he simply tells us that the purchaser will only be 
able to acquire through usucapion if he was unaware of the intention of the 
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behaviour. 
  Another solution offering an analogous limitation of the faculty to dispose of 
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This text has proven very challenging for modern scholars, who disagree on the 
exact problem addressed by Ulpian. Some claim that it deals with a case of error in 
domino, since the procurator would be mistakenly giving as his own something 
                                                 
267  Miquel, Quaestiones (1992.), p. 24-25, 84-88; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 18, 95. 
268  Cicero, Topica 42: “Si tutor fidem praestare debet, si socius, si cui mandaris, si qui fiduciam 
acceperit, debet etiam procurator”. 
269  D. 1,19,1pr-1: “Whatever acts and deeds are performed by the imperial procurator, they 
obtain the same force and validity from him as if they had been done by the emperor. (1) 
If the imperial procurator makes a conveyance of a piece of property which belongs to the 
emperor as being his own property, then in my opinion he does not transfer ownership. 
For he transfers it in those cases in which he executes the conveyance as Caesar’s agent 
with his express consent. Accordingly, if he should purport to act by way of sale or gift or 
settlement out of court, his act is a nullity. For his commission is not to alienate Caesar’s 
property, but to administer it carefully” (transl. Watson). 
 
which belongs to the Emperor270. There is however no sign of a mistake, which 
is why this position has gradually lost supporters. Others have focused their 
analysis on the need for a special authorization (consensus) of the owner so that the 
procurator may transfer ownership, which led to the claims of interpolation of the 
text and their later refutation once Angelini’s views became dominant271. Sansón, 
moreover, has used this text to support her views regarding the difference 
between the delivery nomine proprio and nomine alieno272. However, the most 
satisfactory approach to this text is given by Burdese, who stresses the fraudulent 
behaviour of the procurator to determine the outcome of the case. Only this 
interpretation successfully explains the obligation to carefully administer (diligenter 
gerere) the Emperor’s property mentioned in the text, an aspect which either goes 
unobserved or is discarded as interpolated by other authors discussing the text. 
 Following Burdese’s approach, it becomes clear what the significance is of the 
fact that the procurator delivers the thing that is the Emperor’s property “as being 
his own” (quasi rem propriam). As will be shown below273, it is largely irrelevant 
whether the delivery by a non-owner takes place nomine proprio or nomine alieno, 
as long as the transferor follows the owner’s instructions274. In D. 1,19,1,1, 
however, there is no reference to a such limitation, and Ulpian just reminds us 
that ownership will only be transferred as long as the procurator follows the 
owner’s consent (cum negotium Caesaris gerens consensu ipsius tradit). Apparently, 
there is no special authorization to transfer ownership in this case, since we are 
told that the procurator was not commissioned to transfer ownership of the 
Emperor’s property (alienare ei rem Caesaris) but rather to administer it carefully 
(diligenter gerere). The fact that this requirement is not met in the present situation 
throws light on the significance of the delivery performed by the procurator of the 
object “as being his own”, since it indicates that there is a fraudulent component 
in his behaviour. In this particular context, one may well assume that the 
procurator alienates to his personal advantage some objects under his 
administration, presenting himself as the true owner when selling, donating or 
settling in court. The main problem to be considered in this context is whether 
he was authorized to conclude any of these acts, which is why Ulpian highlights 
this point. However, the potestas alienandi of the procurator is also limited by the 
fact that he must administer in a careful and faithful way, which is why it is not 
enough to formally adhere to the owner’s instructions; a fraudulent 
administration will just as well set the alienation beyond the limits of his potestas 
alienandi. Both the owner’s formal instructions and the need to administer 
faithfully interact in this case, which is why one may assume that even if some of 
                                                 
270  See e.g. Voci, Modi di acquisto (1952), p. 101-102; Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 650 n. 1073. 
271  See on this evolution Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 71. 
272  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 94. 
273  Chapter 2, Section 5. 
274  This is why the disobedience of the owner’s instructions to deliver on his behalf prevents 
the transfer of ownership in D. 39,5,25 (Jav. 6 epistolarum). 
CHAPTER 2. VOLUNTAS DOMINI AS BASIS FOR THE POTESTAS ALIENANDI
126
 
124 
the alienations did fall within the formal boundaries of the Emperor’s 
authorization, the fraudulent behaviour of the procurator will exclude the transfer 
of ownership. This interpretation agrees moreover with that of another decision 
of Ulpian found in D. 27,10,10,1 (Ulp. 16 ed.)275, where a curator furiosi transfers 
an object of the lunatic “quasi suam”, which leads the author to deny the transfer 
of ownership on account that the thing was not transferred while administering 
the lunatic’s affairs. The agreement between both solutions is by no means casual, 
especially if one considers that they are to be found within the same book of 
Ulpian’s Commentary to the Edict276. 
 A problem which D. 1,19,1,1 leaves unanswered is whether the notion of 
bona fides plays a relevant role in the decision. It is evident that if the owner 
fraudulently delivered some objects to his own advantage, he would not be 
acting in a loyal way, but this does not mean necessarily that Roman jurists had 
the notion of bona fides in mind. The same problem is to be seen in D. 41,4,7,6, 
where one may assume that the intention to harm the owner (ut te damno 
adficeret) is incompatible with the requirements of the bona fides, despite the fact 
that this notion is not brought into analysis. In the end, the exclusion of the 
potestas alienandi of the non-owner when he administers in an abusive way 
appears to be based on some basic objective notions of what a good 
administration should be, which are described only in D. 17,1,60,4 with 
reference to the requirements of the bona fides (quatenus res ex fide agenda esset). It 
remains therefore enigmatic whether the bona fides would play a role in the 
decisions of Julian and Ulpian, or whether Scaevola was only resorting to this 
notion in an attempt to offer a clearer view of what was expected from the non-
owner. However, as will be shown below, there are several cases in which 
Roman jurists apply similar objective criteria to determine the transfer of 
ownership in cases where the potestas alienandi does not stem from the owner’s 
authorization, many of which do not take place within a personal relationship 
governed by the fides. Accordingly, it would appear that the restriction of the 
potestas alienandi in order to avoid an uneconomical administration is not 
necessarily linked to the notion of fides, despite the fact that in certain contexts 
jurists may resort to this notion for that purpose. 
 
d. Filling the lacuna of Gai 2,64. 
 
The decisions reviewed so far show the great flexibility with which Roman 
jurists approached the notion of voluntas domini, since the potestas alienandi of an 
authorized non-owner could be restricted through an objectified voluntas, 
particularly when the owner’s authorization was too broad or let the door open 
                                                 
275  See on this text Chapter 2, Section 4(c) below. 
276  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 511-512 actually sets both texts side by side in fragments 565 
and 566, under the rubric “De Publiciana in rem actione”. See moreover Lenel, EP (1927), 
p. 171 n. 1. 
 
for abusive acts of his intermediary. The great inventiveness of Roman jurists to 
determine the scope of the voluntas domini in such cases finds an curious corollary 
in the modern attempts to fill a famous lacuna in Gai 2,64, where the 
circumstances under which a non-owner may transfer ownership are described. 
Since Roman law offered so many different approaches on the subject, the 
various attempts to reconstruct the lacuna based on dogmatic considerations have 
reflected the wide array of solutions offered by Roman jurisprudence277. Among 
the most famous reconstructions one finds that of Mommsen, who conjectured 
that the text should have made reference to the loyal behaviour of the procurator 
(item procurator <si quid ne corrumpatur distrahendum> est)278. Another conjecture 
was provided by Krüger279, who relied on the ideas of Gaius in D. 41,1,9,4 to fill 
the lacuna, according to which the procurator could transfer ownership if he had 
the libera administratio (item procurator <rem absentis, cuius negotiorum libera 
administratio ei permissa> est). This view was particularly successful among those 
who favoured the view that the procurator had a broad power to dispose in 
classical times280, but its validity is not necessarily linked to these notions. David 
and Nelson would agree with this conjecture, but finding it too long for the 
length of the gap in the text proposed instead “procurator <rem absentis, si hoc ei 
concessum> est”281. Angelini offered another reconstruction which stressed the 
need for a special authorization to transfer ownership, filling the lacuna with the 
words “item procurator <cui hoc specialiter mandatum> est”282. All of these 
reconstructions reflect different approaches to the potestas alienandi in the sources, 
and therefore none of them seems to be more accurate than the others from a 
strictly dogmatic perspective283: it is in fact equally true according to the sources 
that the fraudulent acts of the non-owner would prevent the transfer of 
ownership, that a procurator with the libera administratio would be able to transfer 
                                                 
277  See on this point David/Nelson, Gai Institutionum, Kommentar (1960), p. 276; Girard/Senn, 
Textes de Droit Romain (1967), p. 76; Böhm, Gaiusstudien (1977) XV, p. 16-17; Miceli, 
Rappresentanza (2008), p. 171-177. 
278  Mommsen, Emendationes Gaianae (1905 [1877]), p. 42. This reconstruction was later 
followed by Bizoukides, Gaius (1937) I, p. 101. 
279  Krüger/Studemund, Gai Institutiones (1877), p. 53. This reconstruction was later followed 
in FIRA (1968) I, p. 58. Zulueta, Institutes of Gaius (1946) I, p. 80-82 also adheres to this 
reconstruction, but points out (p. 82 n. 1) that Mommsen’s conjecture is closer to the 
letters which can be read. 
280  Bonfante, Facoltà e decadenza (1921 [1898]), p. 250-261; Miceli, Rappresentanza (2008), 
p. 176. 
281  David/Nelson, Gai Institutionum, Kommentar (1960), p. 276. 
282  Angelini, Il procurator (1971), p. 149. This reconstruction is however not held as definitive, 
and recently Manthe, Gaius Institutiones (2004), p. 132 proposed yet another one: “qui 
pecuniae administration permissa est”. 
283  Other reconstructions are however less plausible, such as that of Kniep, Gai Institutionum 
(1912) II, p. 23-24, who in an attempt to make sense of some of the more readable letters 
of the text proposes “procurator <iure civili, cum a praetore alienari concessum> est”, which does 
not fit with the sources on the subject, despite the claims of Kniep, Gai Institutionum (1912) 
II, p. 208 in regard to D. 3,3,67. 
SCOPE OF THE POTESTAS ALIENANDI OF THE AUTHORIZED NON-OWNER
127
 
124 
the alienations did fall within the formal boundaries of the Emperor’s 
authorization, the fraudulent behaviour of the procurator will exclude the transfer 
of ownership. This interpretation agrees moreover with that of another decision 
of Ulpian found in D. 27,10,10,1 (Ulp. 16 ed.)275, where a curator furiosi transfers 
an object of the lunatic “quasi suam”, which leads the author to deny the transfer 
of ownership on account that the thing was not transferred while administering 
the lunatic’s affairs. The agreement between both solutions is by no means casual, 
especially if one considers that they are to be found within the same book of 
Ulpian’s Commentary to the Edict276. 
 A problem which D. 1,19,1,1 leaves unanswered is whether the notion of 
bona fides plays a relevant role in the decision. It is evident that if the owner 
fraudulently delivered some objects to his own advantage, he would not be 
acting in a loyal way, but this does not mean necessarily that Roman jurists had 
the notion of bona fides in mind. The same problem is to be seen in D. 41,4,7,6, 
where one may assume that the intention to harm the owner (ut te damno 
adficeret) is incompatible with the requirements of the bona fides, despite the fact 
that this notion is not brought into analysis. In the end, the exclusion of the 
potestas alienandi of the non-owner when he administers in an abusive way 
appears to be based on some basic objective notions of what a good 
administration should be, which are described only in D. 17,1,60,4 with 
reference to the requirements of the bona fides (quatenus res ex fide agenda esset). It 
remains therefore enigmatic whether the bona fides would play a role in the 
decisions of Julian and Ulpian, or whether Scaevola was only resorting to this 
notion in an attempt to offer a clearer view of what was expected from the non-
owner. However, as will be shown below, there are several cases in which 
Roman jurists apply similar objective criteria to determine the transfer of 
ownership in cases where the potestas alienandi does not stem from the owner’s 
authorization, many of which do not take place within a personal relationship 
governed by the fides. Accordingly, it would appear that the restriction of the 
potestas alienandi in order to avoid an uneconomical administration is not 
necessarily linked to the notion of fides, despite the fact that in certain contexts 
jurists may resort to this notion for that purpose. 
 
d. Filling the lacuna of Gai 2,64. 
 
The decisions reviewed so far show the great flexibility with which Roman 
jurists approached the notion of voluntas domini, since the potestas alienandi of an 
authorized non-owner could be restricted through an objectified voluntas, 
particularly when the owner’s authorization was too broad or let the door open 
                                                 
275  See on this text Chapter 2, Section 4(c) below. 
276  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 511-512 actually sets both texts side by side in fragments 565 
and 566, under the rubric “De Publiciana in rem actione”. See moreover Lenel, EP (1927), 
p. 171 n. 1. 
 
for abusive acts of his intermediary. The great inventiveness of Roman jurists to 
determine the scope of the voluntas domini in such cases finds an curious corollary 
in the modern attempts to fill a famous lacuna in Gai 2,64, where the 
circumstances under which a non-owner may transfer ownership are described. 
Since Roman law offered so many different approaches on the subject, the 
various attempts to reconstruct the lacuna based on dogmatic considerations have 
reflected the wide array of solutions offered by Roman jurisprudence277. Among 
the most famous reconstructions one finds that of Mommsen, who conjectured 
that the text should have made reference to the loyal behaviour of the procurator 
(item procurator <si quid ne corrumpatur distrahendum> est)278. Another conjecture 
was provided by Krüger279, who relied on the ideas of Gaius in D. 41,1,9,4 to fill 
the lacuna, according to which the procurator could transfer ownership if he had 
the libera administratio (item procurator <rem absentis, cuius negotiorum libera 
administratio ei permissa> est). This view was particularly successful among those 
who favoured the view that the procurator had a broad power to dispose in 
classical times280, but its validity is not necessarily linked to these notions. David 
and Nelson would agree with this conjecture, but finding it too long for the 
length of the gap in the text proposed instead “procurator <rem absentis, si hoc ei 
concessum> est”281. Angelini offered another reconstruction which stressed the 
need for a special authorization to transfer ownership, filling the lacuna with the 
words “item procurator <cui hoc specialiter mandatum> est”282. All of these 
reconstructions reflect different approaches to the potestas alienandi in the sources, 
and therefore none of them seems to be more accurate than the others from a 
strictly dogmatic perspective283: it is in fact equally true according to the sources 
that the fraudulent acts of the non-owner would prevent the transfer of 
ownership, that a procurator with the libera administratio would be able to transfer 
                                                 
277  See on this point David/Nelson, Gai Institutionum, Kommentar (1960), p. 276; Girard/Senn, 
Textes de Droit Romain (1967), p. 76; Böhm, Gaiusstudien (1977) XV, p. 16-17; Miceli, 
Rappresentanza (2008), p. 171-177. 
278  Mommsen, Emendationes Gaianae (1905 [1877]), p. 42. This reconstruction was later 
followed by Bizoukides, Gaius (1937) I, p. 101. 
279  Krüger/Studemund, Gai Institutiones (1877), p. 53. This reconstruction was later followed 
in FIRA (1968) I, p. 58. Zulueta, Institutes of Gaius (1946) I, p. 80-82 also adheres to this 
reconstruction, but points out (p. 82 n. 1) that Mommsen’s conjecture is closer to the 
letters which can be read. 
280  Bonfante, Facoltà e decadenza (1921 [1898]), p. 250-261; Miceli, Rappresentanza (2008), 
p. 176. 
281  David/Nelson, Gai Institutionum, Kommentar (1960), p. 276. 
282  Angelini, Il procurator (1971), p. 149. This reconstruction is however not held as definitive, 
and recently Manthe, Gaius Institutiones (2004), p. 132 proposed yet another one: “qui 
pecuniae administration permissa est”. 
283  Other reconstructions are however less plausible, such as that of Kniep, Gai Institutionum 
(1912) II, p. 23-24, who in an attempt to make sense of some of the more readable letters 
of the text proposes “procurator <iure civili, cum a praetore alienari concessum> est”, which does 
not fit with the sources on the subject, despite the claims of Kniep, Gai Institutionum (1912) 
II, p. 208 in regard to D. 3,3,67. 
CHAPTER 2. VOLUNTAS DOMINI AS BASIS FOR THE POTESTAS ALIENANDI
128
 
126 
ownership, and that a special authorization would be needed regarding the 
alienation of objects not comprised in the ordinary administration. Considering 
the content of this lacuna, we will have to wait for the ongoing research of 
Briguglio284 to shed more light on the point. One should however not expect a 
revolutionary piece of information concerning the faculty to dispose of the 
procurator, as the sources already offer a complex, yet consistent picture on the 
subject. 
 
5. Traditio nomine proprio and nomine alieno 
 
One of the subjects where the opinions of scholars differ the most concerns the 
possibility and significance of the delivery performed by the non-owner on behalf 
of the owner (nomine alieno) or on behalf of himself (nomine proprio). The 
confusion on this point stems originally from the application of the notion of 
‘direct representation’ to describe the transfer of ownership in Roman law. Some 
scholars consider that the non-owner could only alienate nomine proprio, as an 
‘indirect representative’, and not on behalf of the owner285. The idea according 
to which a third party could directly affect the principal by acting on his behalf 
may have seem far too modern, and therefore had to be excluded or restricted to 
the case of the nuntius286. Other authors were led to the opposite conclusion: 
since the transfer of ownership was an exception to the primitive ban on direct 
representation, the non-owner would have been able to act as a ‘direct 
representative’, i.e. nomine alieno287. Such deductions, however, are based on 
vague doctrinal standpoints, which have little or no support in the sources. 
 Sansón and Miquel developed a more elaborate explanation of the 
significance of the traditio nomine proprio and nomine alieno. They distinguish 
different legal grounds for the transfer of ownership depending on whether the 
delivery was performed on behalf of the owner or not. In the case of Miquel, the 
distinction is based on the analysis of two texts which have already been reviewed 
here, D. 39,5,9,2 (Pomp. 33 Sab.) and D. 6,2,14 (Ulp. 16 ed.). Regarding the 
first text, Miquel offers an original interpretation, according to which this 
fragment would compare two different grounds for the potestas alienandi, which 
would be distinguished through the conjunction “aut” (Quod filius familias patris 
iussu aut voluntate donavit). The meaning of each of these different concepts – iussu 
                                                 
284  See on the new techniques used to read the Veronese Palimpsest Briguglio, Gai Codex 
Rescriptus (2012), p. 1-51. Despite the enhanced photomechanical version offered in this 
edition, it has remained far from my modest abilities to offer a reconstruction of the text 
under discussion. 
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Recht (1928) II, p. 413. Plescia, Development of agency (1984), p. 172-175, 182, 185 only 
accepts a traditio alieno nomine in Justinianic law. 
 
and voluntate – would then be developed in the second part of the text, where 
the distinction would again be signaled through the use of “aut” (perinde est, ac si 
pater ipse donaverit aut si mea voluntate rem meam tu nomine tuo Titio dones). The 
result of this is that Miquel extracts two separate statements from this text: “Quod 
filiusfamilias patris iussu donavit, perinde est ac si pater ipse donavit” and “Quod 
filiusfamilias patris voluntate donavit perinde est ac si mea voluntate rem meam tu nomine 
tuo Titio dones”288. In the first case, the existence of a iussum would imply that 
ownership is transferred on behalf of the owner (ac si pater ipse donaverit), while 
the delivery patris voluntate in the second case would be done on behalf of the 
non-owner/transferor (tu nomine tuo). That the term traditio voluntate domini 
indicates exclusively a delivery nomine proprio is then explained through 
D. 6,2,14, where we are told that the purchaser did not make use of the exceptio 
si non auctor meus ex voluntate tua vendidit precisely because he ignored the 
existence of a principal (per ignorantiam [sc. facti] non est usus exceptione). This 
interpretation leads Miquel to draw a parallel with modern institutions of private 
law, since the delivery iussu domini would be equivalent to the modern transfer of 
ownership in the framework of direct representation – Stellvertretung in BGB 
§§ 164 ff. – and the delivery voluntate domini would find a parallel in the modern 
‘authorization’ – Ermächtigung in BGB § 185289. 
 Sansón also makes use of the distinctions between an alienation performed 
nomine alieno and nomine proprio, resorting to the notions of “representación 
directa”, “poder”, “apoderamiento” and “autorización” – the Spanish equivalents 
of Stellvertretung, Vollmacht, Bevollmächtigung and Ermächtigung – in order to 
describe the legal grounds for the potestas alienandi290. Such notions are applied as 
a basic framework throughout her studies to determine the outcome of the 
transfer of ownership, considering that the alienation mandatu domini by a 
procurator would be grounded in his ‘poder’ or ‘apoderamiento’ – i.e. Vollmacht, 
Bevollmächtigung – while the delivery voluntate domini would be based on the 
owner’s ‘autorización’ – i.e. Ermächtigung. In the first case, the delivery would 
take place on behalf of the owner, while on the second case it would be 
performed nomine proprio. However, the precise terminology borrowed from 
modern private law finds no equivalent in Roman law, and when distinguishing 
between the delivery mandatu domini and voluntate domini to indicate different 
legal grounds for the delivery the author is forced to focus her attention on 
specific texts – excluding more relevant evidence – in order to make her findings 
                                                 
288  Miquel, Traditio rei alienae (1993), p. 270. 
289  Miquel, Traditio rei alienae (1993), p. 275. 
290  See e.g. Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 67: “En principio, parece que entregar voluntate 
domini y enajenar mandatu domini no son expresiones que se correspondan totalmente. 
Mientras esta última da la impresión de hacer referencia a la idea de poder o 
apoderamiento, aquella de entregar voluntate domini parece más bien indicar un acto de 
autorización del dominus”. For similar expressions, see moreover p. 68; 71-78; 96-98; 108-
109; 219 ff. These ideas are already found in Sansón, Potestas alienandi (1988), p. 272-273, 
influencing Nebrera, Ἡ τραδιτίων (1989), p. 119 ff.; 254 n. 71. 
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ownership, and that a special authorization would be needed regarding the 
alienation of objects not comprised in the ordinary administration. Considering 
the content of this lacuna, we will have to wait for the ongoing research of 
Briguglio284 to shed more light on the point. One should however not expect a 
revolutionary piece of information concerning the faculty to dispose of the 
procurator, as the sources already offer a complex, yet consistent picture on the 
subject. 
 
5. Traditio nomine proprio and nomine alieno 
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284  See on the new techniques used to read the Veronese Palimpsest Briguglio, Gai Codex 
Rescriptus (2012), p. 1-51. Despite the enhanced photomechanical version offered in this 
edition, it has remained far from my modest abilities to offer a reconstruction of the text 
under discussion. 
285  Jörs/Kunkel/Wenger (1987), p. 113; Zimmermann, The law of obligations (1996), p. 51. 
286  See on the traditio by a nuntius Chapter 2, Section 3. 
287  Kniep, Gai Institutionum (1912) II, p. 23 n. 8 considers the alienation by a procurator in 
Gai 2,64 as “Ein altes Beispiel für unmittelbare Stellvertretung”. See also Siber, Römisches 
Recht (1928) II, p. 413. Plescia, Development of agency (1984), p. 172-175, 182, 185 only 
accepts a traditio alieno nomine in Justinianic law. 
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a basic framework throughout her studies to determine the outcome of the 
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procurator would be grounded in his ‘poder’ or ‘apoderamiento’ – i.e. Vollmacht, 
Bevollmächtigung – while the delivery voluntate domini would be based on the 
owner’s ‘autorización’ – i.e. Ermächtigung. In the first case, the delivery would 
take place on behalf of the owner, while on the second case it would be 
performed nomine proprio. However, the precise terminology borrowed from 
modern private law finds no equivalent in Roman law, and when distinguishing 
between the delivery mandatu domini and voluntate domini to indicate different 
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consistent. Despite the complications which Sansón faces when applying this 
distinction, she holds tenaciously to it as basic guideline for approaching the 
potestas alienandi in Roman sources, and even defended its validity291 from the 
criticism of Burdese292. 
 The standpoints of Sansón and Miquel may appear odd from a 
methodological perspective, since these authors are keen to fit the Roman 
sources into a modern dogmatic framework for the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner. This approach, however, has deep roots in modern Roman law 
scholarship, as can be seen from the authors quoted by Sansón and Miquel in 
support of their approach293, which include names such as Mitteis, Rabel and 
Kaser, among others. These Spanish scholars attempted therefore to apply in a 
fully consistent way the ideas of their German predecessors, and it was only when 
an effort of such scale was carried out that the flaws of the theoretical model 
became evident.  
 A less dogmatic examination of the sources reveals that acting nomine proprio 
or nomine alieno had no decisive consequence for the transfer of ownership, or at 
least did not provide a different legal ground. This has already been highlighted 
by Burdese294, and in a more incidental way by Wieling295 and Potjewijd296. The 
central element to determine the attribution of property by a non-owner was that 
the delivery took place voluntate domini. The only significant difference between 
acting on behalf of the owner or not is that the content of the bona fides of the 
acquirer would vary for the purpose of acquiring through usucapion. The good 
faith of the purchaser could indeed also refer to the potestas alienandi of a non-
owner, as shown in the definition of bonae fidei emptor in D. 50,16,109 (Mod. 5 
pandectarum), who is described as “qui ignoravit, eam rem alienam esse, aut putavit 
eum, qui vendidit, ius vendendi habere, puta procuratorem aut tutorem esse”297. This 
shows in turn that there was nothing special about a non-owner who openly 
delivered on behalf of someone else, apart from the fact that the good faith of the 
purchaser would consist not in believing to acquire from the owner, but rather 
from a non-owner with ius vendendi. These ideas are applied to a concrete case in 
the following text: 
 
                                                 
291  Sansón, Representación (2012), p. 1-20. 
292  Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009), p. 15-29; Burdese, Agire per altri (2010), p. 15-18. 
293  Miquel, Traditio rei alienae (1993), p. 275 n. 10. 
294  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 73-79, as well as p. 84: “… il principio che va sotto la 
denominazione di rappresentanza diretta non era affatto sconosciuto ai classici, anche se, 
per il normale atteggiarsi degli interessi in gioco, non apparisse necessario quello que si 
suole considerare elemento essenziale del fenomeno rappresentativo, vale a dire la 
contemplatio domini, l’agire nomine alieno”. 
295  Wieling, Drittwirkungen (1993), p. 244 n. 80. 
296  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 142-143. 
297  See on this text Chapter 1, Section 3 above. 
 
D. 41,4,14 (Scaev. 25 dig.): Intestatae sororis hereditas obvenit 
duobus fratribus, quorum alter absens erat, alter praesens: praesens 
etiam absentis causam agebat, ex qua hereditate suo et fratris sui 
nomine fundum in solidum vendidit Lucio Titio bona fide ementi: 
quaesitum est, cum scierit partem fundi absentis esse, an totum 
fundum longa possessione ceperit. Respondit, si credidisset mandatu 
fratris venisse, per longum tempus cepisse298. 
 
In this fragment, Cervidius Scaevola presents the case of two brothers who 
inherited a piece of land from their sister, the one being present and the other 
absent. The brother who was present decides to sell it to Lucius Titius, who buys 
in good faith (bona fide ementi). When asked whether the buyer would usucapt 
considering that he knew that part of the land was of an absent person, Scaevola 
shows what would be the content of the good faith of the purchaser in this case: 
believing that the seller was acting according to the mandate of his brother. Only 
if the sale took place under this supposition will the buyer be in good faith, 
setting him on the path to acquire by usucapion.  
 The texts dealing with the bona fides of the transferee show in the first place 
that there was no obstacle for the delivery taking place nomine alieno, as some 
modern scholars assume. If the delivery could only take place nomine proprio, the 
consequence would be rather odd with regard to the good faith of the purchaser, 
since any inquiry into the faculty to dispose would be per se excluded, the 
transferee always presenting himself as the true owner. If this was the case, the 
good faith as a requirement for usucapion would have little meaning, since the 
acquirer would not be able inquire about the potestas alienandi of the seller. 
 The sources feature many cases where the transferee would be completely 
aware of acquiring from a non-owner. This would be particularly the case for 
individuals who were praepositi working at places where it would be publicly 
announced who was in charge of selling what. One may have an idea of how 
clear the person of the principal normally was by the fact that the actiones 
adiecticiae qualitatis would be directed against him, which shows that normally he 
would be perfectly identifiable. In some cases, the purchaser would be 
immediately aware of purchasing from a non-owner, as if he bought from 
someone whom we knew to be a slave or from a son-in-power. In all of these 
cases, the contemplatio domini would normally have no decisive effects for the 
                                                 
298  D. 41,1,14: “The inheritance of their intestate sister devolved upon her two brothers, one 
of whom was present, the other, absent; the brother who was present conducted also the 
business of the absentee and, in the name of his brother and his own, sold all the land from 
the inheritance to Lucius Titius who bought it in good faith. The question was: since he 
knows that part belongs to an absentee, can the purchaser usucapt the whole? The reply 
was that if he believed the vendor to have his brother’s mandate to sell, he would acquire 
ownership by long possession” (transl. Watson, modified). 
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consistent. Despite the complications which Sansón faces when applying this 
distinction, she holds tenaciously to it as basic guideline for approaching the 
potestas alienandi in Roman sources, and even defended its validity291 from the 
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 A less dogmatic examination of the sources reveals that acting nomine proprio 
or nomine alieno had no decisive consequence for the transfer of ownership, or at 
least did not provide a different legal ground. This has already been highlighted 
by Burdese294, and in a more incidental way by Wieling295 and Potjewijd296. The 
central element to determine the attribution of property by a non-owner was that 
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acting on behalf of the owner or not is that the content of the bona fides of the 
acquirer would vary for the purpose of acquiring through usucapion. The good 
faith of the purchaser could indeed also refer to the potestas alienandi of a non-
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pandectarum), who is described as “qui ignoravit, eam rem alienam esse, aut putavit 
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shows in turn that there was nothing special about a non-owner who openly 
delivered on behalf of someone else, apart from the fact that the good faith of the 
purchaser would consist not in believing to acquire from the owner, but rather 
from a non-owner with ius vendendi. These ideas are applied to a concrete case in 
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consequence would be rather odd with regard to the good faith of the purchaser, 
since any inquiry into the faculty to dispose would be per se excluded, the 
transferee always presenting himself as the true owner. If this was the case, the 
good faith as a requirement for usucapion would have little meaning, since the 
acquirer would not be able inquire about the potestas alienandi of the seller. 
 The sources feature many cases where the transferee would be completely 
aware of acquiring from a non-owner. This would be particularly the case for 
individuals who were praepositi working at places where it would be publicly 
announced who was in charge of selling what. One may have an idea of how 
clear the person of the principal normally was by the fact that the actiones 
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298  D. 41,1,14: “The inheritance of their intestate sister devolved upon her two brothers, one 
of whom was present, the other, absent; the brother who was present conducted also the 
business of the absentee and, in the name of his brother and his own, sold all the land from 
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obligations arising from the agreement or for the transfer of ownership299. 
Regarding the obligations, on the one hand, the agent would only bind himself 
to the other party, leaving the principal outside of the obligatory link, and acting 
on his behalf would not alter this. This is shown by D. 3,3,67 (Pap. 2 resp.), 
where we are told that the procurator who sold “pro domino” – on behalf of the 
owner – would be nonetheless personally bound towards the purchaser300. 
Regarding the transfer of ownership, on the other hand, it is irrelevant as well 
whether the agent identifies himself as such or not, as long as he acts voluntate 
domini. Only for the usucapion would it be relevant on whose behalf the non-
owner acted, since it would determine the content of the good faith of the 
acquirer. Finally, it is worth noting that in the context of the sale of a pledged 
object, the creditor would make clear that he is not the owner of the sold object, 
since this circumstance would free him from the liability following from the 
eviction of the sold object301. 
 The claim that the distinction between delivering nomine alieno/nomine proprio 
is irrelevant appears however to be challenged by the following text: 
 
D. 39,5,25 (Jav. 6 epistolarum): Si tibi dederim rem, ut Titio meo 
nomine donares, et tu tuo nomine eam ei dederis, an factam eius 
putes? Respondit: si rem tibi dederim, ut Titio meo nomine donares 
eamque tu tuo nomine ei dederis, quantum ad iuris suptilitatem 
accipientis facta non est et tu furti obligaris: sed benignius est, si 
agam contra eum qui rem accepit, exceptione doli mali me 
summoveri302. 
 
The owner gave a specific instruction to the non-owner, who was to perform a 
gift to Titius on behalf of the owner (dederim rem, ut Titio meo nomine donares). 
The non-owner, however, disobeys this instruction and delivers nomine proprio. 
Accordingly, ownership is not transferred, not because there is anything wrong in 
general regarding traditio nomine proprio, but because the owner’s instructions were 
not followed. This implies that the delivery did not take place voluntate domini, 
                                                 
299  The main exception to this regards the solutio, where normally it would be essential for the 
transfer of ownership to act nomine debitoris. See on this point D. 46,3,17 (Pomp. 19 Sab.) 
below. It should however be noted that this follows from the peculiarities of payment – see 
Chapter 1, Section 2(c) above – and cannot be extended to any case of transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner. 
300  See on this text Chapter 2, Section 3 above. 
301  D. 21,2,68pr (Pap. 11 resp.). See on this point Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 38-42, 54. 
302  D. 39,5,25: “If I have given you some property to give to Titius in my name and you give 
it to him in your own name, do you think that the property becomes of Titius? He replied 
that if I have given you some property to give to Titius in my name and you give it to him 
in your own name, as far as a strict interpretation of law goes, the property does not 
become the recipient’s and you will be liable to a charge of theft. However, the more 
liberal view is that if I were to bring an action against the recipient, I would be successfully 
opposed by a defence of fraud” (transl. Watson, modified). 
 
which is also why the transferor will commit furtum. All of this shows that the 
significance of delivering nomine proprio / nomine alieno depends exclusively on the 
instructions of the dominus negotii and has nothing to do with the structure of the 
traditio voluntate domini itself. It is moreover worth noting that in the opinion of 
Javolenus this would be the regular outcome of the case according a strict 
interpretation of law (quantum ad iuris suptilitatem), which shows that he is 
reproducing a well-accepted view, introducing an innovative opinion regarding 
the exceptio doli only towards the end of the text303. 
 A similar case is conveyed by Pomponius regarding the payment through a 
third person: 
 
D. 46,3,17 (Pomp. 19 Sab.): Cassius ait, si cui pecuniam dedi, ut 
eam creditori meo solveret, si suo nomine dederit, neutrum liberari, 
me, quia non meo nomine data sit, illum, quia alienam dederit: 
ceterum mandati eum teneri. Sed si creditor eos nummos sine dolo 
malo consumpsisset, is, qui suo nomine eos solvisset, liberatur, ne, si 
aliter observaretur, creditor in lucro versaretur304. 
 
As mentioned above305, the payment performed through an agent is governed by 
different rules from the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, since in the first 
problem it is essential, in order to release the debtor from his obligation, that the 
agent acts in his name. In this text, however, both problems are intertwined, 
since the discussion centres on the transfer of ownership of money when an agent 
pays the debt. Pomponius quotes the opinion of Cassius, according to whom if a 
person was instructed to make a payment in the name of the debtor and instead 
makes the payment on behalf of himself, neither of them will be released. This 
implies that both the principal and the agent had individual debts with regard to 
the creditor, and that the agent used the money given to him to pay his own 
debt306. In the case of the principal/debtor, he is not released from his debt 
because the payment was not made on his behalf (quia non meo nomine data sit). 
Regarding the agent, the reason why he will not be released is that he did not 
transfer ownership over the money, “because he gave another’s money” (quia 
alienam dederit). This succinct explanation implies that the agent could have only 
                                                 
303  See on this point Chapter 4, Section 5 below. 
304  D. 46,3,17: “Cassius says that if I give money to someone to pay to my creditor and he 
pays it in his own name, neither of us is released, not I, because the payment was not in 
my name, not he, because he gave another’s money; but he will be liable [to me] in the 
action on mandate. Should the creditor, however, without bad faith spend the coins, the 
person in whose name they were paid over will be released in order to avoid that, by 
following a different solution, the creditor should make profit” (transl. Watson, modified). 
305  Chapter 1, Section 2(c). 
306  This is also the interpretation of Franciscus Accursius in his gl. Cassius ait to D. 46,3,17: 
“Casus: Debebam Sempronio centum aureos. Dedi tibi hanc summam, ut eam Sempronio 
pro me solveres. Tu nequam homo, quia forte eidem debebas, dedisti hanc pecuniam tuo 
nomine, non meo…” 
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The owner gave a specific instruction to the non-owner, who was to perform a 
gift to Titius on behalf of the owner (dederim rem, ut Titio meo nomine donares). 
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299  The main exception to this regards the solutio, where normally it would be essential for the 
transfer of ownership to act nomine debitoris. See on this point D. 46,3,17 (Pomp. 19 Sab.) 
below. It should however be noted that this follows from the peculiarities of payment – see 
Chapter 1, Section 2(c) above – and cannot be extended to any case of transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner. 
300  See on this text Chapter 2, Section 3 above. 
301  D. 21,2,68pr (Pap. 11 resp.). See on this point Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 38-42, 54. 
302  D. 39,5,25: “If I have given you some property to give to Titius in my name and you give 
it to him in your own name, do you think that the property becomes of Titius? He replied 
that if I have given you some property to give to Titius in my name and you give it to him 
in your own name, as far as a strict interpretation of law goes, the property does not 
become the recipient’s and you will be liable to a charge of theft. However, the more 
liberal view is that if I were to bring an action against the recipient, I would be successfully 
opposed by a defence of fraud” (transl. Watson, modified). 
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significance of delivering nomine proprio / nomine alieno depends exclusively on the 
instructions of the dominus negotii and has nothing to do with the structure of the 
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agent acts in his name. In this text, however, both problems are intertwined, 
since the discussion centres on the transfer of ownership of money when an agent 
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303  See on this point Chapter 4, Section 5 below. 
304  D. 46,3,17: “Cassius says that if I give money to someone to pay to my creditor and he 
pays it in his own name, neither of us is released, not I, because the payment was not in 
my name, not he, because he gave another’s money; but he will be liable [to me] in the 
action on mandate. Should the creditor, however, without bad faith spend the coins, the 
person in whose name they were paid over will be released in order to avoid that, by 
following a different solution, the creditor should make profit” (transl. Watson, modified). 
305  Chapter 1, Section 2(c). 
306  This is also the interpretation of Franciscus Accursius in his gl. Cassius ait to D. 46,3,17: 
“Casus: Debebam Sempronio centum aureos. Dedi tibi hanc summam, ut eam Sempronio 
pro me solveres. Tu nequam homo, quia forte eidem debebas, dedisti hanc pecuniam tuo 
nomine, non meo…” 
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transferred ownership over the coins if he had acted voluntate domini, but since 
this would involve acting nomine alieno he could not have appeared paying his 
own debt. From the moment he disobeys the order to act nomine alieno and pays 
his own debt he loses the potestas alienandi granted by the owner, becoming 
moreover liable to the actio mandati (mandati eum teneri) and to the actio furti307. 
Therefore, acting on behalf of the owner is only relevant for the transfer of 
ownership as far as it implies following the owner’s authorization to transfer 
ownership. 
 Apart from the texts mentioned so far, there are very few cases in which the 
sources mention at all that the non-owner transferred nomine proprio or nomine 
alieno, which is in itself a clear sign of the minor role that this element had in the 
context of the transfer of ownership. Miquel made use of the reference to the 
traditio nomine alieno at the end of D. 39,5,9,2 to claim the existence of different 
legal grounds for the alienation depending on whose behalf the alienation took 
place308. His interpretation, however, is highly unlikely, particularly because it 
would offer a completely sui generis distinction which is not to be found in the 
Roman sources. If one attends to the considerable amount of texts addressing the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner, the only general distinctions regarding the 
potestas alienandi refer to the role of the voluntas domini, the concession of the libera 
administratio peculii by the owner or the existence of a legal provision. 
Accordingly, it appears that the best interpretation of D. 39,5,9,2 is that 
Pomponius was simply offering a number of cases in which the consequence of 
the delivery would be identical.  
 Another element which makes Miquel’s reconstruction unconvincing is that 
D. 39,5,9,2 does not really revolve around the contrast nomine proprio / nomine 
alieno. Miquel assumes that the iussum would imply to act in the name of the 
owner, but the sources offer numerous examples where this is not the case309. 
Neither is it possible to understand the phrase “ac si pater ipse donaverit” as 
implying a delivery nomine alieno. Instead, this idea seems to indicate an 
equivalence in the result of the delivery, just as the sentence “Nihil autem interest, 
utrum ipse dominus per se tradat alicui rem, an voluntate eius aliquis” in D. 41,1,9,4 
puts on the same level the delivery voluntate domini with the one performed by 
the owner himself. The fact that both Gaius (D. 41,1,9,4) and Pomponius 
(D. 39,5,9,2) draw a parallel with the alienation by an owner reaffirms that the 
latter author is only indicating different circumstances in which the delivery will 
produce the same consequence. 
                                                 
307  D. 47,2,52,16 (Ulp. 37 ed.): “Iulianus libro vicensimo secundo digestorum scripsit, si 
pecuniam quis a me acceperit, ut creditori meo solvat, deinde, cum tantam pecuniam 
eidem creditori deberet, suo nomine solverit, furtum eum facere”. 
308  See Chapter 2, Section 3 above. 
309  That the existence of a iussum was not equivalent to acting on behalf of the principal can 
be seen in Gai. 3,167a: “Illud quaeritur, an quod nomen domini adiectum efficit, idem 
faciat unius ex dominis iussum intercedens (…)” 
 
 Maybe one of the most interesting arguments offered by Miquel to prove that 
the delivery voluntate domini takes place nomine proprio refers to his interpretation 
of D. 6,2,14, where he highlights that the purchaser did not use the 
corresponding praetorian defence “per ignorantiam”. According to Miquel, this 
cannot refer to a problem of ignorantia iuris concerning the existence of this 
defence310, but rather indicates the unawareness at the time of the delivery that 
the transferor was acting under the instructions of the owner who later claims the 
object back. Miquel considers that the ignorance of the purchaser would be 
caused by the fact that the traditio voluntate domini was always performed nomine 
proprio, and therefore the transferee would not gain notice of who the real owner 
was. The problem of this interpretation is that Ulpian does not present the 
ignorance of the purchaser as a necessary consequence of the traditio voluntate 
domini, but rather as something that may happen (potest enim fieri…). Therefore, if 
the ignorance of the purchaser indeed refers to the unawareness of who the 
original owner was, it is clear that he would not have been necessarily ignorant of 
this fact. Otherwise, there would have been no point in granting an exceptio based 
on a circumstance which the purchaser could not possibly know. It seems 
therefore more plausible that the ignorance of the acquirer refers to an error iuris, 
as Winkel claims311, which would explain why his ignorance does not necessarily 
follow from the context of the case. Another possibility is that the case refers 
indeed to an error facti of the acquirer regarding the existence of the principal, but 
that such mistake did not follow necessarily from the fact that the delivery was 
performed by an agent. Whatever the case may be, it follows that D. 6,2,14 does 
not draw a clear link between the traditio voluntate domini and the contemplatio 
domini at the delivery.  
 Sansón would develop a much more complex outlook on the Roman sources 
than Miquel, based on the general distinction between the delivery concluded 
nomine proprio and nomine alieno. However, the few texts which grant a relevant 
role to this distinction lead Sansón to seek support for her ideas in texts that are 
not so compelling. For example, she signals the vital importance of the need to 
act nomine alieno by a procurator in D. 1,19,1,1, where the alienation is excluded 
because he delivered “quasi rem propriam”312, which would also be the case in 
D. 27,10,10pr. These texts, however, refer to the problem of the abusive and 
disloyal behaviour of the procurator and the curator furiosi313, respectively, and 
therefore provide no support to identify two different legal grounds for the 
delivery314. Additionally, the author does not apply her general dogmatic 
framework to texts which do refer to the contemplatio domini – such as 
                                                 
310  This point is however not as clear as Miquel holds, and in fact the opposite view is held by 
Winkel, Error iuris (1985), p. 136-137. 
311  Winkel, Error iuris (1985), p. 136-137. 
312  Sansón, Potestas alienandi (1988), p. 273-274; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 71-72. 
313  See Chapter 2, Section 4 and Chapter 3, Section 2. 
314  This is the interpretation defended by Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009), p. 21 and 29. 
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310  This point is however not as clear as Miquel holds, and in fact the opposite view is held by 
Winkel, Error iuris (1985), p. 136-137. 
311  Winkel, Error iuris (1985), p. 136-137. 
312  Sansón, Potestas alienandi (1988), p. 273-274; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 71-72. 
313  See Chapter 2, Section 4 and Chapter 3, Section 2. 
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D. 41,4,14315 – and in other cases – as in D. 41,1,9,4316 – assumes that the 
delivery takes place on behalf of the owner. Moreover, probably one of the most 
decisive elements in Sansón’s analysis is the use of texts dealing with the 
acquis i t ion  by a non-owner, where there is much more information available 
regarding the significance of acting on behalf of the owner or not. The repeated 
reference to the contemplatio domini on this context leads Sansón to assume that 
analogous rules should have governed the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner317. It is, however, not possible to apply by analogy the rules concerning 
the acquisition of ownership by a third person to the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner, as already shown above318, since the basis of their validity is 
completely different. Accordingly, despite the apparent similarities between both 
groups of cases, they should in fact be regarded as essentially different, particularly 
since in the case of the acquisition the patrimony of the principal is enlarged, 
while in the case of the alienation it is diminished. It is moreover worth noting 
that the contemplatio domini plays a decisive role for the acquisition due to the 
focus on whether the principal becomes possessor, but in the context of the 
transfer of ownership the central problem is whether the delivery takes place 
voluntate domini or not. 
 The analysis of the Roman sources reveals that the contemplatio domini does 
not play a decisive role to determine the attribution of ownership when the 
delivery is performed by a non-owner. This element will only be relevant when, 
according to the owner’s instructions, the delivery had to be performed nomine 
alieno or nomine proprio, but in this context the outcome of the case revolves once 
more around the central element to determine the potestas alienandi of the 
authorized non-owner: the compliance with the voluntas domini. It is therefore 
not possible to distinguish different grounds for the transfer of ownership 
depending on behalf of whom the delivery is concluded. This in turn shows that 
modern dogmatic concepts such as that of ‘direct representation’ are of no use 
when describing Roman sources, as already highlighted by Burdese319. Roman 
law scholars should accordingly strive for a more source-oriented terminology 
and abandon the clear-cut legal concepts borrowed from modern private law 
more than a century ago, which provide a dogmatic framework which distorts a 
proper understanding of the potestas alienandi in Roman law. 
 
  
                                                 
315  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 104-105. 
316  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 77. 
317  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 68 n. 118; p. 72-74; p. 96 n. 247. 
318  Chapter 1, Section 2(c). 
319  Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009), p. 29; Burdese, Agire per altri (2010), p. 23: “Nell’ambito 
della realtà considerata, non sembra poi riscontrabile alcuna ipotesi che possa considerarsi 
espressione, in termini moderni, del fenomeno di rappresentanza c.d. diretta, ove 
contrassegnata dalla contemplatio domini, il cui ricorrere si avrebbe solo in casi particolari e 
non allo scopo di rispondere ad istanze di affidamento da parte dell’acquirente”. 
 
6. Voluntas domini, iusta causa traditionis and error in dominio 
 
a. Voluntas domini and the structure of traditio. 
 
The study of the sources so far has revealed the key position of the voluntas domini 
in order to determine the potestas alienandi of a non-owner. While this is an 
element of undeniable importance in classical jurisprudence, the fact that a 
specific intent must exist at the time of the delivery has been the subject of a 
long-standing controversy concerning the nature of the classical traditio and the 
significance of the iusta causa traditionis. During most of the 20th century, Roman 
law scholars were divided on this point in two main groups: on the one hand, 
some authors favoured a more abstract approach, which would imply that it 
would only be decisive that the parties agreed on the transfer of ownership at the 
time of delivery; on the other hand, some scholars regarded the classical traditio as 
essentially causal, claiming that the only truly decisive agreement for the transfer 
of ownership was the one reached at the iusta causa traditionis320. According to the 
latter view, most of the texts which highlight the importance of a particular 
intent at the time of the delivery would be of postclassical origin321, many of 
which would have originally referred to the mancipatio or in iure cessio. However, 
some scholars favour an intermediate approach, acknowledging that while 
Roman law required a iusta causa traditionis, a certain intent or agreement could 
take place at the delivery. Several formulas have been used in this regard, and 
while some authors demand only a specific intent on the part of the transferor in 
order to transfer ownership322, others consider that an actual agreement must take 
place between both parties in order to transfer ownership323. The terms animus 
adquirendi et transferendi dominii are often to be found in such dogmatic 
framework. Such concessions were criticised by other scholars, who defended a 
strictly causal approach according to which the traditio would be an exclusively 
material act where no special agreement needs to take place. According to this 
view, every form of intent or agreement at the delivery should be related to the 
iusta causa traditionis324. Despite this resistance, scholars gradually developed more 
nuanced views on the subject, which avoid defending a strictly causal or abstract 
                                                 
320  The status quaestionis on this subject is described by Miquel, Compraventa y transmisión 
(1993), p. 90-101. 
321  See in particular Pringsheim, Animus (1933), p. 55-60; Jörs/Kunkel/Wenger (1949), 
p. 129. On the claims according to which the references to a subjective animus or voluntas 
would be typically postclassical see Chapter 2, Section 1(a) above. 
322  Biondi, Istituzioni (1965), p. 258-259; Guarino, Diritto Privato Romano (2001) II, p. 256, 
694. 
323  Betti, La attuazione (1933), p. 153-157; Betti, Sul carattere causale (1936), p. 117-119; Cuena 
Casas, Poder de disposición (1996), p. 51-53; Belda Mercado, Presupuestos (2001), p. 40-46; 
Giuffrè, Il diritto (2006), p. 287-288; Talamanca, Elementi (2001), p. 226-227. 
324  Lokin, Traditio (1971), p. 125-129; Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 647-648; [Miquel, 
foreword to] Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 2-3; Salomón, Sine vitio (2003), p. 23-49; 
D’Ors, DPR (2004), p. 241-244; Lokin, Prota (2012), p. 147-148. 
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320  The status quaestionis on this subject is described by Miquel, Compraventa y transmisión 
(1993), p. 90-101. 
321  See in particular Pringsheim, Animus (1933), p. 55-60; Jörs/Kunkel/Wenger (1949), 
p. 129. On the claims according to which the references to a subjective animus or voluntas 
would be typically postclassical see Chapter 2, Section 1(a) above. 
322  Biondi, Istituzioni (1965), p. 258-259; Guarino, Diritto Privato Romano (2001) II, p. 256, 
694. 
323  Betti, La attuazione (1933), p. 153-157; Betti, Sul carattere causale (1936), p. 117-119; Cuena 
Casas, Poder de disposición (1996), p. 51-53; Belda Mercado, Presupuestos (2001), p. 40-46; 
Giuffrè, Il diritto (2006), p. 287-288; Talamanca, Elementi (2001), p. 226-227. 
324  Lokin, Traditio (1971), p. 125-129; Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 647-648; [Miquel, 
foreword to] Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 2-3; Salomón, Sine vitio (2003), p. 23-49; 
D’Ors, DPR (2004), p. 241-244; Lokin, Prota (2012), p. 147-148. 
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model by showing that while some elements in Roman law suggest a causal 
system – such as the general requirement of a iusta causa traditionis – other features 
are more ‘abstract’325. In other words, the terms ‘causal’ and ‘abstract’ may fall 
short when describing the Roman sources, since the key importance of the iusta 
causa traditionis does not exclude the fact that a particular intent at the time of the 
delivery may be relevant for the transfer of ownership. This is why some authors 
have observed that a clear-cut distinction between ‘abstract’ and ‘causal’ systems 
of delivery was only developed in a consistent way by legal scholarship in the 
course of the 19th century326, and therefore it is not easy to fit Roman 
jurisprudence under this conceptual framework. 
 The problem of the iusta causa traditionis is relevant for the study of the potestas 
alienandi due to the fact that the controversy regarding the agreement relevant for 
the transfer of ownership influenced to some extent the significance granted to 
the fact that the delivery could be performed voluntate domini by a non-owner. 
For example Betti, who granted considerable importance to the agreement of the 
parties at the time of the delivery, would approach some cases of delegatio tradendi 
as part of the need to reach an agreement at the time of the delivery which 
would ratify the intent given at the iusta causa traditionis327. While this theory does 
not really concern the delivery by a non-owner, Sansón considered it to 
adequately describe some aspects of the potestas alienandi328, although later in her 
work she would state that the voluntas domini at the delivery cannot be considered 
as part of a separate requirement for the transfer of ownership in Roman law329. 
Similarly Miquel, in the foreword to Sansón’s work, claimed that the potestas 
alienandi should be understood as an objective and autonomous requirement for 
the transfer of ownership, and not be approached as part of a subjective animus 
required at the time of the delivery330, following thus a strictly causal 
understanding of the transfer of ownership by traditio. On the other hand 
Potjewijd would conceive the delivery by the non-owner as a ‘compound title’ 
(samengestelde titel) formed by the intent of the owner who authorizes the delivery 
and the will of the agent who performs the traditio, which should coincide in 
order to transfer ownership331. In this way, the author avoids acknowledging the 
intent at the delivery as an independent requirement for the transfer of 
ownership, and instead identifies it with the title of the delivery. 
                                                 
325  Examples of this more eclectic approach are Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), 
p. 12-13; Lovato, Traditio e conventio (2001), p. 79-133; Lambertini, Iusta causa traditionis 
(2007), p. 2745-2756. 
326  Van Vliet, Iusta causa traditionis (2003), p. 360-361. 
327  Betti, La attuazione (1933), p. 173-174, 245-247; Betti, Sul carattere causale (1936), p. 127-
130. 
328  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 70 n. 127 and p. 176. 
329  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 223. 
330  [Miquel, foreword to] Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 2-3. 
331  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 145, 149-151, 197. This notion is borrowed 
from Dutch private law, as shown in Chapter 8, Section 5 below. 
 
 An assessment on the nature of the classical system for transfer of ownership 
would exceed the margins of the present research. It is however important to 
note that the references to a particular intent at the delivery were by no means 
alien to classical Roman law, which is why one cannot follow the claim that the 
need for such an intent would be typically post-classical. The relevance of such a 
voluntas is of course undeniable in the numerous cases studied so far where the 
owner’s authorization serves as the basis for the potestas alienandi of a non-owner. 
The intent at the moment of the delivery is in no way dependent on a previous 
iusta causa traditionis, which is why ownership will not be transferred if the owner 
forbids the delivery – even after there is an agreement regarding the iusta causa 
traditionis, as in D. 6,2,14 – or loses his own faculty to dispose – due to death, 
insanity etc. – before the conveyance takes place. It is moreover interesting that 
Roman jurists at times even discuss this problem along with other cases where 
the voluntas domini plays a relevant role for the transfer of ownership. This is 
particularly the case in a famous text of the Res cottidianae of Gaius reproduced in 
the D. 41,1,9,3-8 and included as well in Inst. 2,1,42-48, which shows the 
general significance of the voluntas domini in D. 41,1,9,3: 
 
D. 41,1,9,3 (Gai. 2 rer. cott.): Hae quoque res, quae traditione 
nostrae fiunt, iure gentium nobis acquiruntur: nihil enim tam 
conveniens est naturali aequitati quam voluntatem domini volentis 
rem suam in alium transferre ratam haberi332. 
 
Since the text generally highlights the importance of the voluntas domini at the 
delivery, it has been traditionally regarded as particularly representative of an 
abstract system of delivery333, considering that it lays an emphasis on the will at 
the delivery, not in the preceding iusta causa traditionis. Others have attempted to 
avoid this interpretation by pointing out that this text follows the acquisition of 
ownership through occupatio and accessio, where the voluntas has no role to play. 
Accordingly, when beginning the study of the traditio a mention to the 
importance of the intent of the parties regarding the transfer of ownership would 
be in place in order to offer a contrast with the other ways of acquiring 
ownership334. Such an approach cannot be followed, not only because the 
voluntas domini does play a role in certain cases of accessio, but especially because 
Gaius explicitly develops the applications of this voluntas for the transfer of 
ownership, the first of which – D. 41,1,9,4 – highlights its role for the transfer of 
                                                 
332  D. 41,1,9,3: “Those things, again, which are delivered to us become ours under the law of 
nations; for nothing is so adequate to natural equity as that effect should be given to the 
intent of an owner who wishes to transfer his thing to someone else” (transl. Watson, 
modified). 
333  Lokin, Traditio (1971), p. 130. 
334  Miquel, La doctrina (1961), p. 518-519; Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 647; Miquel, Savigny y 
el nacimiento (2003), p. 5763. 
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332  D. 41,1,9,3: “Those things, again, which are delivered to us become ours under the law of 
nations; for nothing is so adequate to natural equity as that effect should be given to the 
intent of an owner who wishes to transfer his thing to someone else” (transl. Watson, 
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333  Lokin, Traditio (1971), p. 130. 
334  Miquel, La doctrina (1961), p. 518-519; Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 647; Miquel, Savigny y 
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ownership by an authorized non-owner. The voluntas domini forms the unifying 
thread of the rest of the text, since it is applied in D. 41,1,9,5-6 to explain certain 
cases of traditio ficta335 and again in D. 41,1,9,7-8 to determine whether 
ownership over abandoned and jettisoned objects can be acquired. All of this 
does not imply that Gaius proposes here an abstract model of delivery, but simply 
that the intent at the delivery could play a relevant role in particular 
circumstances.  
 Apart from these applications, the voluntas domini also plays a role in other 
contexts, particularly when the delivery does not take place immediately after an 
agreement is reached regarding the iusta causa traditionis. One may for instance 
find in the sources cases in which a buyer snatches the object he bought from the 
seller without his consent, where ownership is not transferred because the object 
was not obtained voluntate domini336. The traditio would also not seem fit to 
transfer ownership if the owner loses his potestas alienandi – e.g. by becoming a 
lunatic – after an agreement has been reached regarding the iusta causa traditionis, 
and no ownership will be transferred if the acquirer refuses the delivery and the 
transferee nonetheless leaves the thing at his home337. There are also numerous 
texts where the owner may recover an object which he delivered under duress338. 
Considering all of this evidence, it seems that scholars who defend a strictly causal 
model of transfer of ownership in Roman law by denying any possible 
significance of the intent at the delivery are carried too far in their zeal to offer a 
fully consistent model, having to force the sources in order to extract the desired 
interpretation. This is the case, for instance, of the work of Salomón339, who can 
only discard the significance of the voluntas at the delivery by claiming that the 
cases where such an intent is to be found cannot be considered as cases of traditio, 
but as mere analogies made by the Roman jurists of the ‘prototypical’ traditio, 
which would consist in the delivery from hand to hand.  
 The text of D. 41,1,9,3 is usually confronted with Gai 2,20, which includes 
among the requirements to transfer ownership by traditio the need for a iusta causa 
traditionis, ownership over the object and that the delivered object is a res nec 
mancipi. According to some scholars, the omission of any reference to the voluntas 
at the delivery would show that this text represents the classical doctrine, while 
                                                 
335  The intent of the acquirer is moreover signalled as relevant for the acquisition of 
ownership in D. 41,2,1,21 (Paul 54 ed.). 
336  D. 41,2,5 (Paul 63 ed.): “Si ex stipulatione tibi Stichum debeam et non tradam eum, tu 
autem nanctus fueris possessionem, praedo es: aeque si vendidero nec tradidero rem, si non 
voluntate mea nanctus sis possessionem, non pro emptore possides, sed praedo es”. This 
text is dealt in Chapter 2, Section 1(b) above. See on this and similar texts Betti, Sul 
carattere causale (1936), p. 118-119 n. 7. Contrary to this interpretation is Salomón, Sine vitio 
(2003), p. 46 ff. 
337  Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 647. 
338  E.g. D. 4,2,9pr (Ulp. 11 ed.) i.f.; D. 43,16,5 (Ulp. 11 ed.); C. 2,19,3 (Gordian, 238). 
Regarding metus in the context of the sale and/or delivery see Hartkamp, Der Zwang 
(1971), p. 166-172; 178-181; Du Plessis, Compulsion (2004), p. 20-22. 
339  Salomón, Sine vitio (2003), p. 24 ff. 
 
D. 41,1,9,3 reflects post-classical trends and would probably not even correspond 
to Gaius. There is however no contradiction between both texts, since the fact 
that the voluntas domini at the delivery is not mentioned in Gai 2,20 only shows 
that this element was not always  relevant for the transfer of ownership. This 
agrees with the fact that the fragments following D. 41,1,9,3 describe only 
isolated applications of the voluntas domini in specific situations. The differences 
between the Institutes of Gaius and the Res cottidianae are also breached if one 
considers that the former work also makes reference to the voluntas domini at the 
delivery, since in Gai 2,64 the legal basis for the potestas alienandi of the pledge 
creditor is precisely the voluntas debitoris340. 
 From the texts reviewed so far, it would appear that the voluntas domini would 
provide a general framework to approach several problems related to the transfer 
of ownership by traditio. This of course does not imply that all the solutions in 
which reference is made to this element would be self-evident; on the contrary, 
jurists apply the voluntas domini in a dynamic way which leaves plenty of room for 
innovation – as already seen in various cases of potestas alienandi – which can lead 
in turn to divergent views when dealing with particular problems. Particularly 
noteworthy is a contribution by Lovato341 concerning the role of the agreement 
at the delivery among four different texts located within book 7 of Ulpian’s 
Disputationes: D. 41,2,34, dealing with the traditio longa manu and the acquisition 
of possession through a procurator or slave; D. 39,5,13, which discusses the 
acquisition or ownership through a servus communis; D. 41,1,35, addressing a case 
of error in dominio; and D. 12,1,18, concerning the agreement of the parties to 
transfer ownership when the iusta causa traditionis is not entirely clear342. Lovato 
shows in a compelling way that the common thread which runs through these 
texts is the relevance of a conventio between the parties at the delivery, which 
would therefore have a decisive role in determining the outcome of the transfer 
of ownership in several contexts. That some of these cases could lead to 
disagreement, as happens in the acquisition through a third person or regarding 
the agreement on the iusta causa traditionis, is only a consequence of the 
contrasting opinions regarding the significance of the owner’s voluntas – or the 
agreement between the parties – at the delivery, but does not imply that Roman 
law was inconsistent regarding the requirements to transfer ownership: it was 
generally clear that the voluntas played a certain role at the delivery, but it was left 
to the jurist to determine exactly what role this was. 
 Despite the fact that already classical jurisprudence granted the voluntas domini 
a significant role at the delivery, one could still argue that Justinianic law gave 
much more emphasis to the voluntas at the traditio from a systematic perspective. 
                                                 
340  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 46. 
341  Lovato, Traditio e conventio (2001), p. 79-133. 
342  Recently Schermaier, Consensus (2014), p. 115 has also framed the discussion regarding the 
agreement on the iusta causa traditionis under the general evolution of consensus in Roman 
classical law. 
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A contrast can be drawn at this point if one compares the Institutes of Gaius with 
those of Justinian: while both Gaius and Justinian omit any reference to a 
particular voluntas when drawing the general requirements to transfer ownership 
in Gai 2,20 and Inst. 2,1,40-41 respectively, Justinian introduces in Inst. 2,1,42-
48 the text of the Res cottidianae found in D. 41,1,9,3-8, thereby bestowing great 
attention on the voluntas domini. It is therefore no wonder that Byzantine legal 
scholarship would grant this element a particular significance when discussing the 
general requirements to transfer ownership343. For instance, already Theophilus 
would not include the iusta causa traditionis as a requirement for the transfer of 
ownership, declaring more generally that the delivery must be made with the 
intention to transfer ownership344. Miquel has shown that subsequent scholars 
would offer progressively abstract formulations, until eventually late Byzantine 
jurists presented a systematization of the transfer of ownership by delivery which 
matches many of the features of Savigny’s dinglicher Vertrag345.  
 The evolution of the voluntas domini in Byzantine legal scholarship is without 
any doubt fascinating from the point of view of legal systematization, since it 
shows that the voluntas domini, which in classical Roman law fulfiled a relevant 
role only in particular cases, was gradually approached as a central requirement 
for the transfer of ownership and eventually absorbed the need for a iusta causa 
traditionis. However, such an evolution seems to be of little moment for the 
practical outcome of numerous cases traditionally solved through the reference to 
the voluntas domini. Already in classical law jurists resorted to this element to 
resolve various problems, and the fact that this voluntas was listed by Byzantine 
scholars among the basic requirements to transfer ownership brought almost no 
change to their analysis, which is particularly the case regarding the situations 
involving the transfer of ownership by a non-owner voluntate domini346. It is 
accordingly difficult to agree with Nebrera, who claims that the need for a 
voluntas domini as a basis for the potestas alienandi would be part of the gradual 
abstraction of the transfer of ownership by traditio in Byzantine scholarship, 
                                                 
343  Concerning the structure of the traditio in Byzantine law see Betti, Il dogma bizantino 
(1930), p. 304-334; Fuchs, Iusta causa traditionis (1952), p. 16-26; Miquel, La doctrina 
(1961), p. 515-529. 
344  Theoph. Par. 2,1,40: εੁȢ δ੻ το διὰ TRADITIONOS μεταșε૙ναί με τ੽ν δεσποτείαν δε૙ ταῦτα 
συνδραμε૙ν, ੮στε δεσπότην εੇναι τઁν TRADITEUONTA κα੿ ȥυȤૌ τοῦ ȕοȪȜεσșαι 
μεταșε૙ναι τોν δεσποτείαν ποιε૙σșαι τ੽ν TRADITIONA κα੿ σωματικઁν εੇναι τઁ 
TRADITEUOMENON (To pass ownership by delivery, these conditions must concur: the 
deliverer must be owner; the delivery must be made with the intention of passing the 
ownership; and the thing delivered must be corporeal [transl. Murison]). 
345  Miquel, La doctrina (1961), p. 515-529. This interpretation was earlier set forth by 
Jörs/Kunkel/Wenger (1949), p. 129 n. 18, but criticized by Fuchs, Iusta causa traditionis 
(1952), p. 24-26. On the ideas of Byzantine scholars on this point see moreover 
Pringsheim, Animus (1933), p. 59. 
346  The only relevant innovation of Byzantine scholars in this regard was that the delivery was 
considered to be performed by the owner himself for systematic purposes, as will be shown 
in Chapter 6, Section 4. 
 
granting more importance to the intent at the delivery347. The fact is that 
numerous references to this voluntas can be found in classical jurisprudence, and 
therefore it is not possible to see in this regard a Byzantine innovation, or that 
there is an evolution which relates specifically to the general structure of the 
transfer of ownership by traditio. It is moreover worth noting that Nebrera is not 
alone in her general standpoint, since other scholars have also approached the 
references to the voluntas domini at the delivery by a non-owner as a typically 
post-classical or Byzantine element, despite the enormous evidence in classical 
sources regarding this point. Such notions, however, are only rooted on general 
preconceptions regarding the character of Roman and Byzantine law while 
disregarding the sources. 
 The fact that there is no innovation concerning the need and significance of 
the voluntas domini as ground for the potestas alienandi can be seen from the 
analysis of a scholion dealing with D. 6,2,14348, extensively analysed by Miquel 
and Nebrera349. It consists of an old scholion, which Zachariae considered to be 
by Stephanus350, an opinion which has been reproduced by Miquel and Nebrera 
despite the fact that the authorship of Stephanus was not accepted in the critical 
edition of Scheltema, Van der Wal and Holwerda. When discussing the outcome 
of this case, the scholiast would observe that ownership is not transferred 
(εੁκότωȢ ο੝ μετηνȑȤșη δεσποτεία) because the delivery was not performed 
according to the owner’s authorization (ਲ τραδιτίων παρὰ γνώμην α੝τοῦ 
ਥγȑνετο), quoting as the legal basis of his decision Inst. 2,1 (μαșઅν ਥν τ૶ α࢝ τιτ 
τોȢ Ǻ࢝ τ૵ν ੉νστιτ.) – certainly referring to Inst. 2,1,42-43 – where, in the words 
of this author, it is pointed out that the traditio transfers ownership to the acquirer 
over the delivered object as long as it is done with the owner’s intent (ਲ 
τραδιτίων ਥπ੿ τઁν ȜαμȕȐνοντα μεταĳȑρει τ੽ν τοῦ τραδιτευομȑνου πρȐγματοȢ 
δεσποτείαν ੖τε κατὰ γνώμην γίνεται τοῦ δεσπότου). This analysis offers 
interesting features, such as the suppression of the distinction between having 
something in bonis or ex iure Quiritium highlighted by Miquel and Nebrera, which 
leads to a rather odd situation when determining whether ownership was 
transferred or not. It is also curious that the scholiast mentions that the sale is 
valid because it was concluded according to the owner’s intent (਱ πρ઼σιȢ κατὰ 
γνώμην δεσπότου τ੽ν ਕρȤ੽ν γενομȑνη ਩ρρωται), which is certainly not a very 
classical remark considering that in Roman law it was normally irrelevant for the 
                                                 
347  Nebrera, Ἡ τραδιτίων (1989), p. 109 ff.; 159-163; 171-173; 341-345. 
348  BS 902/30-35 (Sch. ad Bas. 15,2,14,2): ȉουτȑστι δίδοται α੝τ૶ κα੿ νεμȑν૳ παραγραĳ੽ 
ਥκπεσόντι τોȢ νομોȢ ȆουȕȜικιανȒ Ǽੁ γὰρ κα੿ ਲ πρ઼σιȢ κατὰ γνώμην δεσπότου τ੽ν ਕρȤ੽ν 
γενομȑνη ਩ρρωται ੔ȜωȢ ੖τι ਲ τραδιτίων παρὰ γνώμην α੝τοῦ ਥγȑνετο εੁκότωȢ ο੝ 
μετηνȑȤșη δεσποτεία ȅੁδαȢ γὰρ μαșઅν ਥν τ૶ α࢝ τιτ τોȢ Ǻ࢝ τ૵ν ੉νστιτ ੔τι τότε ਲ 
τραδιτίων ਥπ੿ τઁν ȜαμȕȐνοντα μεταĳȑρει τ੽ν τοῦ τραδιτευομȑνου πρȐγματοȢ δεσποτείαν 
੖τε κατὰ γνώμην γίνεται τοῦ δεσπότου 
349  Miquel, Exceptio rei voluntate (1988), p. 686-687; Nebrera, Ἡ τραδιτίων (1989), p. 151 ff.; 
Miquel, Traditio rei alienae (1993), p. 278-280. 
350  Zachariae, Supplementum Basilicorum (1846), p. 48. 
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A contrast can be drawn at this point if one compares the Institutes of Gaius with 
those of Justinian: while both Gaius and Justinian omit any reference to a 
particular voluntas when drawing the general requirements to transfer ownership 
in Gai 2,20 and Inst. 2,1,40-41 respectively, Justinian introduces in Inst. 2,1,42-
48 the text of the Res cottidianae found in D. 41,1,9,3-8, thereby bestowing great 
attention on the voluntas domini. It is therefore no wonder that Byzantine legal 
scholarship would grant this element a particular significance when discussing the 
general requirements to transfer ownership343. For instance, already Theophilus 
would not include the iusta causa traditionis as a requirement for the transfer of 
ownership, declaring more generally that the delivery must be made with the 
intention to transfer ownership344. Miquel has shown that subsequent scholars 
would offer progressively abstract formulations, until eventually late Byzantine 
jurists presented a systematization of the transfer of ownership by delivery which 
matches many of the features of Savigny’s dinglicher Vertrag345.  
 The evolution of the voluntas domini in Byzantine legal scholarship is without 
any doubt fascinating from the point of view of legal systematization, since it 
shows that the voluntas domini, which in classical Roman law fulfiled a relevant 
role only in particular cases, was gradually approached as a central requirement 
for the transfer of ownership and eventually absorbed the need for a iusta causa 
traditionis. However, such an evolution seems to be of little moment for the 
practical outcome of numerous cases traditionally solved through the reference to 
the voluntas domini. Already in classical law jurists resorted to this element to 
resolve various problems, and the fact that this voluntas was listed by Byzantine 
scholars among the basic requirements to transfer ownership brought almost no 
change to their analysis, which is particularly the case regarding the situations 
involving the transfer of ownership by a non-owner voluntate domini346. It is 
accordingly difficult to agree with Nebrera, who claims that the need for a 
voluntas domini as a basis for the potestas alienandi would be part of the gradual 
abstraction of the transfer of ownership by traditio in Byzantine scholarship, 
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considered to be performed by the owner himself for systematic purposes, as will be shown 
in Chapter 6, Section 4. 
 
granting more importance to the intent at the delivery347. The fact is that 
numerous references to this voluntas can be found in classical jurisprudence, and 
therefore it is not possible to see in this regard a Byzantine innovation, or that 
there is an evolution which relates specifically to the general structure of the 
transfer of ownership by traditio. It is moreover worth noting that Nebrera is not 
alone in her general standpoint, since other scholars have also approached the 
references to the voluntas domini at the delivery by a non-owner as a typically 
post-classical or Byzantine element, despite the enormous evidence in classical 
sources regarding this point. Such notions, however, are only rooted on general 
preconceptions regarding the character of Roman and Byzantine law while 
disregarding the sources. 
 The fact that there is no innovation concerning the need and significance of 
the voluntas domini as ground for the potestas alienandi can be seen from the 
analysis of a scholion dealing with D. 6,2,14348, extensively analysed by Miquel 
and Nebrera349. It consists of an old scholion, which Zachariae considered to be 
by Stephanus350, an opinion which has been reproduced by Miquel and Nebrera 
despite the fact that the authorship of Stephanus was not accepted in the critical 
edition of Scheltema, Van der Wal and Holwerda. When discussing the outcome 
of this case, the scholiast would observe that ownership is not transferred 
(εੁκότωȢ ο੝ μετηνȑȤșη δεσποτεία) because the delivery was not performed 
according to the owner’s authorization (ਲ τραδιτίων παρὰ γνώμην α੝τοῦ 
ਥγȑνετο), quoting as the legal basis of his decision Inst. 2,1 (μαșઅν ਥν τ૶ α࢝ τιτ 
τોȢ Ǻ࢝ τ૵ν ੉νστιτ.) – certainly referring to Inst. 2,1,42-43 – where, in the words 
of this author, it is pointed out that the traditio transfers ownership to the acquirer 
over the delivered object as long as it is done with the owner’s intent (ਲ 
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δεσποτείαν ੖τε κατὰ γνώμην γίνεται τοῦ δεσπότου). This analysis offers 
interesting features, such as the suppression of the distinction between having 
something in bonis or ex iure Quiritium highlighted by Miquel and Nebrera, which 
leads to a rather odd situation when determining whether ownership was 
transferred or not. It is also curious that the scholiast mentions that the sale is 
valid because it was concluded according to the owner’s intent (਱ πρ઼σιȢ κατὰ 
γνώμην δεσπότου τ੽ν ਕρȤ੽ν γενομȑνη ਩ρρωται), which is certainly not a very 
classical remark considering that in Roman law it was normally irrelevant for the 
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350  Zachariae, Supplementum Basilicorum (1846), p. 48. 
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validity of the sale whether the owner authorized it or not. From the perspective 
of the legal sources it is moreover remarkable that an indication is made to a 
particular legal provision – Inst. 2,1,42-43 – as the reference point regarding the 
need for a voluntas domini when the delivery was performed by a non-owner. 
Apart from such peculiarities, the decision introduces no innovation in 
comparison to classical jurisprudence, since the significance granted to the 
voluntas domini experiences practically no change. The fact that the owner’s intent 
at the delivery played moreover for Byzantine jurists a central role in the 
systematization of the requirements to transfer ownership did not bring along any 
changes in the particular outcome which traditionally followed from the 
application of this notion: both classical Roman law and Byzantine law would 
resort to the voluntas domini at the delivery to determine the outcome of 
particular cases. Accordingly, there is no reason why compilers should have felt 
the need to modify classical texts in order to grant the voluntas domini an even 
more significant practical role.  
 Other texts show that there is no real correlation between the gradual changes 
experienced by the structure of traditio and the voluntas domini as ground for the 
potestas alienandi. For instance, Byzantine jurists would grant this voluntas a more 
restricted role regarding the error in dominio, as will be seen in the following 
section. Accordingly, the evolution on this point is opposite to what one should 
expect according to the theories of Nebrera351. 
 The study of Roman sources conducted so far shows that there is no obstacle 
to acknowledge that already in classical law the voluntas at the delivery 
occasionally played a relevant role to determine whether ownership was 
transferred or not. Moreover, the systematic changes which affected the traditio in 
the Corpus Iuris did not introduce far-reaching consequences for the practical 
outcome of cases where the voluntas was applied, at least concerning the cases 
where the potestas alienandi stems from the owner’s consent. In other words, 
while the general understanding or systematization of the requirements to transfer 
ownership experienced some changes in classical Roman law, the practical role of 
the voluntas at the delivery seems to have undergone little changes, the most 
relevant of which concerns the traditio ficta. The fact that Nebrera claims that a 
fundamental change took place between Roman law and Byzantine law can only 
be explained because her approach to classical Roman law is rooted in the 
theories of Sansón, which lay more emphasis on the fact that the non-owner acts 
nomine alieno or nomine proprio. If one acknowledges instead that the voluntas 
domini was already in classical law the main requirement to determine the potestas 
alienandi by an authorized non-owner, it becomes evident that the basic approach 
to this problem is identical in Roman and Byzantine law. All of this enables an 
approach to the sources free of dogmatic prejudices, since it cannot be argued 
                                                 
351  Regarding the error in domino in Byzantine scholarship see Nebrera, Ἡ τραδιτίων (1989), 
p. 253-259, who fails to prove what the essential difference would be regarding classical 
Roman law when analysing D. 17,1,49. 
 
that classical law had a strictly causal system of delivery, and that accordingly 
every form of intent or agreement should be seen as a postclassical innovation. 
The voluntas domini in the context of the potestas alienandi can therefore be 
considered a relevant element for the transfer of ownership in both classical and 
Justinianic law, remaining largely unaffected by the broader changes which took 
place in the context of the structure and requirements of the traditio such as the 
relevance of the iusta causa traditionis. This also implies that scholars should not 
strive to frame the traditio voluntate domini performed by a non-owner within a 
specific ‘causal’ or ‘abstract’ structure of delivery, especially since these terms are 
rather inadequate to describe Roman sources. 
 
b. Error in dominio and voluntas domini. 
 
The fact that the voluntas domini at the delivery should be approached 
independently from the general problem of the iusta causa traditionis and the 
structure of the transfer of ownership is particularly meaningful for the study of 
the so-called error in dominio, which takes place when someone mistakenly 
delivers an object of his own thinking it belongs to someone else or vice versa. 
The sources appear to offer contradicting evidence regarding the solution of this 
problem, since some texts deny that ownership may be transferred in such 
circumstances while others allow it. The analysis of this problem has traditionally 
been approached through the controversy regarding the iusta causa traditionis: on 
the one hand, authors such as Voci considered that the fact that ownership could 
not be transferred if there was a mistake at the delivery would prove the 
significance of the agreement at the delivery, thus confirming his abstract 
approach to the transfer of ownership; on the other hand, scholars favouring a 
causal understanding of the traditio such as Reggi considered that the truly 
classical solution would be to allow the transfer of ownership despite the 
existence of an error at the delivery352. According to the latter view, the texts 
which denied the transfer of ownership because of the lack of voluntas at the 
delivery would be of postclassical origin, reflecting therefore the abstract structure 
of the delivery in this period. Since most scholars over the last decades subscribed 
to an eminently causal model of delivery, the dominant view was that classical 
Roman law did not grant any particular relevance to the error in dominio. The 
decisive rule in this point would instead be “plus est in re quam in existimatione 
mentis”, which would determine that the subjective representation of the tradens 
would play no role in the transfer of ownership353. 
 Since the problem of the iusta causa traditionis has traditionally played a key 
role in the discussion of the error in dominio, some authors have provided another 
insight by avoiding discussing this problem as a mere appendix of the discussion 
                                                 
352  Reggi, Error in dominio (1952), p. 88-114. 
353  Lokin, Traditio (1971), p. 128; Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 649-650. 
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validity of the sale whether the owner authorized it or not. From the perspective 
of the legal sources it is moreover remarkable that an indication is made to a 
particular legal provision – Inst. 2,1,42-43 – as the reference point regarding the 
need for a voluntas domini when the delivery was performed by a non-owner. 
Apart from such peculiarities, the decision introduces no innovation in 
comparison to classical jurisprudence, since the significance granted to the 
voluntas domini experiences practically no change. The fact that the owner’s intent 
at the delivery played moreover for Byzantine jurists a central role in the 
systematization of the requirements to transfer ownership did not bring along any 
changes in the particular outcome which traditionally followed from the 
application of this notion: both classical Roman law and Byzantine law would 
resort to the voluntas domini at the delivery to determine the outcome of 
particular cases. Accordingly, there is no reason why compilers should have felt 
the need to modify classical texts in order to grant the voluntas domini an even 
more significant practical role.  
 Other texts show that there is no real correlation between the gradual changes 
experienced by the structure of traditio and the voluntas domini as ground for the 
potestas alienandi. For instance, Byzantine jurists would grant this voluntas a more 
restricted role regarding the error in dominio, as will be seen in the following 
section. Accordingly, the evolution on this point is opposite to what one should 
expect according to the theories of Nebrera351. 
 The study of Roman sources conducted so far shows that there is no obstacle 
to acknowledge that already in classical law the voluntas at the delivery 
occasionally played a relevant role to determine whether ownership was 
transferred or not. Moreover, the systematic changes which affected the traditio in 
the Corpus Iuris did not introduce far-reaching consequences for the practical 
outcome of cases where the voluntas was applied, at least concerning the cases 
where the potestas alienandi stems from the owner’s consent. In other words, 
while the general understanding or systematization of the requirements to transfer 
ownership experienced some changes in classical Roman law, the practical role of 
the voluntas at the delivery seems to have undergone little changes, the most 
relevant of which concerns the traditio ficta. The fact that Nebrera claims that a 
fundamental change took place between Roman law and Byzantine law can only 
be explained because her approach to classical Roman law is rooted in the 
theories of Sansón, which lay more emphasis on the fact that the non-owner acts 
nomine alieno or nomine proprio. If one acknowledges instead that the voluntas 
domini was already in classical law the main requirement to determine the potestas 
alienandi by an authorized non-owner, it becomes evident that the basic approach 
to this problem is identical in Roman and Byzantine law. All of this enables an 
approach to the sources free of dogmatic prejudices, since it cannot be argued 
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that classical law had a strictly causal system of delivery, and that accordingly 
every form of intent or agreement should be seen as a postclassical innovation. 
The voluntas domini in the context of the potestas alienandi can therefore be 
considered a relevant element for the transfer of ownership in both classical and 
Justinianic law, remaining largely unaffected by the broader changes which took 
place in the context of the structure and requirements of the traditio such as the 
relevance of the iusta causa traditionis. This also implies that scholars should not 
strive to frame the traditio voluntate domini performed by a non-owner within a 
specific ‘causal’ or ‘abstract’ structure of delivery, especially since these terms are 
rather inadequate to describe Roman sources. 
 
b. Error in dominio and voluntas domini. 
 
The fact that the voluntas domini at the delivery should be approached 
independently from the general problem of the iusta causa traditionis and the 
structure of the transfer of ownership is particularly meaningful for the study of 
the so-called error in dominio, which takes place when someone mistakenly 
delivers an object of his own thinking it belongs to someone else or vice versa. 
The sources appear to offer contradicting evidence regarding the solution of this 
problem, since some texts deny that ownership may be transferred in such 
circumstances while others allow it. The analysis of this problem has traditionally 
been approached through the controversy regarding the iusta causa traditionis: on 
the one hand, authors such as Voci considered that the fact that ownership could 
not be transferred if there was a mistake at the delivery would prove the 
significance of the agreement at the delivery, thus confirming his abstract 
approach to the transfer of ownership; on the other hand, scholars favouring a 
causal understanding of the traditio such as Reggi considered that the truly 
classical solution would be to allow the transfer of ownership despite the 
existence of an error at the delivery352. According to the latter view, the texts 
which denied the transfer of ownership because of the lack of voluntas at the 
delivery would be of postclassical origin, reflecting therefore the abstract structure 
of the delivery in this period. Since most scholars over the last decades subscribed 
to an eminently causal model of delivery, the dominant view was that classical 
Roman law did not grant any particular relevance to the error in dominio. The 
decisive rule in this point would instead be “plus est in re quam in existimatione 
mentis”, which would determine that the subjective representation of the tradens 
would play no role in the transfer of ownership353. 
 Since the problem of the iusta causa traditionis has traditionally played a key 
role in the discussion of the error in dominio, some authors have provided another 
insight by avoiding discussing this problem as a mere appendix of the discussion 
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regarding the structure of the transfer of ownership by traditio. Burdese proposed 
to set the analysis of the problem outside the controversy of whether the traditio 
was originally causal or abstract354, and in this more impartial setting concluded 
that the error in dominio was in fact relevant for the transfer of ownership. 
However, despite his original distance to the causal/abstract dilemma, he could 
not avoid drawing some general conclusions regarding the structure of the traditio 
and the role of the animus transferendi et acquirendi dominii355. Similarly, Harke 
would consider in principle that acknowledging the relevance of the error in 
dominio would imply a certain animus at the delivery which would contradict the 
structure of traditio as presented in Gai 2,20356, but he does not let this objection 
take over most of his analysis of the individual texts, and instead bypasses this 
problem by claiming that this error would not be referred to the intent at the 
delivery as such357. There is however no need for such considerations when 
approaching the error in dominio, since the voluntas domini did play a relevant role 
already in classical jurisprudence, being an element in constant development in 
the hands of jurists. This is why Lovato, who approaches the error in dominio in 
the larger context of the controversies regarding the voluntas at the delivery, has 
no general systematic or dogmatic remark against the relevance of the owner’s 
intent at the delivery concerning the error in dominio358. The following paragraphs 
will likewise approach the problem of the error in dominio within the general 
framework of the voluntas domini as shown in the present chapter. 
 To determine the significance of the error in dominio according to classical 
Roman law, it is first of all necessary to determine what texts actually refer to this 
problem. This point is of the utmost relevance, since scholars who claim that the 
error in dominio had no consequence for the transfer of ownership usually rely 
mostly on texts which are considered by Burdese and Harke to be unrelated to 
this subject359. The first of them is D. 1,19,1,1, already studied above, where 
Ulpian declares that the delivery of a res Caesaris performed “quasi rem propriam” 
by his procurator does not transfer ownership360. According to some scholars, this 
would show that the subjective representation of the transferor cannot affect the 
consequences that the delivery would normally have, i.e. the fact that the 
procurator believed to be owner will not suffice to transfer ownership361. Similar 
arguments are used when discussing another text by Ulpian: 
                                                 
354  Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 23-24. 
355  Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 45-47. 
356  Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 130. 
357  Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 132-133, 136, 150-151. 
358  Lovato, Traditio e conventio (2001), p. 129-133. 
359  Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 24-27; Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 131-132. 
360  D. 1,19,1,1: “Si rem Caesaris procurator eius quasi rem propriam tradat, non puto eum 
dominium transferre: tunc enim transfert, cum negotium Caesaris gerens consensu ipsius 
tradit. Denique si venditionis vel donationis vel transactionis causa quid agat, nihil agit: non 
enim alienare ei rem Caesaris, sed diligenter gerere commissum est”. 
361  Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 650. 
 
D. 27,10,10,1 (Ulp. 16 ed.): Curator furiosi rem quidem suam quasi 
furiosi tradere poterit et dominium transferre: rem vero furiosi si 
quasi suam tradat, dicendum, ut non transferat dominium, quia non 
furiosi negotium gerens tradidit362. 
 
In this case, it is not a procurator, but instead a curator furiosi who delivers a thing 
belonging to the lunatic “as if it were his own” (quasi suam) and does not succeed 
to transfer ownership, which would confirm that the subjective belief of the 
transferor is of no significance363. Such an interpretation has however been 
contested because neither of these texts actually refers to a case where the 
transferor commits an error regarding the ownership of the delivered object. In 
fact, not only is there no indication of the existence of such a mistake, but both 
texts even explicitly indicate that ownership is not transferred because the 
conduct of the transferor does not constitute a loyal administration. In the case of 
D. 1,19,1,1, this is shown by the words “diligenter gerere commissum est”364, an idea 
which is conveyed in equivalent terms in D. 27,10,10,1, where it is pointed out 
that ownership was not transferred “quia non furiosi negotium gerens tradidit”365. 
Accordingly, the true problem in these texts is that the non-owner exceeds the 
limits of his potestas alienandi through his disloyal administration366. In such a 
context, the fact that the transferor delivers the thing “quasi suam” would 
probably indicate that he sought to obtain for himself whatever profit derived 
from such an act – e.g. to keep the price obtained in a sale – and not that he 
mistook an object of the owner as his own. This would also explain why in 
D. 27,10,10,1 the delivery by the curator furiosi of a thing of his own “quasi furiosi” 
would transfer ownership, since he would knowingly transfer ownership over an 
object of his own in order to take care of the interests of the person under his 
custody. 
 Having discarded these texts as irrelevant for the error in dominio, we may 
focus on those which are explicitly referred to this subject, among which a 
fragment of Ulpian’s Disputationes is especially clear: 
 
D. 41,1,35 (Ulp. 7 disputationum): Si procurator meus vel tutor 
pupilli rem suam quasi meam vel pupilli alii tradiderint, non recessit 
                                                 
362  D. 27,10,10,1: “The curator of a lunatic could indeed convey his own property as if it 
belonged to the lunatic and so transfer ownership, but if he conveys the lunatic’s property 
as if it were his own, it must be said that this does not transfer ownership because he did 
not convey it while administering the lunatic’s affairs” (transl. Watson). 
363  Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 650. 
364  See Chapter 2, Section 4 above. 
365  See Chapter 3, Section 2 below. 
366  Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 24-27; Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 131-132. 
According to these authors, neither would there be an error regarding the ownership of 
the delivered goods in D. 27,9,5,2 (Ulp. 35 ed.). 
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regarding the structure of the transfer of ownership by traditio. Burdese proposed 
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ab eis dominium et nulla est alienatio, quia nemo errans rem suam 
amittit367. 
 
The fragment describes the delivery performed by a non-owner – procurator or 
tutor in this case – over a thing of his own as if it belonged to the owner, to 
which Ulpian offers a straightforward solution by claiming that ownership will 
not be transferred, because no one can lose his property through error (quia nemo 
errans rem suam amittit). This reasoning was seen by Reggi as a clear example of 
the abstract model of delivery of Justinianic law, regarding the text to be 
interpolated as a whole368. It was also argued that this solution would be 
inaccurate and could accordingly not agree with classical legal thought, since 
ownership could for instance be transferred in the case of the solutio indebiti. 
Burdese did not consider any of these arguments strong enough to assume a 
radical modification of the text by the compilers, especially criticising that Reggi 
would assume an interpolation based exclusively on dogmatic considerations. 
Lovato369 has moreover highlighted that it seems particularly unlikely that the 
compilers would have modified the text in order to grant greater significance to 
the error in dominio, considering that Byzantine scholars offered a restricted 
interpretation of the cases in which this error would be relevant, as attested by 
some old scholia discussing this subject370. 
 The general rule “nemo errans rem suam amittit” may certainly be inadequate to 
address other problems regarding the transfer of ownership, but its inaccuracy is 
compellingly explained by Lovato within the context of Ulpian’s Disputationes, 
which contain mainly excerpts of the teaching conducted by Ulpian to public 
audiences in an oral way371. With this in mind, Lovato shows that Ulpian would 
often resort to broad statements for argumentative and rhetoric purposes, being 
better understood in the oral context in which they were issued, where the 
speaker would assume some specific knowledge in the audience that would allow 
a proper understanding of a specific assertion372. In the case of the nemo errans 
rule, this implies that Ulpian did not attempt to present a universal truth for legal 
thinking, but simply to formulate in a convincing and succinct way the general 
implications of an error at the time of the delivery373. 
                                                 
367  D. 41,1,35: “If a procurator or a tutor should deliver his own thing to someone, thinking it 
to be mine or the property of his pupillus, he does not lose ownership in it, and the 
alienation is null, since no one can lose his property through error” (transl. Watson). 
368  Reggi, Error in dominio (1952), p. 114. 
369  Lovato, Traditio e conventio (2001), p. 132; Lovato, Disputationes (2003), p. 134. 
370  BS 2249/10 – 2250/13 (Sch. ad Bas. 38,9,5). 
371  Lovato, Disputationes (2003), p. 3-15. 
372  Lovato, Disputationes (2003), p. 101 ff. 
373  Lovato, Traditio e conventio (2001), p. 133; Lovato, Disputationes (2003), p. 135. 
 
 Lovato also highlights that the decision given in D. 41,1,35 fits with other 
solutions given by Ulpian within book seven of his Disputationes374, where the 
intent at the delivery plays a fundamental role to determine the transfer of 
ownership375. There is in fact nothing alien to classical law about attending to the 
owner’s intent at the delivery, and in fact in this case the traditio did not properly 
take place voluntate domini. Harke considers the phrase “nemo errans rem suam 
amittit” related to the rule “errantis nulla voluntas est”, since the person who 
performs a delivery under mistake does not validly consent376. This link, 
however, does not mean that the error of the tradens refers to the existence of an 
authorization, as Harke claims in order to avoid a contradiction with the classical 
structure of the traditio as presented in Gai 2,20377. As pointed out above, already 
in classical jurisprudence the voluntas domini at the delivery was decisive for the 
transfer of ownership in several circumstances. 
 Another text where the error in dominio prevents the transfer of ownership is 
the following: 
 
D. 18,1,15,2 (Paul 5 Sab.): Si rem meam mihi ignoranti vendideris 
et iussu meo alii tradideris, non putat Pomponius dominium meum 
transire, quoniam non hoc mihi propositum fuit, sed quasi tuum 
dominium ad eum transire: et ideo etiam si donaturus mihi rem 
meam iussu meo alii tradas, idem dicendum erit378. 
 
In this text, a person buys an object which belongs to himself without knowing 
it, and instead of requesting the seller to deliver him the object, gives him a 
iussum to deliver it to another person. The text sets therefore the opposite case to 
that of D. 41,1,35, since in D. 18,1,15,2 we find a non-owner who is instructed 
to transfer ownership by the true owner who erroneously considered the former 
to be owner, while in D. 41,1,35 the owner delivers an object of his own on the 
assumption that it belongs to another person. According to Paul, Pomponius 
considered that the reason behind the impossibility to transfer ownership is that it 
was not the intention (propositum) of the person giving the iussum that his own 
property should be transferred, but someone else’s. It should moreover be borne 
in mind that this text does not refer to a normal case of traditio by a non-owner, 
                                                 
374  For the controversy regarding the authorship of this work see Lovato, Disputationes (2003), 
p. 16-21. 
375  Lovato, Traditio e conventio (2001), p. 129-130. 
376  See on this point Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 135-136. 
377  Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 136. 
378  D. 18,1,15,2: “Pomponius says that if you sell me what, in fact, belongs to me although I 
do not know it and, at my behest, deliver it to someone else, my ownership does not pass 
to him, because my intention was that not my ownership but yours should be transferred 
to him. It follows that the same holds good if, intending a gift to me of what is really mine, 
you, on my instructions, deliver the thing to someone else” (transl. Watson, modified). See 
on the translation of this text van der Ven, D. 18,1,15,2 (1998), p. 91-99. 
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ab eis dominium et nulla est alienatio, quia nemo errans rem suam 
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but to a delegatio tradendi379, since the person performing the delivery follows the 
iussum of another person to transfer an object allegedly belonging to him to a 
third person380.  
 Reggi saw in the existence of a delegatio an indication that the decision in 
classical Roman law should have been different381, since Pomponius followed the 
theory of Celsus, according to whom in the case of the delegation ownership 
would pass to the person giving the iussum at least for a moment382. This would 
in turn imply that the error of the person carrying out the delivery would not be 
relevant, and accordingly the original solution of Pomponius would have been to 
allow the transfer of ownership. In the opinion of some scholars383, the 
modification of the classical solution would be due to the Justinianic conception 
of traditio, which abandoned the strict causal system of delivery of classical 
Roman law. 
 Once again, the objections of Reggi are driven almost exclusively by 
dogmatic preconceptions concerning the structure of the transfer of ownership 
by delivery. The claims regarding the significance of the opinions of Pomponius 
on delegatio are moreover blown out of proportion. Already Betti and Burdese 
claimed that such ideas had a limited scope of application, not being applicable to 
this particular case384. This opinion is moreover confirmed by the study of Alonso 
on the delegatio which stresses that only in particular circumstances would jurists 
such as Celsus, Pomponius and Ulpian resort to the idea that the delegatio 
involved a double transfer of ownership385, which is why it is not possible to 
claim that Pomponius would understand that every delegatio involved that 
ownership should first pass to the person granting the iussum. Accordingly, 
Alonso considers that the solution given in D. 18,1,15,2 agrees perfectly with the 
classical system of delegation, where ownership is transferred directly from the 
person who received the iussum to the transferee. There is accordingly nothing 
alien to classical law in the text, since it does not only reflect the normal 
attribution of property in the context of the delegatio, but it also shows that the 
intent of the owner is vital for the transfer of ownership to take place. In fact, in 
this particular case ownership is not transferred because it was not the owner’s 
intention that his own property should be delivered (quoniam non hoc mihi 
propositum fuit). This in turn shows that the difference in the facts between 
                                                 
379  Alonso, Delegación (2001) I.1, p. 222; Zandrino, Delegatio (2010), p. 59 n. 128. 
380  On the distinction between the traditio by a non-owner and the delegatio tradendi, see 
Chapter 1, Section 4(c) above.  
381  Reggi, Error in dominio (1952), p. 111-113. 
382  The famous opinion of Celsus in this regard is reproduced in D. 24,1,3,12 (Ulp. 32 Sab.), 
and that of Pomponius in D. 47,2,44pr (Pomp. 19 Sab.). Scholars consider that Pomponius 
follows Celsus on this point: Alonso, Delegación (2001) I.1, p. 222; Zandrino, Delegatio 
(2014) II, p. 201 n. 218 (with further bibliographical references). 
383  Lange, Das kausale Element (1930), p. 60-61; Reggi, Error in dominio (1952), p. 112-113. 
384  Betti, La attuazione (1933), p. 232; Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 30. 
385  See Alonso, Delegación (2001) I.1, p. 222-223 concerning the opinion of Pomponius in 
D. 47,2,44pr. 
 
D. 41,1,35, and D. 18,1,15,2 is not decisive to the outcome of the case386, since 
the outcome of the delivery will be the same when the owner mistakenly delivers 
his own property on the idea that it belonged to someone else (D. 41,1,35) and 
when the owner orders the delivery of something which he considers to be 
someone else’s while in fact belonging to him (D. 18,1,15,2). In both cases, the 
owner will be mistaken regarding the property of the delivered goods, which is 
why ownership cannot be transferred387. 
 The relevance of the voluntas domini at the delivery is attested by yet another 
text: 
 
D. 17,1,49 (Marcell. 6 dig.): Servum Titii emi ab alio bona fide et 
possideo: mandatu meo eum Titius vendidit, cum ignoraret suum 
esse, vel contra ego vendidi illius mandatu, cum forte is, cui heres 
exstiterit, eum emisset: de iure evictionis et de mandatu quaesitum 
est. Et puto Titium, quamvis quasi procurator vendidisset, 
obstrictum emptori neque, si rem tradidisset, vindicationem ei 
concedendam, et idcirco mandati eum non teneri, sed contra 
mandati agere posse, si quid eius interfuisset, quia forte venditurus 
non fuerit. Contra mandator, si rem ab eo vindicare velit, 
exceptione doli summovetur et adversus venditorem testatoris sui 
habet ex empto iure hereditario actionem388. 
 
In this text, Marcellus discusses the significance of the error in dominio regarding 
two cases. In the first case, someone (ego) purchases a slave that did not belong to 
the seller, but to Titius. The purchaser (ego) then gives the slave to Titius so that 
he will deliver him through traditio to a third person as a procurator, which he 
proceeds to do while being unaware of the fact that he (Titius) was in fact the 
owner of the slave. The second case presents a reversed problem, where someone 
(ego) purchases a slave which did not belong to the seller, nor to Titius, but in the 
meantime the real owner dies leaving Titius as his heir, who was not involved in 
this sale. Without being aware of this circumstance, Titius gives a mandate to the 
purchaser and putative owner (ego) to sell the object. This second case seems 
                                                 
386  Alonso, Delegación (2001) I.1, p. 222 n. 3. 
387  Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 142-143. 
388  D. 17,1,49: “I have in good faith bought Titius’ slave from someone else and possess him; 
Titius sold him on my mandate, not knowing him to be his own; or, on the contrary, I 
sold him on [Titius’] mandate and by chance he to whom [Titius] becomes heir had 
bought him. What is the position regarding the right of eviction and the mandate? My 
view is that Titius, although he sold [the slave] as if he were a procurator, is under an 
obligation to the buyer and that if he had handed the property over, he should not be 
allowed a vindicatio. Accordingly, he is not liable on mandate, but, on the other hand, he 
can raise an action on mandate if he should have had an interest, perhaps because he was 
not going to sell [the slave]. The mandatory, on the other hand, if he wishes to claim the 
property from him, is met by a defence of fraud, but he has by right of inheritance the 
testator’s action on sale against the seller” (transl. Watson, modified). 
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but to a delegatio tradendi379, since the person performing the delivery follows the 
iussum of another person to transfer an object allegedly belonging to him to a 
third person380.  
 Reggi saw in the existence of a delegatio an indication that the decision in 
classical Roman law should have been different381, since Pomponius followed the 
theory of Celsus, according to whom in the case of the delegation ownership 
would pass to the person giving the iussum at least for a moment382. This would 
in turn imply that the error of the person carrying out the delivery would not be 
relevant, and accordingly the original solution of Pomponius would have been to 
allow the transfer of ownership. In the opinion of some scholars383, the 
modification of the classical solution would be due to the Justinianic conception 
of traditio, which abandoned the strict causal system of delivery of classical 
Roman law. 
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claimed that such ideas had a limited scope of application, not being applicable to 
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propositum fuit). This in turn shows that the difference in the facts between 
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384  Betti, La attuazione (1933), p. 232; Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 30. 
385  See Alonso, Delegación (2001) I.1, p. 222-223 concerning the opinion of Pomponius in 
D. 47,2,44pr. 
 
D. 41,1,35, and D. 18,1,15,2 is not decisive to the outcome of the case386, since 
the outcome of the delivery will be the same when the owner mistakenly delivers 
his own property on the idea that it belonged to someone else (D. 41,1,35) and 
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concedendam, et idcirco mandati eum non teneri, sed contra 
mandati agere posse, si quid eius interfuisset, quia forte venditurus 
non fuerit. Contra mandator, si rem ab eo vindicare velit, 
exceptione doli summovetur et adversus venditorem testatoris sui 
habet ex empto iure hereditario actionem388. 
 
In this text, Marcellus discusses the significance of the error in dominio regarding 
two cases. In the first case, someone (ego) purchases a slave that did not belong to 
the seller, but to Titius. The purchaser (ego) then gives the slave to Titius so that 
he will deliver him through traditio to a third person as a procurator, which he 
proceeds to do while being unaware of the fact that he (Titius) was in fact the 
owner of the slave. The second case presents a reversed problem, where someone 
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meantime the real owner dies leaving Titius as his heir, who was not involved in 
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rather odd, since one would normally not expect that someone who does not 
consider himself owner to order someone else to transfer ownership, which is 
why this part of the text has been frequent target of accusations of 
interpolation389. This should however be understood as a case of delegatio tradendi, 
where Titius would order the purchaser of the slave to deliver it to another 
person390. Accordingly, Marcellus would be dealing first with a case where the 
parties attempt to carry out a transfer of ownership by a non-owner voluntate 
domini, and secondly with a delegatio where ownership is supposed to be 
transferred by the owner himself. The fact that both cases would be dealt jointly 
shows that the rules concerning the error in dominio apply equally to them, as 
already claimed when discussing D. 18,1,15,2. 
 Marcellus announces that the text deals with the right of eviction and the 
mandate (de iure evictionis et de mandatu quaesitum est), discussing whether the true 
owner may recover the object delivered once he finds out the truth. Scholars 
argue in particular what defence is given against the owner in the first case, while 
in the second it is explicitly shown that the acquirer will have an exceptio doli. 
Such problems will be dealt with in further detail when discussing the praetorian 
corrections to the transfer of ownership by a non-owner391. For now it is enough 
to indicate that the peculiarity of this text lies in the fact that in both cases the 
owner draws a claim which is contradictory to his previous behaviour: in the first 
case in the context of the sale which he concluded – as Marcellus explicitly 
mentions – and in the second as the person who orders the delivery in the 
context of a delegatio. In none of these cases will ownership be transferred due to 
the lack of voluntas domini, but in each of them the rei vindicatio will meet a 
praetorian remedy based on the previous acts of the owner. Nonetheless, the 
owner will retain the possibility to seek responsibility from the person who 
ordered him the delivery – in the first case – or who performed the delivery on 
his instruction – in the second case. Therefore, this text confirms the relevance of 
the error in dominio, both in the context of a traditio which was supposed to be 
performed by a non-owner – just as in D. 41,1,35 – and when it was intended to 
be done by the true owner who follows the iussum of another individual – as 
happens in D. 18,1,15,2. 
 Having these three texts – D. 41,1,35, D. 18,1,15,2 and D. 17,1,49 – as a 
basic proof of the relevance of the error in dominio for the transfer of ownership, 
there are other fragments which deal with related problems, shedding further 
light on this issue. One group of texts refer to the problem of the freeman who 
thought to be a slave (liber homo bona fide serviens), where the problem of the error 
in dominio underlies several cases, since the putative slave  may  convey  things  of  
  
                                                 
389  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 71. 
390  That the existence of a delegatio is indicated by reference to the existence of a mandate is 
moreover nothing new. See on this point Zandrino, Delegatio (2010), p. 66, 110-166. 
391  Chapter 4, Section 5 below. 
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his own on the assumption that they belong to someone else. This is indeed the 
problem in the following text of Ulpian: 
 
D. 12,4,3,8 (Ulp. 26 ed.): Suptilius quoque illud tractat, an ille, qui 
se statuliberum putaverit, nec fecerit nummos accipientis, quoniam 
heredi dedit quasi ipsius heredis nummos daturus, non quasi suos, 
qui utique ipsius fuerunt, adquisiti scilicet post libertatem ei ex 
testamento competentem. Et puto, si hoc animo dedit, non fieri 
ipsius: nam et cum tibi nummos meos quasi tuos do, non facio tuos. 
Quid ergo, si hic non heredi, sed alii dedit, cui putabat se iussum? Si 
quidem peculiares dedit, nec fecit accipientis: si autem alius pro eo 
dedit aut ipse dedit iam liber factus, fient accipientis392. 
 
A slave is set free in his master’s will, but he believes he is only a statuliber and 
that accordingly he must pay the heir a certain amount of money in order to 
become free. Under these circumstances, the ignorant freedman would in fact be 
delivering coins belonging to himself. The fact that the slave acquired ownership 
over the coins after the death of the owner (adquisiti scilicet post libertatem ei ex 
testamento competentem) would show that they were part of the peculium which the 
slave used to administer, since manumitted slaves would normally gain ownership 
over their peculium393. Since the slave delivered his own coins, the text poses the 
question of the ownership over them. This fragment is to be found at the end of 
a large passage dealing with the condictio, which could make the reader wonder 
whether ownership was transferred, considering that the condictio would only take 
place when ownership was indeed transferred. The text, however, leaves no 
room for doubt, since it is clearly stated that ownership was not transferred (non 
fieri ipsius… non facio tuos), unlike any of the fragments preceding it.  
 Since ownership was not transferred, the question then is what exactly 
prevented the transfer of ownership. According to Reggi, since the putative slave 
thought he was paying the heir with money of the peculium, he could not have 
possibly had the intention of transferring ownership due to the fact that the heir 
would appear to be the actual owner of the coins delivered to him394. In other 
words, the putative slave would only seek to perform a physical delivery of 
                                                 
392  D. 12,4,3,8: “He also goes rather nicely into the question whether one who thinks he is a 
statuliber fails to pass title to coins which he pays the heir, given that he thinks they belong 
to the heir when they are really his own, acquired after his freedom became effective 
under the will. I think that if he pays with that intention, no property passes. What if he 
pays someone other than the heir, believing himself directed to do so? If the coins come 
from the peculium, no title passes to the recipient. However, if someone else pays on his 
behalf or he himself pays after becoming free, title will pass to the recipient” (transl. 
Watson, modified). 
393  Brinkhof, Peculium (1978), p. 169-172. Roman jurists did not accept that the payment 
made by the statuliber could be done with money not belonging to his peculium, as shown 
in D. 40,7,39,2 (Jav. 4 ex posterioribus Labeonis). 
394  Reggi, Error in dominio (1952), p. 106-108. 
 
objects which, in his view, belonged to the recipient. According to this view, 
Ulpian would only accept the transfer of ownership when the transferor did in 
fact seek to transfer ownership, as would happen when another one gave on his 
behalf (si autem alius pro eo dedit) or when the slave paid himself after being freed 
(ipse dedit iam liber factus). 
 Several objections can be made to Reggi’s view. It is in the first place not 
entirely clear that the statuliber who pays the heir is merely seen as performing a 
physical delivery. For instance, in D. 40,7,39,2395 Labeo and Trebatius are 
reported to claim that if a statuliber paid with money that the heir gave him for 
business “he would be deemed to be returning it rather than giving it” (transl. 
Watson) and therefore he would not become free. This would suggest that the 
statuliber would only become free when he could actually be seen as performing a 
‘dare’, even when he was not technically an owner. However, even if this was 
not the case, the key of the solution lies clearly in the intent of the 
owner/putative slave at the delivery, as shown by the words “si hoc animo dedit, 
non fieri ipsius”. This idea is moreover stressed by the general claim “nam et cum 
tibi nummos meos quasi tuos do, non facio tuos”, which Harke396 has rightly pointed 
out to refer generally to the error in dominio, and not to the particular case of the 
statuliber. The decision agrees with the general views reviewed so far, where the 
intention of the owner is decisive for the transfer of ownership. Since the owner 
was mistaken about the property of the delivered coins, he would not transfer 
ownership. There is moreover no need to refer this mistake to the underlying 
causa, as Harke points out in order to defend a strictly causal structure of 
traditio397: there is nothing new in demanding a particular animus by the transferor 
at the delivery. 
 The significance of the error in dominio in this case is also to be seen in the fact 
that the same solution is given if the putative slave delivered the object to a third 
party on the assumption that he was ordered to do so (alii dedit, cui putabat se 
iussum): according to Ulpian, if he delivered something belonging to his peculium 
he would not transfer ownership (Si quidem peculiares dedit, nec fecit accipientis). Just 
as in the payment to the heir, the putative slave would be delivering something 
of his own – having acquired ownership over the assets of his peculium – on the 
assumption that he was not the owner of it. Ulpian would then compare this 
situation with the delivery performed by the freedman who is aware of his 
condition or by someone on his behalf, where ownership would indeed be 
transferred: “si autem alius pro eo dedit aut ipse dedit iam liber factus, fient accipientis”. 
The insertion of this idea is certainly a bit odd, leading Burdese to regard it as an 
                                                 
395  D. 40,7,39,2 (Jav. 4 ex posterioribus Labeonis): “Si heres servo pecuniam ad negotiandum 
dedisset, statuliberum eam ipsam numerando liberari ex testamento non posse Labeo 
Trebatius responderunt, quia reddere eam magis quam dare videretur. Ego puto, si 
peculiares nummi fuerunt, ex testamento eum liberum futurum”. 
396  Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 138. 
397  Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 138. 
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addition by the compilers which would merely indicate cases where the tradens 
has the potestas alienandi398. While this final sentence certainly does not follow the 
flow of ideas of the text, there is nothing alien to classical law about comparing 
the validity of the delivery by the owner and an authorized non-owner, which is 
why one cannot assume that the text is interpolated simply because it does not 
meet the expectations of a modern reader. 
 A final argument in favour of the idea that D. 12,4,3,8 reflects the relevance 
of the error in dominio is the fact that the author of the text is Ulpian, who features 
in D. 41,1,35 enouncing the rule “nemo errans rem suam amittit”, which is in 
accordance with the general claim “cum tibi nummos meos quasi tuos do, non facio 
tuos” of D. 12,4,3,8. It is moreover worth noting that in the latter text Ulpian 
introduces the solution as a personal opinion (Et puto…), something which 
contributes to the understanding of the historical evolution of the error in dominio 
in Roman sources. Up to this point, among the jurists who consider that 
ownership will not pass when there is an error in dominio, the earliest is Marcellus 
(D. 17,1,49), active in the second half of the 2nd century AD399. Later we find the 
opinion of Paul (D. 18,1,15,2) and of Ulpian (D. 41,1,35 and D. 12,4,3,8). 
Considering that the voluntas domini at the traditio was an element in constant 
evolution in the hands of Roman jurisprudence, one may not assume that the 
error in dominio played an identical role for earlier jurists. 
 The fact that an evolution took place regarding the voluntas domini and the 
relevance of the error in dominio is readily noticeable when one examines the 
solutions given to similar cases by earlier jurists. As mentioned above, D. 12,4,3,8 
is preceded by a series of cases discussing the condictio, among which the texts in 
D. 12,4,3,5-7 deal as well with a delivery by a liber homo bona fide serviens who 
pays to the heir as a statuliber. The fact that these paragraphs deal with cases which 
are largely identical to that of D. 12,4,3,8 in the context of a condictio is by itself 
remarkable, since in the latter text Ulpian assumes that ownership was not 
transferred in the first place. Burdese attempted to avoid the contradiction by 
claiming that normally jurists would approach this problem in the context of the 
condictio because when the delivered object is money, as happens when the 
statuliber pays the heir, it would be common that the consumptio nummorum would 
force the original owner to claim his ownership back through a condictio400. A 
better explanation is however to be found in the fact that the different solutions 
correspond to the opinions of different authors, whose opinions are reproduced 
by Ulpian. In D. 12,4,3,5, Ulpian401 wonders whether a putative slave who paid 
                                                 
398  Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 35. 
399  Kunkel, Herkunft (1967), p. 213. 
400  Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 32-33. 
401  D. 12,4,3,5 (Ulp. 26 ed.): “Si liber homo, qui bona fide serviebat, mihi pecuniam dederit, 
ut eum manumittam, et fecero: postea liber probatus an mihi condicere possit, quaeritur. 
Et Iulianus libro undecimo digestorum scribit competere manumisso repetitionem. 
Neratius etiam libro membranarum refert paridem pantomimum a Domitia Neronis filia 
 
his master in order to become free could use the condictio against him once he 
found out that he was free from the start, quoting in this regard the opinion of 
Julian and Neratius, who were in favour of granting the condictio402. Celsus would 
apply the same decision to the payment by a statuliber in D. 12,4,3,6403, an 
opinion which this jurist would also apply in D. 12,4,3,7404 when the slave was 
only made unconditionally free through a codicil while the testament compelled 
him to pay a sum to the heir. After quoting and discussing these opinions, Ulpian 
introduces an original view in D. 12,4,3,8, since he does not approach the 
delivery by a putative statuliber in the context of the condictio, but rather within 
the framework of the transfer of ownership405. The facts are in fact identical to 
those upon which Celsus grants the condictio in D. 12,4,3,6, but in the meantime 
jurists have developed the implications of the voluntas domini at the delivery, 
which according to Ulpian would involve that the error in dominio prevents the 
transfer of ownership. The shift in the approach to this problem is undeniable, 
describing neatly the significance granted to the voluntas at the delivery when the 
owner is under error: while earlier jurists such as Neratius, Celsus and Julian were 
only willing to grant a condictio, the consolidation of the relevance of the error in 
dominio by the time of Ulpian would grant a completely different approach to 
these cases. Accordingly, one cannot approach Roman jurists as presenting a 
unique, coherent approach to the problem of the error in dominio, since the 
relevance of this element would evolve under the dynamic notion of the voluntas 
domini. It is only safe to claim that, by the 3rd century AD, jurists have derived 
from this voluntas that a mistaken owner would not transfer ownership. The idea 
of an evolution of the significance of an error in dominio had already been sketched 
by Schulz406, and even if Burdese did not consider his ideas convincing407, the 
opinions gathered by Ulpian in D. 12,4,3,5-8 seem to confirm some of the 
guidelines of the theory of Schulz. 
 The fact that the error in dominio was only seen as preventing the transfer of 
ownership in the course of the second half of the 2nd century AD contributes to 
                                                                                                                   
decem, quae ei pro libertate dederat, repetisse per iudicem nec fuisse quaesitum, an 
Domitia sciens liberum accepisset”. 
402  The opinion of Julian concerning a similar problem is also reproduced by Ulpian in 
D. 17,1,8,5 (Ulp. 31 ed.), although in this case the money was given to a third person in 
order to free him. See on this text Buckland, Slavery (1908), p. 349. 
403  D. 12,4,3,6 (Ulp. 26 ed.): “Si quis quasi statuliber mihi decem dederit, cum iussus non 
esset, condicere eum decem Celsus scribit”. 
404  D. 12,4,3,7 (Ulp. 26 ed.): “Sed si servus, qui testamento heredi iussus erat decem dare et 
liber esse, codicillis pure libertatem accepit et id ignorans dederit heredi decem, an repetere 
possit? Et refert patrem suum Celsum existimasse repetere eum non posse: sed ipse Celsus 
naturali aequitate motus putat repeti posse. Quae sententia verior est, quamquam constet, 
ut et ipse ait, eum qui dedit ea spe, quod se ab eo qui acceperit remunerari existimaret vel 
amiciorem sibi esse eum futurum, repetere non posse opinione falsa deceptum”. 
405  The ground for the solution given in D. 12,4,3,8 is therefore completely different to those 
in the previous cases, contrary to the opinion of Reggi, Error in dominio (1952), p. 108-109. 
406  Schulz, Concursus Causarum (1917), p. 141-145. 
407  Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 45. 
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understand the solutions of earlier jurists on this problem. Cervidius Scaevola, for 
instance, still approaches the payment made by a liber homo bona fide serviens as a 
statuliber in the context of a condictio in D. 12,6,67pr408. In fact, the only solution 
of this period granting any relevance to the error in dominio would be that of 
Marcellus in D. 17,1,49. Only after Ulpian had ascertained that “nemo errans rem 
suam amittit” could a change of paradigm be introduced into this problem. 
 Similar considerations can be made regarding D. 12,1,41409, where Africanus 
discusses the validity of a series of transactions, including the traditio of coins, 
concluded by a slave after the death of his owner, who declared him heir in his 
testament. The problem was already discussed in the context of the cases where 
the owner granting his authorization for the delivery dies before it takes place410. 
The solution given by Africanus is in agreement with the opinion of Julian, 
according to which the voluntas domini would disappear once the owner died. 
Since the slave was set free by the owner in his will, he can be considered a liber 
homo bona fide serviens, but Africanus does not pay attention to the fact that he 
unknowingly delivers objects which he now partially owns. Instead, the jurist 
focuses on the fact that the freedman is only owner of a share over the delivered 
object and that he does not have the authorization of the other co-owners to 
deliver. According to the traditional views found already in Alfenus 
(D. 24,1,38,1), the co-owner who does not have the authorization of the other 
co-owners for the delivery will only transfer ownership over his share, a solution 
which is reproduced by Africanus in this context. All of this involves a 
considerable degree of sophistication regarding the significance of the voluntas 
domini at the delivery, but the relevance of the error in dominio had not yet been 
established by the jurisprudence of his time, which is why no additional 
considerations are made regarding this point. One may therefore approach the 
solution in the context of the evolution of the voluntas domini instead of looking 
                                                 
408  D. 12,6,67pr (Scaev. 5 dig.): “Stichus testamento eius, quem dominum suum arbitrabatur, 
libertate accepta, si decem annis ex die mortis annuos decem heredibus praestitisset, per 
octo annos praefinitam quantitatem ut iussus erat dedit, postmodum se ingenuum comperit 
nec reliquorum annorum dedit et pronuntiatus est ingenuus: quaesitum est, an pecuniam, 
quam heredibus dedit, ut indebitam datam repetere et qua actione possit. Respondit, si 
eam pecuniam dedit, quae neque ex operis suis neque ex re eius, cui bona fide serviebat, 
quaesita sit, posse repeti”. The text is located by Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 219-220 
under the rubric “De condictione”. 
409  D. 12,1,41 (Afr. 8 quaest.): “Eius, qui in provincia Stichum servum kalendario 
praeposuerat, Romae testamentum recitatum erat, quo idem Stichus liber et ex parte heres 
erat scriptus: qui status sui ignarus pecunias defuncti aut exegit aut credidit, ut interdum 
stipularetur et pignora acciperet. Consulebatur quid de his iuris esset. (…) Quas vero 
pecunias ipse credidisset, eas non ex maiore parte, quam ex qua ipse heres sit, alienatas esse: 
nam et si tibi in hoc dederim nummos, ut eos Sticho credas, deinde mortuo me ignorans 
dederis, accipientis non facies: neque enim sicut illud receptum est, ut debitores solventes 
ei liberentur, ita hoc quoque receptum, ut credendo nummos alienaret. Quare si nulla 
stipulatio intervenisset, neque ut creditam pecuniam pro parte coheredis peti posse neque 
pignora teneri”. 
410  Chapter 2, Section 1(b) above. 
 
for evidence of interpolations, as previous authors defending the relevance of the 
error in dominio have attempted411. 
 Having a broad outlook of the evolution of the significance of the error in 
dominio concerning the traditio, one cannot complain about the amount or quality 
of the texts addressing this problem. It is therefore not necessary to resort to the 
solutions to this problem in other contexts, such as manumission or legacy, in 
order to have further clarity. Scholars questioning the relevance of the error in 
dominio have traditionally relied to a great extent on texts dealing with these 
subjects, since they offer several examples where the belief of the owner is 
irrelevant to the outcome of the act. Regarding manumission the text normally 
quoted corresponds to Julian: 
 
D. 40,2,4,1 (Jul. 42 dig.): Quotiens dominus servum manumittat, 
quamvis existimet alienum esse eum, nihilo minus verum est 
voluntate domini servum manumissum et ideo liber erit. Et ex 
contrario si se Stichus non putaret manumittentis esse, nihilo minus 
libertatem contingere. Plus enim in re est, quam in existimatione et 
utroque casu verum est Stichum voluntate domini manumissum 
esse. Idemque iuris est et si dominus et servus in eo errore essent, ut 
neque ille se dominum nec hic se servum eius putaret412. 
 
The text leaves no room for doubt: if the owner manumitted a slave which he 
deemed to belong to someone else, and even if the slave did not think he 
belonged to his manumitter413, the manumission will nonetheless be considered 
to take place voluntate domini. Julian even presents an aphorism to support this 
outcome: “For the facts matter more than what is believed” (Plus enim in re est, 
quam in existimatione)414. An opposite solution is however given by Julian’s 
contemporary Pomponius: 
 
                                                 
411  Voci, L’errore (1937), p. 98; Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 36-37. The latter author 
envisages however the possibility of an evolution of the jurisprudence in this point (p. 37): 
“Qualora poi non si ritenessero fondati – come io ritengo – i sospetti di alterazione si 
potrebbe ancora pensare ad una incertezza di opinione sussistente in proposito prima 
dell’età dei Severi”. 
412  D. 40,2,4,1: “Whenever a master manumits a slave, even though he believes that the slave 
is owned by someone else, it still remains true that the slave was manumitted by wish of 
the master, and for this reason he will be free. And conversely, if Stichus supposed that he 
was not owned by the manumitter, nonetheless, he becomes free. For the facts matter 
more than what is believed, and in both cases, it is true that Stichus was manumitted by 
wish of the master. The same rule of law holds even if master and slave erroneously 
believed, the one that he was not the master, the other that he was not his slave” (transl. 
Watson). 
413  The error of the slave seems however completely irrelevant. See Burdese, Error in dominio 
(1953), p. 40. 
414  Regarding the use of this aphorism by Julian see Wacke, Plus est in re (1996), p. 342-244. 
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D. 40,12,28 (Pomp. 12 ad Quintum Mucium): Non videtur domini 
voluntate servus in libertate esse, quem dominus ignorasset suum 
esse: et est hoc verum: is enim demum voluntate domini in libertate 
est, qui possessionem libertatis ex voluntate domini consequitur415. 
 
In this case, the jurist considers that the ignorance of the owner concerning his 
position with regard to the manumitted slave will indeed prevent the 
manumission from being effective, because the act cannot be regarded to take 
place voluntate domini.  
 What can explain these contradicting views? Burdese and Provera have 
claimed that each text would refer to a different kind of manumission, the one of 
Julian to the manumissio vindicta, and that of Pomponius to an informal 
manumission416. The fact that in the first case we are told that “plus est in re…” 
could accordingly be explained because the manumissio vindicta was a formal and 
abstract act, which would produce legal consequences by the mere performance 
of it, being irrelevant what the intent of the person performing it was. On the 
contrary, in the informal manumission described by Pomponius the owner’s 
intent will be the only thing which matters, which is why a mistake on his behalf 
would affect the legal grounds for the manumission.  
 The problem with these distinctions is, in the first place, that there is little 
evidence to prove that different types of manumission are addressed in each text. 
While in the case of D. 40,2,4,1 both the title of the Digest and Lenel’s 
Palingenesia indicate that it dealt with the manumissio vindicta417, there is no 
similar evidence concerning D. 40,12,28. Burdese claims that the reference to the 
voluntas domini would be a sure giveaway that the text refers to an informal 
manumission, which in turn forces him to regard as interpolated the reference to 
this element in D. 40,2,4,1418, since the majority of scholars consider that there 
would be no place for a special voluntas at the act of the manumissio vindicta. This 
choice is not only arbitrary – why not regard D. 40,12,28 as interpolated as well? 
– and based on broad and largely unproven principles concerning the structure of 
the manumissio vindicta 419, but also removes almost all the reasoning behind 
Julian’s decision. In fact, this text indicates twice that the manumission can be 
regarded as taking place voluntate domini, an idea to which one can relate on an 
intuitive level: if the owner did carry out a legal act which such specific 
                                                 
415  D. 40,12,28: “A slave is not deemed to enjoy freedom by the wish of his owner, when the 
owner had not known that the man was his; that is right; for a man only enjoys freedom 
by the wish of the owner, when he obtains the possession of freedom in accordance with 
that wish” (transl. Watson). 
416  Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 37-41; Provera, Errore (1956), p. 175. 
417  D. 40,2, “De manumissis vindicta”; Lenel, Paling. (1889) I, col. 430 also sets the text under 
the rubric “De manumissis vindicta” in the original work of Julian. 
418  Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 39-40. 
419  Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 144 claims in fact that the voluntas domini played a 
relevant role both in the manumissio vindicta and in informal forms of manumission. 
 
consequences as the manumission, there is certainly some ground to regard his 
mistake concerning ownership as irrelevant in order to determine his intent when 
carrying out such an act420. Accordingly, Julian and Pomponius appear to be 
discussing the same basic problem421, drawing nonetheless opposite conclusions. 
 The contradiction between the solutions of Julian and Pomponius is better 
explained in the general context of the evolution of the voluntas domini in Roman 
jurisprudence. The opinion of Julian is in fact consistent with that reported by 
Ulpian in D. 12,4,3,5, where Julian was willing to grant a condictio – not a rei 
vindicatio – to the liber homo bona fide serviens who paid to his putative master. As 
noted above, this opinion shows that at the time of Julian jurists had not 
considered the error in dominio to be something which would stand in the way of 
the voluntas domini. The same line of reasoning is found in D. 40,2,4,1, where 
Julian explicitly declares that the manumission of a slave whom the owner 
wrongfully considers to belong to someone else can nonetheless be considered to 
take place voluntate domini. The opinion of Pomponius shows that the 
interpretation regarding the meaning of the voluntas domini in relation to the error 
in dominio not only changed in relation to the transfer of ownership, but also in 
the context of the manumission. In fact, the evolution may have first taken place 
regarding the manumission, since the solution of Pomponius in D. 40,12,28 
would precede that of Marcellus in D. 17,1,49. The contradiction between 
D. 40,2,4,1 and D. 40,12,28 is therefore to be regarded as part of the general 
evolution of the voluntas domini in Roman jurisprudence. 
 Scholars have also attempted to draw an analogy regarding the case of the 
legacy, where the Institutes of Justinian explicitly declare that if the deceased 
bequeathed something which he wrongfully considered to belong to someone 
else, his legacy would nonetheless be valid422. Once again, we are left with a 
similar sentence to that of Julian in D. 40,2,4,1, since the Institutes give as 
ground for this solution “nam plus valet quod in veritate est quam quod in opinione”. 
The text deserves however less attention, since it refers to a problem where a 
direct analogy with the transfer of ownership by traditio is not possible423. The 
impossibility to draw an analogy is particularly clear considering that the voluntas 
defuncti referred to in the text involves a completely different problem from that 
of the voluntas domini found at the traditio or manumission, which in fact 
disappears with the death of the owner. One should accordingly avoid the 
excessive abstraction behind the attempt of building a general theory of the error 
in dominio in Roman law. After all, it should not be forgotten that the term error 
in dominio is not to be found in the Roman sources, and that there is no 
                                                 
420  Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 146. 
421  Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 144. 
422  Inst. 2,20,11: “Si quis rem suam quasi alienam legaverit, valet legatum: nam plus valet 
quod in veritate est quam quod in opinione. Sed et si legatarii putavit, valere constat, quia 
exitum voluntas defuncti potest habere”. 
423  Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 41. 
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indication that jurists would have developed a consistent theory which would 
govern every patrimonial act in an identical way. The way in which Roman 
jurists reason at this point is much less principle-oriented that what modern jurists 
would like, and the interpreter will be better off by focusing on the casuistic 
approach behind each solution. 
 The problems derived from the principle-based approach to Roman sources 
can be seen in the fact that numerous scholars traditionally denied the relevance 
of the error in dominio due to the fact that it would contradict the rule “plus est in 
re quam in existimatione”. This rule has already appeared in the decision of Julian 
in D. 40,2,4,1, being moreover to be found in an alternative form in the just-
mentioned text of Inst. 2,20,11 dealing with legacies. This idea is moreover 
phrased in similar terms in numerous other texts, which have merited the 
attention of modern scholarship424. This general idea is applied in different 
contexts, but the only one truly relevant for the present study is that of 
D. 40,2,4,1. The main consideration to be borne in mind regarding these various 
texts is that one should not grant an excessive ‘normative value’ to regulae or 
topical arguments, which usually serve the sake of eloquence425. For example, in 
the case of D. 40,2,4,1 Julian offers a solution which is entirely based on the 
interpretation of the voluntas domini at the manumission, where the “plus est in 
re…” only makes the argument more convincing. This idea is also applied in 
numerous text to determine whether the person who thought to acquire from an 
unauthorized non-owner would acquire ownership in case the transferor could 
indeed validly transfer ownership426, where the general outcome will be that 
ownership will be transferred, although the subjective representation of the 
acquirer could prevent him from becoming a bona fide possessor if ownership was 
not transferred. These consequences do not follow from the “plus est in re…” 
argument, but rather from general rules governing the transfer of ownership427. 
Moreover, the limited significance of this rule can be attested by the fact that one 
may find an inverted formulation of it in D. 29,2,15 (Ulp. 7 Sab.) where Ulpian 
claims that “plus est in opinione quam in veritate”. 
 Considering the modest role of the “plus est in re…” rule, as well as the fact 
that Roman jurists do not appear to have attempted to develop a comprehensive 
and consistent theory of the error in dominio, there seems to be no good reason to 
bring the cases of the traditio and manumission under this general rule. The only 
case where such a rule is applied in this context is D. 40,2,4,1, which represents 
                                                 
424  See in particular Wacke, Plus est in re (1996), p. 309-357; Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), 
p. 146-149. 
425  See on this point Chapter 6, Section 3 below. 
426  D. 22,6,9,4 (Paul libro singulari de iuris et facti ignorantia): “Qui ignoravit dominum esse rei 
venditorem, plus in re est, quam in existimatione mentis: et ideo, tametsi existimet se non 
a domino emere, tamen, si a domino ei tradatur, dominus efficitur”. See moreover 
D. 41,3,44,1; D. 41,4,2,2; D. 41,4,2,15; FV 260. 
427  Wacke, Plus est in re (1996), p. 355: “Unsere regula erzeugt jedoch selbst keine Wirkungen; 
sie beschreibt vielmehr bloß bereits von Rechts wegen eintretende Wirkungen”. 
 
an interpretation of the voluntas domini by Julian which would soon be abandoned 
by other jurists. It is therefore much more accurate to approach the solutions 
given by Roman jurists to the error in dominio in the context of traditio and 
manumission following the juristic development of the voluntas domini in these 
cases, rather than to force them into fitting within the “plus est in re…” rule. 
 The main concluding remark regarding the relevance of the error in dominio 
for the transfer of ownership by acts inter vivos is that the scope given to the 
voluntas domini played a central role in the solutions given by Roman jurists. Up 
to the mid-2nd century AD, the mistake by the owner regarding the ownership of 
the object was not considered an obstacle for the transfer of ownership or for the 
validity of the manumission. Julian would even explicitly declare that a 
manumission in such a case should be regarded as performed voluntate domini 
(D. 40,2,4,1). However, at around that time, jurists began to consider that such 
an error would imply that there was no voluntas domini at the act, an idea which 
would be consolidated by the time of Ulpian, who could generally claim that 
“nemo errans rem suam amittit” (D. 41,1,35). This evolution shows that jurists were 
open to revise the significance granted to this old requirement of the ius civile.  
 As already mentioned, the central role of the voluntas domini to determine the 
outcome of the transfer of ownership in the error in dominio does not pose a threat 
to the causal understanding of the structure of the transfer of ownership by traditio 
in Roman law. The interpreter must simply accept that, in particular 
circumstances, Roman jurists did consider the voluntas at the delivery to 
determine the consequence of the transfer of ownership, which is particularly the 
place when this took place by a non-owner. It is far too theoretical to see in this 
approach a reflection of a general abstract or causal approach to the transfer of 
ownership. Modern Roman law scholarship would be in fact better off without 
these claustrophobic labels, which force the solutions of Roman jurists into 
narrow concepts that were certainly alien to them. Classical jurisprudence did not 
develop a complex model regarding the role of the intent at the delivery based 
on the role of the iusta causa traditionis; on the contrary, the importance of the 
agreement on the iusta causa traditionis seems to have been approached within the 
general problem of the significance of the voluntas domini. This can be seen not 
only in the fact that Ulpian tackled this problem in the 7th book of his 
Disputations (D. 12,1,18) along with other cases where the voluntas domini plays a 
decisive role, but is also illustrated by the fact that the compilers located 
D. 41,1,35 (Ulp. 7 disp.) and D. 41,1,36 (Jul. 13 dig.) side by side, the one 
dealing with the error in dominio, the other with the agreement on the iusta causa 
traditionis. Moreover, the differences between the significance of the voluntas 
domini do not seem so categorical between acts traditionally considered ‘causal’ 
and ‘abstract’ if one considers that among the cases studied in this section the 
voluntas domini appears to fulfil a relevant role not only for the transfer of 
ownership by traditio (D. 18,1,15,2), but also in the context of the mancipatio 
(D. 17,1,49) and the manumissio vindicta (D. 40,2,4,1). 
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 Having acknowledged that the voluntas domini in several cases plays a relevant 
role for the traditio, one may see to what extent is the error in dominio governed by 
considerations regarding the voluntas domini in the case of the transfer of 
ownership, instead of avoiding this reference, as several scholars defending a 
strictly ‘causal’ system have done before. It was already mentioned that Burdese 
attempted to avoid references to the debate on the iusta causa traditionis, despite 
which he would nonetheless state in his concluding remarks that the relevance of 
the error in dominio should not be seen as a confirmation for an animus transferendi 
dominii428. Similarly Harke considered that granting any relevance to the intent at 
the delivery would imply a contradiction to the causal structure of the traditio as 
presented in Gai 2,20, which leads him to deny the importance of the voluntas at 
the delivery. Instead, he explains the solutions given by Roman jurists under 
broader considerations regarding the notion of error in Roman law, claiming that 
ownership would not be transferred when the mistake of the owner would affect 
the very essence of the act which was intended to be carried out429. While this 
approach may offer valuable insight into some of the solutions provided by earlier 
jurists – such as that of Julian in D. 40,2,4,1 – it is however clear that the voluntas 
domini did play a central role in the evolution of the relevance of the error in 
dominio in the transfer of ownership. Considering that there is nothing alien to 
classical law in granting the voluntas a certain role at the delivery, one may 
confidently state that, in the course of the second half of the 2nd century AD, 
jurists began to consider that the error in dominio would prevent the transfer of 
ownership in cases of transfer of ownership inter vivos and in the case of 
manumission, since the act could not be regarded as performed voluntate domini. 
 
  
                                                 
428  Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 46-47. 
429  Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 150-151: “Dieser läßt das bei Gaius (inst. 2.20) 
überlieferte Prinzip unberührt, wonach der von einer causa getragene Realakt der traditio 
ohne weiteres Eigentum an einer res nec mancipi überträgt. Der Satz: nemo errans rem suam 
amittit, setzt kein Verfügungsgeschäft mit Eigentumsübetragungswillen voraus, sondern 
kommt nur dann zum Zuge, wenn der Verfügende einer Fehlvorstellung über einen 
begleitenden Rechtsakt unterliegt”. 
 
Chapter 3. Legal provisions as basis for the  
potestas alienandi  
 
 
1. Potestas alienandi of legal guardians 
 
Along with the cases in which a non-owner transfers ownership voluntate domini, 
Roman jurists often mention cases where the potestas alienandi stems from a 
particular legal provision, as does Gaius when mentioning the faculty of the 
curator furiosi to sell goods belonging to the lunatic, which stems from the Law of 
the Twelve Tables1. Despite the common juxtaposition between these different 
kinds of cases2, it should be noted that the legal basis which explains the transfer 
of ownership is completely different. The cases in which the potestas alienandi 
stems from a legal provision, as mentioned above3, confront the interpreter with 
a number of cases which offer no fundamental common guiding principle other 
than the fact that in all of them the possibility and way in which the faculty to 
dispose is exercised is not determined by the owner’s will, being instead fixed 
beforehand by the law. This signals an essential difference with those cases in 
which ownership is transferred voluntate domini, which serves as a binding element 
that determines the way in which the transfer of ownership takes place in those 
various cases. The cases where the potestas alienandi stems from specific legal 
provisions offers a much more fragmentary outlook, since each of them may be 
governed by rules which may not applicable to other, similar cases. This, 
however, does not exclude that there are some common patterns among these 
cases, which will be stressed in the following paragraphs. This is due to a great 
extent to the fact that Roman jurisprudence played an important role in 
establishing the features of these figures. When it is claimed that in these cases the 
potestas alienandi is determined by law, it should not be thought that there are 
statutory provisions, such as leges and senatus consulta, which extensively regulate 
the faculties of the non-owner. Instead, statutory provisions offer normally only a 
starting point that is further developed by jurists, which results in the expansion 
or restriction of the circumstances in which a non-owner may transfer ownership 
without having to count on the owner’s consent. Moreover, since much of the 
development of these cases is owed to the work of Roman jurisprudence, it is 
not uncommon that jurists apply specific solutions to similar cases, which gives 
them a higher degree of uniformity. This uniformity would apparently increase 
                                                 
1  Gai 2,64: “Ex diverso agnatus furiosi curator rem furiosi alienare potest ex lege XII 
tabularum”. 
2  See e.g. D. 15,1,21,1 (tutor impuberis, curator furiosi, procurator); D. 41,1,35 (procurator, tutor 
impuberis); D. 44,3,15,2-4 (mandate, slave, son-in-power, tutor impuberis, curator furiosi); 
D. 50,16,109 (procurator, tutor impuberis). 
3  Chapter 2, Section 2(a).  
165
 
162 
 Having acknowledged that the voluntas domini in several cases plays a relevant 
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the delivery. Instead, he explains the solutions given by Roman jurists under 
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manumission, since the act could not be regarded as performed voluntate domini. 
 
  
                                                 
428  Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), p. 46-47. 
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überlieferte Prinzip unberührt, wonach der von einer causa getragene Realakt der traditio 
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1  Gai 2,64: “Ex diverso agnatus furiosi curator rem furiosi alienare potest ex lege XII 
tabularum”. 
2  See e.g. D. 15,1,21,1 (tutor impuberis, curator furiosi, procurator); D. 41,1,35 (procurator, tutor 
impuberis); D. 44,3,15,2-4 (mandate, slave, son-in-power, tutor impuberis, curator furiosi); 
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under Justinian, since scholars often claim that he extended the rules dealing with 
one specific kind of legal guardian to other cases4. 
 Most of the cases in which a legal provision authorizes a non-owner to 
transfer ownership are closely related to a legal prohibition to transfer ownership, 
where the law not only determines that a particular owner may not transfer 
ownership, but also the legal guardian who may do so in his place and in what 
way. The case which is more commonly mentioned, following the text of Gaius, 
is the curator furiosi, but one should also bear in mind other cases in which a non-
owner may transfer ownership, such as the tutor impuberis – mainly when the 
pupillus is still an infans – and the curator prodigi.  
 Since the potestas alienandi is granted to legal guardians when the owner faces a 
legal prohibition to dispose, one may wonder whether the tutor mulieris should be 
studied along with these other institutions. The negative answer seems intuitive, 
since the tutor mulieris does not carry out himself the alienation of the goods 
belonging to the mulier, but simply has to authorize – through his auctoritatis 
interpositio – the alienation performed by her in particular circumstances. 
Likewise, the tutor impuberis may appear in certain cases simply to be authorizing 
the transfer of ownership and not carrying it out himself, particularly when the 
pupillus is an impubes infantia maior and can therefore act for himself, provided he 
obtains the auctoritatis interpositio. Despite the fact that in such cases the tutor 
mulieris and tutor impuberis do not carry out the transfer of ownership themselves, 
this latter institution is dealt with in the context of the general problem of the 
potestas alienandi in the Institutes of Justinian5 (Inst. 2,8,2), in the title dealing with 
the problem of “Those who may alienate or not” (Inst. 2,8, “Quibus alienare licet 
vel non”) and after the alienation by a pledge creditor (Inst. 2,8,1). As mentioned 
above6, this gave place to the theory according to which the study of the potestas 
alienandi and the tutelae originally would have also been dealt with side by side in 
the Institutes of Gaius. This led several editors to place Gai 2,62-64 immediately 
before Gai 2,80-85, which deals with the alienations by the mulier and pupillus. 
Even when this emendatio is no longer accepted, it cannot be denied that there is 
indeed a close link between both texts. This link is also visible in the Institutes of 
Gaius, considering that Gai 2,63 deals with the case of an owner – the husband – 
who can only dispose of his property – the fundus dotalis – with the authorization 
of another person – his wife –, which resembles to some extent the need for 
authorization of the tutor described in Gai 2,80-85. Some authors have attempted 
to take the link between both groups of cases even further by focusing on the 
letters R U identified by Studemund7 before the rubric “De pupillis an aliquid a se 
                                                 
4  Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 453. On the interpolation of texts referring to the curator minoris 
and the tutor impuberis see Buckland, Text-book (1963), p. 171 n. 1. 
5  The tutela mulierum is of course not dealt with within this title, being absent from 
Justinianic law. 
6  See Chapter 1, Section 3. 
7  Studemund, Gaii Institutionum (1874), p. 73. 
 
alienare possunt” preceding Gai 2,80, and which are normally seen as meaning 
“Rubrica quinta”8. Kniep9 has suggested that this would mean that Gai 2,80 
introduces the fifth case in which an owner may not transfer ownership, since 
previously the cases of the fundus dotalis (Gai 2,63), the lunatic, the alienation 
through a procurator and the pledge creditor (Gai 2,64) would have been 
mentioned. However, this explanation cannot be accepted, considering that at 
least in the case of the alienation by a procurator and a pledge creditor the owner 
does not forfeit his power to alienate10.  
 The link between the cases dealt with in Gai 2,80-85 and the more general 
text Gai 2,62-64 lies in the fact that the alienation by a mulier or a pupillus falls 
within the cases where, in the words of Gai 2,62, “qui dominus sit, alienandae rei 
potestatem non habeat”, since the owner must comply with a specific requirement 
in order to transfer ownership, just as happens with the owner of the fundus 
dotalis in Gai 2,63. All of these cases can accordingly be framed within the general 
problem of the illegal alienations, and one may understand that Justinian would 
set the case of the pupillus within Inst. 2,8, offering a good fit with the general 
topic dealt with in this title. Nonetheless, since in the case of the tutor impuberis 
and the tutor mulieris it is the owner himself who – complying with certain 
conditions – performs the transfer of ownership, these cases would seem to pose a 
different problem to those in which a non-owner transfers ownership himself, as 
happens with those described in Gai 2,64. Despite this essential difference, it 
should be observed that it is particularly difficult to draw a clear line between 
both groups of cases, particularly since at times one institution can work in both 
ways. This is the case regarding the tutela impuberis, where the tutor would 
necessarily have to alienate if the pupillus was an impubes, but only eventually 
would do so if the pupillus was an impubes infantia maior and could accordingly act 
by himself with the authorization of the tutor. This duality can also be observed 
in other kinds of guardianship, such as the curator minoris (xxv annis). It is also 
worth noting that the sources often deal jointly with the alienation by different 
kinds of legal guardians11. Even if one admits that some of the texts that offer 
such a joint analysis are the result of interpolations, it is clear that already classical 
jurists would offer in several cases common rules for different forms of legal 
guardianship. 
 Along with these kinds of legal guardians, it should be noted that there are 
other kinds of curatores, such as the curator bonorum captivi and the curator ventris, 
whose administration falls on a certain patrimony which does not have a current 
                                                 
8  David/Nelson, Gai Institutionum, Text (1960), p. 84; Böhm, Gaiusstudien 15 (1977), 
p. 115. Kniep, Gai Institutionum (1912) II, p. 205 reads instead “regula quinta”. 
9  Kniep, Gai Institutionum (1912) II, p. 204-205, 221. 
10  See on this point Chapter 2, Section 3(a). 
11  See e.g. Gai 1,199; D. 12,2,17,2 (Paul 18 ed.); D. 14,4,3,1 (Ulp. 29 ed.); D. 27,9,8,1 (Ulp. 
2 de omnibus tribunalibus); D. 41,2,14,1 (Paul 68 ed.); D. 47,2,33 (Ulp. 41 Sab.); 
D. 44,4,4,25 (Ulp. 76 ed.); D. 47,2,57(56),4 (Jul. 22 dig.); D. 50,4,1,4 (Hermog. 1 
epitomarum); C. 5,37,22 (Constantine, 326).  
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8  David/Nelson, Gai Institutionum, Text (1960), p. 84; Böhm, Gaiusstudien 15 (1977), 
p. 115. Kniep, Gai Institutionum (1912) II, p. 205 reads instead “regula quinta”. 
9  Kniep, Gai Institutionum (1912) II, p. 204-205, 221. 
10  See on this point Chapter 2, Section 3(a). 
11  See e.g. Gai 1,199; D. 12,2,17,2 (Paul 18 ed.); D. 14,4,3,1 (Ulp. 29 ed.); D. 27,9,8,1 (Ulp. 
2 de omnibus tribunalibus); D. 41,2,14,1 (Paul 68 ed.); D. 47,2,33 (Ulp. 41 Sab.); 
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owner, since the captive is actually a slave who loses his patrimony and the 
nasciturus has not yet become owner. Such curators have a very limited power to 
dispose concerning the goods which they administer, and in fact Hermogenian 
indicates that such kinds of guardians differ greatly (magna est differentia) from cases 
such as the curator furiosi, the curator (tutor) impuberis and the curator prodigi, since 
these latter three can broadly administrate the affairs of the owner, while the 
former cases only have the custodia over the goods, being able to sell only those 
which deteriorate12. Nonetheless, Hermogenian himself deals jointly with these 
different kinds of legal guardianship in another text13, and since they do have a 
certain – albeit very limited – power to alienate they cannot be excluded from 
the current outlook. 
 It should be noted in passing that there are other cases in which a non-owner 
derives from the law the faculty to transfer ownership over someone else’s 
property. Some cases resemble the position of a legal guardian, as happens with 
the administrators of the piae causae14. Also public officials could be entitled to 
transfer ownership over things belonging to the fiscus15. It is however not always 
clear whether we are dealing with an act governed by institutions of ‘private’ law, 
as happens with the “ius dandae vendendaeve aquae” mentioned by Frontinus as 
belonging to certain magistrates16, while Ulpian reserves it for the emperor17. At 
this point, it is worth noting that the nature of the faculty to dispose appears to 
be completely unrelated to the general rules reviewed so far when the attribution 
of property takes place through the addictio of the magistrate18, as happens for 
instance in the sectio bonorum of confiscated property or the venditio sub hasta of 
spoils of war19. There are moreover some cases where the attribution of property 
does not take place by a non-owner who is authorized by the law, but rather by 
                                                 
12  D. 26,7,48 (Hermog. 1 iuris epitomarum): “Inter bonorum ventrisque curatorem et inter 
curatorem furiosi itemque prodigi pupillive magna est differentia, quippe cum illis quidem 
plane rerum administratio, duobus autem superioribus sola custodia et rerum, quae 
deteriores futurae sunt, venditio committitur”. 
13  D. 50,4,1,4 (Hermog. 1 epitomarum). Other example of a text dealing jointly with these 
different kinds of legal guardians is D. 40,5,36pr (Marcianus 16 fideicommissorum). 
14  See on the faculty to dispose of these administrators Sánchez, Fundaciones (2002), p. 929-
951. 
15  D. 49,14,5,1 (Ulp. 16 ed.): “Si ab eo, cui ius distrahendi res fisci datum est, fuerit 
distractum quid fisci, statim fit emptoris, pretio tamen soluto”. 
16  Frontinus, De aquaeductu 95: “Ad quem autem magistratum ius dandae vendendaeve aquae 
pertinuerit, in eis ipsis legibus variatur. Interdum enim ab aedilibus, interdum a censoribus 
permissum invenio; sed apparet, quotiens in re publica censores erant, ab illis potissimum 
petitum, cum ei non erant, aedilium eam potestatem fuisse”. The meaning of the ius dandae 
vendendaeve is discussed by Tarwacka, The Roman Censors (2014). 
17  D. 43,20,1,41-42: “(41) Permittitur autem aquam ex castello vel ex rivo vel ex quo alio 
loco publico ducere. (42) Idque a principe conceditur: alii nulli competit ius aquae 
dandae”. 
18  See on this institution Lévy-Bruhl, Addicere (1947), p. 141-160; Wolf, In iure cessio und 
manumissio (2013), p. 381-382. 
19  See on public auctions García, Ventas por subasta (2005), p. 41-63. 
 
the law itself (ipso iure)20. Considering that these institutions have additional 
features which exceed the margins of the present research, they will be excluded 
from further analysis. 
 As mentioned before, the cases in which a legal guardian is appointed to 
administer someone else’s patrimony – and consequently to transfer ownership in 
certain cases – are laid down by various legal provisions, often through a first 
mention in a particular statute – such as the Twelve Tables – from which they 
started developing. This law contains in fact provisions concerning the curator 
furiosi21, the prodigus22, the tutela impuberis23 and the tutela mulieris24. The succinct 
original provisions on legal guardians were complemented in the course of time, 
particularly through the activity of the praetor, the interpretation of jurists or 
new statutory provisions. This led to new rules which govern the way in which 
these legal guardians would be appointed and how should they carry out their 
administration25. Legal guardians who were in charge of the administration of the 
owner’s patrimony could transfer ownership over his assets26, but could only do 
so within a rather strict framework determined by the administration in the best 
interest of the owner, and therefore acts which implied gratuitously disposing or 
renouncing a right or a position would normally be excluded, such as the 
dedication of objects to the gods27, manumitting slaves28 or making gifts which 
went beyond what was considered customary29. Moreover, the Oratio Severi of 
195 AD laid down clear rules regarding the tutores, forbidding them to alienate 
rustic or suburban land unless they obtained the authorization by the 
corresponding magistrate30. The prohibitions laid down by the Oratio Severi 
would later be extended by jurisprudence to cover other cases, such as the 
                                                 
20  See e.g. D. 23,3,9,1 (Ulp. 31 Sab.): “…Sed benignius est favore dotium necessitatem 
imponi heredi consentire ei quod defunctus fecit aut, si distulerit vel absit, etiam nolente 
vel absente eo dominium ad maritum ipso iure transferri, ne mulier maneat indotata”. See 
on this point Stagl, Favor dotis (2009), p. 204-205. 
21  Tab. 5.7a: “Si furiosus escit, adgnatum gentiliumque in eo pecuniaque potestas esto”. 
22  D. 27,10,1pr (Ulp. 1 Sab.); D. 27,10,13 (Gai. 3 ad edictum provinciale); Tit. Ulp. 12,2. 
23  C. 5,30,1 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 290); D. 26,4,1pr (Ulp. 14 Sab.); Inst. 1,15pr. 
24  Gai 2,47. 
25  Concerning the cura prodigi see D. 27,10,1pr (Ulp. 1 Sab.); Tit. Ulp. 12,3; PS 3,4a,7. 
26  See e.g. D. 12,2,17,2 (Paul 18 ed.): “Si tutor qui tutelam gerit aut curator furiosi prodigive 
iusiurandum detulerit, ratum id haberi debet: nam et alienare res et solvi eis potest et 
agendo rem in iudicium deducunt”; D. 27,10,10,1 (Ulp. 16 ed.): “Curator furiosi rem 
quidem suam quasi furiosi tradere poterit et dominium transferre (...)”. 
27  D. 27,10,12 (Marcel. 1 dig.): “Ab adgnato vel alio curatore furiosi rem furiosi dedicari non 
posse constat: adgnato enim furiosi non usquequaque competit rerum eius alienatio, sed 
quatenus negotiorum exigit administratio”. 
28  D. 27,10,17 (Gai. 1 de manumissionibus). 
29  On the prohibition to make gifts, see e.g. D. 26,7,22 (Paul 3 ed.); D. 26,7,46,7 (Paul 9 
resp.); C. 5,37,16 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 293) i.f. On the possibility to perform 
customary gifts see D. 26,7,12,3 (Paul. 38 ed.). 
30  D. 27,9,1pr-2 (Ulp. 35 ed.). 
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owner, since the captive is actually a slave who loses his patrimony and the 
nasciturus has not yet become owner. Such curators have a very limited power to 
dispose concerning the goods which they administer, and in fact Hermogenian 
indicates that such kinds of guardians differ greatly (magna est differentia) from cases 
such as the curator furiosi, the curator (tutor) impuberis and the curator prodigi, since 
these latter three can broadly administrate the affairs of the owner, while the 
former cases only have the custodia over the goods, being able to sell only those 
which deteriorate12. Nonetheless, Hermogenian himself deals jointly with these 
different kinds of legal guardianship in another text13, and since they do have a 
certain – albeit very limited – power to alienate they cannot be excluded from 
the current outlook. 
 It should be noted in passing that there are other cases in which a non-owner 
derives from the law the faculty to transfer ownership over someone else’s 
property. Some cases resemble the position of a legal guardian, as happens with 
the administrators of the piae causae14. Also public officials could be entitled to 
transfer ownership over things belonging to the fiscus15. It is however not always 
clear whether we are dealing with an act governed by institutions of ‘private’ law, 
as happens with the “ius dandae vendendaeve aquae” mentioned by Frontinus as 
belonging to certain magistrates16, while Ulpian reserves it for the emperor17. At 
this point, it is worth noting that the nature of the faculty to dispose appears to 
be completely unrelated to the general rules reviewed so far when the attribution 
of property takes place through the addictio of the magistrate18, as happens for 
instance in the sectio bonorum of confiscated property or the venditio sub hasta of 
spoils of war19. There are moreover some cases where the attribution of property 
does not take place by a non-owner who is authorized by the law, but rather by 
                                                 
12  D. 26,7,48 (Hermog. 1 iuris epitomarum): “Inter bonorum ventrisque curatorem et inter 
curatorem furiosi itemque prodigi pupillive magna est differentia, quippe cum illis quidem 
plane rerum administratio, duobus autem superioribus sola custodia et rerum, quae 
deteriores futurae sunt, venditio committitur”. 
13  D. 50,4,1,4 (Hermog. 1 epitomarum). Other example of a text dealing jointly with these 
different kinds of legal guardians is D. 40,5,36pr (Marcianus 16 fideicommissorum). 
14  See on the faculty to dispose of these administrators Sánchez, Fundaciones (2002), p. 929-
951. 
15  D. 49,14,5,1 (Ulp. 16 ed.): “Si ab eo, cui ius distrahendi res fisci datum est, fuerit 
distractum quid fisci, statim fit emptoris, pretio tamen soluto”. 
16  Frontinus, De aquaeductu 95: “Ad quem autem magistratum ius dandae vendendaeve aquae 
pertinuerit, in eis ipsis legibus variatur. Interdum enim ab aedilibus, interdum a censoribus 
permissum invenio; sed apparet, quotiens in re publica censores erant, ab illis potissimum 
petitum, cum ei non erant, aedilium eam potestatem fuisse”. The meaning of the ius dandae 
vendendaeve is discussed by Tarwacka, The Roman Censors (2014). 
17  D. 43,20,1,41-42: “(41) Permittitur autem aquam ex castello vel ex rivo vel ex quo alio 
loco publico ducere. (42) Idque a principe conceditur: alii nulli competit ius aquae 
dandae”. 
18  See on this institution Lévy-Bruhl, Addicere (1947), p. 141-160; Wolf, In iure cessio und 
manumissio (2013), p. 381-382. 
19  See on public auctions García, Ventas por subasta (2005), p. 41-63. 
 
the law itself (ipso iure)20. Considering that these institutions have additional 
features which exceed the margins of the present research, they will be excluded 
from further analysis. 
 As mentioned before, the cases in which a legal guardian is appointed to 
administer someone else’s patrimony – and consequently to transfer ownership in 
certain cases – are laid down by various legal provisions, often through a first 
mention in a particular statute – such as the Twelve Tables – from which they 
started developing. This law contains in fact provisions concerning the curator 
furiosi21, the prodigus22, the tutela impuberis23 and the tutela mulieris24. The succinct 
original provisions on legal guardians were complemented in the course of time, 
particularly through the activity of the praetor, the interpretation of jurists or 
new statutory provisions. This led to new rules which govern the way in which 
these legal guardians would be appointed and how should they carry out their 
administration25. Legal guardians who were in charge of the administration of the 
owner’s patrimony could transfer ownership over his assets26, but could only do 
so within a rather strict framework determined by the administration in the best 
interest of the owner, and therefore acts which implied gratuitously disposing or 
renouncing a right or a position would normally be excluded, such as the 
dedication of objects to the gods27, manumitting slaves28 or making gifts which 
went beyond what was considered customary29. Moreover, the Oratio Severi of 
195 AD laid down clear rules regarding the tutores, forbidding them to alienate 
rustic or suburban land unless they obtained the authorization by the 
corresponding magistrate30. The prohibitions laid down by the Oratio Severi 
would later be extended by jurisprudence to cover other cases, such as the 
                                                 
20  See e.g. D. 23,3,9,1 (Ulp. 31 Sab.): “…Sed benignius est favore dotium necessitatem 
imponi heredi consentire ei quod defunctus fecit aut, si distulerit vel absit, etiam nolente 
vel absente eo dominium ad maritum ipso iure transferri, ne mulier maneat indotata”. See 
on this point Stagl, Favor dotis (2009), p. 204-205. 
21  Tab. 5.7a: “Si furiosus escit, adgnatum gentiliumque in eo pecuniaque potestas esto”. 
22  D. 27,10,1pr (Ulp. 1 Sab.); D. 27,10,13 (Gai. 3 ad edictum provinciale); Tit. Ulp. 12,2. 
23  C. 5,30,1 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 290); D. 26,4,1pr (Ulp. 14 Sab.); Inst. 1,15pr. 
24  Gai 2,47. 
25  Concerning the cura prodigi see D. 27,10,1pr (Ulp. 1 Sab.); Tit. Ulp. 12,3; PS 3,4a,7. 
26  See e.g. D. 12,2,17,2 (Paul 18 ed.): “Si tutor qui tutelam gerit aut curator furiosi prodigive 
iusiurandum detulerit, ratum id haberi debet: nam et alienare res et solvi eis potest et 
agendo rem in iudicium deducunt”; D. 27,10,10,1 (Ulp. 16 ed.): “Curator furiosi rem 
quidem suam quasi furiosi tradere poterit et dominium transferre (...)”. 
27  D. 27,10,12 (Marcel. 1 dig.): “Ab adgnato vel alio curatore furiosi rem furiosi dedicari non 
posse constat: adgnato enim furiosi non usquequaque competit rerum eius alienatio, sed 
quatenus negotiorum exigit administratio”. 
28  D. 27,10,17 (Gai. 1 de manumissionibus). 
29  On the prohibition to make gifts, see e.g. D. 26,7,22 (Paul 3 ed.); D. 26,7,46,7 (Paul 9 
resp.); C. 5,37,16 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 293) i.f. On the possibility to perform 
customary gifts see D. 26,7,12,3 (Paul. 38 ed.). 
30  D. 27,9,1pr-2 (Ulp. 35 ed.). 
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alienation of land possessed in good faith31 and the administration by other legal 
guardians32. Other legal provisions dealing with the faculties of legal guardians to 
transfer ownership would be enacted later, such as C. 5,37,22 (Constantine, 326), 
which deals in detail with the faculties of the tutores and curatores on this point.  
 Considering that the appointment and administration by legal guardians was 
fixed beforehand, it becomes necessary to determine what the consequence of an 
alienation carried out against these provisions would be. At this point it is worth 
noting that, in the cases where the owner is affected by a prohibition to dispose, 
this normally implies that the transgression of this prohibition does not only 
prevent the transfer of ownership from taking place, but also excludes the 
acquisition through usucapio. This general rule suffers exceptions in particular 
cases. It is for instance abandoned regarding the mulier who acts without the 
authorization of her tutor due to the progressive emancipation of women. The 
usucapion could also be admitted utilitatis causa regarding the alienation 
performed by a lunatic. All of this does not imply that similar consequences apply 
to the alienation performed by a non-owner who does not have the faculty to 
dispose regarding the goods of the owner who suffers a prohibition to dispose. 
This problem covers a wide variety of cases, such as the alienation by someone 
who was not appointed at all as a legal guardian33, who cannot administer the 
owner’s affairs despite being a legal guardian34, who omitted some of the 
requirements concerning his appointment or who acted beyond the legal faculties 
granted to him. In such cases ownership will not be transferred, but the 
possibility of usucapion will not be automatically excluded35. As long as the sale 
of the legal guardian is not in itself subject to a prohibition to dispose it will serve 
as a valid iusta causa and usucapion will follow, although in particular cases an in 
integrum restitutio in favour of the ward could be granted36. However, there were 
certain prohibitions to dispose which could affect the alienation of legal 
                                                 
31  D. 27,9,5,2 (Ulp. 35 ed.). The doctrine is divided concerning whether the prohibition was 
also extended in classical times to the pledge of the land of the pupillus. See on this point 
Biscardi, L’oratio Severi (1970), p. 248-250. 
32  D. 27,9,8,1 (Ulp. 2 de omnibus tribunalibus); C. 5,70,2 (Gordianus, 238). 
33  D. 27,9,8pr (Ulp. 2 de omnibus tribunalibus): “Qui neque tutores sunt ipso iure neque 
curatores, sed pro tutore negotia gerunt vel pro curatore, eos non posse distrahere res 
pupillorum vel adulescentium nulla dubitatio est”. This text is discussed by Seiler, 
Negotiorum gestio (1968), p. 229-230. See moreover D. 26,7,47,3 (Scaev. 2 resp.), D. 27,5,2 
(Celsus 25 dig.) and D. 44,4,4,24 (Ulp. 76 ed.). The latter two fragments are analysed 
below. For D. 26,7,47,3 see Seiler, Negotiorum gestio (1968), p. 229; Sansón, La transmisión 
(1998), p. 115. 
34  D. 26,8,4 (Pomp. 17 Sab.). 
35  On the possibility of usucapion see e.g. D. 26,8,4 (Pomp. 17 Sab.); D. 27,5,2 (Celsus 25 
dig.). D. 26,7,47,3 (Scaev. 2 resp.) declares that the ward will be able to exercise the rei 
vindicatio “si manet res”, which is interpreted by Kübler, Die Vormundschaftliche Gewalt 
(1939), p. 191, that the object has not yet been consumed, while Seiler, Negotiorum gestio 
(1968), p. 229 and Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 115 understand that usucapion has not 
yet taken place. 
36  D. 4,4,49 (Ulp. 35 ed.). 
 
guardians, such as those established by the Oratio Severi, the violation of which 
would prevent the purchaser from acquiring through usucapion37. The tutor 
could also be seen as committing theft in particular circumstances38, giving the 
transferred object the character of theftuous and thereby excluding the possibility 
of usucapion. 
 Finally, it should be noted that the failure to comply with one of the 
requirements of administration not always will lead to the impossibility of 
transferring the iustum dominium. This is particularly the case regarding the cautio 
which the tutor must grant when assuming his office, which during the classical 
period was only compulsory for the tutores honorarii39, i.e. those designated 
according to rules laid down by the praetor. This implies that the failure to grant 
this surety in the context of the transfer of ownership will only lead to a 
praetorian defence, normally in the form of an exceptio40. Only after the 
distinction between civil and praetorian remedies had lost any significance could 
it be generally claimed that the tutor who did not grant the proper surety could 
not transfer any property of the ward41. 
 
2. Alienatio administrationis causa, bona fides and furtum 
 
Up to this point we have only encountered more or less fixed rules which 
govern the alienations by legal guardians. It is however worth noting that Roman 
jurists also resorted to general notions which make reference to the 
administration of the owner’s affairs in his best interest in order to determine the 
validity of an alienation. An example of this technique can be seen in the 
following rescript: 
 
C. 5,37,16 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 293): Non omni titulo rerum 
pupilli potestatem alienandi tutores habent, sed administrationis 
tantum causa distrahentes, quae venum eis dare licet, iustam causam 
possidendi comparantibus praestant. Cum itaque donare nulla 
ratione res eorum quorum administrant negotia potestatem habent, 
vindicare dominium a possidentibus non prohiberis42. 
                                                 
37  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 113-114. 
38  D. 26,7,55,1 (Tryphoninus 14 disputationum); D. 47,2,33 (Ulp. 41 Sab.). 
39  Gai 1,199-200. See on this point Guzmán, Caución tutelar (1974), p. 83-95. 
40  On the relevance of the surety given by the legal guardian for the transfer of ownership see 
D. 27,5,2 (Celsus 25 dig.); D. 27,10,7,1-2 (Jul. 21 dig.); D. 44,4,4,23-24 (Ulp. 76 ed.). The 
fact that only a praetorian protection ope exceptionis was offered in the classical period is 
stressed by Guzmán, Caución tutelar (1974), p. 99-100. 
41  C. 5,42,5pr (Constantine/Maximianus, 305): “Tutor, qui satisdationem, cum dare debuit, 
minime interposuit, nihil omnino ex bonis pupilli alienare potest”. Equally categorical is 
C. 5,42,3pr (Diocletian/Maximianus, 287). See on this point Guzmán, Caución tutelar 
(1974), p. 100. 
42  C. 5,37,16: “Guardians do not have unlimited power to alienate the property of their 
ward. They can give proper possession to purchasers only when in the course of their 
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Up to this point we have only encountered more or less fixed rules which 
govern the alienations by legal guardians. It is however worth noting that Roman 
jurists also resorted to general notions which make reference to the 
administration of the owner’s affairs in his best interest in order to determine the 
validity of an alienation. An example of this technique can be seen in the 
following rescript: 
 
C. 5,37,16 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 293): Non omni titulo rerum 
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tantum causa distrahentes, quae venum eis dare licet, iustam causam 
possidendi comparantibus praestant. Cum itaque donare nulla 
ratione res eorum quorum administrant negotia potestatem habent, 
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37  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 113-114. 
38  D. 26,7,55,1 (Tryphoninus 14 disputationum); D. 47,2,33 (Ulp. 41 Sab.). 
39  Gai 1,199-200. See on this point Guzmán, Caución tutelar (1974), p. 83-95. 
40  On the relevance of the surety given by the legal guardian for the transfer of ownership see 
D. 27,5,2 (Celsus 25 dig.); D. 27,10,7,1-2 (Jul. 21 dig.); D. 44,4,4,23-24 (Ulp. 76 ed.). The 
fact that only a praetorian protection ope exceptionis was offered in the classical period is 
stressed by Guzmán, Caución tutelar (1974), p. 99-100. 
41  C. 5,42,5pr (Constantine/Maximianus, 305): “Tutor, qui satisdationem, cum dare debuit, 
minime interposuit, nihil omnino ex bonis pupilli alienare potest”. Equally categorical is 
C. 5,42,3pr (Diocletian/Maximianus, 287). See on this point Guzmán, Caución tutelar 
(1974), p. 100. 
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ward. They can give proper possession to purchasers only when in the course of their 
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This point deserves special attention, since it shows that Roman jurists were not 
willing to grant validity to any act which could formally be seen as part of the 
guardian’s power to alienate, but would rather examine if it took place 
administrationis causa. The making of a gift is shown as a typical case where the 
alienation does not take place administrationis causa, and therefore the ward will be 
able to recover the object by resorting to the rei vindicatio. There are a significant 
number of texts which contain similar solutions, such as the following: 
 
D. 27,10,17 (Gai. 1 de manumissionibus): Curator furiosi nullo modo 
libertatem praestare potest, quod ea res ex administratione non est: 
nam in tradendo ita res furiosi alienat, si id ad administrationem 
negotiorum pertineat: et ideo si donandi causa alienet, neque 
traditio quicquam valebit, nisi ex magna utilitate furiosi hoc 
cognitione iudicis faciat43. 
 
Gaius excludes in principle the possibility that the curator furiosi may perform a 
manumission, since this act is not regarded as part of his powers of 
administration, pointing out that alienations performed by him are only valid if 
they belong to the administratio negotiorum. A parallel is then drawn with the 
alienation donandi causa, which will normally be ineffective. Nonetheless, Gaius 
points out that the donation will however transfer ownership if from it follows a 
great benefit for the lunatic, which shows that even the most common examples 
of acts not normally covered under the concept of administration will be valid if 
they, in one way or another, improve the position of the owner. Conversely, this 
implies that the acts which could be seen as part of the administration of the 
owner’s affairs could be revised attending to the convenience for the owner. 
Ulpian, for instance, considers that the pledge given by the curator furiosi will only 
be valid if it was granted with the best interest of the lunatic in mind44. 
 A similar guideline is used by Ulpian in another case dealing with the curator 
furiosi: 
 
D. 27,10,10,1 (Ulp. 16 ed.): Curator furiosi rem quidem suam quasi 
furiosi tradere poterit et dominium transferre: rem vero furiosi si 
                                                                                                                   
administration they sell property on a ground which gives the right to do so. Since, 
therefore, they have no power to donate the property of persons whose affairs they 
manage, you are not forbidden to reclaim the property from the possessor thereof” (transl. 
Blume, modified). 
43  D. 27,10,17: “A lunatic’s curator ought in no way to grant freedom because this is not a 
matter of administration. In so granting, he only alienates the lunatic’s property if this is 
part of the administration of his affairs. So if he alienates as a gift, the delivery will not be 
valid unless, in the judge’s opinion, it is done for the greater benefit of the lunatic” (transl. 
Watson). 
44  D. 27,10,11 (Paul 7 ad Plautium) “Pignus a curatore furiosi datum valet, si utilitate furiosi 
exigente id fecit”. 
 
quasi suam tradat, dicendum, ut non transferat dominium, quia non 
furiosi negotium gerens tradidit45. 
 
In the first part of the text, we are told that the delivery of a thing belonging to 
the lunatic by the curator furiosi “as if it belonged to the lunatic” will transfer 
ownership, while in the second part it is said that such a delivery performed “as if 
it were his own” (the guardian’s) will not transfer ownership. The exact 
significance of these expressions is a controversial matter, and for a considerable 
time it was considered that they referred to a case of error in dominio, where the 
guardian thought to deliver something of the lunatic when in fact it belonged to 
himself and vice versa46. Another opinion is that the text would demonstrate the 
key role which the contemplatio domini plays at the delivery, since acts performed 
nomine alieno would transfer ownership, while those performed nomine proprio 
would at most grant bonitary ownership47. Despite these ideas, the prevailing 
opinion48 is that the key to this text is that the guardian would not have 
performed an act of administration in the best interest of the lunatic, an 
interpretation which agrees with the ratio offered at the end of the text (“because 
he did not convey it while administering the lunatic’s affairs”). Accordingly, the 
expression “quasi suam tradat” should be seen as indicating that the guardian 
performed the delivery as if the thing were his own, having his own interest in 
mind and not that of the lunatic. It may be not too adventurous to assume that in 
such a case the benefit which arises from the operation, whatever it may be, goes 
the person of the guardian. This interpretation also agrees with that of 
D. 1,19,1,1 (Ulp. 16 ed.)49, found within the same book of Ulpian’s Commentary 
to the Edict, where ownership over an object delivered by a procurator “as being 
his own property” (quasi rem propriam) is not transferred, because he is not seen as 
administering carefully (diligenter gerere). 
 Up to this point it could appear that Roman jurists made use of a strictly 
objective criterion, which would be to determine in each case whether a 
particular act of alienation can be regarded as performed administrationis causa or 
not. It would moreover seem from the text of D. 27,10,17 that it would be 
mainly the judge’s duty (cognitio iudicis) to determine whether the owner derives a 
benefit from the guardian’s actions. There are however other texts which are 
more subjectively oriented in their approach, particularly due to the reference to 
                                                 
45  D. 27,10,10,1: “The curator of a lunatic could indeed convey his own property as if it 
belonged to the lunatic and so transfer ownership, but if he conveys the lunatic’s property 
as if it were his own, it must be said that this does not transfer ownership because he did 
not convey it while administering the lunatic’s affairs” (transl. Watson). 
46  De Francisci, Trasferimento (1924), p. 192-193; Voci, L’errore (1937), p. 96-97. 
47  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 122-123. The opinions of Sansón regarding the 
significance of the contemplatio domini at traditio are discussed in Chapter 2, Section 5 below. 
48  Betti, Esercitazioni (1930), p. 107-109; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 16-18. 
49  See on this text Chapter 2, Section 3(d) above. 
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nam in tradendo ita res furiosi alienat, si id ad administrationem 
negotiorum pertineat: et ideo si donandi causa alienet, neque 
traditio quicquam valebit, nisi ex magna utilitate furiosi hoc 
cognitione iudicis faciat43. 
 
Gaius excludes in principle the possibility that the curator furiosi may perform a 
manumission, since this act is not regarded as part of his powers of 
administration, pointing out that alienations performed by him are only valid if 
they belong to the administratio negotiorum. A parallel is then drawn with the 
alienation donandi causa, which will normally be ineffective. Nonetheless, Gaius 
points out that the donation will however transfer ownership if from it follows a 
great benefit for the lunatic, which shows that even the most common examples 
of acts not normally covered under the concept of administration will be valid if 
they, in one way or another, improve the position of the owner. Conversely, this 
implies that the acts which could be seen as part of the administration of the 
owner’s affairs could be revised attending to the convenience for the owner. 
Ulpian, for instance, considers that the pledge given by the curator furiosi will only 
be valid if it was granted with the best interest of the lunatic in mind44. 
 A similar guideline is used by Ulpian in another case dealing with the curator 
furiosi: 
 
D. 27,10,10,1 (Ulp. 16 ed.): Curator furiosi rem quidem suam quasi 
furiosi tradere poterit et dominium transferre: rem vero furiosi si 
                                                                                                                   
administration they sell property on a ground which gives the right to do so. Since, 
therefore, they have no power to donate the property of persons whose affairs they 
manage, you are not forbidden to reclaim the property from the possessor thereof” (transl. 
Blume, modified). 
43  D. 27,10,17: “A lunatic’s curator ought in no way to grant freedom because this is not a 
matter of administration. In so granting, he only alienates the lunatic’s property if this is 
part of the administration of his affairs. So if he alienates as a gift, the delivery will not be 
valid unless, in the judge’s opinion, it is done for the greater benefit of the lunatic” (transl. 
Watson). 
44  D. 27,10,11 (Paul 7 ad Plautium) “Pignus a curatore furiosi datum valet, si utilitate furiosi 
exigente id fecit”. 
 
quasi suam tradat, dicendum, ut non transferat dominium, quia non 
furiosi negotium gerens tradidit45. 
 
In the first part of the text, we are told that the delivery of a thing belonging to 
the lunatic by the curator furiosi “as if it belonged to the lunatic” will transfer 
ownership, while in the second part it is said that such a delivery performed “as if 
it were his own” (the guardian’s) will not transfer ownership. The exact 
significance of these expressions is a controversial matter, and for a considerable 
time it was considered that they referred to a case of error in dominio, where the 
guardian thought to deliver something of the lunatic when in fact it belonged to 
himself and vice versa46. Another opinion is that the text would demonstrate the 
key role which the contemplatio domini plays at the delivery, since acts performed 
nomine alieno would transfer ownership, while those performed nomine proprio 
would at most grant bonitary ownership47. Despite these ideas, the prevailing 
opinion48 is that the key to this text is that the guardian would not have 
performed an act of administration in the best interest of the lunatic, an 
interpretation which agrees with the ratio offered at the end of the text (“because 
he did not convey it while administering the lunatic’s affairs”). Accordingly, the 
expression “quasi suam tradat” should be seen as indicating that the guardian 
performed the delivery as if the thing were his own, having his own interest in 
mind and not that of the lunatic. It may be not too adventurous to assume that in 
such a case the benefit which arises from the operation, whatever it may be, goes 
the person of the guardian. This interpretation also agrees with that of 
D. 1,19,1,1 (Ulp. 16 ed.)49, found within the same book of Ulpian’s Commentary 
to the Edict, where ownership over an object delivered by a procurator “as being 
his own property” (quasi rem propriam) is not transferred, because he is not seen as 
administering carefully (diligenter gerere). 
 Up to this point it could appear that Roman jurists made use of a strictly 
objective criterion, which would be to determine in each case whether a 
particular act of alienation can be regarded as performed administrationis causa or 
not. It would moreover seem from the text of D. 27,10,17 that it would be 
mainly the judge’s duty (cognitio iudicis) to determine whether the owner derives a 
benefit from the guardian’s actions. There are however other texts which are 
more subjectively oriented in their approach, particularly due to the reference to 
                                                 
45  D. 27,10,10,1: “The curator of a lunatic could indeed convey his own property as if it 
belonged to the lunatic and so transfer ownership, but if he conveys the lunatic’s property 
as if it were his own, it must be said that this does not transfer ownership because he did 
not convey it while administering the lunatic’s affairs” (transl. Watson). 
46  De Francisci, Trasferimento (1924), p. 192-193; Voci, L’errore (1937), p. 96-97. 
47  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 122-123. The opinions of Sansón regarding the 
significance of the contemplatio domini at traditio are discussed in Chapter 2, Section 5 below. 
48  Betti, Esercitazioni (1930), p. 107-109; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 16-18. 
49  See on this text Chapter 2, Section 3(d) above. 
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the bona fides or dolus of a legal guardian. The first of these concepts is referred to 
in the following text: 
 
D. 26,7,12,1 (Paul 38 ed.): Quae bona fide a tutore gesta sunt, rata 
habentur etiam ex rescriptis Traiani et Hadriani: et ideo pupillus rem 
a tutore legitime distractam vindicare non potest: nam et inutile est 
pupillis, si administratio eorum non servatur, nemine scilicet 
emente. Nec interest, tutor solvendo fuerit nec ne, cum, si bona fide 
res gesta sit, servanda sit, si mala fide, alienatio non valet50. 
 
Paul declares in this text that acts performed by a tutor in good faith will be 
upheld, which in turn means that if he transferred ownership the pupillus will not 
be able to exercise the rei vindicatio, without clarifying whether this implies a 
denegatio actionis or the existence of a particular exceptio. Considering that legal 
guardians would have been able to transfer Quiritary ownership, the former 
option appears more likely. It is further argued that the reason for this solution is 
that otherwise no one would buy from a tutor. This seems to indicate that this is a 
somewhat innovative solution, but the reference to the ratification (rata habentur) 
of this practice by rescripts by Trajan and Hadrian – about which we know 
nothing further – rather shows that an already existing solution was confirmed on 
this ground. The final sentence stresses the validity of an alienation performed by 
the tutor in good faith, and the opposite solution in case he acts in bad faith. That 
the relevance of good faith is no innovation of Paul’s can be seen in the fact that 
Africanus before him, when discussing the conditions for a statuliber to become 
free and his collusion with the tutor to whom he had to render account of the 
money, indicates that in the latter case he will not be freed since the transaction 
“should take place in good faith without fraud on the part of the statuliber and the 
tutor in accordance with the regular practice for the alienation of property of a 
pupillus”51 (transl. Watson). 
 While it could appear that Paul resorts exclusively to subjective elements to 
determine the validity of the sale, it should be noted that the text refers to a thing 
“lawfully alienated” (legitime distractam)52. The reference to the good or bad faith 
of the tutor seems therefore to merely complement the general notions regarding 
                                                 
50  D. 26,7,12,1: “What is done in good faith by a tutor is ratified in accordance with the 
rescripts of Trajan and Hadrian; and therefore, a pupillus cannot vindicate property lawfully 
alienated by a tutor; for it is also injurious to pupilli if their administration is not upheld, 
because surely no one would buy. Nor does it matter whether the tutor was solvent or not, 
since, if the business was carried out in good faith, it should be upheld, if fraudulently, the 
alienation is not valid” (transl. Watson, modified). 
51  D. 40,4,22 (Afr. 9 quaestionum): “(…) ut bona fide et citra fraudem statuliberi et tutoris id 
fiat, sicut et in alienationibus rerum pupillarium servatur (…)” 
52  Conversely, Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 18 does not see any need for the term 
legitime and considers it interpolated, following Ind. Itp. (1931) II, col. 131, despite 
discarding the opinions of the authors there quoted regarding other aspects of the text. 
 
the limits of his administration, emphasizing the subjective stance of the tutor 
regarding the convenience of the alienation. The fact that the good or bad faith 
of the legal guardian does not replace the requirement according to which the 
administration must be carried out in the owner’s best interest, but rather 
complements it, can be seen in the texts dealing with the theft by a legal 
guardian. A distinctive feature of the theft by legal representatives is that normally 
the owner’s will is irrelevant, and therefore the criterion to determine the 
existence of furtum is not that the legal guardian acts ‘invito domino’, but rather 
that he administers in a perfidious way, as Tryphoninus puts it when discussing 
the theft by a tutor impuberis in D. 26,7,55,1 (Tryphoninus 14 disputationum): 
“(…) Sed tutores propter admissam administrationem non tam invito domino contrectare 
eam videntur quam perfide agere (…)”53. That the tutor administers in a disloyal or 
perfidious way which allows qualifying his acts as theftuous does not simply mean 
that his management makes the situation of the owner worse. Just as in other 
cases in which a non-owner already has in his power the object belonging to 
another one54, the subjective representation of the legal guardian plays a decisive 
role in order to determine the existence of furtum. The significance of the animus 
furandi is not only to be seen in Tryphoninus’ reference to the perfidious way in 
which the tutor conducts himself, but it is moreover explicitly declared by 
Ulpian: 
 
D. 47,2,33 (Ulp. 41 Sab.): Tutor administrationem quidem rerum 
pupillarium habet, intercipiendi autem potestas ei non datur: et ideo 
si quid furandi animo amoverit, furtum facit nec usucapi res potest. 
Sed et furti actione tenetur, quamvis et tutelae agi cum eo possit. 
Quod in tutore scriptum est, idem erit et in curatore adulescentis 
ceterisque curatoribus55. 
 
In this fragment we are told that the administration which the tutor impuberis has 
does not give him the faculty to take away (intercipiendi potestas), which confirms 
that the acts concluded by legal guardians must take place administrationis causa. 
However, if he takes goods with the intention to steal (animo furandi) he will 
commit furtum, and the things which he takes, being res furtivae, will not be 
acquired through usucapion by subsequent possessors. From this text it becomes 
                                                 
53  D. 26,7,55,1: “(…) The tutores, however, because they have accepted the administration, 
are seen not so much as appropriating the property against the owner’s will, as in acting in 
a perfidious way (…)” (transl. Watson, modified). 
54  See Chapter 2, Section 2 above. 
55  D. 47,2,33: “A tutor has the administration of the estate of his pupillus, but he is not 
allowed to take away from it; hence, if he should take something with the intention to 
steal he commits theft, and the thing is incapable of usucapion. And he is liable to the 
action on theft, even though he is also liable to the action on tutelage. What has been 
written in relation to the tutor of a pupillus applies also to the case of a minor and to other 
curators” (transl. Watson, modified). 
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the bona fides or dolus of a legal guardian. The first of these concepts is referred to 
in the following text: 
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habentur etiam ex rescriptis Traiani et Hadriani: et ideo pupillus rem 
a tutore legitime distractam vindicare non potest: nam et inutile est 
pupillis, si administratio eorum non servatur, nemine scilicet 
emente. Nec interest, tutor solvendo fuerit nec ne, cum, si bona fide 
res gesta sit, servanda sit, si mala fide, alienatio non valet50. 
 
Paul declares in this text that acts performed by a tutor in good faith will be 
upheld, which in turn means that if he transferred ownership the pupillus will not 
be able to exercise the rei vindicatio, without clarifying whether this implies a 
denegatio actionis or the existence of a particular exceptio. Considering that legal 
guardians would have been able to transfer Quiritary ownership, the former 
option appears more likely. It is further argued that the reason for this solution is 
that otherwise no one would buy from a tutor. This seems to indicate that this is a 
somewhat innovative solution, but the reference to the ratification (rata habentur) 
of this practice by rescripts by Trajan and Hadrian – about which we know 
nothing further – rather shows that an already existing solution was confirmed on 
this ground. The final sentence stresses the validity of an alienation performed by 
the tutor in good faith, and the opposite solution in case he acts in bad faith. That 
the relevance of good faith is no innovation of Paul’s can be seen in the fact that 
Africanus before him, when discussing the conditions for a statuliber to become 
free and his collusion with the tutor to whom he had to render account of the 
money, indicates that in the latter case he will not be freed since the transaction 
“should take place in good faith without fraud on the part of the statuliber and the 
tutor in accordance with the regular practice for the alienation of property of a 
pupillus”51 (transl. Watson). 
 While it could appear that Paul resorts exclusively to subjective elements to 
determine the validity of the sale, it should be noted that the text refers to a thing 
“lawfully alienated” (legitime distractam)52. The reference to the good or bad faith 
of the tutor seems therefore to merely complement the general notions regarding 
                                                 
50  D. 26,7,12,1: “What is done in good faith by a tutor is ratified in accordance with the 
rescripts of Trajan and Hadrian; and therefore, a pupillus cannot vindicate property lawfully 
alienated by a tutor; for it is also injurious to pupilli if their administration is not upheld, 
because surely no one would buy. Nor does it matter whether the tutor was solvent or not, 
since, if the business was carried out in good faith, it should be upheld, if fraudulently, the 
alienation is not valid” (transl. Watson, modified). 
51  D. 40,4,22 (Afr. 9 quaestionum): “(…) ut bona fide et citra fraudem statuliberi et tutoris id 
fiat, sicut et in alienationibus rerum pupillarium servatur (…)” 
52  Conversely, Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 18 does not see any need for the term 
legitime and considers it interpolated, following Ind. Itp. (1931) II, col. 131, despite 
discarding the opinions of the authors there quoted regarding other aspects of the text. 
 
the limits of his administration, emphasizing the subjective stance of the tutor 
regarding the convenience of the alienation. The fact that the good or bad faith 
of the legal guardian does not replace the requirement according to which the 
administration must be carried out in the owner’s best interest, but rather 
complements it, can be seen in the texts dealing with the theft by a legal 
guardian. A distinctive feature of the theft by legal representatives is that normally 
the owner’s will is irrelevant, and therefore the criterion to determine the 
existence of furtum is not that the legal guardian acts ‘invito domino’, but rather 
that he administers in a perfidious way, as Tryphoninus puts it when discussing 
the theft by a tutor impuberis in D. 26,7,55,1 (Tryphoninus 14 disputationum): 
“(…) Sed tutores propter admissam administrationem non tam invito domino contrectare 
eam videntur quam perfide agere (…)”53. That the tutor administers in a disloyal or 
perfidious way which allows qualifying his acts as theftuous does not simply mean 
that his management makes the situation of the owner worse. Just as in other 
cases in which a non-owner already has in his power the object belonging to 
another one54, the subjective representation of the legal guardian plays a decisive 
role in order to determine the existence of furtum. The significance of the animus 
furandi is not only to be seen in Tryphoninus’ reference to the perfidious way in 
which the tutor conducts himself, but it is moreover explicitly declared by 
Ulpian: 
 
D. 47,2,33 (Ulp. 41 Sab.): Tutor administrationem quidem rerum 
pupillarium habet, intercipiendi autem potestas ei non datur: et ideo 
si quid furandi animo amoverit, furtum facit nec usucapi res potest. 
Sed et furti actione tenetur, quamvis et tutelae agi cum eo possit. 
Quod in tutore scriptum est, idem erit et in curatore adulescentis 
ceterisque curatoribus55. 
 
In this fragment we are told that the administration which the tutor impuberis has 
does not give him the faculty to take away (intercipiendi potestas), which confirms 
that the acts concluded by legal guardians must take place administrationis causa. 
However, if he takes goods with the intention to steal (animo furandi) he will 
commit furtum, and the things which he takes, being res furtivae, will not be 
acquired through usucapion by subsequent possessors. From this text it becomes 
                                                 
53  D. 26,7,55,1: “(…) The tutores, however, because they have accepted the administration, 
are seen not so much as appropriating the property against the owner’s will, as in acting in 
a perfidious way (…)” (transl. Watson, modified). 
54  See Chapter 2, Section 2 above. 
55  D. 47,2,33: “A tutor has the administration of the estate of his pupillus, but he is not 
allowed to take away from it; hence, if he should take something with the intention to 
steal he commits theft, and the thing is incapable of usucapion. And he is liable to the 
action on theft, even though he is also liable to the action on tutelage. What has been 
written in relation to the tutor of a pupillus applies also to the case of a minor and to other 
curators” (transl. Watson, modified). 
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clear that not every form of bad administration amounts to furtum, but only those 
cases in which the legal guardian has the animus furandi.  
 The requirements and consequences of the theft of a tutor are also sketched by 
Julian: 
 
D. 41,4,7,3 (Jul. 44 dig.): Si tutor rem pupilli subripuerit et 
vendiderit, usucapio non contingit, priusquam res in potestatem 
pupilli redeat: nam tutor in re pupilli tunc domini loco habetur, 
cum tutelam administrat, non cum pupillum spoliat56. 
 
That no special reference to the animus furandi is to be found in this text can be 
explained by the fact that the conduct of the tutor leaves no room for doubt 
concerning his intentions, since he snatches an object belonging to the ward in 
order to sell it. Julian’s final remark, according to which the tutor is regarded to 
act domini loco when he administers the tutelage and not when he despoils the 
ward, accounts in principle only for the fact that ownership is not transferred, 
since the acts concluded by the tutor are not performed administrationis causa.  
 The preceding texts show that the administration in the owner’s best interest 
and the reference to the good or bad faith of the legal guardian are not 
conflicting criteria to determine the transfer of ownership. The basic element to 
analyse is that the management of the legal guardian takes place administrationis 
causa, which is a relatively flexible notion that considers the best interest of the 
owner, according to which even the binding force of some legal prohibitions 
affecting the legal guardian can be modified. Considering the flexibility of this 
criterion, the reference to the existence of bad faith on the side of the legal 
guardian may be a key element in order to determine at what point he exceeds 
the limits of his administration. The deliberately disloyal management will lead to 
qualifying the alienations performed by the legal guardian as furtum, which will 
prevent the acquisition through usucapion57. The significance of this fact, 
however, should not be blown out of proportion, and just like not every delivery 
performed invito domino is to be considered furtum58, not every case of bad 
administration by a legal guardian will be theftuous: a positive intention to 
commit theft will be required to qualify the delivered object as a res furtiva. 
Accordingly, the alienation performed by a legal guardian which has such 
                                                 
56  D. 41,4,7,3: “If a tutor should appropriate a thing belonging to his pupillus and sell it, there 
can be no usucapion of it until it returns into the control of the pupillus; for a tutor is 
regarded as an owner in the affairs of his ward, only when he is administering his 
guardianship, not when he is despoiling the pupillus” (transl. Watson). 
57  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 117-120 considers that the conveyance performed mala 
fide by a legal guardian does not necessarily imply that he commits furtum, but it does not 
seem feasible to make a distinction between mala fides on the one hand and dolus or animus 
furandi on the other one. If a legal guardian, intentionally and with a fraudulent intent, 
exceeds his faculties of administration, he will inevitably be seen as committing furtum. 
58  See Chapter 2, Section 2 above. 
 
detrimental effects for the owner that it cannot be considered to have taken place 
administrationis causa will not amount to furtum if the transferor did not consider to 
exceed his faculties of administration, just as the acts of alienation of someone 
who believes to have been lawfully appointed as a legal guardian without it being 
so. 
 
3. Possibility to transfer the dominium ex iure Quiritium  
 
Since it is clear that legal guardians could transfer ownership, the question rises 
on whether they would be able to transfer ownership in the same way as the 
owner would if he was not affected by a prohibition to dispose, and particularly 
whether Quiritary ownership could be transferred. An affirmative answer seems 
in principle intuitive, considering that this was the case regarding the traditio 
voluntate domini and that it seems rather odd that someone who draws his potestas 
alienandi from a legal provision could not achieve the same result. There are 
moreover several texts which stress that a legal guardian would act domini loco, 
and among them the following text regarding both the tutor and the curator: 
 
D. 47,2,57(56),4 (Jul. 22 dig.): Qui tutelam gerit, transigere cum 
fure potest et, si in potestatem suam redegerit rem furtivam, desinit 
furtiva esse, quia tutor domini loco habetur. Sed et circa curatorem 
furiosi eadem dicenda sunt, qui adeo personam domini sustinet, ut 
etiam tradendo rem furiosi alienare existimetur. Condicere autem 
rem furtivam tutor et curator furiosi eorum nomine possunt59. 
 
In the context of theft, Julian indicates that the reversio of the stolen object also 
takes place if the tutor is the one who receives it, since he is considered to be in 
the place of the owner (domini loco). Following this idea, we are told that the 
same can be said about the curator, which even implies that he must be deemed to 
transfer ownership when performing the traditio over assets of the lunatic. The 
text leaves little room to doubt that the effects of the delivery will be identical to 
that performed by the owner himself, and this is not the only case in which it is 
declared that a legal guardian acts domini loco60. Moreover, several other fragments 
also grant the acts performed by a legal guardian the same consequences as if they 
had been carried out by an owner not affected by a prohibition to dispose or by a 
non-owner acting voluntate domini. According to Paul, for instance, the ward 
                                                 
59  D. 47,2,57(56),4: “An administering tutor can make a transactio with the thief, and if he 
recovers the stolen thing into his control, it is no longer a stolen thing; for a tutor is in the 
position of an owner. The same must be said regarding the curator of a lunatic, who has to 
such an extent the role of the owner that even by delivering a thing belonging to the 
lunatic he is deemed to alienate it. A tutor and the curator of a lunatic can also bring a 
condictio for stolen goods in the name of the pupillus or lunatic” (transl. Watson, modified). 
60  See e.g. D. 26,7,27 (Paul 7 ad Plautium); D. 41,4,7,3 (Jul. 44 dig.). 
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clear that not every form of bad administration amounts to furtum, but only those 
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pupilli redeat: nam tutor in re pupilli tunc domini loco habetur, 
cum tutelam administrat, non cum pupillum spoliat56. 
 
That no special reference to the animus furandi is to be found in this text can be 
explained by the fact that the conduct of the tutor leaves no room for doubt 
concerning his intentions, since he snatches an object belonging to the ward in 
order to sell it. Julian’s final remark, according to which the tutor is regarded to 
act domini loco when he administers the tutelage and not when he despoils the 
ward, accounts in principle only for the fact that ownership is not transferred, 
since the acts concluded by the tutor are not performed administrationis causa.  
 The preceding texts show that the administration in the owner’s best interest 
and the reference to the good or bad faith of the legal guardian are not 
conflicting criteria to determine the transfer of ownership. The basic element to 
analyse is that the management of the legal guardian takes place administrationis 
causa, which is a relatively flexible notion that considers the best interest of the 
owner, according to which even the binding force of some legal prohibitions 
affecting the legal guardian can be modified. Considering the flexibility of this 
criterion, the reference to the existence of bad faith on the side of the legal 
guardian may be a key element in order to determine at what point he exceeds 
the limits of his administration. The deliberately disloyal management will lead to 
qualifying the alienations performed by the legal guardian as furtum, which will 
prevent the acquisition through usucapion57. The significance of this fact, 
however, should not be blown out of proportion, and just like not every delivery 
performed invito domino is to be considered furtum58, not every case of bad 
administration by a legal guardian will be theftuous: a positive intention to 
commit theft will be required to qualify the delivered object as a res furtiva. 
Accordingly, the alienation performed by a legal guardian which has such 
                                                 
56  D. 41,4,7,3: “If a tutor should appropriate a thing belonging to his pupillus and sell it, there 
can be no usucapion of it until it returns into the control of the pupillus; for a tutor is 
regarded as an owner in the affairs of his ward, only when he is administering his 
guardianship, not when he is despoiling the pupillus” (transl. Watson). 
57  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 117-120 considers that the conveyance performed mala 
fide by a legal guardian does not necessarily imply that he commits furtum, but it does not 
seem feasible to make a distinction between mala fides on the one hand and dolus or animus 
furandi on the other one. If a legal guardian, intentionally and with a fraudulent intent, 
exceeds his faculties of administration, he will inevitably be seen as committing furtum. 
58  See Chapter 2, Section 2 above. 
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In the context of theft, Julian indicates that the reversio of the stolen object also 
takes place if the tutor is the one who receives it, since he is considered to be in 
the place of the owner (domini loco). Following this idea, we are told that the 
same can be said about the curator, which even implies that he must be deemed to 
transfer ownership when performing the traditio over assets of the lunatic. The 
text leaves little room to doubt that the effects of the delivery will be identical to 
that performed by the owner himself, and this is not the only case in which it is 
declared that a legal guardian acts domini loco60. Moreover, several other fragments 
also grant the acts performed by a legal guardian the same consequences as if they 
had been carried out by an owner not affected by a prohibition to dispose or by a 
non-owner acting voluntate domini. According to Paul, for instance, the ward 
                                                 
59  D. 47,2,57(56),4: “An administering tutor can make a transactio with the thief, and if he 
recovers the stolen thing into his control, it is no longer a stolen thing; for a tutor is in the 
position of an owner. The same must be said regarding the curator of a lunatic, who has to 
such an extent the role of the owner that even by delivering a thing belonging to the 
lunatic he is deemed to alienate it. A tutor and the curator of a lunatic can also bring a 
condictio for stolen goods in the name of the pupillus or lunatic” (transl. Watson, modified). 
60  See e.g. D. 26,7,27 (Paul 7 ad Plautium); D. 41,4,7,3 (Jul. 44 dig.). 
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cannot exercise the rei vindicatio over assets lawfully alienated by his tutor61, which 
indicates that the iustum dominium was indeed transferred by the latter. Moreover 
Gaius declares in Gai 2,4762 that according to the Law of the Twelve Tables the 
traditio of a res mancipi performed by a woman would only lead to usucapion if it 
was authorized by her tutor, which grants this traditio the same consequences – a 
possessio ad usucapionem – as if it was performed by an owner not affected by a 
prohibition to dispose. It is also reported that the accessio possessionis will take 
place if the traditio is performed by a legal guardian, just as if it was performed by 
the owner himself, by an authorized non-owner or by a son-in-power or slave 
acting within the libera administratio peculii63.  
 All of these texts presented so far seem to show that acts concluded or 
authorized by a legal guardian would bear the same consequences as if performed 
by the owner, and one could expect accordingly that the dominium ex iure 
Quiritium was granted to the acquirer. There are, however, a significant number 
of texts in which the position of the acquirer appears to be protected exclusively 
through praetorian remedies, showing that he does not have Quiritary 
ownership. Some scholars consider that this would imply that legal guardians 
were not able to transfer the dominium ex iure Quiritium, an opinion which agrees 
with the traditional view according to which Roman law would originally have 
excluded that a non-owner according to the ius civile could directly affect the 
position of the owner, and that only at a later stage the praetor would have 
protected the acquirer. Such an approach, however, forgets that not every form 
of legal guardianship has the same source, and that besides the curatores and tutores 
‘legitimi’ – those whose guardianship stemmed from a statutory provision such as 
the Law of the Twelve Tables – there were a significant number of cases in 
which the prohibition to dispose and the subsequent concession of the potestas 
alienandi to a guardian stemmed from the activity of the praetor, making them 
accordingly ‘honorarii’. Only regarding this latter group would the potestas 
alienandi of a legal guardian refer exclusively to the transfer of praetorian 
ownership. This can be seen through the analysis of texts dealing with praetorian 
prohibitions to dispose, such as the following: 
 
                                                 
61  D. 26,7,12,1 (Paul 38 ed.): “Quae bona fide a tutore gesta sunt, rata habentur etiam ex 
rescriptis Traiani et Hadriani: et ideo pupillus rem a tutore legitime distractam vindicare 
non potest (…)” 
62  Gai 2,47: “Item olim mulieris, quae in agnatorum tutela erat, res mancipi usucapi non 
poterant, praeterquam si ab ipsa tutore auctore traditae essent: id ita lege XII tabularum 
cautum erat”. 
63  D. 41,2,14pr-1 (Paul 68 ed.); D. 44,3,15pr-6 (Ven. 5 interdictorum). 
 
D. 27,10,10pr (Ulp. 16 ed.): Iulianus scribit eos, quibus per 
praetorem bonis interdictum est, nihil transferre posse ad aliquem, 
quia in bonis non habeant, cum eis deminutio sit interdicta64.  
 
Ulpian reproduces here the opinion of Julian, according to whom those under a 
praetorian prohibition to dispose could not transfer ownership over their assets 
because they do not have them in bonis. The fragment is located by Lenel under 
the rubric De Publiciana in rem actione, and according to him it would have dealt 
specifically with the cases of delivery a domino65. This does not imply that the 
person affected by the praetorian prohibition to alienate can transfer the nudum 
ius Quiritium, since other texts show that the acquirer may only acquire through 
usucapion in such cases, and only if he was unaware of the condition of the 
transferor66. Nonetheless, the text shows the fundamental link between the 
praetorian prohibitions to dispose and the possibility to transfer the praetorian 
ownership. 
 Having the basic guideline according to which the effects of the alienation by 
a legal guardian would be determined by the source of his potestas alienandi, it is 
worth noting that it is not always clear when we face a legitimus or a honorarius 
guardian. Clear references to the problem inevitably became blurred in Justinian’s 
compilation, from which we can only distinguish the existence of various pieces 
of legislation determining or confirming the faculties of certain legal guardians67, 
as well as the intervention of the praetor, either generally granting faculties of 
administration in new cases, by bestowing specific praetorian exceptions in 
particular cases or by fixing the specific duties and faculties of the guardian in the 
decree granting the administration. It is therefore often unclear whether classical 
jurists would regard the potestas alienandi in specific cases as stemming from 
statutory provisions or from the activity of the praetor. 
 One should moreover not exclude that the praetor may intervene in a 
particular case for causes unrelated to the source of the legal guardian’s potestas 
alienandi. This seems to be the case in the following text: 
 
D. 27,10,7,1 (Jul. 21 dig.): Curator dementi datus decreto 
interposito, uti satisdaret, non cavit et tamen quasdam res de bonis 
eius legitimo modo alienavit. Si heredes dementis easdem res 
vindicent, quas curator alienavit, et exceptio opponetur ‘si non 
curator vendiderit’, replicatio dari debet ‘aut si satisdatione 
                                                 
64  D. 27,10,10pr: “Julian wrote that those who were forbidden to deal with their goods by 
the praetor could not convey anything to anybody, because they have no goods since they 
are forbidden to alienate” (transl. Watson). 
65  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 511 n. 5; Lenel, EP (1927), p. 169. 
66  D. 18,1,26 (Pomp. 17 Sab.); D. 41,3,12 (Paul 21 ed.); D. 41,4,7,5 (Jul. 44 dig.). 
67  See e.g. D. 26,7,12,1 (Paul. 38 ed.): “Quae bona fide a tutore gesta sunt, rata habentur 
etiam ex rescriptis Traiani et Hadriani (…)”. 
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because they do not have them in bonis. The fragment is located by Lenel under 
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ius Quiritium, since other texts show that the acquirer may only acquire through 
usucapion in such cases, and only if he was unaware of the condition of the 
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praetorian prohibitions to dispose and the possibility to transfer the praetorian 
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 Having the basic guideline according to which the effects of the alienation by 
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worth noting that it is not always clear when we face a legitimus or a honorarius 
guardian. Clear references to the problem inevitably became blurred in Justinian’s 
compilation, from which we can only distinguish the existence of various pieces 
of legislation determining or confirming the faculties of certain legal guardians67, 
as well as the intervention of the praetor, either generally granting faculties of 
administration in new cases, by bestowing specific praetorian exceptions in 
particular cases or by fixing the specific duties and faculties of the guardian in the 
decree granting the administration. It is therefore often unclear whether classical 
jurists would regard the potestas alienandi in specific cases as stemming from 
statutory provisions or from the activity of the praetor. 
 One should moreover not exclude that the praetor may intervene in a 
particular case for causes unrelated to the source of the legal guardian’s potestas 
alienandi. This seems to be the case in the following text: 
 
D. 27,10,7,1 (Jul. 21 dig.): Curator dementi datus decreto 
interposito, uti satisdaret, non cavit et tamen quasdam res de bonis 
eius legitimo modo alienavit. Si heredes dementis easdem res 
vindicent, quas curator alienavit, et exceptio opponetur ‘si non 
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64  D. 27,10,10pr: “Julian wrote that those who were forbidden to deal with their goods by 
the praetor could not convey anything to anybody, because they have no goods since they 
are forbidden to alienate” (transl. Watson). 
65  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 511 n. 5; Lenel, EP (1927), p. 169. 
66  D. 18,1,26 (Pomp. 17 Sab.); D. 41,3,12 (Paul 21 ed.); D. 41,4,7,5 (Jul. 44 dig.). 
67  See e.g. D. 26,7,12,1 (Paul. 38 ed.): “Quae bona fide a tutore gesta sunt, rata habentur 
etiam ex rescriptis Traiani et Hadriani (…)”. 
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interposita secundum decretum vendiderit’. Quod si pretio accepto 
curator creditores furiosi dimisit, triplicatio doli tutos possessores 
praestabit68.  
 
Julian presents in this fragment the case of a curator furiosi who was ordered by the 
praetorian decree conferring him this quality to give a surety, and without doing 
so he proceeds to lawfully alienate (legitimo modo alienavit). We are then told that 
the heirs of the lunatic may attempt a rei vindicatio, to which the acquirer of the 
goods may bring up the defence ‘unless the curator sold it’, which will in turn be 
met with a replicatio referring to the existence of a surety by the curator. If the legal 
guardian had granted no surety, but nonetheless had administered in the interest 
of the lunatic – paying off the lunatic’s creditors with the money he obtained 
from the transaction – the acquirer would be able to repel the lunatic’s heirs with 
a triplicatio doli, which would be grounded on the fact that while the lunatic lost 
an asset belonging to him, his position was not really made worse by the 
management of the curator69.  
 The most puzzling element concerning D. 27,10,7,1 is that this is the only 
known text in which a reference to the exceptio si non curator vendiderit is made, 
which makes one wonder why no other reference to it can be found in the 
numerous cases in which a curator furiosi – or any other legal guardian – transfers 
ownership. According to some scholars, this text would prove that every 
alienation performed by a curator furiosi could only provide a bonitary ownership 
to the acquirer70, which is why the rei vindicatio of the heirs can only be faced 
with an exceptio. Others simply regard the text as decisively interpolated, since the 
words “legitimo modo” used to describe the alienation would have been 
introduced by the compilers to make reference to the prohibition arising from 
the Oratio Severi, which would have been introduced after the time of Julian71. 
Solazzi and Gonvers in particular consider that ownership is not transferred 
because of the failure of the curator to grant the satisdatio72, an idea which, 
however, does not take into account that this was a requirement of the ius 
honorarium that could not possibly affect the transfer of the iustum dominium. A 
more complete explanation can be found in the fact that the underlying reason 
                                                 
68  D. 27,10,7,1: “A curator appointed for a lunatic and ordered by decree to give security did 
not do so, but transferred certain objects from the property in a lawful manner. If the 
lunatic’s heirs claim the objects which the curator transferred and the defence is raised 
‘unless the curator sold it’, a replicatio ought to be given ‘if he sold it after giving security 
according to decree’. If the curator paid off the lunatic’s creditors with the money he 
received, the possessors will be protected by a triplicatio of fraud” (transl. Watson, 
modified). 
69  Guzmán, Caución tutelar (1974), p. 98; Carbone, Satisdatio tutoris (2014), p. 32-33. It is 
worth noting that according to Gai 1,199 the purpose of the surety was to prevent the 
consumption and diminishing of the owner’s goods (consumantur aut deminuantur). 
70  Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 455. 
71  Beseler, Miscellanea (1925), p. 249. 
72  Solazzi, La minore età (1912), p. 142; Gonvers, L’exceptio (1939), p. 81.  
 
for the failure in transferring ownership does not lie in the lack of potestas 
alienandi or the existence of a prohibition to dispose, but rather in the fact that 
the curator is performing a traditio instead of a mancipatio. While D. 27,10,7,1 does 
not give many clues on this point, another decision within the same fragment 
leaves little room for doubt:  
 
D. 27,10,7,3 (Jul. 21 dig.): Quaesitum est, an alteri ex curatoribus 
furiosi recte solvetur vel an unus rem furiosi alienare possit. 
Respondi recte solvi. Eum quoque, qui ab altero ex curatoribus 
fundum furiosi legitime mercaretur, usucapturum, quia solutio 
venditio traditio facti magis quam iuris sunt ideoque sufficit unius ex 
curatoribus persona, quia intellegitur alter consentire: denique si 
praesens sit et vetet solvi, vetet venire vel tradi, neque debitor 
liberabitur neque emptor usucapiet73. 
 
In the first part of the text the possibility of the existence of more than one curator 
furiosi is presented, along with Julian’s opinion that the payment or alienation 
performed by one of them will be valid. It is then claimed that if a piece of land 
is lawfully purchased (legitime mercaretur) from one of the legal guardians, the 
acquirer will be able to usucapt. The fact that ownership is not successfully 
transferred and consequently that the purchaser only has a possessio ad usucapionem 
is rather unexpected, since we have just been informed that one of the curatores 
may validly pay or transfer ownership. The explanation according to which 
“payment, sale and delivery (traditio) are matters of fact rather than of law and so 
it is enough if one of the curatores acts, the other being taken to agree” only 
reveals that the other curator is seen as agreeing, and the final sentence shows that 
if he forbids the payment, sale or traditio, the possibility of acquiring through 
usucapion will be excluded. Some authors have seen in this fragment, just as in 
D. 27,10,7,1, a piece of evidence that legal guardians would not be able to 
convey Quiritary ownership, but at most a possessio ad usucapionem that might be 
protected by the praetor74. There is however an alternative explanation for the 
defective transfer of ownership in this text, which is to be found in the fact that 
the curator performs a traditio over a res mancipi (a piece of land). The outcome in 
such circumstances is in fact the same as that reported by Gai 2,47, according to 
which the delivery of a res mancipi by a mulier who is authorized by her tutor 
would lead to the acquisition by usucapion. Considering all of this, it is worth 
                                                 
73  D. 27,10,7,3: “It was asked whether a payment can properly be given by one of two 
curators of a lunatic or whether one could alienate the lunatic’s property. I replied that it 
was rightfully paid. Further someone who bought the lunatic’s estate in a lawful manner 
from one of the curators can usucapt, because payment, sale and delivery are matters of fact 
rather than of law and so it is enough if one of the curatores acts, the other being taken to 
agree. But if the other is present and forbids the payment, or forbids the sale or delivery, 
the debtor is not discharged, nor can the buyer usucapt” (transl. Watson, modified). 
74  Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 455. 
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it is enough if one of the curatores acts, the other being taken to agree” only 
reveals that the other curator is seen as agreeing, and the final sentence shows that 
if he forbids the payment, sale or traditio, the possibility of acquiring through 
usucapion will be excluded. Some authors have seen in this fragment, just as in 
D. 27,10,7,1, a piece of evidence that legal guardians would not be able to 
convey Quiritary ownership, but at most a possessio ad usucapionem that might be 
protected by the praetor74. There is however an alternative explanation for the 
defective transfer of ownership in this text, which is to be found in the fact that 
the curator performs a traditio over a res mancipi (a piece of land). The outcome in 
such circumstances is in fact the same as that reported by Gai 2,47, according to 
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73  D. 27,10,7,3: “It was asked whether a payment can properly be given by one of two 
curators of a lunatic or whether one could alienate the lunatic’s property. I replied that it 
was rightfully paid. Further someone who bought the lunatic’s estate in a lawful manner 
from one of the curators can usucapt, because payment, sale and delivery are matters of fact 
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74  Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 455. 
CHAPTER 3. LEGAL PROVISIONS AS BASIS FOR THE POTESTAS ALIENANDI
182
 
180 
noting that already Lenel75 thought that the text referred to a case where the 
lunatic’s piece of land was not lawfully purchased (<non> legitime mercaretur). 
While the specific reference to the unlawfulness of the alienation is not expressed 
in the current form of the text76, it appears highly probable that it is due to the 
fact that the fundus was alienated by resorting to the traditio instead of the 
mancipatio, which would have granted the acquirer the same position as if the 
traditio had been performed by an authorized owner. The fact that only a possessio 
ad usucapionem was granted in this case may have escaped the eyes of Justinian’s 
commissioners, who would have been more interested in preserving the rules 
expressed by Julian regarding the plurality of curatores. 
 A similar reconstruction can be made regarding D. 27,10,7,1, since we are 
not informed of the underlying reason behind the failure in the transfer of 
Quiritary ownership. Lenel suspects that the original text would have reported 
that ownership was unlawfully alienated (<non> legitimo modo alienavit), perhaps a 
case where a res mancipi was not conveyed through mancipatio, because otherwise 
the buyer would have obtained the iustum dominium77. Accordingly, both 
D. 27,10,7,1 and D. 27,10,7,3 would have been subject to corrections regarding 
the validity of the alienation by the curator. It is most likely that the author would 
have therefore analysed the alienation by a curator who not only had given no 
satisdatio, but also alienated in way which did not grant the dominium ex iure 
Quiritium, probably by conveying a res mancipi through traditio. This would 
explain better the resulting formula, and particularly the role of the exceptio: the 
lunatic would remain Quiritary owner of the delivered objects, which would 
later pass to his heirs, who decide to make use of the rei vindicatio, being however 
repelled with the exceptio si non curator vendiderit. This defence would therefore be 
an adaptation of the exceptio rei traditae et venditae, but since it was not the owner 
himself who sold and delivered, reference is made to the intervention of the 
curator78. In other words, the defence was not granted because the alienation was 
performed by a legal guardian, but because there was a particular obstacle for the 
transfer of ownership, which in D. 27,10,7,1 and D. 27,10,7,3 was the traditio of 
a res mancipi. This would explain the exceptional position of the exceptio si non 
curator vendiderit in Roman law and why it is not to be found more often in cases 
where a legal guardian would transfer ownership. Only the omission by the 
curator in granting a cautio would neutralize the claim to the exceptio si non curator 
vendiderit, thus showing the relevance in the eyes of the praetor of duly granting 
this surety, which does not exclude the application of a general triplicatio doli in 
turn.  
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authors, the adapted version of the exceptio rei venditae et traditae would be “si non curator 
Ai Ai fundum quo de agitur No No vendidit et tradidit”. 
 
4. Ownership over the administered goods? 
 
The evidence presented so far shows that the alienations performed or authorized 
by a legal guardian will have the same consequences as those carried out by an 
owner who has the potestas alienandi. There are moreover several texts which 
show the broad faculties to administer and transfer ownership of legal guardians, 
leaving little room for doubt concerning the broad scope of their potestas 
alienandi79. Considering moreover that legal guardians would transfer the iustum 
dominium, it appears that their faculty to dispose stems from the ius civile and that 
it would have been acknowledged since a very early stage. This idea, however, 
was not consistent with the view of some scholars who considered that the ius 
civile would have precluded any form of direct representation. The point was 
even more problematic considering that the broad faculties of legal guardians 
would seem to allow them to carry out formal acts in order to transfer ownership 
such as the mancipatio or the in iure cessio, which would imply that already in a 
primitive stage Roman law knew some forms of ‘direct representation’. Mitteis 
came up with an alternative explanation for this, declaring that the curator furiosi 
would have had a ‘quasi-dominical power’ (quasi-dominikale Gewalt) which would 
enable him to alienate the lunatic’s property even by mancipatio80. Mitteis points 
out to the well-known text of the Law of the Twelve Tables “Si furiosus escit, 
adgnatum gentiliumque in eo pecuniaque potestas esto” (Tab. 5.7a) to confirm the 
existence of this power over the lunatic. This fragment, however, only grants a 
potestas over the person of the lunatic and his pecunia, which would not seem to 
include his res mancipi81. In fact Lenel seems to have been willing to accept only 
the possibility that a curator furiosi could transfer ownership over res nec mancipi82, 
for which he probably had this text in mind. In order to overcome this clear 
objection, Mitteis claimed that jurists would have certainly extended this rule to 
the familia of the lunatic83, but he is not capable of bringing any further evidence 
on the point. 
 The very feeble ground on which the ideas of Mitteis were based contrasts 
with the great enthusiasm with which scholars received them84, perhaps due to 
the fact that it was the only way to uphold the traditional interpretation regarding 
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the evolution of direct representation. The idea of a ‘quasi-dominical power’ was 
even applied by scholars to other legal guardians, such as the curator prodigi or the 
tutor impuberum85, which had not been envisaged by Mitteis at all. Kübler, for 
instance, claimed that the tutor was not included among the cases mentioned in 
Gai 2,64 because all of the individuals mentioned in this text were non domini, 
while the tutor would actually act in the capacity of an owner86. The reason for 
the expansion of this theory was that it was adopted by some scholars dealing 
with the structure of the primitive Roman family. Bonfante, for instance, 
claimed that the potestas of the curator furiosi would have the same content as that 
exercised by the paterfamilias over his wife, slaves and filii, and accordingly he 
would be the owner of the lunatic’s property. This opinion is followed by other 
scholars, such as Guarino87. Moreover, Arangio-Ruiz88 and Kaser89 have stressed 
that in pre-classical times there would be no possible distinction between 
ownership and the power to alienate – a thought certainly inspired by the theory 
of a primitive prohibition of direct representation – which implies that those in 
charge of administering other people’s property would actually have to become 
owners themselves. 
 Despite the general claims on the point, little evidence has been brought to 
support the idea of a ‘quasi-ownership’ of the legal guardian. For example, it is 
often argued that the reference to the legal guardian acting ‘loco domini’ would be 
a clear indication of the fact that he would originally have been considered 
owner of the administered goods. This can hardly be seen as convincing evidence 
considering that this expression only indicates that legal guardians are regarded to 
take the place of the owner – the lunatic or ward – who therefore keeps his 
ownership over the administered goods. Moreover, some scholars have claimed 
that the curator furiosi would become owner of the administered goods because 
the state of mental insanity would have been regarded in Rome as incurable and 
definitive90, a claim which has however been discarded by later studies on the 
subject. Regarding the views on the structure of the primitive Roman family and 
the position of the paterfamilias, it cannot be discussed here which is the most 
plausible theory on the subject. However, it is worth noting the clear 
anachronism of looking for ‘ownership’ and ‘ownership-like’ figures in pre-
                                                 
85  Siber, Verwaltungsrecht (1917), p. 83; Arangio-Ruiz, Erede e tutore (1946 [1930]), p. 149-
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classical Roman law, projecting thereby notions of the late Republic into the 
analysis of earlier terms such as potestas. The notion of ‘potestas’ has in fact a vague 
content, and for instance Capogrossi Colognesi considers that it only referred to 
the power over people, while the idea of ‘mancipium’ would be the predecessor of 
the idea of ‘dominium’91. This author would moreover emphasize that the potestas 
of the curator furiosi cannot be seen as involving dominium over the assets of the 
lunatic92. Archi and Lanza would also exercise caution when approaching the 
notion of potestas in relation to legal guardians in the Twelve Tables, avoiding 
granting it a specific technical meaning93. 
 Leaving aside these specific points, the more arguable aspect of the theory of a 
‘quasi-ownership’ of legal guardians is that it was built on preconceptions 
concerning the evolution of ‘direct representation’ in Roman law which have no 
support in the sources. Accordingly, the starting point from which this idea was 
brought into life seems to have become obsolete. This is why Diliberto, who 
approached the origins of the cura furiosi without pretending to defend any 
specific theory of direct representation, reached very different conclusions 
concerning the significance of the potestas of this legal guardian. In fact, he 
observed that the rights of the lunatic were not extinguished or absorbed by his 
curator94, which would imply that the transfer of ownership performed by him 
would indeed take place a non domino95. It is therefore no wonder that the lack of 
evidence to hold that the curator furiosi acted as a dominus has led more and more 
scholars to simply consider him as acting as a non-owner96. 
 Finally, it should be borne in mind that, even if at the time of the Twelve 
Tables the potestas of legal guardians would comprise an ownership-like power, 
evidence suggests that already at a very early stage Roman jurists granted them 
the potestas alienandi over the administered goods. It is for instance noteworthy 
that legal guardians were able to transfer the dominium ex iure Quiritium not only 
through traditio, but also through formal ways of transferring ownership97, being 
moreover regarded as acting domini loco. Since legal guardians could exercise such 
                                                 
91  Capogrossi Colognesi, Struttura della proprietà (1969) I, p. 464-465. See on this point 
Amunátegui, Potestas manus (2012), p. 60, 84-85. 
92  Capogrossi Colognesi, Struttura della proprietà (1969) I, p. 145 n. 246: “Si consideri come 
neppure in diritto classico si possa tradurre, in relazione a tale fattispecie, il termine potestas 
in dominium sulla pecunia, né, per il furiosus si possa parlare anche allora di alcun altro tipo di 
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93  Archi, Curatela (1981 [1962]), p. 181: “In proposito tuttavia conviene non dimenticare che 
potestas è termine che indica una nozione di potere colta nella sua realtà effettuale, senza 
pretesa di una precisa qualificazione giuridica. In altre parole, dall’in potestate esse non è 
possibile dedurre con rigida formula la situazione giuridica nella quale si trova la persona o 
la res, su cui il potere si esercita. E ciò soprattutto nell’epoca decemvirale, anteriore 
all’elaborazione delle categorie dovute alla giurisprudenza repubblicana”. Lanza, Furiosus 
(1990), p. 31 ff.  
94  Diliberto, Cura furiosi (1984), p. 44-48, 101-106. 
95  Diliberto, Cura furiosi (1984), p. 88. 
96  See e.g. Albanese, Atti negoziali (1982), p. 355. 
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broad powers, which are moreover in agreement with the ius civile, one could in 
fact assume that the way in which the curatores and tutores carry out their 
administration in classical law is a surviving institution from pre-classical times 
rather than an innovation of the classical period. 
 
 
Chapter 4. Praetorian remedies regarding the transfer 
of ownership by a non-owner 
 
In the previous two chapters it has been shown that Roman jurisprudence made 
use of some broad notions which could be refined by jurists. In those cases where 
the owner authorized the delivery the voluntas domini played a central role, and 
while this notion belonged to the ius civile, jurists could develop different ideas 
regarding what the scope and implications of it were. In particular cases where it 
was clear that an act was performed voluntate domini, jurists would resort to other 
notions such as the bona fides to prevent the transfer of ownership from taking 
place. The idea of an honest and loyal administration played moreover a key role 
in the cases where the potestas alienandi stemmed from a legal provision, therefore 
preventing legal guardians from abusing their position. All of this shows that 
already in the sphere of the ius civile jurists had a considerable amount of tools to 
refine their solutions and avoid unfair outcomes. Nonetheless, the intervention of 
the praetor became indispensable in many cases, which leads to the study of a 
series of additional remedies which modified the practical solutions offered by 
jurists. In this chapter, attention will be paid to those praetorian remedies which 
modified the outcome prescribed by the ius civile. A revision of this problem is 
justified considering that scholars have often misunderstood the significance of 
the transfer of ownership by a non-owner for the ius civile. Since it has been 
shown that a non-owner could transfer Quiritary ownership under certain 
circumstances, it becomes imperative to determine the significance of the 
praetor’s intervention in the context of the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner. 
 
1. Actio Publiciana 
 
a. D. 6,2,14. 
 
The actio Publiciana would be granted by the praetor in a great variety of 
situations in order to enable an acquirer who had not become owner according 
to the ius civile – and therefore could not resort to the rei vindicatio – to recover 
the possession of the object in case of losing it1. One of the applications of the 
actio Publiciana concerning an alienation carried out through an – originally – 
authorized non-owner is to be found in a text of Ulpian which conveys the 
opinion of Papinian: 
 
                                                 
1  On the active legal standing for the actio Publiciana, see Apathy, Die publizianische Klage 
(1981), p. 12-13; Apathy, Publiciana ohne Ersitzungsbesitz (1984), p. 749-758; Wubbe, Ergo 
et Publicianam (1995), p. 647-656. 
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broad powers, which are moreover in agreement with the ius civile, one could in 
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D. 6,2,14 (Ulp. 16 ed.): Papinianus libro sexto quaestionum scribit: 
Si quis prohibuit vel denuntiavit ex causa venditionis tradi rem, quae 
ipsius voluntate a procuratore fuerit distracta, et is nihilo minus 
tradiderit, emptorem tuebitur praetor, sive possideat sive petat rem. 
Sed quod iudicio empti procurator emptori praestiterit, contrario 
iudicio mandati consequetur: potest enim fieri, ut emptori res 
auferebatur ab eo, qui venire mandavit, quia per ignorantiam non 
est usus exceptione, quam debuit opponere, veluti ‘si non auctor 
meus ex voluntate tua vendidit’2. 
 
As explained above3, this fragment deals with a case where the owner initially 
authorizes his procurator, in the context of a contract of mandate, to sell an object 
belonging to him. However, after the sale has been concluded, the owner 
decides to revoke his authorization. Despite the owner’s prohibition, the 
procurator delivers the object to the buyer, who will then be protected by the 
praetor either if he possesses or if he reclaims the object (sive possideat sive petat 
rem). While the text does not explicitly say that he may recover through the actio 
Publiciana, there is little doubt on the point, considering not only that the text is 
inserted in the Digest under the title “De Publiciana in rem actione”, but also that 
Lenel’s Palingenesia locates it under the same title in Ulpian’s work4. Moreover, 
an old scholion of the Basilica explicitly declares that the praetor in this case 
grants the Publiciana5. The text also mentions that the acquirer may oppose the 
exceptio si non auctor meus ex voluntate tua vendidit against the owner. The 
possibility of using this defence is introduced in a rather cumbersome way, since 
we are told that if the acquirer does not make use of this exception he may hold 
the procurator – with whom he concluded the sale – liable, which in turn will 
grant the procurator an actio mandati contraria against the owner who originally 
authorized the sale. It is clear that ownership was not transferred in the first place 
because the delivery was not performed voluntate domini, since the owner 
withdrew his authorization before the delivery took place6. In this context it is 
however more enigmatic that the praetor would be willing to protect the 
                                                 
2  D. 6,2,14: “Papinian, in the sixth book of his Questions, writes: Where, at “A’s” request, 
something of his has been sold by his procurator and “A” then forbids delivery of the thing 
sold, or notifies to that effect, but the procurator nevertheless delivers it, the praetor will 
protect the buyer, whether he is in possession or is suing for the thing. If the procurator 
incurs liability to the buyer in an action on the sale, he may sue “A” by actio contraria on 
the mandate. It may happen that the principal who gave the mandate to sell recovers the 
thing from the buyer, because the latter, through ignorance, has failed to raise a defence 
which he ought to have pleaded, such as ‘unless the seller to me sold at your request’” 
(transl. Watson). 
3  See in particular Chapter 2, Section 1(a) above.  
4  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 514, under the rubric “De Publiciana in rem actione”. 
5  BS 902, 30-31 (Sch. ad Bas. 15,2,14,2): ȉουτȑστι δίδοται α੝τ૶ κα੿ νεμȑν૳ παραγραĳ੽ 
ਥκπεσόντι τોȢ νομોȢ ȆουȕȜικιανȒ. 
6  Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009), p. 22; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 99. 
 
transferee despite the fact that he acquired invito domino. In order to determine 
the reason for the praetorian protection, it is essential to examine some difficult 
aspects of the case7. 
 The first odd feature of this case is that, while the non-owner delivers invito 
domino, there is no reference to the existence of furtum, which would render the 
delivered object a res inhabilis for usucapion. This has led some scholars to assume 
that the text must have dealt with a piece of land8, where the possibility of furtum 
was excluded. There is however no reference to this in the text, which deals 
simply with a res9. One could also think that the non-owner delivered the object 
before he had notice of the owner’s prohibition, which could exclude the 
existence of any dolus malus or animus furandi. The text, however, does not allow 
this interpretation, since we are told that the owner forbade or notified the 
transferor (prohibuit vel denuntiavit) and that the latter nonetheless – i.e. despite the 
prohibition – delivered it (nihilo minus tradiderit). Considering this, the best 
interpretation may be that this delivery can indeed be considered a case of furtum, 
since the transferor acts openly against the owner’s authorization, but that 
nonetheless the praetor decides to grant the Publiciana. It is in fact not 
uncommon that the Publiciana would be granted to an acquirer who did not have 
the possessio ad usucapionem, as Apathy has demonstrated10. Moreover, the sources 
present other cases, such as D. 39,5,2511, where the acquirer will be protected by 
the praetor – in this case, through an exceptio doli – despite the fact that the 
unauthorized delivery rendered the thing a res furtiva. Accordingly, there is no 
incompatibility between the existence of furtum and the praetorian protection. 
 Another point which remains problematic is whether the delivery took place 
nomine alieno or nomine proprio. Already Voci claimed that the ignorance of the 
acquirer which leads him not to make use of the exception (per ignorantiam non est 
usus exceptione) would show that he was unaware of the fact that he had acquired 
by a procurator, which would in turn show that the latter had delivered the object 
nomine proprio, without mentioning that he was acting on behalf of someone 
else12. As shown above13, Miquel and Sansón would follow this interpretation, 
which fits their own theories concerning the importance of the contemplatio 
domini in order to distinguish the legal grounds for the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner14. One may however hardly derive from this text that the transferee 
was necessarily unaware of who the principal was, since we are merely told that it 
may happen (potest enim fieri…) that the  buyer was in a state of ignorance. This is 
                                                 
7  For a detailed analysis of the facts surrounding the case see further Krampe, Emptorem 
tuebitur praetor (2005), p. 183-186. 
8  Von Tuhr, Actio de in rem verso (1895), p. 101. 
9  Krampe, Emptorem tuebitur praetor (2005), p. 183-184. 
10  Apathy, Publiciana ohne Ersitzungsbesitz (1984), p. 749-758 
11  See on this text Chapter 4, Section 5 below. 
12  Voci, Modi di acquisto (1952), p. 85-86. 
13  Chapter 2, Section 5. 
14  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 88. Similarly Nebrera, Ἡ τραδιτίων (1989), p. 132-134. 
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7  For a detailed analysis of the facts surrounding the case see further Krampe, Emptorem 
tuebitur praetor (2005), p. 183-186. 
8  Von Tuhr, Actio de in rem verso (1895), p. 101. 
9  Krampe, Emptorem tuebitur praetor (2005), p. 183-184. 
10  Apathy, Publiciana ohne Ersitzungsbesitz (1984), p. 749-758 
11  See on this text Chapter 4, Section 5 below. 
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13  Chapter 2, Section 5. 
14  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 88. Similarly Nebrera, Ἡ τραδιτίων (1989), p. 132-134. 
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why authors like Benke consider the ignorance of the relation between owner 
and seller as a mere possibility15. Moreover, if the acquirer was necessarily 
unaware of who the principal was, he would hardly ever be able make use of the 
said exception against the owner.  
 There is an additional difficulty regarding the transferee’s ignorance as 
mentioned in the text, since it is not clear whether it deals with an ignorantia facti 
– concerning either the fact that he was buying from a procurator or that the 
owner had forbidden the sale – or an ignorantia iuris – regarding whether he did 
or did not have a defence at his disposal. According to most scholars, the 
ignorance concerned the fact that the transferor was acting under the instructions 
of the owner who later claims the object back16. Winkel17, however, considers 
that the text could be referred to an error iuris, which would be dealt with in the 
context of the claims arising between owner/principal, non-owner/seller and 
acquirer/buyer, showing that if the latter did not know of the existence of the 
exception, he could nonetheless make the seller liable through an actio empti. It 
seems in any case difficult to distinguish whether the buyer did not use the 
exception because he ignored the facts on which it was based or simply ignored 
the existence of this exception, since it would appear that in either case he could 
nonetheless claim liability from the seller. For the present research it is only 
essential to highlight that it is not decisive for the outcome of the case whether 
the transferor acted nomine alieno or nomine proprio. 
 Having a clear outlook on the case, it becomes possible to determine the legal 
grounds for the praetorian protection, which is not explicitly expressed in the 
text. A considerable number of theories have been offered at this point. Voci 
thought that the praetorian protection was based on the acquirer’s good faith, 
who would have ignored the owner’s prohibition18, but it is hard to see how the 
bona fides of the acquirer merits such an exceptional protection in this particular 
case. Others consider that the owner’s voluntas at the traditio would be presumed 
by his voluntas at the sale. Guzmán, for instance, makes this claim under the 
general idea that only the intent as given at the iusta causa traditionis was relevant 
for the transfer of ownership, which implies that a revocation of the 
authorization after the sale was concluded would not prevent the transfer of 
ownership19. This idea, however, crashes against the abundant evidence which 
shows that only the intent at the moment of the delivery is relevant to determine 
the transfer of ownership20. Sansón also considers that the voluntas for the delivery 
                                                 
15  Benke, Zu Papinians actio (1988), p. 630. 
16  Schlossmann, Stellvertretung (1900) I, p. 176, 179-180; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), 
p. 51; Voci, Modi di acquisto (1952), p. 85; Benke, Zu Papinians actio (1988), p. 630; 
Nebrera, Ἡ τραδιτίων (1989), p. 132-133 n. 7; Babusiaux, Id quod actum est (2006), p. 151-
152. 
17  Winkel, Error iuris (1985), p. 136-137. 
18  Voci, Modi di acquisto (1952), p. 86. 
19  Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 645-646. 
20  Chapter 2, Section 1 above. 
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would be somehow presumed by the ius honorarium from the previous 
authorization given to sale21, but this presumption is nowhere to be found in 
other cases where the authorization disappeared before the delivery takes place – 
either due to death or to voluntary revocation – and where no equivalent 
praetorian protection is granted.  
 Another explanation was given by Burdese, who in his first work on the 
subject considered that the reason for the praetorian protection was to simplify 
the relations between dominus, procurator and acquirer22. This idea of procedural 
economy cannot, however, explain by itself the ground of the decision, and in a 
later work Burdese pointed out that the protection granted to the acquirer was 
based on the equitable extension of the owner’s intent given at the sale23. 
Similarly, other authors have claimed that the ground for this protection was the 
venire contra factum proprium principle, since the intimate connection between the 
sale and the subsequent traditio made it unacceptable for the owner to ban the 
delivery once an agreement was reached concerning the iusta causa traditionis24. 
The reference to this aphorism may seem anachronistic, since it only appeared as 
such in the writings of Azo25, but it does nonetheless convey the idea that the 
owner in D. 6,2,14 is incurring in a contradiction to his previous behaviour 
which the praetor is not willing to tolerate26. This need for an equitable 
correction of the normal outcome is especially necessary in this case due to the 
fact that the prohibition of the owner puts the procurator in an impossible position: 
on the one hand, he is already bound by the contract of sale to deliver the object 
to the buyer, but on the other hand the prohibition of the owner will prevent 
him from validly transferring ownership. In this context, the praetor will protect 
the contracting parties by granting the acquirer an exceptio to defend himself 
against the owner, which would in turn avoid the procurator to incur in any 
liability towards the buyer. Only if the acquirer does not make use of this 
exception will the owner/principal recover the sold object, which will in turn 
trigger an actio empti by the buyer against the procurator/seller, and subsequently an 
actio mandati contraria from the latter against the principal. 
 The abusive behaviour of the owner/principal is the key element which 
determines that the acquirer is protected by the praetor in this particular case and 
not in other situations where the owner’s authorization did not extend to the 
delivery. There is another element, which is not usually taken into account, 
                                                 
21  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 99-100; 210-211. 
22  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 50-51. 
23  Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009), p. 22. 
24  Riezler, Venire contra factum (1912), p. 18-20; Miquel, Quaestiones (1992), p. 147; Miquel, 
Traditio rei alienae (1993), p. 276; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 211; Potjewijd, 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 147. 
25  Azo, Brocardica (Basel 1567), p. 121-123. 
26  Regarding the venire contra factum proprium principle in Roman law and medieval 
scholarship the reader may consult in the foreseeable future the monographic work of Lisa 
Isola. 
 
which explains the scope of the protection granted to the acquirer: the fact that 
he will not have a possessio ad usucapionem. In other cases in which the 
authorization of the owner is revoked or extinguished before the delivery takes 
place, the acquirer may at least acquire ownership through usucapion, as happens 
in those cases where the agent was not aware of the death of the owner at the 
time of the delivery. Moreover, the fact that the acquirer obtains the possessio ad 
usucapionem would allow him to make use of the Publiciana in case he loses 
control over the object. The only scenario in which he will be defeated is if the 
owner who did not authorize the sale reclaims the object before the period for 
the usucapion is completed. In the case described in D. 6,2,14, however, the fact 
that the agent knowingly carried out the delivery against the owner’s instructions 
will render the object a res furtiva, regarding which usucapion will not be 
possible. Nonetheless, Papinian considers that the acquirer should be protected, 
disregarding the fact that the delivery did not take place voluntate domini. 
Considering that the core of the problem stems from the abusive prohibition of 
the owner, he will be prevented from claiming the object through an exceptio. 
This protection, however, would only be enough if the acquirer could later 
become owner through usucapion, because then his position would be secured. 
But since the acquirer cannot rely on acquiring through usucapion, the praetor 
grants him the Publiciana so that he may have the thing in bonis, being able both 
to recover the object and to deter the claims of the previous owner. 
 
b. D. 17,1,57. 
 
While the application by Papinian of the actio Publiciana to a case where the 
delivery was performed invito domino was unusual, there is another text in which 
this jurist shows how far he was willing to go in extending the scope of the 
Publiciana: 
 
D. 17,1,57 (Pap. 10 resp.): Mandatum distrahendorum servorum 
defuncto qui mandatum suscepit intercidisse constitit. Quoniam 
tamen heredes eius errore lapsi non animo furandi, sed exsequendi, 
quod defunctus suae curae fecerat, servos vendiderant, eos ab 
emptoribus usucaptos videri placuit. Sed venaliciarium ex provincia 
reversum publiciana actione non inutiliter acturum, cum exceptio 
iusti dominii causa cognita detur neque oporteat eum, qui certi 
hominis fidem elegit, ob errorem aut imperitiam heredum adfici 
damno27. 
                                                 
27  D. 17,1,57: “It was established that a mandate to sell off slaves had lapsed with the death of 
the person who undertook the mandate. However, because his heirs had fallen into error 
and, with the intention not of theft but of carrying out the duty which the deceased had 
assumed, had sold the slaves, it was agreed that those [slaves] appeared to have been 
usucapted by their buyers. [It was also agreed,] however, that the slave-dealer on his return 
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would be somehow presumed by the ius honorarium from the previous 
authorization given to sale21, but this presumption is nowhere to be found in 
other cases where the authorization disappeared before the delivery takes place – 
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21  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 99-100; 210-211. 
22  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 50-51. 
23  Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009), p. 22. 
24  Riezler, Venire contra factum (1912), p. 18-20; Miquel, Quaestiones (1992), p. 147; Miquel, 
Traditio rei alienae (1993), p. 276; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 211; Potjewijd, 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 147. 
25  Azo, Brocardica (Basel 1567), p. 121-123. 
26  Regarding the venire contra factum proprium principle in Roman law and medieval 
scholarship the reader may consult in the foreseeable future the monographic work of Lisa 
Isola. 
 
which explains the scope of the protection granted to the acquirer: the fact that 
he will not have a possessio ad usucapionem. In other cases in which the 
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The text was already studied when dealing with the lack of dolus malus or animus 
furandi by the non-owner who performs the delivery28, since it illustrates that the 
error iuris is enough to exclude this element from the delivery. In this case, a 
slave-dealer grants a mandate to sell off slaves before leaving on a journey. The 
person in charge of selling dies in the meantime, which inevitably means that the 
mandate was extinguished. The heirs, however, believe themselves to be bound 
to carry out the mandate and sell the slaves – probably at a low price, which 
would explain why the slave-dealers would rather have the slaves returned to 
him. Since the heirs are not delivering with a theftuous intent (non animo furandi), 
the buyers will be granted a possessio ad usucapionem. Papinian offers the puzzling 
opinion that the slave-dealer, upon his return, may validly (non inutiliter) recover 
through the actio Publiciana the objects which the buyers acquired in the 
meantime through usucapion. Such a decision seems to go against the very 
nature of the Publiciana, not only because the slave-dealer has no possession at all, 
but also because he would recover from the dominus ex iure Quiritium29. The 
awkwardness of such a solution explains why some manuscripts – including the 
Codex Florentinus30 – actually deny the Publiciana by reading “non utiliter”. It is 
however clear that the text originally read “non inutiliter”, not only because the 
opinion of Papinian is oriented at justifying this solution – to avoid the slave-
dealer to suffer loss because of the inexperience of the heirs of the person he 
relied upon – but also because the scholia of the 6th century to the Basilica 
confirm this lecture31. Particularly interesting at this point is a scholion by 
Dorotheus which explicitly declares that the true reading is “non inutiliter”, 
despite the fact that some copies of the Digest offer a different version32. This 
corruption is therefore easily explained as a ‘polar error’, where a scribe copied 
the opposite to what he saw in the assumption that the original text could not 
possibly be correct. 
 Brandsma and Sansón have carried out detailed studies on this text, to which 
the reader is referred for further detail33. For the purpose of the present study it is 
enough to note that Papinian does not deal in this case with an ordinary 
Publiciana, but rather with the actio Publiciana rescissoria, which enables the person 
                                                                                                                   
from the province would have a competent actio Publiciana, since the defence of ownership 
is [only] granted after investigation of the facts and it is not right for someone who chose a 
particular man for his trustworthiness to suffer loss because of the mistake or inexperience 
of his heirs” (transl. Watson). 
28  Chapter 2, Section 2 above. 
29  See Brandsma, Publiciana rescissoria (1992), p. 44-52. 
30  For other versions in medieval manuscripts see Brandsma, Publiciana rescissoria (1992), p. 44. 
31  See on this point Brandsma, Publiciana rescissoria (1992), p. 43; Sansón, Publiciana rescissoria 
(1998), p. 389. 
32  BS 792/19-20 (Sch. ad Bas. 14,1,57): ǻωροșȑου. ȆουȕȜικιαν੽ν ૧εσκισορίαν. ȉοῦτο δ੻ τઁ 
૧ητઁν NON INUTILITER șȑȜει, εੁ καί τινα τ૵ν ਕντιγραĳ૵ν ο੝κ ਩Ȥουσιν ο੢τω... See 
Brandsma, Publiciana rescissoria (1992), p. 43. 
33  Brandsma, Publiciana rescissoria (1992), p. 41-59; Sansón, Publiciana rescissoria (1998), p. 383-
393. See moreover Nebrera, Ἡ τραδιτίων (1989), p. 178-223. 
 
making use of it to recover the object by rescinding the usucapion of the 
acquirer. The exact way in which the Publiciana rescissoria operates in this case has 
been greatly debated, but both Brandsma and Sansón have concluded that it 
consists in an in integrum restitutio which takes place through the refusal of the 
praetor, causa cognita, to grant the exceptio iusti dominii to the acquirer34. It remains 
in any case exceptional that a jurist would be willing to correct the attribution of 
property through usucapion to protect the slave-dealer who was absent from the 
inexperience of the people who received the slaves. Such a solution shows that 
the restricted limits within which usucapion took place in classical law were 
considered at times to lead to unfair results. The solution given by Papinian can 
therefore be seen as preceding other developments which would take place in 
post-classical law, such as the longer periods to become owner by usucapion or 
praescriptio, particularly when they take place inter absentes35. Nonetheless, 
Papinian’s solution did not have such far-reaching consequences, since it appears 
that the Publiciana rescissoria could only be brought for a period of one year36. 
 Another application of the Publiciana is made by Julian in D. 21,2,39,1 (Jul. 57 
dig.), but since this text deals with the mancipatio by a slave it will be studied in 
further detail below37. 
 
2. Exceptio si non auctor meus ex voluntate tua vendidit  
 
The analysis of D. 6,2,14 in the previous section already introduced us to the 
study of the exceptio si non auctor meus ex voluntate tua vendidit, which can be 
granted to the acquirer against the owner who reclaims an object after having 
authorized the sale of it but not its subsequent delivery. It was already highlighted 
that this exception is only granted on grounds which are relatively specific to this 
case. It is particularly significant that the owner acts in an abusive way by 
inducing his procurator to sell and then forbidding him to carry out the delivery. 
Moreover, the fact that the acquirer did not have a possessio ad usucapionem seems 
to play a relevant role as well. This praetorian defence is seldom found in the 
sources, but another text of Julian seems to refer to it as well: 
 
D. 41,4,7,6 (Jul. 44 dig.): Procurator tuus si fundum, quem centum 
aureis vendere poterat, addixerit triginta aureis in hoc solum, ut te 
damno adficeret, ignorante emptore, dubitari non oportet, quin 
emptor longo tempore capiat: nam et cum sciens quis alienum 
fundum vendidit ignoranti, non interpellatur longa possessio. Quod 
                                                 
34  Brandsma, Publiciana rescissoria (1992), p. 54-59; Sansón, Publiciana rescissoria (1998), p. 390. 
35  C. 7,31,1 (Justinian, 531): “…nihil inhumanius erat, si homo absens et nesciens tam 
angusto tempore suis cadebat possessionibus”. 
36  See D. 44,7,35pr (Paul 1 ed.), commented by Brandsma, Publiciana rescissoria (1992), p. 55-
56; Sansón, Publiciana rescissoria (1998), p. 390. 
37  Chapter 5, Section 3 below. 
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corruption is therefore easily explained as a ‘polar error’, where a scribe copied 
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granted to the acquirer against the owner who reclaims an object after having 
authorized the sale of it but not its subsequent delivery. It was already highlighted 
that this exception is only granted on grounds which are relatively specific to this 
case. It is particularly significant that the owner acts in an abusive way by 
inducing his procurator to sell and then forbidding him to carry out the delivery. 
Moreover, the fact that the acquirer did not have a possessio ad usucapionem seems 
to play a relevant role as well. This praetorian defence is seldom found in the 
sources, but another text of Julian seems to refer to it as well: 
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34  Brandsma, Publiciana rescissoria (1992), p. 54-59; Sansón, Publiciana rescissoria (1998), p. 390. 
35  C. 7,31,1 (Justinian, 531): “…nihil inhumanius erat, si homo absens et nesciens tam 
angusto tempore suis cadebat possessionibus”. 
36  See D. 44,7,35pr (Paul 1 ed.), commented by Brandsma, Publiciana rescissoria (1992), p. 55-
56; Sansón, Publiciana rescissoria (1998), p. 390. 
37  Chapter 5, Section 3 below. 
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si emptor cum procuratore collusit et eum praemio corrupit, quo 
vilius mercaretur, non intellegetur bonae fidei emptor nec longo 
tempore usu capiet: et si adversus petentem dominum uti coeperit 
exceptione rei voluntate eius venditae, replicationem doli utilem 
futuram esse38. 
 
This case was already reviewed in the context of the scope of the voluntas domini, 
where it was determined that the abusive behaviour of the procurator would 
exclude his potestas alienandi at the delivery39. The acquirer would nonetheless be 
able to acquire ownership through usucapion, unless he colluded with the seller 
in order to obtain the object at an uneconomic price – which would exclude his 
bona fides as a possessor. According to Julian, this would also imply that he cannot 
successfully make use of the exceptio rei voluntate eius venditae, which would meet a 
replicatio doli granted to the owner based on the fraudulent behaviour of the 
acquirer.  
 While D. 41,4,7,6 only emphasizes the restricted scope of the exceptio under 
discussion, it would appear possible to derive a contrario sensu that, if the acquirer 
did not collude with the seller, he could successfully resort to the exceptio rei 
voluntate eius [sc. domini] venditae against the owner’s rei vindicatio. This conclusion 
does not agree with the general evidence found in the sources, since the acquirer 
who obtains an object from a non-owner voluntate domini does not have to resort 
to a particular praetorian defence against the plaintiff’s claim. Instead, he will only 
have to prove the existence of the owner’s authorization40. If normally no 
praetorian defence was needed for the acquirer who received an object voluntate 
domini, what would explain that it is discussed at the end of D. 41,4,7,6? At this 
point, it is worth noting that there is a common feature between the cases in 
which this exception is applied: the lack of a possessio ad usucapionem. In 
D. 6,2,14, the usucapion cannot take place due to the lack of potestas alienandi of 
the transferor who knowingly acts invito domino, thereby rendering the thing 
delivered furtiva. On the other hand, in the second case described in D. 41,4,7,6 
the usucapion is excluded due to the lack of bona fides by the acquirer regarding 
the lack of potestas alienandi of the transferor. It would therefore appear that the 
defence presented in these texts only could be granted when the usucapion was 
                                                 
38  D. 41,4,7,6: “Suppose that your procurator, who could have obtained a hundred gold pieces 
for the land, asks only thirty for the sole purpose of causing you loss; there can be no doubt 
that, he being unaware of this fact, the purchaser will acquire title by long possession; for 
even when one aware of the facts sells a third person’s land to one who is not, nothing 
prevents long possession. But if the purchaser should be in collusion with the procurator, 
bribing him to sell at an uneconomic price, he will not be held a purchaser in good faith 
and so will not usucapt the land. And if, when the principal sues, the purchaser should 
invoke the defence that the thing was sold with his consent, a replication of fraud will be 
effective against him” (transl. Watson). 
39  Chapter 2, Section 4(c). 
40  See Chapter 2, Section 1(a) above. 
 
excluded, most likely to remedy the situation of the acquirer by attending to the 
fact that the owner had initially authorized the alienation of the object.  
 Considering the similarities between the exceptiones contained in D. 41,4,7,6 
and D. 6,2,14, it is safe to claim that, despite being formulated with a different 
wording (exceptio rei voluntate eius venditae / exceptio si non auctor meus ex voluntate 
tua vendidit) they are essentially the same remedy. It appears to be an exceptio in 
factum that the praetor grants the acquirer for equitable reasons41, which takes into 
account the initial authorization given to alienate in order to limit the use of the 
rei vindicatio. Moreover, the limited scope of this exceptio – only to be found in 
cases where the acquirer does not have a possessio ad usucapionem – would 
distinguish it from the broader exceptio rei venditae et traditae, which could be used 
in a wider range of situations to protect that acquirer who has a possessio bonae 
fidei from the claims of the owner, as will be shown in the following section.  
 
3. Exceptio rei venditae et traditae 
 
a. D. 21,3,1,2-3. 
 
A text of Ulpian located under the Digest title De exceptione rei venditae et traditae 
poses the question of the extent to which the exceptio rei voluntate eius venditae 
could be distinguished from the exceptio rei venditae et traditae:  
 
D. 21,3,1,2 (Ulp. 76 ed.): Si quis rem meam mandatu meo 
vendiderit, vindicanti mihi rem venditam nocebit haec exceptio, nisi 
probetur me mandasse, ne traderetur, antequam pretium solvatur42. 
 
In this text we are told by Ulpian that the buyer can make use of ‘this defence’ – 
considered by most scholars to be indeed the exceptio rei venditae et traditae43 – 
when the owner granted a mandate to sell and then tries to recover the object. 
However, according to Ulpian, such a defence will be of no avail if it is proven 
that the owner ordered beforehand that the traditio should only take place after 
the buyer had paid the price. The text has raised wide controversy among 
scholars concerning what exactly prevented the transfer of ownership and which 
was the defence granted to the acquirer. The most widespread opinion is that the 
dominium ex iure Quiritium would not be transferred because the text deals with 
the traditio of a res mancipi44. Some scholars in particular consider that the text 
                                                 
41  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 208, 215, 231. 
42  D. 21,3,1,2: “If someone, acting on my mandate, sells a thing belonging to me, I shall be 
defeated by this defence in the event that I seek to assert title to it after the sale; unless it be 
proven that my mandate was that the thing should not be delivered until the full price had 
been paid” (transl. Watson, modified). 
43  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 860; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 80. 
44  Pringsheim, Kauf (1916), p. 77; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 80; Potjewijd, 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 148-149. 
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the transferor who knowingly acts invito domino, thereby rendering the thing 
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the usucapion is excluded due to the lack of bona fides by the acquirer regarding 
the lack of potestas alienandi of the transferor. It would therefore appear that the 
defence presented in these texts only could be granted when the usucapion was 
                                                 
38  D. 41,4,7,6: “Suppose that your procurator, who could have obtained a hundred gold pieces 
for the land, asks only thirty for the sole purpose of causing you loss; there can be no doubt 
that, he being unaware of this fact, the purchaser will acquire title by long possession; for 
even when one aware of the facts sells a third person’s land to one who is not, nothing 
prevents long possession. But if the purchaser should be in collusion with the procurator, 
bribing him to sell at an uneconomic price, he will not be held a purchaser in good faith 
and so will not usucapt the land. And if, when the principal sues, the purchaser should 
invoke the defence that the thing was sold with his consent, a replication of fraud will be 
effective against him” (transl. Watson). 
39  Chapter 2, Section 4(c). 
40  See Chapter 2, Section 1(a) above. 
 
excluded, most likely to remedy the situation of the acquirer by attending to the 
fact that the owner had initially authorized the alienation of the object.  
 Considering the similarities between the exceptiones contained in D. 41,4,7,6 
and D. 6,2,14, it is safe to claim that, despite being formulated with a different 
wording (exceptio rei voluntate eius venditae / exceptio si non auctor meus ex voluntate 
tua vendidit) they are essentially the same remedy. It appears to be an exceptio in 
factum that the praetor grants the acquirer for equitable reasons41, which takes into 
account the initial authorization given to alienate in order to limit the use of the 
rei vindicatio. Moreover, the limited scope of this exceptio – only to be found in 
cases where the acquirer does not have a possessio ad usucapionem – would 
distinguish it from the broader exceptio rei venditae et traditae, which could be used 
in a wider range of situations to protect that acquirer who has a possessio bonae 
fidei from the claims of the owner, as will be shown in the following section.  
 
3. Exceptio rei venditae et traditae 
 
a. D. 21,3,1,2-3. 
 
A text of Ulpian located under the Digest title De exceptione rei venditae et traditae 
poses the question of the extent to which the exceptio rei voluntate eius venditae 
could be distinguished from the exceptio rei venditae et traditae:  
 
D. 21,3,1,2 (Ulp. 76 ed.): Si quis rem meam mandatu meo 
vendiderit, vindicanti mihi rem venditam nocebit haec exceptio, nisi 
probetur me mandasse, ne traderetur, antequam pretium solvatur42. 
 
In this text we are told by Ulpian that the buyer can make use of ‘this defence’ – 
considered by most scholars to be indeed the exceptio rei venditae et traditae43 – 
when the owner granted a mandate to sell and then tries to recover the object. 
However, according to Ulpian, such a defence will be of no avail if it is proven 
that the owner ordered beforehand that the traditio should only take place after 
the buyer had paid the price. The text has raised wide controversy among 
scholars concerning what exactly prevented the transfer of ownership and which 
was the defence granted to the acquirer. The most widespread opinion is that the 
dominium ex iure Quiritium would not be transferred because the text deals with 
the traditio of a res mancipi44. Some scholars in particular consider that the text 
                                                 
41  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 208, 215, 231. 
42  D. 21,3,1,2: “If someone, acting on my mandate, sells a thing belonging to me, I shall be 
defeated by this defence in the event that I seek to assert title to it after the sale; unless it be 
proven that my mandate was that the thing should not be delivered until the full price had 
been paid” (transl. Watson, modified). 
43  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 860; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 80. 
44  Pringsheim, Kauf (1916), p. 77; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 80; Potjewijd, 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 148-149. 
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would prove the importance of paying the price for the transfer of ownership in 
the context of a mancipatio45. Sansón, however, considers that the key to this text 
lies in the fact that it was unclear whether the owner had authorized the sale, 
which is why it would be relevant to determine whether the instruction 
regarding the payment was given beforehand or not46. According to Sansón, this 
implies that the exceptio mentioned in D. 21,3,1,2 was basically the same exceptio 
in factum as that of D. 41,4,7,6 and D. 6,2,14. 
 The interpretation of Sansón cannot be admitted, since there would be no 
need to resort to an exceptio in the first place if the underlying problem for the 
transfer of ownership was exclusively whether the owner authorized the delivery 
and under what conditions he did so. The controversy would then be restricted 
exclusively to proving the owner’s authorization: if the delivery was performed 
voluntate domini, the acquirer would have become Quiritary owner and the 
previous owner would fail in his claim; if, on the other hand, the traditio took 
place invito domino, the owner would recover his property. In other words, there 
is no place for an exceptio when the only point under discussion is the existence of 
the voluntas domini at the delivery by a non-owner47. This becomes clear when 
reading the fragment immediately following D. 21,3,1,248: 
 
D. 21,3,1,3 (Ulp. 76 ed.): Celsus ait: si quis rem meam vendidit 
minoris quam ei mandavi, non videtur alienata et, si petam eam, 
non obstabit mihi haec exceptio: quod verum est49. 
 
In this case, the reason why ownership is not transferred is the lack of potestas 
alienandi of the non-owner, who acts invito domino by selling the thing at a lower 
price than that which was instructed50. Under these circumstances, we are told 
that the thing is not deemed to have been alienated (non videtur alienata) and that 
the exceptio will not be available against the owner (non obstabit mihi haec exceptio). 
There is in fact no need for a praetorian defence in this case, since the 
controversy will consist in proving an element of the ius civile: whether the 
delivery was performed voluntate domini or not51.  
 D. 21,3,1,3 poses a basic, rather uncomplicated case, in which ownership is 
not transferred if the delivery is performed invito domino. The outcome to such a 
problem is determined exclusively by the rules of the ius civile, and there is no 
                                                 
45  Meylan, Paiement du prix (1930), p. 480; Romano, Trasferimento (1937), p. 188-190. 
46  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 40-42, 99-100, 213-215. 
47  See on this point Chapter 2, Section 1(a) above. 
48  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 81. 
49  D. 21,3,1,3: “Celsus says that if my mandatary has sold a thing of mine at a price lower 
than that which I specified, the thing is deemed not to have been alienated; and so if I 
claim the thing as mine, this defence will not lie against me; this is correct” (transl. 
Watson, modified). 
50  See Chapter 2, Section 4(a) above. 
51  See similarly C. 7,26,4 (Alexander, 224), discussed in Chapter 2, Section 1(a) above. 
 
need to resort to a praetorian defence. The fact that in D. 21,3,1,2 the acquirer 
needs to resort to an exceptio against the owner’s vindicatio shows that there is 
another underlying reason why ownership is not transferred. Considering that the 
immediately preceding fragments (D. 21,3,1pr-1)52 deal with the traditio of a res 
mancipi – a piece of land – it appears more adequate to follow the majority of 
scholars in assuming that ownership was not transferred in D. 21,3,1,2 because 
the transferor delivered a res mancipi by traditio. The relation between D. 21,3,1,2 
and D. 21,3,1,3 shows that Ulpian is simply extending the rules concerning the 
owner’s authorization – developed under the ius civile – to the field of praetorian 
defences. The basic solution is provided by the ius civile and reproduced in 
D. 21,3,1,3: the non-owner who fails to observe the instructions of the owner 
does not convey ownership, allowing the owner to reclaim the object through 
the rei vindicatio. In D. 21,3,1,2, Ulpian applies this solution to a case where the 
dominium ex iure Quiritum was not transferred in the first place due to the failure 
to comply with formal requirements, which does not imply that the voluntas 
domini ceases to play a relevant role: if the owner did authorize the whole 
operation, the exceptio rei venditae et traditae will suffice to repel his rei vindicatio (Si 
quis rem meam mandatu meo vendiderit, vindicanti mihi rem venditam nocebit haec 
exceptio); if, however, it is proven that the non-owner did not deliver according 
to the instructions of the owner, the defence of the acquirer will be of no avail 
(nisi probetur me mandasse, ne traderetur, antequam pretium solvatur). In other words, 
the only peculiarity of the exceptio rei venditae et traditae in case of a traditio of a res 
mancipi by a non-owner is that it becomes relevant to determine whether 
ownership was not transferred simply because of the fact that no formal mode of 
transferring ownership was used – in which case the acquirer will have the thing 
in bonis – or if the non-owner additionally did not act voluntate domini. In the 
latter case, the exceptio rei venditae et traditae will not suffice to repel the claim of 
the object, since there is an additional circumstance which prevents the transfer 
of ownership from taking place, namely the lack of voluntas domini.  
 
b. D. 21,3,1,5. 
 
Ulpian would later, within the same fragment, discuss another case which 
presents similar features to those described in D. 21,3,1,2: 
 
D. 21,3,1,5 (Ulp. 76 ed.): Si quis rem emerit, non autem fuerit ei 
tradita, sed possessionem sine vitio fuerit nactus, habet exceptionem 
contra venditorem, nisi forte venditor iustam causam habeat, cur 
                                                 
52  See on these texts Chapter 4, Section 3 below. 
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rem vindicet: nam et si tradiderit possessionem, fuerit autem iusta 
causa vindicanti, replicatione adversus exceptionem utetur53. 
 
In this text, Ulpian describes two different cases. In the first case, an object is sold 
to another person, who gains possession of it without obtaining it by the delivery 
of the owner. The basic facts surrounding this text have been discussed above54, 
where it was claimed that it is most likely that the delivery of the sold object was 
performed by a non-owner who acted invito domino, but who nonetheless did not 
deliver with dolus malus or animus furandi. In this context, the acquirer will be 
granted ‘the exceptio’ – without further clarification – to repel the owner’s rei 
vindicatio, although the latter will be able to recover if he had a good cause (iusta 
causa) to assert his title to the thing. While this would appear to indicate that the 
underlying problem behind the failure to transfer ownership is the lack of voluntas 
domini at the delivery, the text then offers a second case, much simpler than the 
first one, in which we are told that if the owner himself performs the delivery, he 
will have a replicatio against the exceptio of the acquirer. However, why would the 
acquirer have an exceptio in the first place? Why did the delivery of possession by 
the owner himself not simply transfer the dominium ex iure Quiritum to the 
acquirer? At this point, it becomes clear that Ulpian continues to discuss, just as 
the first paragraphs of this fragment, the traditio of a res mancipi. The case offers 
therefore great similarity to D. 21,3,1,2, since in the first part it addresses a case 
where the delivery took place invito domino, and in the second part a case where 
the tradens, being the owner, had potestas alienandi. 
 Given these basic facts, it becomes clear that the exceptio which is mentioned 
is the exceptio rei venditae et traditae, which the acquirer of the res mancipi tradita 
will oppose to the owner’s rei vindicatio. The peculiar feature of this case in 
relation to D. 21,3,1,2 is that an additional problem is discussed, namely whether 
the owner who sold had a good cause (iusta causa) not to deliver the object. This 
point is discussed regarding each of the cases within the text. Regarding the first 
case, one can conceive that the owner could have good motives to delay the 
delivery, which is why an unauthorized delivery could indeed be harmful to his 
interests. In the second case it is however more enigmatic what good reason 
could the owner, who performs the delivery himself, adduce in order to recover 
the object55. Whatever this iusta causa may be, the owner is granted a replicatio 
against the defence of the acquirer, which will enable him to recover the object 
                                                 
53  D. 21,3,1,5: “Put the case that a person buys something which is not delivered to him but 
of which he acquires possession without any flaw in the manner of his acquisition; he will 
have this defence against the vendor unless the later can show good cause why he should 
assert title to the thing; for also if the vendor did himself deliver possession but has good 
ground for asserting his title, he will have an answer to the defendant’s defence” (transl. 
Watson). 
54  Chapter 2, Section 2 above. 
55  Gonvers, L’exceptio (1939), p. 58 thinks that it may be related to the existence of a 
prohibition to dispose. 
 
despite having delivered it himself. Does this replicatio have a role to play in the 
first case as well? The lack of evidence on this point makes it difficult to offer a 
categorical answer, but it is nonetheless clear that in the first case the delivery did 
not take place voluntate domini, which according to D. 21,3,1,2 would allow the 
owner of the res mancipi who did not authorize the delivery to recover it. 
Considering this, it seems likely that the owner will simply obtain a replicatio in 
both cases, especially if one understands “nam et si tradiderit possessionem… 
replicatione adversus exceptionem utetur” as “for also  if the vendor did himself deliver 
possession… he will have a replicatio to the defendant’s exceptio”56, which would 
indicate that already in the first case the replicatio was available. The latter 
interpretation seems more adequate, considering that the existence of a iusta causa 
to recover would probably be brought into the discussion through a replicatio in 
factum. 
 The study of D. 21,3,1,2 and 5 shows that Ulpian addressed, in the context of 
the exceptio rei venditae et traditae, two cases in which a res mancipi was delivered by 
a non-owner through traditio, discussing how the owner would confront the 
exceptio of the acquirer. In both cases, Ulpian extends the general solutions of the 
ius civile to the praetorian ownership, since the traditio performed over a res 
mancipi will confront the original owner with the exceptio rei venditae et traditae, 
but he will nonetheless be able to recover if he proves that he did not authorize 
the delivery. In other words, the acquirer of a res mancipi by traditio will not have 
the thing in bonis, as he normally has, if the delivery was not performed voluntate 
domini. This shows that the exceptio rei venditae et traditae will never be able to 
repel on its own the claim of the owner who did not authorize the delivery, and 
therefore has a very different scope of application from the exceptio si non auctor 
meus ex voluntate tua vendidit discussed in the previous section. There is 
accordingly no confusion between these two praetorian defences, even in the 
work of a jurist like Ulpian who, as will be seen in the next section, was not 
always keen to offer clear boundaries to the scope of application of different 
praetorian defences. 
 
4. Convalescence of the delivery 
 
The scope of application of the various exceptiones may sometimes overlap, as it 
can be seen in the context of the ‘convalescence’57. This term can be used to 
describe those situations in which an act which was in itself invalid bears legal 
consequences due to the occurrence of a particular incident, despite the fact that 
                                                 
56  Watson, instead, prefers to translate “nam et si” as “for even if”. Instead, D’Ors et al., 
Digesto (1972) II, p. 75 translate “for also if” (pues también si), just as Spruit et al., Corpus 
Iuris Civilis (1996) III, p. 703 (want ook indien). 
57  It is worth noting that Roman legal sources only resort to the verb convalescere, not to the 
noun convalescentia. See Heumann/Seckel, Handlexikon (1926), s.v. Convalescere (p. 106). 
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56  Watson, instead, prefers to translate “nam et si” as “for even if”. Instead, D’Ors et al., 
Digesto (1972) II, p. 75 translate “for also if” (pues también si), just as Spruit et al., Corpus 
Iuris Civilis (1996) III, p. 703 (want ook indien). 
57  It is worth noting that Roman legal sources only resort to the verb convalescere, not to the 
noun convalescentia. See Heumann/Seckel, Handlexikon (1926), s.v. Convalescere (p. 106). 
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the act was not ratified by the corresponding person58. The best-known case of 
convalescence in the context of the transfer of ownership is the rejection of the 
rei vindicatio of the owner of an object who had initially delivered it as an 
unauthorized non-owner, and that only later became owner59. In such case, the 
seller does not ratify the delivery once be becomes owner, but the mere fact of 
him becoming owner in this circumstances will prevent him from reclaiming the 
object. This famous problem has been preserved in different fragments within the 
Digest:  
 
D. 6,1,72 (Ulp. 16 ed.): Si a Titio fundum emeris Sempronii et tibi 
traditus sit pretio soluto, deinde Titius Sempronio heres extiterit et 
eundem alii vendiderit et tradiderit, aequius est, ut tu potior sis. 
Nam et si ipse venditor eam rem a te peteret, exceptione eum 
summoveres. Sed et si ipse possideret et tu peteres, adversus 
exceptionem dominii replicatione utereris60. 
 
D. 21,2,17 (Ulp. 29 Sab.): Vindicantem venditorem rem, quam ipse 
vendidit, exceptione doli posse summoveri nemini dubium est, 
quamvis alio iure dominium quaesierit: improbe enim rem a se 
distractam evincere conatur. Eligere autem emptor potest, utrum 
rem velit retinere intentione per exceptionem elisa, an potius re 
ablata ex causa stipulationis duplum consequi61. 
 
D. 21,3,1pr-1 (Ulp. 76 ed.): Marcellus scribit, si alienum fundum 
vendideris et tuum postea factum petas, hac exceptione recte 
repellendum. (1) Sed et si dominus fundi heres venditori existat, 
idem erit dicendum62. 
 
                                                 
58  See Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 6 and 211 ff. 
59  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 213 ff. 
60  D. 6,1,72: “‘A’ buys from Titius land belonging to Sempronius, and on his paying the 
price, it is delivered to him. Then, Titius becomes heir to Sempronius and sells and 
delivers the same land to ‘B’. It is fairer that ‘A’ should have the prior claim. For even if 
Titius should sue him for the land, ‘A’ may defeat him with a defence. And if Titius were 
in possession and ‘A’ should sue him, ‘A’ would have a replicatio to counter his defence of 
ownership” (transl. Watson). 
61  D. 21,2,17: “No doubt exists that if a vendor claims ownership of a thing which he himself 
sold, he can be defeated with the defence of fraud, even though his assertion of ownership 
is under a different title; for it is scandalous of his to seek to evict his purchaser from what 
he himself sold. For his part, however, the purchaser has the option of invoking the 
defence, thus countering the claim and so keeping the thing, or of allowing the thing to be 
taken from him and recovering double the price on the stipulation” (transl. Watson, 
modified). 
62  D. 21,3,1pr-1: “Marcellus writes that if you sell a third person’s land and then claim it as 
your own, you will correctly be defeated by this defence. (1) The same applies, even if the 
true owner of the land become heir to the vendor” (transl. Watson). 
 
D. 21,3,2 (Pomp. 2 ex Plautio): Si a Titio fundum emeris qui 
Sempronii erat isque tibi traditus fuerit, pretio autem soluto Titius 
Sempronio heres exstiterit et eundem fundum Maevio vendiderit et 
tradiderit: Iulianus ait aequius esse priorem te tueri, quia et si ipse 
Titius fundum a te peteret, exceptione summoveretur et si ipse 
Titius eum possideret, publiciana peteres63. 
 
D. 44,4,4,32 (Ulp. 76 ed.): Si a Titio fundum emeris qui Sempronii 
erat isque tibi traditus fuerit pretio soluto, deinde Titius Sempronio 
heres extiterit et eundem fundum Maevio vendiderit et tradiderit: 
Iulianus ait aequius esse praetorem te tueri, quia et, si ipse Titius 
fundum a te peteret, exceptione in factum comparata vel doli mali 
summoveretur et, si ipse eum possideret et publiciana peteres, 
adversus excipientem ‘si non suus esset’ replicatione utereris, ac per 
hoc intellegeretur eum fundum rursum vendidisse, quem in bonis 
non haberet64. 
 
All of these texts have the peculiarity of discussing an identical problem65, and 
three of them (D. 6,1,72; D. 21,3,2; D. 44,4,4,32) even comment the exact same 
case, as seen from the names used to describe the parties involved. Titius, a non-
owner, sells and delivers through traditio a piece of land, belonging to 
Sempronius, to a first acquirer (‘you’). Since Sempronius did not authorize the 
delivery, ownership could not have been transferred. However, an unexpected 
development takes place, since Sempronius dies and leaves Titius as his heir, 
thereby making him owner of the object he delivered before. In this scenario, 
Titius should have to ratify the previous delivery to the first acquirer (‘you’) in 
                                                 
63  D. 21,3,2: “Let us suppose that you buy land from Titius which, in fact, belongs to 
Sempronius and that it is transferred to you; then, the price having been paid, Titius 
becomes heir to Sempronius and sells and transfers the same land to Maevius. Julian says 
that it is you who are to have the protection of the law, because, even if Titius himself 
were claiming the land from you, he would be defeated by this defence and if he were in 
possession of the land, you could claim it from him by the Publician action” (transl. 
Watson). Scholars argue whether the text should read priorem or praetorem. See on this 
point Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 79 n. 10; García Garrido, Venta a non domino (2006 
[1997]), p. 365; Ter Beek, Dolus (1999), p. 899 n. 1. 
64  D. 44,4,4,32: “If you have bought land, which belonged to Sempronius, from Titius, and 
the land has been delivered to you and the price paid, and then Titius became heir to 
Sempronius and sold and delivered the said land to Maevius, Julian said that it would be 
equitable that the praetor should protect you, because, if Titius himself had claimed the 
land from you, he would also be barred by a defence devised in factum or by a defence of 
fraud, and if you yourself were in possession of the land and had brought a Publician 
action, you would use a replication against one who pleaded the defence that ‘it was not 
your property’, and thereby it was accepted that he had sold land of which he did not have 
bonitary ownership” (transl. Watson). 
65  Also D. 6,2,9,4 (Ulp. 16 ed.) and D. 19,1,31,2 (Nerat. 3 membranarum) deal with similar 
cases. However, they do not analyse the praetorian defences, which is why they will be not 
discussed here. 
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order to make him owner, but instead decides to take advantage of the situation 
and transfers the object to a second acquirer, Maevius. Being these the basic facts, 
most scholars also assume that the second conveyance performed by Titius was a 
mancipatio66, since this mode of transferring ownership did not require a physical 
delivery67, which would explain why was it possible for Titius to transfer 
ownership over an object which he had already delivered. This would moreover 
agree with the fact that in most texts it is explicitly mentioned that the disputed 
object is a piece of land, i.e. a res mancipi68. 
 The different texts offer basically the same outcome, since the non-owner 
who later acquired ownership (Titius) will be prevented from successfully 
reclaiming the object from the first acquirer (‘you’) through a rei vindicatio, being 
met with a praetorian defence. Moreover, some of the texts – D. 6,1,72; 
D. 21,3,2; D. 44,4,4,32 – explicitly declare that the first acquirer may recover 
through the actio Publiciana and a subsequent replicatio, which shows that he has 
the thing in bonis. Therefore, the praetor corrects the ius civile and protects the 
first acquirer despite the fact that he did not receive the object voluntate domini69. 
The motivation behind this remedy rests on equitable grounds70, as Julian is 
reported to have claimed in D. 44,4,4,32 (Iulianus ait aequius esse praetorem te tueri) 
and D. 21,3,2 (Iulianus ait aequius esse priorem te tueri). Ulpian himself reproduces 
this view in D. 6,1,72 (aequius est), which is further developed by him in 
D. 21,2,17 by claiming that he who tries to evict his purchaser from that which 
he sold to him acts in an indecent way (improbe).  
 While the general outcome of these cases is identical, the specific defence 
granted to the acquirer differs in the opinions of jurists. In D. 44,4,4,32, Ulpian 
reports that Julian granted an exceptio in factum or an exceptio doli, and in 
D. 21,3,1pr he indicates that Marcellus would grant an exceptio rei venditae et 
                                                 
66  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 79; 511; 865 n. 2; Pringsheim, Eigentumsübergang (1930), 
p. 418; Gonvers, L’exceptio (1939), p. 51; Koschaker, Convalida (1953), p. 3, 49-50, 79; 
Ranieri, Alienatio convalescit (1974), p. 8; Apathy, Die actio Publiciana (1982), p. 176-178; 
Ankum, Propriété bonitaire relatif (1985), p. 133 ff.; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 185 
n. 131; Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoedheid (1998), p. 213 n. 5; 215 n. 13; 217; Ankum, 
Fusion and transfusion (2001), p. 121-122; Koops, Koop en traditio (2014), p. 51-52. 
67  This point is however not completely conclusive, considering that the requirement of a 
physical delivery in the context of the traditio was also considerably relaxed regarding 
immovable property.  
68  If the second conveyance was indeed a mancipatio, it appears that the rules on 
convalescence would have nonetheless been applicable to the delivery of res nec mancipi, 
which is why D. 21,2,17 is written in broader terms. See Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoedheid 
(1998), p. 218. 
69  The lack of a voluntas domini is particularly clear in some texts dealing with the 
convalescence in the context of the pledge, such as D. 13,7,41 (Paul 3 quaestionum) (rem 
meam obligaverat sine mea voluntate) and D. 20,1,22 (Mod. 7 differentiarum) (rem meam 
ignorante me creditori suo pignori obligaverit). See on these texts Potjewijd, 
Beschikkingsbevoedheid (1998), p. 253-254 and 259 n. 161. 
70  See Potjewijd, Convalescentie (1996), p. 27-28; Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoedheid (1998), 
p. 238-239; Ter Beek, Dolus (1999), p. 901-902; Koops, Koop en traditio (2014), p. 51-52. 
 
traditae71. In D. 21,2,17, however, Ulpian himself claims that there is no doubt 
that an exceptio doli will be in place. Scholars have long debated why jurists would 
provide the buyer different defences, and what would this imply for the 
evolution of the exceptio in factum, the exceptio doli and the exceptio venditae et 
traditae72. For instance, some scholars claim that the exceptio venditae et traditae was 
applicable to similar cases already before Marcellus73, while Koschaker considers 
that it was precisely this jurist who expanded the scope of application of this 
defence74. Others think that this expansion would only have taken place in the 
time of Justinian75. The answer to this problem also determines the scope of 
application granted to the exceptio doli within the general context of the 
convalescence of the delivery76. It has moreover been pointed out that the 
differences regarding the specific defence given by the praetor would not be so 
relevant in the time of Ulpian due to the progressive abandonment of the 
formulary procedure, which implies that it was no longer essential to draw a clear 
distinction between the specific exceptio which should be invoked considering 
that the effect reached would be identical77. This would explain why Ulpian had 
no problem in bringing up different exceptiones for the same problem when 
quoting the ideas of different jurists, reproducing their original views without 
attempting to offer a definite answer to the problem. 
 While the debate concerning the original scope of the exceptio doli and the 
exceptio rei venditae et traditae exceeds the margins of the present research, it is 
worth noting that the application of the latter defence by Marcellus seems rather 
out of place in the context of the convalescence of the delivery. The exceptio doli 
seems in fact more suitable considering the abusive and contradictory behaviour 
of the plaintiff78, which is why the concession of the exceptio rei venditae et traditae 
by Marcellus suggests an innovative expansion of the field of application of this 
                                                 
71  Although no express reference is made to this defence, the text is not only found under the 
Digest title “De exceptione rei venditae et traditae”, but is moreover located under the rubric 
“Rei venditae et traditae” by Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 860. See Koschaker, Convalida 
(1953), p. 7-10; Kaser, RPR (1971) I, p. 439 n. 12; Potjewijd, Convalescentie (1996), p. 25-
26; Wacke, Konvaleszenz der Verfügung (1997), p. 210; Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoedheid 
(1998), p. 214. Contrary to this view is Koops, Koop en traditio (2014), p. 53 n. 37. 
72  For a status quaestionis on this point see Ranieri, Alienatio convalescit (1974), p. 5 n. 6; 
Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 161, 175-179; Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoedheid (1998), 
p. 219 n. 24; Ter Beek, Dolus (1999), p. 897-902. 
73  Wubbe, Res aliena (1960), p. 39 ff.; Kaser, In bonis esse (1961), p. 195-197. 
74  Koschaker, Convalida (1953), p. 9-11. 
75  Gonvers, L’exceptio (1939), p. 49; Ankum, Propriété bonitaire relatif (1985), p. 134 n. 58. 
76  See on this point Bonfante, Exceptio rei venditae (1918), p. 453-454; Sansón, La transmisión 
(1998), p. 169-172. 
77  Koschaker, Convalida (1953), p. 10; Tondo, Convalida (1959), p. 93-100; Wesener, 
Nichtediktale Einreden (1995), p. 121-122; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 178, 185 and 
194. 
78  See similar cases of application of the exceptio doli in Chapter 4, Section 5 below. 
Concerning the pertinent application of this defence to the convalescence of the delivery 
see Ter Beek, Dolus (1999), p. 901-902.  
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71  Although no express reference is made to this defence, the text is not only found under the 
Digest title “De exceptione rei venditae et traditae”, but is moreover located under the rubric 
“Rei venditae et traditae” by Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 860. See Koschaker, Convalida 
(1953), p. 7-10; Kaser, RPR (1971) I, p. 439 n. 12; Potjewijd, Convalescentie (1996), p. 25-
26; Wacke, Konvaleszenz der Verfügung (1997), p. 210; Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoedheid 
(1998), p. 214. Contrary to this view is Koops, Koop en traditio (2014), p. 53 n. 37. 
72  For a status quaestionis on this point see Ranieri, Alienatio convalescit (1974), p. 5 n. 6; 
Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 161, 175-179; Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoedheid (1998), 
p. 219 n. 24; Ter Beek, Dolus (1999), p. 897-902. 
73  Wubbe, Res aliena (1960), p. 39 ff.; Kaser, In bonis esse (1961), p. 195-197. 
74  Koschaker, Convalida (1953), p. 9-11. 
75  Gonvers, L’exceptio (1939), p. 49; Ankum, Propriété bonitaire relatif (1985), p. 134 n. 58. 
76  See on this point Bonfante, Exceptio rei venditae (1918), p. 453-454; Sansón, La transmisión 
(1998), p. 169-172. 
77  Koschaker, Convalida (1953), p. 10; Tondo, Convalida (1959), p. 93-100; Wesener, 
Nichtediktale Einreden (1995), p. 121-122; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 178, 185 and 
194. 
78  See similar cases of application of the exceptio doli in Chapter 4, Section 5 below. 
Concerning the pertinent application of this defence to the convalescence of the delivery 
see Ter Beek, Dolus (1999), p. 901-902.  
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defence. The underlying facts of the case in D. 21,3,1pr show that this jurist is 
dealing with a situation in which someone delivered through traditio a res mancipi 
invito domino, attempting to reivindicate after he has become owner himself (si 
alienum fundum vendideris et tuum postea factum petas). The concession of the exceptio 
rei venditae et traditae in such a context seems odd considering that the guidelines 
offered later by Ulpian in D. 21,3,1,2 and 5 would not seem to allow this 
defence in this particular case. Ulpian, as shown in the previous section, considers 
that the owner of a res mancipi can recover it if the traditio was performed invito 
domino by a non-owner. If, however, the owner authorized the traditio, he will be 
met with an exceptio rei venditae et traditae. In the case of the convalescence 
examined in D. 21,3,1pr, the traditio of the res mancipi was performed invito 
domino, which would in principle exclude the exceptio rei venditae et traditae, at 
least according to the scope granted to this defence at the time of Ulpian. 
However, this case has a peculiar feature, namely that the plaintiff was in fact the 
person who performed the delivery invito domino. By granting the exceptio rei 
venditae et traditae in this context, Marcellus seems to regard as decisive only the 
fact that the person who sold and delivered was the same one who later reclaims 
the object as its true owner, which is why he considers that the exceptio rei 
venditae et traditae would be in place79. Accordingly, in the eyes of this jurist, the 
fact that the traditio was not authorized by the owner at the time it took place 
would not be an obstacle to resort to this praetorian defence if the plaintiff was 
the one who carried out the delivery. That this interpretation was too liberal may 
explain why it was not followed by any earlier or later jurists. Ulpian may have 
accordingly reproduced the opinion of Marcellus rather anecdotally when dealing 
with the exceptio rei venditae et traditae, as the only jurist who would be willing to 
make use of this defence in the context of the convalescence of the delivery80. 
 
5. Exceptio doli 
 
Apart from the case of convalescence of the delivery, there are other situations 
where the transfer of ownership is performed by a non-owner in which the 
exceptio doli is invoked. All of these applications show the rather residual role of 
the exceptio doli, since they tackle a great variety of situations where no other 
defence is available, but where nonetheless the praetor checks different forms of 
abusive or fraudulent behaviour. 
 
  
                                                 
79  Koschaker, Convalida (1953), p. 9-10 considers that Marcellus may be fighting the opinion 
of Julian by offering an application by way of analogy of the exceptio rei venditae et traditae. 
80  Koschaker, Convalida (1953), p. 10 considers that there may even be a certain criticism 
from Ulpian to Marcellus on this point. 
 
a. C. 8,44,11. 
 
The exceptio doli is to be found explicitly applied to the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner in a constitution of the time of Alexander Severus:  
 
C. 8,44(45),11 (Alexander, 231): Exceptione doli recte eum 
submovebis, quem ab auctore tuo fideiussorem accepisti, si eius 
nomine controversiam refert, quasi per uxorem suam, antequam tu 
emeres, comparaverit, qui vendenti adeo consensum dedit, ut se 
etiam pro evictione obligaverit81.  
 
In this case, a non-owner delivered an object to the buyer, while a fideiussor who 
granted security to the buyer against eviction was in fact owner of the thing at 
the time of the delivery. The warrantor then decides to reclaim the object from 
the buyer, arguing that he had become owner of the thing through his wife. 
There is nothing wrong with this rei vindicatio from the perspective of the ius 
civile, since the owner did not in fact grant his authorization for the sale of his 
own property, but merely intervened as a warrantor82. Nonetheless, the praetor 
considers that this latter circumstance implies that the owner can be regarded to 
have authorized the sale, since he even became a warrantor against eviction (adeo 
consensum dedit, ut se etiam pro evictione obligaverit). It is noteworthy that this 
consent is not taken into account as a voluntas domini which would grant the 
owner Quiritary ownership – since he did not actually authorize the sale – but is 
only considered to grant an exceptio doli against the owner. The jurists of 
Alexander’s chancery appear therefore to be cautious regarding the actual 
existence of a voluntas domini at the delivery83. The exceptio doli is especially 
justified considering that the warrantor/owner appears to have been aware of the 
                                                 
81  C. 8,44,11: “You will rightly defeat by the defence of fraud him whom you received as 
surety for your vendor and who raises a dispute on the ground that he bought the 
property, through his wife, before you bought it, since he gave his consent to the sale to 
you, even to the extent that he became a warrantor against eviction” (transl. Blume, 
modified). 
82  See Krüger, Exceptio doli (1892), p. 61; Costa, L’exceptio doli (1897), p. 32; Tondo, 
Convalida (1959), p. 113-114; Schanbacher, Die Konvaleszenz (1987), p. 145 n. 768; 
Wacke, Konvaleszenz der Verfügung (1997), p. 215-217; Ter Beek, Dolus (1999), p. 1189-
1190. 
83  Considering that there was not truly a voluntas domini aimed at the traditio, it is no wonder 
that the jurists of Alexander’s chancery would prefer to grant a praetorian defence instead 
of considering that Quiritary ownership was transferred. It is therefore not necessary to 
assume that the praetorian protection takes place in the context of the traditio of a res 
mancipi, as assumed by Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 197. Moreover, if that 
were the case, one would expect the praetor to grant an exceptio rei venditae et traditae, as 
shown in Chapter 4, Section 3 above. 
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82  See Krüger, Exceptio doli (1892), p. 61; Costa, L’exceptio doli (1897), p. 32; Tondo, 
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fact that he was the owner all along84, since he does not invoke a mistake on this 
point. But even if the owner was not aware of his condition, the sole fact that 
someone who has obliged himself to protect the buyer from eviction would later 
reclaim the object from the latter seems enough to motivate the intervention of 
the praetor on account of his contradictory and malicious behaviour85. 
 
b. D. 17,1,49. 
 
Another case where the exceptio doli is brought up in the context of the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner refers to the error in dominio as described by Marcellus 
in D. 17,1,4986. This text, which was already analysed above87, contains two 
cases: in the first one, the owner delivers as procurator an object which he ignores 
to be in fact his own; in the second one, the owner – who again is unaware of 
his condition – orders a seller to deliver the object of the sale to a third party in 
what seems to be a case of delegatio. What is particularly interesting for the 
purpose of the praetorian remedies is that the owner will be met – at least in the 
second case – with an exceptio doli if he reclaims his property, which was not 
transferred due to the lack of voluntas domini. Regarding the first case we are only 
told that the rei vindicatio will not be granted to him because he is obliged towards 
the buyer, having sold as a procurator (quamvis quasi procurator vendidisset, obstrictum 
emptori neque, si rem tradidisset, vindicationem ei concedendam). To properly 
understand the defence granted to the owner, it is also worth noting that the text 
discusses the transfer of ownership over a slave, which is reported to have taken 
place through traditio, at least in the first case. This would imply that already from 
the start the delivery by traditio could not transfer the dominium ex iure Quiritium 
over the slave. 
 The ground for the exceptio doli in the second case is most likely the 
contradictory behaviour of the non-owner, who first orders the delivery of the 
object and then reclaims it88. Regarding the first case, Marcellus conveys the 
ground for his decision – the seller cannot simply reclaim the object, being 
                                                 
84  Koschaker, Convalida (1953), p. 30; Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 196 n. 86. 
Krüger, Exceptio doli (1892), p. 61 claims that the owner must have been unaware of his 
condition, while Wacke, Konvaleszenz der Verfügung (1997), p. 216 considers this possible. 
85  See Gonvers, L’exceptio (1939), p. 112; Koschaker, Convalida (1953), p. 31; Tondo, 
Convalida (1959), p. 112-114; Ter Beek, Dolus (1999), p. 1189-1190. 
86  D. 17,1,49 (Marcell. 6 dig.): “Servum Titii emi ab alio bona fide et possideo: mandatu meo 
eum Titius vendidit, cum ignoraret suum esse, vel contra ego vendidi illius mandatu, cum 
forte is, cui heres exstiterit, eum emisset: de iure evicitonis et de mandatu quaesitum est. Et 
puto Titium, quamvis quasi procurator vendidisset, obstrictum emptori neque, si rem 
tradidisset, vindicationem ei concedendam, et idcirco mandati eum non teneri, sed contra 
mandati agere posse, si quid eius interfuisset, quia forte venditurus non fuerit. Contra 
mandator, si rem ab eo vindicare velit, exceptione doli summovetur et adversus 
venditorem testatoris sui habet ex empto iure hereditario actionem”. 
87  Chapter 2, Section 6(b). 
88  Regarding the exceptio doli in the delegatio see Zandrino, Delegatio (2014), p. 106 ff. 
 
himself personally obliged to protect the buyer from eviction – which also 
involves a contradictory behaviour89. It is however not clear what exactly renders 
the rei vindicatio ineffective. At this point it should be borne in mind that there are 
two different legal grounds which explain why the transfer of ownership did not 
take place in the first case: first of all, the transferor delivered a res mancipi by 
traditio, which would not grant the dominium ex iure Quiritium to the acquirer; 
secondly, since the tradens was not aware of being owner of the thing delivered, 
the traditio cannot be seen as taking place with the intent of the owner, as already 
shown when discussing the error in dominio. Since the traditio of a res mancipi took 
place invito domino, it is useful to recall D. 21,3,1,2 and 590, according to which 
the exceptio rei venditae et traditae will be of no avail against the owner if he did not 
authorize the delivery. It should however be borne in mind that the text belongs 
to Marcellus, who expanded the scope of the exceptio rei venditae et traditae to cases 
where the plaintiff is the same person who delivered the object, despite the fact 
that the delivery took place invito domino, as shown when discussing 
D. 21,3,1pr91. It seems therefore likely that Marcellus would grant in the first case 
the exceptio rei venditae et traditae, as most scholars think92. This would moreover 
explain why the exceptio doli is only explicitly granted in the second case, where 
no other praetorian remedy seems available. Nonetheless, the equivocal wording 
of the text leaves the door open for debate93. 
 
c. D. 39,5,25. 
 
The exceptio doli finds other applications regarding cases where the owner actually 
intended to transfer ownership through another person, as can be seen in 
D. 39,5,2594, which was already analysed above95. In this case, the owner gave 
instructions to another person to perform a gift to Titius on his behalf, i.e. acting 
nomine alieno. The non-owner, however, decides to perform the gift on behalf of 
himself (nomine proprio). Since this is an infringement of the owner’s instructions, 
                                                 
89  See on this point Costa, L’exceptio doli (1897), p. 31-32; Zilletti, Errore (1961), p. 127-129; 
Ter Beek, Dolus (1999), p. 965. 
90  Chapter 4, Section 3 above. 
91  Chapter 4, Section 4 above. 
92  Costa, L’exceptio doli (1897), p. 28; Betti, Esercitazioni (1930), p. 119; Reggi, Error in 
dominio (1952), p. 98; Wolf, Error (1961), p. 76; Ter Beek, Dolus (1999), p. 963 n. 8; 
Harke, Error in dominio? (2004), p. 139-140. 
93  Other scholars think that the text deals rather with a case of denegatio actionis: Voci, L’errore 
(1937), p. 90; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 70; Burdese, Error in dominio (1953), 
p. 28. Later Voci, Modi di acquisto (1952), p. 106 n. 1 would claim that in the first case the 
plaintiff would either face a denegatio actionis or an exceptio doli. 
94  D. 39,5,25 (Jav. 6 epistolarum): “Si tibi dederim rem, ut Titio meo nomine donares, et tu 
tuo nomine eam ei dederis, an factam eius putes? Respondit: si rem tibi dederim, ut Titio 
meo nomine donares eamque tu tuo nomine ei dederis, quantum ad iuris suptilitatem 
accipientis facta non est et tu furti obligaris: sed benignius est, si agam contra eum qui rem 
accepit, exceptione doli mali me summoveri”. 
95  Chapter 2, Section 5 above. 
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tuo nomine eam ei dederis, an factam eius putes? Respondit: si rem tibi dederim, ut Titio 
meo nomine donares eamque tu tuo nomine ei dederis, quantum ad iuris suptilitatem 
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95  Chapter 2, Section 5 above. 
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the traditio will take place invito domino and ownership will not be transferred 
because of the lack of potestas alienandi96. Moreover, the conscious disobedience 
of the owner’s intent renders the thing delivered a res furtiva97. This allows the 
owner to exercise the rei vindicatio against the acquirer, but in this particular case 
Javolenus is willing to grant the latter an exceptio doli.  
 Some scholars have regarded the last sentence of the text as interpolated, 
considering the reference to the benignitas as a typically postclassical element98. 
Such claim is however unfounded, since scholars have shown that there is 
nothing alien to classical law about the references to the benignitas99. On the 
contrary, in this particular case the contrast between iuris subtilitas and benignitas is 
the key to understanding the innovative solution offered by Javolenus, who 
acknowledges that according to a strict interpretation of the ius civile (quantum ad 
iuris suptilitatem) the acquirer would not become owner, but that it is more liberal 
(benignius est) to protect the acquirer by resorting to the ius honorarium100. It is 
however not evident what the grounds for this innovation are, which has been 
used to reaffirm the claims of interpolation. Hausmaninger thinks that the claim 
of the plaintiff would be a case of venire contra factum proprium101. MacCormack 
claims that the owner has formed an expectation on the person of the acquirer, 
an interpretation which cannot be accepted considering that the delivery was not 
performed nomine domini102. More appealing is MacCormack’s indication that the 
owner takes advantage of his agent’s disobedience in order to deprive the 
acquirer from the object. Potjewijd103 offers a more complete outlook on the 
                                                 
96  Some authors claim that ownership was not transferred because there was no causa 
traditionis between the principal and the acquirer: Costa, L’exceptio doli (1897), p. 33; 
Eckardt, Iavoleni Epistulae (1978), p. 26; Hausmaninger, Subtilitas iuris (1986), p. 64; Ter 
Beek, Dolus (1999) II, p. 846 n. 1. This view cannot be accepted, since the lack of voluntas 
domini in this case signals a problem of potestas alienandi at the delivery, and not the absence 
of a iusta causa traditionis. This is also the opinion of Thomas, Animus furandi (1968), p. 29-
30 n. 130; Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 137. 
97  See on this point Schlossmann, Stellvertretung (1900) I, p. 303-304 n. 1; Albanese, Furtum I 
(1953), p. 193. 
98  Costa, L’exceptio doli (1897), p. 34; Levy/Rabel, Ind. Itp. (1935) III, p. 106; Riccobono, 
Lineamenti (1930), p. 440; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 76-77; Koschaker, Convalida 
(1953), p. 81 n. 200; Albanese, Furtum I (1953), p. 192-193; Thomas, Animus furandi 
(1968), p. 29-30 n. 130; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 97.  
99  Wubbe, Benignus redivivus (1968), p. 237-262; Wubbe, Benigna interpretatio (1972), p. 295-
314; Palma, Benignior interpretatio (1997). Further on the classical nature of the benignitas see 
Hausmaninger, Benevolent (1981), p. 1139-1156; Hausmaninger, Subtilitas iuris (1986), 
p. 63-70; Hendel, D. 28,4,3 (2013), p. 419-431. 
100  Riccobono, Lineamenti (1930), p. 440; Eckardt, Iavoleni Epistulae (1978), p. 25-26; 
Hausmaninger, Benevolent (1981), p. 1144-1145; Hausmaninger, Subtilitas iuris (1986), 
p. 64-65; Hausmaninger/Gamauf, Roman Property Law (2012), p. 117. 
101  Hausmaninger, Subtilitas iuris (1986), p. 64. Also Ter Beek, Dolus (1999) II, p. 845-846 
stresses the fundamental contradiction between the initial intention of the owner and the 
subsequent rei vindicatio. 
102  MacCormack, Dolus (1986), p. 260. 
103  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 137. 
 
problem by showing that there was no actual damage to the principal – he 
intended anyhow to make a gift – and that the acquirer would inevitably have 
found out through the lawsuit who the real donor was. It is true that the owner 
had an interest in appearing as the generous donor, and in fact Schlossmann has 
pointed out that there does follow a certain profit from the fact of appearing as 
the donor instead of the donor’s agent104. Nonetheless, this can hardly be seen as 
a solid reason to actually reclaim the object from the acquirer. Since the acquirer 
will find out who the owner was, the owner cannot be seen as having an interest 
in recovering the object which he intended to donate in the first place. This is 
why he is regarded to act in an abusive way when resorting to the rei vindicatio, 
which leads the praetor to grant the exceptio doli against him. 
 
d. D. 17,1,5,3-4. 
 
Paul presents a similar outcome in another case where the transferor does not 
follow the owner’s instructions: 
 
D. 17,1,5,3-4 (Paul. 32 ed.): Item si mandavero tibi, ut fundum 
meum centum venderes, tuque eum nonaginta vendideris, et petam 
fundum, non obstabit mihi exceptio, nisi et reliquum mihi, quod 
deest, mandati meo, praestes, et indemnem me per omnia conserves. 
(4) Servo quoque dominus si praeceperit, certa summa rem vendere, 
ille minoris vendiderit, similiter vindicare eam dominus potest, nec 
ulla exceptione summoveri, nisi indemnitas ei praestetur105. 
 
The text deals with a common form of infringement of the owner’s intent, in 
which the transferor sells at a lower price than that indicated by the owner106. In 
D. 17,1,5,3 Paul declares that if the non-owner sells a piece of land for ninety, 
having been ordered in the context of a contract of mandate to sell for one 
hundred, the owner will be able to reclaim the land and ‘a defence’ will prevail 
against him (et petam fundum, non obstabit mihi exceptio), unless the owner gets the 
difference in the price from the seller. In D. 17,1,5,4 practically the same case is 
drawn regarding an alienation by a slave, where again we are told that the owner 
                                                 
104  Schlossmann, Stellvertretung (1900) I, p. 303-304 n. 1. This author quotes in this regard 
D. 47,2,55(54),1 (Gai. 13 ed. prov.): “…species enim lucri est ex alieno largiri et beneficii 
debitorem sibi adquirere”. 
105  D. 17,1,5,3-4: “Again, if I give you a mandate to sell my farm for one hundred and you 
sell it for ninety and I bring an action for the farm, a defence will not prevail against me, 
unless you make good to me the balance which is outstanding under the terms of my 
mandate and generally ensure that I suffer no loss. (4) Further, if a master instructs his slave 
to sell something at a certain price and the slave sells at a lower figure, the master is 
similarly entitled to bring a vindication for the thing, and no defence will prevail against 
him, unless he is given security against financial loss” (transl. Watson). 
106  See also D. 21,3,1,3, studied in Chapter 4, Section 3 above. 
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may bring the rei vindicatio and that no exceptio will avail against him, unless he 
receives security against financial loss. While none of these texts mentions the 
ground for this decision, it seems more likely that it lies in the fact that the owner 
would suffer no damage from the acts of the transferor, and therefore it would 
not be acceptable for him to regain the property over the delivered goods. 
 While the outcome of Paul’s reasoning is clear, it goes again without saying 
what praetorian defences are being discussed. Concerning D. 17,1,5,3, where we 
are told that ‘the defence’ will not prevail against the claim of the owner of the 
delivered piece of land, it is only possible that such defence would be the exceptio 
rei venditae et traditae, which would not be effective against the owner since the 
delivery was not performed voluntate domini, just as seen in D. 21,3,1,2. In 
D. 17,1,5,4, on the other side, it does not seem relevant to determine which 
particular defence would be available in principle, since we are simply told that 
no defence (nec ulla exceptione) will prevail against the owner. Having this starting 
point, both texts present an exception to this general rule following the word 
“nisi” (unless…) in case the owner suffers no loss, either because the seller gave 
him the difference in the price or because he was granted a security regarding the 
loss. This solution has traditionally been considered to be a Justinianic addition to 
the original text107, since Paul would have followed the opinion of Sabinus as 
conveyed in Gai 3,161108. According to this text, if someone was ordered to buy 
a piece of land for 100 and instead buys at 150, he cannot bring the actio mandati 
contraria against the owner even if he lets him have the land for the price which 
the latter had commissioned. Moreover, it is often claimed that this solution 
would confuse problems belonging to the law of obligations and to the law of 
property. 
 The allegations against the classical origin of D. 17,1,5,3-4 are however not 
unsurmountable. Sansón in particular has pointed out that Paul may be adopting 
a more liberal view in this particular case and that, due to the absence of a 
voluntas domini at the delivery, he simply grants an exceptio doli to protect the 
acquirer109. The author cautiously observes that the text does not grant much 
ground to support any definitive conclusion, but the possibility that an exceptio 
doli is available is in fact more likely, for instance, than the exceptio rei venditae et 
                                                 
107  Pringsheim, Gai. Ver. 3, 161 (1939), p. 349-351; Gonvers, L’exceptio (1939), p. 91; 
Arangio-Ruiz, Mandato (1949), p. 185; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 82-83; van 
Warmelo, Lashebber (1964), p. 5. Much more cautious is Watson, Mandate (1961), p. 191-
194. 
108  Gai 3,161: “Cum autem is, cui recte mandaverim, egressus fuerit mandatum, ego quidem 
eatenus cum eo habeo mandati actionem, quatenus mea interest inplesse eum mandatum, si 
modo implere potuerit; at ille mecum agere non potest. Itaque si mandaverim tibi, ut verbi 
gratia fundum mihi sestertiis C emeres, tu sestertiis CL emeris, non habebis mecum 
mandati actionem, etiamsi tanti velis mihi dare fundum, quanti emendum tibi mandassem; 
idque maxime Sabino et Cassio placuit. Quod si minoris emeris, habebis mecum scilicet 
actionem, quia qui mandat, ut C milibus emeretur, is utique mandare intellegitur, uti 
minoris, si posset, emeretur”. 
109  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 213. 
 
traditae that Burdese110 thought to identify – be it as a postclassical addition – in 
this text. This latter theory seems particularly unlikely considering that ownership 
is not transferred in this context due to the lack of voluntas domini, which would 
not enable the acquirer to successfully repel the rei vindicatio of the owner of the 
delivered res mancipi. The possibility to resort to the exceptio doli would moreover 
offer a similar outcome to that given by Javolenus in D. 39,5,25, where the 
owner cannot be seen as having a real interest in recovering the thing. At this 
point it could be argued that this solution is opposite to that given regarding the 
acquisition of ownership through a third person (Gai 3,161), but then again it is 
important to bear in mind that one must be particularly careful when drawing 
analogies between the cases where ownership is acquired and those where it is 
transferred. Moreover, Gai 3,161 only deals with the problem of acquisition 
through an agent regarding the law of obligations, denying the actio mandati 
contraria against the principal. In D. 17,1,5,3-4, on the other hand, nothing is said 
concerning the relationship between agent and principal, but only between 
principal and acquirer, in which context an exceptio doli against the rei vindicatio 
does not seem out of place. Both problems would be confused by authors like 
Arangio-Ruiz, who claimed that in the original text Paul was dealing with the 
relationship between principal and agent, and therefore the outcome of 
D. 17,1,5,3-4 should be understood within the general problem regarding the 
cases where an agent exceeds the powers granted to him by the principal111. This 
connection is nonetheless by no means evident, especially since the relation 
between principal/owner and acquirer as described in this text can be perfectly 
explained through the general rules concerning the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner, the only innovation being the concession of a defence against the rei 
vindicatio in case the owner suffered no harm. That the particular relation 
between owner and transferor is of little moment for the outcome of this case can 
moreover be seen in the fact that the same solution is given in D. 17,1,5,3 and 
D. 17,1,5,4, despite the fact that the first case deals with the alienation performed 
in the context of a contract of mandate while in the second case the authorized 
tradens is merely a slave. 
 Rather different is the situation concerning the approach to this identical 
problem in the Pauli Sententiae: 
 
                                                 
110  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 83. 
111  Arangio-Ruiz, Mandato (1949), p. 185: “In verità l’opinione dei più fra gli studiosi, che 
Paolo si sia limitato a dirimere la controversia di proprietà fra mandante ed acquirente, non 
suffraga: a buon conto, il giureconsulto non discetteva in sede di proprietà, ma in sede di 
mandato, ed ogni lettore diligente doveva attendersi che egli dicesse se ed in quali limiti 
spettasse, rispettivamente al mandante o al mandatario o ad entrambi, l’actio mandati”. 
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PS 2,15,3: Certo pretio rem iussus distrahere si minoris vendiderit, 
mandati iudicio pretii summa poterit integrari: venditionem enim 
dissolui non placuit112. 
 
The text grossly oversimplifies the classical solutions regarding the mandate to 
dispose113, first of all by claiming that all the principal can do when the agent sells 
for less is to recover the difference in the price from him because “the sale cannot 
be set aside” (venditionem enim dissolui non placuit). Neither in Gai 3,161 nor in 
D. 17,1,5,3-4 does the problem revolve around the validity of the sale, which 
will in fact be perfectly valid. The only problem is that, since the seller did not 
act voluntate domini, he will not have the potestas alienandi and the owner may 
recover through a rei vindicatio from the seller, who will then be able to bring an 
actio empti against the seller. None of this implies setting the sale aside. One may 
however understand that by ‘venditio’ the text does not refer to the sale, but to 
the transfer of ownership as such114. If that was the case, the Pauli Sententiae 
would simply state that ownership cannot be reclaimed. Whatever the case may 
be, this solution merges the ius civile and the ius honorarium in an abbreviated way 
which is highly non-classical. 
 
6. Pretorian remedies concerning alienations by legal guardians 
 
It was already shown115 when dealing with D. 27,10,7,1116 that the exceptio rei 
venditae et traditae finds an application as well when ownership over a res mancipi is 
transferred through traditio by a legal guardian, which is phrased by Julian as the 
exceptio si non curator vendiderit. Apart from this specific text, no further reference 
is found in the sources concerning this praetorian defence. There are however 
several other praetorian defences which modify the general rules regarding the 
transfer of ownership by a legal guardian. An example of this can be found 
towards the end of D. 27,10,7,1, where we are told that if the plaintiff presents a 
replicatio which mentions that the curator did not duly grant the surety for 
administering the lunatic’s property, the legal guardian could make use of a 
triplicatio doli if he had used the money gained from the sale to pay the creditors 
                                                 
112  PS 2,15,3: “If a person who was ordered to sell property for a certain price sells it for less, 
the entire sum can be recovered by an action of mandate, for it has been held that the sale 
cannot be set aside” (transl. Scott, modified). 
113  Arangio-Ruiz, Mandato (1949), p. 187-188; Watson, Mandate (1961), p. 192; Nörr, 
Mandatsexzeß (1993), p. 379-381. 
114  See Chapter 2, Section 4(a) above. 
115  Chapter 3, Section 2 above. 
116  D. 27,10,7,1 (Jul. 21 dig.): “Curator dementi datus decreto interposito, uti satisdaret, non 
cavit et tamen quasdam res de bonis eius legitimo modo alienavit. Si heredes dementis 
easdem res vindicent, quas curator alienavit, et exceptio opponetur ‘si non curator 
vendiderit’, replicatio dari debet ‘aut si satisdatione interposita secundum decretum 
vendiderit’. Quod si pretio accepto curator creditores furiosi dimisit, triplicatio doli tutos 
possessores praestabit”. 
 
of the lunatic. The legal grounds of this triplicatio is that the position of the lunatic 
was not made worse by the administration of his curator, which is why the 
absence of a satisdatio would be of no real significance117. Therefore, the normal 
outcome of the case would be corrected through a praetorian defence which 
would prevent an abusive claim from the owner. 
 It is worth recalling at this point that the most common objective of the 
praetorian innovations granted in the context of the alienations by a non-owner 
was to limit the scope of the potestas alienandi. This need arises from the fact that 
the legal guardian would validly transfer ownership as long as he acted 
administrationis causa and in good faith118, which left the door open for cases in 
which someone could, with the best of intentions, conclude ruinous business for 
the owner. The praetor gradually introduced limitations in order to protect the 
owner, as can be seen in the following text: 
 
D. 4,4,49 (Ulp. 35 ed.): Si res pupillaris vel adulescentis distracta 
fuerit, quam lex distrahi non prohibet, venditio quidem valet, 
verumtamen si grande damnum pupilli vel adulescentis versatur, 
etiam si collusio non intercessit, distractio per in integrum 
restitutionem revocatur119. 
 
Ulpian reports here that the praetor would be willing to grant the in integrum 
restitutio for acts concluded by the tutor which cannot be seen as forbidden by the 
law and where there was no collusion with the acquirer, but which nonetheless 
result in a significant loss for the ward. Particularly interesting about this text is 
that it shows to what extent lawful acts of administration could be nonetheless 
highly detrimental for the owner, even if there was no intention by the legal 
guardian to worsen the situation of the ward. The praetor corrects this state of 
affairs so that the position of the ward will be even stronger regarding the 
administration of this tutor. 
 Another similar case in which the in integrum restitutio is granted in order to 
remedy the consequences of a lawful – albeit detrimental – administration:  
 
D. 4,4,47pr (Scaev. 1 resp.): Tutor urguentibus creditoribus rem 
pupillarem bona fide vendidit, denuntiante tamen matre emptoribus: 
quaero, cum urguentibus creditoribus distracta sit nec de sordibus 
tutoris merito quippiam dici potest, an pupillus in integrum restitui 
                                                 
117  Guzmán, Caución tutelar (1974), p. 98. It is worth noting that according to Gai 1,199 the 
purpose of the surety was to prevent the consumption and diminishing of the owner’s 
goods (consumantur aut deminuantur). 
118  Chapter 3, Section 2 above. 
119  D. 4,4,49: “If the property of a pupillus or young person has been sold and no statute 
forbids the sale, it is certainly valid, but still, if the pupillus or young person suffers a 
considerable loss, even if there has been no collusion, it is revoked by means of restitutio in 
integrum” (transl. Watson). 
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potest. Respondi cognita causa aestimandum, nec idcirco, si iustum 
sit restitui, denegandum id auxilium, quod tutor delicto vacaret120. 
 
A tutor finds himself forced to sell some of the goods of the ward in order to meet 
the claims of the former’s creditors. That this state of affairs is not particularly 
favourable is evident from the warning of the mother to the buyers against the 
transaction. Nonetheless, the tutor is reported to sell in good faith and to be free 
of any accusation of corruptness, which seems to imply that these sales can be 
seen as taking place administrationis causa. Just like in the previous case, the 
detrimental results of a lawful administration lead the praetor to remedy this 
situation by granting an in integrum restitutio which will allow the ward to recover 
his goods. 
 Another interesting example in which the praetor may correct the normal 
outcome is to be found in an opinion by Ulpian:  
 
D. 44,4,4,23 (Ulp. 76 ed.): Illa etiam quaestio ventilata est apud 
plerosque, an de dolo tutoris exceptio pupillo experienti nocere 
debeat. Et ego puto utilius, etsi per eas personas pupillis favetur, 
tamen dicendum esse, sive quis emerit a tutore rem pupilli sive 
contractum sit cum eo in rem pupilli, sive dolo quid tutor fecerit et 
ex eo pupillus locupletior factus est, pupillo nocere debere, nec illud 
esse distinguendum, cautum sit ei an non, solvendo sit an non tutor, 
dummodo rem administret: unde enim divinat is, qui cum tutore 
contrahit? Plane si mihi proponas collusisse aliquem cum tutore, 
factum suum ei nocebit121. 
 
                                                 
120  D. 4,4,47pr: “A tutor at the urging of the creditors sold in good faith property of his 
pupillus, although the mother warned the buyers against the transaction. I ask whether the 
pupillus can obtain restitutio in integrum since the property has been sold at the urging of the 
creditors and no accusation of corruptness can properly be brought against the tutor. My 
reply was that there must be an investigation into the case and the question of restitutio 
considered and that should restitutio be just, help should not be refused on the ground that 
the tutor had committed no delict” (transl. Watson). 
121  D. 44,4,4,23: “The question was also discussed among several as to whether a defence of 
fraud on the part of a tutor ought to avail against his pupillus if the latter sues. And I 
consider more useful that, although pupilli are to be benefited through such persons, it 
nonetheless must be said that the defence must avail against the pupillus if the tutor did 
something fraudulently and the pupillus was enriched thereby, whether someone has 
purchased the property of the pupillus from his tutor or whether a contract was made with 
him with respect to the property of the pupillus; and a distinction must not be made as to 
whether or not a guarantee was given by the tutor or whether or not he was solvent, as 
long as he was administering the property; for how is the person who contracts with the 
tutor to guess this? Surely, if you tell me that someone has colluded with the tutor, his act 
will clearly prejudice him” (transl. Watson, modified). 
 
The text is one among several fragments in which Roman jurists discuss whether 
the dolus of the tutor would harm or benefit the position of the ward122. 
Particularly interesting about Ulpian’s text is that it discusses the problem in the 
context of the transfer of ownership, evaluating the possibility of granting an 
exceptio based on the dolus of the tutor to the acquirer whose position is challenged 
by the ward who wants to recover his ownership. Some examples are set forward 
in which the tutor could act fraudulently, such as the alienation by the tutor of 
goods belonging to the ward, the conclusion of contracts which affect his 
property or the production of fraudulent acts which enrich the pupillus. The 
opinion of Ulpian seems to be very innovative if compared to that of Paul in 
D. 26,7,12,1, where the possibility that ownership is transferred is simply 
excluded (alienatio non valet) if the tutor acted in bad faith. Ulpian, quite 
conversely, is of the opinion (ego puto) that it is more practical to grant a 
praetorian remedy to protect the acquirer. The departure from the traditional 
rules is shown by the reference to the guideline according to which the position 
of the ward should be improved by the acts of his tutor (per eas personas pupillis 
favetur). The main problem regarding this text, however, is to understand the 
reason behind Ulpian’s decision, especially considering that, in the way the text 
has come down to us, the only element which appears to be decisive is the fact 
that the tutor has the administration of the ward’s property123, which is also the 
case in the fragment following it (D. 44,4,4,24). This idea is linked to the fact 
that it would be intolerable for legal certainty to allow the ward to recover if the 
tutor acted fraudulently, since the other party could not be aware of this 
circumstance. This thought seems to inspire as well the closing sentence, 
according to which if the other party colluded with the tutor he will not be able 
to raise this defence. 
 The problem behind Ulpian’s decision is that it is in complete contradiction 
with every other text examined so far. Until now it has been shown that legal 
guardians must not exceed their faculties of administration, and that if they 
perform acts which cannot be seen to take place administrationis causa the owner 
may recover his property before it is acquired through usucapion. Moreover, the 
fact that the legal guardian acts in bad faith normally appears as a decisive factor 
to determine the unlawfulness of his alienation, turning the delivered asset into a 
res furtiva which cannot be usucapted. Confronted with all of this evidence, 
Ulpian’s solution appears to be highly dissonant, and scholars have often regarded 
it as heavily interpolated124.  
                                                 
122  See on this subject Knütel, Dolus tutoris (1986), p. 101-126. 
123  Knütel, Dolus tutoris (1986), p. 121. 
124  Solazzi, Azioni del pupillo (1955 [1912]), p. 531-532. For an outlook on these claims see 
Knütel, Dolus tutoris (1986), p. 121 n. 107. More recently Martens, Durch Dritte (2007), 
p. 75, who cannot conceive that an exceptio would be granted under the circumstances 
described here. 
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122  See on this subject Knütel, Dolus tutoris (1986), p. 101-126. 
123  Knütel, Dolus tutoris (1986), p. 121. 
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 Among the various attempts to explain the text, the more solid one appears to 
be to correct “sive” for “si” in “sive dolo quid tutor fecerit et ex eo pupillus locupletior 
factus est”, proposed by Knütel125 and already accepted in the Dutch translation of 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis126. According to this, the enrichment of the ward would 
be one of the decisive elements to grant the exceptio, which makes more sense in 
the general context of the fragment than to list the possibility of enrichment 
along with the cases in which the tutor concludes a specific act affecting the ward, 
as happens in Watson’s translation of the Digest: “(…) the defence must avail 
against the pupillus, whether someone has purchased the property of the pupillus 
from his tutor or whether a contract was made with him with respect to the 
property of the pupillus or whether the tutor did something fraudulently and the 
pupillus was enriched thereby (…)”. Moreover, to understand the enrichment of 
the pupillus as a condition for the exceptio also agrees with several other texts 
regarding the question of whether the dolus of the tutor harms the ward, since 
they show that only if the pupillus does become richer due to the dolus of the tutor 
will this latter element harm the position of the ward127. 
 The fact that the acquirer will only obtain an exceptio against the claim of the 
pupillus if the latter was enriched by the fraudulent acts of his tutor offers a 
coherent outlook with the opinions of Roman jurists reviewed so far. The 
fraudulent administration of the tutor will prevent the transfer of ownership from 
taking place, which is why the remedy proposed by Ulpian appears as a 
praetorian correction to this unavoidable outcome. Moreover, the chance that 
the ward will become richer because of the fraudulent administration is not as 
restricted as some authors consider128, and one can in fact conceive that acts by 
which the tutor violates prohibitions such as those laid down by the Oratio Severi 
may have a positive effect in the situation of the pupillus129. This could imply that 
the acquirer may not obtain a possessio ad usucapionem, which would be the case 
anyhow if the dolus of the tutor enables to qualify his conduct as furtum, thereby 
rendering the object delivered a res furtiva. That the praetor would be willing to 
offer his protection even when the thing cannot be acquired by usucapion is not 
to be considered impossible130. In this context, the claim of the ward to recover 
his property may appear abusive considering that his position was not made 
worse by the fraudulent acts of the tutor, which is precisely what motivates the 
                                                 
125  Knütel, Dolus tutoris (1986), p. 122 n. 117. 
126  Spruit et al., Corpus Iuris Civilis (2001) VI, p. 176 n. 1. 
127  D. 26,9,3 (Pap. 20 quaestionum): “Dolus tutorum puero neque nocere neque prodesse 
debet: quod autem vulgo dicitur tutoris dolum pupillo non nocere, tunc verum est, cum 
ex illius fraude locupletior pupillus factus non est (…)”. See also D. 4,3,15pr (Ulp. 11 ed.); 
D. 14,4,3,1 (Ulp. 29 ed.); D. 15,1,21,1 (Ulp. 29 ed.); D. 19,1,13,7 (Ulp. 32 ed.). On the 
relevance of the ward’s enrichment regarding the dolus tutoris see Knütel, Dolus tutoris 
(1986), p. 105-112. 
128  Martens, Durch Dritte (2007), p. 74-75. 
129  Knütel, Dolus tutoris (1986), p. 122. 
130  See on the possibility to obtain the actio Publiciana despite not being able to usucapt 
Apathy, Publiciana ohne Ersitzungsbesitz (1984), p. 749-758.  
 
existence of prohibitions of alienation and the limits to the latter’s administration. 
Ulpian rightfully observes that the solvency of the tutor or the question of 
whether he granted a surety has no significance to determine the outcome of the 
case, which can be explained by the fact that the position of the ward and his 
creditors has actually improved as a result of the tutor’s fraudulent administration. 
What is however considered relevant by Ulpian is that the tutor is in charge of 
the administration of the ward’s property, not so much because he alienates 
administrationis causa – since he actually exceeds his faculties – but rather because 
the transferee could not know that the tutor was acting fraudulently, which 
motivates the opposite solution in case he colluded with the tutor. This solution 
thus provides a rare example in which Roman jurists modify the normal 
outcome of a case regarding the transfer of ownership to favour the protection of 
legal certainty in commercial transactions, but this concern can only be 
understood in the present case due to the enrichment of the ward. If the position 
of the ward was made worse due to the fraudulent transactions of his tutor, there 
would be no room for the exceptio. 
 The significance of the appointment of the tutor for the administration of the 
affairs of the ward to determine the outcome of the case becomes evident when 
examining Ulpian’s text following D. 44,4,4,23: 
 
D. 44,4,4,24 (Ulp. 76 ed.): Si quis non tutor, sed pro tutore negotia 
gerat, an dolus ipsius noceat pupillo, videamus. Et putem non 
nocere: nam si is, qui pro tutore negotia gerebat, rem vendiderit et 
usucapta sit, exceptionem non nocere pupillo rem suam persequenti, 
etiamsi ei cautum sit, quia huic rerum pupilli administratio concessa 
non fuit131. 
 
Before examining this text, it is worth noting that there is an earlier text from 
Celsus which appears to be closely related to that of Ulpian: 
 
D. 27,5,2 (Celsus 25 dig.): Si is, qui pro tutore negotia gerebat, cum 
tutor non esset, rem pupilli vendidit nec ea usucapta est, petet eam 
pupillus, quamquam ei cautum est: non enim eadem huius quae 
tutoris est rerum pupilli administratio132. 
                                                 
131  D. 44,4,4,24: “If someone is administering affairs as a tutor, but without being so, let us see 
whether his fraud avails against the pupillus. And I would think that it does not avail; for if 
he who administered affairs on behalf of the tutor sold property and it was not yet 
usucapted, the defence does not avail against the pupillus if he claims his property, even if a 
guarantee has been given to him, because the administration of the affairs of the pupillus has 
not been entrusted to him” (transl. Watson, modified). 
132  D. 27,5,2: “If someone who administered the affairs as a tutor, but without being so, sold 
the property of the pupillus but it has not been usucapted, the pupillus can reclaim it, even 
when the tutor gave security; for such administration of the property of the pupillus is 
different from that of a tutor” (transl. Watson). 
PRETORIAN REMEDIES CONCERNING ALIENATIONS BY LEGAL GUARDIANS
219
 
216 
 Among the various attempts to explain the text, the more solid one appears to 
be to correct “sive” for “si” in “sive dolo quid tutor fecerit et ex eo pupillus locupletior 
factus est”, proposed by Knütel125 and already accepted in the Dutch translation of 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis126. According to this, the enrichment of the ward would 
be one of the decisive elements to grant the exceptio, which makes more sense in 
the general context of the fragment than to list the possibility of enrichment 
along with the cases in which the tutor concludes a specific act affecting the ward, 
as happens in Watson’s translation of the Digest: “(…) the defence must avail 
against the pupillus, whether someone has purchased the property of the pupillus 
from his tutor or whether a contract was made with him with respect to the 
property of the pupillus or whether the tutor did something fraudulently and the 
pupillus was enriched thereby (…)”. Moreover, to understand the enrichment of 
the pupillus as a condition for the exceptio also agrees with several other texts 
regarding the question of whether the dolus of the tutor harms the ward, since 
they show that only if the pupillus does become richer due to the dolus of the tutor 
will this latter element harm the position of the ward127. 
 The fact that the acquirer will only obtain an exceptio against the claim of the 
pupillus if the latter was enriched by the fraudulent acts of his tutor offers a 
coherent outlook with the opinions of Roman jurists reviewed so far. The 
fraudulent administration of the tutor will prevent the transfer of ownership from 
taking place, which is why the remedy proposed by Ulpian appears as a 
praetorian correction to this unavoidable outcome. Moreover, the chance that 
the ward will become richer because of the fraudulent administration is not as 
restricted as some authors consider128, and one can in fact conceive that acts by 
which the tutor violates prohibitions such as those laid down by the Oratio Severi 
may have a positive effect in the situation of the pupillus129. This could imply that 
the acquirer may not obtain a possessio ad usucapionem, which would be the case 
anyhow if the dolus of the tutor enables to qualify his conduct as furtum, thereby 
rendering the object delivered a res furtiva. That the praetor would be willing to 
offer his protection even when the thing cannot be acquired by usucapion is not 
to be considered impossible130. In this context, the claim of the ward to recover 
his property may appear abusive considering that his position was not made 
worse by the fraudulent acts of the tutor, which is precisely what motivates the 
                                                 
125  Knütel, Dolus tutoris (1986), p. 122 n. 117. 
126  Spruit et al., Corpus Iuris Civilis (2001) VI, p. 176 n. 1. 
127  D. 26,9,3 (Pap. 20 quaestionum): “Dolus tutorum puero neque nocere neque prodesse 
debet: quod autem vulgo dicitur tutoris dolum pupillo non nocere, tunc verum est, cum 
ex illius fraude locupletior pupillus factus non est (…)”. See also D. 4,3,15pr (Ulp. 11 ed.); 
D. 14,4,3,1 (Ulp. 29 ed.); D. 15,1,21,1 (Ulp. 29 ed.); D. 19,1,13,7 (Ulp. 32 ed.). On the 
relevance of the ward’s enrichment regarding the dolus tutoris see Knütel, Dolus tutoris 
(1986), p. 105-112. 
128  Martens, Durch Dritte (2007), p. 74-75. 
129  Knütel, Dolus tutoris (1986), p. 122. 
130  See on the possibility to obtain the actio Publiciana despite not being able to usucapt 
Apathy, Publiciana ohne Ersitzungsbesitz (1984), p. 749-758.  
 
existence of prohibitions of alienation and the limits to the latter’s administration. 
Ulpian rightfully observes that the solvency of the tutor or the question of 
whether he granted a surety has no significance to determine the outcome of the 
case, which can be explained by the fact that the position of the ward and his 
creditors has actually improved as a result of the tutor’s fraudulent administration. 
What is however considered relevant by Ulpian is that the tutor is in charge of 
the administration of the ward’s property, not so much because he alienates 
administrationis causa – since he actually exceeds his faculties – but rather because 
the transferee could not know that the tutor was acting fraudulently, which 
motivates the opposite solution in case he colluded with the tutor. This solution 
thus provides a rare example in which Roman jurists modify the normal 
outcome of a case regarding the transfer of ownership to favour the protection of 
legal certainty in commercial transactions, but this concern can only be 
understood in the present case due to the enrichment of the ward. If the position 
of the ward was made worse due to the fraudulent transactions of his tutor, there 
would be no room for the exceptio. 
 The significance of the appointment of the tutor for the administration of the 
affairs of the ward to determine the outcome of the case becomes evident when 
examining Ulpian’s text following D. 44,4,4,23: 
 
D. 44,4,4,24 (Ulp. 76 ed.): Si quis non tutor, sed pro tutore negotia 
gerat, an dolus ipsius noceat pupillo, videamus. Et putem non 
nocere: nam si is, qui pro tutore negotia gerebat, rem vendiderit et 
usucapta sit, exceptionem non nocere pupillo rem suam persequenti, 
etiamsi ei cautum sit, quia huic rerum pupilli administratio concessa 
non fuit131. 
 
Before examining this text, it is worth noting that there is an earlier text from 
Celsus which appears to be closely related to that of Ulpian: 
 
D. 27,5,2 (Celsus 25 dig.): Si is, qui pro tutore negotia gerebat, cum 
tutor non esset, rem pupilli vendidit nec ea usucapta est, petet eam 
pupillus, quamquam ei cautum est: non enim eadem huius quae 
tutoris est rerum pupilli administratio132. 
                                                 
131  D. 44,4,4,24: “If someone is administering affairs as a tutor, but without being so, let us see 
whether his fraud avails against the pupillus. And I would think that it does not avail; for if 
he who administered affairs on behalf of the tutor sold property and it was not yet 
usucapted, the defence does not avail against the pupillus if he claims his property, even if a 
guarantee has been given to him, because the administration of the affairs of the pupillus has 
not been entrusted to him” (transl. Watson, modified). 
132  D. 27,5,2: “If someone who administered the affairs as a tutor, but without being so, sold 
the property of the pupillus but it has not been usucapted, the pupillus can reclaim it, even 
when the tutor gave security; for such administration of the property of the pupillus is 
different from that of a tutor” (transl. Watson). 
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The palingenetic analysis of both texts reveals a link between them, since their 
location according to Lenel’s Palingenesia would be under the rubric “De 
exceptionibus”133, which is in turn the subject dealt with in the 44th book of the 
Edictuum Perpetuum134. That Ulpian was aware of the opinions of Celsus on the 
subject is moreover shown in the first paragraph of Ulpian’s fragment 
(D. 44,4,4pr), which begins with a quote of Celsus’ opinion (“Apud Celsum 
quaeritur…”). Lenel decides to ignore this link and, perhaps due to the fact that 
D. 27,5,2 does not make any reference whatsoever to an exceptio, corrects the 
number of the book of Celsus’ digestorum from 25 to 27, in order to place it 
under the rubric “Rem pupilli salvam fore”135. This emendatio does not appear to be 
entirely justified, not only because the surety plays no relevant role in Celsus’ text 
(quamquam ei cautum est), just as in that of Ulpian (etiamsi ei cautum sit), but 
because it seems evident that Ulpian and Celsus are dealing with the same issue, 
and Ulpian’s fragment deals explicitly with an exceptio. 
 The comparison between both texts reveals that Ulpian closely follows on the 
model of Celsus, following even the same sequence of ideas: someone who is not 
appointed as a tutor sells an asset of the ward, who will be able to reclaim it 
despite the surety granted by the protutor because the latter did not have the 
administration of the ward’s affairs. The only substantial difference is that Ulpian 
adds that the protutor acts fraudulently136, resuming therefore in this fragment the 
discussion of whether an exceptio should be granted on account of the dolus of the 
tutor (D. 44,4,4,23). The link between these texts also throws light on the 
problem discussed by Ulpian. First of all, it becomes clear that Ulpian’s text does 
not deal with a case in which someone acts on behalf of the tutor, as conveyed in 
Watson’s translation137, but rather with the problem of the administration by 
someone who acts as a tutor without being appointed to do so. Under this 
framework, both Celsus and Ulpian deal with the sale concluded by the protutor 
and the possibility of the ward to recover his property. The fact that in both texts 
the ward is able to successfully reclaim his property enables us moreover to 
perform a minor correction regarding Ulpian’s text, where the littera Florentina 
reads “rem vendiderit et usucapta sit”, by changing the “et” into a “nec”138. 
According to this modification, the thing would have been sold but not yet 
                                                 
133  Lenel, Paling. (1889) I, col. 161; II, col. 863-864. 
134  Lenel, EP (1927), p. 501-513. 
135  Lenel, Paling. (1889) I, col. 162 n. 2. 
136  Not every case where someone acted as a tutor without being authorized to do so implied a 
fraudulent motive, as can be seen in D. 27,5,1,1 (Ulp. 36 ed.): “Pro tutore autem negotia 
gerit, qui munere tutoris fungitur in re impuberis, sive se putet tutorem, sive scit non esse, 
finget tamen esse”. 
137  “If someone is administering affairs not as a tutor, but on behalf of a tutor…” (transl. 
Watson).  
138  Seiler, Negotiorum gestio (1968), p. 230 n. 9, with further references. This correction has 
also been adopted in the Dutch translation of the Digest, as can be seen in Spruit et al., 
Corpus Iuris Civilis (2001) VI, p. 176 n. 2, as well as by Sansón, La transmisión (1998), 
p. 116. 
 
usucapted, which agrees with the general meaning of the text, according to 
which the ward would indeed be able to recover and no defence would avail 
against him. This modification also agrees with the texts of Celsus, which 
describes the property of the ward as not yet usucapted (nec ea usucapta est).  
 Both Celsus and Ulpian agree on the outcome of the case and the ground of 
it: the ward will be able to recover his property, because the protutor did not have 
the administration of the ward’s affairs. This decision shows that there is a 
fundamental difference between this case and that laid down in D. 44,4,4,23. 
While the transfer of the iustum dominium will not take place both when the tutor 
exceeds his faculties of administration and when he is not appointed tutor at all, 
Roman jurists appear to be willing to grant praetorian remedies only in the 
former case, first of all because the pupillus could become richer but also in order 
to protect the legal certainty in contracts concluded with a tutor who is lawfully 
appointed. This implies that these considerations play no role139 when the person 
fraudulently acting as a tutor has not been actually appointed, making the 
outcome of the case more straightforward: ownership will not be transferred and 
the ward will be able to recover his goods once he is old enough, or through his 
real tutor. Only Ulpian explicitly declares that the exceptio will not avail against the 
ward, but it is nonetheless likely that the text of Celsus would have also been 
framed within the study of the exceptiones arising in the administration of tutores 
and protutores, considering the position of the text within the Palingenesia and the 
link with D. 44,4,4,24. Perhaps the original context was the exceptio rei venditae et 
traditae140, but one cannot rule out that it would deal specifically with the exceptio 
which arises from the dolus of the tutor, since this subject was a matter of concern 
already for earlier jurists141. It is accordingly difficult to determine whether the 
reference to the dolus of the tutor, which is one of the few elements mentioned by 
Ulpian which do not feature in the text of Celsus, was indeed discussed in the 
preceding text by Celsus or whether he was dealing with a different problem. It 
could indeed be the case that Ulpian was addressing a problem which was not 
discussed by Celsus – the dolus of the tutor – and that he structured his outcome 
on the text of this author, assessing (putem) that the element which determines 
the outcome in D. 27,5,2 would be equally relevant to solve the case of the 
protutor acting fraudulently. Be that as it may, the absence of any reference to an 
exceptio in D. 27,5,2 may be explained by the fact that the exceptio has no role to 
play here, and the contrast with other cases in which the exceptio was indeed 
                                                 
139  Whether the enrichment of the ward as a result of the management of the protutor – by 
receiving the price of the sold object – will grant an acquirer an exceptio doli against his 
claims is a matter of controversy among modern scholars, but it is not discussed in the 
sources. See on this point Seiler, Negotiorum gestio (1968), p. 229 n. 3; Sansón, La 
transmisión (1998), p. 115 n. 325. 
140  Seiler, Negotiorum gestio (1968), p. 229. 
141  See e.g. D. 26,7,61 (Pomp. 20 epistolarum), where Aristo’s opinion regarding the culpa 
tutoris, as well as D. 26,9,3 (Pap. 20 quaestionum), where Sabinus’ views are conveyed 
regarding the dolus tutoris, as well as D. 50,17,198 (Jav. 13 ex Cassio). 
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The palingenetic analysis of both texts reveals a link between them, since their 
location according to Lenel’s Palingenesia would be under the rubric “De 
exceptionibus”133, which is in turn the subject dealt with in the 44th book of the 
Edictuum Perpetuum134. That Ulpian was aware of the opinions of Celsus on the 
subject is moreover shown in the first paragraph of Ulpian’s fragment 
(D. 44,4,4pr), which begins with a quote of Celsus’ opinion (“Apud Celsum 
quaeritur…”). Lenel decides to ignore this link and, perhaps due to the fact that 
D. 27,5,2 does not make any reference whatsoever to an exceptio, corrects the 
number of the book of Celsus’ digestorum from 25 to 27, in order to place it 
under the rubric “Rem pupilli salvam fore”135. This emendatio does not appear to be 
entirely justified, not only because the surety plays no relevant role in Celsus’ text 
(quamquam ei cautum est), just as in that of Ulpian (etiamsi ei cautum sit), but 
because it seems evident that Ulpian and Celsus are dealing with the same issue, 
and Ulpian’s fragment deals explicitly with an exceptio. 
 The comparison between both texts reveals that Ulpian closely follows on the 
model of Celsus, following even the same sequence of ideas: someone who is not 
appointed as a tutor sells an asset of the ward, who will be able to reclaim it 
despite the surety granted by the protutor because the latter did not have the 
administration of the ward’s affairs. The only substantial difference is that Ulpian 
adds that the protutor acts fraudulently136, resuming therefore in this fragment the 
discussion of whether an exceptio should be granted on account of the dolus of the 
tutor (D. 44,4,4,23). The link between these texts also throws light on the 
problem discussed by Ulpian. First of all, it becomes clear that Ulpian’s text does 
not deal with a case in which someone acts on behalf of the tutor, as conveyed in 
Watson’s translation137, but rather with the problem of the administration by 
someone who acts as a tutor without being appointed to do so. Under this 
framework, both Celsus and Ulpian deal with the sale concluded by the protutor 
and the possibility of the ward to recover his property. The fact that in both texts 
the ward is able to successfully reclaim his property enables us moreover to 
perform a minor correction regarding Ulpian’s text, where the littera Florentina 
reads “rem vendiderit et usucapta sit”, by changing the “et” into a “nec”138. 
According to this modification, the thing would have been sold but not yet 
                                                 
133  Lenel, Paling. (1889) I, col. 161; II, col. 863-864. 
134  Lenel, EP (1927), p. 501-513. 
135  Lenel, Paling. (1889) I, col. 162 n. 2. 
136  Not every case where someone acted as a tutor without being authorized to do so implied a 
fraudulent motive, as can be seen in D. 27,5,1,1 (Ulp. 36 ed.): “Pro tutore autem negotia 
gerit, qui munere tutoris fungitur in re impuberis, sive se putet tutorem, sive scit non esse, 
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usucapted, which agrees with the general meaning of the text, according to 
which the ward would indeed be able to recover and no defence would avail 
against him. This modification also agrees with the texts of Celsus, which 
describes the property of the ward as not yet usucapted (nec ea usucapta est).  
 Both Celsus and Ulpian agree on the outcome of the case and the ground of 
it: the ward will be able to recover his property, because the protutor did not have 
the administration of the ward’s affairs. This decision shows that there is a 
fundamental difference between this case and that laid down in D. 44,4,4,23. 
While the transfer of the iustum dominium will not take place both when the tutor 
exceeds his faculties of administration and when he is not appointed tutor at all, 
Roman jurists appear to be willing to grant praetorian remedies only in the 
former case, first of all because the pupillus could become richer but also in order 
to protect the legal certainty in contracts concluded with a tutor who is lawfully 
appointed. This implies that these considerations play no role139 when the person 
fraudulently acting as a tutor has not been actually appointed, making the 
outcome of the case more straightforward: ownership will not be transferred and 
the ward will be able to recover his goods once he is old enough, or through his 
real tutor. Only Ulpian explicitly declares that the exceptio will not avail against the 
ward, but it is nonetheless likely that the text of Celsus would have also been 
framed within the study of the exceptiones arising in the administration of tutores 
and protutores, considering the position of the text within the Palingenesia and the 
link with D. 44,4,4,24. Perhaps the original context was the exceptio rei venditae et 
traditae140, but one cannot rule out that it would deal specifically with the exceptio 
which arises from the dolus of the tutor, since this subject was a matter of concern 
already for earlier jurists141. It is accordingly difficult to determine whether the 
reference to the dolus of the tutor, which is one of the few elements mentioned by 
Ulpian which do not feature in the text of Celsus, was indeed discussed in the 
preceding text by Celsus or whether he was dealing with a different problem. It 
could indeed be the case that Ulpian was addressing a problem which was not 
discussed by Celsus – the dolus of the tutor – and that he structured his outcome 
on the text of this author, assessing (putem) that the element which determines 
the outcome in D. 27,5,2 would be equally relevant to solve the case of the 
protutor acting fraudulently. Be that as it may, the absence of any reference to an 
exceptio in D. 27,5,2 may be explained by the fact that the exceptio has no role to 
play here, and the contrast with other cases in which the exceptio was indeed 
                                                 
139  Whether the enrichment of the ward as a result of the management of the protutor – by 
receiving the price of the sold object – will grant an acquirer an exceptio doli against his 
claims is a matter of controversy among modern scholars, but it is not discussed in the 
sources. See on this point Seiler, Negotiorum gestio (1968), p. 229 n. 3; Sansón, La 
transmisión (1998), p. 115 n. 325. 
140  Seiler, Negotiorum gestio (1968), p. 229. 
141  See e.g. D. 26,7,61 (Pomp. 20 epistolarum), where Aristo’s opinion regarding the culpa 
tutoris, as well as D. 26,9,3 (Pap. 20 quaestionum), where Sabinus’ views are conveyed 
regarding the dolus tutoris, as well as D. 50,17,198 (Jav. 13 ex Cassio). 
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relevant could be expressed in an equally clear way by simply showing that the 
ward will be able to successfully recover his ownership – which implies that no 
defence will avail against him – if the person who delivered his property had not 
been appointed tutor. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5. Mancipatio and in iure cessio  
by a non-owner 
 
It was pointed out incidentally in the last chapter that there is very limited 
information regarding whether a non-owner could transfer ownership through 
one of the so-called “formal” ways to transfer ownership – i.e. mancipatio and in 
iure cessio. Therefore, while it is commonly agreed that the prohibitions to dispose 
(e.g. Gai 2,63) also affect the mancipatio and in iure cessio, it is not clear to what 
extent the cases mentioned in Gai 2,64 apply to these formal ways of transferring 
ownership. This uncertainty is caused by the very limited available references to 
the mancipatio and in iure cessio in the sources. Due to this circumstance, it has 
been considered convenient to deal with the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner through mancipatio and in iure cessio only after drawing a clear picture 
concerning the problem in the context of traditio. There is moreover a particular 
circumstance for approaching this problem in a separate chapter, namely the 
decisive influence of the traditional ideas regarding the ‘prohibition of direct 
representation’ in Roman law. As mentioned above1, these formal ways of 
transferring ownership have been traditionally regarded by some scholars as 
unsuited to be concluded by a non-owner due to the primitive ban which 
Roman law would initially have applied regarding direct representation. Since 
the traditional theories on this point have been contested throughout the present 
study, this chapter attempts to revise the evidence on the subject without having 
as a starting point that formal ways of transferring ownership necessarily had to be 
performed by the owner due to a primitive prohibition of direct representation. 
 
1. Direct representation and mancipatio or in iure cessio by a non-owner 
 
Considering that there is very limited evidence regarding formal modes of 
transferring ownership, and particularly concerning the possibility for a non-
owner to perform them, it becomes important to determine what led scholars to 
lay their attention on this point in the first place. After all, if the sources rendered 
no evidence whatsoever on this point, there would be little need to discuss it in 
the first place. While the main reason since the 19th century had to do with the 
theories concerning direct representation in Roman law, the discussion regarding 
the mancipatio and in iure cessio by a non-owner can be traced back the 16th 
century. It was Jacobus Raevardus (1535-1568) who first claimed that Roman 
law did not accept that an actus legitimus, i.e. an act belonging to the old ius civile, 
could be performed through another person2. This author took as a starting point 
for his discussion whether an hereditas could be acquired through a procurator 
                                                 
1  Chapter 1, Section 1 above. 
2  Raevardus, De auctoritate prudentum (1566), p. 36-51. 
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study, this chapter attempts to revise the evidence on the subject without having 
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no evidence whatsoever on this point, there would be little need to discuss it in 
the first place. While the main reason since the 19th century had to do with the 
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the mancipatio and in iure cessio by a non-owner can be traced back the 16th 
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1  Chapter 1, Section 1 above. 
2  Raevardus, De auctoritate prudentum (1566), p. 36-51. 
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performing the cretio, which Duarenus (1509-1559) had considered possible3. 
Raevardus claimed that it was not possible to conclude these acts through 
another person on account of the rule “Nemo alieno nomine lege agere potest” of 
D. 50,17,123pr4, and therefore excluded that a number of acts could be 
performed in this way, including the mancipatio5. Following this idea, Raevardus 
conceived that the only way in which the mancipatio could take place through 
another person was to transfer ownership to him in the context of the fiducia, so 
that he could in turn perform the mancipatio6. As an example of this practice, the 
author quotes the case of Cicero, Ad Atticum 13,50,2, where a series of owners 
convey ownership through mancipatio to the slave of an individual so that the 
acquirer may in turn perform the mancipatio to the buyer at an auction. This 
would explain the need to resort to the fiducia and the significance of this 
institution in Roman law in relation to the mancipatio. The views of Raevardus 
would not be universally accepted, being for instance contested by Conradi 
(1701-1748), who not only discarded the ideas of Raevardus concerning the 
acquisition of the hereditas through a procurator performing the cretio7, but also his 
theories concerning the role of the fiducia in relation to the mancipatio through 
another person8. Regarding the text of Cicero, Ad Atticum 13,50,2, Conradi 
considers that it in no way suggests the existence of a transfer of ownership 
through fiducia, but that instead the owners would give the auctioneer an 
authorization to transfer through mancipatio by means of the slave sent to them9 – 
a reading which the author claims to draw from the commentaries of Paulus 
Manutius (1512-1574)10. Other authors, such as Averanius (1662-1738) were 
more receptive of the ideas of Raevardus, claiming that it was indeed a regula iuris 
that an actus legitimus could not be concluded through another person, which 
would imply among other things that a mancipatio could only be performed by a 
                                                 
3  Duarenus, Disputationum anniversariarum (Luca 1768), lib. 2 cap. 27, p. 76-77. 
4  D. 50,17,123pr (Ulp. 14 ed.): “No one can legally act on behalf of another” (transl. 
Watson). 
5  Raevardus, De auctoritate prudentum (1566), p. 39-40: “Alieno nomine lege agree nemo 
poterat, capit. cxxiii. de reg. iur. [D. 50,17,123] Hoc est usitata legis actionum solemnia 
apud magistratus populi Rom. nemo alterius nomine poterat exercere. capit. xv. in fi. de 
adop. [Inst. 1,11,12]. Et idcirco per alium mancipare, per alium adire hereditatem, per 
alium manumittere, per alium adoptare, et sic deinceps, nemini fuisse liberum videtur”.  
6  Raevardus, De auctoritate prudentum (1566), p. 41-51. 
7  Conradi, De pacto fiduciae (Helmstedt 1732), p. 12-14. 
8  Conradi, De pacto fiduciae (Helmstedt 1732), p. 23-25. 
9  Conradi, De pacto fiduciae (Helmstedt 1732), p. 24: “Enimvero, quomodo fiduciaria 
mancipatio quaedam hoc in loco intelligi possit, non animadvertimus… Cicero debuit 
Vestorii servo iubere, id est mandare, ut pro sua parte Hetereio manciparetur fundus 
Brinnianus, ut ita, Cicerone auctore, Vestorius, qui, uti supra vidimus, hereditatem, in qua 
iste fundus erat, pro Cicerone creverat, fundum Puteolis recte, ex voluntate domini, 
mancipio dare posset”. 
10  Manutius, Commentarius in epistolas (Venice 1568), p. 644 notes, when commenting the 
words “ut ipse ei Puteolis recte mancipio dare posset”: “ut caveretur Hetereio; cui si 
fundum iniussu Ciceronis Vestorius dedisset, non bene dedisset”. 
 
non-owner who received the thing fiduciae causa from the owner, as the above-
quoted letter of Cicero would prove11. 
 Considering these developments, it becomes clear that Mühlenbruch and 
Savigny were not offering a completely innovative view when claiming that 
Roman law originally did not allow to conclude legal acts through another 
person, since this idea followed already from preceding scholars. The influence 
on this point is not to be doubted, especially considering that Mühlenbruch 
would often quote Averanius to support some of his views on the subject12. To a 
considerable extent, Mühlenbruch reproduces some of the views of previous 
authors regarding the acceptance of an inheritance, acceptilatio, mancipatio and 
other actus legitimi, which is why Cicero, Ad Atticum 13,50,2 is again brought into 
discussion, as an example that the only way for a non-owner to perform the 
mancipatio was to acquire the thing himself in the first place fiduciae causa13. His 
contribution is mainly to add other pieces of evidence that could support the 
claim that there was a general impossibility to act through another person14. 
Moreover, both Mühlenbruch and Savigny expanded the original claim of 
previous scholars by claiming the existence of a general ban on ‘direct 
representation’ in Roman law, which not only went beyond the actus legitimi, but 
also casts a shadow of doubt over every text where the idea of ‘direct 
representation’ could be identified. While developing these general notions, very 
little attention is bestowed in actually proving that the mancipatio or in iure cessio 
cannot be concluded by a non-owner, normally resorting to very general texts 
which deal with other problems. This in turn shows that these scholars rely more 
on the general consistency of their theories than on the scarce evidence on the 
topic15. 
 It has already been discussed above that there is no solid ground to claim the 
existence of a primitive ban of direct representation in Roman law16. Scholars 
have moreover pointed out that some actus legitimi could in fact be performed 
through another person17. However, the idea that formal acts for transferring 
ownership could not be performed by a non-owner was firmly rooted in the 
general notions regarding the evolution of direct representation in Roman law. 
Mitteis would be the first author to gather and discuss most of the evidence 
available concerning the possibility of concluding a mancipatio and in iure cessio 
through another person, striving to show that classical Roman law would not 
                                                 
11  Averanius, Interpretationum juris (Leiden 1753) I, lib. I, cap. XII, n. 54, (p. 106). 
12  Mühlenbruch, Doctrina Pandectarum (1831) III, p. 323 (§ 694) n. 5; Mühlenbruch, Cession 
(1836), p. 45 n. 75; p. 46, n. 77. 
13  Mühlenbruch, Cession (1836), p. 46, n. 77. 
14  Mühlenbruch, Cession (1836), p. 41-42. 
15  Mühlenbruch, Cession (1836), p. 42-43 n. 69; p. 46, n. 77; Savigny, System (1841) III, 
p. 93 n. (e); p. 95. See moreover Puchta, Institutionen (1842) II, p. 331. 
16  Chapter 1, Section 1 above. 
17  See e.g. Hellmann, Stellvertretung (1882), p. 106; Roby, Roman Private law (1902) I, p. 404-
405. 
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performing the cretio, which Duarenus (1509-1559) had considered possible3. 
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another person on account of the rule “Nemo alieno nomine lege agere potest” of 
D. 50,17,123pr4, and therefore excluded that a number of acts could be 
performed in this way, including the mancipatio5. Following this idea, Raevardus 
conceived that the only way in which the mancipatio could take place through 
another person was to transfer ownership to him in the context of the fiducia, so 
that he could in turn perform the mancipatio6. As an example of this practice, the 
author quotes the case of Cicero, Ad Atticum 13,50,2, where a series of owners 
convey ownership through mancipatio to the slave of an individual so that the 
acquirer may in turn perform the mancipatio to the buyer at an auction. This 
would explain the need to resort to the fiducia and the significance of this 
institution in Roman law in relation to the mancipatio. The views of Raevardus 
would not be universally accepted, being for instance contested by Conradi 
(1701-1748), who not only discarded the ideas of Raevardus concerning the 
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theories concerning the role of the fiducia in relation to the mancipatio through 
another person8. Regarding the text of Cicero, Ad Atticum 13,50,2, Conradi 
considers that it in no way suggests the existence of a transfer of ownership 
through fiducia, but that instead the owners would give the auctioneer an 
authorization to transfer through mancipatio by means of the slave sent to them9 – 
a reading which the author claims to draw from the commentaries of Paulus 
Manutius (1512-1574)10. Other authors, such as Averanius (1662-1738) were 
more receptive of the ideas of Raevardus, claiming that it was indeed a regula iuris 
that an actus legitimus could not be concluded through another person, which 
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non-owner who received the thing fiduciae causa from the owner, as the above-
quoted letter of Cicero would prove11. 
 Considering these developments, it becomes clear that Mühlenbruch and 
Savigny were not offering a completely innovative view when claiming that 
Roman law originally did not allow to conclude legal acts through another 
person, since this idea followed already from preceding scholars. The influence 
on this point is not to be doubted, especially considering that Mühlenbruch 
would often quote Averanius to support some of his views on the subject12. To a 
considerable extent, Mühlenbruch reproduces some of the views of previous 
authors regarding the acceptance of an inheritance, acceptilatio, mancipatio and 
other actus legitimi, which is why Cicero, Ad Atticum 13,50,2 is again brought into 
discussion, as an example that the only way for a non-owner to perform the 
mancipatio was to acquire the thing himself in the first place fiduciae causa13. His 
contribution is mainly to add other pieces of evidence that could support the 
claim that there was a general impossibility to act through another person14. 
Moreover, both Mühlenbruch and Savigny expanded the original claim of 
previous scholars by claiming the existence of a general ban on ‘direct 
representation’ in Roman law, which not only went beyond the actus legitimi, but 
also casts a shadow of doubt over every text where the idea of ‘direct 
representation’ could be identified. While developing these general notions, very 
little attention is bestowed in actually proving that the mancipatio or in iure cessio 
cannot be concluded by a non-owner, normally resorting to very general texts 
which deal with other problems. This in turn shows that these scholars rely more 
on the general consistency of their theories than on the scarce evidence on the 
topic15. 
 It has already been discussed above that there is no solid ground to claim the 
existence of a primitive ban of direct representation in Roman law16. Scholars 
have moreover pointed out that some actus legitimi could in fact be performed 
through another person17. However, the idea that formal acts for transferring 
ownership could not be performed by a non-owner was firmly rooted in the 
general notions regarding the evolution of direct representation in Roman law. 
Mitteis would be the first author to gather and discuss most of the evidence 
available concerning the possibility of concluding a mancipatio and in iure cessio 
through another person, striving to show that classical Roman law would not 
                                                 
11  Averanius, Interpretationum juris (Leiden 1753) I, lib. I, cap. XII, n. 54, (p. 106). 
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accept this. Due to the scarcity of sources on this point, Mitteis focused mainly 
on the cases where the sources were more generous, namely those in which a 
slave or legal guardian appeared to perform a mancipatio and those where a son-
in-power carried out the manimissio vindicta following the authorization of his 
father18. His claims would set the mood for the discussion of this point 
throughout the 20th century, which would always find its starting point in the 
ideas of Mitteis. While his views have been questioned by some scholars, the idea 
that classical Roman law did not allow formal modes of transferring ownership to 
be concluded by a non-owner has remained dominant19, influencing the 
approach to several problems. Following this idea, for instance, it is usually 
claimed that the nemo plus rule, which is to be found within fragments originally 
dealing with formal modes of transferring ownership (D. 50,17,54 and 
D. 41,1,20pr), could only be truly applied to the mancipatio and the in iure cessio, 
because only in these cases was it not possible for a non-owner to transfer 
ownership20. Moreover, it is often claimed that the only way in which a non-
owner may perform the mancipatio is to receive the thing fiduciae causa in order to 
retransfer through mancipatio himself21. Other ideas have been derived from this 
view as well, such as the claim of Sansón that the actio Publiciana may have 
originally been used to protect the acquirer who received through mancipatio an 
object from an authorized non-owner22. 
 Since the idea of a primitive ban on direct representation finds little support 
in the sources, and considering that this idea served as the main ground for 
scholars to claim that a non-owner cannot resort to formal ways of transferring 
ownership, one may wonder: how strong are the arguments to defend this 
position nowadays? After all, it is more than clear that scholars until Mitteis 
denied the mancipatio or in iure cessio by a non-owner precisely on the assumption 
that this would not fit with their general views on direct representation, not 
because the sources offered a clear view on the subject. In fact, before Mitteis 
offered a careful overview of the sources, scholars relied almost exclusively on 
general statements, and seldom did they bring specific texts to support their 
views. Mitteis himself pointed out the lack of evidence to support his position, 
for which he blamed the compilers23. It is evident from the analysis of this debate 
                                                 
18  Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta I (1900), p. 199-211; Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta II (1904), 
p. 379-381; Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 208-211. 
19  See e.g. Popesco-Ramniceano, Représentation (1927), p. 53-57; Siber, Römisches Recht 
(1928) II, p. 412-413; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 21 n. 30; Kaser, Verfügungsakte 
(1950), p. 66; Kaser, RPR (1971) I, p. 267 and 286; Claus, Gewillkürte Stellvertretung (1973), 
p. 307; Hernanz, Iussum (1993), p. 70 ff.; Weimar, Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 552; 
Andrés Santos, Subrogación real (1997), p. 190; Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), 
p. 135; Perani, Pignus distrahere (2014), p. 52 n. 124. 
20  See Chapter 6 below. 
21  Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 128-129, 143-144, 178. 
22  Sansón, Función originaria (1997), p. 152; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 151 ff. 
23  Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta I (1900), p. 201; Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 208 
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that the categorical way in which the doctrine has traditionally denied the 
possibility to transfer ownership through formal ways by a non-owner openly 
contrasts with the very weak textual foundations on which this opinion rests, 
which have been traditionally adapted to fit within this general theory. The 
discussion therefore shows the existence of an untested preconception: the 
complete prohibition of direct representation in formal ways to transfer 
ownership. This starting point is all the more dangerous considering that it is 
normally left open where exactly can we identify a case of ‘direct representation’ 
in the sources, which is why Buckland, when criticizing the claims of Mitteis, 
wittily pointed out that although the general notions regarding direct 
representation in Roman law were not unfounded, the different sets of rules in 
Roman law did not approach the issue from the point of view of a general 
prohibition of direct representation24. He therefore urged that “[i]n discussing 
this question [the possibility that a slave may mancipate] it is necessary to avoid 
assumptions as to what they [the Romans] must have held, and, in particular, the 
assumption that wherever we see representation they also did”25. 
 At this point it becomes clear that, unless one assumes from the start that no 
actus legitimus could be concluded through another person, it is difficult to derive 
from the sources that ownership could not be transferred through mancipatio by a 
non-owner. That the arguments in favour of this starting point have become 
obsolete in the course of time can be seen in the fact that Ankum, when 
concluding his first contribution regarding mancipatio by slaves, discusses what the 
ground would have been to deny this possibility26. When doing so, he discards 
the traditional ground upheld by previous scholars, namely that slaves could not 
conclude formal acts of alienation (förmliche Verfügungsgeschäfte). Ankum shows 
that in fact it is well documented that slaves could perform various formal acts – 
acquire through mancipatio, stipulatio and cretio – and that they could also carry out 
acts of alienation such as the traditio and the pledge. He therefore deduces that the 
ground for this prohibition must lie elsewhere, and most likely in the fact that a 
slave could not fulfil the role of an auctor to defend the acquirer in case the latter 
was evicted, since slaves could not appear in court as parties. These ideas merit 
several observations. First of all, it is worth noting that the 19th century theory of 
a general prohibition regarding acts concluded by another person – particularly 
formal acts – no longer finds a solid ground, since by the time Ankum wrote this 
article the evidence originally presented on behalf of this notion no longer 
seemed equally convincing. This is also the reason why the author does not look 
                                                                                                                   
Manzipationsveräusserung ist freilich nicht ganz leicht zu führen, weil die klassischen 
Erörterungen über diese Frage von den Kompilatoren gestrichen sind”. Corbino, Forma 
librale (1984), p. 2258 accordingly notes that although there is an extremely authoritative 
doctrinal tradition denying the possibility to mancipate by a non-owner, the textual 
support for that opinion is not as strong as it would seem. 
24  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 372. 
25  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 373. 
26  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 13. 
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accept this. Due to the scarcity of sources on this point, Mitteis focused mainly 
on the cases where the sources were more generous, namely those in which a 
slave or legal guardian appeared to perform a mancipatio and those where a son-
in-power carried out the manimissio vindicta following the authorization of his 
father18. His claims would set the mood for the discussion of this point 
throughout the 20th century, which would always find its starting point in the 
ideas of Mitteis. While his views have been questioned by some scholars, the idea 
that classical Roman law did not allow formal modes of transferring ownership to 
be concluded by a non-owner has remained dominant19, influencing the 
approach to several problems. Following this idea, for instance, it is usually 
claimed that the nemo plus rule, which is to be found within fragments originally 
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D. 41,1,20pr), could only be truly applied to the mancipatio and the in iure cessio, 
because only in these cases was it not possible for a non-owner to transfer 
ownership20. Moreover, it is often claimed that the only way in which a non-
owner may perform the mancipatio is to receive the thing fiduciae causa in order to 
retransfer through mancipatio himself21. Other ideas have been derived from this 
view as well, such as the claim of Sansón that the actio Publiciana may have 
originally been used to protect the acquirer who received through mancipatio an 
object from an authorized non-owner22. 
 Since the idea of a primitive ban on direct representation finds little support 
in the sources, and considering that this idea served as the main ground for 
scholars to claim that a non-owner cannot resort to formal ways of transferring 
ownership, one may wonder: how strong are the arguments to defend this 
position nowadays? After all, it is more than clear that scholars until Mitteis 
denied the mancipatio or in iure cessio by a non-owner precisely on the assumption 
that this would not fit with their general views on direct representation, not 
because the sources offered a clear view on the subject. In fact, before Mitteis 
offered a careful overview of the sources, scholars relied almost exclusively on 
general statements, and seldom did they bring specific texts to support their 
views. Mitteis himself pointed out the lack of evidence to support his position, 
for which he blamed the compilers23. It is evident from the analysis of this debate 
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that the categorical way in which the doctrine has traditionally denied the 
possibility to transfer ownership through formal ways by a non-owner openly 
contrasts with the very weak textual foundations on which this opinion rests, 
which have been traditionally adapted to fit within this general theory. The 
discussion therefore shows the existence of an untested preconception: the 
complete prohibition of direct representation in formal ways to transfer 
ownership. This starting point is all the more dangerous considering that it is 
normally left open where exactly can we identify a case of ‘direct representation’ 
in the sources, which is why Buckland, when criticizing the claims of Mitteis, 
wittily pointed out that although the general notions regarding direct 
representation in Roman law were not unfounded, the different sets of rules in 
Roman law did not approach the issue from the point of view of a general 
prohibition of direct representation24. He therefore urged that “[i]n discussing 
this question [the possibility that a slave may mancipate] it is necessary to avoid 
assumptions as to what they [the Romans] must have held, and, in particular, the 
assumption that wherever we see representation they also did”25. 
 At this point it becomes clear that, unless one assumes from the start that no 
actus legitimus could be concluded through another person, it is difficult to derive 
from the sources that ownership could not be transferred through mancipatio by a 
non-owner. That the arguments in favour of this starting point have become 
obsolete in the course of time can be seen in the fact that Ankum, when 
concluding his first contribution regarding mancipatio by slaves, discusses what the 
ground would have been to deny this possibility26. When doing so, he discards 
the traditional ground upheld by previous scholars, namely that slaves could not 
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that in fact it is well documented that slaves could perform various formal acts – 
acquire through mancipatio, stipulatio and cretio – and that they could also carry out 
acts of alienation such as the traditio and the pledge. He therefore deduces that the 
ground for this prohibition must lie elsewhere, and most likely in the fact that a 
slave could not fulfil the role of an auctor to defend the acquirer in case the latter 
was evicted, since slaves could not appear in court as parties. These ideas merit 
several observations. First of all, it is worth noting that the 19th century theory of 
a general prohibition regarding acts concluded by another person – particularly 
formal acts – no longer finds a solid ground, since by the time Ankum wrote this 
article the evidence originally presented on behalf of this notion no longer 
seemed equally convincing. This is also the reason why the author does not look 
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for a general ground which would cover every case of mancipatio by a non-
owner, but only attempts to explain the case of the slave on its own. It is 
however not particularly convincing that the impossibility of slaves to appear as 
parties in trial would explain their inability to perform the mancipatio, considering 
that the same objection could be made regarding every case in which a slave was 
party to a contract, since never could the slave appear in trial to demand or 
answer for his contractual obligations. 
 
2. General evidence on the mancipatio by a non-owner 
 
Considering that traditionally scholars have found a starting point for denying the 
mancipatio by a non-owner in preconceptions which are nowadays largely 
obsolete, what actual evidence can be brought up to deny that a non-owner may 
transfer ownership through mancipatio? First of all, it is worth noting that there is 
not a single text which can be seen as a general prohibition regarding the 
intervention of another person. On the contrary, there are several texts where 
ownership is acquired through a person performing the mancipatio on behalf of 
someone else27, as can be seen in two texts of Gaius dealing with acquisitions 
through alieni iuris: 
 
Gai 2,87: Igitur quod liberi nostri, quos in potestate habemus, item 
quod servi nostri mancipio accipiunt vel ex traditione nanciscuntur 
sive quid stipulentur vel ex aliqualibet causa adquirunt, id nobis 
adquiritur…28 
 
Gai 3,167: Communem servum pro dominica parte dominis 
adquirere certum est, excepto eo, quod uni nominatim stipulando 
aut mancipio accipiendo illi soli adquirit, velut cum ita stipuletur: 
TITIO DOMINO MEO DARI SPONDES? aut cum ita mancipio 
accipiat: HANC REM EX IURE QUIRITIVM LUCII TITII 
DOMINI MEI ESSE AIO, EAQUE EI EMPTA ESTO HOC 
AERE AENEAQUE LIBRA29. 
 
                                                 
27  Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2258-2261. 
28  Gai 2,87: “First we acquire things which descendants within our power and also our slaves 
obtain by mancipation or delivery, or when they take stipulations for anything or when 
things come to them on any other basis…” (transl. Gordon/Robinson). 
29  Gai 3,167: “A slave held in co-ownership certainly acquires for his owners in proportion 
to their shares. That does not apply where he acquires for one of the owners by taking a 
stipulation in his name alone or by receiving a mancipation in his name, as where, for 
instance, he takes a stipulation in these words: ‘Do you solemnly promise to give to my 
owner Titius?’ or when the mancipation takes the form: ‘I say that this thing belongs by 
Quiritary right to Lucius Titius my owner and let it be bought for him with this bronze 
and these bronze scales’” (transl. Gordon/Robinson). See on the distinctions within this 
text Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2268. 
 
These texts show that the mancipatio was not as inflexible as it is usually thought, 
and that the intervention of another person was not excluded by its very nature 
or because of a general ban on direct representation. Even though the acquisition 
of ownership does not allow establishing a direct analogy with the transfer of 
ownership, the texts show at least that the intervention of intermediaries in 
formal acts of transfer of ownership and in the name of the owner was not 
something unheard of in Roman law30. It could be argued that the text deals 
with the acquisition of a slave, which was precisely one of the cases in which 
ownership was acquired directly by the owner through the intervention of 
another individual. It is however difficult to think of a reason why a slave could 
intervene only acquiring ownership, and not disposing of it, particularly since, as 
Buckland has pointed out, the acquirer has a much more active role in the 
mancipatio than the transferor31. Moreover, there is no structural feature of the 
mancipatio which would enable a slave only to acquire and not to transfer, unlike 
what can be seen in other actus legitimi. For instance, while a slave could take the 
acceptilatio on behalf of his master, he could not grant it even if he was authorized, 
because in that case he should have pronounced the fixed words ‘habeo acceptum’, 
for which he did not have the proper position32. Similarly, as it will be shown 
below, Gai 2,96 excludes that an alieni iuris may acquire through in iure cessio, 
since they cannot appear vindicating, having nothing of their own. No similar 
structural obstacle is to be found in the case of the mancipatio, which is why it 
seems safe to assume that a non-owner could both acquire and transfer ownership 
on behalf of someone else by resorting to it. 
 That a slave could acquire for his owner is also attested by epigraphic sources, 
such as the formula Baetica33, which contains a mancipatio fiduciae causa where a 
slave appears to acquire through mancipatio on behalf of his owner. A more recent 
discovery concerns the sale of the girl Fortunata, which was edited first by 
Tomlin34 and later by Camodeca35, and where we find again a slave acting as the 
mancipio accipiens on behalf of his master. Considering both the juristic and 
epigraphic evidence on the subject, it is rather puzzling that Reduzzi Merola 
would claim as ‘evident’ that the parties did not actually conclude a mancipatio36. 
                                                 
30  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 372: “it is not easy to see why the rule against 
representation should not equally have excluded acquisition by mancipatio through a slave, 
which it certainly did not. And if the power to acquire did not rest on representation, it is 
not obvious why the power of alienation, so far as it existed, should be thought of as 
resting on this conception”. 
31  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 373: “A slave could acquire for his master by 
mancipatio, and his is the more remarkable in that it was the acquirer who took the active 
part and spoke the formal words… It is therefore not unthinkable that with authorization 
he could take the more passive part which falls to the transferor”. 
32  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 373. 
33  FIRA (1968) III, p. 296-297. See on this text Chapter 5, Section 3 below. 
34  Tomlin, The Girl (2003), p. 41-51. 
35  Camodeca, Puella Fortunata (2007), p. 397-404. 
36  Reduzzi Merola, D. 21,2,39,1 (2004), p. 320 n. 15. 
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epigraphic evidence on the subject, it is rather puzzling that Reduzzi Merola 
would claim as ‘evident’ that the parties did not actually conclude a mancipatio36. 
                                                 
30  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 372: “it is not easy to see why the rule against 
representation should not equally have excluded acquisition by mancipatio through a slave, 
which it certainly did not. And if the power to acquire did not rest on representation, it is 
not obvious why the power of alienation, so far as it existed, should be thought of as 
resting on this conception”. 
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he could take the more passive part which falls to the transferor”. 
32  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 373. 
33  FIRA (1968) III, p. 296-297. See on this text Chapter 5, Section 3 below. 
34  Tomlin, The Girl (2003), p. 41-51. 
35  Camodeca, Puella Fortunata (2007), p. 397-404. 
36  Reduzzi Merola, D. 21,2,39,1 (2004), p. 320 n. 15. 
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Moreover, even if in fact the mancipatio had become ‘degenerated’ in provincial 
legal practice and was simply mentioned in acts of sale as an empty formality, as 
some scholars consider37, one can well assume that this practice was modelled 
after the common legal practice in Roman law, namely that a slave could acquire 
for his master through mancipatio, instead of understanding that an act of sale 
would contain an element contrary to the law38.  
 The possibility that a non-owner could acquire through mancipatio for 
someone else was not restricted to slaves or other alieni iuris, as we find in the 
Tabula Erculanensis 87,11,9-11, that bears witness to the restitution through 
mancipatio of a fundus dotalis, which is performed to a freedman who acts on 
behalf of his patron39. This evidence, to the dismay of some scholars40, seems to 
openly contradict the principle per extraneam personam nobis adquiri non posse, 
questioning at the same time that Roman law would not have accepted forms of 
‘direct representation’ in legal acts concluded by a sui iuris41. Another piece of 
evidence in favour of the acquisition by mancipatio through another person can be 
found in Cicero’s Pro Caecina, which has been studied by Corbino42. The central 
point of the oratio is whether a certain Aebutius, who was commissioned by 
Caesennia to acquire a piece of land at an auction, acquired the land for himself 
or for Caesennia. Caecina – Caesennia’s heir – claimed that the land became 
property of Caesennia because Aebutius had acquired by mandate of her. 
Different arguments come into play to determine who acquired ownership: 
whether Caesennia had given a mandate to Aebutius to acquire ownership; 
whether Aebutius acted nomine alieno or nomine proprio, and what had Caesennia 
instructed him regarding this point; whether Aebutius used Caesennia’s money to 
buy the fundus; whether it was known at the auction that he was acting on behalf 
of Caesennia. As Corbino has shown, this discussion can only take place if is 
peacefully accepted by both parts that it was possible for a sui iuris to acquire 
ownership through mancipatio on behalf of another person. Otherwise one could 
                                                 
37  Camodeca, Puella Fortunata (2007), p. 400. 
38  Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 108 n. 42. 
39  FIRA (1968) III, p. 612-614. See in general on this text Arangio-Ruiz/Pugliese Carratelli, 
Tabulae Herculanenses V (1955), p. 470 ff.; Cosentini, La dote di Paolina (1971), p. 715-733; 
Corbino, Mancipio asse aere, p. 463-467; Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), 
p. 284-287. 
40  Arangio-Ruiz/Pugliese Carratelli, Tabulae Herculanenses V (1955), p. 477 – and later 
Arangio-Ruiz in FIRA (1968) III, p. 613 – attempt to explain the acquisition of property 
by mancipatio through a freedman in a way compatible with the principle per extraneam 
personam nobis adquiri non posse, indicating that this would be due to a certain subsistence of 
links of subordination between a patronus and his libertus, opinion which is however 
authoritatively discarded by Cosentini, La dote di Paolina (1971), p. 731, who finds no 
proof of this relationship. Cosentini, La dote di Paolina (1971), p. 733 and Orestano, 
Rappresentanza (1967), p. 798 n.1 hypothesize that the libertus would draw this faculty to 
acquire by acting as a procurator, but Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2261 declares that if 
that were the case, one could expect to see that circumstance in the document itself. 
41  See Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2258-2261. 
42  Corbino, La ‘pro Caecina’ (1982), p. 277-287. 
 
have expected Aebutius to defend himself by invoking the rule per extraneam 
personam. This oratio appears therefore as a compelling refutation for the general 
validity of this rule, particularly regarding the mancipatio43. 
 The existence of a primitive ban on transferring ownership by mancipatio 
through a non-owner is moreover difficult to harmonize with the fact that in the 
primitive consortium ercto non cito one of the co-owners could validly mancipate a 
common thing: 
 
Gai 3,154b: …In hac autem societate fratrum ceterorumve, qui ad 
exemplum fratrum suorum societatem coierint, illud proprium erat, 
[unus] quod vel unus ex sociis communem servum manumittendo 
liberum faciebat et omnibus libertum adquirebat: item unus rem 
communem mancipando eius faciebat, qui mancipio accipiebat44. 
 
Most scholars have pointed out that this text most probably does not refer to a 
case in which one of the co-owners is authorized by the others to carry out the 
manumission or mancipatio45 – which would directly prove that an authorized 
non-owner could perform the mancipatio. If that was the case, there would be 
nothing special about this ancient institution, which is precisely the point which 
Gaius is trying to make, since in classical law it was also possible for one of the 
co-owners to transfer ownership if he was authorized to do so by the others. It is 
therefore not possible to see this text as an example of ‘direct representation’46. 
Nonetheless, this information certainly does not fit well with the idea that pre-
classical Roman law did not allow that an act performed by another person could 
have direct consequences to the owner – if anything, it would prove the 
opposite, namely that in some cases even an unauthorized non-owner could 
affect the position of the owner. In this particular case, the unauthorized non-
owner would validly transfer through mancipatio the ownership of the other co-
owners47, which shows that there is nothing fundamentally wrong concerning 
the possibility that a non-owner may affect the position of the owner by resorting 
to formal ways of transferring ownership. At this point, it is worth noting that 
this text only became available to scholars in the thirties of the 20th century, 
                                                 
43  Corbino, La ‘pro Caecina’ (1982), p. 285-287 however observes cautiously that his 
conclusions would be more limited if the acquisition through a third person could only 
take place in the context of an auction and through addictio. The scarce information on this 
subject prevents therefore from holding his conclusions as definitive. 
44  Gai 3,154b: “…However, in this partnership between brothers and between other people 
entering a partnership in imitation of brothers, a special feature was that even one of the 
partners by manumitting a slave held in co-ownership made him free and the freedman of 
all of them; again, one partner by mancipating a thing held in co-ownership made it the 
property of the recipient” (transl. Gordon/Robinson). 
45  Buckland, Alienation and manumission (1942), p. 486. 
46  Claus, Gewillkürte Stellvertretung (1973), p. 62-64. 
47  See on this text Gutiérrez-Masson, Del «consortium» (1987), p. 95-101. 
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would contain an element contrary to the law38.  
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Gaius is trying to make, since in classical law it was also possible for one of the 
co-owners to transfer ownership if he was authorized to do so by the others. It is 
therefore not possible to see this text as an example of ‘direct representation’46. 
Nonetheless, this information certainly does not fit well with the idea that pre-
classical Roman law did not allow that an act performed by another person could 
have direct consequences to the owner – if anything, it would prove the 
opposite, namely that in some cases even an unauthorized non-owner could 
affect the position of the owner. In this particular case, the unauthorized non-
owner would validly transfer through mancipatio the ownership of the other co-
owners47, which shows that there is nothing fundamentally wrong concerning 
the possibility that a non-owner may affect the position of the owner by resorting 
to formal ways of transferring ownership. At this point, it is worth noting that 
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remaining therefore unknown to those who conceived the idea of a primitive 
prohibition of direct representation. 
 While there are no texts which would generally indicate the impossibility of 
concluding a mancipatio through a non-owner, there are other fragments which 
suggest that it was in fact possible for a non-owner to mancipate. For instance, 
some texts dealing with the transfer of ownership by a non-owner are phrased in 
such general terms that they seem to encompass every mode of transferring 
ownership. That is the case in Gai 2,62-6448, where Gaius refers generally to the 
alienatio by a non-owner49, without restricting its scope to the traditio. Moreover, 
we are explicitly informed by Gaius that the prohibition in Gai 2,63 covered also 
the cases of in iure cessio and mancipatio50, which shows that the problem of the 
potestas alienandi as generally framed in Gai 2,62-64 also covers formal ways of 
transferring ownership. This agrees with the fact that the text stands at the end of 
the part where Gaius deals with the transfer of ownership in general and the 
acquisition through usucapion, since the text would concern all of these modes 
of acquiring ownership.  
 Another text which would appear to comprise the different modes of 
transferring ownership is to be found in the Codex: 
 
C. 7,26,1 (Caracalla, 213): Mancipia tua si ab eis distracta sunt, qui 
ius vendendi non habuerunt, vindicare ea potes. Nec enim usucapi 
ab emptoribus potuerunt, cum illicita venditione furtum contractum 
sit51. 
 
The text grants the possibility to the owner of slaves who have been transferred 
by someone who does not have the ius vendendi to recover them by resorting to 
the rei vindicatio (vindicare ea potes). As it stands, the text does not seem to have 
undergone any modifications, escaping from remarks even in the Index 
Interpolationum52. The fact that a non-owner may have the ius vendendi to alienate 
is formulated with general terms (distrahere), which do not seem to refer 
exclusively to the traditio. If that were the case, the owner would anyhow have 
the rei vindicatio, since the non-owner would have performed a traditio over a res 
mancipi which would have only granted the acquirer the bonitary ownership. 
None of these problems are present in this text, which sets it apart from other 
fragments dealing with the traditio of a res mancipi by a non-owner, such as 
                                                 
48  Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2261-2262. 
49  Gai 2,62: “…alienandae rei potestatem… alienare possit”; 2,63: “prohibetur alienare”; 
2,64: “…alienare potest… voluntate debitoris intellegitur pignus alienari”. 
50  Gai 2,63: “…quamvis ipsius sit vel mancipatum ei dotis causa vel in iure cessum vel 
usucaptum”. 
51  C. 7,26,1: “If your slaves were sold by those who had no right to sell, you may vindicate 
them. Nor could the purchasers acquire ownership by prescription, since the unlawful sale 
constituted theft” (transl. Blume, modified). 
52  Broggini, Ind. Itp. (1969), p. 122. 
 
D. 21,3,1,2 and D. 21,3,1,553. It would therefore appear that the problem of the 
ius vendendi over res mancipi is unrelated to the particular mode of transferring 
ownership which is used.  
 There are other texts within the Justinianic compilation where the activity of 
the compilers did not hide completely the evidence concerning the transfer of 
ownership through formal acts by a non-owner, as can be seen in the following 
text: 
 
D. 6,1,41,1 (Ulp. 17 ed.): Si servus mihi vel filiusfamilias fundum 
vendidit et tradidit, habens liberam peculii administrationem, in rem 
actione uti potero. Sed et si domini voluntate domini rem tradat, 
idem erit dicendum: quemadmodum cum procurator voluntate 
domini vendidit vel tradidit, in rem actionem mihi praestabit54. 
 
In this case, which was already discussed above55, we find a series of non-owners 
who may validly transfer ownership – granting the acquirer an actio in rem – over 
a res mancipi – a piece of land – as long as they have the libera administratio peculii 
or act voluntate domini. Buckland and Corbino claimed that, if the text referred to 
Italic land, the transfer of ownership must have taken place through a formal way 
of transferring ownership56. Against this view it is usually argued that the text was 
located by Lenel under the rubric “Si praedium stipendiarium vel tributarium 
petatur”57, which would clearly show that we are dealing with a fundus 
provincialis58. Accordingly, the actio in rem granted to the acquirer in the text 
would not be the rei vindicatio, but a provincial equivalent or the actio Publiciana. 
It is however worth noting that Lenel was not entirely convinced of locating 
fragments 585-589 of Ulpian under this rubric, reporting that he only did so 
because they appeared to be referred to the transfer of a piece of land by traditio59. 
It is moreover not clear whether all of these texts referred indeed to provincial 
land, or whether they dealt exclusively with the transfer of ownership by traditio. 
                                                 
53  Chapter 4, Section 3 above. 
54  D. 6,1,41,1: “If a slave or a son in parental power, having free management of his peculium, 
has sold and delivered land to me, I can bring an action in rem for it; and if he delivers his 
principal’s thing with his principal’s consent, the same applies. So also when a procurator has 
sold and delivered with his principal’s consent, that will give me an action in rem” (transl. 
Watson). 
55  Chapter 1, Section 4(a) and Chapter 2, Section 1(a) above. 
56  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 377; Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), 
p. 70 n. 53 
57  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 515.  
58  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 14 n. 14; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 17. 
59  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 515 n. 5: “Fr. 585-589 sub hac rubrica non sine dubitatione 
collocavi: moveor autem eo, quod in his omnibus de fundo agi videtur non per 
mancipationem, sed per traditionem”. See moreover Lenel, EP (1927), p. 188 n. 6. 
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remaining therefore unknown to those who conceived the idea of a primitive 
prohibition of direct representation. 
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48  Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2261-2262. 
49  Gai 2,62: “…alienandae rei potestatem… alienare possit”; 2,63: “prohibetur alienare”; 
2,64: “…alienare potest… voluntate debitoris intellegitur pignus alienari”. 
50  Gai 2,63: “…quamvis ipsius sit vel mancipatum ei dotis causa vel in iure cessum vel 
usucaptum”. 
51  C. 7,26,1: “If your slaves were sold by those who had no right to sell, you may vindicate 
them. Nor could the purchasers acquire ownership by prescription, since the unlawful sale 
constituted theft” (transl. Blume, modified). 
52  Broggini, Ind. Itp. (1969), p. 122. 
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In some of them there is no room for discussion. For instance, in D. 6,1,7760 – 
fragment 589 of Ulpian in the Palingenesia – we find a woman who donates land 
through a letter to another person who was on that land at that time, thereby 
transferring him possession and granting him an actio in rem. This can only happen 
in the context of the traditio, and therefore the text cannot possibly have referred 
to formal ways of transferring ownership. Other texts are less clear on the point, 
and particularly D. 39,6,2961 – fragment 587 of Ulpian in the Palingenesia – 
which does not refer to a fundus in the first place, leading Erman and Lenel to 
suspect that the text must have been interpolated62. Moreover, this text not only 
refers to the actio in rem, but it also explicitly grants the donor a rei vindicatio 
(donator poterit rem vindicare). All of this makes it even more doubtful that Ulpian 
was dealing exclusively with the traditio of provincial land. Concerning 
D. 6,1,41,1, there is also an interesting piece of evidence which could show that 
the text originally also dealt with the mancipatio, namely that towards the end we 
are told that an authorized procurator ‘sold or  delivered’ (vendidit vel tradidit). This 
is one of the few elements of the text which appears to be truly anomalous63, 
leading scholars to claim that the text would originally read “et tradidit”64. It is 
however rather inexplicable that the compilers would have modified the original 
“et” for “vel”. A much more likely explanation for this odd conjunction is to be 
found in a similar case of interpolation, where the compilers render the original 
“stipulando aut mancipio accipiendo” of Gai 3,167 into “stipulando aut per traditionem 
accipiendo” in Inst. 3,28,3, carelessly preserving the original disjunction65. 
Similarly, it seems much more likely that the original text of D. 6,1,41,1 would 
have referred to the mancipatio and that the compilers forgot to modify the 
original conjunction, than to assume that they would change “et” for “vel” 
without any reason. 
                                                 
60  D. 6,1,77 (Ulp. 17 ed.): “Quaedam mulier fundum non marito donavit per epistulam et 
eundem fundum ab eo conduxit: posse defendi in rem ei competere, quasi per ipsam 
adquisierit possessionem veluti per colonam. Proponebatur, quod etiam in eo agro qui 
donabatur fuisset, cum epistula emitteretur: quae res sufficiebat ad traditam possessionem, 
licet conductio non intervenisset”. 
61  D. 39,6,29 (Ulp. 17 ed.): “Si mortis causa res donata est et convaluit qui donavit, 
videndum, an habeat in rem actionem. Et si quidem quis sic donavit, ut, si mors 
contigisset, tunc haberet cui donatum est, sine dubio donator poterit rem vindicare: 
mortuo eo tunc is cui donatum est. Si vero sic, ut iam nunc haberet, redderet, si 
convaluisset vel de proelio vel peregre redisset, potest defendi in rem competere donatori, 
si quid horum contigisset, interim autem ei cui donatum est. Sed et si morte praeventus sit 
is cui donatum est, adhuc quis dabit in rem donatori”. 
62  Erman, Beiträge zur Publiciana I (1890), p. 273-274; Lenel, EP (1927), p. 188 n. 6. 
63  Miceli, Rappresentanza (2008), p. 185 n. 154. 
64  Angelini, Il Procurator (1971), p. 151; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 43. 
65  Gai 3,167: “Communem servum pro dominica parte dominis adquirere certum est, 
excepto eo, quod uni nominatim stipulando aut mancipio accipiendo illi soli adquirit…”; 
Inst. 3,28,3: “Communem servum pro dominica parte dominis adquirere certum est, 
excepto eo, quod uni nominatim stipulando aut per traditionem accipiendo illi soli 
adquirit…” 
 
 The examination of these texts shows how difficult it is in most cases to 
determine whether a text dealing with the transfer of ownership by a non-owner 
was originally referred to formal ways of transferring ownership or not. The 
reason for this is that none of the texts in Justinian’s compilation provide any 
explicit information on this point, since the compilers were ordered to supress all 
references to the distinction between Quiritary and praetorian ownership66, as 
well as to the res mancipi and res nec mancipi67. It could be argued that some clues 
can be found regarding the original content of Justinianic texts. A starting point 
in this regard can be to observe whether the thing transferred is a res mancipi. This 
element is, however, not decisive by itself to determine what mode of 
transferring ownership was used, especially since the traditio in this case would 
anyhow grant the in bonis protection to the acquirer. Much more helpful is to 
observe the procedural elements surrounding the transfer of ownership, which 
the compilers were not keen to suppress. For instance, if the acquirer is granted a 
rei vindicatio to recover what he received it is safe to assume that he obtained the 
iustum dominium, which in the case of the res mancipi can only take place through 
formal ways of transferring ownership. Conversely, if in the same case the owner 
is only granted praetorian remedies – e.g. the actio Publiciana, the exceptio rei 
venditae et traditae – one may assume that something prevented the transfer of 
Quiritary ownership68. What the exact cause for this may be can only be 
determined by studying the remedies granted by the praetor. Another element 
which may grant clues as to the original mode of transferring ownership used is 
that some operations could only be concluded by formal acts. This is particularly 
the case with the in iure cessio, which was commonly used to perform a series of 
acts69. For example, incorporeal things could be transferred through in iure cessio70, 
and particularly the hereditas and the tutela. Moreover, the emancipatio and the 
datio in adoptionem could take place through the in iure cessio, while the usufruct 
and certain servitudes could also be granted by resorting to it. Roman law also 
developed the manumissio vindicta, a form of manumission which was modelled 
after the in iure cessio71. In this case, the manumission would take place through 
the intervention of a third person (adsertor in libertatem) who, with the agreement 
of the slave’s master, would claim him to be free, which the praetor would 
confirm due to the lack of opposition of the master. 
 Apart from these indications, there are few technical expressions which can be 
generally used to determine the original mode of transferring ownership used, or 
whether the acquirer obtained Quiritary or bonitary ownership. For instance, the 
use of the expression ‘in bonis’ will unequivocally show that the acquirer obtained 
                                                 
66  C. 7,25,1 (Justinian, 530-531). 
67  C. 7,31,4 (Justinian, 531). 
68  E.g. D. 6,2,14, “praetor emptorem tuebitur praetor”. 
69  Devilla, In iure cessio (1962), p. 703. 
70  Gai 2,29-37; Tit. Ulp. 19,11. 
71  Wolf, In iure cessio und manumissio (2013), p. 390. 
GENERAL EVIDENCE ON THE MANCIPATIO BY A NON-OWNER
235
 
232 
In some of them there is no room for discussion. For instance, in D. 6,1,7760 – 
fragment 589 of Ulpian in the Palingenesia – we find a woman who donates land 
through a letter to another person who was on that land at that time, thereby 
transferring him possession and granting him an actio in rem. This can only happen 
in the context of the traditio, and therefore the text cannot possibly have referred 
to formal ways of transferring ownership. Other texts are less clear on the point, 
and particularly D. 39,6,2961 – fragment 587 of Ulpian in the Palingenesia – 
which does not refer to a fundus in the first place, leading Erman and Lenel to 
suspect that the text must have been interpolated62. Moreover, this text not only 
refers to the actio in rem, but it also explicitly grants the donor a rei vindicatio 
(donator poterit rem vindicare). All of this makes it even more doubtful that Ulpian 
was dealing exclusively with the traditio of provincial land. Concerning 
D. 6,1,41,1, there is also an interesting piece of evidence which could show that 
the text originally also dealt with the mancipatio, namely that towards the end we 
are told that an authorized procurator ‘sold or  delivered’ (vendidit vel tradidit). This 
is one of the few elements of the text which appears to be truly anomalous63, 
leading scholars to claim that the text would originally read “et tradidit”64. It is 
however rather inexplicable that the compilers would have modified the original 
“et” for “vel”. A much more likely explanation for this odd conjunction is to be 
found in a similar case of interpolation, where the compilers render the original 
“stipulando aut mancipio accipiendo” of Gai 3,167 into “stipulando aut per traditionem 
accipiendo” in Inst. 3,28,3, carelessly preserving the original disjunction65. 
Similarly, it seems much more likely that the original text of D. 6,1,41,1 would 
have referred to the mancipatio and that the compilers forgot to modify the 
original conjunction, than to assume that they would change “et” for “vel” 
without any reason. 
                                                 
60  D. 6,1,77 (Ulp. 17 ed.): “Quaedam mulier fundum non marito donavit per epistulam et 
eundem fundum ab eo conduxit: posse defendi in rem ei competere, quasi per ipsam 
adquisierit possessionem veluti per colonam. Proponebatur, quod etiam in eo agro qui 
donabatur fuisset, cum epistula emitteretur: quae res sufficiebat ad traditam possessionem, 
licet conductio non intervenisset”. 
61  D. 39,6,29 (Ulp. 17 ed.): “Si mortis causa res donata est et convaluit qui donavit, 
videndum, an habeat in rem actionem. Et si quidem quis sic donavit, ut, si mors 
contigisset, tunc haberet cui donatum est, sine dubio donator poterit rem vindicare: 
mortuo eo tunc is cui donatum est. Si vero sic, ut iam nunc haberet, redderet, si 
convaluisset vel de proelio vel peregre redisset, potest defendi in rem competere donatori, 
si quid horum contigisset, interim autem ei cui donatum est. Sed et si morte praeventus sit 
is cui donatum est, adhuc quis dabit in rem donatori”. 
62  Erman, Beiträge zur Publiciana I (1890), p. 273-274; Lenel, EP (1927), p. 188 n. 6. 
63  Miceli, Rappresentanza (2008), p. 185 n. 154. 
64  Angelini, Il Procurator (1971), p. 151; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 43. 
65  Gai 3,167: “Communem servum pro dominica parte dominis adquirere certum est, 
excepto eo, quod uni nominatim stipulando aut mancipio accipiendo illi soli adquirit…”; 
Inst. 3,28,3: “Communem servum pro dominica parte dominis adquirere certum est, 
excepto eo, quod uni nominatim stipulando aut per traditionem accipiendo illi soli 
adquirit…” 
 
 The examination of these texts shows how difficult it is in most cases to 
determine whether a text dealing with the transfer of ownership by a non-owner 
was originally referred to formal ways of transferring ownership or not. The 
reason for this is that none of the texts in Justinian’s compilation provide any 
explicit information on this point, since the compilers were ordered to supress all 
references to the distinction between Quiritary and praetorian ownership66, as 
well as to the res mancipi and res nec mancipi67. It could be argued that some clues 
can be found regarding the original content of Justinianic texts. A starting point 
in this regard can be to observe whether the thing transferred is a res mancipi. This 
element is, however, not decisive by itself to determine what mode of 
transferring ownership was used, especially since the traditio in this case would 
anyhow grant the in bonis protection to the acquirer. Much more helpful is to 
observe the procedural elements surrounding the transfer of ownership, which 
the compilers were not keen to suppress. For instance, if the acquirer is granted a 
rei vindicatio to recover what he received it is safe to assume that he obtained the 
iustum dominium, which in the case of the res mancipi can only take place through 
formal ways of transferring ownership. Conversely, if in the same case the owner 
is only granted praetorian remedies – e.g. the actio Publiciana, the exceptio rei 
venditae et traditae – one may assume that something prevented the transfer of 
Quiritary ownership68. What the exact cause for this may be can only be 
determined by studying the remedies granted by the praetor. Another element 
which may grant clues as to the original mode of transferring ownership used is 
that some operations could only be concluded by formal acts. This is particularly 
the case with the in iure cessio, which was commonly used to perform a series of 
acts69. For example, incorporeal things could be transferred through in iure cessio70, 
and particularly the hereditas and the tutela. Moreover, the emancipatio and the 
datio in adoptionem could take place through the in iure cessio, while the usufruct 
and certain servitudes could also be granted by resorting to it. Roman law also 
developed the manumissio vindicta, a form of manumission which was modelled 
after the in iure cessio71. In this case, the manumission would take place through 
the intervention of a third person (adsertor in libertatem) who, with the agreement 
of the slave’s master, would claim him to be free, which the praetor would 
confirm due to the lack of opposition of the master. 
 Apart from these indications, there are few technical expressions which can be 
generally used to determine the original mode of transferring ownership used, or 
whether the acquirer obtained Quiritary or bonitary ownership. For instance, the 
use of the expression ‘in bonis’ will unequivocally show that the acquirer obtained 
                                                 
66  C. 7,25,1 (Justinian, 530-531). 
67  C. 7,31,4 (Justinian, 531). 
68  E.g. D. 6,2,14, “praetor emptorem tuebitur praetor”. 
69  Devilla, In iure cessio (1962), p. 703. 
70  Gai 2,29-37; Tit. Ulp. 19,11. 
71  Wolf, In iure cessio und manumissio (2013), p. 390. 
CHAPTER 5. MANCIPATIO AND IN IURE CESSIO BY A NON-OWNER
236
 
234 
a praetorian protection72. Conversely, expressions such as ‘meum esse’ would make 
reference to the Quiritary ownership. Other terms, however, do not allow the 
interpreter to reach equivalent conclusions. For example, it has been claimed that 
the words ‘dominium’ or ‘dominus’ would have been used exclusively to refer to 
Quiritary ownership73, but the sources are by no means clear on this point, 
especially considering that several texts cover under the term ‘dominium’ both the 
dominium ex iure Quiritium and the bonitary ownership74. 
 The study of interpolations may contribute to distinguish whether a text was 
originally referred to formal ways of transferring ownership or to the traditio. In 
the previous chapters we have run into a number of cases where the non-owner 
appears in fact to have conveyed a res mancipi simply through traditio. It was 
already shown that the exceptio rei venditae et traditae would be available to the 
acquirer of a res mancipi who received it through traditio from a non-owner with 
potestas alienandi, whether the latter was acting voluntate domini – as can be seen in 
D. 21,3,1,2 and D. 21,3,1,575 – or as a legal guardian – as shown in 
D. 27,10,7,176. In these cases, the acquirer is granted the in bonis protection, just 
as if the delivery had been performed by the owner of the thing himself. There 
are moreover other cases in which a res mancipi is delivered by traditio and where, 
despite the lack of potestas alienandi of the transferee, the owner is protected in 
some other way by the praetor, as happens in D. 17,1,49 and D. 17,1,5,3-477. 
Since the traditio of a res mancipi by an authorized non-owner would have the 
same consequences for the praetor as if the delivery was performed by the owner 
himself, it is not strange that the acquirer would have been content with 
obtaining the in bonis protection instead of going through the trouble of 
performing the elaborate rituals of the mancipatio or in iure cessio to transfer 
ownership. 
 Despite the insight which the study of interpolations may provide, it may not 
always be clear whether a text originally dealt with a formal transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner, since there were other legal institutions which could fulfill an 
identical practical function. Particularly relevant at this point is the possibility to 
resort to the fiducia, an agreement concluded by the owner who transfers through 
                                                 
72  Ankum/van Gessel-de Roo/Pool, In bonis III (1990), p. 161. 
73  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 123. 
74  Gai 2,40: “Sed postea diuisionem accepit dominium, ut alius possit esse ex iure Quiritium 
dominus, alius in bonis habere”; Gai 1,55: “Ceterum cum apud cives Romanos duplex sit 
dominium, nam vel in bonis vel ex iure Quiritium vel ex utroque iure cuiusque servus esse 
intellegitur”; C. 7,25,1 (Justinian, 530-531): “nullam esse differentiam patimur inter 
dominos, apud quos vel nudum ex iure quiritium vel tantummodo in bonis reperitur”. 
Moreover, the expressions dominus and dominium may be used to refer to provincial 
property, as shown in Gai 2,7 and D. 6,1,41,1 (Ulp. 17 ed.). On the significance of 
dominium see Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 168; Ankum, Propriété bonitaire 
relatif (1985), p. 131-132; Weimar, Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 557. 
75  See Chapter 4, Section 3 above. 
76  See Chapter 3, Section 2 and Chapter 4, Section 6 above. 
77  See Chapter 4, Section 5 above. 
 
mancipatio or in iure cessio with the acquirer, which would determine what the 
acquirer should do with the object he received. The agreement could have 
different objectives within the law of property, such as giving a security to the 
acquirer, who may alienate the object if an obligation is not fulfiled, in what is 
referred to by Gaius as the fiducia cum creditore (Gai 2,60). The acquirer could also 
be instructed to perform other acts, such as simply holding to the thing for a 
period of time, to retransfer ownership to another person, to manumit a slave, 
etc., which is known as the fiducia cum amico. Regarding the transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner, this implies that an owner who was willing to transfer 
ownership through another person could convey a res mancipi in the context of 
the fiducia to a trusted person so that the latter could retransfer ownership by 
mancipatio or in iure cessio himself. Many of the applications of the fiducia were 
gradually replaced by the appearance of new bonae fidei contracts – such as the 
deposit, mandate, etc. – which allowed the owner to reach the same objectives 
without having to transfer ownership. Nonetheless, the fiducia continued to be 
used in some contexts even in post-classical law. 
 The interpolation of texts originally referred to the fiducia often makes it 
impossible to determine whether a text was originally referred to the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner who received fiduciae causa or not78. This problem is 
not restricted to the Corpus Iuris Civilis, where the main challenge is the 
interpolation of the classical texts, but it also concerns other materials where it is 
not clear whether the non-owner received first fiduciae causa or not, as happens in 
the following letter of Cicero to Atticus:  
 
Cicero, Ad Atticum 15,26,4: Octavam partem tuli luminarum 
medium ad strane memineris cui Caerellia videris mancipio dare ad 
eam summam quae sub praecone fuit maxima. Id opinor esse 
CCCLXXX. 
 
The text is very corrupted, which is why several alternative reconstructions can 
be found of it. Despite this, the general meaning of the text is not essentially 
affected from a legal perspective79. In this passage Cicero asks to Atticus to 
transfer ownership through mancipatio over a share – an eighth part – of a house. 
In this form, the text appears to be an excellent example of a mancipatio by a non-
owner. There is however no way to know whether Cicero transferred in the first 
place the thing fiduciae causa to Atticus, and therefore the text can be interpreted 
in one sense or the other. For example, Costa understands that Cicero had 
previously conveyed the land to Atticus fiduciae causa so that he could transfer 
                                                 
78  On the efforts to determine whether texts dealing with the pledge were originally referred 
to the fiducia see Noordraven, Die Fiduzia (1999), p. 17-41; Dunand, Le transfert fiduciaire 
(2000), p. 82-84, 86-87. 
79  Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2266-2267; Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), 
p. 290. 
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a praetorian protection72. Conversely, expressions such as ‘meum esse’ would make 
reference to the Quiritary ownership. Other terms, however, do not allow the 
interpreter to reach equivalent conclusions. For example, it has been claimed that 
the words ‘dominium’ or ‘dominus’ would have been used exclusively to refer to 
Quiritary ownership73, but the sources are by no means clear on this point, 
especially considering that several texts cover under the term ‘dominium’ both the 
dominium ex iure Quiritium and the bonitary ownership74. 
 The study of interpolations may contribute to distinguish whether a text was 
originally referred to formal ways of transferring ownership or to the traditio. In 
the previous chapters we have run into a number of cases where the non-owner 
appears in fact to have conveyed a res mancipi simply through traditio. It was 
already shown that the exceptio rei venditae et traditae would be available to the 
acquirer of a res mancipi who received it through traditio from a non-owner with 
potestas alienandi, whether the latter was acting voluntate domini – as can be seen in 
D. 21,3,1,2 and D. 21,3,1,575 – or as a legal guardian – as shown in 
D. 27,10,7,176. In these cases, the acquirer is granted the in bonis protection, just 
as if the delivery had been performed by the owner of the thing himself. There 
are moreover other cases in which a res mancipi is delivered by traditio and where, 
despite the lack of potestas alienandi of the transferee, the owner is protected in 
some other way by the praetor, as happens in D. 17,1,49 and D. 17,1,5,3-477. 
Since the traditio of a res mancipi by an authorized non-owner would have the 
same consequences for the praetor as if the delivery was performed by the owner 
himself, it is not strange that the acquirer would have been content with 
obtaining the in bonis protection instead of going through the trouble of 
performing the elaborate rituals of the mancipatio or in iure cessio to transfer 
ownership. 
 Despite the insight which the study of interpolations may provide, it may not 
always be clear whether a text originally dealt with a formal transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner, since there were other legal institutions which could fulfill an 
identical practical function. Particularly relevant at this point is the possibility to 
resort to the fiducia, an agreement concluded by the owner who transfers through 
                                                 
72  Ankum/van Gessel-de Roo/Pool, In bonis III (1990), p. 161. 
73  Sansón, La transmisión (1998), p. 123. 
74  Gai 2,40: “Sed postea diuisionem accepit dominium, ut alius possit esse ex iure Quiritium 
dominus, alius in bonis habere”; Gai 1,55: “Ceterum cum apud cives Romanos duplex sit 
dominium, nam vel in bonis vel ex iure Quiritium vel ex utroque iure cuiusque servus esse 
intellegitur”; C. 7,25,1 (Justinian, 530-531): “nullam esse differentiam patimur inter 
dominos, apud quos vel nudum ex iure quiritium vel tantummodo in bonis reperitur”. 
Moreover, the expressions dominus and dominium may be used to refer to provincial 
property, as shown in Gai 2,7 and D. 6,1,41,1 (Ulp. 17 ed.). On the significance of 
dominium see Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 168; Ankum, Propriété bonitaire 
relatif (1985), p. 131-132; Weimar, Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 557. 
75  See Chapter 4, Section 3 above. 
76  See Chapter 3, Section 2 and Chapter 4, Section 6 above. 
77  See Chapter 4, Section 5 above. 
 
mancipatio or in iure cessio with the acquirer, which would determine what the 
acquirer should do with the object he received. The agreement could have 
different objectives within the law of property, such as giving a security to the 
acquirer, who may alienate the object if an obligation is not fulfiled, in what is 
referred to by Gaius as the fiducia cum creditore (Gai 2,60). The acquirer could also 
be instructed to perform other acts, such as simply holding to the thing for a 
period of time, to retransfer ownership to another person, to manumit a slave, 
etc., which is known as the fiducia cum amico. Regarding the transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner, this implies that an owner who was willing to transfer 
ownership through another person could convey a res mancipi in the context of 
the fiducia to a trusted person so that the latter could retransfer ownership by 
mancipatio or in iure cessio himself. Many of the applications of the fiducia were 
gradually replaced by the appearance of new bonae fidei contracts – such as the 
deposit, mandate, etc. – which allowed the owner to reach the same objectives 
without having to transfer ownership. Nonetheless, the fiducia continued to be 
used in some contexts even in post-classical law. 
 The interpolation of texts originally referred to the fiducia often makes it 
impossible to determine whether a text was originally referred to the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner who received fiduciae causa or not78. This problem is 
not restricted to the Corpus Iuris Civilis, where the main challenge is the 
interpolation of the classical texts, but it also concerns other materials where it is 
not clear whether the non-owner received first fiduciae causa or not, as happens in 
the following letter of Cicero to Atticus:  
 
Cicero, Ad Atticum 15,26,4: Octavam partem tuli luminarum 
medium ad strane memineris cui Caerellia videris mancipio dare ad 
eam summam quae sub praecone fuit maxima. Id opinor esse 
CCCLXXX. 
 
The text is very corrupted, which is why several alternative reconstructions can 
be found of it. Despite this, the general meaning of the text is not essentially 
affected from a legal perspective79. In this passage Cicero asks to Atticus to 
transfer ownership through mancipatio over a share – an eighth part – of a house. 
In this form, the text appears to be an excellent example of a mancipatio by a non-
owner. There is however no way to know whether Cicero transferred in the first 
place the thing fiduciae causa to Atticus, and therefore the text can be interpreted 
in one sense or the other. For example, Costa understands that Cicero had 
previously conveyed the land to Atticus fiduciae causa so that he could transfer 
                                                 
78  On the efforts to determine whether texts dealing with the pledge were originally referred 
to the fiducia see Noordraven, Die Fiduzia (1999), p. 17-41; Dunand, Le transfert fiduciaire 
(2000), p. 82-84, 86-87. 
79  Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2266-2267; Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), 
p. 290. 
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ownership over it himself80. This is refuted by Corbino, who thinks that the 
starting point of Costa are the doctrines of Mitteis regarding direct 
representation, leading him to offer a forced interpretation of the passage81. 
Ankum in turn claims that through the word memineris Cicero would be 
reminding Atticus about this previous mancipatio, assuming through a petitio 
principii, that Atticus could not have acted as an agent of Cicero to mancipate 
“because Roman law did not permit that”82.  
 The same problem is found in a text of Plautus within Persia, where a letter is 
brought to the pimp Dordalus by the slave Tosilus, who claims to have received 
it from a Persian friend offering him a beautiful slave woman for sale. The letter 
was given to Tosilus by a young Persian, who probably is the mandatarius or 
procurator of the Persian friend83. In the letter it is however indicated that the 
transfer of ownership – which would be concluded by the young Persian – will 
not take place through mancipatio, nor will a repromissio secundum mancipium be 
given: 
 
Plautus, Persa 11, 523-524: ac suo periclo is emat qui eam mercabitur: 
mancipio neque promittet neque quisquam dabit84. 
 
Considering that there is no willingness to transfer ownership through mancipatio, 
one could assume that in normal circumstances the messenger – who is not the 
owner – would be able to perform it. It is however impossible to tell whether all 
of this assumes that ownership was previously transferred fiduciae causa to the 
bearer of the letter or not, and therefore no clear conclusions can be drawn from 
this text. 
 The problem of the coexistence of the fiducia with other legal institutions such 
as mandate and pledge sets an almost unsurmountable barrier to the interpreter 
when analysing cases where it is not clear whether one institution or the other is 
being used85. In order to avoid taking too many chances when approaching the 
sources, the cases where this confusion is more likely to take place will be 
avoided. This is particularly the case when the owner authorizes the transfer of 
                                                 
80  Costa, Cicerone giureconsulto (1927) I, p. 108 n.1. 
81  Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 71, n. 53. See moreover Corbino, Forma 
librale (1984), p. 2265-2267; Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 290. 
82  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 15-16 n. 41. 
83  For a detailed description of this case see Ankum, L’actio auctoritatis (1979), p. 9-11. 
84  “He who buys her does it at his own risk: / no one will perform the promissio secundum 
mancipium or deliver her through mancipatio”. This translation accepts Ankum’s opinion 
that the word promittet would refer to the repromissio secundum mancipium. See on this point 
Ankum, Repromissio e satisdatio (1981), p. 760-762. 
85  See e.g. D. 13,7,8,1 (Pomp. 35 Sab.), where a pledge creditor transfers ownership over a 
number of slaves, which according to Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 147 would originally 
refer to the fiducia, while Noordraven, D. 13,7,6pr (1980), p. 247-253 and Ankum, 
Repromissio e satisdatio (1981), p. 782 ff. consider that this title of the work of Pomponius 
would in fact deal with the pledge. 
 
ownership through a person sui iuris86 – where the fiducia cum amico could for 
instance be confused with a mandate – as well as in those situations where the 
transfer of ownership takes place in the context of a surety, in which case the 
fiducia cum creditore can be easily confused with the pledge87. The focus will 
instead be laid on those cases where there is no possible confusion between 
different institutions, namely when the alienation is performed by an alieni iuris 
acting on behalf of his father or master and the cases where ownership is 
transferred by a legal guardian, since in none of these cases will the non-owner 
have the thing fiduciae causa.  
 
3. Mancipatio by a slave 
 
Regarding the mancipatio by a non-owner, the case which has traditionally 
received more attention is that of the slave, since it seems to be the case where 
more evidence can be found on the subject. The starting point for disagreement 
since the 16th century has been the following text by Cicero: 
 
Cicero, Ad Atticum 13,50,2: Vestorius ad me scripsit, ut iuberem 
mancipio dari servo suo pro mea parte Hetereio cuidam fundum 
Brinnianum, ut ipse ei Puteolis recte mancipio dare posset. Eum 
servum, si tibi videbitur, ad me mittes. Opinor enim ad te etiam 
scripsisse Vestorium88. 
 
The context of the text is the following89: Cicero had been instituted heir along 
with Atticus and other people by Brinnius, whose goods had been auctioned 
after his death by Vestorius, a banker at Puteoli. Among the auctioned goods was 
                                                 
86  On the mancipatio by a procurator see the opinions of Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), 
p. 378; Frese, Prokurator (1926), p. 362 and 366; Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 168; 
Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 21; Kaser, Pfandrecht I (1976), p. 248-249; Ankum, 
Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 6; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 7. Regarding the 
possibility of concluding formal acts through a nuntius see Longo, Nuntius (1982), p. 514. 
87  On the possibility that a pledge creditor may mancipate see Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht 
(1908), p. 190; Solazzi, Acquisto del possesso (1955 [1911]), p. 339; Burdese, Lex commissoria 
(1949), p. 168-171-173; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 7; Corbino, Forma librale 
(1984), p. 2262-63, n. 26; Weimar, Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 566; Perani, Pignus 
distrahere (2014), p. 129-130. 
88  A translation of this text is offered by Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 9: “Vestorius 
has written to me that I should arrange through his slave the mancipation through him (i.e. 
Vestorius) of my share in the Briannian farm to a certain Hetereius, so that he himself can 
convey it to him in Puteoli in the legally prescribed form of the mancipatio”. Another 
interpretation is given by Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2265: “Vestorio mi ha scritto 
affinché io ordini, tramite un suo schiavo e per la mia parte, che sia mancipato il fondo 
Brinniano ad un tale Etereio, dimodoché egli possa regularmente mancipare a lui in 
Pozzuoli. Se tu credi, etc.” 
89  For further details see Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 4; Corbino, Forma librale 
(1984), p. 2264-2265; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 8. 
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ownership over it himself80. This is refuted by Corbino, who thinks that the 
starting point of Costa are the doctrines of Mitteis regarding direct 
representation, leading him to offer a forced interpretation of the passage81. 
Ankum in turn claims that through the word memineris Cicero would be 
reminding Atticus about this previous mancipatio, assuming through a petitio 
principii, that Atticus could not have acted as an agent of Cicero to mancipate 
“because Roman law did not permit that”82.  
 The same problem is found in a text of Plautus within Persia, where a letter is 
brought to the pimp Dordalus by the slave Tosilus, who claims to have received 
it from a Persian friend offering him a beautiful slave woman for sale. The letter 
was given to Tosilus by a young Persian, who probably is the mandatarius or 
procurator of the Persian friend83. In the letter it is however indicated that the 
transfer of ownership – which would be concluded by the young Persian – will 
not take place through mancipatio, nor will a repromissio secundum mancipium be 
given: 
 
Plautus, Persa 11, 523-524: ac suo periclo is emat qui eam mercabitur: 
mancipio neque promittet neque quisquam dabit84. 
 
Considering that there is no willingness to transfer ownership through mancipatio, 
one could assume that in normal circumstances the messenger – who is not the 
owner – would be able to perform it. It is however impossible to tell whether all 
of this assumes that ownership was previously transferred fiduciae causa to the 
bearer of the letter or not, and therefore no clear conclusions can be drawn from 
this text. 
 The problem of the coexistence of the fiducia with other legal institutions such 
as mandate and pledge sets an almost unsurmountable barrier to the interpreter 
when analysing cases where it is not clear whether one institution or the other is 
being used85. In order to avoid taking too many chances when approaching the 
sources, the cases where this confusion is more likely to take place will be 
avoided. This is particularly the case when the owner authorizes the transfer of 
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librale (1984), p. 2265-2267; Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 290. 
82  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 15-16 n. 41. 
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84  “He who buys her does it at his own risk: / no one will perform the promissio secundum 
mancipium or deliver her through mancipatio”. This translation accepts Ankum’s opinion 
that the word promittet would refer to the repromissio secundum mancipium. See on this point 
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refer to the fiducia, while Noordraven, D. 13,7,6pr (1980), p. 247-253 and Ankum, 
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would in fact deal with the pledge. 
 
ownership through a person sui iuris86 – where the fiducia cum amico could for 
instance be confused with a mandate – as well as in those situations where the 
transfer of ownership takes place in the context of a surety, in which case the 
fiducia cum creditore can be easily confused with the pledge87. The focus will 
instead be laid on those cases where there is no possible confusion between 
different institutions, namely when the alienation is performed by an alieni iuris 
acting on behalf of his father or master and the cases where ownership is 
transferred by a legal guardian, since in none of these cases will the non-owner 
have the thing fiduciae causa.  
 
3. Mancipatio by a slave 
 
Regarding the mancipatio by a non-owner, the case which has traditionally 
received more attention is that of the slave, since it seems to be the case where 
more evidence can be found on the subject. The starting point for disagreement 
since the 16th century has been the following text by Cicero: 
 
Cicero, Ad Atticum 13,50,2: Vestorius ad me scripsit, ut iuberem 
mancipio dari servo suo pro mea parte Hetereio cuidam fundum 
Brinnianum, ut ipse ei Puteolis recte mancipio dare posset. Eum 
servum, si tibi videbitur, ad me mittes. Opinor enim ad te etiam 
scripsisse Vestorium88. 
 
The context of the text is the following89: Cicero had been instituted heir along 
with Atticus and other people by Brinnius, whose goods had been auctioned 
after his death by Vestorius, a banker at Puteoli. Among the auctioned goods was 
                                                 
86  On the mancipatio by a procurator see the opinions of Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), 
p. 378; Frese, Prokurator (1926), p. 362 and 366; Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 168; 
Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 21; Kaser, Pfandrecht I (1976), p. 248-249; Ankum, 
Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 6; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 7. Regarding the 
possibility of concluding formal acts through a nuntius see Longo, Nuntius (1982), p. 514. 
87  On the possibility that a pledge creditor may mancipate see Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht 
(1908), p. 190; Solazzi, Acquisto del possesso (1955 [1911]), p. 339; Burdese, Lex commissoria 
(1949), p. 168-171-173; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 7; Corbino, Forma librale 
(1984), p. 2262-63, n. 26; Weimar, Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 566; Perani, Pignus 
distrahere (2014), p. 129-130. 
88  A translation of this text is offered by Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 9: “Vestorius 
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(1984), p. 2264-2265; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 8. 
CHAPTER 5. MANCIPATIO AND IN IURE CESSIO BY A NON-OWNER
240
 
238 
a piece of land, which Vestorius now had to deliver to Hetereius, the buyer of 
the fundus at the auction90. In order to transfer ownership, each of the coheirs 
must perform the mancipatio to Vestorius, who will then be able to transfer 
ownership to Hetereius. A slave had been sent around by Vestorius to each of the 
coheirs, although the exact purpose of this journey remains uncertain. Cicero 
asks Atticus, who was in Rome, to send the slave of Vestorius to him at 
Tusculum. The whole controversy around this text revolves around the 
significance of the presence of the slave at Tusculum regarding the possibility of a 
slave to transfer ownership through mancipatio, which is particularly difficult to 
elucidate due to the unclear role of the word “iuberem”, as well as the significance 
of “servo suo”. It was already shown above that since the 16th century scholars 
were divided between those who considered that ownership was transferred to 
Vestorius through the slave – who would therefore act as the mancipio accipiens – 
and those who considered that Cicero would be merely authorizing Vestorius 
through a slave to perform the mancipatio. This dispute was reedited at the 
beginning of the 20th century, since Mitteis91 understands that Vestorius will 
become owner by the mancipatio performed by Cicero to his slave once he arrives 
to Tusculum, while Roby thinks that iuberem would indicate that Cicero would 
order one of his slaves to perform the mancipatio92, being later followed by 
Buckland93, while Corbino thinks that the iussum is directed to Vestorius through 
his own slave94. Considering the ambiguity of the text, most of the arguments to 
refute opposing views relied more on assumptions as to the most reasonable thing 
to be expected from the parties or simply on preconceptions regarding the 
possibility of performing formal acts through a non-owner. For instance, Mitteis 
considers that it is impossible for a free person to be authorized to transfer 
ownership through mancipatio. If that was indeed possible, Cicero would have 
simply given his authorization in a letter to Vestorius95, an idea which is also 
brought up by Ankum96. The latter author moreover considers that the text 
shows that someone could not authorize a slave to mancipate, because in that 
case Cicero would just have given a iussum through a letter to one of his slaves in 
Rome to perform the mancipatio to Vestorius’ slave visiting Atticus97. On the 
                                                 
90  Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2264 n. 31 does not agree that Hetereius has already 
adjudicated the piece of land to himself, since if that was the case the heirs themselves 
should perform the mancipatio to him. 
91  Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta I (1900), p. 209-210.  
92  Roby, Roman Private law (1902) I, p. 432-433 n.1. 
93  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 373-375. 
94  Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 65-69; Corbino, Forma librale (1984), 
p. 2264-66. 
95  Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta I (1900), p. 209; Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 208 
n. 16. 
96  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 6; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 9. 
97  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 5-6; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 11. 
 
other hand, the interpretation of Corbino98 rests on the idea that there could not 
be a mancipatio at a distance which did not provide possession, and furthermore 
that shares could not be mancipated, so the purpose of the journey of Vestorius’ 
slave would be not to acquire from the different owners through mancipatio, but 
rather to obtain the authorization of every coheir so that Vestorius could perform 
the mancipatio. Accordingly, Corbino considers that this text would prove that the 
authorization to mancipate could be given to a free person who did not have a 
general power of administration. 
 Concerning the facts of the case, the most convincing interpretation of the 
texts seems to be the one offered by Ankum on his second contribution on the 
subject99, according to which the role of the slave of Vestorius was to visit the 
different co-owners so that each of them would convey their shares through 
mancipatio to the slave, making Vestorius owner of the piece of land and thereby 
enabling him to mancipate it to the buyer Hetereius. This interpretation has the 
advantage of relying on well-known institutions of Roman law, namely that 
slaves could acquire through mancipatio for their owners and that a non-owner 
could transfer through mancipatio by acquiring an object fiduciae causa. The 
interpretation of Corbino, on the other side, relies on several ideas which are by 
no means clear to modern scholarship, such as that one could not mancipate 
shares. Nonetheless, while Ankum’s interpretation seems to be preferable, it is 
not possible to agree with the juristic conclusions he draws from it concerning 
the possibility of mancipating through a non-owner, especially since at many 
points too much is assumed. For instance, there is no reason for assuming that 
Cicero was concerned at all about sparing the slave of Vestorius from travelling 
from Rome to Tusculum, and therefore all the reasons of efficiency set forth by 
Mitteis and Ankum do not seem to be very compelling. It is further unknown 
whether the condition of argentarius held by Vestorius introduced any further 
complexities of which we are unaware, as Corbino and Ankum acknowledge 
themselves100. Moreover, the fact that Vestorius would prefer to acquire the thing 
through mancipatio by each owner instead of resorting to other imaginable ways – 
e.g. to receive an authorization by letter – can be seen as an example of the legal 
practice at the time, which does not imply that other ways of reaching the same 
result were completely excluded. Accordingly, concerning the significance of this 
text for the mancipatio by a non-owner, it seems preferable to subscribe to the 
views of authors such as Kaser and Watson, who refrain from drawing any 
conclusions from it101. 
                                                 
98  Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 65-69; Corbino, Forma librale (1984), 
p. 2264-66. His opinion is followed by Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), 
p. 287-289. 
99  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 10-11. 
100  Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 69-70 n. 51; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves 
(1984), p. 10; Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2266. Both authors wonder whether this 
condition itself would allow Vestorius to perform the mancipatio a non domino. 
101  Kaser, Verfügungsakte (1950), p. 66 n. 32; Watson, Law of persons (1967), p. 183-184. 
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a piece of land, which Vestorius now had to deliver to Hetereius, the buyer of 
the fundus at the auction90. In order to transfer ownership, each of the coheirs 
must perform the mancipatio to Vestorius, who will then be able to transfer 
ownership to Hetereius. A slave had been sent around by Vestorius to each of the 
coheirs, although the exact purpose of this journey remains uncertain. Cicero 
asks Atticus, who was in Rome, to send the slave of Vestorius to him at 
Tusculum. The whole controversy around this text revolves around the 
significance of the presence of the slave at Tusculum regarding the possibility of a 
slave to transfer ownership through mancipatio, which is particularly difficult to 
elucidate due to the unclear role of the word “iuberem”, as well as the significance 
of “servo suo”. It was already shown above that since the 16th century scholars 
were divided between those who considered that ownership was transferred to 
Vestorius through the slave – who would therefore act as the mancipio accipiens – 
and those who considered that Cicero would be merely authorizing Vestorius 
through a slave to perform the mancipatio. This dispute was reedited at the 
beginning of the 20th century, since Mitteis91 understands that Vestorius will 
become owner by the mancipatio performed by Cicero to his slave once he arrives 
to Tusculum, while Roby thinks that iuberem would indicate that Cicero would 
order one of his slaves to perform the mancipatio92, being later followed by 
Buckland93, while Corbino thinks that the iussum is directed to Vestorius through 
his own slave94. Considering the ambiguity of the text, most of the arguments to 
refute opposing views relied more on assumptions as to the most reasonable thing 
to be expected from the parties or simply on preconceptions regarding the 
possibility of performing formal acts through a non-owner. For instance, Mitteis 
considers that it is impossible for a free person to be authorized to transfer 
ownership through mancipatio. If that was indeed possible, Cicero would have 
simply given his authorization in a letter to Vestorius95, an idea which is also 
brought up by Ankum96. The latter author moreover considers that the text 
shows that someone could not authorize a slave to mancipate, because in that 
case Cicero would just have given a iussum through a letter to one of his slaves in 
Rome to perform the mancipatio to Vestorius’ slave visiting Atticus97. On the 
                                                 
90  Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2264 n. 31 does not agree that Hetereius has already 
adjudicated the piece of land to himself, since if that was the case the heirs themselves 
should perform the mancipatio to him. 
91  Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta I (1900), p. 209-210.  
92  Roby, Roman Private law (1902) I, p. 432-433 n.1. 
93  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 373-375. 
94  Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 65-69; Corbino, Forma librale (1984), 
p. 2264-66. 
95  Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta I (1900), p. 209; Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 208 
n. 16. 
96  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 6; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 9. 
97  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 5-6; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 11. 
 
other hand, the interpretation of Corbino98 rests on the idea that there could not 
be a mancipatio at a distance which did not provide possession, and furthermore 
that shares could not be mancipated, so the purpose of the journey of Vestorius’ 
slave would be not to acquire from the different owners through mancipatio, but 
rather to obtain the authorization of every coheir so that Vestorius could perform 
the mancipatio. Accordingly, Corbino considers that this text would prove that the 
authorization to mancipate could be given to a free person who did not have a 
general power of administration. 
 Concerning the facts of the case, the most convincing interpretation of the 
texts seems to be the one offered by Ankum on his second contribution on the 
subject99, according to which the role of the slave of Vestorius was to visit the 
different co-owners so that each of them would convey their shares through 
mancipatio to the slave, making Vestorius owner of the piece of land and thereby 
enabling him to mancipate it to the buyer Hetereius. This interpretation has the 
advantage of relying on well-known institutions of Roman law, namely that 
slaves could acquire through mancipatio for their owners and that a non-owner 
could transfer through mancipatio by acquiring an object fiduciae causa. The 
interpretation of Corbino, on the other side, relies on several ideas which are by 
no means clear to modern scholarship, such as that one could not mancipate 
shares. Nonetheless, while Ankum’s interpretation seems to be preferable, it is 
not possible to agree with the juristic conclusions he draws from it concerning 
the possibility of mancipating through a non-owner, especially since at many 
points too much is assumed. For instance, there is no reason for assuming that 
Cicero was concerned at all about sparing the slave of Vestorius from travelling 
from Rome to Tusculum, and therefore all the reasons of efficiency set forth by 
Mitteis and Ankum do not seem to be very compelling. It is further unknown 
whether the condition of argentarius held by Vestorius introduced any further 
complexities of which we are unaware, as Corbino and Ankum acknowledge 
themselves100. Moreover, the fact that Vestorius would prefer to acquire the thing 
through mancipatio by each owner instead of resorting to other imaginable ways – 
e.g. to receive an authorization by letter – can be seen as an example of the legal 
practice at the time, which does not imply that other ways of reaching the same 
result were completely excluded. Accordingly, concerning the significance of this 
text for the mancipatio by a non-owner, it seems preferable to subscribe to the 
views of authors such as Kaser and Watson, who refrain from drawing any 
conclusions from it101. 
                                                 
98  Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 65-69; Corbino, Forma librale (1984), 
p. 2264-66. His opinion is followed by Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), 
p. 287-289. 
99  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 10-11. 
100  Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 69-70 n. 51; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves 
(1984), p. 10; Corbino, Forma librale (1984), p. 2266. Both authors wonder whether this 
condition itself would allow Vestorius to perform the mancipatio a non domino. 
101  Kaser, Verfügungsakte (1950), p. 66 n. 32; Watson, Law of persons (1967), p. 183-184. 
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 Scholars are also keen to extract general conclusions from other texts referring 
to the mancipatio, as happens with the following fragments dealing with the right 
of usufruct: 
 
FV 51: Adquiri nobis potest usufructus et per eos quos in potestate 
manu mancipiove habemus, sed non omnibus modis, sed legato, vel 
si heredibus illis institutis deducto usu fructo proprietas legetur: per 
in iure cessionem autem vel iudicio familiae erciscundae non potest; 
per mancipationem ita potest, ut nos proprietatem, quae illis 
mancipio data sit, deducto usu fructu remancipemus102. 
 
Authors such as Mitteis and Ankum consider that the final part of this text would 
conclusively show that a slave could not transfer ownership through mancipatio, 
since although the slave is presented as acquiring ownership through mancipatio, it 
appears that the owner himself had to perform the mancipatio afterwards, 
deducting the usufruct from this alienation103. This interpretation is drawn from 
the use of “illis” in the case of the mancipatio and “nos” for the remancipatio, which 
would apparently indicate a change in the person performing the action. The 
argument is however not decisive since these terms seem to be a general 
proposition, where it would be unnecessary to point out that the same slave to 
whom the object was mancipated should remancipate, who would furthermore 
need a special authorization for this act104.  
 Ankum105 proposes a similar argument extracted from the formula Baetica106, 
which contains a mancipatio fiduciae causa of a fundus and a slave. In the text, the 
creditor acquires these goods as real security through mancipatio by the slave 
                                                 
102  FV 51: “Usufruct can be acquired by us also through persons who are in our potestas; not 
by all methods, however, but by a legacy of the usufruct, or when these persons have been 
instituted as heirs and the ownership of a thing has been bequeathed to someone with 
deduction of the usufruct. It cannot be acquired by means of an in iure cessio made to the 
subiecti or by a sentence in a suit to divide an inheritance brought by or against them; it can 
be acquired by means of a mancipatio in this way, that we remancipate the ownership of the 
thing, which has been conveyed to them in the form of a mancipatio, and deduct the 
usufruct for us on that occasion”, translated by Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 10, 
103  Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 209; Kaser, Verfügungsakte (1950), p. 66; Ankum, 
Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 10-11; p. 17 n. 63; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), 
p. 16-17. 
104  This argument is brought forward by Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 377 and 
Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 111 n. 45. Less convincing is Corbino, 
Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 62, who considers that in this case the slave would be 
acting ignorante domino, and therefore could validly acquire rights, but not alienate them 
without the owner’s authorization. Such distinction does not follow from the text, as 
pointed out by Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 16-17. 
105  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 11-12. 
106  FIRA (1968) III, p. 296-297. 
 
Dama107, but when the consequences of non-payment by the debtor are 
described, only the creditor (Lucius Titius) is mentioned as the person entitled to 
alienate these objects108. The silence regarding the slave would prove once again, 
according to Ankum, that slaves would not be able to transfer ownership through 
mancipatio, since it would have otherwise been more practical to establish that the 
slave himself would perform the mancipatio. The text would therefore offer a 
remarkable similarity with FV 51, where it would have been also more practical 
that the slave himself transferred ownership through mancipatio. However, just as 
FV 51, the text is not conclusive, since the formula merely describes a general 
proposition, leaving open who will carry out the subsequent mancipatio. This is 
even more true concerning the formula Baetica, where the mancipatio will take 
place at a point in the future and may therefore be performed by Lucius Titius or 
by any other slave whom he sees fit for this. 
 More evidence is to be found in a text dealing with the mancipatio by a slave 
within the Digest: 
 
D. 21,2,39,1 (Jul. 57 dig.): Si servus tuus emerit hominem et 
eundem vendiderit Titio eiusque nomine duplam promiserit et tu a 
venditore servi stipulatus fueris: si Titius servum petierit et ideo 
victus sit, quod servus tuus in tradendo sine voluntate tua 
proprietatem hominis transferre non potuisset, supererit Publiciana 
actio et propter hoc duplae stipulatio ei non committetur: quare 
venditor quoque tuus agentem te ex stipulatu poterit doli mali 
exceptione summovere. Alias autem si servus hominem emerit et 
duplam stipuletur, deinde eum vendiderit et ab emptore evictus 
fuerit: domino quidem adversus venditorem in solidum competit 
actio, emptori vero adversus dominum dumtaxat de peculio. 
Denuntiare vero de evictione emptor servo, non domino debet: ita 
                                                 
107  FIRA (1968) III, p. 296: “Dama L. Titii ser(vus) fundum Baianum… (sestertio) n(ummo) I 
et hominem Midam (sestertio) n(ummo) I fidi fiduciae causa mancipio accepit ab L. 
Baianio”, translated by Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 11: “Dama, slave of L Titius 
has received the estate of Baian(i)us… for one sestertius and the slave Midas for one 
sestertius on the ground of fiducia in the form of mancipatio from L Baianius”. 
108  FIRA (1968) III, p. 297: “…si pecunia sua quaque die L. Titio h(eredi)ve eius data soluta 
non esset, tum uti eum fundum eaque mancipia, sive quae mancipia ex is «vellet» L. Titius 
h(eres)ve eius vellet, ubi et quo die vellet, pecunia praesenti venderet… mancipio pluris 
(sestertio) n(ummo) I invitus ne daret, neve satis secundum mancipium daret, neve ut in ea 
verba, quae in verba satis s(ecundum) m(ancipium) dari solet, repromitteret, neve simplam 
neve [duplam…]”, translated by Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 11-12: “If the 
money should not have been paid to L. Titius or his heir at the fixed date, that L. Titius 
could then sell for ready money his estate and these slaves or some slaves of these which L. 
Titius or his heir would want to sell, at the place and on the date he wished… and that he 
will not have to mancipate against his will for more than one sestertius and that he had not 
to give a satisdatio secundum mancipium, neither a promise in the form of a stipulatio with 
these words, which are generally inserted in a satisdatio secundum mancipium, nor to make a 
stipulatio simplae or duplae (for the case of eviction)”. 
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 Scholars are also keen to extract general conclusions from other texts referring 
to the mancipatio, as happens with the following fragments dealing with the right 
of usufruct: 
 
FV 51: Adquiri nobis potest usufructus et per eos quos in potestate 
manu mancipiove habemus, sed non omnibus modis, sed legato, vel 
si heredibus illis institutis deducto usu fructo proprietas legetur: per 
in iure cessionem autem vel iudicio familiae erciscundae non potest; 
per mancipationem ita potest, ut nos proprietatem, quae illis 
mancipio data sit, deducto usu fructu remancipemus102. 
 
Authors such as Mitteis and Ankum consider that the final part of this text would 
conclusively show that a slave could not transfer ownership through mancipatio, 
since although the slave is presented as acquiring ownership through mancipatio, it 
appears that the owner himself had to perform the mancipatio afterwards, 
deducting the usufruct from this alienation103. This interpretation is drawn from 
the use of “illis” in the case of the mancipatio and “nos” for the remancipatio, which 
would apparently indicate a change in the person performing the action. The 
argument is however not decisive since these terms seem to be a general 
proposition, where it would be unnecessary to point out that the same slave to 
whom the object was mancipated should remancipate, who would furthermore 
need a special authorization for this act104.  
 Ankum105 proposes a similar argument extracted from the formula Baetica106, 
which contains a mancipatio fiduciae causa of a fundus and a slave. In the text, the 
creditor acquires these goods as real security through mancipatio by the slave 
                                                 
102  FV 51: “Usufruct can be acquired by us also through persons who are in our potestas; not 
by all methods, however, but by a legacy of the usufruct, or when these persons have been 
instituted as heirs and the ownership of a thing has been bequeathed to someone with 
deduction of the usufruct. It cannot be acquired by means of an in iure cessio made to the 
subiecti or by a sentence in a suit to divide an inheritance brought by or against them; it can 
be acquired by means of a mancipatio in this way, that we remancipate the ownership of the 
thing, which has been conveyed to them in the form of a mancipatio, and deduct the 
usufruct for us on that occasion”, translated by Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 10, 
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acting ignorante domino, and therefore could validly acquire rights, but not alienate them 
without the owner’s authorization. Such distinction does not follow from the text, as 
pointed out by Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 16-17. 
105  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 11-12. 
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Dama107, but when the consequences of non-payment by the debtor are 
described, only the creditor (Lucius Titius) is mentioned as the person entitled to 
alienate these objects108. The silence regarding the slave would prove once again, 
according to Ankum, that slaves would not be able to transfer ownership through 
mancipatio, since it would have otherwise been more practical to establish that the 
slave himself would perform the mancipatio. The text would therefore offer a 
remarkable similarity with FV 51, where it would have been also more practical 
that the slave himself transferred ownership through mancipatio. However, just as 
FV 51, the text is not conclusive, since the formula merely describes a general 
proposition, leaving open who will carry out the subsequent mancipatio. This is 
even more true concerning the formula Baetica, where the mancipatio will take 
place at a point in the future and may therefore be performed by Lucius Titius or 
by any other slave whom he sees fit for this. 
 More evidence is to be found in a text dealing with the mancipatio by a slave 
within the Digest: 
 
D. 21,2,39,1 (Jul. 57 dig.): Si servus tuus emerit hominem et 
eundem vendiderit Titio eiusque nomine duplam promiserit et tu a 
venditore servi stipulatus fueris: si Titius servum petierit et ideo 
victus sit, quod servus tuus in tradendo sine voluntate tua 
proprietatem hominis transferre non potuisset, supererit Publiciana 
actio et propter hoc duplae stipulatio ei non committetur: quare 
venditor quoque tuus agentem te ex stipulatu poterit doli mali 
exceptione summovere. Alias autem si servus hominem emerit et 
duplam stipuletur, deinde eum vendiderit et ab emptore evictus 
fuerit: domino quidem adversus venditorem in solidum competit 
actio, emptori vero adversus dominum dumtaxat de peculio. 
Denuntiare vero de evictione emptor servo, non domino debet: ita 
                                                 
107  FIRA (1968) III, p. 296: “Dama L. Titii ser(vus) fundum Baianum… (sestertio) n(ummo) I 
et hominem Midam (sestertio) n(ummo) I fidi fiduciae causa mancipio accepit ab L. 
Baianio”, translated by Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 11: “Dama, slave of L Titius 
has received the estate of Baian(i)us… for one sestertius and the slave Midas for one 
sestertius on the ground of fiducia in the form of mancipatio from L Baianius”. 
108  FIRA (1968) III, p. 297: “…si pecunia sua quaque die L. Titio h(eredi)ve eius data soluta 
non esset, tum uti eum fundum eaque mancipia, sive quae mancipia ex is «vellet» L. Titius 
h(eres)ve eius vellet, ubi et quo die vellet, pecunia praesenti venderet… mancipio pluris 
(sestertio) n(ummo) I invitus ne daret, neve satis secundum mancipium daret, neve ut in ea 
verba, quae in verba satis s(ecundum) m(ancipium) dari solet, repromitteret, neve simplam 
neve [duplam…]”, translated by Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 11-12: “If the 
money should not have been paid to L. Titius or his heir at the fixed date, that L. Titius 
could then sell for ready money his estate and these slaves or some slaves of these which L. 
Titius or his heir would want to sell, at the place and on the date he wished… and that he 
will not have to mancipate against his will for more than one sestertius and that he had not 
to give a satisdatio secundum mancipium, neither a promise in the form of a stipulatio with 
these words, which are generally inserted in a satisdatio secundum mancipium, nor to make a 
stipulatio simplae or duplae (for the case of eviction)”. 
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enim evicto homine utiliter de peculio agere poterit: sin autem 
servus decesserit, tunc domino denuntiandum est109. 
 
Two cases are described within this text. In the first part, a slave belonging to 
‘you’ (servus tuus) bought another slave – whom we can name ‘Stichus’ to avoid 
confusion110 – whom he subsequently sold to Titius. Titius then lost the 
possession over Stichus and he could not successfully recover him in court due to 
the fact that he was not made owner of him by your slave, who performed the 
traditio without your consent (sine voluntate tua). Despite this, the buyer will not 
be able to claim the responsibility arising from eviction, because he can still make 
use of the actio Publiciana, which shows moreover that the person who took 
Stichus from him was not his owner – otherwise the Publiciana would not be 
available against him. This in turn led Julian to hold that the owner of the slave 
who bought and sold Stichus without his consent would be defeated with an 
exceptio doli if he claimed responsibility from the original vendor. In the second 
case presented in the text (Alias autem…) the final buyer is actually evicted by the 
true owner, which allows him to bring an actio ex stipulatu de peculio against the 
owner of the slave who sold him Stichus. The owner of the slave will be able to 
bring against the original seller an action without the restrictions of the actio de 
peculio, i.e. in solidum. 
 The text is traditionally considered to be interpolated111. Mitteis112 stressed the 
fact that an actio Publiciana is granted despite the lack of authorization to dispose 
on behalf of the owner, which would not agree with classical Roman law. 
Therefore, he considered that the words sine voluntate tua were interpolated, 
resulting in a rather precipitate insertion (ziemlich kopflose Einschiebung). According 
to him, the original ground for the failure to transfer ownership would have read 
“quod servus tuus in mancipio proprietatem transferre non potuisset”. Mitteis seems to 
                                                 
109  D. 21,2,39,1: “Suppose that your slave has bought a slave, whom he sells to Titius, 
promising double the price in the event of eviction, while you have stipulated similarly 
from the vendor of the slave. If Titius were to claim the slave and be unsuccessful because 
your slave has not been able to transfer the ownership of the slave since he delivered it 
without your consent, the actio Publiciana remains, and so the stipulation for double will 
not become enforceable; hence also, your own vendor can defeat you with the exceptio doli 
if you sue him on the basis of the stipulation. But the situation is different if the slave has 
bought a slave and has made a stipulation for double, and subsequently sold the slave and it 
was evicted from the buyer; the owner of the slave [he who sold the other slave] will have 
action for the total amount against the seller, but the buyer will have action against the 
owner only to the extent of his peculium. The buyer must, however, give notice of the 
eviction to the slave, not to his master; for then, the eviction taking place, he can 
effectively sue to the extent of the peculium; should the slave now be dead, however, he 
can give notice to the master” (transl. Watson, modified). 
110  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 12. 
111  Levy/Rabel, Ind. Itp. (1931) II, col. 18. 
112  Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta I (1900), p. 208; Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta II (1904), p. 381; 
Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 209. 
 
have relied on Lenel’s Palingenesia113 for claiming that the text dealt originally 
with the mancipatio and not with the traditio, since the text is located under the 
rubric “De auctoritate”. The original location of the text has moreover been 
confirmed by subsequent studies, which concluded that it indeed referred to the 
mancipatio, specifically to the actio auctoritatis114. Therefore, the opinion that the 
text was interpolated was reaffirmed in the view of scholars who considered that 
the text would show that a slave could not perform the mancipatio115. Maybe the 
most representative author of this view is Ankum, who considers that the text 
would in fact be highly interpolated, firstly because the references to the stipulatio 
duplae would have been added – being unnecessary in the original text, where 
the responsibility for auctoritas derived directly from the mancipatio – and the 
indications to the emptio, venditio and traditio would originally correspond to the 
mancipatio. Moreover, the words “sine voluntate tua” would also have been added 
by Justinian, since the reference to the owner’s voluntas would make no sense in 
the original text. The compilers would have inserted this element to replace the 
original reason for losing the rei vindicatio, which would have been deleted from 
the text: the impossibility for a slave to transfer ownership through mancipatio. 
Thus, according to Ankum the reason for the failed transfer of ownership in the 
original text would have been: “quod servus tuus in mancipio dando proprietatem 
hominis transferre non potuisset”. 
 Other interpretations of the text have been brought forward. Buckland, 
Corbino and Coppola Bisazza116 agree that the text originally dealt with a case of 
mancipatio, but since they think that it was possible for a slave to mancipate they 
consider the words “sine voluntate tua” as original117. Corbino however considers 
the final words of the first case (quare venditor quoque tuus agentem te ex stipulatu 
poterit doli mali exceptione summovere) to be incompatible with this solution, since 
the owner of the slave would have no ground to sue the original seller, which is 
why Corbino considers this to be a Justinianic addition to the original text. 
 Another reconstruction is proposed by Talamanca and Reduzzi Merola118, 
who consider that the text never dealt with a case of mancipatio by a slave in the 
first place, but rather with a traditio. According to this view, the outcome of the 
case would be basically the same which would follow from every delivery by 
                                                 
113  Lenel, Paling. (1889) I, col. 463-464 
114  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 35 n. 21; Daube, Utiliter agere (1960), p. 110; Kaser, 
Eviktionshaftung (1970), p. 481-492; Buti, Studi sulla capacità (1976), p. 97; Ankum, L’actio 
auctoritatis (1979); Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 55-60.  
115  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 35 n. 21; Kaser, Verfügungsakte (1950), p. 66-67; 
Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 7-10; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 11-16; 
Ankum, Éviction dans sous-aliénation (2002), p. 231-235. 
116  Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 103-110. 
117  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 375-376; Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare 
(1976), p. 53-60. 
118  Talamanca, Vendita (1993), p. 405 n. 1043; Reduzzi Merola, D. 21,2,39,1 (2004), p. 320-
321. 
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enim evicto homine utiliter de peculio agere poterit: sin autem 
servus decesserit, tunc domino denuntiandum est109. 
 
Two cases are described within this text. In the first part, a slave belonging to 
‘you’ (servus tuus) bought another slave – whom we can name ‘Stichus’ to avoid 
confusion110 – whom he subsequently sold to Titius. Titius then lost the 
possession over Stichus and he could not successfully recover him in court due to 
the fact that he was not made owner of him by your slave, who performed the 
traditio without your consent (sine voluntate tua). Despite this, the buyer will not 
be able to claim the responsibility arising from eviction, because he can still make 
use of the actio Publiciana, which shows moreover that the person who took 
Stichus from him was not his owner – otherwise the Publiciana would not be 
available against him. This in turn led Julian to hold that the owner of the slave 
who bought and sold Stichus without his consent would be defeated with an 
exceptio doli if he claimed responsibility from the original vendor. In the second 
case presented in the text (Alias autem…) the final buyer is actually evicted by the 
true owner, which allows him to bring an actio ex stipulatu de peculio against the 
owner of the slave who sold him Stichus. The owner of the slave will be able to 
bring against the original seller an action without the restrictions of the actio de 
peculio, i.e. in solidum. 
 The text is traditionally considered to be interpolated111. Mitteis112 stressed the 
fact that an actio Publiciana is granted despite the lack of authorization to dispose 
on behalf of the owner, which would not agree with classical Roman law. 
Therefore, he considered that the words sine voluntate tua were interpolated, 
resulting in a rather precipitate insertion (ziemlich kopflose Einschiebung). According 
to him, the original ground for the failure to transfer ownership would have read 
“quod servus tuus in mancipio proprietatem transferre non potuisset”. Mitteis seems to 
                                                 
109  D. 21,2,39,1: “Suppose that your slave has bought a slave, whom he sells to Titius, 
promising double the price in the event of eviction, while you have stipulated similarly 
from the vendor of the slave. If Titius were to claim the slave and be unsuccessful because 
your slave has not been able to transfer the ownership of the slave since he delivered it 
without your consent, the actio Publiciana remains, and so the stipulation for double will 
not become enforceable; hence also, your own vendor can defeat you with the exceptio doli 
if you sue him on the basis of the stipulation. But the situation is different if the slave has 
bought a slave and has made a stipulation for double, and subsequently sold the slave and it 
was evicted from the buyer; the owner of the slave [he who sold the other slave] will have 
action for the total amount against the seller, but the buyer will have action against the 
owner only to the extent of his peculium. The buyer must, however, give notice of the 
eviction to the slave, not to his master; for then, the eviction taking place, he can 
effectively sue to the extent of the peculium; should the slave now be dead, however, he 
can give notice to the master” (transl. Watson, modified). 
110  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 12. 
111  Levy/Rabel, Ind. Itp. (1931) II, col. 18. 
112  Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta I (1900), p. 208; Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta II (1904), p. 381; 
Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 209. 
 
have relied on Lenel’s Palingenesia113 for claiming that the text dealt originally 
with the mancipatio and not with the traditio, since the text is located under the 
rubric “De auctoritate”. The original location of the text has moreover been 
confirmed by subsequent studies, which concluded that it indeed referred to the 
mancipatio, specifically to the actio auctoritatis114. Therefore, the opinion that the 
text was interpolated was reaffirmed in the view of scholars who considered that 
the text would show that a slave could not perform the mancipatio115. Maybe the 
most representative author of this view is Ankum, who considers that the text 
would in fact be highly interpolated, firstly because the references to the stipulatio 
duplae would have been added – being unnecessary in the original text, where 
the responsibility for auctoritas derived directly from the mancipatio – and the 
indications to the emptio, venditio and traditio would originally correspond to the 
mancipatio. Moreover, the words “sine voluntate tua” would also have been added 
by Justinian, since the reference to the owner’s voluntas would make no sense in 
the original text. The compilers would have inserted this element to replace the 
original reason for losing the rei vindicatio, which would have been deleted from 
the text: the impossibility for a slave to transfer ownership through mancipatio. 
Thus, according to Ankum the reason for the failed transfer of ownership in the 
original text would have been: “quod servus tuus in mancipio dando proprietatem 
hominis transferre non potuisset”. 
 Other interpretations of the text have been brought forward. Buckland, 
Corbino and Coppola Bisazza116 agree that the text originally dealt with a case of 
mancipatio, but since they think that it was possible for a slave to mancipate they 
consider the words “sine voluntate tua” as original117. Corbino however considers 
the final words of the first case (quare venditor quoque tuus agentem te ex stipulatu 
poterit doli mali exceptione summovere) to be incompatible with this solution, since 
the owner of the slave would have no ground to sue the original seller, which is 
why Corbino considers this to be a Justinianic addition to the original text. 
 Another reconstruction is proposed by Talamanca and Reduzzi Merola118, 
who consider that the text never dealt with a case of mancipatio by a slave in the 
first place, but rather with a traditio. According to this view, the outcome of the 
case would be basically the same which would follow from every delivery by 
                                                 
113  Lenel, Paling. (1889) I, col. 463-464 
114  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 35 n. 21; Daube, Utiliter agere (1960), p. 110; Kaser, 
Eviktionshaftung (1970), p. 481-492; Buti, Studi sulla capacità (1976), p. 97; Ankum, L’actio 
auctoritatis (1979); Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 55-60.  
115  Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 35 n. 21; Kaser, Verfügungsakte (1950), p. 66-67; 
Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 7-10; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 11-16; 
Ankum, Éviction dans sous-aliénation (2002), p. 231-235. 
116  Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 103-110. 
117  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 375-376; Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare 
(1976), p. 53-60. 
118  Talamanca, Vendita (1993), p. 405 n. 1043; Reduzzi Merola, D. 21,2,39,1 (2004), p. 320-
321. 
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traditio of a res mancipi, namely that the acquirer would be able to regain the 
thing, in case he loses possession, through an actio Publiciana.  
 From the study of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner conducted so 
far, it appears that the best reconstruction of this text is to understand that it 
originally referred to the mancipatio, and that accordingly the references to the 
traditio and to the stipulatio duplae were altered in order to fit with the general 
rules regarding the transfer of ownership and eviction within the compilation. 
However, the ground for the failure in transferring ownership – the lack of 
voluntas domini – would not have been altered by the compilers, since both in the 
traditio and in the mancipatio by a non-owner it was necessary that the conveyance 
took place according to the intent of the owner. In other words, the activity of 
the compilers would have been limited to mechanical interpolations to update 
Julian’s decision. The grounds for this claim will be developed in the following 
paragraphs. 
 The first point to be considered, against those who claim that the reference to 
the voluntas domini was an addition of the compilers, is the reason for preserving 
this text within the Digest. If we assume that both in the traditio and in the 
mancipatio it was possible for an authorized non-owner to transfer ownership, we 
can understand that the text was kept by the compilers because it agreed with the 
general rules regarding traditio. If, on the other hand, the ground for the decision 
in the first case was completely different, it is hard to see why the commissioners 
would have gone throught the trouble of modifying an essential element within 
the text instead of simply leaving it out. If this text was completely alien to the 
new system, and its interpolation would result in Mitteis’ “kopflose Einschiebung”, 
why would Justinian’s commissaries have preserved it? Ankum suggests that the 
reason for this was that the compilers wanted to preserve the applications of the 
rei vindicatio of the second part of the text and they did not wish to eliminate the 
first part altogether119. This argument is however hardly convincing considering 
the freedom the compilers had to discard the material they read, as well as the 
fact that the general meaning of the second part of D. 21,2,39,1 does not suffer at 
all – at least in Justinianic terms – if the first part is discarded and we just begin 
reading the text from the words “si servus hominem emerit…”. The same objection 
can be made to the reconstruction proposed by Talamanca and Reduzzi Merola, 
since one may assume that if the compilers faced a text where the solution was 
intimately linked with the fact that a formal way of transferring ownership was 
used, they would have rather left it out instead of assigning an entirely new 
meaning to it. If one examines the texts reviewed above which were originally 
referred to a mancipatio120, we can see that although the praetorian remedies reveal 
that they dealt originally with formal ways of transferring ownership, the general 
outcome of the case – i.e. who gets to keep the disputed object – still makes 
                                                 
119  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 9-10. 
120  See in particular Chapter 4, Sections 3 and 4 above. 
 
sense and leads to a fair result in Justinianic law. Rewriting entirely the legal 
grounds for a decision seems on the other hand to go beyond the normal 
activities of the commission. 
 Another point in favour of considering that the legal basis for the decision was 
not altered is that this would explain better the way in which the events of the 
case take place. If there was indeed a prohibition to mancipate concerning slaves, 
it appears unthinkable that a slave would resort to this formal way of transferring 
ownership instead of the traditio, which would at least grant the acquirer an in 
bonis protection in case the owner consented. This general inconsistency puzzles 
Mitteis himself, who seems amazed at the fact that, despite the impossibility of 
slaves to perform the mancipatio, such transactions could nonetheless take place in 
commercial practice121. It would moreover also be unexplainable why the 
acquirer would accept to receive through mancipatio from a slave. One could only 
imagine that Titius would either be unaware of the fact that the transferor was a 
slave or that he did not know about the prohibition, which would imply that the 
text would gravitate around the problem of his bona fides. There is however no 
trace of any of these vital points, which would force us to assume that the 
modifications to the text were even deeper if the text indeed contained no 
reference to the owner’s intent. 
 The text is also better understood under the legal grounds conveyed to us 
regarding the role of the actio Publiciana. Mitteis claimed that this action had no 
role to play if the conveyance did not take place voluntate domini122, which is in 
fact inaccurate123 as shown by the analysis of D. 6,2,14 presented above124. The 
Publiciana would be especially justified in D. 21,2,39,1 if the acquirer had 
received the object in good faith and if the transferor did not have an animus 
furandi, since this would grant the acquirer a possessio ad usucapionem125. On the 
other hand, if ownership was not transferred because of the existence of a 
prohibition to dispose affecting the mancipatio by a slave, it would be most likely 
that the acquirer would not gain a possessio ad usucapionem. While this would not 
completely exclude the possibility of resorting to the Publiciana126, it is certainly 
more likely that this action was granted in the context of a possessio ad usucapionem 
than in a case of illegal alienation. Moreover, it is likely that in the eyes of 
Justinian’s commissaries, this application of the Publiciana would also hold true for 
the traditio, and consequently it would not have been unfounded to leave the text 
in its current wording. 
                                                 
121  Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 209: “Interessant ist es zu sehen, dass solche 
Sklavenmanzipationen praktisch doch unternommen wurden”.  
122  Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta II (1904), p. 381; Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 209. 
123  On the lack of ground to hold this see Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 375. 
124  Chapter 4, Section 1 above. 
125  On the possibility to resorting to the actio Publiciana when the alienation is performed a non 
domino, see moreover Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 58 n. 19. 
126  Apathy, Publiciana ohne Ersitzungsbesitz (1984), p. 749-758. 
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this text within the Digest. If we assume that both in the traditio and in the 
mancipatio it was possible for an authorized non-owner to transfer ownership, we 
can understand that the text was kept by the compilers because it agreed with the 
general rules regarding traditio. If, on the other hand, the ground for the decision 
in the first case was completely different, it is hard to see why the commissioners 
would have gone throught the trouble of modifying an essential element within 
the text instead of simply leaving it out. If this text was completely alien to the 
new system, and its interpolation would result in Mitteis’ “kopflose Einschiebung”, 
why would Justinian’s commissaries have preserved it? Ankum suggests that the 
reason for this was that the compilers wanted to preserve the applications of the 
rei vindicatio of the second part of the text and they did not wish to eliminate the 
first part altogether119. This argument is however hardly convincing considering 
the freedom the compilers had to discard the material they read, as well as the 
fact that the general meaning of the second part of D. 21,2,39,1 does not suffer at 
all – at least in Justinianic terms – if the first part is discarded and we just begin 
reading the text from the words “si servus hominem emerit…”. The same objection 
can be made to the reconstruction proposed by Talamanca and Reduzzi Merola, 
since one may assume that if the compilers faced a text where the solution was 
intimately linked with the fact that a formal way of transferring ownership was 
used, they would have rather left it out instead of assigning an entirely new 
meaning to it. If one examines the texts reviewed above which were originally 
referred to a mancipatio120, we can see that although the praetorian remedies reveal 
that they dealt originally with formal ways of transferring ownership, the general 
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sense and leads to a fair result in Justinianic law. Rewriting entirely the legal 
grounds for a decision seems on the other hand to go beyond the normal 
activities of the commission. 
 Another point in favour of considering that the legal basis for the decision was 
not altered is that this would explain better the way in which the events of the 
case take place. If there was indeed a prohibition to mancipate concerning slaves, 
it appears unthinkable that a slave would resort to this formal way of transferring 
ownership instead of the traditio, which would at least grant the acquirer an in 
bonis protection in case the owner consented. This general inconsistency puzzles 
Mitteis himself, who seems amazed at the fact that, despite the impossibility of 
slaves to perform the mancipatio, such transactions could nonetheless take place in 
commercial practice121. It would moreover also be unexplainable why the 
acquirer would accept to receive through mancipatio from a slave. One could only 
imagine that Titius would either be unaware of the fact that the transferor was a 
slave or that he did not know about the prohibition, which would imply that the 
text would gravitate around the problem of his bona fides. There is however no 
trace of any of these vital points, which would force us to assume that the 
modifications to the text were even deeper if the text indeed contained no 
reference to the owner’s intent. 
 The text is also better understood under the legal grounds conveyed to us 
regarding the role of the actio Publiciana. Mitteis claimed that this action had no 
role to play if the conveyance did not take place voluntate domini122, which is in 
fact inaccurate123 as shown by the analysis of D. 6,2,14 presented above124. The 
Publiciana would be especially justified in D. 21,2,39,1 if the acquirer had 
received the object in good faith and if the transferor did not have an animus 
furandi, since this would grant the acquirer a possessio ad usucapionem125. On the 
other hand, if ownership was not transferred because of the existence of a 
prohibition to dispose affecting the mancipatio by a slave, it would be most likely 
that the acquirer would not gain a possessio ad usucapionem. While this would not 
completely exclude the possibility of resorting to the Publiciana126, it is certainly 
more likely that this action was granted in the context of a possessio ad usucapionem 
than in a case of illegal alienation. Moreover, it is likely that in the eyes of 
Justinian’s commissaries, this application of the Publiciana would also hold true for 
the traditio, and consequently it would not have been unfounded to leave the text 
in its current wording. 
                                                 
121  Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 209: “Interessant ist es zu sehen, dass solche 
Sklavenmanzipationen praktisch doch unternommen wurden”.  
122  Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta II (1904), p. 381; Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 209. 
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124  Chapter 4, Section 1 above. 
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domino, see moreover Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 58 n. 19. 
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 It is also worth noting that the way in which the Publiciana is used by the 
acquirer is hardly understandable if we assume with Talamanca and Reduzzi 
Merola that we are simply dealing with a traditio of a res mancipi. In the first part 
of the text we are in fact told that the final acquirer, upon losing the thing, 
unsuccessfully tries to recover it, despite which he still has the Publiciana at his 
disposal. Virtually every interpreter of this text has understood that the acquirer 
first resorted to the rei vindicatio127, but that he was defeated because it was proven 
that he was not the owner. If Titius had obtained a res mancipi through traditio, it 
is almost unconceivable that he would resort to the rei vindicatio instead of the 
Publiciana, in which case the only explanation would be that he was grossly 
ignorant of the proper legal remedy he could use. On the other hand, if the 
underlying problem was the lack of voluntas domini, the chain of events is readily 
understood, since Titius would believe to have gained the iustum dominium by the 
mancipatio of the slave, but in the course of the rei vindicatio it would be proven 
that he is not the real owner because he received from an unauthorized slave and 
therefore he would be defeated. In other words, the acquirer would only become 
aware that he was not made Quiritary owner after finding out in court that he 
received from someone without potestas alienandi. It is again worth noting that 
these developments would have also made sense in the eyes of the compilers, 
which is why they preserved the case. 
 At this point it is also relevant to analyse the attempt by the master of the 
slave who bought and sold Stichus to claim the stipulatio duplae from the original 
seller. Considering that Titius was not evicted, and that ownership was not 
transferred due to the lack of potestas alienandi of his slave, it is hard to see why 
the master of the slave would attempt to claim the responsibility arising from 
eviction from the original seller. It is in any case worth noting that the failed rei 
vindicatio of Titius certainly had some consequence with regard to the master of 
the slave (‘you’), since it allowed him to sue the original seller. In the text we are 
simply told that the stipulation “will not become enforceable” (ei non committetur), 
which does not give any information concerning what will prevent it from being 
enforceable. When analysing what this implies, it should be borne in mind that: 
(1) the failure of the rei vindicatio certainly had an effect concerning the master of 
the slave; (2) the stipulatio duplae <auctoritas> bore no consequence against him on 
account of the existence of a praetorian remedy, namely the availability of the 
actio Publiciana. This would indicate that the lack of enforceability is related to the 
existence of a praetorian protection of the master of the slave, most probably a 
denegatio actionis or an exceptio. This contrast between the ius civile and ius 
honorarium would explain why the master of the slave could demand liability from 
the original seller and that this claim would not appear to be completely without 
ground, since only through an exceptio doli would the original seller avoid being 
                                                 
127  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 375; Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), 
p. 53; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 7; Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini 
(2008), p. 103. 
 
held responsible. In other words, the basic requirements to make the seller 
responsible would appear to have been met despite the fact that the final buyer 
was not evicted. The fact that this claim was valid according to the ius civile has 
troubled several authors128, and according to Corbino it would show that the text 
has an unsolvable inner contradiction129, leading him to regard it as interpolated. 
Kaser and Ankum had interpreted the text in the only way possible, i.e. that the 
actio auctoritatis would not be a Regressklage, and therefore it could be brought 
against the first seller even if the final buyer had not brought an action against 
him130. Accordingly, the circumstances described in the text would be sufficient 
to trigger the claim of responsibility based on the actio auctoritatis. The text would 
therefore show the contrast between the ius civile and the praetorian remedies, 
starting from the fact that the impossibility of the final buyer to bring an action 
against the slave’s master would be based on the existence of a praetorian remedy 
– the actio Publiciana – which would in turn imply that the ground given by the 
ius civile to bring the actio auctoritatis against the original seller would stay firm, and 
only another praetorian remedy – the exceptio doli – would keep the original 
buyer from being unfairly defeated in trial.  
 The peculiar features of the actio auctoritatis affect in no way the interpretation 
which has been offered of the text so far. Corbino only sees a contradiction 
between accepting the voluntas domini as the ground for the failed transfer of 
ownership and the existence of a claim against the first vendor because he 
considers that this last element would indicate that ownership was not transferred 
in the first place. There is however no such contradiction in the text, since the 
ground for the master of the slave to sue the original vendor is rooted exclusively 
in the nature of the actio auctoritatis. There is accordingly no need to claim that 
ownership did not pass in the first place because the original seller was not the 
owner, as Ankum and Reduzzi Merola assume131, since the first case can be 
sufficiently understood if the underlying problem is exclusively the lack of 
authorization to mancipate the slave. The lack of ownership of the original 
vendor only plays a role in the second case of D. 21,2,39,1, and it is in fact the 
element which triggers a successful claim from the final acquirer – who is actually 
evicted, unlike the first case – against the master’s slave, and from the latter 
against the first seller. It is moreover worth noting that the text in this way 
should have made sense to the compilers, which would explain why they kept it 
within the compilation. The only odd feature would be the fact that the master 
of the slave (‘you’) would be able to claim responsibility in the first case against 
                                                 
128  See e.g. Girard, Actio auctoritatis (1923), p. 224 n. 1; Daube, Utiliter agere (1960), p. 111 ff. 
129  Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 55-56. 
130  Kaser, Eviktionshaftung (1970), p. 481 ff.; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 7 n. 48; 
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131  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 14-15; Reduzzi Merola, D. 21,2,39,1 (2004), 
p. 320. 
MANCIPATIO BY A SLAVE
249
 
246 
 It is also worth noting that the way in which the Publiciana is used by the 
acquirer is hardly understandable if we assume with Talamanca and Reduzzi 
Merola that we are simply dealing with a traditio of a res mancipi. In the first part 
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considers that this last element would indicate that ownership was not transferred 
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ground for the master of the slave to sue the original vendor is rooted exclusively 
in the nature of the actio auctoritatis. There is accordingly no need to claim that 
ownership did not pass in the first place because the original seller was not the 
owner, as Ankum and Reduzzi Merola assume131, since the first case can be 
sufficiently understood if the underlying problem is exclusively the lack of 
authorization to mancipate the slave. The lack of ownership of the original 
vendor only plays a role in the second case of D. 21,2,39,1, and it is in fact the 
element which triggers a successful claim from the final acquirer – who is actually 
evicted, unlike the first case – against the master’s slave, and from the latter 
against the first seller. It is moreover worth noting that the text in this way 
should have made sense to the compilers, which would explain why they kept it 
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128  See e.g. Girard, Actio auctoritatis (1923), p. 224 n. 1; Daube, Utiliter agere (1960), p. 111 ff. 
129  Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 55-56. 
130  Kaser, Eviktionshaftung (1970), p. 481 ff.; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 7 n. 48; 
Ankum, L’actio auctoritatis (1979), p. 31, 38-40; Ankum, Repromissio e satisdatio (1981), 
p. 776. 
131  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 14-15; Reduzzi Merola, D. 21,2,39,1 (2004), 
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the original seller, but this may be easily explained if the compilers assumed that 
Titius managed to hold the master of the slave liable in the first place if the 
availability of the Publiciana was not taken into account.  
 A final issue regarding D. 21,2,39,1 concerns the relationship between the 
two cases presented in this fragment. As was shown before, in the second case the 
buyer is evicted, and consequently Julian shows which actions will be available to 
the buyer against the master of the slave who sold him Stichus, and to the master 
of the slave against the original seller. Ankum claimed that this second case would 
confirm that the problem discussed is the prohibition to mancipate by a slave132. 
According to him, in this case the slave would have acquired ownership through 
a mancipatio and would have subsequently transferred ownership through traditio. 
In order to hold this, Ankum considers that the first reference to the stipulatio 
duplae would have been added by the compilers, but that the reference to the 
subsequent sale would be original, and would not refer to a mancipatio. 
Accordingly, he offers the following reconstruction: “alias autem si servus hominem 
emerit [et duplam stipuletur] <et mancipio acceperit>, deinde eum vendiderit et ab emptore 
evictus fuerit: domino quidem adversus venditorem in solidum competebit actio, emptori 
vero adversus dominium dumtaxat de peculio”133. The author claims therefore that the 
first part of D. 21,2,39,1 could not have been referred to the problem of the 
voluntas domini, since if that was the case this would have been mentioned in the 
second part. 
 However, the link between both cases as proposed by Ankum cannot be 
accepted. First of all, his reconstruction of the text is rather artificial from the 
moment that he selects which sections originally referred to a mancipatio and 
which to a traditio. Furthermore, he attempts to show that the underlying 
problem throughout the text was the prohibition to mancipate for a slave. It is 
clear that the real issue addressed in this text is to determine which actiones can be 
brought against the original seller and against the master of the slave. If this was 
not the case and the whole text was simply intended to show the different 
consequences of a mancipatio and a traditio performed by a slave, the reference to 
the original seller would be completely out of place. The contrast between the 
first and the second case would be to emphasize what would happen if the final 
buyer was actually evicted: in the first case, since he was not evicted and still had 
the actio Publiciana, he could not hold the master of the slave responsible for the 
eviction, and consequently the master of the slave could not successfully sue the 
original seller. In the second case, Julian expressly shows that the final buyer was 
evicted, and therefore presents the actiones which can be brought against the 
master of the slave and against the original seller.  
 The question of whether the slave acted with or without his master’s intent is 
completely irrelevant in the second case.  Ankum  wrongfully claims that the actio 
                                                 
132  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 8-9; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 13. 
133  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1984), p. 12. 
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de peculio against ‘you’ necessarily implies that the slave was authorized to sell on 
account of having the libera administratio peculii134, since the concessio peculii did not 
necessarily involve a libera administratio135. Moreover, the actio de peculio could be 
brought against the owner merely on account of the fact that a person alieni iuris 
conducted business within his peculium, regardless  of  the  owner’s  knowledge or 
authorization136. The central element within the case is rather that the final seller 
was evicted, which would show that the original seller was not the owner of the 
slave in the first place. This would also explain why the first part of the text only 
mentions, in the motivation of the decision, the fact that the slave performed the 
mancipatio without the owner’s intent, which seems so disturbing for Ankum137: 
the lack of the owner’s intention is not the central problem within the general 
picture. Julian’s main concern is to determine how and when could the 
responsibility for eviction be brought against the first and the second seller. 
 The evidence presented above shows that it is most likely that D. 21,2,39,1 
originally referred to a mancipatio performed without the owner’s authorization 
than to a general prohibition to mancipate imposed on slaves138, granting thereby 
conclusive evidence concerning the possibility of slaves to perform the mancipatio 
and showing that the rules for the potestas alienandi in this case would be very 
similar to those governing the transfer of ownership by traditio139. 
 
4. Mancipatio by a curator furiosi or tutor impuberis 
 
While scholars have intensely debated whether a slave could mancipate, there has 
been less discussion concerning the mancipatio by legal guardians. The reason for 
this is that there are several texts in the sources which show legal guardians as 
generally capable of validly transferring ownership over any of the owner’s assets, 
particularly in the case of the curator furiosi140. Nonetheless, the acceptance of a 
mancipatio by a non-owner seemed to go against the general notions regarding the 
evolution of direct representation which dominated Roman law scholarship since 
the 19th century. It is no wonder that in this context, the most comprehensive 
view on the subject would be provided by Mitteis, who denied that a tutor or a 
curator could mancipate. In the case of the tutor, Mitteis gathers various scattered 
texts which could be seen – if the interpolations he claims to identify indeed took 
                                                 
134  See on this point Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini (2008), p. 110 n. 44. 
135  See Chapter 1, Section 4(b) above. 
136  See Gai 4,72a: “… Licet enim negotium ita gestum sit cum filio servove, ut neque 
voluntas neque consensus patris dominive intervenerit, si quid tamen ex ea re, quae cum 
illis gesta est, in rem patris dominive versum sit, quatenus in rem eius versum fuerit, 
eatenus datur actio…” 
137  Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), p. 9. 
138  Buckland, Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 377. 
139  Corbino, Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 70-71. 
140  See e.g. Gai 2,64; D. 40,1,13 (Pomp. 1 ex Plautio); D. 27,10,17 (Gai. 1 de manumissionibus); 
D. 47,2,57,4 (Jul. 22 dig.). 
 
place – as showing a general prohibition to mancipate141. Regarding the curator 
furiosi, since not even the best goodwill could provide a similar evidence, Mitteis 
indicates that we would be facing an apparent exception to the general rule that 
no non-owner could mancipate, since in fact the curator would hold a quasi-
dominical power (quasi-dominikale Gewalt) which would enable him to alienate 
the lunatic’s property142. 
 The ideas of Mitteis regarding the powers by the curator were seen as 
satisfactory by most scholars143, despite the fact that they barely have any support 
in the sources144. It is in fact likely that scholars admitted this view because it 
preserved the traditional interpretation of the evolution of direct representation 
in pre-classical Roman law, but the lack of evidence on the subject has inevitably 
led some scholars such as Diliberto, who refutes the traditional ideas on several 
points, to accept that the curator furiosi transferred ownership as a non-owner145. It 
would therefore appear that no solid evidence stands in the way of accepting the 
mancipatio by a curator furiosi. However, after discarding that the curator furiosi 
would be owner of the administered goods, Diliberto himself claimed that he 
probably could not perform the mancipatio because he could not alienate res 
mancipi on account of their importance and value146. This author presents no 
evidence to confirm such a statement, and he appears to be rather adventurous 
when claiming the existence of this prohibition to mancipate, considering that 
the doctrine before him agreed that that the curator furiosi could mancipate, 
differing only on the ground on which he could do so. Therefore, it seems more 
faithful to the sources to simply admit that there is no positive evidence regarding 
the existence of a prohibition to mancipate, and that the curator furiosi did act as a 
non-owner when transferring ownership.  
 The idea of a ‘quasi-dominical power’ was also applied by scholars to other 
legal guardians, such as the curator prodigi147 or the tutor impuberum148. This has led 
to a rather confusing approach regarding the mancipatio by a tutor, which was 
originally denied by Mitteis149, being later accepted by some authors under the 
                                                 
141  Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 209 n. 19. 
142  Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 210. 
143  See e.g. Kniep, Gai Institutionum (1912) II, p. 236-237; Siber, Verwaltungsrecht (1917), 
p. 83-84; Siber, Römisches Recht (1928) II, p. 413; Guarino, Notazioni IV-V (1949), p. 194-
198; Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 168-169; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 14-
15; Rabel, Grundzüge (1955), p. 185; Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 78. 
144  See Chapter 3, Section 4 above. 
145  Diliberto, Cura furiosi (1984), p. 88. See moreover Albanese, Atti negoziali (1982), p. 355. 
146  Diliberto, Cura furiosi (1984), p. 102. 
147  Guarino, Notazioni IV-V (1949), p. 194-198. 
148  Siber, Verwaltungsrecht (1917), p. 83; Arangio-Ruiz, Erede e tutore (1946 [1930]), p. 149-
167; Levy-Bruhl, La tutelle (1948), p. 318-323. See for further literature Kaser, Ehe und 
conventio (1950), p. 91 n. 79. 
149  Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta I (1900), p. 209; Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 209 
n. 17. 
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idea that the tutor acted as a dominus150, while others simply admitted that the tutor 
as such could mancipate151. Kübler, for instance, claimed that the tutor was not 
included among the cases mentioned in Gai 2,64 because all of the individuals 
mentioned in this text were non domini, while the tutor would actually act in the 
capacity of an owner152. This point has already been discussed above153, where it 
was shown that legal guardians should not be considered as having ownership 
over the administered goods. It is enough to point out here that the ideas of 
Mitteis concerning an impossibility to mancipate had few followers154, but an 
article of Bund155 revived the controversy on this subject. This author 
acknowledges that there is no clear evidence on the point156 and considers the 
arguments given against and in favour of the prohibition for the tutor to 
mancipate to be inconclusive157, regarding however the following text to be key 
in solving the controversy158: 
 
D. 47,2,57,4 (Jul. 22 dig.): Qui tutelam gerit, transigere cum fure 
potest et, si in potestatem suam redegerit rem furtivam, desinit 
furtiva esse, quia tutor domini loco habetur. Sed et circa curatorem 
furiosi eadem dicenda sunt, qui adeo personam domini sustinet, ut 
etiam tradendo rem furiosi alienare existimetur. Condicere autem 
rem furtivam tutor et curator furiosi eorum nomine possunt159. 
 
The text deals with the reversio in potestatem of stolen objects, which implies that 
they cannot longer be considered res furtivae. When the owner of the goods has 
an appointed legal guardian, this reversio takes place through the tutor or curator, 
since they are considered to act loco domini. According to Bund, the text shows 
                                                 
150  Burdese, Lex commissoria (1949), p. 169; Burdese, Autorizzazione (1950), p. 14-15; Weimar, 
Eigentumsübergang (1993), p. 551. Bund, Veräusserungsbefugnis (1962), p. 159 explicitly 
avoids going into this problem. 
151  Sachers, Tutela (1948), p. 1548. 
152  Kübler, Vormundschaftliche Gewalt (1939), p. 83. 
153  Chapter 3, Section 4 above. 
154  E.g. Siber, Römisches Recht (1928) II, p. 316. Among the recent scholarship see Guzmán, 
DPR (2013) I, p. 428. 
155  Bund, Veräusserungsbefugnis (1962), p. 157-164. 
156  Bund, Veräusserungsbefugnis (1962), p. 159-160: “Soweit ersichtlich, berichten die 
römischen Rechtsquellen nirgends eindeutig über eine Manzipation von Mündelsachen 
durch den Vormund”. 
157  Bund, Veräusserungsbefugnis (1962), p. 163: “Eine Abwägung der geschilderten Gründe und 
Gegengründe mag den Autoren Recht geben, die die von Mitteis angeführten Gründe 
nicht für überzeugend, aber auch das Gegenteil nicht für erwiesen halten”. 
158  Bund, Veräusserungsbefugnis (1962), p. 164. 
159  D. 47,2,57,4: “An administering tutor can make a transactio with the thief, and if he 
recovers the stolen thing into his control, it is no longer a stolen thing; for a tutor is in the 
position of an owner. The same must be said regarding the curator of a lunatic, who so far 
has the role of an owner that even by delivering a thing belonging to the lunatic he is 
deemed to alienate it. A tutor and the curator of a lunatic can also bring a condictio for stolen 
goods in the name of the pupillus or lunatic” (transl. Watson, modified). 
 
that the curator furiosi has greater powers regarding the lunatic than the tutor has 
with regard to the ward, as the words ‘adeo’ and ‘etiam’ would show. In other 
words, Julian would be indicating that the curator can assume even greater powers 
than the tutor with regard to the administered goods. However, the text would 
oddly indicate that, while having greater powers than the tutor, the curator can 
perform the traditio, which would not actually imply having greater powers 
considering that the tutor can also transfer ownership through traditio. Following 
this idea, Bund considers that the only way to make sense of the text is to 
consider “tradendo” as interpolated, while the original text would have read 
“mancipando”, as the Index Interpolationum160 shows following the indication of 
Lenel161. According to Bund this correction allows to properly understand the 
text in the sense that Julian would claim that the curator furiosi has even more 
powers than the tutor since he can even transfer ownership by mancipatio, which 
would indirectly show that the tutor did not have this power. 
 One can hardly share the enthusiasm of Bund regarding the significance of 
this text. Concerning the possibility of interpolations, there are no elements 
which can lead to a definitive answer on the subject, apart from the fact that 
Julian is clearly trying to make a statement of the kind “the curator has such 
powers that he can even…”. This statement would be more emphatic if referred 
to the mancipatio, but one can only guess here. Even if one were to accept this 
interpolation, it is by no means clear that Julian is using an argument a maiore ad 
minus, as Bund claims. On the contrary, after indicating that the tutor is regarded 
as acting domini loco, Julian points out that “the same must be said regarding the 
curator of a lunatic” (Sed et circa curatorem furiosi eadem dicenda sunt), putting both 
cases on an equal level. The subsequent consecutive clause “adeo… ut etiam…” 
cannot either be seen as emphasizing a difference with regard to the tutor162, but 
simply stresses that the curator furiosi is to such an extent regarded as acting domini 
loco that he can even transfer ownership, which is basically the most invasive act 
one can carry out regarding other person’s patrimony. That no fundamental 
difference between the tutor and the curator is implied at this point is also to be 
seen from the closing sentence of the text, which again sets both types of legal 
guardians on the same level when discussing the condictio of stolen goods. 
 The analysis of the sources certainly produces very little evidence concerning 
the existence of a prohibition to mancipate affecting the tutor, which may explain 
why most scholars prefer to offer an alternative legal basis for this alienation in 
order to avoid acknowledging a case of direct representation – namely by 
claiming that the tutor would actually be owner of the administered goods – than 
to defend the existence of a prohibition to dispose. There is in fact no support in 
the sources for the idea of a prohibition to mancipate affecting the legal 
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idea that the tutor acted as a dominus150, while others simply admitted that the tutor 
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capacity of an owner152. This point has already been discussed above153, where it 
was shown that legal guardians should not be considered as having ownership 
over the administered goods. It is enough to point out here that the ideas of 
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rem furtivam tutor et curator furiosi eorum nomine possunt159. 
 
The text deals with the reversio in potestatem of stolen objects, which implies that 
they cannot longer be considered res furtivae. When the owner of the goods has 
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152  Kübler, Vormundschaftliche Gewalt (1939), p. 83. 
153  Chapter 3, Section 4 above. 
154  E.g. Siber, Römisches Recht (1928) II, p. 316. Among the recent scholarship see Guzmán, 
DPR (2013) I, p. 428. 
155  Bund, Veräusserungsbefugnis (1962), p. 157-164. 
156  Bund, Veräusserungsbefugnis (1962), p. 159-160: “Soweit ersichtlich, berichten die 
römischen Rechtsquellen nirgends eindeutig über eine Manzipation von Mündelsachen 
durch den Vormund”. 
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158  Bund, Veräusserungsbefugnis (1962), p. 164. 
159  D. 47,2,57,4: “An administering tutor can make a transactio with the thief, and if he 
recovers the stolen thing into his control, it is no longer a stolen thing; for a tutor is in the 
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difference between the tutor and the curator is implied at this point is also to be 
seen from the closing sentence of the text, which again sets both types of legal 
guardians on the same level when discussing the condictio of stolen goods. 
 The analysis of the sources certainly produces very little evidence concerning 
the existence of a prohibition to mancipate affecting the tutor, which may explain 
why most scholars prefer to offer an alternative legal basis for this alienation in 
order to avoid acknowledging a case of direct representation – namely by 
claiming that the tutor would actually be owner of the administered goods – than 
to defend the existence of a prohibition to dispose. There is in fact no support in 
the sources for the idea of a prohibition to mancipate affecting the legal 
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guardians, and in fact this notion even seems to contradict the evidence we have. 
This is particularly the case regarding the prohibition of the oratio Severi163, which 
aimed at restricting the alienations done by legal guardians over rustic or 
suburban properties – i.e. res mancipi – and which to a great extent would have 
been superfluous if legal guardians were not allowed to resort to formal ways of 
transferring ownership in the first place, as pointed out by Kübler164. This author 
also points out that the wording of the oratio is very general, resorting to words 
such as “distrahere” and “alienare” (D. 27,9,1,1) which seem to cover any mode of 
transferring ownership165. It therefore seems that this was the first restriction of 
the kind regarding the alienation of land, and that before that time legal guardians 
faced no general restriction on the subject. Moreover, it would be almost 
inconceivable that legal guardians could not perform the mancipatio throughout 
the pre-classical and classical periods. This circumstance is stressed by Kübler 
when claiming that the tutor most certainly was able to mancipate in Roman law, 
because the buyer would not have settled for a mere bonitary ownership166. Bund 
discards this objection rather lightly by pointing out that it is not completely clear 
how relevant the mancipatio was during the Principate167, claiming moreover that 
the alienation of res mancipi such as land would not normally be consistent with 
the diligent administration of the ward’s affairs168. None of these arguments are 
particularly convincing. First of all, it is undeniable that at some stage it must 
have been indeed unacceptable for the acquirer not to be made Quiritary owner, 
particularly before the praetorian remedies that granted the bonitary ownership to 
the acquirer were fully consolidated. Moreover, one could expect that the 
alienation of some res mancipi could fall within a normal administration of the 
tutor – particularly regarding slaves and draft animals – and that even the 
alienation of goods such as immovable property could occasionally be 
unavoidable, as shown by the fact that they could be authorized in particular 
cases following the rules of the oratio Severi. 
 Next to the lack of evidence in the sources to support a prohibition to 
mancipate affecting legal guardians, it is worth pointing out that the original 
ground that modern scholars had in mind to hold that prohibition – namely the 
existence of a prohibition of direct representation – has gradually fallen out of the 
picture, similarly to what happened regarding the problem of the mancipatio by 
slaves. For instance, already Bund had left the problem of the ground of the 
prohibition outside the discussion, which is no minor void within his analysis of 
this subject. The discussion on the possibility of legal guardians to mancipate 
seems therefore to drag on even after the general idea which inspired a negative 
                                                 
163  D. 27,9,1pr-2 (Ulp. 35 ed.). 
164  Kübler, Vormundschaftliche Gewalt (1939), p. 83. 
165  Kübler, Vormundschaftliche Gewalt (1939), p. 83. 
166  Kübler, Vormundschaftliche Gewalt (1939), p. 83. 
167  Bund, Veräusserungsbefugnis (1962), p. 162-163. 
168  Bund, Veräusserungsbefugnis (1962), p. 163 n. 21. 
 
answer has lost most of its strength. The same concerns those theories which hold 
that legal guardians would have some kind of ownership over the administered 
goods. It seems therefore convenient to discard these notions as remnants of the 
dogmatic ideas concerning the possibility of a non-owner to act as ‘direct 
representative’, which do not find a solid ground in the sources.  
 
5. In iure cessio and manumissio vindicta by a non-owner 
 
The problem of whether a non-owner may perform an in iure cessio has not been 
nearly as controversial as that of the mancipatio by a non-owner. The reason for 
this is that there is a clear rule which seems to govern this subject, namely the 
regula iuris “Nemo alieno nomine lege agere potest”169 of D. 50,17,123pr (Ulp. 14 ed.), 
an idea which is also found in Gai 4,82. As shown above170, this text originally 
referred to the legis actiones, and since the in iure cessio was modelled after a legis 
actio sacramento in rem it would seem impossible for a non-owner to transfer 
ownership through this mechanism. The same can be said concerning the 
manumissio vindicta, considering that it was modelled after the in iure cessio. 
Accordingly, most scholars have assumed that the limitations of procedural 
representation in the legis actiones excluded the possibility that a non-owner may 
perform the in iure cessio or the manumissio vindicta171. 
 Despite the soundness of the explanation shared by most scholars, the sources 
offer conflicting evidence on the subject, particularly regarding the manumissio 
vindicta. It is in fact possible to find a significant number of texts in which a son-
in-power manumits a slave through this mechanism by following the instruction 
of his father, among which one may list: D. 37,14,13; D. 38,2,22; D. 40,1,7; 
D. 40,1,16; D. 40,1,22; D. 40,2,4pr.; D. 40,2,10; D. 40,2,18,2; D. 40,2,22; 
D. 40,9,15,1; D. 49,17,6; PS 1,13a; C. 7,15,1,3. This would seem to indicate 
that, just as it happens in other cases of patrimonial loss, the owner directly loses 
his ownership over the slave if the non-owner acts voluntate domini. In the eyes of 
a scholar like Mitteis, however, accepting the validity of such texts would imply 
acknowledging a clear case of direct representation over an act of the ius civile, 
which was completely inadmissible within his general theory on the subject. This 
is why Mitteis dedicated two articles to analysing the different cases in which a 
son-in-power appeared performing the manumissio vindicta. In them, he claimed 
that every single one of these texts had undergone some form of interpolation or 
                                                 
169  D. 50,17,123pr: “No one can legally act on behalf of another” (transl. Watson). 
170  Chapter 1, Section 1 above. 
171  Mühlenbruch, Cession (1836), p. 42-43 n. 69; Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 208; 
Kaser, Verfügungsakte (1950), p. 67; Kaser, RPR (1971) I, p. 267 and 286; Hernanz, Iussum 
(1993), p. 72; Andrés Santos, Subrogación real (1997), p. 190. Regarding slaves in particular 
see: Buckland, Slavery (1908), p. 159; Devilla, In iure cessio (1962), p. 703; Corbino, 
Leggitimazione a mancipare (1976), p. 60 n. 21; p. 61; Ankum, Mancipatio by slaves (1978), 
p. 3 
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transferring ownership in the first place, as pointed out by Kübler164. This author 
also points out that the wording of the oratio is very general, resorting to words 
such as “distrahere” and “alienare” (D. 27,9,1,1) which seem to cover any mode of 
transferring ownership165. It therefore seems that this was the first restriction of 
the kind regarding the alienation of land, and that before that time legal guardians 
faced no general restriction on the subject. Moreover, it would be almost 
inconceivable that legal guardians could not perform the mancipatio throughout 
the pre-classical and classical periods. This circumstance is stressed by Kübler 
when claiming that the tutor most certainly was able to mancipate in Roman law, 
because the buyer would not have settled for a mere bonitary ownership166. Bund 
discards this objection rather lightly by pointing out that it is not completely clear 
how relevant the mancipatio was during the Principate167, claiming moreover that 
the alienation of res mancipi such as land would not normally be consistent with 
the diligent administration of the ward’s affairs168. None of these arguments are 
particularly convincing. First of all, it is undeniable that at some stage it must 
have been indeed unacceptable for the acquirer not to be made Quiritary owner, 
particularly before the praetorian remedies that granted the bonitary ownership to 
the acquirer were fully consolidated. Moreover, one could expect that the 
alienation of some res mancipi could fall within a normal administration of the 
tutor – particularly regarding slaves and draft animals – and that even the 
alienation of goods such as immovable property could occasionally be 
unavoidable, as shown by the fact that they could be authorized in particular 
cases following the rules of the oratio Severi. 
 Next to the lack of evidence in the sources to support a prohibition to 
mancipate affecting legal guardians, it is worth pointing out that the original 
ground that modern scholars had in mind to hold that prohibition – namely the 
existence of a prohibition of direct representation – has gradually fallen out of the 
picture, similarly to what happened regarding the problem of the mancipatio by 
slaves. For instance, already Bund had left the problem of the ground of the 
prohibition outside the discussion, which is no minor void within his analysis of 
this subject. The discussion on the possibility of legal guardians to mancipate 
seems therefore to drag on even after the general idea which inspired a negative 
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representative’, which do not find a solid ground in the sources.  
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nearly as controversial as that of the mancipatio by a non-owner. The reason for 
this is that there is a clear rule which seems to govern this subject, namely the 
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referred to the legis actiones, and since the in iure cessio was modelled after a legis 
actio sacramento in rem it would seem impossible for a non-owner to transfer 
ownership through this mechanism. The same can be said concerning the 
manumissio vindicta, considering that it was modelled after the in iure cessio. 
Accordingly, most scholars have assumed that the limitations of procedural 
representation in the legis actiones excluded the possibility that a non-owner may 
perform the in iure cessio or the manumissio vindicta171. 
 Despite the soundness of the explanation shared by most scholars, the sources 
offer conflicting evidence on the subject, particularly regarding the manumissio 
vindicta. It is in fact possible to find a significant number of texts in which a son-
in-power manumits a slave through this mechanism by following the instruction 
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that, just as it happens in other cases of patrimonial loss, the owner directly loses 
his ownership over the slave if the non-owner acts voluntate domini. In the eyes of 
a scholar like Mitteis, however, accepting the validity of such texts would imply 
acknowledging a clear case of direct representation over an act of the ius civile, 
which was completely inadmissible within his general theory on the subject. This 
is why Mitteis dedicated two articles to analysing the different cases in which a 
son-in-power appeared performing the manumissio vindicta. In them, he claimed 
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did not originally refer to the manumissio vindicta172. This reconstruction was not 
considered convincing by Buckland, who soon offered a refutation to it173. This 
author showed that in most cases the allegations of Mitteis had no ground and 
that there was moreover no evidence whatsoever to support the idea of an 
impossibility of the son-in-power to carry out the manumissio vindicta. Moreover, 
he considers that the sources are so consistent on this point that it is not possible 
to assume the existence of a systematic interpolation. Being aware of the fact that 
Mitteis is fighting the manumissio vindicta by a filius in order to exclude direct 
representation from Roman law, Buckland points out that one should not grant 
such significance to this problem. Instead, according to him, one should view this 
case as a mere exception based on the favor libertatis, allowing something which 
would normally be inadmissible174. According to Kaser this element played an 
important role, but he considers that a filius could perform the manumissio vindicta 
already in classical times because jurists no longer treated this institution as a legis 
actio, and therefore they allowed something which would be unconceivable in 
the ancient procedure175. 
 The conflicting cases are however not limited to the manumissio vindicta by a 
son-in-power. For instance, the above-quoted text of D. 27,10,17176, which 
discusses the attributions of the curator furiosi, was located according to Lenel’s 
Palingenesia under the rubric “Qui vindicta manumittere manumittique possint”177. 
This text denies the possibility for the curator furiosi to perform the manumissio 
(vindicta), for which a very specific ground is given, namely that it would fall 
outside his administratio. This shows that the impossibility mentioned in this case 
cannot be extended to any other non-owner. Moreover, the text as conveyed by 
Justinian discusses afterwards the validity of the traditio by the curator, but since the 
text originally discussed the manumissio vindicta Lenel conjectured that it initially 
made reference to the in iure cessio178. This would imply that the curator would be 
able to transfer ownership by in iure cessio when conducting the administratio of 
the lunatic’s affairs. Mitteis considers this claim to be so uncertain that is not even 
                                                 
172  Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta I (1900); Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta II (1904); Mitteis, 
Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 211 n. 23. 
173  Buckland, Manumissio vindicta (1903), p. 737-744; Buckland, Slavery (1908), p. 718-723. 
174  Buckland, Slavery (1908), p. 723: “I venture to suggest that Professor Mitteis in studying 
these texts is giving them an importance they do not deserve in relation to his general 
theory. He has shewn us how inadmissible the idea of representation in formal acts was to 
the classical lawyer. But the foregoing chapters shew that favor libertatis led to the doing of 
things, the acceptance of interpretations, and the laying down of rules, quite inadmissible 
in other branches of the law”. 
175  Kaser, Verfügungsakte (1950), p. 78 ff. 
176  D. 27,10,17 (Gai. 1 de manumissionibus): “Curator furiosi nullo modo libertatem praestare 
potest, quod ea res ex administratione non est: nam in tradendo ita res furiosi alienat, si id 
ad administrationem negotiorum pertineat: et ideo si donandi causa alienet, neque traditio 
quicquam valebit, nisi ex magna utilitate furiosi hoc cognitione iudicis faciat”. See Chapter 
3, Section 2 above. 
177  Lenel, Paling. (1889) I, col. 250. 
178  Lenel, Paling. (1889) I, col. 250 n. 1 and 2. 
 
worth discussing it, pointing out moreover that it should be borne in mind that 
the curator furiosi would have a ‘quasi-dominical power’179. This hasty and 
unfounded rejection of Lenel’s claim shows that Mitteis relies more on his own 
preconceptions regarding the evolution of direct representation in Roman law 
than in the sources, excluding at any rate the possibility to transfer ownership 
through formal acts. 
 There are other cases in which it seems likely that a non-owner may affect 
the position of the owner through an in iure cessio, which can be seen regarding 
the in iure cessio servitutis. This becomes clear when studying the 53rd book of 
Ulpian’s ad Edictum, where Lenel locates the following text under the rubric De 
aqua180: 
 
D. 50,17,165 (Ulp. 53 ed.): Cum quis possit alienare, poterit et 
consentire alienationi. Cui autem donare non conceditur, 
probandum erit nec, si donationis causa consenserit, ratam eius 
voluntatem habendam181. 
 
The text has been studied above, among the evidence that the transfer of 
ownership voluntate domini is put by Roman jurists on the same level as the 
transfer of ownership by the owner himself182. The original location of the 
fragment appears moreover to give an additional piece of information, namely 
that we are dealing with a formal act, which will be the in iure cessio183 if the right 
to carry water is granted over urban property184. The text is moreover closely 
linked to other fragments located under this rubric, according to which the 
owner of the lands that will be affected by the servitude must give his consent 
(voluntas) when this right is granted185. Other rules are given on the subject 
within the same title, which agree with those that have been studied above 
concerning the voluntas domini for the transfer of ownership: if there are many co-
                                                 
179  Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 211 n. 23. See on this notion Chapter 3, Section 4 
and Chapter 5, Section 4 above. 
180  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 752. 
181  D. 50,17,165: “Anyone who can alienate can also consent to alienation. Anyone who is 
not allowed to give must prove his case, and if he grants it for the sake of giving, his 
intention is not to be regarded as valid” (transl. Watson). 
182  Chapter 2, Section 1(a) above. 
183  Lenel, EP (1927), p. 373 considers that this title dealt with the constitution through in iure 
cessio of the servitus aquae ductus. 
184  If the right is granted over rustic land the constitution may also take place through a 
mancipatio, as shown in Gai 2,29: “Sed iura praediorum urbanorum in iure cedi tantum 
possunt; rusticorum vero etiam mancipari possunt”.  
185  D. 39,3,8 (Ulp. 53 ed.): “In concedendo iure aquae ducendae non tantum eorum, in 
quorum loco aqua oritur, verum eorum etiam, ad quos eius aquae usus pertinet, voluntas 
exquiritur, id est eorum, quibus servitus aquae debebatur, nec immerito: cum enim 
minuitur ius eorum, consequens fuit exquiri, an consentiant. Et generaliter sive in corpore 
sive in iure loci, ubi aqua oritur, vel in ipsa aqua habeat quis ius, voluntatem eius esse 
spectandam placet”. 
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important role, but he considers that a filius could perform the manumissio vindicta 
already in classical times because jurists no longer treated this institution as a legis 
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(vindicta), for which a very specific ground is given, namely that it would fall 
outside his administratio. This shows that the impossibility mentioned in this case 
cannot be extended to any other non-owner. Moreover, the text as conveyed by 
Justinian discusses afterwards the validity of the traditio by the curator, but since the 
text originally discussed the manumissio vindicta Lenel conjectured that it initially 
made reference to the in iure cessio178. This would imply that the curator would be 
able to transfer ownership by in iure cessio when conducting the administratio of 
the lunatic’s affairs. Mitteis considers this claim to be so uncertain that is not even 
                                                 
172  Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta I (1900); Mitteis, Manumissio vindicta II (1904); Mitteis, 
Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 211 n. 23. 
173  Buckland, Manumissio vindicta (1903), p. 737-744; Buckland, Slavery (1908), p. 718-723. 
174  Buckland, Slavery (1908), p. 723: “I venture to suggest that Professor Mitteis in studying 
these texts is giving them an importance they do not deserve in relation to his general 
theory. He has shewn us how inadmissible the idea of representation in formal acts was to 
the classical lawyer. But the foregoing chapters shew that favor libertatis led to the doing of 
things, the acceptance of interpretations, and the laying down of rules, quite inadmissible 
in other branches of the law”. 
175  Kaser, Verfügungsakte (1950), p. 78 ff. 
176  D. 27,10,17 (Gai. 1 de manumissionibus): “Curator furiosi nullo modo libertatem praestare 
potest, quod ea res ex administratione non est: nam in tradendo ita res furiosi alienat, si id 
ad administrationem negotiorum pertineat: et ideo si donandi causa alienet, neque traditio 
quicquam valebit, nisi ex magna utilitate furiosi hoc cognitione iudicis faciat”. See Chapter 
3, Section 2 above. 
177  Lenel, Paling. (1889) I, col. 250. 
178  Lenel, Paling. (1889) I, col. 250 n. 1 and 2. 
 
worth discussing it, pointing out moreover that it should be borne in mind that 
the curator furiosi would have a ‘quasi-dominical power’179. This hasty and 
unfounded rejection of Lenel’s claim shows that Mitteis relies more on his own 
preconceptions regarding the evolution of direct representation in Roman law 
than in the sources, excluding at any rate the possibility to transfer ownership 
through formal acts. 
 There are other cases in which it seems likely that a non-owner may affect 
the position of the owner through an in iure cessio, which can be seen regarding 
the in iure cessio servitutis. This becomes clear when studying the 53rd book of 
Ulpian’s ad Edictum, where Lenel locates the following text under the rubric De 
aqua180: 
 
D. 50,17,165 (Ulp. 53 ed.): Cum quis possit alienare, poterit et 
consentire alienationi. Cui autem donare non conceditur, 
probandum erit nec, si donationis causa consenserit, ratam eius 
voluntatem habendam181. 
 
The text has been studied above, among the evidence that the transfer of 
ownership voluntate domini is put by Roman jurists on the same level as the 
transfer of ownership by the owner himself182. The original location of the 
fragment appears moreover to give an additional piece of information, namely 
that we are dealing with a formal act, which will be the in iure cessio183 if the right 
to carry water is granted over urban property184. The text is moreover closely 
linked to other fragments located under this rubric, according to which the 
owner of the lands that will be affected by the servitude must give his consent 
(voluntas) when this right is granted185. Other rules are given on the subject 
within the same title, which agree with those that have been studied above 
concerning the voluntas domini for the transfer of ownership: if there are many co-
                                                 
179  Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 211 n. 23. See on this notion Chapter 3, Section 4 
and Chapter 5, Section 4 above. 
180  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 752. 
181  D. 50,17,165: “Anyone who can alienate can also consent to alienation. Anyone who is 
not allowed to give must prove his case, and if he grants it for the sake of giving, his 
intention is not to be regarded as valid” (transl. Watson). 
182  Chapter 2, Section 1(a) above. 
183  Lenel, EP (1927), p. 373 considers that this title dealt with the constitution through in iure 
cessio of the servitus aquae ductus. 
184  If the right is granted over rustic land the constitution may also take place through a 
mancipatio, as shown in Gai 2,29: “Sed iura praediorum urbanorum in iure cedi tantum 
possunt; rusticorum vero etiam mancipari possunt”.  
185  D. 39,3,8 (Ulp. 53 ed.): “In concedendo iure aquae ducendae non tantum eorum, in 
quorum loco aqua oritur, verum eorum etiam, ad quos eius aquae usus pertinet, voluntas 
exquiritur, id est eorum, quibus servitus aquae debebatur, nec immerito: cum enim 
minuitur ius eorum, consequens fuit exquiri, an consentiant. Et generaliter sive in corpore 
sive in iure loci, ubi aqua oritur, vel in ipsa aqua habeat quis ius, voluntatem eius esse 
spectandam placet”. 
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owners, all of them must grant their consent186; moreover, the consent of the 
owner can be granted before or after the right has been established187. Further 
reference to the edictal regulation is to be found in C. 3,34,4, which confirms 
that the praetorian edict did not allow this right to be granted without the 
consent of the affected persons188. Paul as well gives detailed information about 
the rules which must be followed regarding the voluntas domini when granting the 
right to carry water in D. 39,3,9pr-2, where there is little doubt that the original 
text referred to the in iure cessio considering that the text makes several references 
to the ‘cessio’189. 
 The interpretation of D. 50,17,165 is however challenged by the palingenetic 
observations of Johnston, who observes that Lenel often does not follow the 
order in which the compilers gathered the works of classical jurists as described 
by Bluhme and later by Krüger190. As one of these cases Johnston mentions 
D. 50,17,165, which according to the Bluhme-Krüger order should have 
belonged to an earlier subject, which is why the author considers that this 
fragment is best located under the topic of the damnum infectum191. In this context, 
the text would be referred to a case of transfer of ownership, and particularly to 
the prohibition to donate affecting the owner of the threatened building. While 
the author acknowledges that this reconstruction is far from certain, it is certainly 
plausible. It should however be pointed out that he discards too lightly the link 
between this fragment and the ones dealing with the constitution of a servitude 
by indicating that one cannot properly speak of alienatio in this context. One may 
in any case agree that both interpretations are plausible, but even if D. 50,17,165 
did not specifically refer to formal ways of transferring ownership the relevance of 
the other texts dealing with the voluntas domini at the constitution of a right to 
carry water remains intact. 
 The significance of the voluntas domini is also to be found in other texts 
dealing with the constitution of servitudes involving formal acts, such as 
                                                 
186  D. 39,3,10pr (Ulp. 53 ed.): “Si autem plures sint eiusdem loci domini, unde aqua ducitur, 
omnium voluntatem esse sequendam non ambigitur: iniquum enim visum est voluntatem 
unius ex modica forte portiuncula domini praeiudicium sociis facere”.  
187  D. 39,3,10,1 (Ulp. 53 ed.): “An tamen subsequi voluntas possit, videamus. Et placet nihil 
interesse, utrum praecedat voluntas aquae ductionem an subsequatur, quia et posteriorem 
voluntatem praetor tueri debet”. 
188  C. 3,34,4 (Alexander, 223): “Aquam, quae in alieno loco oritur, sine voluntate eius, ad 
quem usus eiusdem aquae pertinet, praetoris edictum non permittit ducere”. See Lenel, EP 
(1927), p. 374. 
189  D. 39,3,9pr-2 (Paul 49 ed.): “In diem addicto praedio et emptoris et venditoris voluntas 
exquirenda est, ut, sive remanserit penes emptorem sive recesserit, certum sit voluntate 
domini factam aquae cessionem. (1) Ideo autem voluntas exigitur, ne dominus ignorans 
iniuriam accipiat: nullam enim potest videri iniuriam accipere, qui semel voluit. (2) Non 
autem solius eius, ad quem ius aquae pertinebit, voluntas exigitur in aquae cessione, sed 
etiam domini locorum, etsi dominus uti ea aqua non possit, quia reccidere ius solidum ad 
eum potest”. 
190  Johnston, Lenel’s Palingenesia (1997), p. 58 ff. 
191  Johnston, Lenel’s Palingenesia (1997), p. 61-63. 
 
D. 8,2,26192, D. 8,3,11193 and D. 21,2,10194. In the last two texts the verb cedere is 
preserved, which strongly suggests that they originally dealt with a case of in iure 
cessio195. 
 Considering the cases in which a non-owner is reported as performing an in 
iure cessio or manumissio vindicta in the sources, it becomes imperative to re-
examine the traditional grounds on which it has been claimed that only the 
owner could resort to this formal mode of alienation. If the only ground for this 
claim was the idea of a general prohibition of direct representation regarding 
formal acts, pointing out the weak support of this theory in the sources should be 
enough, but in this particular case the rule “Nemo alieno nomine lege agere potest” 
appears to be an unsurmountable obstacle due to the fact that procedural 
representation was not admitted in the legis actiones. In other words, as long as we 
consider the in iure cessio and the manumissio vindicta to be essentially a legis actio 
sacramento in rem, it does not seem possible to explain how a non-owner could 
appear in court transferring something which was not his own. 
 A solution to the contradicting evidence of the sources can be found in a 
recent study by Wolf dealing with the structure of the in iure cessio and the 
manumissio vindicta196. The author studies the idea according to which the in iure 
cessio was a ‘nachgeformte Rechtsgeschäft’, i.e. a legal act modelled after another 
one197. In the case of the in iure cessio, the legal act after which it would have been 
modelled is the legis actio sacramento in rem. According to him, the in iure cessio 
does draw some elements from the legis actio sacramento in rem, but its features are 
decisively determined by its role as a mode of transferring ownership, and not by 
the legis actio on which it is modelled. For Wolf, Roman jurists would have 
therefore borrowed only some bricks from the legis actio in order to build a mode 
for transferring ownership, which is why it would appear excessive to claim that 
the in iure cessio was actually ‘modelled’ after it198. In other words, the in iure cessio 
                                                 
192  D. 8,2,26 (Paul 15 Sab.): “In re communi nemo dominorum iure servitutis neque facere 
quicquam invito altero potest neque prohibere, quo minus alter faciat (nulli enim res sua 
servit)…” 
193  D. 8,3,11 (Celsus 27 dig.): “Per fundum, qui plurium est, ius mihi esse eundi agendi potest 
separatim cedi. Ergo suptili ratione non aliter meum fiet ius, quam si omnes cedant et 
novissima demum cessione superiores omnes confirmabuntur: benignius tamen dicetur et 
antequam novissimus cesserit, eos, qui antea cesserunt, vetare uti cesso iure non posse”.  
194  D. 21,2,10 (Celsus 27 dig.): “Si quis per fundum quem cum alio communem haberet, quasi 
solus dominus eius esset, ius eundi agendi mihi vendiderit et cesserit, tenebitur mihi 
evictionis nomine ceteris non cedentibus”. 
195  It should be noted that, despite the reference to a cessio, some authors consider D. 21,2,10 
as referring to the mancipatio, since it would deal with the actio de auctoritate. See Lenel, 
Paling. (1889) I, col. 162; Peralta, Evicción de servidumbres (1996), p. 94-96. 
196  Wolf, In iure cessio und manumissio (2013), p. 375-391. Part of the study was also published 
in Italian in Wolf, La in iure cessio (2013), p. 1-12. 
197  The term was coined by Rabel, Nachgeformte Rechtsgeschäfte (1906-1907). 
198  Wolf, In iure cessio und manumissio (2013), p. 382: “Maßgebend für die Konstruktion der in 
iure cessio war nicht die Vorlage, der sie – was durchweg hervorgehoven wird – 
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owners, all of them must grant their consent186; moreover, the consent of the 
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reference to the edictal regulation is to be found in C. 3,34,4, which confirms 
that the praetorian edict did not allow this right to be granted without the 
consent of the affected persons188. Paul as well gives detailed information about 
the rules which must be followed regarding the voluntas domini when granting the 
right to carry water in D. 39,3,9pr-2, where there is little doubt that the original 
text referred to the in iure cessio considering that the text makes several references 
to the ‘cessio’189. 
 The interpretation of D. 50,17,165 is however challenged by the palingenetic 
observations of Johnston, who observes that Lenel often does not follow the 
order in which the compilers gathered the works of classical jurists as described 
by Bluhme and later by Krüger190. As one of these cases Johnston mentions 
D. 50,17,165, which according to the Bluhme-Krüger order should have 
belonged to an earlier subject, which is why the author considers that this 
fragment is best located under the topic of the damnum infectum191. In this context, 
the text would be referred to a case of transfer of ownership, and particularly to 
the prohibition to donate affecting the owner of the threatened building. While 
the author acknowledges that this reconstruction is far from certain, it is certainly 
plausible. It should however be pointed out that he discards too lightly the link 
between this fragment and the ones dealing with the constitution of a servitude 
by indicating that one cannot properly speak of alienatio in this context. One may 
in any case agree that both interpretations are plausible, but even if D. 50,17,165 
did not specifically refer to formal ways of transferring ownership the relevance of 
the other texts dealing with the voluntas domini at the constitution of a right to 
carry water remains intact. 
 The significance of the voluntas domini is also to be found in other texts 
dealing with the constitution of servitudes involving formal acts, such as 
                                                 
186  D. 39,3,10pr (Ulp. 53 ed.): “Si autem plures sint eiusdem loci domini, unde aqua ducitur, 
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voluntatem praetor tueri debet”. 
188  C. 3,34,4 (Alexander, 223): “Aquam, quae in alieno loco oritur, sine voluntate eius, ad 
quem usus eiusdem aquae pertinet, praetoris edictum non permittit ducere”. See Lenel, EP 
(1927), p. 374. 
189  D. 39,3,9pr-2 (Paul 49 ed.): “In diem addicto praedio et emptoris et venditoris voluntas 
exquirenda est, ut, sive remanserit penes emptorem sive recesserit, certum sit voluntate 
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190  Johnston, Lenel’s Palingenesia (1997), p. 58 ff. 
191  Johnston, Lenel’s Palingenesia (1997), p. 61-63. 
 
D. 8,2,26192, D. 8,3,11193 and D. 21,2,10194. In the last two texts the verb cedere is 
preserved, which strongly suggests that they originally dealt with a case of in iure 
cessio195. 
 Considering the cases in which a non-owner is reported as performing an in 
iure cessio or manumissio vindicta in the sources, it becomes imperative to re-
examine the traditional grounds on which it has been claimed that only the 
owner could resort to this formal mode of alienation. If the only ground for this 
claim was the idea of a general prohibition of direct representation regarding 
formal acts, pointing out the weak support of this theory in the sources should be 
enough, but in this particular case the rule “Nemo alieno nomine lege agere potest” 
appears to be an unsurmountable obstacle due to the fact that procedural 
representation was not admitted in the legis actiones. In other words, as long as we 
consider the in iure cessio and the manumissio vindicta to be essentially a legis actio 
sacramento in rem, it does not seem possible to explain how a non-owner could 
appear in court transferring something which was not his own. 
 A solution to the contradicting evidence of the sources can be found in a 
recent study by Wolf dealing with the structure of the in iure cessio and the 
manumissio vindicta196. The author studies the idea according to which the in iure 
cessio was a ‘nachgeformte Rechtsgeschäft’, i.e. a legal act modelled after another 
one197. In the case of the in iure cessio, the legal act after which it would have been 
modelled is the legis actio sacramento in rem. According to him, the in iure cessio 
does draw some elements from the legis actio sacramento in rem, but its features are 
decisively determined by its role as a mode of transferring ownership, and not by 
the legis actio on which it is modelled. For Wolf, Roman jurists would have 
therefore borrowed only some bricks from the legis actio in order to build a mode 
for transferring ownership, which is why it would appear excessive to claim that 
the in iure cessio was actually ‘modelled’ after it198. In other words, the in iure cessio 
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would not be a ‘nachgeformtes Rechtsgeschäft’ or a ‘fictitious trial’, but would to a 
great extent have an autonomous legal nature. This idea had already been 
developed by Mitteis199 and Lévy-Bruhl200, but Wolf takes their thoughts further. 
He stresses in particular some essential differences concerning the legis actio 
sacramento in rem, and particularly the absence of an oath, which would imply that 
the in iure cessio would revolve around the addictio of the magistrate, while in a 
real process the core of the controversy would be to determine who had sworn 
wrongfully. Other relevant differences are pointed out, such as the fact that in a 
normal legis actio each party would make their claims concerning the ownership 
of the disputed object and only then would the praetor intervene (Gai 4,16), 
while in the in iure cessio only the acquirer would do so, after which the 
magistrate would ask the transferor whether he wants to make a counter-
vindication (Gai 2,21: “praetor interrogat eum, qui cedit, an contra vindicet”). These 
differences are in fact so relevant that even Kaser, who regarded the in iure cessio 
as a nachgeformtes Rechtsgeschäft, had to admit that it must have become 
independent from the legis actio at a very early stage201. Wolf considers these 
differences to be all the more relevant considering the rigid character of the legis 
actio, which would not allow the smallest change in the procedure – as shown in 
Gai 4,30 – which would show that we are not truly facing a legal process, not 
even in the form of a confessio. Accordingly, Wolf considers that the in iure cessio 
was not a spontaneous application of a legis actio for another end, but rather an 
artificial creation through the expert work of the Pontifices in pre-classical Roman 
law. Similar observations would moreover apply to the manumissio vindicta, which 
according to this author would borrow most elements from the in iure cessio – and 
not from the vindicatio in libertatem –, differing however in many points from it 
and particularly in the wording used by the adsertor202. 
 Some of the arguments offered by Wolf are more controversial than others, 
but he certainly does manage to offer a convincing picture on the legal nature of 
the in iure cessio and the manumissio vindicta, particularly considering that it 
accounts for the substantial differences between these rituals and the legis actio 
sacramento in rem. The essential differences could for instance explain why Gaius 
points out that the in iure cessio ‘is called a legis actio’ (Gai 2,24: idque legis actio 
vocatur) instead of simply declaring that it is in fact a legis actio. The idea of a 
fundamental difference between a legal act with regard to that on which it was 
modelled is moreover already to be found in the explanation of Kaser concerning 
the possibility of a son-in-power to perform the manumissio vindicta203. Wolf 
                                                                                                                   
„nachgeformt“ wurde, sondern ihre gewollte Funktion eines Rechtsübertragungsgeschäfts; 
die legis actio sacramento in rem lieferte mit ihren Elementen nur die Bausteine”. 
199  Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 276-279. 
200  Lévy-Bruhl, In jure cessio (1934), p. 114-136. Regarding the manumissio vindicta see Lévy-
Bruhl, Affranchissement par vindicte (1934), p. 56-76. 
201  Kaser, Das altrömische Ius (1949), p. 105. 
202  Wolf, In iure cessio und manumissio (2013), p. 384-391. 
203  Kaser, Verfügungsakte (1950), p. 78. 
 
would therefore only claim that this difference was already clear since the 
creation of the in iure cessio and the manumissio vindicta. Whatever the case may 
be, it becomes clear that the rules governing these legal acts were not identical to 
those of the legis actio sacramento in rem in classical Roman law. This would 
explain why ownership could be transferred or the manumission could be 
performed by someone who would be completely inadequate to perform a legis 
actio according to the ancient rules of procedural representation, which could be 
seen as a proof for the ideas of Wolf that only the function given to these legal 
acts is truly decisive in order to determine their legal nature. It then becomes 
clear why Roman jurists had no problem in allowing the alienation to take place 
in these cases voluntate domini, as in many other cases of patrimonial loss produced 
by a non-owner. 
 The fact that the in iure cessio and the manumissio vindicta were not directly 
governed by the rules of the legis actiones does not imply that there were no 
boundaries whatsoever regarding the persons that could take part in them, some 
of which would relate to the structure of the pre-classical procedure, as can be 
seen in the following text: 
 
Gai 2,96: In summa sciendum est his, qui in potestate manu 
mancipiove sunt, nihil in iure cedi posse; cum enim istarum 
personarum nihil suum esse possit, conveniens est scilicet, ut nihil 
suum esse in iure vindicare possint204. 
 
When declaring that the alieni iuris cannot acquire anything through in iure cessio, 
Gaius gives as the reason for it that, since they have nothing of their own, they 
cannot vindicate anything as their own in court. This limitation is also to be 
found in the Fragmenta Vaticana205, and although the reason for it is absent here, 
it is clear that it relates to the impossibility to appear in court. Scholars have 
traditionally seen these texts as a confirmation that a non-owner could not 
perform solemn acts of alienation206, considering moreover that the reason for 
this limitation was the inability to appear in court affecting the alieni iuris under 
the legis actiones. While this latter statement is basically correct, a much more 
accurate explanation can be given when taking into account that the in iure cessio 
was not governed directly by the rules of procedure, but simply borrowed some 
elements of it. Following this idea, it is important to note that the prohibition 
                                                 
204  Gai 2,96: “Finally note that nothing can be assigned in court to those who are in our 
power, or in marital subordination or bondage to us. As they can own nothing, it of course 
follows that they can vindicate nothing as theirs in court” (transl. Gordon/Robinson). 
205  FV 51: “Adquiri nobis potest usufructus et per eos quos in potestate manu mancipiove 
habemus, sed non omnibus modis, sed legato, vel si heredibus illis institutis deduct usu 
fructo proprietas legetur: per in iure cessionem autem vel iudicio familiae erciscundae non 
potest…” 
206  Mühlenbruch, Cession (1836), p. 42-43 n. 69; Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 211 
n. 22. 
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while in the in iure cessio only the acquirer would do so, after which the 
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differences are in fact so relevant that even Kaser, who regarded the in iure cessio 
as a nachgeformtes Rechtsgeschäft, had to admit that it must have become 
independent from the legis actio at a very early stage201. Wolf considers these 
differences to be all the more relevant considering the rigid character of the legis 
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„nachgeformt“ wurde, sondern ihre gewollte Funktion eines Rechtsübertragungsgeschäfts; 
die legis actio sacramento in rem lieferte mit ihren Elementen nur die Bausteine”. 
199  Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 276-279. 
200  Lévy-Bruhl, In jure cessio (1934), p. 114-136. Regarding the manumissio vindicta see Lévy-
Bruhl, Affranchissement par vindicte (1934), p. 56-76. 
201  Kaser, Das altrömische Ius (1949), p. 105. 
202  Wolf, In iure cessio und manumissio (2013), p. 384-391. 
203  Kaser, Verfügungsakte (1950), p. 78. 
 
would therefore only claim that this difference was already clear since the 
creation of the in iure cessio and the manumissio vindicta. Whatever the case may 
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When declaring that the alieni iuris cannot acquire anything through in iure cessio, 
Gaius gives as the reason for it that, since they have nothing of their own, they 
cannot vindicate anything as their own in court. This limitation is also to be 
found in the Fragmenta Vaticana205, and although the reason for it is absent here, 
it is clear that it relates to the impossibility to appear in court. Scholars have 
traditionally seen these texts as a confirmation that a non-owner could not 
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this limitation was the inability to appear in court affecting the alieni iuris under 
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204  Gai 2,96: “Finally note that nothing can be assigned in court to those who are in our 
power, or in marital subordination or bondage to us. As they can own nothing, it of course 
follows that they can vindicate nothing as theirs in court” (transl. Gordon/Robinson). 
205  FV 51: “Adquiri nobis potest usufructus et per eos quos in potestate manu mancipiove 
habemus, sed non omnibus modis, sed legato, vel si heredibus illis institutis deduct usu 
fructo proprietas legetur: per in iure cessionem autem vel iudicio familiae erciscundae non 
potest…” 
206  Mühlenbruch, Cession (1836), p. 42-43 n. 69; Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 211 
n. 22. 
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refers to the acquisition and not the alienation through in iure cessio. Regarding 
the latter case, as shown above, we do have evidence that would indicate that a 
non-owner could in fact perform an in iure cessio in case of being authorized to do 
so, and that even a son-in-power could free a slave by resorting to the manumissio 
vindicta if authorized by the pater. What could explain these differences? The 
answer to this is readily found in the structure of these legal acts, where the 
acquirer or adsertor plays a much more active role than the person who transfers 
ownership or frees a slave. In fact, to transfer ownership through the in iure cessio, 
the transferor must simply appear in front of the magistrate and refrain from 
denying the claim of the other party. The acquirer, on the other hand, would 
have to utter the words “hunc ego hominem ex iure quiritium meum esse aio” 
(Gai 2,24) and make the vindication over the transferred object. Considering 
these very different roles, it is no wonder that Roman jurisprudence – 
particularly in earlier times – would have been unwilling to accept that someone 
who could by no means make such a claim – namely someone who owned 
nothing – could acquire ownership in this way. Moreover, the possibility of 
varying the words of the acquisition in a similar way as to that of the mancipatio 
(Gai 3,167) in order to mention the person on whose behalf the thing was 
acquired was completely excluded due to the fact that such an indication had no 
place in the legis actiones. This does not mean that the in iure cessio was governed 
by the rules on the subject, but simply that, at the time it was created, there was 
no such thing as procedural representation, and therefore jurists could not 
introduce the possibility to acquire on behalf of another person. The situation 
must have been entirely different in the case of the transferor, where jurists 
would have had no hesitation in allowing an authorized non-owner to take the 
role of the owner. As in many other situations, it must have been regarded as 
enough for the owner to consent to the act in order to make it valid according to 
the ius civile. There was moreover nothing in the structure of the in iure cessio 
which would object to this interpretation – on the contrary, it was perfectly 
suitable, considering that the non-owner actually had to appear in court as 
someone who had no right to claim the object, allowing the addictio of the 
magistrate to take place. The same conclusions are applicable mutatis mutandis to 
the structure of the manumissio vindicta, which would explain why it was possible 
for a son-in-power to perform it on behalf of his father. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6. Intellectual background and evolution of 
the nemo plus rule in Antiquity 
 
 
To many contemporary scholars it may appear rather odd to leave the analysis of 
the nemo plus rule at the end of a study on the potestas alienandi in Roman law, 
considering that the idea that “no one can transfer to another a better right than 
he himself has” is normally held as the basic starting point for discussing whether 
a non-owner may transfer ownership. However, the significance of this rule in 
classical Roman law is often misunderstood, as it will be shown in this chapter, 
where it is claimed that the nemo plus rule in fact fulfilled a secondary role when 
approaching the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. Moreover, one can only 
understand the opinions of contemporary scholars on this regula iuris by framing 
them under the general discussion regarding the existence of direct representation 
in Roman law. It is traditionally argued that the said rule could only apply to 
formal ways of transferring ownership, where there was no room for direct 
representation. Having shown in the previous chapter that it was indeed possible 
for a non-owner to carry out formal acts for transferring ownership, it becomes 
necessary to revise what the real significance of the nemo plus rule was. In order 
to determine its original role in classical Antiquity, special attention will be paid 
to the use of this rule in literary sources, as well as the different ways in which 
jurists applied it. This examination will show that classical jurists did not approach 
the nemo plus rule as a fundamental truth which could not be controverted, and 
that only in the time of Justinian attempts would be made to explain it in a way 
which deprived it from any exceptions1.  
 
1. Divergent views on the significance of the nemo plus rule 
 
The nemo plus rule was laid down by Ulpian and included in the last title of the 
Digest, “On various rules of ancient law” (De diversis regulis iuris antiqui) in the 
following wording: 
 
D. 50,17,54 (Ulp. 46 ed.): Nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre 
potest, quam ipse haberet2. 
 
                                                 
1  The views on this point have already been the subject of two previous contributions: 
Rodríguez Diez, Eerherstel (2014), p. 13-18; Rodríguez Diez, Origen y evolución (2015), 
p. 347-375. 
2  D. 50,17,54: “No one can transfer to another a better right than he himself has”. 
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The same idea is conveyed – again by Ulpian – with a similar wording in 
D. 41,1,20pr, where the rule is specifically referred to the transfer of ownership 
by traditio:  
 
D. 41,1,20pr (Ulp. 29 Sab.): Traditio nihil amplius transferre debet 
vel potest ad eum qui accipit, quam est apud eum qui tradit. Si 
igitur quis dominium in fundo habuit, id tradendo transfert, si non 
habuit, ad eum qui accipit nihil transfert3. 
 
Traditionally this rule enjoyed such enormous prestige that even 20th century 
Roman law scholars would regard it as self-evident and free from exceptions. 
Hoetink, for instance, qualifies the rule as an “unavoidable and logical 
requirement”4, and Kaser excludes that this rule may have exceptions, granting it 
the same natural value as the sentence “one glass cannot pour into another one 
more water than it contains”5. Some authors even go beyond these general claims 
and grant the rule a large scope based on systematic considerations. This approach 
is for instance to be found in the large monographic study of Carlin, according to 
whom every case which appears to contradict the nemo plus rule is in fact only an 
apparent exception6. For instance, the delivery by a non-owner acting voluntate 
domini should be regarded as performed by the owner himself, just as that of a 
legal guardian, since he acts ‘loco domini’. This approach to the nemo plus rule is 
still influential among recent authors such as Longchamps, who recently defended 
                                                 
3  D. 41,1,20pr: “Delivery should not and cannot transfer to the transferee any better title 
than resides in the transferor. Hence, if someone conveys land of which he is owner, he 
transfers his title; if he does not have ownership, he conveys nothing to the recipient” 
(Transl. Watson, modified). 
4  Hoetink, Nemo plus iuris (1935), p. 475: “… niet alleen eeuwenlang is beschouwd als de 
kernachtige formulering van het Romeinse denkbeeld der eigendomsoverdracht, maar èn 
door het gezag dat het Romeinse recht genoot èn door het karakter van onweerlegbare 
vanzelfsprekendheid dat de formulering bezat, nog heden ten dage geldt als een 
onomkoombare, want logische, eis waaraan elk positief recht zich heeft te onderwerpen” 
(…[the rule of D. 50,17,54] not only has been considered for centuries as the concise 
formulation of the Roman notion of transfer of ownership but, through both the authority 
that Roman law enjoyed and the quality of irrefutable obviousness which that formulation 
contained, it applies still today as an unavoidable and logical requirement to which every 
positive law has to submit.) 
5  Kaser, Ein Jahrhundert Interpolationenforschung (1986 [1979]), p. 149 n. 6: “Ohne Ausnahme 
war anscheinend der Satz nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet (Ulp. 
D. 50,17,54)… Wenn es stimmt, daß die genannte Regel so eng ausgelegt wurde, daß für 
Ausnahmen kein Raum blieb, erklärt sich dies am ehesten daraus, daß die Regel gleichsam 
‘naturgesetzlich’ verstanden wurde wie der Satz, daß man aus einem vollen Glas in ein 
leeres nicht mehr hineingießen kann, als in jenem enthalten ist”. 
6  Carlin, Niemand kann (1882), p. 6: “Als folgerichtige Ausflüsse einer Regel, welche kraft 
logischer Notwendigkeit ausnahmslos ist, sind es diese drei Grundsätze auch: es können 
davon nur sche inbare  Ausnahmen bestehen, in größerer oder geringerer Zahl…” 
Similarly Puchta, Institutionen (1842) II, p. 646; Bekker, Pandektenrecht (1886) I, p. 108 
(§ 33). 
 
the absolute validity of this rule by claiming that it only faced apparent 
exceptions, explaining how in each case the alienation in fact is regarded as 
performed by the owner himself7.  
 Despite the preeminent role traditionally granted to the nemo plus rule by 
scholars, others consider that its scope and significance have been exaggerated, 
and that classical jurists would have not awarded the rule such universal validity. 
The cornerstone of this critical approach consists in pointing out the original 
context in which Ulpian applies the rule, and it is therefore no coincidence that 
the first attempts to revise the scope of D. 50,17,54 came after the palingenetic 
analysis became possible following the works of Labitte8 and Agustín9. The first 
attempt to approach the rule in its original context took place as early as 1568 in 
the writings of Jacobus Raevardus (1535-1568), who deduced from the original 
position of the text that it should have dealt with the patrimonial situation of 
women in Rome10. More fortunate was the opinion of Petrus Faber (c. 1540-
1600) who considered that Ulpian had dealt in book 46th of the Commentary to 
the Edict with the successio ab intestato, and therefore this would have been the 
original context of D. 50,17,5411. A similar opinion is found in the writings of 
Jacques Godefroy (1587-1652), whose extensive commentary on the last title of 
the Digest was published posthumously in 1653. When dealing with 
D. 50,17,54, Godefroy makes the cunning observation that the text originally 
was located within the general topic of the bonorum possessio, specifically under 
the rubric unde legitimi12. He therefore declared that the rule would originally 
have stated that no one can transfer to his heir a greater right than he himself 
has13. Godefroy demonstrates his opinion mainly by enumerating similar rules, all 
of which are formulated in the context of the law of succession14.  
                                                 
7  Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 78: “Exceptions to that rule with regard to 
derivative acquisition of ownership were only apparent. The academic discussion in Gaius’ 
Institutes, G 2 62-64, cannot be taken seriously”. Similarly, Zwalve, Hoofdstukken 
Privaatrecht (2006), p. 260 n. 70 considers that the cases of traditio voluntate domini are only 
apparent exceptions to the nemo plus rule. 
8  Labitte, Index legum omnium quae in Pandectis continentur (Frankfurt 1724 [1557]), p. 152. 
9  Agustín, De nominibus propriis του Πανδεκτου Florentini (Tarragona 1579), col. 162. 
10  Raevardus, De regulis iuris (Antwerp 1568), p. 152-154. 
11  Petrus Faber, Ad Titulum de diversis regulis iuris antiqui (Cologne 1608), p. 249: “Pertinet 
vero proprie ad intestatorum successiones, de quibus loquebatur Ulpianus lib. 46. ad 
edictum, quod ab interpretibus animadversum non fuisse miror”. 
12  Godefroy, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Geneva 1653), p. 242: “cujus species pertinent ad 
BONORVM POSSESSIONEM unde legitimi”.  
13  Godefroy, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Geneva 1653), p. 242: “Ad alium, ait lex, v.g. ad 
haeredem: nemo scilic. plus juris in haeredem transmittere potest, quam ipse habet vel 
haberet”, and later once more: “Nemo plus iuris ad haeredem transmittere potest, quam 
ipse haberet”. 
14  Godefroy, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Geneva 1653), p. 242-243. Although Godefroy 
considers the rule to operate mainly in the context of the law of succession, he 
acknowledges that it can apply in other situations in which someone derives his right from 
someone else: “Est igitur haec regula proprie de aequo defuncti & haeredis iure. Potest 
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12  Godefroy, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Geneva 1653), p. 242: “cujus species pertinent ad 
BONORVM POSSESSIONEM unde legitimi”.  
13  Godefroy, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Geneva 1653), p. 242: “Ad alium, ait lex, v.g. ad 
haeredem: nemo scilic. plus juris in haeredem transmittere potest, quam ipse habet vel 
haberet”, and later once more: “Nemo plus iuris ad haeredem transmittere potest, quam 
ipse haberet”. 
14  Godefroy, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Geneva 1653), p. 242-243. Although Godefroy 
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 The palingenetic observations of Godefroy would be confirmed by the efforts 
of later scholars. More than two centuries later, Rudorff would still locate 
D. 50,17,54 under the rubric Unde legitimi15 in his reconstruction of the Edictum 
Perpetuum, among the general analysis of the bonorum possessio, and Lenel would 
follow this order a few years later16. Lenel, however, introduced a different 
approach than that of Godefroy when noticing the context of the rule, and noted 
that the fragment may have originally dealt with a specific case of in iure cessio 
hereditatis17. The reason for this choice is by no means evident. As it has been 
noted, Godefroy considered that this rule would refer to the rights which are 
transferred from the deceased to his heir, but Lenel thought that it should refer to 
the in iure cessio hereditatis between the heir and a third party. While Lenel does 
not give reasons for his choice, one is drawn to think that it was motivated by 
the use of the word transferre, which could indicate a transfer of ownership, 
particularly compared to the verb relinquere used in D. 50,17,120, which expressly 
applies the rule to the law of succession. 
 Having the palingenetic analysis as a starting point, several scholars stressed 
during the 20th century that the nemo plus rule as presented in D. 50,17,54 and 
D. 41,1,20pr was the result of postclassical generalization and interpolation18. 
This opinion became particularly popular through the textual criticism of Schulz, 
who pointed out the inappropriate use of the subjunctive “haberet” instead of 
the indicative “habet”19 in D. 50,17,54, which according to him would prove 
that the original wording had been altered by Justinian’s commissioners in order 
to formulate a rule through the generalization of a particular case, leaving behind 
them a trace of their clumsiness by not adapting the text adequately to the new 
context. Schulz accordingly reconstructs the text, stating that it would have been 
originally referred to the case in which an heres legitimus performs an in iure cessio 
without having acquired the inheritance by aditio hereditatis, and so the original 
wording would have been ‘Heres non plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse 
haberet si hereditatem adisset’20. 
                                                                                                                   
tamen & haec regula produci seu porrigi ad alias quoque personas, quae ius suum ex 
alterius velut auctoris persona derivant” (p. 243). 
15  Rudorff, Edicti perpetui (1869), p. 149, § 160. 
16  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 722, nr. 1200. 
17  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 722, nr. 1200, n. 1: “Possunt haec ad iniurecessionem 
hereditatis referri”. This opinion was already present in the first edition of his Edictum 
Perpetuum (1883), p. 284, § 157 n. 6, and was upheld until the last edition (1927), p. 356, 
§ 157 n. 2. 
18  See De Francisci, Il trasferimento (1924), p. 8-11, 149-152; Albertario, Introduzione storica 
(1935), p. 158; Jörs/Kunkel/Wenger (1949), p. 125 n. 4; Levy, Law of Property (1951), 
p. 176; Voci, Modi di acquisto (1952), p. 4-5 and 81; Gallo, Studi sul trasferimento (1955), 
p. 115-121; Schulz, Classical Roman Law (1951), p. 351-352; Spruit, Nemo plus iuris (1980-
1981), p. 77-80; Álvarez, Nemo plus iuris (2006), p. 1-4. 
19  Schulz, Classical Roman Law (1951), p. 352.  
20  Schulz, Classical Roman Law (1951), p. 352. This reconstruction is accepted by Spruit, 
Nemo plus iuris (1980-1981), p. 79-80. 
 
 The observations concerning the validity of the rule were not limited to the 
textual criticism, since scholars determined that the activity of the compilers 
brought along significant dogmatic changes. Most authors consider the nemo plus 
rule to be contrary to classical Roman law due to the significant number of 
exceptions it would suffer, such as those mentioned in Gai 2,62-6421. Since the 
rule would be unacceptable in its general formulation in several cases – such as 
the traditio by a non-owner – scholars concluded that it originally must have 
referred to the in iure cessio which, according to the dominant opinion, could 
only be performed by the owner himself. The rule would therefore be truly 
applicable for the case of the in iure cessio – in this case, hereditatis – and not in the 
general formulation offered in the Digest. 
 The objections against D. 50,17,54 did not stop there, since it was further 
argued that this rule would introduce an anachronism when dealing with the 
transfer of ownership, since it would describe it as the ‘transfer of a right’. Such a 
notion, it has been argued, would be completely alien to classical Roman law, 
where property was not approached as a right which could be transferred itself22. 
This objection, however, has little ground, considering that the text originally 
would have referred to the in iure cessio hereditatis, and therefore the ‘ius’ which is 
transferred to is not ownership itself but the hereditas as a whole23. It should be 
noted in this context that the text uses the genitive singular ‘iuris’, and the 
sentence could accordingly be translated as “no one can transfer a better right” or 
“more of a right”, meaning the hereditas. The circumstance that the text is 
rendered in plural form by some translators24 agrees with the general scope given 
to the text as a regula iuris, but departs significantly from its original meaning.  
 Another criticism on D. 50,17,54, this time from a methodological angle, 
came from Spruit, who stressed that the abstract terms in which the rule is 
presented are alien to classical legal reasoning, but are adequate to the Byzantine 
method, and therefore the commissioners would have developed an abstract rule 
from a decision which was meant to solve only one particular case25. 
 The text of D. 41,1,20pr was also target of similar criticism. It has been 
argued that this text was not the result of generalization, as would be the case of 
D. 50,17,54, but of downright interpolation. Already Lenel considered that the 
text originally referred to the mancipatio and not to the traditio, despite the fact 
that he located it under the rubric “De mancipatione et traditione rei venditae”26. His 
opinion may be explained by the fact that the second sentence deals with the 
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(1980-1981), p. 78. 
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23  D’Ors, Concepto de ius (1953), p. 286; D’Ors, DPR (2004), p. 228 n. 1. 
24  E.g. Watson, Digest: “No one can transfer greater r i g h t s…”. 
25  Spruit, Nemo plus iuris (1980-1981), p. 78. 
26  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 1122, nr. 2721. 
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conveyance of a fundus, which led other scholars to agree with Lenel, since in this 
case the dominium ex iure Quiritium could only be transferred through mancipatio27. 
Moreover, the argument concerning the accuracy of the nemo plus rule was also 
brought up regarding the text of D. 41,1,20pr: the nemo plus rule could only be 
truly used in the context of formal ways to transfer ownership, such as the 
mancipatio or the in iure cessio, in which only the owner himself could transfer 
ownership and could not do so through another person. Accordingly, several 
scholars consider that this evolution would be indicative of the corruption of a 
flawless rule through interpolation, since it would suffer exceptions in the case of 
traditio which were unknown in the original formulation28. 
 The two contrasting views on the validity of the nemo plus rule presented so 
far have nonetheless a common ground, which is the assumption that this rule 
was in itself completely valid. The only difference is that some scholars consider 
that it retained its validity even within Justinian’s compilation, while others deem 
that the generalization and interpolation of classical texts by the compilers 
corrupted the value of a rule which was absolutely valid in classical jurisprudence. 
There is however another approach to this rule, according to which it never had 
an absolute validity. This opinion was brought forward by Buckland29, who 
refutes the views of Albertario by claiming that the existence of classical texts 
which allow the alienation by a non-owner are no obstacle to the validity of the 
nemo plus rule, especially since the regulae iuris would only seldom have absolute 
validity. Other authors favour this more moderate approach, such as von 
Lübtow, who despite following many of the ideas of Schulz considers that the 
nemo plus argument is merely a general rule which was never completely 
accurate30. Also Feenstra considers that this rule would have been at most used as 
an argument by classical jurists, and that its modest value becomes evident by the 
careful expression “debet vel potest” that Ulpian uses in D. 41,1,20pr31. Finally, 
Kupiszewski is keen to observe that the rule did not have an absolute validity, 
nor in classical nor in Justinianic law, in view of the exceptions it faces32. 
 Among the various views on the significance of the nemo plus rule, that of 
Schulz appears to be the most influential nowadays, since the majority of the 
authors dealing with this rule or with the transfer of ownership by a non-owner 
                                                 
27  De Francisci, Il trasferimento (1924), p. 8-11, 149-152; Gallo, Studi sul trasferimento (1955), 
p. 115-121; Spruit, Nemo plus iuris (1980-1981), p. 80 n. 4; Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris 
(2015), p. 75. 
28  Schulz, Classical Roman Law (1951), p. 352: “The whole text seems to be spurious. The 
author overlooked the cases in which a non-owner could transfer ownership”. 
29  Buckland, Interpolations (1941), p. 1308-1309. 
30  Von Lübtow, Hand wahre Hand (1955), p. 145 n. 129: “Aber es handelt sich um eine 
Faustregel, die nie ganz exakt sein kann”. 
31  Feenstra, Romeinsrechtelijke grondslagen (1994), p. 50. 
32  Kupiszewski’s opinion is offered in translation by Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), 
p. 78 n. 63. 
 
accept his reconstruction and some of the consequences derived from it33. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that many scholars regard this rule as a concise 
expression of the rules governing the transfer of ownership in Roman law, and 
therefore use it as a starting point to determine the outcome of the transfer of 
ownership by traditio as well34. This application of the rule does not agree with 
the opinion of Schulz, according to whom the nemo plus can only be seen as 
having absolute validity in the context of formal ways of transferring ownership, 
which shows that scholars tend to value it more as a starting point than as an 
absolute principle. 
 Considering the contrasting approaches to the significance of the nemo plus 
rule for Roman classical law, it is worth noting that there are certain issues which 
have been completely overlooked in the analysis of this rule and which will be 
explored in the following sections. The first issue which deserves attention is the 
existence in non-legal sources of other texts which convey the same idea behind 
the nemo plus rule, which is especially interesting because these references may 
provide additional clues regarding the significance granted to this idea in the 
intellectual context of Antiquity. The second point where there is much left to 
say regards the different forms that the rule adopts in classical jurisprudence, since 
there are numerous cases other than D. 41,1,20pr and D. 50,17,54 where the 
same underlying idea is applied in different contexts and with different 
significance. The lack of attention for these problems may be explained due to 
the absence of a comprehensive modern study on this rule in Roman law, since 
the last attempt to deal thoroughly with it was the monographic work of Carlin 
in 188235, to which much can be added nowadays. Accordingly, by examining 
the application of the rule in literary sources and in different legal contexts an 
attempt will be made to throw more light on the scope and significance of the 
nemo plus rule in Roman law. 
 
2. The nemo plus argument in literary sources 
 
The nemo plus rule has clear ancestors in literary sources, which can be traced as 
far as the writings of Greek philosophers. Even when the different texts included 
below always highlight the basic notion according to which “no one can 
give/lose what he does not have” the validity awarded to this idea is not uniform 
among different authors, and therefore no technical term – maxim, topical 
argument, axiom, thesis, premise, rule, principle, etc. – can be ascribed to it in a 
comprehensive way. Nonetheless, since this idea is mostly used in argumentative 
                                                 
33  See e.g. among the authors who study the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, the 
opinions of Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 16; Sansón, La transmisión (1998), 
p. 7 n. 1. 
34  E.g. Potjewijd, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1998), p. 10; Lokin, Prota (2012), p. 109-110, 152-
154; Guzman, DPR (2013) I, p. 633. 
35  Carlin, Niemand kann (1882), p. 18-42. 
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contexts, its different variations will be labeled, for the sake of simplicity, as the 
‘nemo plus argument’, in order to distinguish it from the fixed ‘nemo plus rule’ of 
D. 50,17,54. This label has only an instrumental value, as can be seen by the fact 
that in no literary source does this argument begin with the words ‘nemo plus’. 
 The nemo plus argument appears already in Plato’s Symposium, in a text 
where the poet Agathon describes the attributes of the god Love: 
 
Plato, Symposium 196d-e: In the first place let me say that the god is 
a skilful poet – in order that I too, like Eryximachus, may pay 
honour to my craft – and he is also able to make another person a 
poet too. At any rate, at his touch every man becomes a poet 
‘though formerly unvisited by the Muse’. This we can properly take 
as evidence that Love is a skilful creator in virtually every form of 
artistic creation; for no one could give or teach another something 
which he does not possess or know himself (ਘ γȐρ τιȢ ਲ਼ μ੽ ਩Ȥει ਲ਼ μ੽ 
οੇδεν ο੡τૃ ਗν ਦτȑρ૳ δοίη ο੡τૃ ਗν ਙȜȜον διδȐȟειεν) (transl. 
Howatson)36. 
 
This statement is part of the line of reasoning adopted by Agathon in his speech 
(194e-198a), since at the beginning he states that the other speakers in the 
dialogue have focused on the activity of the humans as they love, and that “no 
one has described the nature of him who has bestowed these good things” (194e) 
which according to him is the god Love. Agathon’s speech is therefore a eulogy 
to Love as a source of virtually every skill. The whole idea is quite confusing, and 
based largely on a word play37, in which Agathon says that Love is a skilful 
ποιητ੽Ȣ, which can mean either ‘poet’ or ‘maker’, and since Love is a ποιητ੽Ȣ he 
can ‘make’ other people a ‘poet’ or ‘maker’ too, which in turn means that every 
artistic skill was taught by Love, because otherwise he would not be able to 
bestow or teach this ability.  
 Scholars have highlighted the sloppiness of Agathon’s reasoning38, where the 
idea that “no one could give or teach…” alone can be the target of numerous 
objections. First of all, although the statements “no one can give something 
which he does not possess” and “no one can teach what he does not know” 
                                                 
36  Plato, Symposium 196d-e: “κα੿ πρ૵τον μȑν ੆νૃ α੣ κα੿ ਥγઅ τ੽ν ਲμετȑραν τȑȤνην τιμȒσω 
੮σπερ ਫρυȟίμαȤοȢ τ੽ν αਫ਼τοῦ ποιητ੽Ȣ ੒ șεઁȢ σοĳઁȢ ο੢τωȢ ੮στε κα੿ ਙȜȜον ποιોσαιā π઼Ȣ 
γοῦν ποιητ੽Ȣ γίγνεται ³κਗν ਙμουσοȢ ઝ τઁ πρίν´ ο੤ ਗν ਯρωȢ ਚȥηται મ δ੽ πρȑπει ਲμ઼Ȣ 
μαρτυρί૳ Ȥρોσșαι ੖τι ποιητ੽Ȣ ੒ ਯρωȢ ਕγαșઁȢ ਥν κεĳαȜαί૳ π઼σαν ποίησιν τ੽ν κατὰ 
μουσικȒνā ਘ γȐρ τιȢ ਲ਼ μ੽ ਩Ȥει ਲ਼ μ੽ οੇδεν ο੡τૃ ਗν ਦτȑρ૳ δοίη ο੡τૃ ਗν ਙȜȜον διδȐȟειεν”. 
37  Hunter, Plato’s Symposium (2004), p. 72. 
38  See Hunter, Plato’s Symposium (2004), p. 71: “… Agathon’s speech is marked… by many 
forms of word- and sound-play (puns, equivocations, antithesis, assonance, rhyme, and so 
on), which often take the place of, while simultaneously advertising the absence of, 
anything that could be described as ‘convincing argument’”. See p. 72-73 for the subtle 
word plays and the intricate structure of Agathon’s reasoning. 
 
appear to have a similar validity, the physical element which makes the first 
sentence so compelling is absent in the second one. Agathon mixes in this 
sentence two different ideas, belonging to the material and intellectual worlds 
respectively, and while in the first case it is indeed impossible to obtain an object 
out of nowhere – that is, to have something that was not received – it is in fact 
possible to independently produce knowledge – that is, to know something 
which was not taught by someone else. This implies that one cannot derive a 
contrario sensu from this general idea that every knowledge and skill someone has 
was necessarily learnt from someone else, as implied by Agathon, as if nobody 
could acquire new knowledge by himself. Finally, it is difficult to grasp how 
Agathon concludes that all knowledge must be derived from Love, which implies 
stretching his starting point – that Love must be a skilled poet/creator – to an 
incomprehensible level. 
 Considering the shortcomings of Agathon’s reasoning, it appears that the 
argument that “no one could give or teach another…” has limited validity in 
Plato’s eyes. This becomes evident when reading the subsequent speech of 
Socrates, who implies that Agathon’s speech was a demonstration of empty 
oratory rather than an assertion of the truth39. Socrates ironically declares that, 
apparently, he himself had no idea of how to make a eulogy, because he thought 
that it implied “only to speak the truth about the subject of the eulogy”40, and 
after a short exchange of opinions Agathon find himself compelled to 
acknowledge the superiority of the ideas of Socrates (201b). It is moreover 
noteworthy that Socrates declares that Agathon’s speech reminded him of 
Gorgias, a sophist who features in other platonic dialogues. What exactly 
reminded Socrates of Gorgias in Agathon’s speech is not entirely clear41, but for 
the purpose of this research it cannot be ignored that this reference may indicate 
among other elements the use of the nemo plus argument, which would therefore 
be a creation of sophistic philosophy, and perhaps of Gorgias himself. The mere 
reference to Gorgias in this text, while not providing conclusive evidence on the 
point, is to be taken into account to determine the origins of the argument, 
particularly considering that Plato would go to great lengths when imitating the 
style of sophistic reasoning42. In this particular case, Plato could be parodying the 
                                                 
39  Plato, Symposium 198b-199a: “The speech reminded me of Gorgias, so much so that I had 
the Gorgon experience as in Homer: I was afraid Agathon would conclude his speech by 
challenging mine with the eloquence of Gorgias, that brilliant orator, and – like the 
Gorgon – would turn me into stone, unable to utter a word. It was then I realised what a 
fool I had been in agreeing with you to take my turn and deliver a eulogy of Love, and in 
saying I was an expert on the subject of love, despite, as it turned out, knowing nothing 
about how to compose a eulogy of anything. For in my naivety I thought I had only to 
speak the truth about the subject of the eulogy”. (transl. Howatson & Sheffield). See on 
this text Plato, Symposium (ed. Howatson & Sheffield), p. xiii and Hunter, Plato’s 
Symposium (2004), p. 74-75. 
40  See Hunter, Plato’s Symposium (2004), p. 36. 
41  Hunter, Plato’s Symposium (2004), p. 74 discusses the point. 
42  Tindale, Sophistic argument (2010), p. 37-39. 
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contexts, its different variations will be labeled, for the sake of simplicity, as the 
‘nemo plus argument’, in order to distinguish it from the fixed ‘nemo plus rule’ of 
D. 50,17,54. This label has only an instrumental value, as can be seen by the fact 
that in no literary source does this argument begin with the words ‘nemo plus’. 
 The nemo plus argument appears already in Plato’s Symposium, in a text 
where the poet Agathon describes the attributes of the god Love: 
 
Plato, Symposium 196d-e: In the first place let me say that the god is 
a skilful poet – in order that I too, like Eryximachus, may pay 
honour to my craft – and he is also able to make another person a 
poet too. At any rate, at his touch every man becomes a poet 
‘though formerly unvisited by the Muse’. This we can properly take 
as evidence that Love is a skilful creator in virtually every form of 
artistic creation; for no one could give or teach another something 
which he does not possess or know himself (ਘ γȐρ τιȢ ਲ਼ μ੽ ਩Ȥει ਲ਼ μ੽ 
οੇδεν ο੡τૃ ਗν ਦτȑρ૳ δοίη ο੡τૃ ਗν ਙȜȜον διδȐȟειεν) (transl. 
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use of a real sophistic argument, which Plato himself would refrain from using in 
other places of his dialogues.  
 The suspicions regarding the sophistic origin of the nemo plus argument find 
further support in the fact that Aristotle deals extensively with the argument in 
his Sophistical Refutations (De Sophisticis Elenchis) which are considered to be 
some sort of Appendix to his Topics (Topica)43. In the latter work Aristotle deals 
with dialectic reasoning (συȜȜογισμόȢ διαȜεκτικόȢ), providing argumentation 
techniques which stem from “generally accepted opinions” (ਥνδοȟα) (Topica I, 1, 
100b18, transl. Forster), which are “those which commend themselves to all or 
to the majority or to the wise” (Topica I, 1, 100b22-24). The purpose of the 
Topica is to be used as a tool for argumentation, particularly in the context of the 
debates held in the method of elenchus (gr. ਩ȜεγȤοȢ), where one party would 
interrogate his adversary in order to extract contradictory statements and refute 
his position. This argumentative function implies that the tools given in the 
Topica are meant to reach only plausible conclusions, and not scientifically true 
ones. True scientific conclusions can only be reached through demonstrative 
reasoning (συȜȜογισμόȢ ਕπόδειȟιȢ), which “proceeds from premises which are 
true and primary or of such a kind that we have derived our original knowledge 
for them through premises which are primary and true” (Topica I, 1, 100a27-30). 
Aristotle dealt with demonstrative reasoning in a separate work, his Analytica 
Posteriora.  
 The Sophistical Refutations are closely related to the Topica, but in the former 
text Aristotle deals with eristic reasoning (συȜȜογισμόȢ ਥριστικόȢ), which consists 
either of using apparent generally accepted opinions (ਥνδοȟα) or apparent 
reasoning that uses real or apparent ਥνδοȟα44. Aristotle therefore sets out to 
explore a number of fallacies in argumentation, such as those which would be 
used by the sophists.  
 The nemo plus argument is referred to several times within the Sophistical 
Refutations, keeping in all versions a similar formula45, which is in turn very 
close to the one Plato uses46 – leaving aside, of course, the references to ‘teach’ 
and ‘know’, which only make sense within the specific context of the platonic 
text. This shows that Aristotle deals with a well-known argument, already in use 
before his time and consolidated enough to have a relatively fixed formulation. 
Moreover, considering that neither Plato nor Aristotle make use of the argument 
                                                 
43  See Schreiber, Sophistical Refutations (2003), p. 3. 
44  Topica I, 1, 100b23-101a4; De Sophisticis Elenchis 2, 165b7-8. For the general classification 
of the different kinds of reasoning in the Topica and the Sophistical Refutations see 
Schreiber, Sophistical Refutations, p. 1-4. 
45  De Sophisticis Elenchis 10, 171a9: “੒ δȑ ਘ μ੽ ਩Ȥοι τιȢ δοῦναι”; 22, 178a38: “੖τι δοίη ਗν τιȢ 
੔ μ੽ ਩Ȥει”; 22, 178b2: “੔ μȒ τιȢ ਩Ȥει δοίη ਙν”; 22, 178b4: “੖τι δοίη ਗν τιȢ ੔ μ੽ ਩Ȥει”; 23, 
179a22: “੔ μ੽ ਩Ȥει δοίη ਙν τιȢ”. 
46  Symposium 196e: “ਘ γȐρ τιȢ ਲ਼ μ੽ ਩Ȥει ਲ਼ μ੽ οੇδεν ο੡τૃ ਗν ਦτȑρ૳ δοίη ο੡τૃ ਗν ਙȜȜον 
διδȐȟειεν´. 
 
in other contexts, and that the Sophistical Refutations deal to a great extent with 
argumentation techniques of the sophists47, it appears most likely that the origin 
of the argument is to be found among the sophists. 
 The argument is found as a starting point for a series of fallacies in chapter 22 
of the Sophistical Refutations, where Aristotle studies fallacies resulting from the 
‘Form of the Expression’, which “are directly concerned with how words relate 
to things”48. In order to solve this kind of fallacies, Aristotle considers it necessary 
to have a good understanding of the different ‘categories’. The ‘categories’ in 
Aristotle are “the highest kinds of things that are nameable”49, which according 
to him would be ten in number: substance, quantity, quality, relative, place, 
time, position, state, activity and passivity50. According to Aristotle, “the 
accident, the genus, the property and the definition will always be in one of these 
categories; for all propositions made by means of these indicate either essence or 
quality or quantity or one of the other categories”51. An ambiguous use of words 
could therefore lead to the superposition of two categories and thereby to a 
fallacious reasoning, as Aristotle’s examples show. It is because of this that 
Schreiber suggest to label these fallacies as ‘Category mistakes’. 
 Aristotle first discusses what Schreiber calls fallacies due to ‘Confusion of 
Substance with Quantity’52 (De Sophisticis Elenchis 22, 178a29-37). In Aristotle’s 
example the interrogator formulates the following question: “Has a man lost 
what he had and afterwards has not?”53 (transl. Forster). If the person interrogated 
gives a positive answer, the interrogator could refute him by saying that a man 
who had ten dice and lost one would not lose something which he had before 
but no longer has, i.e. ten dice. This reasoning is fallacious by confusing the 
categories of substance and quantity, since this argument “confuses what someone 
lost with how much or how many someone lost, since things in both Categories can 
be signified by words in the same predicate position”54.  
 Aristotle continues with the dice example in a fallacy which Schreiber labels 
‘Confusion of Substance with Relative’55. In the first example, the interrogator 
asks whether a man could give what he does not have56. If the person 
interrogated gives a negative answer, the interrogator could refute him by 
showing that a person who had ten dice can give one die, even when he has ten 
and not only one. The fallacy therefore induces to confusion by introducing in 
                                                 
47  Schreiber, Sophistical Refutations (2003), p. 2. 
48  Schreiber, Sophistical Refutations (2003), p. 37. 
49  Schreiber, Sophistical Refutations (2003), p. 15. 
50  Aristotle, Categories 4, 1b25–27; Topica I, 9, 103b20-24. 
51  Aristotle, Topica I, 9, 103b24-27. 
52  Schreiber, Sophistical Refutations (2003), p. 39-40. This fallacy is found in De Sophisticis 
Elenchis 22, 178a29-37 
53  “εੁ ੖ τιȢ ਩Ȥων ੢στερον μ੽ ਩Ȥει ਕπȑȕαȜεν” 
54  Schreiber, Sophistical Refutations (2003), p. 39. 
55  Schreiber, Sophistical Refutations (2003), p. 40.  
56  This fallacy is explained in De Sophisticis Elenchis 22, 178a37-b7. 
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the argument an element which does not belong to the category of substance, 
but to that of ‘relative’, which indicates the position of one thing in relation to 
another one: “For ‘single unit’ does not denote either a particular kind of thing 
or a quality or a quantity but a relation to something else, namely, dissociation 
from anything else” (178a38-b1, transl. Forster). A similar example is given by 
using the same initial question: if the interrogator asks whether a man can give 
what he does not have and receives a negative answer, then he could argue that a 
man can give something quickly even when he had not got it quickly, inferring 
from the acceptance of this latter statement by the interrogated person that a man 
could give what he did not have. Aristotle concludes that this is not a correct 
inference, “for ‘giving quickly’ does not denote giving a particular thing but 
giving in a particular manner, and a man could give something in a manner in 
which he did not get it” (178b4-6, transl. Forster). 
 Aristotle gives further examples of such kind of fallacies, such as “Could a 
man strike with a hand that he has not got or see with an eye that he has not 
got?”57, inducing a negative answer which could be refuted by stating that he 
could strike only with one hand or see only with one eye, having two of them. 
Another example would be to state: “what a man has, he has received” (22, 
178b11), which could lead to the refutation that even when a person gave one 
vote, the second person may have ten, and not only  one58. A further variation of 
the fallacy would be to state that “one can have what one has not received; for 
example, one can receive wine that is sound but have it in a sour condition if it 
has gone bad in the process of transfer”. In all of these cases a confusion is 
introduced between what  something is and the manner  in which something is59. 
The interrogator induces the adversary to admit a statement without 
qualification, and afterwards takes advantage of the resulting ambiguity to reach a 
fallacious conclusion by introducing elements which do not belong to the 
substance of the object described.  
 Does all of the above imply that Aristotle considers the statement ‘no one can 
give what he does not have’ fallacious in itself? Not at all. The basic validity of 
the statement in the eyes of Aristotle becomes evident when, in Chapter 23, he 
gives a procedure to solve certain fallacies by appealing to its opposite, which in 
the case of fallacies due to the Form of the Expression would be “the Category 
opposed to the one assumed by the questioner”60. When dealing with the 
argument studied here, Aristotle writes: 
 
De Sophisticis Elenchis 23, 179a22-24: ‘Could one give what one has 
not got?’ Surely not what he has not got but he could give it in a 
                                                 
57  This example is discussed in De Sophisticis Elenchis 22, 178b8-b17. 
58  Schreiber, Sophistical Refutations (2003), p. 41. 
59  Schreiber, Sophistical Refutations (2003), p. 41. 
60  Schreiber, Sophistical Refutations (2003), p. 213 n. 36. 
 
way which he has not got it, for example, a single die by itself (transl. 
Forster). 
 
The idea that ‘no one can give what he does not have’ is therefore a valid thesis, 
and the fallacy only appears when refuting it through the confusion of categories. 
What can accordingly be concluded about the validity of the nemo plus argument 
in Aristotle? As has been said before, eristic reasoning consists in “reasonings from 
apparent but not real endoxa, or apparent reasonings”61. Since in this case the 
thesis would be true, one can only conclude that we are facing an apparent 
reasoning. Moreover, considering that eristic reasoning in most cases is parasitic 
upon dialectical reasoning62, it would appear that the nemo plus argument is a 
valid endoxon.  
 The general validity of the argument contrasts, however, with the fact that it 
is not brought up elsewhere in the works of Aristotle, which seems to show 
caution regarding its general applicability. At this point one may add that there 
are problems related to the application of the nemo plus argument which are not 
directly addressed by Aristotle, and which are more evident in the faulty use of 
the argument within the writings of Plato. Most of the examples that Aristotle 
gives seem to be in fact rather harmless in normal argumentation, involving 
ambiguous language use when describing physical interactions, particularly when 
handing over various objects, which reduces the problems related to the 
application of the argument to very narrow cases that would not normally fool 
anyone. Plato, on the other hand, presents the argument in an analogy with 
teaching, and it is this analogous use which seems to be the central problem 
regarding the use of argument, since when discussing non-corporeal entities it is 
much easier to confuse whether someone ‘has’ something and how can he ‘give’ 
it. In such cases of analogous application the perfect correlation that takes place 
when discussing material objects between what is given and what is received can 
lose its strength. Aristotle’s distinctions between categories therefore remains 
useful, but they must be taken further, not only to discuss the delivery of physical 
objects but also to assess cases of analogous application, in which there seems to 
be a greater danger of confusing different categories.  
 Despite the complications surrounding the nemo plus argument, the seemingly 
self-evident nature of the argument, together with its broad potential for 
analogous application, would secure its repeated application throughout the ages. 
It is moreover worth noting that in Greek non-legal sources there are several 
similar, alternative versions, which may be regarded as variations of the nemo plus 
argument. Such variations bear witness to the versatility of the argument, 
contributing to its widespread application in different contexts. One of this 
variations named by Aristotle is the question “has a man lost what he had and 
                                                 
61  Aristotle, De Sophisticis Elenchis 2, 165b7-8. 
62  Schreiber, Sophistical Refutations (2003), p. 191-192 n. 8. 
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contributing to its widespread application in different contexts. One of this 
variations named by Aristotle is the question “has a man lost what he had and 
                                                 
61  Aristotle, De Sophisticis Elenchis 2, 165b7-8. 
62  Schreiber, Sophistical Refutations (2003), p. 191-192 n. 8. 
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afterwards has not?” (εੁ ੖ τιȢ ਩Ȥων ੢στερον μ੽ ਩Ȥει ਕπȑȕαȜεν, Soph. El. 22, 
178b11). The existence of such variations is particularly interesting since other 
authors would make use of them, as happens with the so-called ceratina paradox, 
also known as the paradox of the horns (gr. κερατίνηȢ) or The Horned One. 
This paradox is reported by Diogenes Laertius to be a creation of Eubulides63, 
who was a contemporary of Aristotle and disciple of Euclid of Megara. Another 
text of Diogenes Laertius conveys the content of this paradox: 
 
Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 7,7,187: 
If you never lost something, you still have it; but you never lost 
horns, therefore you have horns (transl. Hicks, modified)64. 
 
Since the basic proposition of the ceratina paradox is true but incomplete, the 
problem of the syllogism resides in the second proposition, through which a 
fallacious conclusion is reached through the assumption that the other party has 
horns65, a fact which the interrogated person may appear to have acknowledged 
when accepting the first proposition. The inclusion of this variation of the nemo 
plus argument in the paradox may have contributed to the preservation of this 
notion in later authors, since the ceratina paradox would become a commonplace 
in the following centuries. However, Eubulides and his work suffered a 
significant discredit in later ages66, which may have also drawn suspicion to the 
use of the argument in general67. 
 Another text which testifies to the influence and survival of variations of the 
nemo plus argument in the Greek world is to be found much later in the New 
Testament, where St. Paul writes in his First Epistle to the Corinthians “What do 
                                                 
63  Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 2,10,108-109: τોȢ δૃ 
Ǽ੝κȜείδου διαδοȤોȢ ਥστι κα੿ Ǽ੝ȕουȜίδηȢ ੒ ȂιȜȒσιοȢ ੔Ȣ κα੿ ποȜȜοઃȢ ਥν διαȜεκτικૌ 
ȜόγουȢ ਱ρώτησε τόν τε ȥευδόμενον κα੿ τઁν διαȜανșȐνοντα κα੿ ਹȜȑκτραν κα੿ 
ਥγκεκαȜυμμȑνον κα੿ σωρίτην κα੿ κερατίνην κα੿ ĳαȜακρόν περ੿ τοȪτου ĳησί τιȢ τ૵ν 
κωμικ૵ν οਫ਼ριστικઁȢ δૃ Ǽ੝ȕουȜίδηȢ κερατίναȢ ਥρωτ૵ν κα੿ ȥευδαȜαȗόσιν ȜόγοιȢ τοઃȢ 
૧ȒτοραȢ κυȜίων ਕπોȜșૃ ਩Ȥων ǻημοσșȑνουȢ τ੽ν ૧ωποπερπερȒșραν ਥ૴κει γὰρ α੝τοῦ κα੿ 
ǻημοσșȑνηȢ ਕκηκοȑναι κα੿ ૧ωȕικώτεροȢ ੫ν παȪσασșαι ੒ δૃ Ǽ੝ȕουȜίδηȢ κα੿ πρઁȢ 
ਝριστοτȑȜην διεĳȑρετο κα੿ ποȜȜὰ α੝τઁν διαȕȑȕȜηκε (“To the school of Euclid belongs 
Eubulides of Miletus, the author of many dialectical arguments in an interrogatory form, 
namely, The Liar, The Disguised, Electra, The Veiled Figure, The Sorites, The Horned 
One, and The Bald Head. Of his it is said by one of the Comic poets: ‘Eubulides the 
Eristic, who propounded his quibbles about horns and confounded the orators with falsely 
pretentious arguments, is gone with all the braggadocio of a Demosthenes.’ Demosthenes 
was probably his pupil and thereby improved his faulty pronunciation of the letter R. 
Eubulides kept up a controversy with Aristotle and said much to discredit him” [transl. 
Hicks, modified]). 
64  “Ǽ੅ τι ο੝κ ਕπ੼ȕαȜεȢ τοῦτ
 ਩ȤειȢǜ κ੼ρατα δ
 ο੝κ ਕπ੼ȕαȜεȢǜ κ੼ρατ
 ਙρ
 ਩ȤειȢ”. 
65  Sorensen, History of Paradox (2003), p. 95. 
66  Sorensen, History of Paradox (2003), p. 88-89. 
67  See e.g. Seneca, Epistulae 45,8 and 49,8, where he uses this paradox as an example of the 
little benefit derived from the study of dialectics. 
 
you have that you have not received?” (1 Cor 4:7: “τ઀ δ੻ ਩ȤειȢ ੔ ο੝κ ਩ȜαȕεȢ;”)68. 
The wording in St. Paul offers a clear resemblance to Aristotle’s “what a man has, 
he has received” (“οੂ δ੻ κα੿ ੪Ȣ ੔ ਩Ȥει ਩Ȝαȕεν”, Soph. El. 22, 178b11). Although 
it is no novelty that the writings of St. Paul contain several references to Greek 
commonplaces or literary sources69, this particular case rather seems to be an 
allusion to a well-known argument in the Greco-Roman world than a direct 
reference to Aristotle himself, and thus bears witness to the dissemination of this 
notion. 
 The nemo plus argument in the meantime had made its way into the Roman 
world, where proof of its application can be found in the works of Cicero. Just as 
in Plato, Aristotle and Eubulides, the argument has a rather shady position within 
Cicero’s production: it does not feature in general works such as his Topica, but it 
is instead used to favour his own arguments in a couple of speeches. The first 
references to the argument can be found in his third speech against the Agrarian 
Laws (63 BC) of Servilius Rullus. Here Cicero accuses Rullus of attempting to 
obtain through the law a legal title over lands which were confiscated in the 
context of Sulla’s proscriptions, and which Rullus and others occupied 
unlawfully, “in order to have what he does not have” (ut ipse habeat quod non 
habet)70. The nemo plus is not used here as an actual argument which conclusively 
proves a point, but rather as a word play which enhances his speech. An 
argumentative use of the nemo plus can be found a few years later in Cicero’s Pro 
Flacco (59 BC): 
 
Cicero, Pro Flacco 56,4: Queritur gravis, locuples, ornata civitas, 
quod non retinet alienum; spoliatam se dicit, quod id non habet 
quod eius non fuit71. 
 
The context of this text is the following: Lucius Valerius Flaccus, a distinguished 
client of Cicero, is being prosecuted for his past activities as governor in Asia72. 
Among other misdeeds, Flaccus is accused by the city of Tralles of taking the 
money that a number of cities had deposited in it. As Alexander notes, Cicero’s 
                                                 
68  English transl. of the New American Standard Bible. Rendered in the Latin Vulgate as: 
“Quid autem habes quod non accepisti?” Similarly, St. John the Evangelist puts in the 
mouth of St. John the Baptist that “A man can receive nothing unless it has been given 
him from heaven” (transl. New American Standard Bible) (John 3:27: “ο੝ δ઄ναται 
ਙνșρωποȢ Ȝαμȕ੺νειν ο੝δ੻ ਨν ਥὰν μ੽ ઝ δεδομ੼νον α੝τ૶ ਥκ τοῦ ο੝ρανοῦ”) Rendered in 
the Latin Vulgate as: “Non potest homo accipere quicquam nisi fuerit ei datum de caelo”. 
69  See in particular Renehan, Classical Greek Quotations (1973), p. 17-45. 
70  Cicero, De Lege Agraria 3,13,7. 
71  “A responsible, wealthy, and magnificent city complains because it does not keep 
something that belongs to someone else; it says it has been robbed, because it does not 
have that which it did not own” (transl. Alexander). 
72  For a complete account on the case see Alexander, Prosecution in the Ciceronian Era (2002), 
p. 78-97. 
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65  Sorensen, History of Paradox (2003), p. 95. 
66  Sorensen, History of Paradox (2003), p. 88-89. 
67  See e.g. Seneca, Epistulae 45,8 and 49,8, where he uses this paradox as an example of the 
little benefit derived from the study of dialectics. 
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The context of this text is the following: Lucius Valerius Flaccus, a distinguished 
client of Cicero, is being prosecuted for his past activities as governor in Asia72. 
Among other misdeeds, Flaccus is accused by the city of Tralles of taking the 
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68  English transl. of the New American Standard Bible. Rendered in the Latin Vulgate as: 
“Quid autem habes quod non accepisti?” Similarly, St. John the Evangelist puts in the 
mouth of St. John the Baptist that “A man can receive nothing unless it has been given 
him from heaven” (transl. New American Standard Bible) (John 3:27: “ο੝ δ઄ναται 
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69  See in particular Renehan, Classical Greek Quotations (1973), p. 17-45. 
70  Cicero, De Lege Agraria 3,13,7. 
71  “A responsible, wealthy, and magnificent city complains because it does not keep 
something that belongs to someone else; it says it has been robbed, because it does not 
have that which it did not own” (transl. Alexander). 
72  For a complete account on the case see Alexander, Prosecution in the Ciceronian Era (2002), 
p. 78-97. 
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arguments “are so weak as to give credence to the prosecution’s case”73. Among 
these arguments we find the attempt to ridicule the position of Tralles by arguing 
that it claims to have been robbed, even when what was taken was not its own. 
The use of the nemo plus argument in such a case shows the imperfections of its 
application within a legal context. A core issue of this imperfect use is the 
ambiguity regarding whether Tralles ‘had’ the money: as a depositary, on the one 
hand, the city did ‘have’ the money in a material sense, but on the other hand 
this also implies that it did not ‘have’ it as its owner. From a legal point of view, 
the sole fact that the city held the money in deposit would appear to be enough 
to grant it the active legal standing necessary to claim it back74, as follows clearly 
from the writings of later jurists. One may however not discard that this was not 
yet clear in the 1st century BC, which makes it difficult to determine what 
Cicero is precisely up to here. If Tralles had the active legal standing, Cicero 
would be attempting to distract the attention from the legal aspects of the trial by 
using the nemo plus argument in a way which only takes into account the verb ‘to 
have’ in the sense of ‘to own’. In this way he would manage to present the 
position of the prosecutor as preposterous, since the city would be claiming 
something which it never had. If this was the case, it would moreover be 
noteworthy that the first evidence of application of the argument in a legal 
context in Rome would be completely inaccurate from a legal perspective, 
serving exclusively the cause of rhetoric. However, if jurists would not grant 
active legal standing to a non-owner, Cicero would appear to be stressing the 
proper legal outcome through a topical argument. Accordingly, the exact 
significance granted to the argument within a legal context remains difficult to 
determine in this case. 
 The nemo plus argument appears to have consolidated itself in Rome in the 
course of the 1st century AD, where numerous references of its use in different 
contexts are to be found. Seneca in particular makes extensive use of the 
argument in his moral writings, specifically when discussing whether an evil man 
can give something good to the wise man. The contrast between these two 
prototypical types of men is a common feature in stoic moral philosophy, which 
is for a great part governed by the thought that evils and goods are opposites75. 
Seneca argues in his De constantia sapientis that, since the evil man has absolutely 
no goodness in him, he cannot bestow a good gift on the wise man, because “a 
man must have before he can give” (habere enim prius debet quam dare)76. This idea 
is again conveyed in Seneca’s treatise ‘On Benefits’ (De beneficiis), where it is 
                                                 
73  Alexander, Prosecution Ciceronian era (2002), p. 93. 
74  Alexander, Prosecution Ciceronian era (2002), p. 93, particularly n. 66. 
75  Seneca, De beneficiis 5,12,5: “mala bonaque dissentiunt nec in unum eunt”. 
76  Seneca, De constantia sapientis 8,1-2: “Et sapienti nihil deest quod accipere possit loco 
muneris, et malus nihil potest dignum tribuere sapiente; habere enim prius debet quam 
dare, nihil autem habet quod ad se transferri sapiens gavisurus sit. Non potest ergo 
quisquam aut nocere sapienti aut prodesse, quoniam divina nec iuvari desiderant nec laedi 
possunt, sapiens autem vicinus proximusque dis consistit, excepta mortalitate similis deo”. 
 
argued that no benefit can be given to an evil man, since he will turn any good 
he receives into something evil. At the end of his explanation on whether an evil 
man may receive something good, Seneca rounds up his argument by pointing 
out that the evil man cannot give a benefit, not only because he lacks the desire 
to do good77, but also because no one can give what he does not have (quoniam 
nemo potest, quod non habet, dare)78. The nemo plus argument therefore fulfils a clear 
role in Seneca’s dual system of good and evil, being applied in a fully consistent 
way. Interesting from a legal perspective, moreover, is the fact that the formula 
“nemo potest, quod non habet, dare” already shows a remarkable resemblance to the 
variations the nemo plus argument would adopt in Roman jurisprudence. 
 The use of the argument in Seneca’s moral philosophy has the interesting 
feature of shifting the application of the nemo plus outside the context of dialectic 
argumentation and rhetoric, as was the case in previous authors such as Plato, 
Aristotle and Cicero. Seneca, while making use of the nemo plus to enhance his 
ideas and to derive specific conclusions, has a distant attitude towards dialectics, 
and even shows contempt for the intellectual challenges surrounding the 
application of the ceratina paradox79. Accordingly, when using the nemo plus 
argument, Seneca appears to adapt a well-known argument to his own interests, 
pulling it out from the dialectical context where it was to be found traditionally.  
 The dissemination of the argument outside dialectics in the 1st century AD is 
also confirmed by a curious application of it by Pliny the Elder when describing a 
certain kind of fig tree that never ripens, but that makes other trees ripen, which 
according to him implies that this fig “bestows on another tree what it has not 
got itself” (quod ipsa non habet alii tribuens)80. Particularly noteworthy is that this 
idea is not used argumentatively, but simply to highlight a curious circumstance 
regarding a particular tree. This application is also interesting due to the fact that 
Pliny indicates that the tree does  give what it does not have itself, thereby 
making reference to the nemo plus argument as a commonplace, without being 
interested in discussing the underlying problem – whether someone or something 
may give what he does not have. Finally, it should be observed that the formula 
used by Pliny also foreshadows the wording which would be adopted by Roman 
jurists, particularly through the words ‘ipsa non habet’.  
 Another application of the nemo plus argument outside the field of dialectics 
can be found in the Enchiridion of Epictetus, who wonders: “who is able to give 
                                                 
77  Seneca presents in De beneficiis 4,11,2 a series of cases in which the evil man would give 
something, having however always the intention of receiving something in return.  
78  Seneca, De beneficiis 5,12,7: “Ergo nihil potest ad malos pervenire, quod prosit, immo nihil, 
quod non noceat. Quaecumque enim illis contigerunt, in naturam suam vertunt et extra 
speciosa profuturaque, si meliori darentur, illis pestifera sunt. Idea nec beneficium dare 
possunt, quoniam nemo potest, quod non habet, dare; hic bene faciendi voluntate caret”. 
79  Seneca, Epistulae 45,8 and 49,8. 
80  Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia 15,79,4: “caprificus vocatur e silvestri genere ficus 
numquam maturescens, sed quod ipsa non habet alii tribuens, quoniam est naturalis 
causarum transitus aeque ut e putrescentibus gignatur aliquid”. 
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another what he does not himself have?” (τίȢ δ੻ δοῦναι δȪναται ਦτȑρ૳ ਘ μ੽ ਩Ȥει 
α੝τόȢ)81. The argument is however used in this context only in passing, while 
discussing a broader issue. Accordingly, unlike in Seneca’s writings, the nemo plus 
argument bears no particular value within the moral philosophy of Epictetus. 
 Despite the widespread use of the nemo plus argument in multiple contexts – 
even without fulfiling an argumentative function – its natural ground of 
application seems to have continued to be the dialectic argumentation and 
rhetoric, as the work of Quintilian shows: 
 
Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 5,10,66: Pecuniam credidisse te dicis; 
aut habuisti ipse aut ab aliquo accepisti aut invenisti aut surripuisti. 
Si neque domi habuisti neque ab aliquo accepisti et cetera, non 
credidisti (transl. Butler).82 
 
Quintilian presents this argument when showing how division may serve for 
refutation. In this particular case it is significant that the division consists in 
mentioning all possible ways in which someone could acquire money which he 
would later lend, showing that if he did not acquire it in the first place he would 
not have been able to lend it. This is a clear application of the nemo plus 
argument variation “what a man has, he has received”. The acquaintance of 
Quintilian with this argument – or at least one of its variations – becomes 
manifest further in the text, where he introduces the statement “A man has not 
lost what he did not have” (Quod quis non habuit, non perdidit)83. This argument is 
presented, along with other less compelling ones84, as an example of arguments 
similar to those derived from necessary or probable consequences (ex 
                                                 
81  Epictetus, Enchiridion 24,2: ਕȜȜȐ σοι οੂ ĳίȜοι ਕȕοȒșητοι ਩σονται. τί ȜȑγειȢ τઁ ਕȕοȒșητοι; 
ο੝Ȥ ਪȟουσι παρὰ σοῦ κερμȐτιον· ο੝δ੻ ποȜίταȢ ૮ωμαίων α੝τοઃȢ ποιȒσειȢ. τίȢ ο੣ν σοι 
εੇπεν, ੖τι ταῦτα τ૵ν ਥĳ¶ ਲμ૙ν ਥστιν, ο੝Ȥ੿ δ੻ ਕȜȜότρια ਩ργα; τίȢ δ੻ δοῦναι δȪναται ਦτȑρ૳, ਘ 
μ੽ ਩Ȥει α੝τόȢ ³κτોσαι ο੣ν´ ĳησίν ³੆να ਲμε૙Ȣ ਩Ȥωμεν´. (But your friends will be without 
assistance? What do you mean by being ‘without assistance’? They will not have paltry 
coin from you, and you will not make them Roman citizens. Well, who told you that 
these are some of the matters under our control, and not rather things which others do? 
And who is able to give another what he does not himself have? ‘Get money, then,’ says 
some friend, ‘in order that we too may have it’ [transl. Oldfather]). 
82  Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 5,10,66: “You say that you lent him money. Either you 
possessed it yourself, received it from another, found it or stole it. If you did not possess it, 
receive it from another, find or steal it, you did not lend it to him” (transl. Butler).  
83  Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 5,10,74. 
84  Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 5,10,74: “Nec sunt his dissimilia ideoque huic loco 
subiicienda, com et ipsa naturaliter congruent: Quod quis non habuit, non perdidit; Quem 
quis amat, sciens non laedit; Quem quis heredem suum esse voluit, carum habuit, habet, 
habebit”. (Similar to these are the following arguments, which must therefore be classed 
under this same head, since it is to this that they naturally belong: ‘A man has not lost what 
he never had’: ‘A man does not wittingly injure him whom he loves’: ‘If one man has 
appointed another as his heir, he regarded, still regards and will continue to regard him 
with affection’ [transl. Butler]). 
 
consequentibus sive adiunctis). Quintilian, however, gives these arguments a higher 
status, considering them undoubted (indubitata) and therefore having almost the 
force of ‘absolute indications’ (paene signorum immutabilium)85. 
 Quintilian offers the peculiarity of conferring this variation of the nemo plus 
argument a privileged position in terms of validity, going as far as qualifying it as 
‘undoubted’. This contrasts with the use of the argument in Cicero’s Pro Flacco, 
where it receives an evidently fallacious application. This argument, however, 
does not appear to have an absolute validity in Quintilian, which is clear not only 
by the somewhat doubtful examples he mentions next to it, but also by the 
explicit reference to these arguments having ‘almost’ (paene) the same force of 
absolute indications. In any case, the inclusion of this argument in such an 
explicit way in the work of Quintilian shows that it was still used among the 
rhetoricians and dialecticians of the 1st century AD. Moreover, it should be borne 
in mind that the ceratina paradox continued to be discussed during the 1st and 2nd 
centuries AD, being mentioned in passing by Quintilian86 and Lucian87, and 
extensively analysed by Gellius88, all of which shows the subsistence of one 
variation of the nemo plus argument among dialecticians. 
 The analysis of the literary sources shows that the nemo plus argument was in 
use in different contexts around the 2nd century AD, which is about the time its 
first traces are found in legal argumentation, as will be shown in the next section. 
The evolution presented up to this period shows the extra-legal origins of the 
argument in the field of dialectics, but the applications it received in Rome went 
far beyond this field, which prevented the nemo plus argument from having a 
uniform significance in the Roman world. Nonetheless, the argument retained a 
place in argumentative contexts and particularly within rhetoric, considering its 
use by Cicero and the fact that it was preserved in Quintilian’s repertoire. 
Accordingly, it can be regarded as a topical argument that can be applied in 
different contexts in order to demonstrate the truth of a statement. Besides this 
restricted role, the nemo plus argument assumes within the Roman world the 
form of a broad commonplace that could be brought up in various contexts, 
serving thus as a versatile reference point which at times appears to convey a 
proverbial truth – as used by Seneca and Epictetus – but at the same time could 
                                                 
85  Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 5,10,74: “Sed cum sint indubitata, vim habent paene 
signorum immutabilium” (However, such arguments, being undoubted, have almost the 
force of absolute indications [transl. Butler]). 
86  Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 1,10,5: “non quia ceratinae aut crocodilinae possint facere 
sapientem, sed quia illum ne in minimis quidem oporteat falli” (not that acquaintance with 
the so-called ‘horn’ or ‘crocodile’ problems can make a man wise, but because it is 
important that he should never trip even in the smallest trifles [transl. Butler]). 
87  Lucian, Symposium 23: ੆να μ੽ τ૵ν ਕπόρων ε੅πω τι κερατίναν ਲ਼ σωρείτην ਲ਼ șερίȗοντα 
Ȝόγον (I shall not mention any of the fallacies like ‘the horns’, ‘the heap’, or ‘the mower’ 
[transl. Harmon]). 
88  Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 16,2,8-13 and 18,2,9. 
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be openly contradicted – as Pliny the Elder does to emphasize the uniqueness of 
a particular tree. 
 The fact that the nemo plus argument constitutes a topical argument and a 
broad commonplace in Roman culture leaves open the question of its validity 
and significance, which may vary according to the context. This fact is 
nonetheless relevant to approach the argument in Roman jurisprudence, since it 
shows that the Romans would not identify a self-evident truth behind this idea 
that would place it above any suspicion. On the contrary, even among 
dialecticians the nemo plus argument appeared as a dangerous starting point due 
the fallacious forms of reasoning which could be derived from it. In fact, in a 
considerable number – if not the majority – of cases the application of the 
argument in non-legal sources involves some form of awkwardness or mistake. 
Moreover, as a commonplace it only enjoyed a very relative value, which even 
made it possible to state that one may give what one does not have in order to 
emphasize a particular idea. This evidence by itself enables us to shift the starting 
point that Roman law scholars have assumed so far, according to which the nemo 
plus argument by its very nature had to be free from exceptions. This seems to be 
in fact the underlying thought not only of those scholars who claim its flawless 
nature in the form conveyed by Justinian, but also of those who consider that the 
argument as presented in D. 50,17,54 cannot be accepted on account of the 
exceptions it could experience. As shown above, the argument did not present 
itself as self-evident and free from exceptions within Roman culture, being often 
applied in an incorrect way, which is why one may not assume beforehand that 
Roman jurists necessarily had to apply it in a way which would be systematically 
flawless. 
 A final point which must be borne in mind is that the condition of the nemo 
plus as a commonplace implies that it must have been fairly well-known among 
educated Romans, and therefore it does not seem possible to assert beforehand 
that Roman jurists would draw it exclusively from one specific source. One 
could speculate that, since the place of origin and most common application of 
the nemo plus argument resides in the study of dialectics, it would seem likely that 
this argument made its way into legal science through the writings of dialecticians 
and rhetoricians. Nonetheless, the argument was so widespread by the 2nd 
century AD that it appears to have acquired a certain proverbial value, which 
makes it difficult to determine a priori what would have been the main source of 
inspiration for jurists. The Roman legal sources must therefore be approached 
with an open mind regarding the value and significance of the nemo plus 
argument. 
 
  
 
3. Development and significance of the nemo plus rule in classical 
Roman law 
 
While the best-known formulations of the nemo plus rule in Roman law are those 
laid down in D. 50,17,54 (Ulp. 46 ed.) and D. 41,1,20pr (Ulp. 29 Sab.), there are 
numerous other texts which give account of this argument, the neglect of which 
has prevented scholars from adequately understanding the significance of the nemo 
plus rule. In fact, the earlier uses of the nemo plus argument within legal reasoning 
suggest that this commonplace gradually assumed a place of relevance within 
juristic writings. This offers a more nuanced view on the significance of the nemo 
plus rule. The first references to the argument in Roman law appear in fact 
around one century earlier than Ulpian’s formula, in the writings of Javolenus: 
 
D. 41,2,21pr (Jav. 7 ex Cassio): Interdum eius possessionem, cuius 
ipsi non habemus, alii tradere possumus, veluti cum is, qui pro 
herede rem possidebat, antequam dominus fieret, precario ab herede 
eam rogavit.89 
 
Javolenus opens this passage by generally declaring that a man may sometimes 
confer a possession which he does not have himself, presenting as an example of 
this general statement the case of someone who possessed pro herede, and who 
begins to possess precario after requesting the object in these terms from the real 
heir, even when the latter never became possessor of the object90. As the first 
known application of the nemo plus argument among Roman jurists, the text 
offers the remarkable feature of using this commonplace as a mere reference 
point. In other words, Javolenus does not apply the nemo plus to describe a 
general rule or to derive a particular solution, but simply to point out the curious 
circumstance that sometimes one may confer a possession which the person who 
granted it did not have. This approach to the nemo plus would therefore resemble 
some of the most casual applications of this commonplace, such as the one made 
by Pliny when describing his wild fig trees. The non-argumentative use of the 
nemo plus by Javolenus would therefore prove that this commonplace had only a 
relative value since its first applications in Roman law. 
 Another early application of the argument, this time by Julian, is reported by 
Ulpian: 
 
                                                 
89  D. 41,2,21pr: “Sometimes a man can confer on another possession of a thing which he 
does not himself possess; this happens, for instance, when, before he has thereby acquired 
ownership, a person possessing as heir obtains a precarium of it from the actual heir” (transl. 
Watson). 
90  The case has been recently analysed in detail by Biavaschi, Ricerche sul precarium (2006), 
p. 117 ff. 
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D. 27,10,10pr (Ulp. 16 ed.): Julianus scribit eos, quibus per 
praetorem bonis interdictum est, nihil transferre posse ad aliquem, 
quia in bonis non habeant, cum eis deminutio sit interdicta91.  
 
If the text truly reproduces Julian’s opinion, then this jurist would have offered 
an application of the argument that foreshadows later developments, presenting 
in fact a similar wording to that used by D. 50,17,54 in the formula “nihil 
transferre posse ad aliquem, quia in bonis non habeant”. This application of the nemo 
plus argument in the context of the praetorian prohibitions to dispose has the 
interesting feature of merely emphasizing a legal problem which is in itself 
relatively clear. In fact, the outcome remains the same if the whole argument is 
removed from the text, since the decisive element for the failure to transfer 
ownership is that the transferor is forbidden to alienate (cum eis deminutio sit 
interdicta). The argument is therefore used here as an element of persuasion which 
merely emphasizes that the person concerned cannot transfer ownership. The 
nemo plus appears therefore as a topical argument in favour of the given solution, 
rather than as a decisive element which determines the outcome of the case. It is 
moreover noteworthy that the argument is not used in a completely accurate 
way, since Julian goes too far when declaring that the transferor cannot transfer 
anything (nihil), which is a clear overstatement, considering that praetorian 
prohibitions only imply the inability to transfer the praetorian ownership, and 
that they do not prevent the transfer of the dominium ex iure Quiritium.  
 In the course of the 2nd century AD the references to the nemo plus argument 
in legal sources multiply, although it is often not clear whether Roman jurists 
have this argument in mind or are inadvertently conveying a similar notion. At 
this point, it is worth noting that countless legal decisions could be seen as 
applications of the nemo plus argument, but one should refrain from assuming that 
in all those cases jurists had this particular argument in mind, especially 
considering that these solutions could be simply inspired by common sense and 
rationality. Considering all of these cases to be applications of the nemo plus 
argument would not only assume a very principle-based thinking among Roman 
jurists, but would as well bring an excessive amount of evidence which may be 
unrelated to the problem, thereby making the analysis of the rule more vague. 
Accordingly, is seems advisable to favour a conservative approach, which limits 
the study of this problem to cases where the nemo plus argument – or a variation 
of it – is explicitly brought up within the decision. 
 Among the doubtful cases of application of the nemo plus argument, one may 
identify as early examples another text of Julian, in a case where a woman 
intercedes on behalf of someone else, and then is denied the exceptio based on the 
Senatusconsultum Velleianum on account of having received the complete amount 
                                                 
91  D. 27,10,10pr: “Julian wrote that those who were forbidden to deal with their goods by 
the praetor could not convey anything to anybody, because they have no goods since they 
are forbidden to alienate” (transl. Watson). 
 
of the debt from the debtor – who for some reason did not pay directly to Titius, 
his creditor92. Julian justifies this solution by declaring “neque enim eam periclitari, 
ne eam pecuniam perdat, cum iam eam habeat” (for she is not in danger of losing that 
money since she already has it), which seems to evoke dialectical questions of the 
kind “do you, or do you not, have what you have not lost?” It is however by no 
means clear that Julian has the nemo plus argument in mind in this case. Another 
doubtful case of application can be seen in D. 30,73pr93, where Gaius discusses 
the terms of a will in which the testator orders his heir “to arrange that Lucius 
may have a hundred”. Gaius concludes that such terms imply that the heir must 
give one hundred to Lucius, since “nobody can arrange that I have a hundred 
unless he gives them to me” (quia nemo facere potest, ut ego habeam centum, nisi mihi 
dederit). The wording used in this solution and its somewhat logical nature may 
give the impression that a reference to the nemo plus argument is being made, but 
once again the text is not completely conclusive, and one cannot discard that 
Gaius had other considerations – e.g. of grammatical nature – in mind. 
 Leaving these cases aside, there is another text of Gaius in which scholars for 
centuries94 have seen an application of the nemo plus argument: 
 
D. 9,4,27,1 (Gai. 6 ed. prov.): Ex his quae diximus de servo qui 
alicui pignoris iure obligatus est deque statulibero et de eo cuius usus 
fructus alienus est, apparet eum, qui alienum servum in iure suum 
esse responderit, quamvis noxali iudicio teneantur, non tamen posse 
noxae deditione ipso iure liberari, quia nullum ad actorem 
dominium transferre possunt, cum ipsi domini non sint. Certe 
tamen, si ex ea causa traditum postea dominus vindicet nec litis 
aestimationem offerat, poterit per exceptionem doli mali repelli95. 
 
Gaius discusses in this text a case of noxal delivery performed over someone else’s 
slave, showing that ownership over the slave will not be transferred, but that the 
                                                 
92  D. 16,1,16pr (Jul. 4 ad Urs. Ferocem): “Si mulier contra senatus consultum Velleianum pro 
me intercessisset Titio egoque mulieri id solvissem et ab ea Titius eam pecuniam peteret, 
exceptio huius senatus consulti non est profutura mulieri: neque enim eam periclitari, ne 
eam pecuniam perdat, cum iam eam habeat”. 
93  D. 30,73pr (Gai. 3 de legatis ad edictum praetoris) “Si heres iussus sit facere, ut Lucius centum 
habeat, cogendus est heres centum dare, quia nemo facere potest, ut ego habeam centum, 
nisi mihi dederit”. 
94  See e.g. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis (Aalen 1993), lib. 3, cap. 16, 1. 
95  D. 9,4,27,1: “From what we have said about a slave whom someone else holds as a pledge, 
or a statuliber, or a slave in whom someone else has a usufruct, it is clear that he who 
declares on oath that someone else’s slave is his, cannot as a matter of course be freed of 
liability by noxal surrender even though he is liable to a noxal action; because those who 
are not owners themselves cannot transfer ownership to the plaintiff. It is true, however, 
that if a slave is handed over in this way and his owner later brings a vindication but does 
not offer to pay damages as calculated, he can be met by the defence of fraud” (transl. 
Watson, modified). 
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acquirer will anyhow be protected with an exceptio doli if the owner exercises the 
rei vindicatio and does not want to pay the fine. What is interesting for the 
purpose of this study is the way in which Gaius gives his opinion: he does not 
simply declare that ownership will not be transferred by someone who is not the 
owner, but goes further to offer the general statement according to which “those 
who are not owners themselves cannot transfer ownership”. This idea is rather 
superficial from a technical point of view, since it adds nothing new to the basic 
fact that only the owner – or a duly authorized non-owner – can transfer 
ownership. Lenel even considers that this explanation cannot have been given in 
the original text of Gaius96. However, one can understand this reference as an 
element of persuasion which enhances the solution to the case. This application 
resembles in fact that of Julian quoted above (D. 27,10,10pr), with the nemo plus 
fulfiling an argumentative role which is however of no great moment from a 
technical perspective to determine the outcome of the case. 
 Another similar application of the nemo plus argument is found in the writings 
of Papinian: 
 
D. 20,1,3,1 (Pap. 11 resp.): Per iniuriam victus apud iudicium rem 
quam petierat postea pignori obligavit: non plus habere creditor 
potest, quam habet qui pignus dedit. Ergo summovebitur rei 
iudicatae exceptione, tametsi maxime nullam propriam qui vicit 
actionem exercere possit: non enim quid ille non habuit, sed quid in 
ea re quae pignori data est debitor habuerit, considerandum est97. 
 
Having wrongfully lost an action to claim an object belonging to him, the 
defeated owner mortgages the object he lost98. Since he was defeated in court, his 
ownership was not acknowledged, and therefore he could not validly mortgage 
the object99. Papinian expresses this circumstance through a clear application of 
the nemo plus argument, declaring that the pledge creditor cannot have more than 
what the debtor gave him. The comparison between what one party has and 
what the other gets, as well as the wording used, leave little room for doubt that 
Papinian is making use of the nemo plus argument. The fact that we are facing the 
application of a topical argument which is destined merely to enhance a solution 
is moreover confirmed by the rather unnecessary nature of the statement “non 
                                                 
96  Lenel, Die Formeln (1927), p. 14: “Diese Trivialität möchte auch ich dem Gaius nicht 
zutrauen; sie wird eine in den Text eingedrungene Glosse sein, deren Inhalt aber sachlich 
zutrifft”. 
97  D. 20,1,3,1: “One who wrongfully lost an action later mortgaged the property which he 
had claimed. The creditor can have no better right than the debtor. So he will be defeated 
by the plea of res iudicata, although the successful defendant can bring no action of his own. 
The point to consider is the right of the debtor who made the mortgage, not the lack of 
right of the successful defendant” (transl. Watson, modified). 
98  The text is studied in detail by Ankum, Pap. D. 20.1.3 (1988), p. 1141-1143. 
99  Pugliese, Ingiustizia della sentenza (1962), p. 766. 
 
plus habere creditor potest, quam habet qui pignus dedit”, which does not add any 
technical elements for the solution of the case. Finally, it is worth noting that the 
application of the argument by Papinian is not completely accurate, since it was 
in fact possible for an authorized non-owner to constitute a pledge over an object 
belonging to someone else100. This shows that the nemo plus is not applied here as 
a notion with an independent systematic value, but merely as an additional – and 
even dispensable – argument.  
 The nemo plus argument appears to have consolidated in legal circles around 
the time of Papinian, considering that it appears repeatedly in the works of two 
of his collaborators from the time he was praefectus praetorio, Paul and Ulpian. Paul 
formulates the argument in an almost identical way to that of his contemporary 
Ulpian, showing that even the wording used in this regard had to some extent 
become fixed among this generation of jurists: 
 
D. 50,17,120 (Paul 12 ed.): Nemo plus commodi heredi suo 
relinquit, quam ipse habuit101. 
 
The text shows an evident application of the nemo plus argument in the context 
of the law of succession, where it is used to determine the relationship between 
the condition of the deceased and that of the heir. That the argument appears 
again applied in a different context shows that its consolidation among jurists did 
not imply that it acquired a technical significance which would bind its 
application to a particular legal problem. Moreover, in another application of the 
argument, Paul shows its limited validity within legal reasoning: 
 
D. 7,1,63 (Paul libro singulari de iure singulari): Quod nostrum non 
est, transferemus ad alios: veluti si qui fundum habet, quamquam 
usum fructum non habeat, tamen usum fructum cedere potest102. 
 
Paul explains that the constitution of usufruct by the owner would imply 
transferring something which he does not have, namely the usufruct. Since the 
owner does have the uti and frui over his own goods, Paul’s assertion may appear 
to be little more than a word play, as Longchamps in fact regards it103. However, 
there are in fact other texts in which this and other iura in re aliena that the owner 
                                                 
100  See Chapter 1, Section 2(b) above. 
101  D. 50,17,120: “No one leaves a greater benefit to his heir than he himself had” (transl. 
Watson). 
102  D. 7,1,63: “We can transfer to others what we do not ourselves have; for example, if a 
man has an estate, then even although he does not have the usufruct, he can still grant a 
usufruct to another” (transl. Watson). 
103  Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 79: “(…) the conclusion that we can transfer to 
another what is not our own is a play on words and constructions, an uncomplicated 
brainteaser without any substantive value”. For the view of the usufruct as a pars dominii see 
Kaser, RPR (1971) I, p. 448 n. 8. 
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96  Lenel, Die Formeln (1927), p. 14: “Diese Trivialität möchte auch ich dem Gaius nicht 
zutrauen; sie wird eine in den Text eingedrungene Glosse sein, deren Inhalt aber sachlich 
zutrifft”. 
97  D. 20,1,3,1: “One who wrongfully lost an action later mortgaged the property which he 
had claimed. The creditor can have no better right than the debtor. So he will be defeated 
by the plea of res iudicata, although the successful defendant can bring no action of his own. 
The point to consider is the right of the debtor who made the mortgage, not the lack of 
right of the successful defendant” (transl. Watson, modified). 
98  The text is studied in detail by Ankum, Pap. D. 20.1.3 (1988), p. 1141-1143. 
99  Pugliese, Ingiustizia della sentenza (1962), p. 766. 
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100  See Chapter 1, Section 2(b) above. 
101  D. 50,17,120: “No one leaves a greater benefit to his heir than he himself had” (transl. 
Watson). 
102  D. 7,1,63: “We can transfer to others what we do not ourselves have; for example, if a 
man has an estate, then even although he does not have the usufruct, he can still grant a 
usufruct to another” (transl. Watson). 
103  Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 79: “(…) the conclusion that we can transfer to 
another what is not our own is a play on words and constructions, an uncomplicated 
brainteaser without any substantive value”. For the view of the usufruct as a pars dominii see 
Kaser, RPR (1971) I, p. 448 n. 8. 
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may appear to have are categorically distinguished from his ownership for 
practical reasons104. Paul is therefore addressing an important issue in this text, 
using the nemo plus as a reference point to convey his ideas. The application of 
the nemo plus in this context resembles that of Javolenus in D. 41,2,21pr, since it 
is used as a mere reference point and not in an argumentative way, which once 
again shows the relative and instrumental value of this notion among Roman 
jurists.  
 The argument as presented by Paul shows significant textual similarities with 
the applications which are found in Ulpian, who is the author who makes more 
references to it. There are once again doubtful cases, where it is not entirely clear 
whether the argument is being applied, as happens in D. 47,2,12pr, where Ulpian 
explains why the actio furti reverted to the owner in case a garment was stolen 
from an insolvent fuller, since the fuller’s insolvency would prevent the owner 
from being compensated for his loss. In order to justify this solution, Ulpian 
declares that “qui non habet quod perdat, eius periculo nihil est” (he who has nothing 
to lose has nothing at risk)105. This last sentence is in the words of Du Plessis 
“rather cryptic”106, and it is indeed difficult to understand such statement if not as 
a reference to a commonplace similar to Quintilian’s “quod quis non habuit, non 
perdidit”107, which would therefore enhance Ulpian’s conclusion. The exact 
relation of this notion to the nemo plus argument, however, remains difficult to 
determine. Beyond any doubt, however, is the application of the nemo plus 
argument by Ulpian to the transfer of ownership by traditio: 
 
D. 41,1,20pr-1 (Ulp. 29 Sab.): Traditio nihil amplius transferre 
debet vel potest ad eum qui accipit, quam est apud eum qui tradit. 
Si igitur quis dominium in fundo habuit, id tradendo transfert, si 
non habuit, ad eum qui accipit nihil transfert. (1) Quotiens autem 
dominium transfertur, ad eum qui accipit tale transfertur, quale fuit 
apud eum qui tradit: si servus fuit fundus, cum servitutibus transit, si 
liber, uti fuit: et si forte servitutes debebantur fundo qui traditus est, 
cum iure servitutium debitarum transfertur. Si quis igitur fundum 
dixerit liberum, cum traderet, eum qui servus sit, nihil iuri servitutis 
                                                 
104  See especially D. 45,1,56,1 (Jul. 52 dig.); D. 8,4,10 (Ulp. 10 Sab.); D. 7,6,5pr. (Ulp. 17 
ed.). Regarding servitudes, D. 8,2,26 (Paul 15 Sab.) explicitly states: “nulli enim res sua 
servit”. Buckland, Text-book (1963), p. 260. 
105  D. 47,2,12pr. (Ulp. 29 Sab.): “Itaque fullo, qui curanda poliendave vestimenta accepit, 
semper agit: praestare enim custodiam debet. Si autem solvendo non est, ad dominum 
actio redit: nam qui non habet quod perdat, eius periculo nihil est” (And so a fuller who 
accepts garments for cleaning and attention will always have the action because he is liable 
for their safekeeping. But if he should be insolvent, the action reverts to the owner; for he 
who has nothing to lose has nothing at risk [transl. Watson, modified]). 
106  Du Plessis, Letting and hiring (2012), p. 65. 
107  Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 5,10,74: “A man has not lost what he did not have” (transl. 
Butler, modified).  
 
fundi detrahit, verumtamen obligat se debebitque praestare quod 
dixit108. 
 
This text is one of the best-known applications of the nemo plus argument, and 
for that same reason it has traditionally been targeted as an example of the 
inaccuracies which the compilers introduced by referring a flawless principle to 
the transfer of ownership by traditio. Such an idea, however, takes as a starting 
point the infallibility of the nemo plus argument, something which cannot be 
claimed by referring to the literary nor the legal sources reviewed so far. As a 
topical argument, the nemo plus is at most used to support a legal outcome, but 
nothing indicates that it would have in itself a specific normative value. Also 
here, Ulpian appears to resort to the nemo plus simply to enhance his general 
notions on the transfer of ownership, and particularly the fact that the position of 
the acquirer will be determined by that of the transferee. The caution of Ulpian 
when phrasing this text is moreover relevant to evaluate its significance, as can be 
seen in the words ‘debet vel potest’, which according to Feenstra show that this 
statement would be regarded by Roman jurists “as an ‘argument’ at most”, and 
that “very likely they were also conscious that this was not a problem of logic, 
but rather of belonging”109. It is nonetheless worth noting that the nemo plus 
argument is presented at the beginning of the text and formulated in abstract 
terms, departing thus from the secondary position which it has in the writings of 
previous jurists. This circumstance, however, does not seem to imply a higher 
level of validity of the rule, but most likely its consolidation and individualization 
among jurists. It is moreover difficult to determine whether this way of bringing 
up the argument was really exceptional, considering that other applications of the 
argument were taken from their original context in order to form regulae such as 
D. 50,17,54 and D. 50,17,120. 
 That the consolidation of the argument did not imply a change in its validity 
becomes evident by the modest role granted to it by Ulpian when bringing it up 
in another context, where he declares that it is no novelty that such statement 
                                                 
108  D. 41,1,20pr-1: “Delivery should not and cannot transfer to the transferee any greater title 
than resides in the transferor. Hence, if someone conveys land of which he is owner, he 
transfers his title; if he does not have ownership, he conveys nothing to the recipient. (1) 
Now whenever ownership is transferred, it passes to the transferee in the same case as it 
was with the transferor; if the land was subject to a servitude, it passes with the servitude; if 
it was unencumbered, it passes in that state; and if, perchance, there should be servitudes 
due to the land, it passes with the servitudes due. Hence if someone declared land to be 
unencumbered and when he conveyed it and it was in fact subject to a servitude, he would 
in no way affect the validity of the servitude; but he would place himself under an 
obligation and have to make reparation for his assertion” (transl. Watson). 
109  Feenstra, Romeinsrechtelijke grondslagen (1994), p. 50: “De Romeinse juristen hebben deze 
uitspraak hoogstens als een ‘argument’ gezien; zij waren er zich waarschijnlijk ook van 
bewust dat het geen kwestie van logica maar eerder van behoren is; vgl. de voorzichtige 
formulering van Ulpianus: ‘mag of kan’ [debet vel potest]”. 
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suffers exceptions, specifically regarding the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner: 
 
D. 41,1,46 (Ulp. 65 ed.): Non est novum, ut qui dominium non 
habeat, alii dominium praebeat: nam et creditor pignus vendendo 
causam dominii praestat, quam ipse non habuit110. 
 
The text presents a clear application of the nemo plus argument, to which Ulpian 
has no problem to formulate some exceptions. This text was originally included 
in book 65th of Ulpian’s Commentary to the Edict, which dealt with the 
curatores111, and therefore ‘et’ would indicate that the creditor pignoris is another 
exception to the general rule, next to the alienation performed by a curator. This 
shows that Ulpian was not willing to defend the universal validity of the 
argument as Aristotle would have done it, but instead was content with using it 
as a reference point which allowed exceptions to be made, just like Javolenus and 
Paul. 
  At this point one may confront the allegations of interpolation concerning 
D. 41,1,20pr, according to which this text would originally have referred to the 
mancipatio. The main point behind such an allegation is that only in the context 
of a mancipatio would the text be free from exceptions. However, such an 
interpretation fails to understand the role of the nemo plus argument in Roman 
jurisprudence, assuming – without further evidence than its apparent infallible 
value – that such a statement could not suffer exceptions. Such an interpretation 
not only neglects the evolution of the argument in the literary sources, which 
shows that we are facing a mere topical argument, but even omits the evidence 
of D. 41,1,46, where under the same title of the Digest Ulpian’s opinion is 
recorded, acknowledging the limited scope of the argument. Moreover, even if 
the text did in fact refer originally to the mancipatio, it would nonetheless suffer 
several exceptions in which a non-owner could transfer ownership through 
mancipatio, as has been shown in Chapter 5 above. In any case, the possibility of 
interpolation in D. 41,1,20pr cannot be completely discarded. Lenel’s motivation 
to refer this text to a case of mancipatio may be due to the fact that the text deals 
with the transfer of ownership over a fundus italicus. However, considering that 
Ulpian writes at the beginning of the 3rd century AD, when the praetorian 
remedies protecting the acquirer of a res mancipi by traditio were fully developed, 
it is not unlikely that the problem of the particular mode to transfer ownership 
                                                 
110  D. 41,1,46: “There is no novelty in the fact that one who does not have ownership may 
yet confer ownership upon another; for also a creditor, in selling a pledge, gives title to an 
ownership which he did not himself have” (transl. Watson, modified). 
111  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 797 sets forth the rubric De constituendo curator et administratione 
eius under the general title De curatore bonis dando (Lenel, EP [1927], p. 434), and in col. 
798 n. 1 relates the text of D. 41,1,46 to D. 42,7,2,1, which deals with the sale performed 
by a curator. 
 
used by the parties may have, in the eyes of Ulpian, been irrelevant altogether to 
the outcome of this case. Only if it could be proven that the word dominium 
refers unequivocally to the dominium ex iure Quiritium should one conclude that 
the text referred to the mancipatio, but there is no conclusive evidence on this 
point112. Moreover, it is also possible that Lenel himself may have been 
influenced by the prevailing views of the second half of the 19th century, 
according to which traditional acts belonging to the ius civile could not be carried 
out by a ‘direct representative’. This dogmatic consideration may have well 
played a role in Lenel’s conjecture, making it therefore even more debatable113. 
According to this evidence, one cannot completely rule out the possibility of a 
mechanical interpolation in D. 41,1,20pr, but even if the text did in fact refer to 
the mancipatio, the significance and role of the nemo plus argument in it would not 
change at all, since the statement would still have exceptions.  
 Ulpian offers other applications of the nemo plus argument, all of which are 
recorded within Book 50 Title 17 as regulae iuris. One of the clearest applications 
takes place in the law of succession, where Ulpian sets the extent of the right of 
the legatee:  
 
D. 50,17,160,2 (Ulp. 70 ed.): Absurdum est plus iuris habere eum, 
cui legatus sit fundus, quam heredem aut ipsum testatorem, si 
viveret.114 
 
The text has a very similar wording to other applications of the nemo plus 
argument by Ulpian, with the additional value of being applied to yet another 
legal matter, namely the position of the legatee. The categorical terminology used 
(absurdum est) shows once again that the argument fulfils the task of enhancing a 
decision, but the fact that it comes from Ulpian also indicates that despite the 
emphatic language, the argument in itself has no universal systematic pretensions: 
                                                 
112  See Chapter 5, Section 1 above. 
113  Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 208 n. 13 claims the opposite, namely that the ideas 
expressed by Lenel, EP (1907), p. 184 n. 2 show that the author accepts the possibility of a 
mancipatio by a non-owner. Mitteis derives this conclusion from the mere fact that Lenel 
claims that different cases of transfer of ownership – among which two take place through 
a non-owner – should refer to provincial land, because the delivery appears to have taken 
place through traditio. Mitteis seems to read too much in between the lines on this point. 
On the other hand, Lenel explicitly suggested to Krüger and Mitteis that a mancipatio could 
not take place by a non-owner acting voluntate domini. See on this point Buckland, 
Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 375. It seems more likely that Lenel had not made up his 
mind completely at the time he was working on the Palingenesia, which is why different 
views can be found on the problem. For instance, according to Lenel, Paling. (1889) I, 
col. 250 n. 1 and 2 a curator furiosi could in fact perform the in iure cessio over the 
administered goods. 
114  D. 50,17,160,2: “It is absurd for someone to whom an estate has been bequeathed to have 
a better right than the heir or the testator himself if he is living” (transl. Watson). 
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112  See Chapter 5, Section 1 above. 
113  Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht (1908), p. 208 n. 13 claims the opposite, namely that the ideas 
expressed by Lenel, EP (1907), p. 184 n. 2 show that the author accepts the possibility of a 
mancipatio by a non-owner. Mitteis derives this conclusion from the mere fact that Lenel 
claims that different cases of transfer of ownership – among which two take place through 
a non-owner – should refer to provincial land, because the delivery appears to have taken 
place through traditio. Mitteis seems to read too much in between the lines on this point. 
On the other hand, Lenel explicitly suggested to Krüger and Mitteis that a mancipatio could 
not take place by a non-owner acting voluntate domini. See on this point Buckland, 
Mancipatio by a slave (1918), p. 375. It seems more likely that Lenel had not made up his 
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114  D. 50,17,160,2: “It is absurd for someone to whom an estate has been bequeathed to have 
a better right than the heir or the testator himself if he is living” (transl. Watson). 
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in this particular context it is intimately related to the outcome of a case, but it 
may as well be contradicted in other contexts. 
 Up to this point three regulae iuris – D. 50,17,54; D. 50,17,120 and 
D. 50,17,160,2 – have been mentioned which convey in a clear way the nemo 
plus argument, but there are several others regarding which it is not entirely clear 
whether Roman jurists had this argument in mind: 
 
D. 50,17,11 (Pomp. 5 Sab.): Id quod nostrum est sine facto nostro 
ad alium transferri non potest.115 
 
D. 50,17,59 (Ulp. 3 disputationum): Heredem eiusdem potestatis 
iurisque esse, cuius fuit defunctus, constat.116 
 
D. 50,17,62 (Jul. 6 dig.): Hereditas nihil aliud est, quam successio in 
universum ius quod defunctus habuerit.117 
 
D. 50,17,83 (Pap. 2 definitionum): Non videtur rem amittere, quibus 
propria non fuit.118 
 
D. 50,17,143 (Ulp. 62 ed.): Quod ipsis qui contraxerunt obstat, et 
successoribus eorum obstabit.119 
 
D. 50,17,156,2 (Ulp. 70 ed.): Cum quis in alii locum successerit, 
non est aequum ei nocere hoc, quod adversus eum non nocuit, in 
cuius locum successit.120 
 
D. 50,17,175,1 (Paul 11 ad Plautium): Non debeo melioris 
condicionis esse, quam auctor meus, a quo ius in me transit.121 
 
                                                 
115  D. 50,17,11: “Something which is ours cannot be transferred to another without any 
action on our part” (transl. Watson). 
116  D. 50,17,59: “It is agreed that an heir has the same powers and rights as the deceased 
person” (transl. Watson). 
117  D. 50,17,62: “An inheritance is nothing other than the succession to every right possessed 
by the deceased person” (transl. Watson). This text has a finds a strong parallel in 
D. 50,16,24 (Gai. 6 ed. prov.). 
118  D. 50,17,83: “People are not regarded as losing something if it was not their property” 
(transl. Watson). 
119  D. 50,17,143: “Anything which stands in the way of those who contracted will stand in 
the way also of their successors” (transl. Watson). 
120  D. 50,17,156,2: “If someone has succeeded to the position of another, it is not right that 
he should be damaged by the fact that he was not responsible for any damage against the 
person to whose place he has succeeded” (transl. Watson). 
121  D. 50,17,175,1: “I must not be in a better position than my author from whom the right 
passes to me” (transl. Watson) 
 
D. 50,17,177pr (Paul 14 ed.): Qui in ius dominiumve alterius 
succedit, iure eius uti debet.122 
 
Most of these texts contrast the legal position of an individual by comparing it to 
that of his predecessor, presenting the position of the former – and often, more 
specifically, his ius – as the fundamental criterion to determine the situation of the 
latter. Accordingly, in substantial terms, all of these regulae would agree with the 
nemo plus argument. Some also appear to reproduce rhetorical notions, such as 
D. 50,17,83, which resembles Quintilian’s “quod quis non habuit, non perdidit”123. 
There are moreover other elements which could indicate a link with other 
applications of the nemo plus argument, such as the categorical language of some 
of them124, the broad formulation of the statements and the possibility of suffering 
exceptions125. Nonetheless, as already mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
it can be argued that countless decisions of Roman jurists do in fact agree in 
substantial terms with the nemo plus argument or resemble one of its variations, 
without necessarily having the argument in mind. The doubts on this point are 
especially justified considering that none of the regulae just presented actually 
convey the basic idea that ‘one cannot give/lose what one does not have’, unlike 
other texts presented so far126. Accordingly, the similarities between these various 
rules and the nemo plus argument cannot be regarded as conclusive evidence of 
the application of this argument in Roman jurisprudence. 
 There is of course another regula which conveys the nemo plus argument, and 
which was generalized into the nemo plus rule: 
 
D. 50,17,54 (Ulp. 46 ed.): Nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre 
potest, quam ipse haberet127. 
 
The original location of the text shows that Justinian’s nemo plus rule is a 
generalization of yet another practical application of the nemo plus argument. The 
main question is: what does this generalization imply regarding the original role 
of the argument? As shown in Section 1 above, several authors in the course of 
the 20th century claimed that it should have referred to the in iure cessio hereditatis, 
                                                 
122  D. 50,17,177pr: “Someone who succeeds into the legal position or right of property of 
another must accept his rights” (transl. Watson). 
123  Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 5,10,74. 
124  D. 50,17,59: constat; D. 50,17,62: nihil aliud est. 
125  An illustration of the way in which such regulae could be plagued with exceptions can be 
seen in the study on D. 50,17,59 made by Wallinga, Heredem eiusque potestatis (2008), 
p. 99-116. 
126  See e.g. nullum… transferre possunt, cum ipsi domini non sint (D. 9,4,27,1); non plus habere… 
potest, quam habet qui… dedit (D. 20,1,3,1); nemo plus… relinquit, quam ipse habuit 
(D. 50,17,120); nihil amplius transferre… potest ad eum qui accipit, quam est apud eum qui tradit 
(D. 41,1,20pr); qui dominium non habeat, alii dominium praebeat (D. 41,1,46); plus iuris habere 
eum… quam… ipsum testatorem (D. 50,17,160,2). 
127  D. 50,17,54: “No one can transfer to another a better right than he has himself”. 
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presenting as the dogmatic ground for this that only then would the regula be free 
from exceptions, since the in iure cessio could only be performed by the owner 
himself. However, it was already shown in Chapter 5 above that the impossibility 
of a non-owner to perform an in iure cessio finds no strong support in the sources 
and stems from an outdated dogmatic reconstruction of the evolution of ‘direct 
representation’ in Roman law. Moreover, so far it has been stressed that the 
various applications of the nemo plus argument did in fact suffer all kinds of 
exceptions. The dogmatic ground for such a conjecture is therefore nonexistent. 
What then could explain Lenel’s own reconstruction, according to which the 
text should refer to an in iure cessio hereditatis? It should be borne in mind that 
before him, Godefroy had conjectured that the rule should have originally dealt 
with the relationship between the heir and the deceased, proposing that it should 
have read more or less as follows: “nemo plus iuris ad haeredem transmittere potest, 
quam ipse haberet”128. Lenel may have chosen a reference to the in iure cessio 
hereditatis due to the fact that the rule has traditionally been applied in the context 
of the transfer of ownership – along with D. 41,1,20pr – and also by the use of 
the verb transferre, which can normally be identified in contexts of transfer of 
ownership. Both reasons would however be inconclusive, since the nemo plus 
argument was also applied in the context of the law of succession – particularly 
by Paul in D. 50,17,120, which uses an almost identical wording to that of 
D. 50,17,54 – and because transferre can also be used within the law of 
succession129. Lenel’s conjecture is therefore as plausible as that of Godefroy, and 
none of them affect the outline of the nemo plus argument as presented so far. 
Considering that it is almost impossible to establish with certainty the original 
context of D. 50,17,54, further reconstructions made on the assumption of any of 
the above hypotheses seem to go too far without enough evidence, such as 
Schulz’ theory that the text would refer to a case in which an heres legitimus 
performed the in iure cessio hereditatis without having acquired the inheritance by 
aditio hereditatis130. This is only one of countless possible reconstructions, and 
Schulz appears to be overconfident when extracting all of this information from 
the mere use of the imperfect subjunctive ‘haberet’ instead of the present 
indicative ‘habet’131. 
                                                 
128  Godefroy, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Geneva 1653), p. 242: “Ad alium ait lex, v.g. ad 
haeredem: nemo scilic. plus juris in haeredem transmitter potest, quam ipse habet vel 
haberet”, and later once more: “Nemo plus iuris ad haeredem transmittere potest, quam 
ipse haberet”. 
129  See Heumann/Seckel, Handlexikon (1926), s.v. Transferre, and particularly the applications 
of this verb in D. 5,2,6,2, D. 36,1,21, D. 36,2,4 and 5pr., Gai 2,286a. To this one may add 
the use of transferre in D. 50,17,11 (Pomp. 5 Sab.), which appears to refer generally to the 
transfer of ownership, but which originally referred to the legatum per vindicationem, as 
pointed out by Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 94, nr. 437, n. 6. 
130  Schulz, Classical Roman Law (1951), p. 352. 
131  This is also the opinion of Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 71 n. 31, who qualifies 
the reconstruction of Schulz as “doubtful”. 
 
 Now that we have a complete outline of the application of the nemo plus 
argument in Roman classical law, its significance for classical jurists becomes 
more clear. In most cases, the argument is applied to enhance a particular legal 
solution which is by itself relatively clear: a non-owner cannot transfer 
ownership, the heir cannot obtain more than what belonged to the deceased, the 
pledge creditor will have no right to the thing pledged if it did not belong to the 
debtor, etc. In none of these cases does the argument, from a strictly dogmatic 
perspective, play a decisive role determining the outcome of the case, but merely 
contributes to make it more convincing. Moreover, it is worth noting that the 
nemo plus argument is applied by these jurists to different problems, such as the 
prohibitions to dispose, the noxal surrender of a slave, the constitution of a 
pledge, etc., which shows that the argument did not acquire a technical meaning, 
remaining a topical argument that could be applied in various contexts. The use 
of the argument in different contexts was favoured by its very broad terms, since 
words such as habere and dare can be applied to various situations within the legal 
world132. 
 That Roman jurists did not attach a particular legal significance to the 
argument becomes moreover clear by the texts where it is only brought up as a 
reference point, in order to show that in fact one may give what one does not 
have, as can be seen in Javolenus (D. 41,2,21pr), Paul (D. 7,1,63) and Ulpian 
(D. 41,1,46)133. Accordingly, the analysis of the different applications of the 
arguments reveals that it does not constitute an overarching principle which 
could by itself determine the outcome of a problem. This, however, does not 
imply that the argument fulfils no systematic role whatsoever, since it seems to 
have been viewed by jurists as a general rule, a starting point for legal reasoning 
which can serve as a useful guideline in various contexts, but could at the same 
time be subject to exceptions and restrictions when needed. To understand this 
modest role it may be helpful to recall that, regarding the transfer of ownership 
by traditio, the general rule is that only the owner may validly transfer 
ownership134, a starting point which is in fact stressed in a number of cases 
through the nemo plus argument. Nonetheless, this general rule may suffer 
exceptions in which a non-owner has potestas alienandi, which also leads a jurist 
like Ulpian to openly admit that the nemo plus argument itself may have 
exceptions in the legal world. 
 Having previously studied the literary sources reproducing the argument, one 
may still wonder about the exact way in which the argument made its way into 
the legal world. As mentioned above135, the fact that the argument was broadly 
                                                 
132  See Heumann/Seckel, Handlexikon (1926), s.v. Dare (p. 120-121); Habere (p. 233-234). 
133  Similarly, the rule “plus est in re quam in existimatione” had no normative value and could in 
fact be reversed, as Ulpian does in D. 29,2,15 (Ulp. 7 Sab.) when claiming “plus est in 
opinione quam in veritate”. See Chapter 2, Section 6(b) above. 
134  Chapter 1, Section 3 above. 
135  Chapter 6, Section 2 i.f. 
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used as a commonplace prevents from narrowing down its origin to a particular 
source. Nonetheless, considering that in legal texts the nemo plus argument is 
mostly used as an element of persuasion, it would appear that it found its place 
within the legal world mainly through the influence of rhetoric. The fact that the 
argument serves mainly the purpose of emphasizing a particular legal outcome 
suggests that jurists may be adopting a notion which rhetoricians would brandish 
in order to favour the position they defended, but which had no decisive 
meaning in the legal sphere. This influence would however only account for the 
cases in which the argument is used as a valid starting point, since in those 
applications where it is brought up to prove the exact opposite – that someone 
may give what he does not have – it appears that jurists resort to this idea as a 
broad commonplace deprived of argumentative value, which can nonetheless 
graphically illustrate a particular legal problem. 
 The place which the nemo plus argument holds within Roman legal writings 
raises the question: why would jurists feel the need to resort to the argument in 
the first place? An answer to such question can be drawn from the relationship 
between law and rhetoric, which remains however a highly controversial point 
among modern scholars. When approaching this subject, it should in the first 
place be borne in mind that the outcome of different problems may not have 
been so evident for the jurists developing new solutions, and that accordingly 
certain elements of persuasion could have played a significant role136, something 
which may be hard to grasp for a modern jurist, who can rely on clear-cut 
dogmatic concepts. Accordingly, the idea that the nemo plus argument only 
emphasizes an already clear solution should be nuanced if the outcome was not as 
evident for the Roman jurists as it seems to us. However, the cases examined so 
far do appear to have relatively predictable outcomes according to classical 
Roman law, which could signal that there are other elements which make the 
use of topical arguments useful. One may think at this point especially of the fact 
that jurists may have often been drawn to present their solutions in a way as clear 
as possible, considering that the addressees of their opinions would not be trained 
in law, as it would normally be the case of the iudex himself. In this context, 
remarks which could be superficial from a technical perspective could have been 
decisive for the success of an opinion. This point may be illustrated by reference 
to the application of the argument by Papinian in D. 20,1,3,1. The outcome of 
the case represents no novelty from a legal perspective, but there are elements 
which could be regarded as repugnant for a rudimentary notion of justice, since 
the rightful owner was wrongfully defeated in the first place. It even seems 
possible that the reluctance to accept this unfair sentence leads the defeated 
owner to behave as if he enjoyed the same position as before, thereby pledging 
the object. Under these circumstances, a layman may be inclined to agree with 
                                                 
136  See on this point Backhaus, In maiore minus (1983), p. 184 and Winkel, General principles 
(1996), p. 104-105. 
 
the rightful owner, allowing him to pledge what is regarded to belong to him, 
but the jurist will have no doubt: the rightful owner cannot any longer be 
regarded as such, since he was defeated in court. At this point, the statement “non 
plus habere creditor potest, quam habet qui pignus dedit” may be the key to breach the 
gap between jurists and laymen, making the outcome of the case as evident to 
the latter as it is to the former and discarding elements which are not legally 
relevant for the outcome of the case. 
 The nemo plus argument is particularly fit to be used for the sake of persuasion 
and emphasis due to its seemingly self-evident nature, conveying a very graphic 
mental image of a legal problem. Complex legal problems are instantly simplified 
by the reference to the more easily understandable world of material objects, 
where it is in fact impossible to conceive that someone may give what he does 
not have. Conversely, this mental image may play an equally useful role to stress 
that sometimes in the legal world someone may give what he does not have, 
thereby conveying a strict contrast with the material world. The relevance of the 
illustrative function of the nemo plus argument moreover becomes clear by 
comparing it to a similar argument drawn from the rhetorical writings and 
included within the Digest as a regula iuris: in maiore minus inest137. This argument 
was carefully studied by Backhaus138, who draws conclusions which help to 
elucidate the significance of the nemo plus argument. Just like this argument, in 
maiore minus inest is drawn by Roman jurists from the field of rhetoric139 and it is 
applied in order to solve particular problems, having however a more decisive 
role in order to determine the outcome of a case. This does not imply that it 
acquires a fixed systematic value, since its application in different contexts implies 
that its significance varies from one case to another140. What is more appealing for 
the present research is that Backhaus considers that the application of this 
argument would aim to make the outcome of a case more evident and 
understandable141. According to this author, the argument in maiore minus inest has 
a particularly illustrative nature (Bildhaftigkeit) due to the reference to the 
interactions of physical objects, where it becomes especially clear that a smaller 
part of a larger object is contained within the latter. Jurists would therefore have 
adopted an argument which by itself cannot determine the outcome of a case, 
but which makes it more eloquent and convincing. Such observations are equally 
applicable to the nemo plus argument, which by itself only serves as an emphatic 
                                                 
137  D. 50,17,110pr (Paul. 6 ed.); D. 50,17,21 (Ulp. 27 Sab.). 
138  Backhaus, In maiore minus (1983), p. 136-184 
139  The argument in maiore minus inest can for instance be found in Cicero, Topica 3,11; 4,23; 
18,68; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 5,10,87. On the origins of this argument see Backhaus, 
In maiore minus (1983), p. 140-142. 
140  One may at this point consider the application of this argument by Quintus Mucius 
Scaevola and Aquilius Gallus regarding legacies in D. 32,29,1 (Lab., 2 post. a Iav. Epit.), 
which would be discarded by later jurists. See on this case Backhaus, In maiore minus 
(1983), p. 169-172. 
141  Backhaus, In maiore minus (1983), p. 181-184. 
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starting point which conveys in a more eloquent way general rules of law, such as 
that only the owner may transfer ownership, adding an element of persuasion to 
the outcome through the reference to the world of material objects, where no 
one can deliver an object which he does not have. That the nemo plus argument 
fulfils a role of persuasion by means of its illustrative character would moreover 
explain why it is often conveyed alongside categorical expressions such as 
“absurdum est” (D. 50,17,160,2) despite the fact that jurists would not in fact 
bother to defend the flawless character of the argument. 
 While the way in which Roman jurists apply the nemo plus argument hints at 
an influence from rhetorical writings, it becomes clear at the same time that the 
works of Aristotle on dialectics were not taken into account to determine the 
scope of the argument. That the nemo plus argument serves the purpose of a 
starting point and not of an overarching principle can be explained through the 
complete neglect of the Aristotelian observations regarding the correct 
application of this argument. If Roman jurists would have been keen to preserve 
the purity of this notion, they could have introduced the necessary distinctions to 
show that in fact no one can give what he does not have. For example, if Ulpian 
had been concerned with preserving the validity of this argument in D. 41,1,46, 
he could have argued that the pledge creditor is no exception to the rule, since 
he will give what he materially has – i.e., the pledged object – and the ownership 
which the acquirer obtains is that of the debtor who gave the pledge. Roman 
jurists, however, did not bother themselves with these scholarly distinctions, 
being more interested in making use of the nemo plus argument as a 
commonplace that could help to illustrate a particular point. Aristotle’s advice is 
therefore neglected, and the application of the argument in classical jurisprudence 
shows how easily the nemo plus argument may lead to confusion when different 
‘categories’ are mixed, which is particularly easy when that which is discussed are 
not physical objects but intellectual entities.  
 That Aristotle’s considerations play no role in determining the scope of the 
argument does not, however, imply that the study of non-legal sources is 
irrelevant on this point, since other developments outside the legal world provide 
us with an essential insight in the way in which jurists would have approached 
the argument, and particularly its position within rhetorical writings, as well as its 
gradual expansion as a broad commonplace with a varied significance. Moreover, 
the fact that some literary sources were neglected by Roman jurists offers further 
insight into the ongoing debate regarding the influence of the general intellectual 
climate in Antiquity on the developments of Roman jurisprudence142, showing 
in the particular case of the nemo plus argument that jurists were much more 
oriented to offering convincing arguments than to building dogmatic 
constructions based on elaborate philosophical considerations. It is however 
                                                 
142  See on this subject Nörr, Der Jurist im Kreis (1976), p. 57-90; Winkel, Roman law in its 
intellectual context (2015), p. 9-24. 
 
worth noting that the contributions of Aristotle would not remain unnoticed by 
jurists, since they would have a decisive impact on the interpretation of the nemo 
plus argument among medieval scholars, as will be shown in Chapter 7. 
 The analysis of literary and legal sources containing the nemo plus argument 
provides us with a much more nuanced outlook regarding its significance for 
classical jurists. At the beginning of this chapter, three views regarding 
D. 50,17,54 were confronted, one in favour of an absolute validity of the rule 
contained in it, the other denouncing that it was rendered inaccurate through the 
activity of the compilers, and another one according to which it never was 
completely accurate to begin with. This last view seems to be the more adequate 
to describe the argument in classical jurisprudence, but it should be noted that 
the nemo plus argument is not always applied in the same way, and its exact 
significance can therefore only be described by resorting to several notions. 
Above all, the nemo plus is used as a topical argument by Roman jurists, relying 
on its apparent self-evident value and illustrative nature to make a legal outcome 
more convincing. When applied in this way, it usually serves to emphasize an 
idea which serves as a general rule in the legal world, such as that only the owner 
may transfer ownership. In this way, the argument is used mainly as a starting 
point for legal reasoning. In this emphatic and illustrative function, the argument 
is applied to different contexts, and does not fulfil in any of them a decisive role 
to determine the outcome of a case. In this sense, Roman jurists never 
approached the nemo plus as an overarching rule or a general principle which 
could by itself provide a legal solution, or that would systematically explain the 
various cases which would seemingly contradict it. A practical approach on the 
application of the rule remained therefore dominant in Roman law, which is 
why the nemo plus argument never fulfiled any systematic function other than to 
reaffirm what would be considered the general rule in different contexts. In this 
way, the argument could have exceptions, which is shown by the three texts in 
which jurists from different periods openly contradict the validity argument 
(D. 7,1,63, D. 41,1,46 and D. 41,2,20pr). The nemo plus is used in such contexts 
not so much as a topical argument, but rather as a commonplace, which through 
its illustrative nature may convey in an emphatic way the peculiarities of legal 
thinking as opposed to the physical reality. In such contexts, the almost 
proverbial value of this idea makes it a perfect tool to draw a reference point 
against which legal solutions can be contrasted. All of this excludes the main 
starting point of the traditional views on the argument, namely that the nemo plus 
should be free from exceptions. Modern scholars appear to be deceived by the 
seemingly self-evident character of the argument, as is particularly evident in 
Kaser’s comparison to the glass of water. It is moreover interesting that their 
approach appears to be largely influenced by the traditional interpretation of the 
ius commune of D. 50,17,54, which will be studied in the following chapter143. 
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4. The nemo plus argument and the traditio a non domino in post-classical 
law 
 
Classical sources show that jurists did not regard the nemo plus argument as an 
infallible principle which could fulfil a general systematic role when determining 
a particular legal outcome. It is however not evident that Justinianic law would 
approach this argument in the same way, considering that within the Digest it is 
conveyed as a regula iuris. The fact that the argument was abstracted from its 
context and presented on its own could suggest that a specific legal significance 
was granted to it in post-classical times, which calls for an overview of its 
applications after Paul and Ulpian. 
 It is first of all worth noting that the nemo plus argument did not crystalize 
into a fixed formula after Ulpian, since the argument is still found in later legal 
writings through a free wording and in different contexts. This can be seen in 
several constitutions, although in some cases it is rather dubious whether the 
nemo plus argument in particular is being applied, as happens with a constitution 
of the year 260 AD which declares through a general formula that no one can 
free someone else’s slave as if he were his own144. A more evident application of 
the argument is found in three constitutions of the time of Diocletian: 
 
C. 8,53(54),14 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 293): Si filius tuus res ad te 
pertinentes sponsae suae te non consentiente donavit, ad eam, quod 
non habuit, transferre non potuit145. 
 
C. 4,26,10,1 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 294): Quod si non habentes 
liberam peculii administrationem rem dominicam eo ignorante 
distraxerunt, neque dominium, quod non habent, in alium transferre 
possunt neque condicionem eorum servilem scientibus possessionis 
iustum adferunt initium (…)146. 
 
                                                 
144  C. 7,10,4 (Valerian/Gallienus, 260) “(…) Nemo enim alienum servum, quamvis ut 
proprium manumittat, ad libertatem producere potest”. 
145  C. 8,53(54),14: “If your son made a gift to his bride of objects belonging to you without 
your consent, he could not transfer to her what he did not have”. I would like to thank 
Dr. Benet Salway for the interesting insights he provided me for the correct interpretation 
of this text. 
146  C. 4,26,10,1: “But if slaves who do not have free management of their peculium sell the 
master’s property without his knowledge, they cannot transfer ownership which they do 
not have to another, not does such transfer give a lawful beginning of possession (so as to 
set the statute of limitation in motion) to those who know the servile condition of the 
seller (…)” (transl. Blume). 
 
C. 4,51,6 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 294): Nemo res ad te 
pertinentes non obligatas sibi nec ex officio vendendi potestatem 
habens distrahendo quicquam tibi nocere potuit147.  
 
The abstract formula “he could not transfer to her what he did not have” in the 
first text leaves no room for doubt concerning the application of the nemo plus 
argument. The same can be said about the application of the argument in 
C. 4,26,10,1, where “neque dominium, quod non habent, in alium transferre possunt” 
offers a considerable resemblance to other juristic formulations of the argument. 
The third text is more complex, since it introduces a large clause in which some 
exceptions to the general rule are given. This is all the more interesting, since the 
basic argument “Nemo res ad te pertinentes… distrahendo quicquam tibi nocere potuit” 
is confronted with some of the common exceptions which the nemo plus 
argument experiences in the legal world. 
 The three constitutions of Diocletian and Maximianus reproduced here not 
only show that the nemo plus argument had not acquired a fixed formula, but also 
that it continued to serve as a mere starting point or general rule for legal 
reasoning which faced exceptions. All three texts refer to the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner, and in all of them it is clearly shown that, in certain 
cases, ownership can be transferred by a non-owner, as happens when the son is 
authorized by the mother (C. 8,53(54),14), when the slave has the libera 
administratio peculii or acts directly authorized by his master (C. 4,26,10,1) and 
when a non-owner in general acts ex officio or sells pledged goods (C. 4,51,6). In 
other words, the nemo plus argument simply conveys the general rule that 
normally the owner will transfer ownership, having no further systematic scope 
by the end of the 3rd century. 
 The argument can also be envisaged in a constitution of 379 AD dealing with 
heretics, which prohibits them to teach the faith since they do not have it, or to 
ordain ministers, since they are not such themselves148. This application is 
however more related to the theological use of the nemo plus argument, which 
will be studied below149. The Pauli Sententiarum interpretatio, composed in the 5th 
century, also makes use of the nemo plus argument in a rather uncommon 
context, namely the judicial deposit, where it is said that someone cannot 
judicially deposit (sequestrare) what he does not have (quia non potest sequestrare, 
quod non habet)150. These examples show that the field of application of the 
                                                 
147  C. 4,51,6: “No one can injure you by selling your property not pledged to him or over 
which he has no power of sale by reason of his office” (transl. Blume). 
148  C. 1,5,2pr (Gratian/Valentinian/Theodosius, 379): “Omnes vetitae legibus et divinis et 
imperialibus constitutionibus haereses perpetuo conquiescant et nemo ulterius conetur 
quae reppererit profana praecepta vel docere vel discere: ne antistites eorundem audeant 
fidem insinuare, quam non habent, et ministros creare, quod non sunt...” 
149  Chapter 7, Section 1. 
150  PS Int. 5,36 ad § 1: “Quoties post auditam causam iudici possessor appellat, fructus 
possessionis, de qua agitur, dum secundae audientiae eventus in dubio est, merito 
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144  C. 7,10,4 (Valerian/Gallienus, 260) “(…) Nemo enim alienum servum, quamvis ut 
proprium manumittat, ad libertatem producere potest”. 
145  C. 8,53(54),14: “If your son made a gift to his bride of objects belonging to you without 
your consent, he could not transfer to her what he did not have”. I would like to thank 
Dr. Benet Salway for the interesting insights he provided me for the correct interpretation 
of this text. 
146  C. 4,26,10,1: “But if slaves who do not have free management of their peculium sell the 
master’s property without his knowledge, they cannot transfer ownership which they do 
not have to another, not does such transfer give a lawful beginning of possession (so as to 
set the statute of limitation in motion) to those who know the servile condition of the 
seller (…)” (transl. Blume). 
 
C. 4,51,6 (Diocletian/Maximianus, 294): Nemo res ad te 
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habens distrahendo quicquam tibi nocere potuit147.  
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ownership by a non-owner, and in all of them it is clearly shown that, in certain 
cases, ownership can be transferred by a non-owner, as happens when the son is 
authorized by the mother (C. 8,53(54),14), when the slave has the libera 
administratio peculii or acts directly authorized by his master (C. 4,26,10,1) and 
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147  C. 4,51,6: “No one can injure you by selling your property not pledged to him or over 
which he has no power of sale by reason of his office” (transl. Blume). 
148  C. 1,5,2pr (Gratian/Valentinian/Theodosius, 379): “Omnes vetitae legibus et divinis et 
imperialibus constitutionibus haereses perpetuo conquiescant et nemo ulterius conetur 
quae reppererit profana praecepta vel docere vel discere: ne antistites eorundem audeant 
fidem insinuare, quam non habent, et ministros creare, quod non sunt...” 
149  Chapter 7, Section 1. 
150  PS Int. 5,36 ad § 1: “Quoties post auditam causam iudici possessor appellat, fructus 
possessionis, de qua agitur, dum secundae audientiae eventus in dubio est, merito 
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argument had not been limited to the law of succession or the transfer of 
ownership inter vivos, remaining free of any particular dogmatic significance. 
 The nemo plus argument remained in use right up to the time of Justinian, as 
the following constitution shows: 
 
C. 6,43,3,2a (Justinian, 531): Nemo itaque ea, quae per legatum vel 
pure vel sub certo die relicta sunt vel quae restitui aliis disposita sunt 
vel substitutione posita, secundum veterem dispositionem putet esse 
in posterum alienanda vel pignoris vel hypothecae titulo adsignanda 
vel mancipia manumittenda. Sed sciat, quod hoc quod alienum est 
non ei liceat utpote sui patrimonii existens alieno iuri applicare, quia 
satis absurdum est et inrationabile rem, quam in suis bonis pure non 
possidet, eam ad alios posse transferre vel hypothecae pignorisve 
nomine obligare vel manumittere et alienam spem decipere151.  
 
This application of the argument takes place in the context of the Justinianic 
reform which suppressed the different kinds of legacies, granting an actio in rem to 
a legatee or a beneficiary of a trust (C. 6,43,1,1). In accordance with this 
innovation, Justinian decrees that an heir may no longer dispose in any way of 
these goods, since they belong to someone else (quod alienum est). When 
explaining this decision, it is declared that it is absurd and irrational that property 
which a party does not own may be transferred to someone else or be alienated 
in any other way (absurdum est et inrationabile rem, quam in suis bonis pure non 
possidet, eam ad alios posse transferre). The contrast between what the heir has and 
what he may transfer shows a clear application of the nemo plus argument, and the 
emphatic reductio ad absurdum reminds us of other classical applications of the nemo 
plus, such as D. 50,17,160,2. Just as in other cases, the emphatic wording used 
does not imply by itself that the argument has an overarching or absolute validity, 
but simply that it emphasizes the general rule that only the owner may transfer 
ownership. 
 That the nemo plus argument was alive and well in Justinianic times becomes 
moreover clear when examining the Paraphrasis of Theophilus, where the 
argument is brought up when describing the requirements for the transfer of 
                                                                                                                   
sequestrantur. Nam si petitor appellaverit, hoc ab eo non potest postulari, quia non potest 
sequestrare, quod non habet” (Girard/Senn, Textes de Droit Romain (1967), p. 407). 
151  C. 6,43,3,2a: “Therefore, let no one [heir] hereafter think that, according to the former 
law, he may alienate or pledge or mortgage property left as a legacy, either unconditionally 
or for a certain time, or property which he has been ordered to restore to others, or for 
which substitution in his place has been provided, or that he may manumit a slave in the 
same situation. But he must know that he may not make a grant of someone else’s 
property, as though it were his own, to another, because it is absurd and irrational that 
property which a party does not own unconditionally might be transferred, pledged, 
mortgaged, or manumitted by him, thus disappointing another’s hope” (transl. Blume, 
modified). 
 
ownership by delivery. Among these requirements, Theophilus points out that 
the tradens must be the owner, a statement which he then emphasizes by 
resorting to the nemo plus argument: 
 
Theoph. Par. 2,1,40: δεσπότην εੇναι τઁν TRADITEUONTA διὰ τοῦτο 
εੇπον ਥπειδ੽ ੒ μ੽ ੫ν δεσπότηȢ ο੝ δȪναται μεταșε૙ναι δεσποτείαν 
਴ν ο੝κ ਩Ȥει152. 
 
This reference to the argument in Theophilus’ didactic paraphrase shows that it 
had remained as a useful starting point to describe the transfer of ownership by 
traditio, being still used as such at the time of Justinian to explain that a non-
owner cannot convey ownership if he does not have it. The popularity of this 
argument in this context is moreover to be seen in the fact that Theophilus 
applies it again when discussing the acquisition by usucapion: 
 
Theoph. Par. 2,6pr: ੖τι μ੻ν ਥȐν τιȢ τઁ οੁκε૙όν μοι TRADITEUSૉ 
πρ઼γμα μεταĳȑρει τȒν προσοῦσαν α੝τ૶ δεσποτείαν 
συνωμοȜόγηται τί δ੻ ੖τι ਕȜȜότριόν τιȢ πρ઼γμα ο੤ ο੝κ ਷ν 
δεσπότηȢ ’ETRADITEUSE μοι ਛρα μεταĳȑρει ਥνταῦșα τ੽ν 
δεσποτείαν Ȝȑγομεν ੖τι ο੝δαμ૵Ȣǜ π૵Ȣ γȐρ ਴ν ο੝κ εੇȤεν τί ο੣ν 
μετȒγαγεν ਥπ
 ਥμ੻ α੝τ੽ν ਴ν εੇȤε νομ੽ν છτοι κατοȤȒν153. 
 
The nemo plus argument is once again used as a starting point to determine the 
outcome of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, since we are told that 
normally the non-owner will not transfer ownership through the rhetorical 
question “For how could he pass it, when he had not got it?” (π૵Ȣ γȐρ ਴ν ο੝κ 
εੇȤεν). The argument is therefore presented once again as self-evident. It is 
moreover interesting that Theophilus attempts a further clarification concerning 
what was really given, stating that the non-owner only gave the possession 
(νομȒ) which he had. This distinction is noteworthy considering that it is an 
isolated case where a jurist attempts to give a further explanation of the scope of 
the nemo plus argument by showing that the non-owner only gives that what he 
has, i.e. his possession over the object.  
 The evidence presented so far shows that the nemo plus argument was still in 
use among jurists in the time of Justinian, and that it did not crystallize into a 
                                                 
152  Theoph. Par. 2,1,40: “I have said that the deliverer must be owner because a non-owner 
cannot pass an ownership that he has not got” (transl. Murison). 
153  Theoph. Par. 2,6pr: “There is no question that, if a man delivers to me a thing that 
belongs to him, he passes his ownership in it. But how does the case stand if a man delivers 
to me a thing that he is not owner of? Does he, in this case, pass the ownership? The 
answer is: certainly not. For how could he pass it, when he had not got it? What then? He 
passed to me the possession or detention that he did have” (transl. Murison, Lokin et al., 
modified). 
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definitive formula after Ulpian, being applied still as an argument to address 
different problems. This, however, does not necessarily imply that the value of 
the argument remained unaltered, since there are traces of an evolution 
concerning the significance of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in the 
time of Justinian which imply a change in the value which jurists were willing to 
grant the nemo plus rule. This evolution consists in regarding the delivery by a 
non-owner in certain cases as performed by the owner himself, and therefore not 
as an actual exception to the general rule according to which the owner may 
transfer ownership. The main indication of this evolution comes from a 
comparison between the systematization of the problem in the Institutes of Gaius 
and in the Institutes of Justinian, and particularly the fact that, while Gaius 
mentions in Gai 2,64 three cases in which a non-owner may transfer ownership – 
the curator furiosi, the procurator and the pledge creditor – Justinian only mentions 
the pledge creditor in the equivalent text of Inst. 2,8,1154. The absence of any 
reference to the alienation by a procurator can be explained from a systematic 
perspective, since the case is dealt with earlier, when describing the requirements 
to transfer ownership. Just as in Gai 2,20, Justinian declares in Inst. 2,1,40 that 
ownership is transferred when the tradens is the owner (et a domino tradita 
alienatur). But instead of waiting until the title “Quibus alienare licet vel non” to 
describe the cases of the traditio by a non-owner, the compilers reproduce – with 
minor changes – in Inst. 2,1,42-43155 another text of Gaius, this time from his 
Res cottidianae, contained in the already mentioned text of D. 41,1,9,3-4. 
Particularly noteworthy is that within this systematic arrangement, Inst. 2,1,42 
appears to indicate an equivalence between the alienation performed by the 
owner and by an authorized non-owner, which could explain the absence of the 
procurator among the exceptions of Inst. 2,8,1. Since it was laid down earlier 
within the Institutes of Justinian that the delivery by an authorized non-owner 
would amount to a delivery performed by the owner himself, the alienation by a 
procurator needed no further comment within the 2nd book of Justinian’s 
Institutes, and its treatment as an exception to the general rule in Inst. 2,8,1 
would be out of place. 
 The tendency to attribute the alienation by a non-owner to the owner 
himself can also be seen in the way the law of Justinian deals with the alienation 
by a pledge creditor: 
                                                 
154  The case of the pupillus is also dealt with in Inst. 2,8,2, although it does not discuss the 
direct alienation by the tutor but rather the need for his authorization in various acts 
performed by the ward. It is accordingly no wonder that Theophilus in his paraphrase 
approaches this problem as a case where an owner cannot alienate, instead of focusing in 
the non-owner’s faculty to dispose, as can be seen in Theoph. Par. 2,8,2: ਯστιν εਫ਼ρε૙ν κα੿ 
ਙȜȜον δεσπότην ο੝ δυνȐμενον ਥκποιε૙ν τὰ οੁκε૙α πρȐγματα (There is to be found also 
another owner that cannot alienate his property [transl. Murison]). 
155  Inst. 2,1,42-43: “Nihil autem interest, utrum ipse dominus tradat alicui rem, an voluntate 
eius alius. (43) Qua ratione, si cui libera negotiorum administratio a domino permissa fuerit 
isque ex his negotiis rem vendiderit et tradiderit, facit eam accipientis”. 
 
Inst. 2,8,1: Contra autem creditor pignus ex pactione, quamvis eius 
ea res non sit, alienare potest. Sed hoc forsitan ideo videtur fieri, 
quod voluntate debitoris intellegitur pignus alienare, qui ab initio 
contractus pactus est, ut liceret creditori pignus vendere, si pecunia 
non solvatur. (…)156 
 
As noted above, this is the only case presented under the title “Quibus alienare licet 
vel non” of the Institutes of Justinian where a non-owner can transfer ownership. 
Nonetheless, the text quickly offers an alternative explanation which seems to 
discard its exceptional character, declaring that in fact this can be seen as taking 
place due to the previous authorization by the owner. Although this explanation 
is taken almost word for word from the Institutes of Gaius157, the systematic 
arrangement of both works gives the text a very different meaning. Gaius, on the 
one hand, presents this case after that of the procurator, and therefore his reference 
to the voluntas debitoris appears simply to throw some light on the legal grounds 
on which this alienation takes place. On the other hand, this same explanation 
has a different effect in the Institutes of Justinian, due to the fact that the pledge 
creditor is presented as the only case where a non-owner may transfer ownership, 
and it appears to indicate that this is in fact no real exception to the general rule, 
since the alienation takes place voluntate domini. In other words, while Gai 2,62-
64 narrows down the previous statement of Gai 2,20 according to which the 
tradens must be the owner, Inst. 2,8,1 seems to offer only an apparent exception 
to the rule that the tradens must be the owner, since the existence of the voluntas 
domini implies that the alienation by a pledge creditor can be set within the 
framework described Inst. 2,1,40-43. 
 The way in which the compilers approach the alienation by a non-owner 
appears to be ratified by the Paraphrase of Theophilus. First of all, it should be 
borne in mind that this author stresses the validity of the nemo plus argument 
within the transfer of ownership, and does not present any exceptions to it. 
Along with this fact, Theophilus stresses in various contexts that the tradens must 
be the owner158. The paraphrase to Inst. 2,1,42-43 is particularly illustrative on 
his views on the systematic arrangement of the traditio by a non-owner, being for 
                                                 
156  Inst. 2,8,1: “On the other side of the line, a creditor, under his contract, has power to 
alienate a pledge despite not being its owner. But here the explanation is perhaps that he 
alienates the pledge with the debtor’s authority, given by a term of the contract allowing 
the creditor the right to sell on failure to repay. (…)” (transl. Birks/McLeod). 
157  Compare Gai 2,64: “(…) Sed hoc forsitan ideo videatur fieri, quod voluntate debitoris 
intellegitur pignus alienari, qui olim pactus est, ut liceret creditori pignus vendere, si 
pecunia non solvatur”. 
158  See for instance the opening sentence of Theop. Par 2,1,41: ਝȜȜ
 εੁ μ੻ν δεσπότηȢ 
TRADITEUSૉ μοτ τઁ οੁκε૙ον πρ઼γμα ਕπઁ δωρε઼Ȣ ਲ਼ προικઁȢ ਲ਼ ਙȜȜηȢ οੂασδȒποτε αੁτίαȢ 
οੈον ਕπઁ PERMUTATIONOS ਕναμĳιȕόȜωȢ μεταĳȑρει τ੽ν δεσποτείαν ਥπ
 ਥμȑ (If an owner 
delivers to me property of his own by way of gift or of dowry, or on any other title 
whatsoever, such as exchange, there is not a shadow of doubt but he passes me the 
ownership (transl. Murison, modified). 
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would amount to a delivery performed by the owner himself, the alienation by a 
procurator needed no further comment within the 2nd book of Justinian’s 
Institutes, and its treatment as an exception to the general rule in Inst. 2,8,1 
would be out of place. 
 The tendency to attribute the alienation by a non-owner to the owner 
himself can also be seen in the way the law of Justinian deals with the alienation 
by a pledge creditor: 
                                                 
154  The case of the pupillus is also dealt with in Inst. 2,8,2, although it does not discuss the 
direct alienation by the tutor but rather the need for his authorization in various acts 
performed by the ward. It is accordingly no wonder that Theophilus in his paraphrase 
approaches this problem as a case where an owner cannot alienate, instead of focusing in 
the non-owner’s faculty to dispose, as can be seen in Theoph. Par. 2,8,2: ਯστιν εਫ਼ρε૙ν κα੿ 
ਙȜȜον δεσπότην ο੝ δυνȐμενον ਥκποιε૙ν τὰ οੁκε૙α πρȐγματα (There is to be found also 
another owner that cannot alienate his property [transl. Murison]). 
155  Inst. 2,1,42-43: “Nihil autem interest, utrum ipse dominus tradat alicui rem, an voluntate 
eius alius. (43) Qua ratione, si cui libera negotiorum administratio a domino permissa fuerit 
isque ex his negotiis rem vendiderit et tradiderit, facit eam accipientis”. 
 
Inst. 2,8,1: Contra autem creditor pignus ex pactione, quamvis eius 
ea res non sit, alienare potest. Sed hoc forsitan ideo videtur fieri, 
quod voluntate debitoris intellegitur pignus alienare, qui ab initio 
contractus pactus est, ut liceret creditori pignus vendere, si pecunia 
non solvatur. (…)156 
 
As noted above, this is the only case presented under the title “Quibus alienare licet 
vel non” of the Institutes of Justinian where a non-owner can transfer ownership. 
Nonetheless, the text quickly offers an alternative explanation which seems to 
discard its exceptional character, declaring that in fact this can be seen as taking 
place due to the previous authorization by the owner. Although this explanation 
is taken almost word for word from the Institutes of Gaius157, the systematic 
arrangement of both works gives the text a very different meaning. Gaius, on the 
one hand, presents this case after that of the procurator, and therefore his reference 
to the voluntas debitoris appears simply to throw some light on the legal grounds 
on which this alienation takes place. On the other hand, this same explanation 
has a different effect in the Institutes of Justinian, due to the fact that the pledge 
creditor is presented as the only case where a non-owner may transfer ownership, 
and it appears to indicate that this is in fact no real exception to the general rule, 
since the alienation takes place voluntate domini. In other words, while Gai 2,62-
64 narrows down the previous statement of Gai 2,20 according to which the 
tradens must be the owner, Inst. 2,8,1 seems to offer only an apparent exception 
to the rule that the tradens must be the owner, since the existence of the voluntas 
domini implies that the alienation by a pledge creditor can be set within the 
framework described Inst. 2,1,40-43. 
 The way in which the compilers approach the alienation by a non-owner 
appears to be ratified by the Paraphrase of Theophilus. First of all, it should be 
borne in mind that this author stresses the validity of the nemo plus argument 
within the transfer of ownership, and does not present any exceptions to it. 
Along with this fact, Theophilus stresses in various contexts that the tradens must 
be the owner158. The paraphrase to Inst. 2,1,42-43 is particularly illustrative on 
his views on the systematic arrangement of the traditio by a non-owner, being for 
                                                 
156  Inst. 2,8,1: “On the other side of the line, a creditor, under his contract, has power to 
alienate a pledge despite not being its owner. But here the explanation is perhaps that he 
alienates the pledge with the debtor’s authority, given by a term of the contract allowing 
the creditor the right to sell on failure to repay. (…)” (transl. Birks/McLeod). 
157  Compare Gai 2,64: “(…) Sed hoc forsitan ideo videatur fieri, quod voluntate debitoris 
intellegitur pignus alienari, qui olim pactus est, ut liceret creditori pignus vendere, si 
pecunia non solvatur”. 
158  See for instance the opening sentence of Theop. Par 2,1,41: ਝȜȜ
 εੁ μ੻ν δεσπότηȢ 
TRADITEUSૉ μοτ τઁ οੁκε૙ον πρ઼γμα ਕπઁ δωρε઼Ȣ ਲ਼ προικઁȢ ਲ਼ ਙȜȜηȢ οੂασδȒποτε αੁτίαȢ 
οੈον ਕπઁ PERMUTATIONOS ਕναμĳιȕόȜωȢ μεταĳȑρει τ੽ν δεσποτείαν ਥπ
 ਥμȑ (If an owner 
delivers to me property of his own by way of gift or of dowry, or on any other title 
whatsoever, such as exchange, there is not a shadow of doubt but he passes me the 
ownership (transl. Murison, modified). 
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the greater part a literal translation of the original text, except for a final remark 
to Inst. 2,1,43 where Theophilus observes: “for he [i.e. the person authorized to 
administer] is deemed to do the act by consent of the owner” (Theoph. 
Par. 2,1,43 i.f.: δοκε૙ γὰρ κατὰ γνώμην τοῦ δεσπότου τοῦτο πρȐττειν [transl. 
Murison]). Through this clarification, Theophilus seems to regard the delivery by 
a non-owner as performed by the owner himself, and thereby avoids making an 
exception to the general rule as presented through the nemo plus argument, 
according to which only the owner can transfer ownership. In other words: since 
the transfer of ownership by an authorized non-owner is considered to stem 
directly from the owner’s will, it cannot at the same time be considered as an 
exception to the general rule that only the owner can transfer ownership. 
 That a delivery by an authorized non-owner amounts to a delivery performed 
by the owner himself in the eyes of Theophilus is also to be seen in his 
paraphrase to the title “Quibus alienare licet vel non”, and particularly in the 
author’s initial statement that “It is necessary to enumerate here paradoxical cases 
(παρȐδοȟα șȑματα) when an owner cannot alienate a thing that belongs to him, 
and when a non-owner can rightly alienate a thing that is not his own”159. That 
the cases described here are referred to as ‘paradoxical’ or ‘contrary to 
expectation’ reveals from the start a somewhat cautious approach to these 
irregular cases. That the general rule according to which the tradens must be the 
owner is not to be lightly discarded in the eyes of Theophilus becomes evident 
by the way in which he deals with the alienation by a pledge creditor, the only 
case of transfer of ownership by a non-owner presented in Inst. 2,8,1: 
 
Theoph. Par. 2,8,1: ȃῦν Ȥρ੽ Ȝȑγειν πότε ੒ μ੽ ੫ν δεσπότηȢ 
δȪναται ਥκποιε૙ν τοῦτο δȑ προȕαίνει ੪Ȣ ਥπ੿ τοȪτου τοῦ șȑματοȢ 
ਥδανεισȐμην παρὰ σοῦ ਦκατઁν νομίσματα ਥνεȤȪρασȐ σοι τઁν 
ਥμઁν ਕγρόν συμĳωνȒσαȢ ੮στε σοι ਥȟε૙ναι ਥνιαυτοῦ 
παραδραμόντοȢ κਕμοῦ μ੽ καταȕαȜόντοȢ τઁ ȤρȑοȢ διαπιπρȐσκειν 
τઁ ਥνȑȤυρον ੁδοઃ ਥνταῦșα ੒ FUHGLWRU μ੽ ੫ν δεσπότηȢ καȜ૵Ȣ 
ਥκποιε૙ ਕȜȜ¶ ਥȐν τιȢ ਥȟετȐσૉ τઁ ਕκριȕȑȢ ο੝ γίνεταί τι 
παρȐδοȟον δοκε૙ γὰρ ੒ GHELWRU πιπρȐσκειν ੒ κα੿ δεσπότηȢ ੫ν 
α੝τ૶ τοȪτ૳ મ διὰ συμĳώνου συγȤωρε૙ τ૶ FUHGLWRUL τઁ 
πιπρȐσκειν ਕγνωμοσȪμηȢ γινομȑνηȢ περ੿ τ੽ν τοῦ ȤρȑουȢ 
ਕπόδοσιν (…)160 
                                                 
159  Theoph. Par. 2,8pr: ਝναγκα૙ον ਥντεῦșεν ਥȟαριșμોσαι παρȐδοȟα șȑματα πότε ੒ δεσπότηȢ 
τઁ ੅διον ਥκποιε૙ν ο੝ δȪναται πρ઼γμα κα੿ πότε ੒ μ੽ ੫ν δεσπότηȢ ੑρș૵Ȣ ਥκποιε૙ τઁ μ੽ 
οੁκε૙ον. 
160  Theoph. Par. 2,8,1: “Now we must state when a non-owner can alienate. Take this case: I 
borrowed from you 100 solidi, mortgaging to you my land, on the terms that, on the lapse 
of a year, if I do not discharge the debt, you shall be at liberty to sell the pledge. Here, you 
see, is a case where the creditor, although not owner, is entitled to alienate. But if the 
matter be closely looked into, there is nothing paradoxical about it. For it is the debtor, 
 
What is particularly striking about this text is that Theophilus discards that the 
alienation by the pledge creditor constitutes an exception to the general rule, 
declaring that there is nothing paradoxical about this case, since the owner “is 
regarded as selling from the very fact that by the terms of agreement he allows 
the creditor to sell, in case he should fail to discharge the debt”. From a 
systematic perspective the delivery is therefore considered as performed by the 
owner himself, which implies that the general rule according to which “the 
deliverer must be owner because a non-owner cannot pass an ownership that he 
has not got” (Theoph. Par. 2,1,40) does not have exceptions. Therefore, in the 
eyes of the compilers, the Institutes of Justinian present only one exception to the 
general rule, which turns out to be only an apparent exception. 
 The evidence presented so far shows that the compilers had a peculiar view 
on the systematization of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, according to 
which the various cases in which this took place could be regarded as alienations 
performed by the owner himself. This appears to be the only relevant evolution 
which takes place in Justinianic law regarding the traditio by a non-owner, which 
has in any case a purely dogmatic and systematic value and bears no practical 
significance. This development is however directly relevant to determine the 
scope of the nemo plus argument within the law of property, since all of a sudden 
the exceptions to it have vanished, as can be clearly seen in the systematization of 
the traditio by a non-owner in Justinian’s Institutes. 
 The evolution described here is very subtle, and raises the question of 
whether traces of this development can be found in the works of classical jurists. 
Burdese, for instance, already thought he could identify a change in the approach 
to the transfer of ownership by a non-owner between the Institutes of Gaius and 
his Res cottidianae, since in the first text the procurator is presented as having an 
autonomous potestas alienandi, while in the second work reference is made to the 
voluntas domini161. There is however no evidence that the different emphasis on 
this point has any further implications, and the fact that the procurator is among 
the exceptions to the general rule indicates that Gaius did not regard the traditio 
voluntate domini as performed by the owner himself for systematic purposes. It 
appears therefore that the systematic arrangement offered in the Institutes of 
Justinian was a Byzantine development, which in turn raises the question of the 
driving force behind this change. The most likely explanation is that, as the 
                                                                                                                   
who is also owner, that is regarded as selling from the very fact that by the terms of 
agreement he allows the creditor to sell, in case he should fail to discharge the debt” 
(transl. Murison). 
161  Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009), p. 26: “…lo stesso Gaio, dopo aver riconosciuto nelle 
Istituzioni una posizione propria di potestas alienandi al procurator (ammesso che si tratti del 
procurator omnium bonorum, anche indipendentemente dall’essere egli fornito di mandato 
speciale ad alienare), avrebbe potuto, in D. 41,1,9,4, tratto dalle res cottidianae, riferire 
genericamente alla voluntas domini il fondamento delle alienazioni effettuate da detto 
procurator in base al permesso dominicale in quanto contenuto nei limiti di un più o meno 
ampio concetto di libera administratio…”. 
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the greater part a literal translation of the original text, except for a final remark 
to Inst. 2,1,43 where Theophilus observes: “for he [i.e. the person authorized to 
administer] is deemed to do the act by consent of the owner” (Theoph. 
Par. 2,1,43 i.f.: δοκε૙ γὰρ κατὰ γνώμην τοῦ δεσπότου τοῦτο πρȐττειν [transl. 
Murison]). Through this clarification, Theophilus seems to regard the delivery by 
a non-owner as performed by the owner himself, and thereby avoids making an 
exception to the general rule as presented through the nemo plus argument, 
according to which only the owner can transfer ownership. In other words: since 
the transfer of ownership by an authorized non-owner is considered to stem 
directly from the owner’s will, it cannot at the same time be considered as an 
exception to the general rule that only the owner can transfer ownership. 
 That a delivery by an authorized non-owner amounts to a delivery performed 
by the owner himself in the eyes of Theophilus is also to be seen in his 
paraphrase to the title “Quibus alienare licet vel non”, and particularly in the 
author’s initial statement that “It is necessary to enumerate here paradoxical cases 
(παρȐδοȟα șȑματα) when an owner cannot alienate a thing that belongs to him, 
and when a non-owner can rightly alienate a thing that is not his own”159. That 
the cases described here are referred to as ‘paradoxical’ or ‘contrary to 
expectation’ reveals from the start a somewhat cautious approach to these 
irregular cases. That the general rule according to which the tradens must be the 
owner is not to be lightly discarded in the eyes of Theophilus becomes evident 
by the way in which he deals with the alienation by a pledge creditor, the only 
case of transfer of ownership by a non-owner presented in Inst. 2,8,1: 
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159  Theoph. Par. 2,8pr: ਝναγκα૙ον ਥντεῦșεν ਥȟαριșμોσαι παρȐδοȟα șȑματα πότε ੒ δεσπότηȢ 
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160  Theoph. Par. 2,8,1: “Now we must state when a non-owner can alienate. Take this case: I 
borrowed from you 100 solidi, mortgaging to you my land, on the terms that, on the lapse 
of a year, if I do not discharge the debt, you shall be at liberty to sell the pledge. Here, you 
see, is a case where the creditor, although not owner, is entitled to alienate. But if the 
matter be closely looked into, there is nothing paradoxical about it. For it is the debtor, 
 
What is particularly striking about this text is that Theophilus discards that the 
alienation by the pledge creditor constitutes an exception to the general rule, 
declaring that there is nothing paradoxical about this case, since the owner “is 
regarded as selling from the very fact that by the terms of agreement he allows 
the creditor to sell, in case he should fail to discharge the debt”. From a 
systematic perspective the delivery is therefore considered as performed by the 
owner himself, which implies that the general rule according to which “the 
deliverer must be owner because a non-owner cannot pass an ownership that he 
has not got” (Theoph. Par. 2,1,40) does not have exceptions. Therefore, in the 
eyes of the compilers, the Institutes of Justinian present only one exception to the 
general rule, which turns out to be only an apparent exception. 
 The evidence presented so far shows that the compilers had a peculiar view 
on the systematization of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, according to 
which the various cases in which this took place could be regarded as alienations 
performed by the owner himself. This appears to be the only relevant evolution 
which takes place in Justinianic law regarding the traditio by a non-owner, which 
has in any case a purely dogmatic and systematic value and bears no practical 
significance. This development is however directly relevant to determine the 
scope of the nemo plus argument within the law of property, since all of a sudden 
the exceptions to it have vanished, as can be clearly seen in the systematization of 
the traditio by a non-owner in Justinian’s Institutes. 
 The evolution described here is very subtle, and raises the question of 
whether traces of this development can be found in the works of classical jurists. 
Burdese, for instance, already thought he could identify a change in the approach 
to the transfer of ownership by a non-owner between the Institutes of Gaius and 
his Res cottidianae, since in the first text the procurator is presented as having an 
autonomous potestas alienandi, while in the second work reference is made to the 
voluntas domini161. There is however no evidence that the different emphasis on 
this point has any further implications, and the fact that the procurator is among 
the exceptions to the general rule indicates that Gaius did not regard the traditio 
voluntate domini as performed by the owner himself for systematic purposes. It 
appears therefore that the systematic arrangement offered in the Institutes of 
Justinian was a Byzantine development, which in turn raises the question of the 
driving force behind this change. The most likely explanation is that, as the 
                                                                                                                   
who is also owner, that is regarded as selling from the very fact that by the terms of 
agreement he allows the creditor to sell, in case he should fail to discharge the debt” 
(transl. Murison). 
161  Burdese, Potestas alienandi (2009), p. 26: “…lo stesso Gaio, dopo aver riconosciuto nelle 
Istituzioni una posizione propria di potestas alienandi al procurator (ammesso che si tratti del 
procurator omnium bonorum, anche indipendentemente dall’essere egli fornito di mandato 
speciale ad alienare), avrebbe potuto, in D. 41,1,9,4, tratto dalle res cottidianae, riferire 
genericamente alla voluntas domini il fondamento delle alienazioni effettuate da detto 
procurator in base al permesso dominicale in quanto contenuto nei limiti di un più o meno 
ampio concetto di libera administratio…”. 
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Paraphrase of Theophilus shows, the nemo plus argument had consolidated as a 
starting point to determine the outcome of the transfer of ownership, and that at 
some point scholars must have become inclined to regard this idea not as a mere 
starting point, but to honour its self-evident nature by interpreting the cases 
traditionally considered as exceptional as covered by the general rule. The shift 
may have even taken place in an effortless way, since already classical jurists often 
equated – although in practical, not systematic terms – the delivery by a non-
owner acting voluntate domini with that performed by the owner himself. This 
equation may even have been easier regarding the alienation by legal guardians, 
which has remained out of the discussion so far due to the silence of Justinian’s 
Institutes on this point. Despite this circumstance, the numerous references 
throughout the writings of Roman jurists where the legal guardian is regarded as 
alienating ‘loco domini’ may have proven enough for Byzantine jurists to regard 
the alienation as performed by the owner himself in this case as well, which 
would explain the absence of any reference to the curator furiosi in Inst. 2,8,1. 
 While the new approach to the transfer of ownership by a non-owner can be 
easily identified in the Institutes of Justinian and even more in the Paraphrase of 
Theophilus, the outlook is not so clear in other works of Justinian’s compilation. 
There are in fact some elements in the compilation which seem to indicate that 
this interpretation was still developing during the composition of the Corpus Iuris. 
Particularly relevant in this regard is the inclusion of D. 41,1,46 (Ulp. 65 ed.), 
which openly denies the absolute validity of the nemo plus argument regarding 
the transfer of ownership, mentioning in particular the alienation by a pledge 
creditor. The text is moreover located only a few lines away from D. 41,1,20pr 
(Ulp. 29 Sab.), where the argument is explicitly applied to the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner. What does this tell us about the validity of the 
argument regarding the transfer of ownership in the eyes of the compilers? In the 
first place, that the alienation by a pledge creditor was the case which they found 
the more difficult to include under the general rule, since it is presented as an 
exception to the general rule not only in D. 41,1,46, but also in Inst. 2,8,1. 
Nonetheless, in a few years’ time this obstacle was overcome: while D. 41,1,46 
presents the pledge creditor as a clear exception to the rule that the delivery must 
be performed by a non-owner, Inst. 2,8,1 challenges this view, and Theoph. 
Par. 2,8,1 shows that it is nothing but an apparent exception.  
 The inclusion of D. 41,1,46 within the compilation also shows that the 
compilers were not willing to acknowledge other cases than the pledge creditor 
as exceptions to the general rule. This can be seen by the original position of the 
text, corresponding to book 65th of Ulpian’s Commentary to the Edict, where he 
dealt with the curatores162, which implies that the creditor pignoris was mentioned 
                                                 
162  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 797 sets forth the rubric De constituendo curator et administratione 
eius under the general title De curatore bonis dando (Lenel, EP [1927], p. 434), and in col. 
798 n. 1 relates the text of D. 41,1,46 to D. 42,7,2,1, which deals with the sale performed 
by a curator. 
 
along with the curator when dealing with the alienation by a non-owner. That the 
compilers decided to omit the reference to the alienation by a legal guardian is 
consistent with the text of Inst. 2,8,1, where such a reference is equally absent, 
showing that in the eyes of the compilers the alienation should be regarded in 
this case as performed by the owner, and not as an exception to the general rule. 
 Having all of these elements in mind, it appears that in Justinianic law the 
nemo plus argument acquired a greater scope regarding the transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner. The argument itself appears in various contexts within the 
compilation, retaining in most cases the same features which it had in classical 
Roman law. However, regarding the transfer of ownership, the nemo plus became 
an overarching rule which in the eyes of the compilers had no room for 
exceptions, besides the case of the pledge creditor (D. 41,1,46) which was 
quickly covered by the general rule. Justinian’s compilation is therefore a 
milestone in the evolution of the nemo plus argument, since the compilers were 
the first jurists to offer an interpretation which would free the rule from 
exceptions.  
 What does this evolution imply for the significance of the nemo plus rule as 
laid down in D. 50,17,54? The answer to this question depends largely on 
personal convictions of the compilers, which apparently experienced variations 
through the years. At the time of composition of the Digest, the compilers appear 
to admit at least one exception to this rule, namely the case of the pledge 
creditor, as shown in D. 41,1,46. This would imply that, by the time of 
composition of the rule in D. 50,17,54, it would be regarded as an almost 
flawless statement regarding the transfer of ownership. The subsequent treatment 
of the alienation by a pledge creditor in the Institutes of Justinian and in the 
Paraphrase of Theophilus shows that soon after, Byzantine jurists would not 
regard this case as exceptional anymore, and therefore the nemo plus rule would 
seem to be completely flawless. Accordingly, the nemo plus rule can be seen as 
having a specific systematic value in Justinianic law, which Byzantine jurists 
further refined after the promulgation of the Digest. The interpretations of 
modern scholars such as Carlin and Lonchamps appear therefore to be best suited 
to describe the significance of the nemo plus rule in Justinianic law. 
 It is worth noting at this point that the overarching scope of the nemo plus rule 
in Byzantine law should not be seen as stemming from the fact that it was laid 
down as a regula iuris, as some authors think163. The fact that a specific text was 
included in the last title of the Digest did not automatically grant it an absolute 
validity. What is more, scholars have emphasized the heterogeneous nature of the 
opinions collected into this title, where the different regulae offer an enormous 
diversity of degrees of validity or functions164. It should moreover be noted that 
                                                 
163  See e.g. Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 78: “And because it was a regula (a rule), in 
accordance with the definition provided in D. 50 17 1, there were no exceptions to it. 
Thus Roman law fully respected the nemo plus iuris rule”. 
164  See especially Stein, Regulae iuris (1966), p. 123. 
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starting point, but to honour its self-evident nature by interpreting the cases 
traditionally considered as exceptional as covered by the general rule. The shift 
may have even taken place in an effortless way, since already classical jurists often 
equated – although in practical, not systematic terms – the delivery by a non-
owner acting voluntate domini with that performed by the owner himself. This 
equation may even have been easier regarding the alienation by legal guardians, 
which has remained out of the discussion so far due to the silence of Justinian’s 
Institutes on this point. Despite this circumstance, the numerous references 
throughout the writings of Roman jurists where the legal guardian is regarded as 
alienating ‘loco domini’ may have proven enough for Byzantine jurists to regard 
the alienation as performed by the owner himself in this case as well, which 
would explain the absence of any reference to the curator furiosi in Inst. 2,8,1. 
 While the new approach to the transfer of ownership by a non-owner can be 
easily identified in the Institutes of Justinian and even more in the Paraphrase of 
Theophilus, the outlook is not so clear in other works of Justinian’s compilation. 
There are in fact some elements in the compilation which seem to indicate that 
this interpretation was still developing during the composition of the Corpus Iuris. 
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which openly denies the absolute validity of the nemo plus argument regarding 
the transfer of ownership, mentioning in particular the alienation by a pledge 
creditor. The text is moreover located only a few lines away from D. 41,1,20pr 
(Ulp. 29 Sab.), where the argument is explicitly applied to the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner. What does this tell us about the validity of the 
argument regarding the transfer of ownership in the eyes of the compilers? In the 
first place, that the alienation by a pledge creditor was the case which they found 
the more difficult to include under the general rule, since it is presented as an 
exception to the general rule not only in D. 41,1,46, but also in Inst. 2,8,1. 
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as exceptions to the general rule. This can be seen by the original position of the 
text, corresponding to book 65th of Ulpian’s Commentary to the Edict, where he 
dealt with the curatores162, which implies that the creditor pignoris was mentioned 
                                                 
162  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 797 sets forth the rubric De constituendo curator et administratione 
eius under the general title De curatore bonis dando (Lenel, EP [1927], p. 434), and in col. 
798 n. 1 relates the text of D. 41,1,46 to D. 42,7,2,1, which deals with the sale performed 
by a curator. 
 
along with the curator when dealing with the alienation by a non-owner. That the 
compilers decided to omit the reference to the alienation by a legal guardian is 
consistent with the text of Inst. 2,8,1, where such a reference is equally absent, 
showing that in the eyes of the compilers the alienation should be regarded in 
this case as performed by the owner, and not as an exception to the general rule. 
 Having all of these elements in mind, it appears that in Justinianic law the 
nemo plus argument acquired a greater scope regarding the transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner. The argument itself appears in various contexts within the 
compilation, retaining in most cases the same features which it had in classical 
Roman law. However, regarding the transfer of ownership, the nemo plus became 
an overarching rule which in the eyes of the compilers had no room for 
exceptions, besides the case of the pledge creditor (D. 41,1,46) which was 
quickly covered by the general rule. Justinian’s compilation is therefore a 
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exceptions.  
 What does this evolution imply for the significance of the nemo plus rule as 
laid down in D. 50,17,54? The answer to this question depends largely on 
personal convictions of the compilers, which apparently experienced variations 
through the years. At the time of composition of the Digest, the compilers appear 
to admit at least one exception to this rule, namely the case of the pledge 
creditor, as shown in D. 41,1,46. This would imply that, by the time of 
composition of the rule in D. 50,17,54, it would be regarded as an almost 
flawless statement regarding the transfer of ownership. The subsequent treatment 
of the alienation by a pledge creditor in the Institutes of Justinian and in the 
Paraphrase of Theophilus shows that soon after, Byzantine jurists would not 
regard this case as exceptional anymore, and therefore the nemo plus rule would 
seem to be completely flawless. Accordingly, the nemo plus rule can be seen as 
having a specific systematic value in Justinianic law, which Byzantine jurists 
further refined after the promulgation of the Digest. The interpretations of 
modern scholars such as Carlin and Lonchamps appear therefore to be best suited 
to describe the significance of the nemo plus rule in Justinianic law. 
 It is worth noting at this point that the overarching scope of the nemo plus rule 
in Byzantine law should not be seen as stemming from the fact that it was laid 
down as a regula iuris, as some authors think163. The fact that a specific text was 
included in the last title of the Digest did not automatically grant it an absolute 
validity. What is more, scholars have emphasized the heterogeneous nature of the 
opinions collected into this title, where the different regulae offer an enormous 
diversity of degrees of validity or functions164. It should moreover be noted that 
                                                 
163  See e.g. Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 78: “And because it was a regula (a rule), in 
accordance with the definition provided in D. 50 17 1, there were no exceptions to it. 
Thus Roman law fully respected the nemo plus iuris rule”. 
164  See especially Stein, Regulae iuris (1966), p. 123. 
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scholars are still puzzled regarding what the compilers had in mind when making 
this title and which were their selection criteria165, particularly considering the 
countless texts which could have been included in D. 50,17 and which were, for 
some reason or another, left out of it166. We see in any case that the regulae iuris 
often serve as a mere starting point, and as such are plagued with exceptions. It is 
therefore not possible to grant the nemo plus rule a particular significance from the 
sole fact that it was made a regula iuris. The contextual information gathered so far 
regarding the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in Justinianic law would 
however indicate that the compilers granted the nemo plus argument a particular 
value when referred to the transfer of ownership, which is why one may suspect 
that this particular rule would have had an almost absolute validity when it was 
composed, becoming even more authoritative when the case of the pledge 
creditor was considered to abide by the general rule. This, still, does not imply 
that the overarching validity of the nemo plus rule stems from the fact that it was 
laid down as a regula iuris by Justinian, but merely that one can set this rule along 
those having a more absolute validity. 
 That the nemo plus rule of D. 50,17,54 did not acquire an absolute validity 
merely from its inclusion within the last title of the Digest becomes evident from 
the fact that the nemo plus argument was laid down in other regulae as well, where 
it appears to have retained the more modest role it had in classical Roman law. In 
other words, there is no general attempt to grant absolute validity to every 
application of the nemo plus argument. This can even be seen with some regulae 
which apply the nemo plus argument or similar arguments to the law of 
succession, as Wallinga has shown when dealing with D. 50,17,59. Accordingly, 
other regulae iuris which refer to the nemo plus argument – such as D. 50,17,120 
and D. 50,17,160,2 – cannot be seen as having absolute validity for the sole fact 
of being located within the last title of the Digest. That the nemo plus argument 
remained largely a mere starting point with relative validity can be seen moreover 
from the fact that exceptions to it such as the ones in D. 41,2,21pr and D. 7,1,63 
were preserved in the Digest, along with the already mentioned case of 
D. 41,1,46. This circumstance is relevant for the proper understanding of the 
evolution of the argument within the transfer of ownership, because it shows that 
the compilers were not led by the self-evident character of the argument or by 
philosophical considerations into granting it the broadest scope possible in every 
context. The evolution which took place in the context of the transfer of 
ownership appears therefore to be an isolated case in which what had long been 
                                                 
165  Stein, Regulae iuris (1966), p. 122: “The precise function of the last title of the Digest is not 
clear today and was probably not clear to the compilers themselves”. 
166  Pothier took upon himself to gather all the regulae-like statements he could find in the 
Corpus Iuris, producing an index with 906 rules (Stein, Regulae iuris [1966], p. 178-179). 
One could therefore inquire what led the compilers to be so conservative in their selection 
criteria. 
 
used as a starting point was at some point understood as an overarching rule, 
while the general nemo plus argument retained limited validity in other contexts.  
 While no particular consequence regarding the validity of the nemo plus rule 
can be drawn from the sole fact of its inclusion within the last title of the Digest, 
it is nonetheless interesting to approach this rule as part of the larger problem of 
the regulae iuris in Justinianic law, especially considering that studies on the regulae 
iuris have traditionally granted very limited attention to the nemo plus rule as part 
of this larger problem. The nemo plus rule has in fact more background 
information than most other regulae to provide us with interesting clues to 
acquire further insight regarding the way in which D. 50,17 was composed. The 
general truth behind the argument must have been valued by the compilers167, 
being aware that it was a useful starting point for legal reasoning when dealing 
with the most diverse subjects, and could therefore be presented as a general 
guideline. This positive assessment of the argument must have led to its inclusion 
within D. 50,17, and not in one, but in multiple versions: D. 50,17,54, 
D. 50,17,120 and D. 50,17,160,2 are all applications of the same argument, 
having even close textual similarities. Moreover, the texts of D. 50,17,11, 
D. 50,17,59, D. 50,17,62, D. 50,17,143, D. 50,17,156,2, D. 50,17,175,1 and 
D. 50,17,177pr bear such a close substantive similarity to the rule as presented in 
D. 50,17,54 that one may wonder what new insight do they all provide to the 
more general formulation in the latter text, besides showing that this basic truth is 
validly applicable in varied contexts. Similar developments can also be found 
regarding other statements with an apparent self-evident value168, which seem to 
have captured the attention of the compilers, some of them having – just as the 
nemo plus argument – a clear origin in dialectics or rhetoric, as well as a limited 
validity within legal writings. One may recall the seemingly logical argument “in 
maiore minor inest” which Quintus Mucius Scaevola and Aquilius Gallus used to 
determine the scope of a legacy in a particular case (D. 32,29,1), which was 
however discarded by later jurisprudence and labelled by Horak as a “clumsy, 
pseudo-logical formalism”169. The argument nonetheless made its way into the 
last title of the Digest in D. 50,17,21 (Ulp. 27 Sab.)170 and in a more abstract 
form into D. 50,17,110pr (Paul 6 ed.): “In eo, quod plus sit, semper inest et 
minus”171. Similar is the case of the maxim “accessorium sequitur principale” (the 
accessory follows the principal), which appears in use in D. 33,8,2172 and 
                                                 
167  Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 73. 
168  Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 69 observes: “This quotation is not the only one 
which, taken out of context, gives the impression of eloquence and timelessness”. 
169  Horak, Rationes decidendi (1969), p. 94-95. 
170  D. 50,17,21 (Ulp. 27 Sab.):“Non debet, cui plus licet, quod minus est non licere”. 
171  D. 50,17,110pr: “In any case, where there is a possibility of more, there is also a possibility 
of less” (transl. Watson). 
172  D. 33,8,2 (Gai. 18 ed. prov.): “Nam quae accessionum locum optinent, exstinguuntur, cum 
principales res peremptae fuerint”. 
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D. 34,2,19,13173, being later generalized in D. 50,17,129,1174 and 
D. 50,17,178175. 
 Along with the fact that the compilers seem to have viewed the nemo plus 
argument as a general truth, it is also worth noting that the multiple references to 
this argument within the last title of the Digest seem to show that it held a 
relevant position in the legal thought and practice at the time the compilation 
was taking place. That the argument was still in use can be seen from the 
references in C. 6,43,3,2a as well as in the Paraphrase of Theophilus, which 
confirms Stein’s view that the compilers chose the texts which still remained 
significant in their own time176. This shows in turn the practical function of 
D. 50,17, since a rule such as the nemo plus would be recognisable and useful for 
legal practitioners177. 
 Having shown that the nemo plus rule does not automatically obtain a 
particular validity from the sole fact of being included in the last title of the 
Digest, and that its overarching validity can only be seen through other 
developments in the time of Justinian, it is however worth noting that the 
generalization of this text into a rule does seem to provide an insight into the 
views of the compilers regarding the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
Accordingly, while the main indicator of the Byzantine systematization of the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner is to be found in the arrangement of the 
subject in Inst. 2,1,40-43 and Inst. 2,8,1, the generalization of Ulpian’s decision 
into a regula iuris in D. 50,17,54 can also be seen as part of this evolution. 
Considering that the nemo plus argument fulfiled a clear systematic function in the 
context of the transfer of ownership in the view of the compilers, the 
manipulation of the original classical text allows them to lay an emphasis which 
favours their own ideas. By generalizing a specific decision referred to the 
hereditas, the compilers did not carry out a substantial innovation. Nonetheless, 
this newfound regula iuris does seem to reflect the personal views of the compilers 
regarding the nature of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, and 
particularly the fact that the alienation by a non-owner can be seen as performed 
                                                 
173  D. 34,2,19,13 (Ulp. 20 Sab.): “Perveniamus et ad gemmas inclusas argento auroque. Et ait 
Sabinus auro argentove cedere: ei enim cedit, cuius maior est species. Quod recte expressit: 
semper enim cum quaerimus, quid cui cedat, illud spectamus, quid cuius rei ornandae 
causa adhibetur, ut accessio cedat principali. Cedent igitur gemmae, fialis vel lancibus 
inclusae, auro argentove”. 
174  D. 50,17,129,1 (Paul 21 ed.): “Cum principalis causa non consistit, ne ea quidem quae 
sequuntur locum habent”. 
175  D. 50,17,178 (Paul 15 ad Plautium): “Cum principalis causa non consistat, plerumque ne ea 
quidem, quae sequuntur, locum habent”. 
176  Stein, Regulae iuris (1966), p. 122: “their purpose [of the compilers] was to include only 
such rules as were still valid in their day. The adjective antiqui in the rubric of the title, far 
from detracting from the validity of the rules, was intended to vouch for their authority as 
part of the traditional classical jurisprudence which Justinian wished to restore to its former 
glory”. 
177  Stein, Regulae iuris (1966), p. 123. 
 
by the owner himself. The case of the pledge creditor would initially be seen to 
fall outside this systematization, but it would soon after be brought under the 
general rule. Accordingly, while the original application of the nemo plus 
argument by Ulpian to the hereditas may have been nothing more than a 
reference to a useful starting point of limited validity, the generalization carried 
out by the compilers seems to reflect a particular systematic approach to the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner by the compilers, which was completely 
absent in the thought of Ulpian. What was originally an argumentative tool 
which would support a legal outcome was, under the eyes of Byzantine jurists, an 
overarching rule reflecting a systematization of the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner, and could as such have an intrinsic legal significance178. 
 There are other regulae in which the compilers appear to be more concerned 
with presenting their own views through the mouthpiece of classical 
jurisprudence than to reflect the ancient legal thought, being the following text 
particularly meaningful for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner: 
 
D. 50,17,11 (Pomp. 5 Sab.): Id, quod nostrum est, sine facto 
nostro ad alium transferri non potest179. 
 
Under its current formulation, this rule offers a rather vague statement, according 
to which the owner must do something in order that his property is transferred. 
But what is the problem being addressed here? The Palingenetic analysis sheds 
some light on the original meaning of this passage, showing that it originally dealt 
with the law of succession, particularly with the bequest, since Lenel locates the 
fragment under the rubric De generis legatorum180, indicating that it must have 
been referred to the legatum per vindicationem181. In such a context, this sentence 
would refer perhaps to the fact that the deceased had to be owner of the 
bequeathed goods in order to transfer ownership over them. Whatever the 
original meaning may be, the generalized version offered by the compilers does 
not aim at conveying the classical thought behind this text, but the compilers 
seem keen on making a point of their own through the text of Pomponius. The 
question therefore remains: what problem were the compilers addressing here? It 
does not seem likely that the factum mentioned refers to the traditio, as if they 
wanted to emphasize that a iusta causa traditionis is not enough, since a physical 
conveyance must follow. The terms of the text are far too vague to draw such a 
                                                 
178  That the generalization of Ulpian’s text was not without consequence is also observed by 
Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 70-71: “Ulpian’s short commentary nemo plus iuris 
ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet acquired a general meaning when the compilers 
highlighted one sentence that merely defined the scope of transferred rights”. 
179  D. 50,17,11: “Something which is ours cannot be transferred to another without any 
action on our part” (transl. Watson). 
180  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 94, nr. 437. 
181  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 94, nr. 437, n. 6: “Solae igitur eae res per vindicationem recte 
legantur, quae ipsius testatoris sunt”. 
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178  That the generalization of Ulpian’s text was not without consequence is also observed by 
Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 70-71: “Ulpian’s short commentary nemo plus iuris 
ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet acquired a general meaning when the compilers 
highlighted one sentence that merely defined the scope of transferred rights”. 
179  D. 50,17,11: “Something which is ours cannot be transferred to another without any 
action on our part” (transl. Watson). 
180  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 94, nr. 437. 
181  Lenel, Paling. (1889) II, col. 94, nr. 437, n. 6: “Solae igitur eae res per vindicationem recte 
legantur, quae ipsius testatoris sunt”. 
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specific dogmatic idea from them. One can instead take it in a more literal sense, 
as demanding that the owner must somehow participate in whatever act 
involving the alienation of his property. In the context of the transfer of 
ownership by traditio, this would involve that if another person carries out the 
delivery he will not be able to transfer ownership “sine facto nostro”, which in this 
particular case would consist in the owner’s authorization. Accordingly, the 
generalization of this text tells us more about the views of the compilers than 
about the original text of Pomponius, favouring the views of the compilers 
regarding the transfer of ownership, and particularly the idea that every transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner can be ultimately referred to the owner himself, who 
must do something to allow this operation to take place. 
 From the evidence examined so far, it can be said that Justinian did not 
corrupt a rule which was flawless under classical law, as scholars such as Schulz 
thought. The evolution was in fact quite the opposite: what was a mostly 
argumentative tool or a starting point in classical Roman law acquired in the time 
of Justinian a particular systematic and dogmatic scope which grants it an 
overarching validity. Byzantine jurists progressively expanded the scope of 
application of what was initially only a starting point, until it transformed into an 
overarching rule with absolute validity. This evolution, however, took place in 
an almost imperceptible way, since it consists exclusively of a change of emphasis 
on a purely systematic point which bears no practical consequences. That the 
compilers believed that every alienation by a non-owner could be traced back to 
the owner himself – thereby preserving the validity of the nemo plus rule – is 
mainly to be seen in the systematic arrangement of the subject in the Institutes of 
Justinian and in the Paraphrase of Theophilus, but a general outlook on the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis does not offer an unambiguous approach to the problem, 
particularly considering that statements such as D. 41,1,46 were included in the 
compilation. This can also be seen in the way the rule was understood since the 
Middle Ages, which will be studied in the following chapter, where it was by no 
means evident that the nemo plus rule had no exceptions. Only eventually did 
jurists claim that the rule had no exceptions, but Justinian’s systematization of this 
problem in his Institutes played only an incidental role in this evolution in the 
general context of the compilation. Accordingly, the interpretation of the nemo 
plus rule offered by authors such as Carlin and Longchamps does reflect the 
approach to the nemo plus rule of Byzantine jurists – not, however, of classical 
Roman law – but is largely tributary to later developments in the interpretation 
of D. 50,17,54, which will be reviewed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 7. Systematization and evolution of  
the nemo plus rule 
 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, the nemo plus argument did not have a central 
position in the understanding of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in 
classical Roman law, but it did acquire a specific systematic role within Justinian’s 
compilation regarding the transfer of ownership. Moreover, the general and 
autonomous formulation of this argument into a regula iuris would favour its 
central position within the systematization of the transfer of ownership, especially 
when discussing whether the various cases of alienation by a non-owner were 
actual exceptions to the general rule. The different legal schools would not 
always award this rule the same validity, which in turn would influence the way 
in which the transfer of ownership by a non-owner was understood in general. 
This principle-based approach compels therefore to set in the first place the study 
of the nemo plus rule in order to understand how the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner was approached during the ius commune, despite the modest 
significance which this rule had in classical Roman law. 
 
1. The nemo plus argument in theology and Canon law  
 
Before dealing with the reception and evolution of the nemo plus rule in legal 
scholarship, it should be borne in mind that the nemo plus argument continued its 
existence outside legal sources, and that the study of its evolution cannot be 
omitted within the present work, due to the way in which it would eventually 
influence its legal applications. In the previous chapter, it was shown that the 
nemo plus argument was a consolidated commonplace in the 2nd century AD, 
making its entrance into juristic writings around that time. The application of the 
argument was however not limited to the legal world after that period, being 
particularly significant among Christian writers. The argument appears to have 
been introduced into the writings of the early Church Fathers in the context of 
the rebaptism controversy which took place since the beginning of the 3rd 
century. Since already in the early Church there were divergent members who 
were labelled as heretics, a question soon arose concerning the validity of the 
sacraments granted by them, a problem which was particularly debated regarding 
the baptism – hence the name ‘rebaptism controversy’ – and the ordination of 
priests1. Tertullian (c. 160 – c. 225) was of the opinion that the sacraments 
conferred by heretics were not valid, and that they should accordingly be granted 
again by someone adhering to the true faith, idea which he supported through 
                                                 
1  On this controversy in the patristic period see Labrecque, Rebaptism (1972). 
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the application of the nemo plus argument by pointing out that since heretics did 
not have the one and proper baptism they could not grant it to someone else2. 
The doctrine of Tertullian would gain fertile ground in his native North Africa, 
since the argument is again found on numerous occasions in the writings of St. 
Cyprian of Carthage (c. 200-258 AD) which deal with the baptism of apostates 
and heretics, particularly in some of his Epistles3 and in the synod organized by 
him in 256 AD4. 
 While the nemo plus argument was repeatedly applied by theologians in the 
context of the granting of sacraments by heretics, this was not the only 
application it received, and other more casual uses by authors such as Lactantius5 
(c. 250 – c. 325 AD) and Zeno of Verona6 (c. 300 – c. 371 AD) show that it 
remained largely a topical argument or widespread commonplace which could be 
brought up in different contexts and with a varying significance. Later 
applications of the argument can also be found in Christian adaptations of 
Epictetus7, in John of Damascus8 and in Isidore of Seville, who uses it when 
determining whether a monk may free a slave9. The various contexts and ways in 
which the nemo plus argument is applied makes it in turn impossible to determine 
a particular source from where theologians would have drawn the argument, 
although the argumentative role normally granted to it would lead to think 
particularly in the influence of rhetoric, especially considering the extended 
                                                 
2  Tertullian, De Baptismo 15,2: “Non debeo in illis cognoscere quod mihi est praeceptum, 
quia non idem deus est nobis et illis, nec unus Christus, id est idem: ergo nec baptismus 
unus, quia non idem. Quem cum rite non habeant sine dubio non habent, nec capit 
numerare quod non habetur: ita nec possunt accipere, quia non habent”. 
3  St. Cyprian of Carthage, Epistula 70,2,3: “Quis autem potest dare quod non habeat, aut 
quomodo potest spiritualia gerere qui ipse amiserit spiritum sanctum? Et idcirco 
baptizandus est et innovandus qui ad ecclesiam rudis venit, ut intus per sanctos 
sanctificetur, quia scriptum est : sancti estote, quoniam et ego sanctus sum, dicit dominus…”  
4  St. Cyprian of Carthage, Sententiae episcoporum numero LXXXVII de haereticis baptizandis 
C. 65: “Quintus ab Acbia dixit : Ille potest dare aliquid, qui aliquid habet. Haeretici autem 
quid possunt dare, quos constat nihil habere?” Other applications of the argument can be 
seen in canones 16, 33, 57, 70 and 76. 
5  Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones 1,15,28 makes use of the argument when discussing the 
deification of mortals in the pagan faith: “Quis enim tam demens, qui consensus et placito 
innumerabilium stultorum aperiri caelum mortuis arbitretur? Aut aliquem, quod ipse non 
habeat, dare alteri posse?” 
6  Zeno of Verona, Tractatus 1,3,15,7: “ut quod non habet perdat”; 2,3,6,10: “nec ulli dabit 
quod non habet”. 
7  [Nilus’] Adaptation, c. 31a,10-11: “τίȢ δ੻ δοῦναι δȪναται ਦτȑρ૳ ਘ μ੽ ਩Ȥει α੝τόȢ”; 
Paraphrasis Christiana, c. 31,10-11: “τίȢ δ੻ δȪναται δοῦναι ਦτȑρ૳ ਘ μ੽ ਩Ȥει α੝τόȢ”; 
Vaticanus Graecus 2231, c. 31,10-11: “τίȢ δ੻ δοῦναι δȪναται ਦτȑρ૳ ਘ μ੽ ਩Ȥει α੝τόȢ” See 
on these texts Boter, The Encheiridion of Epictetus and its three Christian adaptations (1999). 
8  John of Damascus, Contra Manichaeos 63,49: Ȇ૵Ȣ ο੣ν, ੔ ο੝κ ਩Ȥει, δ઄ναται δοῦναι (How 
then can one give what one does not have?) 
9  Isidore of Seville, Regula monachorum, C. 19: “Abbati vel monacho monasterii servum non 
licebit facere liberum: qui enim nihil proprium habet, libertatem rei alienae dare non 
debet. Nam sicut saeculi leges sanxerunt, non potest alienari possessio, nisi a proprio 
domino”. 
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knowledge of this discipline by authors such as Tertullian, Cyprian and 
particularly Lactantius, who was a professor of rhetoric10. It seems in turn rather 
unlikely that these applications of the argument would prove the acquaintance of 
theologians with juristic writings, as Ferrini thinks regarding Lactantius11, since 
jurists were only one among many disciplines making use of the argument. 
Accordingly, although modern scholars have shown the use of legal notions by 
some of these authors12, it appears more likely that Christian theology developed 
an independent tradition to that of legal writings concerning the application of 
the nemo plus argument. Interactions between both traditions may have taken 
place, as seen in the rather legal application of the argument by Isidore of Seville, 
but the scope given to the argument by theologians would be largely determined 
by the needs of their own discipline. 
 Despite the more casual applications just mentioned, the argument would 
mostly be used to discuss the validity of the sacraments conferred by heretics, 
apostates or other individuals with other questionable backgrounds. Such an 
application even made its way to the Code of Justinian through the above-
mentioned constitution of the year 379 AD dealing with heretics, in which they 
were forbidden from teaching what they do not have or from ordaining 
ministers, since they were not ministers themselves (C. 1,5,2pr: “…ne antistites 
eorundem audeant fidem insinuare, quam non habent, et ministros creare, quod non 
sunt…”). The argument is moreover found in a letter which for a long time was 
ascribed to Pope Damasus I13 (c. 305-384 AD) – nowadays identified as a 
medieval forgery – in which the possibility that chorbishops – a clergyman 
inferior to the bishop14 – may ordain bishops is discussed, stating that “by no 
means can they give what they do not have” (“quod non habent, dare nequaquam 
possunt”), an idea which he later develops extensively in order to deny them such 
power15. The argument is used in other contexts by authors such as Saint 
Ambrose16 (c. 340-397), Ambrosiaster17 (4th century AD), Pope Innocent I18 († 
                                                 
10  On the life and career of Lactantius see Bowen/Garnsey, Lactantius (2004), p. 1-6. 
11  Ferrini, Die juristischen Kenntnisse (1894), p. 347, when commenting this text notes: 
“Anspielung auf eine bekannte Rechtsparömie”. 
12  Regarding Cyprian, see e.g. Mentxaka, Notas jurídicas (2014), p. 281-315. 
13  Jaffé-Löwenfeld, Regesta Pontificium Romanorum (1885) I, p. 37.  
14  See on this institution Müller, Chorbischöfe (2006), p. 77-94. 
15  Damasus I, De Chorepiscopis: “Nam benedictio, quam praedicti chorepiscopi ante suam 
prohibitionem, per manus impositionem dabant, magis nobis videtur vulnus inferre, quam 
salutem. Et illi qui pontificatus apicem non habebant, quomodo ea, quae non habebant, 
dare poterant? Quoniam nihil in dante erat, quod ille posset accipere. Aut quis hominum, 
licet et more humano loquamur, dare potest quod non habet? Praesertim cum pontifices 
non erant, ea quae solis pontificibus debentur, dare non poterant. (…) Nam quomodo 
honorem possit retinere qui ab illo acceperit, qui potestatem dare legitime non habuit, 
invenire non possum, cum ille, qui honorem pontificalem non habuit, pontificalia non 
potest iura tribuere…” 
16  Saint Ambrose, De patriarchis 10,45: “nemo potest donare quod non habet”. 
17  (Pseudo)Ambrose, In Epistolam B. Pauli ad Timotheum Primam 10,3,12: “neque enim fas erat 
aut licebat, ut inferior ordinaret majorem: nemo enim tribuit quod non accepit”. 
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417) and Pope Leo the Great19 (c. 400-461), in order to deny the validity of the 
sacrament conferred or to extract analogous consequences, being also brought up 
in the Council of Constantinople of 691/692 AD20 with an identical aim. These 
various opinions would decisively influence later medieval developments, and it 
is therefore no wonder to find both Damasus and Innocent quoted by Pope 
Urban II (c. 1042-1099) in an epistle issued between 1088 and 1089 AD21, in 
which he determines that Daimbert (Daibertus) should be re-ordained as a 
deacon before being ordained bishop, since he was made deacon by Negzelon, 
who was an heretic22. The ground given for the re-ordination is that Negzelon 
could not have given anything by the laying on of hands (“quia nihil habuit, dare 
nil potuit ei cui manus imposuit”), bringing up the authority of Innocent I on this 
point. Afterwards Urban refers to the opinion of Damasus I (“Damasi etiam pape 
testimonio roborati”), insisting on the same point, i.e. that he could not give if he 
had nothing (“quoniam quidem ut prediximus, qui nihil habuit nil dare potuit”). Urban 
II would deal with a similar case in an epistle issued in 1093, in which he 
determined that Poppo of Metz should be re-ordained deacon before being 
ordained bishop23. The ground for this decision is again the lack of the necessary 
                                                                                                                   
18  Innocent I, Epistola ad Rufum et Eusebium ceterosque episcopos 3: “Quomodo ei tribuetur, 
quod munditia ac puritas consuevit accipere? Sed contra asseritur eum, qui honorem 
amisit, honorem dare non posse: nec illum aliquid accepisse, quia nihil in dante erat, quod 
ille posset accipere, acquiescimus, et verum est certe, quia quod non habuit, dare non 
potuit”. A similar line of reasoning is used in his Epistola XXIV Ad Alexandrum episcopum 
antiocenum written in 415 AD (Jaffé-Löwenfeld, Regesta Pontificium Romanorum (1885) I, 
p. 47 nr. 310 [107])18, in which he denies that heretics may confer the baptism due to their 
departure from the Catholic faith. 
19  Leo I, Epistola IX ad Dioscorum Alexandrinum Episcopum (ed. Migne 1846), col. 625: “cum 
sine dubio de eodem fonte gratiae unus spiritus et discipuli fuerit magistri, nec aliud 
ordinatus tradere potuerit, quam quod ab ordinatore suscepit”. 
20  Council of Constantinople (691/692 AD), canon 26: ε੝Ȝογ઀α γὰρ ਖγιασμοῦ μετ੺δοσ઀Ȣ 
ਥστιν ੒ δ੻ τοῦτο μ੽ ਩Ȥων διὰ τઁ ਥκ τોȢ ਕγνο઀αȢ παρ੺πτωμα π૵Ȣ ਦτ੼ρ૳ μεταδઆσει (for 
the blessing is the giving of sanctification. But how can he impart this to another who does 
not possess it himself through a sin of ignorance? [transl. Percival, modified]) The canon is 
rendered in Latin in the following words: “benedictio enim sanctificationis impertio est, 
qui autem propter delictum ex ignorantia id non habet, quomodo alteri impertiet?” 
21  Jaffé-Löwenfeld, Regesta Pontificium Romanorum (1885) I, p. 661 nr. 5383 (4027); Kehr, 
Italia Pontificia (1908) III, p. 119 nr. 2 and p. 320 nr. 6. The case is extensively analysed by 
Kuttner, Urban II and the Doctrine of Interpretation (1972 [1980]), p. 56-85. 
22  The epistle it partly reproduced by Ivo of Chartres (c. 1040-1115) in his Panormia lib. 3, 
cap. 81, and also edited by Jaffé, Monumenta Moguntina (1866), p. 373 nr. 30. Another 
version with slight variations is found in the Collectio Britannica, which was studied by 
Ewald, Papstbriefe Brittischen Sammlung (1880), p. 360-361, and edited by Löwenfeld, 
Epistolae Pontificum Romanorum ineditae (1885), p. 61-62. A recent edition of the letter as 
preserved in the Collectio Britannica is found in Kuttner, Urban II and the Doctrine of 
Interpretation (1972 [1980]), p. 60-61. 
23  Jaffé-Löwenfeld, Regesta Pontificium Romanorum (1885) I, p. 667 nr. 5442 (4062), also in 
Patrologia Latina (ed. Migne) 151, col. 705-706. This letter, less known than the previous 
one, is commented by Kuttner, Urban II and the Doctrine of Interpretation (1972 [1980]), 
p. 84-85. 
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417) and Pope Leo the Great19 (c. 400-461), in order to deny the validity of the 
sacrament conferred or to extract analogous consequences, being also brought up 
in the Council of Constantinople of 691/692 AD20 with an identical aim. These 
various opinions would decisively influence later medieval developments, and it 
is therefore no wonder to find both Damasus and Innocent quoted by Pope 
Urban II (c. 1042-1099) in an epistle issued between 1088 and 1089 AD21, in 
which he determines that Daimbert (Daibertus) should be re-ordained as a 
deacon before being ordained bishop, since he was made deacon by Negzelon, 
who was an heretic22. The ground given for the re-ordination is that Negzelon 
could not have given anything by the laying on of hands (“quia nihil habuit, dare 
nil potuit ei cui manus imposuit”), bringing up the authority of Innocent I on this 
point. Afterwards Urban refers to the opinion of Damasus I (“Damasi etiam pape 
testimonio roborati”), insisting on the same point, i.e. that he could not give if he 
had nothing (“quoniam quidem ut prediximus, qui nihil habuit nil dare potuit”). Urban 
II would deal with a similar case in an epistle issued in 1093, in which he 
determined that Poppo of Metz should be re-ordained deacon before being 
ordained bishop23. The ground for this decision is again the lack of the necessary 
                                                                                                                   
18  Innocent I, Epistola ad Rufum et Eusebium ceterosque episcopos 3: “Quomodo ei tribuetur, 
quod munditia ac puritas consuevit accipere? Sed contra asseritur eum, qui honorem 
amisit, honorem dare non posse: nec illum aliquid accepisse, quia nihil in dante erat, quod 
ille posset accipere, acquiescimus, et verum est certe, quia quod non habuit, dare non 
potuit”. A similar line of reasoning is used in his Epistola XXIV Ad Alexandrum episcopum 
antiocenum written in 415 AD (Jaffé-Löwenfeld, Regesta Pontificium Romanorum (1885) I, 
p. 47 nr. 310 [107])18, in which he denies that heretics may confer the baptism due to their 
departure from the Catholic faith. 
19  Leo I, Epistola IX ad Dioscorum Alexandrinum Episcopum (ed. Migne 1846), col. 625: “cum 
sine dubio de eodem fonte gratiae unus spiritus et discipuli fuerit magistri, nec aliud 
ordinatus tradere potuerit, quam quod ab ordinatore suscepit”. 
20  Council of Constantinople (691/692 AD), canon 26: ε੝Ȝογ઀α γὰρ ਖγιασμοῦ μετ੺δοσ઀Ȣ 
ਥστιν ੒ δ੻ τοῦτο μ੽ ਩Ȥων διὰ τઁ ਥκ τોȢ ਕγνο઀αȢ παρ੺πτωμα π૵Ȣ ਦτ੼ρ૳ μεταδઆσει (for 
the blessing is the giving of sanctification. But how can he impart this to another who does 
not possess it himself through a sin of ignorance? [transl. Percival, modified]) The canon is 
rendered in Latin in the following words: “benedictio enim sanctificationis impertio est, 
qui autem propter delictum ex ignorantia id non habet, quomodo alteri impertiet?” 
21  Jaffé-Löwenfeld, Regesta Pontificium Romanorum (1885) I, p. 661 nr. 5383 (4027); Kehr, 
Italia Pontificia (1908) III, p. 119 nr. 2 and p. 320 nr. 6. The case is extensively analysed by 
Kuttner, Urban II and the Doctrine of Interpretation (1972 [1980]), p. 56-85. 
22  The epistle it partly reproduced by Ivo of Chartres (c. 1040-1115) in his Panormia lib. 3, 
cap. 81, and also edited by Jaffé, Monumenta Moguntina (1866), p. 373 nr. 30. Another 
version with slight variations is found in the Collectio Britannica, which was studied by 
Ewald, Papstbriefe Brittischen Sammlung (1880), p. 360-361, and edited by Löwenfeld, 
Epistolae Pontificum Romanorum ineditae (1885), p. 61-62. A recent edition of the letter as 
preserved in the Collectio Britannica is found in Kuttner, Urban II and the Doctrine of 
Interpretation (1972 [1980]), p. 60-61. 
23  Jaffé-Löwenfeld, Regesta Pontificium Romanorum (1885) I, p. 667 nr. 5442 (4062), also in 
Patrologia Latina (ed. Migne) 151, col. 705-706. This letter, less known than the previous 
one, is commented by Kuttner, Urban II and the Doctrine of Interpretation (1972 [1980]), 
p. 84-85. 
 
status in the person who ordained him: “Talis enim ordinator, cum nihil habuerit, 
nihil dare potuit”. 
 While most Christian authors rely on the nemo plus argument – among other 
elements – to deny the faculty to confer a sacrament in the cases mentioned 
above, it is interesting that authors holding opposing views would elaborate an 
alternative interpretation of this argument without having to question its validity. 
This is particularly the case of Saint Augustine (354-430 AD), who contradicts 
the position of authors such as Tertullian and Cyprian, by declaring that there 
was no need to rebaptize heretics. When it comes to refute the nemo plus 
argument as used by previous authors, Augustine argues that it is God himself 
who gives the Holy Spirit, despite the wickedness of the person who administers 
the sacrament, and therefore the fact that a heretic may validly baptize does not 
contradict the nemo plus argument24. The interpretation given to the nemo plus 
argument by Augustine would not raise as many adherents as the opposite one, 
finding nonetheless a loyal follower in Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 AD), who in 
his 6umma Theologiae confronts the application of this argument when used to 
demonstrate that a non-baptized cannot baptize25, arguing that it is Christ who 
inwardly baptizes, while men only do it outwardly, and therefore the baptism is 
not of he who administers it, but from Christ26. This author also brings up this 
argument when discussing whether evil ministers could confer sacraments, 
refuting a positive answer27 in an almost identical way as in the previous case: 
since Christ himself confers his grace through the minister, the grace would be 
given despite the wickedness of the minister, and therefore the nemo plus 
argument would not be contradicted28.  
 As can be seen from the contrasting views developed by Christian authors, the 
evolution of the nemo plus argument among theologians developed very particular 
features, not only because it was mostly used in one particular context – whether 
                                                 
24  Saint Augustine, De Baptismo libri septem 5,20,28: “Cum dare nemo possit quod non habet, 
quomodo dat homicida Spiritum Sanctum? Et tamen etiam intus ipse baptizat: Deus ergo 
dat etiam ipso baptizante Spiritum Sanctum”. Later in the text (De Baptismo libri septem 
6,40,78) Augustine also refutes the argument as used in Cyprian, 6ententiae episcoporum 
numero L;;;9II De haereticis bapti]andis, C. 33. 
25  Thomas Aquinas, 6umma Theologica 3,67,5: “nullus enim dat, quod non habet: sed non 
baptizatus non habet sacramentum baptismi; ergo non potest ipsum conferre”. 
26  Thomas Aquinas, 6umma Theologica 3,67,5: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod homo 
baptizans adhibet tantummodo ministerium exterius; sed Christus est, qui interius baptizat, 
qui potest uti omnibus hominbus ad quodcumque voluerit: et idea non baptizati possunt 
baptizare, quia, ut Nicolaus papa dicet, baptismus ‘non est illorum’, scilicet baptizantium, 
‘sed eius’, scilicet Christi”.  
27  Thomas Aquinas, 6umma Theologiae 3,64,4: “et etiam cum gratiam non habeant, non 
videtur quod gratiam conferre possint: quia nullus dat quod non habet; non ergo videtur, 
quod per malos sacramenta conferri possint”. 
28  Thomas Aquinas, 6umma Theologiae 3,64,4: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ministri 
Ecclesiae neque a peccatis mundant homines ad sacramenta accedentes, neque gratiam 
conferunt sua virtute; sed hoc facit Christus sua potestate per eos, sicut per quaedam 
instrumenta”. 
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sacraments could be validly conferred or not by specific individuals – but also 
because the validity of the argument itself was never questioned. Authors 
presenting opposing views on a particular subject would only debate on whether 
the nemo plus argument was properly applied, but no one dared to present his 
views as an exception to it. Accordingly, the argument features as an absolute 
truth among Christian writers, something quite unusual among the applications 
given to the argument in the Roman world and certainly very different from the 
approach favoured by classical Roman jurists. 
 The fact that theologians offer contrasting interpretations of the nemo plus 
argument without questioning its validity bears interesting consequences for the 
development of the argument in the legal sphere due to the way in which it was 
laid down in Canon law. Considering the great number of references to the 
argument in Christian writings, it is no wonder that the argument was 
extensively recorded in the Decretum Gratiani. For instance, the application of the 
nemo plus by Cyprian of Carthage is to be found in Decretum Grat. C. 24, q. 1, 
c. 3129, and that of St. Augustine in Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., c. 4130. 
Moreover, within Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, which addresses the problem of 
whether those who abandon a heretical belief and return to the Catholic faith 
should retain their dignity, the above-quoted epistles of Urban II (1088-1089 
AD) and of Pseudo-Damasus I are compiled into Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 24 
and Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 25 respectively. Damasus’ epistle is also found in 
Decretum Grat. C. 9, q. 1, c. 3, within a causa which deals with the ordinations 
performed by excommunicated members of the clergy. The epistles of Innocent I 
were also included in Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 73 and in Decretum Grat. C. 1, 
q. 1, c. 18. These latter texts are moreover combined in Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 
1, c. 1731, which is supplemented with a rubric which makes a clear reference to 
the nemo plus argument (“Those who do not have the completion of the Spirit 
cannot give it themselves”). Numerous other examples can be mentioned: 
Decretum Grat. C. 24, q. 1, c. 16 reproduces the opinion of Leo I, to whom 
                                                 
29  Decretum Grat. C. 24, q. 1, c. 31, § 4: “(…) manifestum est, nec remissionem peccatorum 
per eos dari posse, quos constat Spiritum sanctum non habere”. 
30  Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., c. 41: “Mali non sua potestate, sed Christi virtute baptisma 
ministrant. (…) cum dare nemo possit quod non habet, quomodo dat homicida Spiritum 
sanctum? et tamen intus etiam ipse baptizat. Deus ergo dat etiam ipso baptizante Spiritum 
sanctum…” The opinions of St. Augustine regarding this subject are also reproduced in 
several canons within Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, such as c. 29-39, 58 and 97, among others, 
although the nemo plus argument only comes into play in the latter text, § 8. See moreover 
the opinions of St. Augustine recorded in Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., c. 31, 32, 39 and 40. 
31  Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 17: “Qui perfectionem Spiritus non habent, ipsam dare non possunt. 
Qui perfectionem Spiritus, quam acceperant, perdiderunt, non dare eius plenitudinem 
possunt, que maxime operatur in ordinationibus, quam per suam perfidiam perdiderunt. Et 
iterum: §. 1. Qui honorem non habuit, honorem dare non potuit, nec aliquid accepit ille, 
quia nichil erat in dante, sed dampnationem, quam habuit, per pravam manus inpositionem 
dedit”. 
 
Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 132 is also ascribed, though corresponding in fact to a 
text of Humbert of Silva Candida against simony33; an epistle ascribed to Gregory 
I (Pope between 590-604 AD) included in Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 12 also 
applies the argument when discussing simony34; Decretum Grat. D. 28, c. 16 
reproduces a canon of the Council of Constantinople of 691/692 AD containing 
this argument. Moreover, other texts record alternative versions of the argument, 
such as “Nam quod non acceperunt non habent” (Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 21). To 
all of these applications of the nemo plus argument in theological settings, one may 
add also some other uses of it which belong to private law, such as the inclusion 
of PS Int. 5,36 ad § 1 in Decretum Grat. C. 2, q. 6, c. 2635, referred to the judicial 
deposit and which made its way through the Lex Romana Visigothorum36. In 
this category one may also include Isidore of Seville’s application of the argument 
when discussing the manumission performed by a monk, recorded in Decretum 
Grat. D. 54, c. 22.  
 The extensive reception of the nemo plus argument in the Decretum Gratiani 
reflects not only to what extent theologians and canonists made use of the idea, 
but also the degree of validity which they granted it. Unlike classical Roman 
jurists, none of these authors are willing to formulate exceptions to the idea that 
no one can give what he does not have, but instead make use of it as a decisive 
truth which cannot be contradicted. This approach is especially interesting 
considering that the argument is often used to defend contradicting opinions, as 
happens particularly in cases where someone with a certain status – a heretic, a 
pagan, someone who is not a bishop, etc. – could confer a particular sacrament. 
Gratian records both the opinions of authors who use the argument in favour of 
the validity of the sacrament and of those who use it against it, being the latter 
group by far the largest and including quotations from Cyprian of Carthage, 
Pope Damasus I, Innocent I or Urban II. The opposite view is held within the 
Decretum Gratiani only by Augustine, although it should be noted that there are 
                                                 
32  Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 1: “Symoniaci gratiam non prestant, quam querunt vendere. 
Gratia si non gratis datur vel accipitur, gratia non est. Symoniaci autem non gratis 
accipiunt: igitur gratiam, que maxime in ecclesiasticis ordinibus operatur, non accipiunt. Si 
autem accipiunt, non habent; si autem non habent, neque gratis neque non gratis cuiquam 
dare possunt. Quid ergo dant? profecto quod habent? quid autem habent? Spiritum utique 
mendatii. Quomodo hoc probamus? quia si spiritus veritatis (testante ipsa veritate, de qua 
procedit) gratis accipitur, proculdubio spiritus mendatii esse convincitur, qui non gratis 
accipitur”. 
33  Patrologia Latina (ed. Migne) 143, col. 1017A-B. 
34  Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 12: “… Et cum in Christi corpore non sunt, quomodo Christi 
corpus tradere vel accipere possunt? Qui maledictus est quomodo benedicere potest?” 
35  Decretum Grat. C. 2, q. 6, c. 26: “Quociens post auditam causam iudicem possessor 
appellat, fructus possessionis, de qua agitur, dum sequendae audientiae euentus dubius est, 
merito sequestrantur. Nam si petitor appellauerit, ab eo hoc non potest postulari, quia non 
potest sequestrari quod non habet”. 
36  Lex Romana Visigothorum (ed. Hänel 1849), p. 442. 
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sacraments could be validly conferred or not by specific individuals – but also 
because the validity of the argument itself was never questioned. Authors 
presenting opposing views on a particular subject would only debate on whether 
the nemo plus argument was properly applied, but no one dared to present his 
views as an exception to it. Accordingly, the argument features as an absolute 
truth among Christian writers, something quite unusual among the applications 
given to the argument in the Roman world and certainly very different from the 
approach favoured by classical Roman jurists. 
 The fact that theologians offer contrasting interpretations of the nemo plus 
argument without questioning its validity bears interesting consequences for the 
development of the argument in the legal sphere due to the way in which it was 
laid down in Canon law. Considering the great number of references to the 
argument in Christian writings, it is no wonder that the argument was 
extensively recorded in the Decretum Gratiani. For instance, the application of the 
nemo plus by Cyprian of Carthage is to be found in Decretum Grat. C. 24, q. 1, 
c. 3129, and that of St. Augustine in Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., c. 4130. 
Moreover, within Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, which addresses the problem of 
whether those who abandon a heretical belief and return to the Catholic faith 
should retain their dignity, the above-quoted epistles of Urban II (1088-1089 
AD) and of Pseudo-Damasus I are compiled into Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 24 
and Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 25 respectively. Damasus’ epistle is also found in 
Decretum Grat. C. 9, q. 1, c. 3, within a causa which deals with the ordinations 
performed by excommunicated members of the clergy. The epistles of Innocent I 
were also included in Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 73 and in Decretum Grat. C. 1, 
q. 1, c. 18. These latter texts are moreover combined in Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 
1, c. 1731, which is supplemented with a rubric which makes a clear reference to 
the nemo plus argument (“Those who do not have the completion of the Spirit 
cannot give it themselves”). Numerous other examples can be mentioned: 
Decretum Grat. C. 24, q. 1, c. 16 reproduces the opinion of Leo I, to whom 
                                                 
29  Decretum Grat. C. 24, q. 1, c. 31, § 4: “(…) manifestum est, nec remissionem peccatorum 
per eos dari posse, quos constat Spiritum sanctum non habere”. 
30  Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., c. 41: “Mali non sua potestate, sed Christi virtute baptisma 
ministrant. (…) cum dare nemo possit quod non habet, quomodo dat homicida Spiritum 
sanctum? et tamen intus etiam ipse baptizat. Deus ergo dat etiam ipso baptizante Spiritum 
sanctum…” The opinions of St. Augustine regarding this subject are also reproduced in 
several canons within Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, such as c. 29-39, 58 and 97, among others, 
although the nemo plus argument only comes into play in the latter text, § 8. See moreover 
the opinions of St. Augustine recorded in Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., c. 31, 32, 39 and 40. 
31  Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 17: “Qui perfectionem Spiritus non habent, ipsam dare non possunt. 
Qui perfectionem Spiritus, quam acceperant, perdiderunt, non dare eius plenitudinem 
possunt, que maxime operatur in ordinationibus, quam per suam perfidiam perdiderunt. Et 
iterum: §. 1. Qui honorem non habuit, honorem dare non potuit, nec aliquid accepit ille, 
quia nichil erat in dante, sed dampnationem, quam habuit, per pravam manus inpositionem 
dedit”. 
 
Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 132 is also ascribed, though corresponding in fact to a 
text of Humbert of Silva Candida against simony33; an epistle ascribed to Gregory 
I (Pope between 590-604 AD) included in Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 12 also 
applies the argument when discussing simony34; Decretum Grat. D. 28, c. 16 
reproduces a canon of the Council of Constantinople of 691/692 AD containing 
this argument. Moreover, other texts record alternative versions of the argument, 
such as “Nam quod non acceperunt non habent” (Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 21). To 
all of these applications of the nemo plus argument in theological settings, one may 
add also some other uses of it which belong to private law, such as the inclusion 
of PS Int. 5,36 ad § 1 in Decretum Grat. C. 2, q. 6, c. 2635, referred to the judicial 
deposit and which made its way through the Lex Romana Visigothorum36. In 
this category one may also include Isidore of Seville’s application of the argument 
when discussing the manumission performed by a monk, recorded in Decretum 
Grat. D. 54, c. 22.  
 The extensive reception of the nemo plus argument in the Decretum Gratiani 
reflects not only to what extent theologians and canonists made use of the idea, 
but also the degree of validity which they granted it. Unlike classical Roman 
jurists, none of these authors are willing to formulate exceptions to the idea that 
no one can give what he does not have, but instead make use of it as a decisive 
truth which cannot be contradicted. This approach is especially interesting 
considering that the argument is often used to defend contradicting opinions, as 
happens particularly in cases where someone with a certain status – a heretic, a 
pagan, someone who is not a bishop, etc. – could confer a particular sacrament. 
Gratian records both the opinions of authors who use the argument in favour of 
the validity of the sacrament and of those who use it against it, being the latter 
group by far the largest and including quotations from Cyprian of Carthage, 
Pope Damasus I, Innocent I or Urban II. The opposite view is held within the 
Decretum Gratiani only by Augustine, although it should be noted that there are 
                                                 
32  Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 1: “Symoniaci gratiam non prestant, quam querunt vendere. 
Gratia si non gratis datur vel accipitur, gratia non est. Symoniaci autem non gratis 
accipiunt: igitur gratiam, que maxime in ecclesiasticis ordinibus operatur, non accipiunt. Si 
autem accipiunt, non habent; si autem non habent, neque gratis neque non gratis cuiquam 
dare possunt. Quid ergo dant? profecto quod habent? quid autem habent? Spiritum utique 
mendatii. Quomodo hoc probamus? quia si spiritus veritatis (testante ipsa veritate, de qua 
procedit) gratis accipitur, proculdubio spiritus mendatii esse convincitur, qui non gratis 
accipitur”. 
33  Patrologia Latina (ed. Migne) 143, col. 1017A-B. 
34  Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 12: “… Et cum in Christi corpore non sunt, quomodo Christi 
corpus tradere vel accipere possunt? Qui maledictus est quomodo benedicere potest?” 
35  Decretum Grat. C. 2, q. 6, c. 26: “Quociens post auditam causam iudicem possessor 
appellat, fructus possessionis, de qua agitur, dum sequendae audientiae euentus dubius est, 
merito sequestrantur. Nam si petitor appellauerit, ab eo hoc non potest postulari, quia non 
potest sequestrari quod non habet”. 
36  Lex Romana Visigothorum (ed. Hänel 1849), p. 442. 
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other authors who favour his view without applying the nemo plus argument37. 
The contradicting applications of the nemo plus argument compel Gratian to 
bring some harmony between them, as can be seen in Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, 
c. 57, i.f., which is introduced between texts of Leo I and Augustine38. Despite 
these contradicting applications, the fundamental validity of the argument was 
not questioned among theologians and canonists, who granted it a distinctive 
scope within Christian writings that departed significantly from that found in 
other disciplines. 
 
2. Developments within medieval dialectics 
 
The nemo plus argument not only acquired a prominent place among jurists and 
theologians, but remained relevant among dialecticians and philosophers as well. 
Especially significant in this regard is the translation of Aristotle’s Sophistical 
Refutations into Latin by Boethius39 (c. 480-525), which ensured that the nemo 
plus argument would be known and commented in the Middle Ages, as did later 
translations by James of Venice40 (12th century AD) and William of Moerbeke41 
(c. 1215 – c. 1286).  
 Having access to the opinions of Aristotle regarding the nemo plus argument, 
medieval scholars developed at some point an interpretation which can be found 
in the following text, wrongly ascribed to Bede the Venerable (c. 672-735): 
 
Pseudo-Bede, Sententiae philosophicae collectae ex Aristotele atque 
Cicerone42: Nihil dat quod non habet (1. Elench.): Scilicet quod non 
habet vel formaliter, vel virtualiter. Oportet enim ut alterutro modo 
habeat, siquidem dat. Potest autem bene fieri, ut aliquid agens det 
aliquid, quod tamen ipsum agens non habet formaliter, sicut sol facit 
ista inferiora calida formaliter, licet ipse sit tantum calidus 
virtualiter43. 
                                                 
37  Such us the case of Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 59 and Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., c. 23, 
which reproduce an opinion incorrectly ascribed to Isidore of Seville, admitting the 
validity of a sacrament performed by a pagan. 
38  Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 57, i.f.: “Gratian. Nemo in heresi vel scismate constitutus 
intelligentus est. Ceterum, si cum fidei integritate et animi puritate de manu hereticorum 
aliquis in forma ecclesiae baptisma acceperit, tunc inpletur illud Augustini [Decretum Grat. 
C. 1, q. 1, c. 30]: ‘Per lapideum canalem aqua transit ad areolas.’ Et iterum: ‘Spiritualis 
virtus sacramenti, etc.’”  
39  Dod (ed.), Aristoteles Latinus VI 1, p. 5-60, particularly p. 23, line 11, p. 44, lines 20-27, 
p. 45, lines 4-8, and p. 46, lines 23-25. 
40  Dod (ed.), Aristoteles Latinus VI 2, p. 61-74. 
41  Dod (ed.), Aristoteles Latinus VI 3, p. 75-108, particularly p. 87, lines 10-11, p. 99, lines 26-
31, p. 100-101, lines 41-42. 
42  Patrologia Latina (ed. Migne) 90, col. 1019C. 
43  Pseudo-Bede, Sententiae philosophicae collectae ex Aristotele atque Cicerone: “[One] gives 
nothing that [one] does not have (1. Elench.): This is certainly the case regarding what is 
neither held actually nor potentially. It is therefore necessary to have in one of both ways, 
 
Who the real author of this text is remains a mystery. It was attributed to Bede in 
the 1563 Basel edition of his complete works, which is notorious for the amount 
of material wrongfully ascribed to this author44. Whoever the author may be, the 
text contains an explanation for the nemo plus argument which would become 
widespread among medieval scholars, namely that it is necessary to distinguish the 
way in which something is held from that in which it is given. The text resorts in 
this context to the notion ‘formaliter’ (actually, properly) which is opposed to 
‘virtualiter’ (potentially)45. While the link of this reasoning with Aristotle is 
attested by the reference to the Sophistical Refutations, it is clear that the original 
Aristotelian notions are rendered in a simplified way by stressing the underlying 
guideline that always when something is given it must have been held in some 
way or another. In this particular text the validity of the argument is exemplified 
by stating that the sun can actually (formaliter) make earthy things warm, even 
when it is in itself only potentially (virtualiter) warm. This kind of colourful 
examples would spread among medieval scholars, as will be shown below. 
 As described in the previous section, the nemo plus argument was widely used 
by theologians and canonists, who granted it an absolute validity. It is therefore 
no wonder that medieval scholars were keen to adopt the innovations developed 
in the field of dialectics in order to explain how exactly something could be 
given despite the fact that it was not apparently held. Creative explanations were 
applied in the most diverse contexts, and while authors such as Albertus 
Magnus46 (c. 1193-1280) were satisfied with generally claiming that that which 
was given must have been held in some particular way, most scholars developed 
elaborate distinctions depending on whether the thing was given or held 
formaliter, materialiter, virtualiter, causaliter, exemplariter, eminenter or in some other 
way. Such distinctions can be found, for instance, in the writings of Saint 
                                                                                                                   
in order to give. It is possible that someone gives something which he does not actually 
have, just like the sun makes the earthly things warm even when it is itself only potentially 
warm”. 
44  Jones, Bedae Pseudepigrapha (1939), p. 14-18. 
45  The meaning of this and other medieval philosophical terms normally contrasted with 
‘formaliter’ is discussed by Ferrater Mora, Diccionario (1979) II, s.v. Formaliter (p. 1275-1276): 
“…Se enuncia algo formaliter cuando se dice de un modo propio, de acuerdo con su 
significado preciso (…) Un término entendido formaliter es un término entendido como tal. 
(…) Se enuncia algo virtualiter cuando se hace referencia a la causa capaz de producirlo”. 
Another account – although referring specifically to the works of Thomas Aquinas – is 
offered by Deferrari, Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas (1960), s.v. Formalis (p. 414): 
“relating to the form of a thing, referring to the form of a thing, relating after the manner 
of form, formal, the opposite of materialis”; s.v. Virtualis (p. 1088-1089): “(1) pertaining to 
the power of a thing, coming from it, synonym of potentialis, (2) being according to the 
power or the might of the potentiality, the opposite of actualis and habitualis, synonym of 
potentialis, (3) virtuous…” 
46  Albertus Magnus, Commentarius in II Sententiarum, dist. 30, secunda via: “Si autem ita 
intelligatur, quod nihil dat id quod nullo modo habet…” 
DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN MEDIEVAL DIALECTICS
327
 
324 
other authors who favour his view without applying the nemo plus argument37. 
The contradicting applications of the nemo plus argument compel Gratian to 
bring some harmony between them, as can be seen in Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, 
c. 57, i.f., which is introduced between texts of Leo I and Augustine38. Despite 
these contradicting applications, the fundamental validity of the argument was 
not questioned among theologians and canonists, who granted it a distinctive 
scope within Christian writings that departed significantly from that found in 
other disciplines. 
 
2. Developments within medieval dialectics 
 
The nemo plus argument not only acquired a prominent place among jurists and 
theologians, but remained relevant among dialecticians and philosophers as well. 
Especially significant in this regard is the translation of Aristotle’s Sophistical 
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plus argument would be known and commented in the Middle Ages, as did later 
translations by James of Venice40 (12th century AD) and William of Moerbeke41 
(c. 1215 – c. 1286).  
 Having access to the opinions of Aristotle regarding the nemo plus argument, 
medieval scholars developed at some point an interpretation which can be found 
in the following text, wrongly ascribed to Bede the Venerable (c. 672-735): 
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Cicerone42: Nihil dat quod non habet (1. Elench.): Scilicet quod non 
habet vel formaliter, vel virtualiter. Oportet enim ut alterutro modo 
habeat, siquidem dat. Potest autem bene fieri, ut aliquid agens det 
aliquid, quod tamen ipsum agens non habet formaliter, sicut sol facit 
ista inferiora calida formaliter, licet ipse sit tantum calidus 
virtualiter43. 
                                                 
37  Such us the case of Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 59 and Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., c. 23, 
which reproduce an opinion incorrectly ascribed to Isidore of Seville, admitting the 
validity of a sacrament performed by a pagan. 
38  Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 57, i.f.: “Gratian. Nemo in heresi vel scismate constitutus 
intelligentus est. Ceterum, si cum fidei integritate et animi puritate de manu hereticorum 
aliquis in forma ecclesiae baptisma acceperit, tunc inpletur illud Augustini [Decretum Grat. 
C. 1, q. 1, c. 30]: ‘Per lapideum canalem aqua transit ad areolas.’ Et iterum: ‘Spiritualis 
virtus sacramenti, etc.’”  
39  Dod (ed.), Aristoteles Latinus VI 1, p. 5-60, particularly p. 23, line 11, p. 44, lines 20-27, 
p. 45, lines 4-8, and p. 46, lines 23-25. 
40  Dod (ed.), Aristoteles Latinus VI 2, p. 61-74. 
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Bonaventure47 (c. 1218-1274), Durandus of Saint-Porçain48 (c. 1275-1334), 
Thomas of Strasbourg49 († 1357), Adam of Wodeham50 (c. 1295-1358) and 
William of Vaurouillon51 (c. 1390-1463). Particularly noteworthy is the 
contribution of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), who not only resorts to the nemo 
plus argument in the context of the validity of sacraments as shown in the 
previous section, but also in the most diverse contexts52. This author makes use 
in one passage of the distinction of having something formaliter, virtualiter, etc.53, 
but in another text he uses the equivalent notions of having something in actu (in 
actuality) and virtute (potentially), and in this context he brings up the same 
example given in the Sententiae philosophicae collectae ex Aristotele, namely that the 
sun gives heat despite having it potentially54. This is however not the only case in 
which scholars resort to examples, since Thomas de Argentina also mentions that 
light may produce colours55, and in the context of the validity of sacraments he 
claims that a messenger can deliver a letter containing a benefit from the Pope or 
the Emperor despite not being himself able to grant such benefit56. These 
numerous applications show that in the course of the Middle Ages the nemo plus 
argument acquired a predominant role in the argumentation of theologians and 
                                                 
47  Saint Bonaventure, Sententiarum, liber I, dist. 8, pars 1, art. 2, quaestio 1: “Et ad illud quod 
obiicitur, nihil dat alteri quod non habet, dicendum quod triplex est aliquid habere, scilicet 
formaliter, exemplariter, causaliter et quolibet istorum modorum, quod habet dare potest” 
48  Durandus of Saint-Porçain, Sententiarum, liber IV, dist. 7, quaest. 4: “Non enim oportet 
quod illud quod dat alteri quod habetur a dante formaliter: sed sufficit quod habeat 
virtualiter. Et ideo non obstat ad collationem sacramenti quod conferens receperit simile 
sacramentum: sed sufficit quod habeat in virtute”. 
49  Thomas of Strasbourg, Sententiarum, liber IV, dist. 13, quaest.1: “Praeterea, nihil dat, quod 
non habet (…) Non oporteret ipsum formaliter esse intentionale, sed sufficeret ipsum 
virtualiter esse intentionale, quamvis esset formaliter quid reale”. 
50  Adam of Wodeham, Sententiarum, liber IV, quest. 3: “Ad argumentum in oppositum nemo 
dat quod non habet verum est quod non habet virtualiter nec formaliter paganus autem 
habet satis virtutem lavandi et preferendi verba sacramentalia (…)” 
51  William of Vaurouillon, Sententiarum, liber I, dist. 27: “(…) quia nihil potest dare quod 
non habet. Dico quod verum est quod non habet aut formaliter aut principative aut 
virtualiter aut alio modo: sed non oportet formaliter”. 
52  See e.g. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1,75,1, where he resorts to the argument 
when discussing the properties of the soul. 
53  Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de peccato originali, art. 6: “(…) axioma commune 
nemo dat quod non habet intelligitur quod non habet, vel formaliter, vel materialiter aut 
virtualiter”. 
54  Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis, art. 3: “16. Praeterea, nihil 
dat quod non habet. (…) Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod licet anima non habeat 
corporeitatem in actu, habet tamen virtute, sicut sol calorem”. 
55  Thomas of Strasbourg (de Argentina), Sententiarum, liber II, dist. 13, quaest. 1: “Praeterea, 
nihil dat, quod non habet; sed lumen dat coloribus esse intentionale in medio”. 
56  Thomas of Strasbourg, Sententiarum, liber IV, dist. 5, quaest. 1, art. 1: “Ad tertium 
dicendum, quod licet nullus possit dare, quod non habet, tamen aliquis potest facere 
ministerium ratione cuius alter recipit quod non habet ille, qui facit ministerium. Posset, n. 
[enim] aliquis mihi portare literam Papae vel Imperatoris, ratione cuius literae magnum 
recipere beneficium, licet illius literae transportator beneficium huiusmodi nec haberet, nec 
umquam habiturus esset”. 
 
philosophers and, more importantly, that the absolute validity which the 
argument already had in the church fathers was strengthened by the 
developments in the field of dialectics. Among medieval authors therefore it 
became clear that always when something was given, it must have necessarily 
been held by the giver in some way or another, and there seemed to be no room 
for exceptions.  
 Apart from the technical and careful applications presented so far, it is worth 
noting that the nemo plus argument continued to be largely a commonplace with 
a certain proverbial value, as can be seen in the numerous proverbs and 
aphorisms making reference to it recorded in the Proverbia sententiaeque latinitatis 
medii ac recentioris aevi57. It is important to bear in mind this circumstance in order 
to avoid assuming that every reference to the argument implies that the author 
had D. 50,17,54 in mind. A lesson in this regard can be drawn from the 
application of the argument in Dante’s (1256-1321) De Monarchia, who makes 
use of it when discussing the authority of the Pope and the Emperor, stating that 
a vicar is not equivalent to the man for whom he acts as a vicar, “since nobody 
can give what is not his own”58. This reference has led to controversy among 
modern scholars regarding whether Dante draws this idea from the Digest or 
from another source59. Kay, being aware of the use of the argument by Aristotle, 
Seneca and Thomas Aquinas, states that “[e]vidently by Dante’s time the saying 
had become proverbial, since Aquinas cites it without attribution; hence it was 
most truly a commonplace”60. This opinion appears in fact to be the most 
reasonable, since it is in any case clear that law was only one of the disciplines in 
which the argument was applied, being in fact quite likely not the one in which 
the argument was most frequently employed. And while not every reference to 
the argument can be seen as inspired by legal sources, the extended application of 
the argument by medieval scholars raises the question of whether there was any 
further interaction among jurists and other disciplines, which will be dealt with in 
the following sections. 
  
                                                 
57  Schmidt, Proverbia sententiaeque latinitatis medii ac recentioris aevi (1982): II/7, 081: “Dare 
nemo potest, quod non habet”; II/8, 652l: “Nemo dare alteri, ipse quo caret, potest”; II/8, 
652n1: “Nemo dat, quod non habet”; II/8, 38686: “Nemo plus dat quam habet”; II/8, 
686c: “Nemo plus transferre in alium iuris quam ipse habet, potest”; II/8, 38686i: “Nemo 
potest, quod non habet, dare alteri”; II/9, 39863a3: “Quod non habes, a nemine eripi 
potest”. 
58  Dante, De Monarchia 3,7,7: “Scimus etiam quod vicarius hominis non equivalent ei, 
quantum in hoc quod vicarious est, quia nemo potest dare quod suum non est”. 
59  For a summary of the different opinions see Kay, Roman law in Dante (1997 [1990]), 
p. 267-268. 
60  Kay, Roman law in Dante (1997 [1990]), p. 267-268. 
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3. D. 50,17,54, a general rule plagued by exceptions 
 
By the time the Bolognese glossators were busy with the study of Justinian’s 
compilation, the nemo plus argument was consolidated among theologians, and 
the efforts of dialecticians offered a clear framework on how to apply this 
argument. Despite all of this, jurists initially seem to pay little attention to these 
developments, having their hands full with the enormous mass of texts which 
they attempted to tame into general and comprehensible notions. The regulae iuris 
and brocards played a significant role in the process of systematizing legal 
solutions, and accordingly great attention was paid to the title De diversis regulis 
iuris antiqui61. In this context, the glossators could only take the nemo plus rule as a 
general starting point around which they would gather similar and divergent cases 
as presented in the compilation62, and therefore the scope granted to this rule was 
essentially determined by its legal setting. This was to a certain extent an 
inevitable consequence of Justinian’s abstraction of the rule, which now seemed 
to have an intrinsic value which the glossators had to determine by comparing it 
to the rest of the compilation. Accordingly, sophisticated dialectical or dogmatic 
distinctions would have to wait until jurists had figured out what they were 
dealing with. 
 The interest of the Glossators for the study of the regulae iuris can be seen in 
the fact that already the second generation of this school had produced a full 
commentary on D. 50,17 through the pen of Bulgarus, one of the quattuor 
doctores. Commenting on the nemo plus rule, Bulgarus stands in principle for its 
general validity, since the transferor will transfer ownership if he himself is 
owner, and if he is merely a possessor in good faith he will allow his successor to 
continue with this possession; moreover, if there is any encumbrance on the 
object, this will affect the right of the transferee as well63. Despite this general 
validity, Bulgarus identifies several exceptions, which he moreover introduces 
with a tone of obviousness by using the adverb plane (clearly): the procurator 
selling according to the owner’s intent, the creditor (of the pledge property), the 
public auctioneer, as well as the imperial treasury or the emperor, may transfer 
ownership on various grounds, despite the fact that they do not own the object 
of the transaction64. What is particularly remarkable of this enumeration of 
exceptions is that they are presented in a loose way, without attempting to draw 
a common theory around them: the author feels confident enough to simply state 
that ownership in these cases is transferred “on various grounds” (diversis 
                                                 
61  Stein, Regulae iuris (1966), p. 132 ff. 
62  Feenstra, Romeinsrechtelijke grondslagen (1994), p. 50. 
63  Bulgarus, De diversis regulis iuris (ed. Beckhaus 1856), p. 49: “Qui enim dominus est, 
dominium transfert ad successorem rei vel iuris, qui bonae fidei possessor est, possessionis 
continuationem. Si quod onus rei imminebat apud auctorem, residebit apud successorem”. 
64  Bulgarus, De diversis regulis iuris (ed. Beckhaus 1856), p. 49: “Plane, ut supra diximus, 
procurator domini voluntate vendens, creditor ex pacto vel ex lege, publicus executor, 
fiscus, imperator diversis rationibus dominium transferunt, licet domini non sint”. 
 
rationibus), and he deliberately avoids entering the discussion concerning the 
ground for the transfer of ownership of the pledged property by naming both 
possible sources for this entitlement: the pact or the law (ex pacto vel ex lege).  
 It should be noted that Bulgarus introduces the exceptions to the nemo plus 
rule with the words “as we have said above” (ut supra diximus), which appears to 
point to his commentary to the regula of D. 50,17,11 (Id quod nostrum est sine facto 
nostro ad alium transferri non potest). When commenting this rule, Bulgarus 
determines what should be considered as “our act” (factum nostrum), declaring that 
the alienation through another with our authorization, such as a procurator, pledge 
creditor or public auctioneer should be considered as “our act”65. It is 
noteworthy that despite the fact that Bulgarus regards the transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner to be an act of the owner, he does not attempt to give a 
different interpretation of the nemo plus rule regarding the traditio by a non-
owner, according to which the rule would suffer no exceptions since the delivery 
is seen as performed by the owner himself. Instead, Bulgarus plainly considers 
these cases to be exceptions to the general rule. Similar interpretations of the 
significance of the transfer of ownership were given by other medieval jurists66, 
but this had no immediate consequence for the interpretation of the nemo plus 
rule. 
 Bulgarus’ approach to the nemo plus rule as a general rule with numerous 
exceptions would set a trend for later scholars, who would collect a progressively 
higher number of exceptions under this rule. This trend is already clearly 
noticeable in Placentinus’ Additiones to Bulgarus’ commentary67, where he adds 
more exceptions to the rule, thus rendering the commentary to D. 50,17,54 into 
a large list of anomalous cases68. Interestingly enough, Placentinus draws 
exceptions not only from the transfer of ownership, as Bulgarus had before him, 
but adds examples related to the usucapion, the acquisition of servitudes 
                                                 
65  Bulgarus, De diversis regulis iuris (ed. Beckhaus 1856), p. 12: “Factum nostrum intelligo, 
cum rem nostram nos ipsi distrahimus vel alius voluntate nostra ut procurator, creditor, 
exactor publicus, cuius factum nostrum est, ut pro evictione teneamur pretium reddituri 
emptori… Princeps tamen et fiscus si rem nostram ut suam distrahant, alienare 
intelliguntur”. 
66  See e.g. Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (ed. Woodbine 1922) II, p. 126: 
“Fingitur enim per voluntatem domini quod res quasi ex eo et per manum suam ad 
detentorem pervenerit possessio et dominium”. 
67  The text was edited by Beckhaus alongside that of Bulgarus. 
68  Placentinus, Additiones ad Bulgari commentarium, p. 49: “Item in re sua quis aliis dare 
seruitutem potest, licet eam non habeat ut supra de usu fr.1. Quod nostrum non est. 
[D. 7,1,63] Et bonae fidei possessor alii condicionem usu capiendi praestare potest, licet 
ipse forte, quia titulo caret, non possit usu capere, ut supra de diversis et tempr. praescr. 
[D. 44,3,?] Item patronus nocens, qui temere in ius impune vocari potest, ad filium 
innocentem hunc transmittit honorem, ut supra de in ius voc. l. Adoptivum § ult. 
[D. 2,4,8,2] Sed et posterior creditor, qui ipse nihil de vendendo pignore pepigerat, 
succedit in locum prioris, qui vendere poterat; ipse quoque uendere poterit. Saepe enim 
quis per alium habet, quod per se habere non potuit, ut supra Quae res pignor. l. Aristo. 
[D. 20,3,3] et Inst. de S.C. Velleiano”. 
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3. D. 50,17,54, a general rule plagued by exceptions 
 
By the time the Bolognese glossators were busy with the study of Justinian’s 
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object, this will affect the right of the transferee as well63. Despite this general 
validity, Bulgarus identifies several exceptions, which he moreover introduces 
with a tone of obviousness by using the adverb plane (clearly): the procurator 
selling according to the owner’s intent, the creditor (of the pledge property), the 
public auctioneer, as well as the imperial treasury or the emperor, may transfer 
ownership on various grounds, despite the fact that they do not own the object 
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61  Stein, Regulae iuris (1966), p. 132 ff. 
62  Feenstra, Romeinsrechtelijke grondslagen (1994), p. 50. 
63  Bulgarus, De diversis regulis iuris (ed. Beckhaus 1856), p. 49: “Qui enim dominus est, 
dominium transfert ad successorem rei vel iuris, qui bonae fidei possessor est, possessionis 
continuationem. Si quod onus rei imminebat apud auctorem, residebit apud successorem”. 
64  Bulgarus, De diversis regulis iuris (ed. Beckhaus 1856), p. 49: “Plane, ut supra diximus, 
procurator domini voluntate vendens, creditor ex pacto vel ex lege, publicus executor, 
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exceptions would set a trend for later scholars, who would collect a progressively 
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noticeable in Placentinus’ Additiones to Bulgarus’ commentary67, where he adds 
more exceptions to the rule, thus rendering the commentary to D. 50,17,54 into 
a large list of anomalous cases68. Interestingly enough, Placentinus draws 
exceptions not only from the transfer of ownership, as Bulgarus had before him, 
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(D. 7,1,63), the summoning to court, among others. This progressive 
accumulation of exceptions would continue in the work of Bertram of Metz, 
whose commentary on the nemo plus rule is largely an expanded version of the 
opinions of Bulgarus and Placentinus69.  
 An original approach to the nemo plus rule is to be found in the commentary 
on D. 50,17 attributed to Johannes Bassianus, who comments two cases 
considered as exceptions to the rule by the aforementioned authors, but which 
according to him fall under the general rule70. First of all, he deals with the 
alienation by the creditor of a pledge, which he considers to be a faculty which 
derives from the law and not from the creditor himself (hoc procedit a potestate iuris 
propria, non creditoris). It is clear that Bassianus does not approach this case as an 
exception, since he introduces it with ‘nam’ (‘for’), thereby explaining the 
content of the rule. Neither does Bassianus consider the application of the 
argument to the usufruct by Paul in D. 7,1,63 to be truly an exception to the 
rule (nec tamen eo quoque casu plus iuris transfert quam ipse habet). It is fascinating to 
observe at this point that the jurist draws an argument from the field of dialectics 
when explaining why this is no exception to the rule, since he points out that the 
owner in such a case would not be transferring more rights than those which he 
                                                 
69  Betrandus Metensis, De regulis iuris (ed. Caprioli 1981), p. 79: “Successor rei est qui rem 
post alium possidet; successor iuris cui etiam servitus, ut tignorum <in> parietem immissio, 
confertur. Qui ergo rem ad alium transfert, si bona fide possidet, et illum bone fidei 
possessorem facit; si prescriptionem habuerit, et eam transfert in successorem. Similiter de 
usucapione et de onere. Set hec regula habet exceptionem, quia procurator meus, licet 
dominium rei mee non habeat, tamen meo consensu alii vendens eam, dominium transfert 
ad ipsum. Idem facit creditor ex pacto, ut cum dixi: « Si vadium meum in tali festo non 
redimo, vende illud ». Vel ex lege creditor dominium pignoris mei vendendo ad alium 
transfert, scilicet si michi obtulit ad redimendum et post tertiam oblationem per biennium 
expectaverit, tunc secure vendere potest. Idem facit publicus exactor, si abstulerit michi 
equum quia nolui tributum solvere, quia factum eius est factum meum, idest culpa mea. 
Idem potest fiscus, idest res publica, pro collecta quam non solvo. Idem potest et 
imperator, si putat agrum meum suum esse et dat alii; tamen habeo regressum contra 
imperatorem, ut tantum valens michi reddat. Hec regula habet etiam exceptiones, quia 
usumfructum rei mee quem ego non habeo, quia nemo habet in re propria usumfructum, 
possum in alium transferre; et similiter habitationem. Aliquando etiam aliquis transfert 
honorem in alium, quem ipse non habet. Verbi gratia, libertus potest nocentem patronum 
temere in ius vocare, set filium patroni innocentem nequaquam temere, idest venia non 
impetrata, in ius vocare potest. Hunc honorem habet filius ex successione, quem pater non 
habuit. Similiter, si aliquis confert ecclesie fundum qui debet stertoriam seruitutem, ecclesia 
non prestabit eam. Si quis possedit rem immobilem v. annis bona fide et alius ab eo recepit 
bona fide et aliis v. annis possedit, priores v. anni cum sequentibus continuantur: et ita 
currit usucapio, vel ut melius dicatur prescriptio; et ita per auctorem, idest priorem 
possessorem, transfertur in successorem et utilitas et etiam onus vel tributum vel aliud quod 
prius imminebat possessioni”. 
70  Johannes Bassianus, De regulis iuris (ed. Caprioli 1983), p. 32: “Nam quod creditor pignoris 
dominium transfert, hoc procedit a potestate iuris propria, non creditoris: proprie igitur 
ipse id non potest. In re autem propria usumfructum quem non habet quis potest alii suo 
iure constitutere; nec tamen eo quoque casu plus iuris transfert quam ipse habet, set aliud 
quantum ad formam tantum”.  
 
himself has, “set alium quantum ad formam tantum” – but something else only as to 
the way the thing is held. The key to understanding this text lies in the meaning 
given to ‘forma’, which in this context does not seem to agree with the dialectical 
idea of granting something ‘formaliter’, as the owner is not ‘merely’ giving 
something which he ‘actually’ has. Instead, the noun ‘forma’ is used here to point 
out “any mode, form, or state in which a thing may exist”71. Accordingly, even 
when the author does not make explicit reference to the distinction of having 
something ‘formaliter’ or ‘virtualiter’ it is clear that he is reaching out to dialectical 
distinctions in order to explain how it is possible for the owner to grant the 
usufruct without this implying an infringement of the nemo plus rule.  
 The innovative application of dialectical ideas of Bassianus to the 
interpretation of D. 50,17,54 was not an immediate success. This can be seen in 
the work of Azo, whose opinions on the nemo plus rule are to be found in his 
Summa. In his commentary on Inst. 2,8 (Quibus alienare licet, vel non) Azo collects 
all the cases in which a non-owner may transfer ownership – which he had 
previously brought up when discussing C. 4,5172 – and points out that all these 
cases are contrary to the regula iuris, quoting on this point the nemo plus rule as 
laid down in D. 41,1,20pr73. Therefore, the glossators continued the main trend 
of piling up more and more exceptions on the nemo plus rule instead of trying to 
explain them in another way. Accursius would subscribe to this approach as well 
in his Glossa Ordinaria, collecting all the anomalous cases pointed out by his 
predecessors into one heavy gloss with nine exceptions74. Likewise, Odofredus 
                                                 
71  Oxford Latin Dictionary (1968), p. 722, s.v. forma. 
72  Azo, Summa Codicis (Venice 1566), col. 431-432. 
73  Azo, Summa Institutionum (Venice 1566), col. 1077: “Et sunt haec notabilia, & contra 
regulam iuris civilis. Regulare est enim, ut traditio nihil amplius transferat ad eum, qui 
accipit, quam sit apud eum, qui tradit ut ff. de acquiren. rer. do. l. Traditio [D. 41,1,20pr]”. 
74  Accursius, gl. Nemo plus ad D. 50,17,54: “Si mihi fundum vendideris et tradideris: quod 
iuris habes, in me transfers, unde si tu dominus eras: et ego dominus ero, et si non dominus 
eras: nec ego, sed possessionem adipiscor. § Item si a te poterit advocari per hipotecariam: 
et a me poterit; si nomine fundi tenebaris solvere tributa: et ego, si hic fundus seruitutem 
debebat, et ego servitutem debebo, ut supra de acqui. rer. do. l. Traditio [D. 41,1,20] et de 
act.empt. l. Ex empto in princip. [D. 19,1,11pr.] et C. de distract. pign. l. Si debitor 
[C. 8,27,12] et C. sine cen. vel reli. l. ii. et fina. [C. 4,47,2 + 4,47,3] et de l. traditio ibi, et 
Si servum, et cet. Haec autem regula in tu. & cu. fallit: ut C. de admin. tut. l. Fin. & l. 
Lex, in fin. [C. 5,37,28,5 + 5,37,22pr] <2.> Item in procuratore: ut Inst. de re. divi. §. 
Nihil [Inst. 2,1,42]. 3. Item in iudice: ut Inst. de offi. iud. § Si [Inst. 4,17,4]. <4.> Item in 
executore: ut supra de evict. l. Si pignora [D. 21,2,50] qui transferunt plus quam habent. 
Quod quare accidat: dic ut not. supra eo. l. Id quod nostrum [D. 50,17,11]. 5. Item in 
creditore fallit: ut Inst. qui. alie. licet vel non § i [Inst. 2,8,1]. 6. Item in usufruct. formali: 
ut supra de usufr. l. Quod nostrum [D. 7,1,63]. 7. Item qui propter malam fidem 
usucapere impeditur: si vendat alii bona fide accipienti, plus iuris transfert quam habeat: ut 
Inst. de usuca. § Quod autem [Inst. 2,6,7]. Sed responderi potest, quod emptor non a 
venditore, sed a se ius usucapiendi habet. 8. Item fallit in censitoribus & fluminibus: ut 
supra de aqui re. dom. l. ergo § Alluvio [D. 41,1,30,3]. 9. Item fallit in datione libertatis: 
quod dic ut Inst. de lib. §. Si [Inst. 1,5,3]”. Other lists with these exceptions are to be 
found in gl. Qui tradit to D. 41,1,20pr, gl. Alienare potest to Inst. 2,8,1 and gl. Nemo to 
C. 4,51,6.  
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(D. 7,1,63), the summoning to court, among others. This progressive 
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opinions of Bulgarus and Placentinus69.  
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on D. 50,17 attributed to Johannes Bassianus, who comments two cases 
considered as exceptions to the rule by the aforementioned authors, but which 
according to him fall under the general rule70. First of all, he deals with the 
alienation by the creditor of a pledge, which he considers to be a faculty which 
derives from the law and not from the creditor himself (hoc procedit a potestate iuris 
propria, non creditoris). It is clear that Bassianus does not approach this case as an 
exception, since he introduces it with ‘nam’ (‘for’), thereby explaining the 
content of the rule. Neither does Bassianus consider the application of the 
argument to the usufruct by Paul in D. 7,1,63 to be truly an exception to the 
rule (nec tamen eo quoque casu plus iuris transfert quam ipse habet). It is fascinating to 
observe at this point that the jurist draws an argument from the field of dialectics 
when explaining why this is no exception to the rule, since he points out that the 
owner in such a case would not be transferring more rights than those which he 
                                                 
69  Betrandus Metensis, De regulis iuris (ed. Caprioli 1981), p. 79: “Successor rei est qui rem 
post alium possidet; successor iuris cui etiam servitus, ut tignorum <in> parietem immissio, 
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himself has, “set alium quantum ad formam tantum” – but something else only as to 
the way the thing is held. The key to understanding this text lies in the meaning 
given to ‘forma’, which in this context does not seem to agree with the dialectical 
idea of granting something ‘formaliter’, as the owner is not ‘merely’ giving 
something which he ‘actually’ has. Instead, the noun ‘forma’ is used here to point 
out “any mode, form, or state in which a thing may exist”71. Accordingly, even 
when the author does not make explicit reference to the distinction of having 
something ‘formaliter’ or ‘virtualiter’ it is clear that he is reaching out to dialectical 
distinctions in order to explain how it is possible for the owner to grant the 
usufruct without this implying an infringement of the nemo plus rule.  
 The innovative application of dialectical ideas of Bassianus to the 
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all the cases in which a non-owner may transfer ownership – which he had 
previously brought up when discussing C. 4,5172 – and points out that all these 
cases are contrary to the regula iuris, quoting on this point the nemo plus rule as 
laid down in D. 41,1,20pr73. Therefore, the glossators continued the main trend 
of piling up more and more exceptions on the nemo plus rule instead of trying to 
explain them in another way. Accursius would subscribe to this approach as well 
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executore: ut supra de evict. l. Si pignora [D. 21,2,50] qui transferunt plus quam habent. 
Quod quare accidat: dic ut not. supra eo. l. Id quod nostrum [D. 50,17,11]. 5. Item in 
creditore fallit: ut Inst. qui. alie. licet vel non § i [Inst. 2,8,1]. 6. Item in usufruct. formali: 
ut supra de usufr. l. Quod nostrum [D. 7,1,63]. 7. Item qui propter malam fidem 
usucapere impeditur: si vendat alii bona fide accipienti, plus iuris transfert quam habeat: ut 
Inst. de usuca. § Quod autem [Inst. 2,6,7]. Sed responderi potest, quod emptor non a 
venditore, sed a se ius usucapiendi habet. 8. Item fallit in censitoribus & fluminibus: ut 
supra de aqui re. dom. l. ergo § Alluvio [D. 41,1,30,3]. 9. Item fallit in datione libertatis: 
quod dic ut Inst. de lib. §. Si [Inst. 1,5,3]”. Other lists with these exceptions are to be 
found in gl. Qui tradit to D. 41,1,20pr, gl. Alienare potest to Inst. 2,8,1 and gl. Nemo to 
C. 4,51,6.  
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presents us with numerous exceptions to the rule, while quoting mostly texts 
which are different from those used by Accursius75. The only divergent view 
within the interpretation of the nemo plus rule by Accursius is the way in which 
he deals with the case of the usufruct given by the owner, which he considers to 
be an exception to the rule, since he directs the reader to his gloss Quod nostrum 
to D. 7,1,63, which reads simply “non formalem, sed causalem”. Through this brief 
indication, Accursius shows that he does not consider it possible for someone to 
actually give what he does not have, but that this can happen causally, a 
distinction which corresponds directly with those in use among dialecticians at 
that time. Accursius seems to be following the footsteps of Bassianus at this point, 
but it is interesting to note that he is not willing to apply this kind of distinctions 
to other exceptions under the general rule.  
 The number of exceptions that the glossators piled around the rule could 
seem to affect its value, but in fact it makes it useful from a systematic 
perspective, being a kind of thumb rule around which several exceptional cases 
can be organized. In other words, while the number of exceptions shows that the 
rule had no universal validity, the fact that several similar exceptions could be 
gathered around it made it an important reference point in order to deal with the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner. This may explain as well why a jurist like 
Accursius was not interested in applying ideas borrowed from dialectics to discard 
the existence of exceptions to the rule. The importance granted to the nemo plus 
rule is moreover to be seen in the fact that it to make its way into the Siete 
Partidas of Alfonso X76. 
 While it is understandable that legists would find it useful to gather exceptions 
around this general rule, it is on the other hand extremely curious that canonists 
would be influenced by this trend as well. As shown above77, theologians 
developed a parallel tradition when applying the nemo plus argument, a tradition 
which would lead to an abundant reception of this argument in Canon law as 
laid down in the Decretum Gratiani. Despite the existence of this tradition, 
canonists were decisively influenced in the approach to the nemo plus argument 
by the developments which took place among legists, which is no wonder 
considering that the first generations of jurists who studied the Decretum Gratiani 
                                                 
75  Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto Novo (Lyon 1552), f. 191vb: “Fallit in casibus, ubi creditor 
potest vendere pignus ex pacto, vel ex lege: ut supra de acqui. rer. domi. l. non est novum 
[D. 41,1,46]. Item fallit in procuratore, et tutore: ut supra de procur. l. qui procuratorem 
[D. 3,3,57] et supra pro emptore l. qui fundum [D. 41,4,7pr.]. Item fallit in executore: ut 
Jnsti. de offic. iud. § fina. [Inst. 4,17,7] Item fallit in fisco, et Augusta: ut C. de quadrien. 
prescrip. l. bene a Zenone [C. 7,37,3]”. See also Odofredus, Lectura super Codice (Lyon 
1552) I, f. 252v, dealing with C. 4,51,6. 
76  Siete Partidas 7,34,12: “Como ninguno puede dar mas a otri, que ha el. E aun dixeron, que 
ningun ome non puede dar mas derecho a otro en alguna cosa, de aquello que le 
pertenesce en ella” (That no one can give more to another one, than what he has. And it was 
further said, that no man can give more right over a thing to another one, than what he 
has in it). 
77  Chapter 7, Section 1 above. 
 
were trained in Roman law. The influence of Roman law among canonists 
becomes evident by the formulation of the nemo plus argument in the Liber Extra 
(1234 AD), where the wording used to render it is much closer to the one of the 
Digest than to any of the formulas used by popes or church fathers. The first 
application is to be found in a decretal of Lucius III – Pope between 1181 and 
1185 – which states that laymen can only transfer to clergymen a right which 
they have themselves: “Quum enim laici non possint in alios nisi ius, quod habent, 
transferre…”78 (X 3,38,11 i.f.). In this particular case, it was decreed that 
clergymen could not obtain the ius patronatus from the donation of a layman, 
since the consent of the bishop was needed in order to obtain such a right. The 
nemo plus rule is used to justify this solution: since the laymen had no ius 
patronatus, they could not confer it to the clergymen. A second application of the 
argument can be found in a decretal of Innocent III – Pope from 1198 to 1216 – 
in which he deals with a problem of private law concerning a man who had the 
usufruct over a piece of land and gave it as a dowry to his future spouse, from 
whom the land was claimed back after her husband died. Under this 
circumstance it is clear that the wife could not acquire the land, an idea which is 
rendered through the nemo plus argument in a wording which again resembles 
greatly the rule of Ulpian: “nullus plus iuris in alium transferre possit, quam eum 
constet habere”79. 
 The influence of Roman law in the way the nemo plus argument was 
approached is not only to be seen in the wording used by jurists, but also in the 
general validity granted to this idea. Since theologians normally interpreted the 
argument in a way which had no exceptions, one could expect that canonists 
would have been particularly keen to resort to dialectical notions in order to 
avoid that the rule would have exceptions. Instead, they followed the trend 
imposed by legists in gathering exceptions around this general rule. In fact, some 
of the exceptions which canonists made to this rule were borrowed from texts of 
Roman law. While initially some authors only linked this argument with texts of 
                                                 
78  “Since laymen can only transfer to another a right which they have…”. The fragment is 
within the title De iure patronatus, and the full text reads: X 3,38,11: “Idem [Lucius III] 
Abbatibus, Prioribus et Clericis per achiepiscopatum Eboracensem constitutis. Cura 
pastorali necessitate constringimur, et auctoritate iniuncti nobis officii provocamur, pro 
statu ecclesiarum vigili studio satagere, et, ne contra iuris ordinem alicui conferri valeant, 
attentiori sollicitudine providere. Inde est, quod universitati vestrae per apostolica scripta 
praecipiendo. Mandamus, quatenus ex donatione laicorum, nisi auctoritas dioecesani 
episcopi et consensus adsit, nullus vestrum aliquas sibi ecclesias vindicare praesumat, vel 
retinere taliter acquisitas, nisi legitima fuerit praescriptione munitus, aut diocesani episcopi 
forte habuerit postea consensum. Quum enim laici non possint in alios nisi ius, quod 
habent, transferre, nos huiusmodi concessiones viribus carere decernimus, et irritas penitus 
esse censemus”. 
79  X 4,20,6: “…Nos autem consultationi tuae taliter respondemus, quod, quum regulariter 
nullus plus iuris in alium transferre possit, quam eum constet habere, vir, cui terra praedicto 
modo conceditur, non potest uxori relinquere quod ei non licuit, nisi quoad vixerit, 
possidere”. 
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presents us with numerous exceptions to the rule, while quoting mostly texts 
which are different from those used by Accursius75. The only divergent view 
within the interpretation of the nemo plus rule by Accursius is the way in which 
he deals with the case of the usufruct given by the owner, which he considers to 
be an exception to the rule, since he directs the reader to his gloss Quod nostrum 
to D. 7,1,63, which reads simply “non formalem, sed causalem”. Through this brief 
indication, Accursius shows that he does not consider it possible for someone to 
actually give what he does not have, but that this can happen causally, a 
distinction which corresponds directly with those in use among dialecticians at 
that time. Accursius seems to be following the footsteps of Bassianus at this point, 
but it is interesting to note that he is not willing to apply this kind of distinctions 
to other exceptions under the general rule.  
 The number of exceptions that the glossators piled around the rule could 
seem to affect its value, but in fact it makes it useful from a systematic 
perspective, being a kind of thumb rule around which several exceptional cases 
can be organized. In other words, while the number of exceptions shows that the 
rule had no universal validity, the fact that several similar exceptions could be 
gathered around it made it an important reference point in order to deal with the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner. This may explain as well why a jurist like 
Accursius was not interested in applying ideas borrowed from dialectics to discard 
the existence of exceptions to the rule. The importance granted to the nemo plus 
rule is moreover to be seen in the fact that it to make its way into the Siete 
Partidas of Alfonso X76. 
 While it is understandable that legists would find it useful to gather exceptions 
around this general rule, it is on the other hand extremely curious that canonists 
would be influenced by this trend as well. As shown above77, theologians 
developed a parallel tradition when applying the nemo plus argument, a tradition 
which would lead to an abundant reception of this argument in Canon law as 
laid down in the Decretum Gratiani. Despite the existence of this tradition, 
canonists were decisively influenced in the approach to the nemo plus argument 
by the developments which took place among legists, which is no wonder 
considering that the first generations of jurists who studied the Decretum Gratiani 
                                                 
75  Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto Novo (Lyon 1552), f. 191vb: “Fallit in casibus, ubi creditor 
potest vendere pignus ex pacto, vel ex lege: ut supra de acqui. rer. domi. l. non est novum 
[D. 41,1,46]. Item fallit in procuratore, et tutore: ut supra de procur. l. qui procuratorem 
[D. 3,3,57] et supra pro emptore l. qui fundum [D. 41,4,7pr.]. Item fallit in executore: ut 
Jnsti. de offic. iud. § fina. [Inst. 4,17,7] Item fallit in fisco, et Augusta: ut C. de quadrien. 
prescrip. l. bene a Zenone [C. 7,37,3]”. See also Odofredus, Lectura super Codice (Lyon 
1552) I, f. 252v, dealing with C. 4,51,6. 
76  Siete Partidas 7,34,12: “Como ninguno puede dar mas a otri, que ha el. E aun dixeron, que 
ningun ome non puede dar mas derecho a otro en alguna cosa, de aquello que le 
pertenesce en ella” (That no one can give more to another one, than what he has. And it was 
further said, that no man can give more right over a thing to another one, than what he 
has in it). 
77  Chapter 7, Section 1 above. 
 
were trained in Roman law. The influence of Roman law among canonists 
becomes evident by the formulation of the nemo plus argument in the Liber Extra 
(1234 AD), where the wording used to render it is much closer to the one of the 
Digest than to any of the formulas used by popes or church fathers. The first 
application is to be found in a decretal of Lucius III – Pope between 1181 and 
1185 – which states that laymen can only transfer to clergymen a right which 
they have themselves: “Quum enim laici non possint in alios nisi ius, quod habent, 
transferre…”78 (X 3,38,11 i.f.). In this particular case, it was decreed that 
clergymen could not obtain the ius patronatus from the donation of a layman, 
since the consent of the bishop was needed in order to obtain such a right. The 
nemo plus rule is used to justify this solution: since the laymen had no ius 
patronatus, they could not confer it to the clergymen. A second application of the 
argument can be found in a decretal of Innocent III – Pope from 1198 to 1216 – 
in which he deals with a problem of private law concerning a man who had the 
usufruct over a piece of land and gave it as a dowry to his future spouse, from 
whom the land was claimed back after her husband died. Under this 
circumstance it is clear that the wife could not acquire the land, an idea which is 
rendered through the nemo plus argument in a wording which again resembles 
greatly the rule of Ulpian: “nullus plus iuris in alium transferre possit, quam eum 
constet habere”79. 
 The influence of Roman law in the way the nemo plus argument was 
approached is not only to be seen in the wording used by jurists, but also in the 
general validity granted to this idea. Since theologians normally interpreted the 
argument in a way which had no exceptions, one could expect that canonists 
would have been particularly keen to resort to dialectical notions in order to 
avoid that the rule would have exceptions. Instead, they followed the trend 
imposed by legists in gathering exceptions around this general rule. In fact, some 
of the exceptions which canonists made to this rule were borrowed from texts of 
Roman law. While initially some authors only linked this argument with texts of 
                                                 
78  “Since laymen can only transfer to another a right which they have…”. The fragment is 
within the title De iure patronatus, and the full text reads: X 3,38,11: “Idem [Lucius III] 
Abbatibus, Prioribus et Clericis per achiepiscopatum Eboracensem constitutis. Cura 
pastorali necessitate constringimur, et auctoritate iniuncti nobis officii provocamur, pro 
statu ecclesiarum vigili studio satagere, et, ne contra iuris ordinem alicui conferri valeant, 
attentiori sollicitudine providere. Inde est, quod universitati vestrae per apostolica scripta 
praecipiendo. Mandamus, quatenus ex donatione laicorum, nisi auctoritas dioecesani 
episcopi et consensus adsit, nullus vestrum aliquas sibi ecclesias vindicare praesumat, vel 
retinere taliter acquisitas, nisi legitima fuerit praescriptione munitus, aut diocesani episcopi 
forte habuerit postea consensum. Quum enim laici non possint in alios nisi ius, quod 
habent, transferre, nos huiusmodi concessiones viribus carere decernimus, et irritas penitus 
esse censemus”. 
79  X 4,20,6: “…Nos autem consultationi tuae taliter respondemus, quod, quum regulariter 
nullus plus iuris in alium transferre possit, quam eum constet habere, vir, cui terra praedicto 
modo conceditur, non potest uxori relinquere quod ei non licuit, nisi quoad vixerit, 
possidere”. 
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Inst. 2,8,1 and D. 41,1,20pr. This in turn leads to the conclusion that by the 
authority of the law someone can exceptionally give what he does not have, 
while the general rule is that this is not possible, as shown in Decretum Grat. C. 1, 
q. 7, c. 2488.  
 The role of Roman law when approaching the argument is even stronger in 
the work of Bernardus Parmensis († 1266) – who concluded what would become 
the glossa ordinaria to the Liber Extra – in his gloss Nisi ius to X 3,38,11. 
Parmensis in fact makes use exclusively of texts taken from the Corpus Iuris Civilis 
in order to determine the validity of the argument, quoting in favour of it 
D. 50,17,54 and D. 41,1,20pr, while bringing against it D. 41,1,46, Inst. 2,8pr, 
D. 7,1,63, C. 8,27,6 and C. 8,27,7. This gloss declares towards the end that the 
general rule is true, and that its exceptions are due to particular circumstances, for 
the ius patronatus cannot indeed be conferred without the bishop’s 
authorization89. Further interaction between Roman and canon law is moreover 
to be found in the gloss Nullus plus iuris to X 4,20,6, where the texts brought in 
favour of the nemo plus rule are Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 24, D. 50,17,54, 
D. 41,1,20pr, X 3,38,5 and X 3,38,11, while D. 7,1,63 and D. 41,1,46 are 
brought against it. The conclusion derived from these texts is again that the 
exceptions to the rule refer to isolated cases (contraria casualia sunt)90. 
 The nemo plus rule would acquire a fixed formula within canon law in the 
Liber Sextus (1298) of Boniface VIII. In the last title of this work, which deals 
with De Regulis Iuris, an adaptation of the rule of D. 50,17,54 is presented with 
the wording: “Nemo potest plus iuris transferre in alium, quam sibi competere 
dinoscatur” (Sextus, De reg. jur. 79)91. The most interesting variation to the nemo 
plus formula as shown in the Digest is the replacement of the general “quam sibi 
haberet” for an extremely cautious “quam sibi competere dinoscatur” – “which can be 
discerned to belong to him”. This innovation could be seen as related to the 
dialectical approach to this argument, where the key is actually to determine 
whether what is given can be seen as being held by the giver in some way. It is in 
any case difficult to determine whether these considerations played a relevant 
role, particularly considering that the first interpreters of the Liber Sextus 
continued the trend of previous authors by focusing on presenting the texts in 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis which bear witness to the rule or form exceptions to it. 
                                                 
88  Gl. Romanus to Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., c. 23, i.f.: “… iuris ergo auctoritate 
promittente potest quis in alium transferre quod non habuit. Et hoc casuale: illud vero 
regulare. q. 7 Daibertum [Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 24]”. 
89  Bernardus Parmensis, gl. Nisi ius ad X 3,38,11, in fine: “Sol. primum verum est, et ita 
contraria specialia sunt, nec etiam istud ius quod habent, scilicet ius patronatus, possunt 
conferre sine auctoritate episcopi, ut dixi supra eo. illud. [X 3,38,8] et infra eo. nullus”. 
90  Gl. Nullus plus iuris to X 4,20,6: ut. 1 q. 7. “Daibertum. ff. de reg. iur. nemo plus. ff. de 
acq. rerum. domi. traditio. et supra de iure pat. quod autem in fine et c. cura. 
Argumentum contrarium ff. de usufruct. quod nostrum non est. ff. de acquiren. re. romi. 
non est novum. Contraria casualia sunt”. 
91  “No one can transfer to another a greater right than that which can be discerned to belong 
to himself”. 
 
 
canon law80, already the glossa ordinaria on the Decretum Gratiani concluded by 
Bartholomaeus Brixiensis († 1258) gradually includes some references to Roman 
law. Some of the glosses of Brixiensis dealing with the nemo plus argument only 
deal with texts from canon law, such as the gloss Dare to Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 
7, c. 2481, which quotes X 3,38,11 in support of this argument and X 1,6,1182 
against it, the latter text dealing with the case of a bishop who has been elected 
but not yet ordained and who gives a mandate to his suffragan bishop to 
consecrate someone in his jurisdiction83. More interaction with Roman law is 
found in the gloss Quomodo to Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 1884, where Brixiensis 
not only quotes X 3,38,11 in favour of the argument and X 3,38,1985 against it, 
but also brings D. 2,11,13 in favour, since in this text Julian declares that a slave 
cannot take a stipulation for another or make a promise himself, because he 
cannot be sued or sue himself. More appealing are the references to Roman law 
in the gloss Possunt to Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 1, where Johannes Teutonicus 
quotes Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 24, Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., c. 41 and 
D. 50,17,54 in favour of the validity of the argument, while D. 41,1,46 and 
X 1,6,11 are brought against it, which leads Bartholomaeus Brixiensis to 
conclude that generally no one can give what is not his own, but that this rule 
fails in certain cases86. Other glosses confirm the tendency of gathering texts from 
Roman and canon law to confirm and contradict the general rule, such as the 
gloss Romanus to Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., c. 2387, where Decretum Grat. D. 4 
de cons., c. 41 is quoted to prove the general rule, which is then contradicted by 
                                                 
80  See e.g. Pascipoverus, Concordia utriusque iuris 1,5,2, who supports the validity nemo plus 
argument in the context of the sacraments conferred by heretics on Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 
1, c. 18; C. 1, q. 7, c. 24; D. 28, c. 16; D. 4 de cons., c. 41. 
81  Gl. Dare to Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 24: “Arg. qui nihil habet, nihil dare potest. Arg. 
contra extra de electio. suffraganeis 3 [X 1,6,11]. Item argu. quod pro non dato habetur 
quod datur ab eo, qui de iure dare non potest, ut extra de iure patro. quod autem. in fi. 
[X 3,38,11 in fine]” 
82  X 1,6,11: “Metropolitanus confirmatus, licet nondum receperit pallium, potest suum suffraganeum 
consecrari facere. Suffraganeis alicuius metropolitan, ad mandatum ipsius metropolitan, post 
confirmationem electionis suae, etiamsi pallium non receperit, licitum est aliquem electum, 
qui ad eius iurisdictionem pertinent, consecrare…” 
83  Other glosses follow the same tendency of quoting exclusively materials from canon law: 
the gloss Plenitudinem to Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 17 quotes Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, 
c. 1 and Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 24 in favour of the argument; the gloss Accepisse to 
Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 18 quotes X 3,38,5 in favour – whose final phrase reads “pro 
non dato habetur, quod ab illo datur, qui non potest de iure donare” – and X 4,1,4, against 
it; the gloss Nemo to Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., c. 41 quotes in favour of the argument 
Decretum Grat. D. 62, c. 1, Decretum Grat. D. 28, c. 10, Decretum Grat. C. 2, q. 6, c. 26 and 
Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 18. 
84  Here Brixensis quotes X 3,38,11. 
85  This text determines that a clergyman who was instituted by someone without the ius 
patronatus may retain his condition even if this circumstance is later established in trial. 
86  Gl. Possunt to Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 1, c. 1, in fine: “Solutio generale est quod nemo de 
iure dare potest quod non habet. Fallit in certis casibus. B[artholomaeus Brixiensis]”. 
87  Another clear example of this is gl. Proprium to Decretum Grat. D. 54, c. 22. 
D. 50,17,54, A GENERAL RULE PLAGUED BY EXCEPTIONS
337
 
Inst. 2,8,1 and D. 41,1,20pr. This in turn leads to the conclusion that by the 
authority of the law someone can exceptionally give what he does not have, 
while the general rule is that this is not possible, as shown in Decretum Grat. C. 1, 
q. 7, c. 2488.  
 The role of Roman law when approaching the argument is even stronger in 
the work of Bernardus Parmensis († 1266) – who concluded what would become 
the glossa ordinaria to the Liber Extra – in his gloss Nisi ius to X 3,38,11. 
Parmensis in fact makes use exclusively of texts taken from the Corpus Iuris Civilis 
in order to determine the validity of the argument, quoting in favour of it 
D. 50,17,54 and D. 41,1,20pr, while bringing against it D. 41,1,46, Inst. 2,8pr, 
D. 7,1,63, C. 8,27,6 and C. 8,27,7. This gloss declares towards the end that the 
general rule is true, and that its exceptions are due to particular circumstances, for 
the ius patronatus cannot indeed be conferred without the bishop’s 
authorization89. Further interaction between Roman and canon law is moreover 
to be found in the gloss Nullus plus iuris to X 4,20,6, where the texts brought in 
favour of the nemo plus rule are Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 24, D. 50,17,54, 
D. 41,1,20pr, X 3,38,5 and X 3,38,11, while D. 7,1,63 and D. 41,1,46 are 
brought against it. The conclusion derived from these texts is again that the 
exceptions to the rule refer to isolated cases (contraria casualia sunt)90. 
 The nemo plus rule would acquire a fixed formula within canon law in the 
Liber Sextus (1298) of Boniface VIII. In the last title of this work, which deals 
with De Regulis Iuris, an adaptation of the rule of D. 50,17,54 is presented with 
the wording: “Nemo potest plus iuris transferre in alium, quam sibi competere 
dinoscatur” (Sextus, De reg. jur. 79)91. The most interesting variation to the nemo 
plus formula as shown in the Digest is the replacement of the general “quam sibi 
haberet” for an extremely cautious “quam sibi competere dinoscatur” – “which can be 
discerned to belong to him”. This innovation could be seen as related to the 
dialectical approach to this argument, where the key is actually to determine 
whether what is given can be seen as being held by the giver in some way. It is in 
any case difficult to determine whether these considerations played a relevant 
role, particularly considering that the first interpreters of the Liber Sextus 
continued the trend of previous authors by focusing on presenting the texts in 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis which bear witness to the rule or form exceptions to it. 
                                                 
88  Gl. Romanus to Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., c. 23, i.f.: “… iuris ergo auctoritate 
promittente potest quis in alium transferre quod non habuit. Et hoc casuale: illud vero 
regulare. q. 7 Daibertum [Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 24]”. 
89  Bernardus Parmensis, gl. Nisi ius ad X 3,38,11, in fine: “Sol. primum verum est, et ita 
contraria specialia sunt, nec etiam istud ius quod habent, scilicet ius patronatus, possunt 
conferre sine auctoritate episcopi, ut dixi supra eo. illud. [X 3,38,8] et infra eo. nullus”. 
90  Gl. Nullus plus iuris to X 4,20,6: ut. 1 q. 7. “Daibertum. ff. de reg. iur. nemo plus. ff. de 
acq. rerum. domi. traditio. et supra de iure pat. quod autem in fine et c. cura. 
Argumentum contrarium ff. de usufruct. quod nostrum non est. ff. de acquiren. re. romi. 
non est novum. Contraria casualia sunt”. 
91  “No one can transfer to another a greater right than that which can be discerned to belong 
to himself”. 
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This is in fact the approach of Dinus Mugellanus (c. 1253 – c. 1303) who in his 
commentary to this text deals with the rule almost exclusively from the 
perspective of the transfer of ownership, pointing out which rights would be 
obtained through traditio, and the numerous cases in which this rule would fail92. 
There is accordingly almost no innovation in his exposition regarding the views 
of the glossators, and Dinus even follows the views of Accursius when excluding 
the constitution of usufruct from the exceptions to the rule by considering that 
the owner had causally what he gives93. 
 More original is the interaction between Roman and canon law regarding the 
nemo plus rule in the work of Johannes Andreae (c. 1270-1348), who early in the 
13th century wrote what would become the glossa ordinaria to the Liber Sextus. In 
his gloss Nemo potest to Sextus, De reg. jur. 79, Andreae states that the rule was 
drawn from D. 50,17,5494, which he quotes however in the abbreviated formula 
“nemo dat quod non habet”95. The author further presents a complete account of 
the texts in favour96 and against97 the validity of the nemo plus rule in Roman and 
canon law, which covers most of the references made by authors before him. 
Like other authors, Andreae concludes that the nemo plus serves as a general rule, 
and explains that the exceptions that affect it are due to particular 
considerations98. Andreae would again extensively comment the nemo plus rule in 
his Mercuriales quaestiones super regulis iuris99, but using a different approach. 
Following on the commentary of Dinus Mugellanus, Andreae presents 
exclusively texts from the Corpus Iuris Civilis when assessing the validity of the 
rule, although he later applies the rule to determine the lawfulness of a particular 
custom of the church of Modena, where clergymen were allowed to dispose of 
                                                 
92  Dinus Mugellanus, De Regulis Juris (Cologne 1617), p. 310: “Fallit autem haec regula in 
tutore, vel curatore. Item in procuratore, iudice, executore, creditore, in malae fidei 
venditore. Item in censitore. Item in flumine, in libertatis datione, et in Imperatore et 
Augusta”. 
93  Dinus Mugellanus, De Regulis Juris (Cologne 1617), p. 310: “Sed ibi non transfertur plus: 
sed per constitutionem variatur tantum species ususfr. quia penes me dominium erat 
causalis, et non erat species servitutis: penes eum cui constituitur, formalis, et erit species 
servitutis”. 
94  Gl. Nemo potest to Sextus, De reg. jur. 79: “Haec regula sumpta fuit ex l. ff. eo. tit. l. nemo 
plus [D. 50,17,54]”.  
95  Gl. Nemo potest to Sextus, De reg. jur. 79: “quod dicitur, nemo dat quod non habet”. 
96  Andreae presents as some of the texts where the rule is quoted or applied Decretum Grat. 
C. 1, q. 7, c. 24, X 4,20,6, D. 41,1,20pr and X 3,38,5. 
97  Against the validity of the rule Andreae quotes X 1,6,11 and Decretum Grat. D. 4 de cons., 
c. 31 – where St. Augustine assesses the validity of the baptism given by someone who is 
not baptized himself – as well as the texts of the Corpus Iuris Civilis regularly quoted by 
glossators such as C. 5,37,28, C. 5,37,22pr. (tutores and curatores), Inst. 2,1,42 (procurator), 
Inst. 4,17,4 (iudex), D. 21,2,50 (executor), D. 7,1,63 (usufruct), Inst. 2,6,7, Nov. 119,7 
(good faith purchase to someone in bad faith), D. 41,1,30,3 (alluvio), etc. 
98  Gl. Nemo potest to Sextus, De reg. jur. 79: “… hoc est generale, illa sunt specialia: 
specialitatis rationem facile considerare poteris”. 
99  Johannes Andreae, In titulum De regulis Iuris Commentarius (Lyon 1551), f. 116-118. 
 
certain objects mortis causa. Also Albericus de Rosate100 (c. 1290 – c. 1360) 
followed closely the works of Dinus and Andreae, quoting both of them at the 
beginning of his commentary on D. 50,17,54. For the greater part of his 
commentary, Albericus discusses the case set forth by Andreae regarding the 
custom of Modena, a problem which in the meantime had been addressed in a 
decretal of Pope John XII101. Towards the end he quotes the usual cases in the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis where someone appears to be transferring what he does not 
have, which again shows the dependence on the previous models of Dinus 
Mugellanus and Johannes Andreae. 
 As shown by the analysis of the works of legists and canonists, most 
commentaries on the nemo plus rule – either on its Roman or its canonical 
version – until the 14th century focused on gathering texts in favour and against 
this rule. While the amount of exceptions that could be brought against the 
validity of the rule seem to undermine it, this methodology appears to be very 
convenient considering that it shows the scope of the rule by gathering the texts 
which are seen as related to it, thereby enabling to use this rule as a starting point 
for legal reasoning, particularly regarding the transfer of ownership. Apart from 
this practical aspect, the approach of jurists may have also been influenced by the 
fact that some texts within the Digest explicitly present exceptions to the nemo 
plus argument, including D. 7,1,63, D. 41,1,46 and D. 41,2,21. All of this may 
explain why jurists were not particularly keen to apply dialectical distinctions that 
could explain the exceptions to the rule in a way which would not contradict its 
validity. Only in isolated cases, such as that of the constitution of usufruct, did 
jurists apply such ideas, but there was no general systematic attempt to free the 
rule from exceptions by resorting to them. This approach would gradually 
change in the course of the 14th century, as will be shown in the following 
section. 
 
4. Gradual reinterpretation of the scope of the nemo plus rule 
 
The first changes in the approach to the nemo plus argument through the 
influence of extra-legal notions took place when jurists discussed specific cases of 
application. As shown in the previous section, some of the glossators did not 
consider that the constitution of a usufruct by the owner was a real exception to 
the nemo plus rule, since the owner could be regarded as having the usufruct 
‘causally’ and therefore he would actually have that what he gave. This opinion 
would also be upheld by later authors, such as Bartolus102, which shows its 
progressive consolidation. 
                                                 
100  Albericus de Rosate, De regulis iuris (Lyon 1543), f. 20vb-21rb. 
101  Extravag. Joan. XXII, 1,2. 
102  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In primam Digesti Novi partem Commentaria (Turin 1574), f. 78ra: 
“In gl. in verb. qui tradit. ibi l. quod nostrum [D. 7,1,63]. Tu dicas quod ibi datur illud 
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jurists apply such ideas, but there was no general systematic attempt to free the 
rule from exceptions by resorting to them. This approach would gradually 
change in the course of the 14th century, as will be shown in the following 
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4. Gradual reinterpretation of the scope of the nemo plus rule 
 
The first changes in the approach to the nemo plus argument through the 
influence of extra-legal notions took place when jurists discussed specific cases of 
application. As shown in the previous section, some of the glossators did not 
consider that the constitution of a usufruct by the owner was a real exception to 
the nemo plus rule, since the owner could be regarded as having the usufruct 
‘causally’ and therefore he would actually have that what he gave. This opinion 
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100  Albericus de Rosate, De regulis iuris (Lyon 1543), f. 20vb-21rb. 
101  Extravag. Joan. XXII, 1,2. 
102  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In primam Digesti Novi partem Commentaria (Turin 1574), f. 78ra: 
“In gl. in verb. qui tradit. ibi l. quod nostrum [D. 7,1,63]. Tu dicas quod ibi datur illud 
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 Another case in which dialectical distinctions can be found with regard to the 
nemo plus argument concerns the discussion of the nature of manumission. This 
controversy revolves around Ulpian’s concept of manumission as a “datio 
libertatis” in D. 1,1,4103, a text which is almost literally reproduced in 
Inst. 1,5pr104. We know from Accursius’ gloss105 that already Irnerius discussed 
the use of ‘datio’ in this text, and that he preferred to describe the manumission as 
a ‘detectio’ or uncovering106. Besta edited two Irnerian glosses in which this 
opinion is expressed107, and Torelli has drawn attention to a marginal gloss which 
he considers to be the original of Irnerius or at least to be very close to it108. The 
opinion of Irnerius concerning the nature of manumission is built around the 
description of slavery as an institution belonging to the ius gentium, not the ius 
naturale. According to this idea, the natural freedom is not ‘bestowed’ by the 
manumitter, but simply ‘uncovered’. Irnerius used the text of D. 41,1,7,7, which 
discusses the making of something with someone else’s materials, to describe a 
beautiful analogy with the case – presented at the end of the text – in which 
someone threshes corn from another person’s ears of corn109. In such a case, 
                                                                                                                   
quod habetur: licet detur aliter quam habetur: quia habebat de usufructu causali, et dat 
formalem”. 
103  D. 1,1,4 (Ulp. 1 institutionum): “Manumissiones quoque iuris gentium sunt. Est autem 
manumissio de manu missio, id est datio libertatis: nam quamdiu quis in servitute est, 
manui et potestati suppositus est, manumissus liberatur potestate. Quae res a iure gentium 
originem sumpsit, utpote cum iure naturali omnes liberi nascerentur nec esset nota 
manumissio, cum servitus esset incognita: sed posteaquam iure gentium servitus invasit, 
secutum est beneficium manumissionis. Et cum uno naturali nomine homines 
appellaremur, iure gentium tria genera esse coeperunt: liberi et his contrarium servi et 
tertium genus liberti, id est hi qui desierant esse servi”. 
104  Inst. 1,5pr.: “Libertini sunt qui ex iusta servitute manumissi sunt. Manumissio autem est 
datio libertatis: nam quamdiu quis in servitute est, manui et potestati suppositus est, et 
manumissus liberatur potestate. Quae res a iure gentium originem sumpsit, utpote cum 
iure naturali omnes liberi nascerentur nec esset nota manumissio, cum servitus esset 
incognita: sed posteaquam iure gentium servitus invasit, secutum est beneficium 
manumissionis. Et cum uno naturali nomine homines appellaremur, iure gentium tria 
genera hominum esse coeperunt, liberi et his contrarium servi et tertium genus libertini, 
qui desierant esse servi”. 
105  Gl. Datio to Inst. 1,5pr.: “id est detectio, secundum Ir[nerius]. Sic ff. de acqui. rer. do. l. 
adeo. § cum quis [D. 41,1,7,7] in si. ibi, cum enim grana”. 
106  See on this point Torelli, Glosse d’Irnerio (1939), p. 251-252; Cortese, La norma giuridica 
(1962), p. 75-78; Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (1967), p. 75-78; Schrage, Libertas (1975), p. 72 
ff. 
107  Besta, L’opera d’Irnerio (1896) II, p. 3, gl. Datio libertatis to D. 1,1,4: “y. non ut aliud detur, 
sed ius quod in eo habetur ei restituitur”; gl. Utpote to D. 1,1,4: “Quamdiu quis liber est, 
liber effici non potest. Set amissa iure gentium, libertas dari ei potest. y.” 
108  Torelli, Glosse d’Irnerio (1939), p. 252: “Id est detectio libertatis; quamdiu enim aliquis in 
servitute est, libertas est inumbrata tegmine servitutis, sed per manumissionem detegitur”. 
See also on this gloss Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (1967), p. 75. 
109  D. 41,1,7,7 (Gai. 2 rer. cott.) i.f.: “Videntur tamen mihi recte quidam dixisse non debere 
dubitari, quin alienis spicis excussum frumentum eius sit, cuius et spicae fuerunt: cum enim 
grana, quae spicis continentur, perfectam habeant suam speciem, qui excussit spicas, non 
novam speciem facit, sed eam quae est detegit”. 
 
nothing new is made, but simply something which lay hidden (the corn under 
the husk) is uncovered. In the case of manumission, according to Irnerius, the 
manumissor would be uncovering something which already existed, rather than 
creating something new, i.e. slavery would be removed rather than freedom 
granted. 
 The opinion of Irnerius was still upheld by Martinus Gosia and Bulgarus, but 
was controversial since the time of Placentinus110. The latter reproduces Irnerius’ 
view, but does not subscribe to it, considering that the manumission consists in 
bestowing a freedom which no slave has111. At this point the nemo plus argument 
comes into play, since later authors explained the possibility of bestowing 
freedom on a slave in the following way: the slave would indeed be receiving a 
freedom which he did not enjoy before, even when the manumitter did not lose 
his own freedom, which would imply that the latter would give something 
which he did not have112. In other words, this line of thought considers that the 
nemo plus argument would be contradicted in the case of manumission. 
According to Odofredus113, this idea – which he qualifies as “childish” – would 
have been introduced by Johannes Bassianus and Azo, but another manuscript 
quoted by Torelli (Bamberg D. II. 6) gives the full responsibility to Azo114. Since 
the opinions of Bassianus on the subject do not present this idea115, and 
considering that Odofredus later in his gloss ascribes the idea specifically to Azo, 
it appears that the nemo plus argument was indeed introduced into this discussion 
                                                 
110  See Torelli, Glosse d’Irnerio (1939), p. 252 n. 1; Glosse di Bulgaro (1959 [1942]), p. 104-105; 
Cortese, La norma giuridica (1962) I, p. 75-78; Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (1967), p. 75-76 
and 280 (§ 477); Schrage, Libertas (1975), p. 76, 78, 81-84. 
111  Placentinus, Summa Institutionum, Mainz 1537, p. 6-7: “Est autem manumissio libertatis, 
qua meo iudicio omnis servus caret, datio; vel secundum alios detectio, nam et frumentum 
facere dicitur is, per quem excutitur”. The problem is discussed again incidentally in the 
context of Inst. 2,8 (p. 30). 
112  The reference to the nemo plus argument in this context seems out of place, but it may 
explained in relation to D. 40,9,19 (Mod. 1 regularum), according to which a slave cannot 
free another slave: “Nulla competit libertas data ab eo, qui postea servus ipse pronuntiatus 
est”. 
113  Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto Veteri (Lyon 1550), f. 7r: “Or signori, dominus Joannes et 
Azo formant hic duas pueriles opiniones. Et prima opinio puerilis est ista: hic dicitur quod 
ille qui manumittit dat libertatem. Ergo aut dat suam libertatem aut alienam: si dat suam 
libertatem, ergo ipse desiit esse liber: si dat alienam illam non potest dare: quia nemo plus 
iuris in alium potest transferre quam in se habeat: ut infra de acquir. re. domi. l. traditio 
[D. 41,1,20pr.] et infra si usus.pe. l. uti frui. [D. 7,6,5pr]”. Odofredus then expresses his 
preference for the opinion according to which the manumission is a mere detectio which 
reveals something which already existed, but afterwards admits that Azo’s opinion – no 
mention of Bassianus is made here – can also be accepted: “Vel potest dici secundum 
Azonem quod ille qui manumittit dat libertatem quam non habet, sicut dicitur in 
usufructu, qui dat usufru. formalem alii quem non habet: ut infra De usufru., l. Quod 
nostrum [D. 7,1,63] et in creditore, ut Institu. Quibus alie. licet vel no. in prin. 
[Inst. 2,8pr.]” Regarding this text see Schrage, Libertas (1975), p. 90-91. 
114  Torelli, Glosse d’Irnerio (1939), p. 252 n. 1. 
115  See Cortese, La norma giuridica (1962) I, p. 77 n. 103; La norma giuridica (1964) II, p. 404-
405; Schrage, Libertas (1975), p. 83-85. 
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was controversial since the time of Placentinus110. The latter reproduces Irnerius’ 
view, but does not subscribe to it, considering that the manumission consists in 
bestowing a freedom which no slave has111. At this point the nemo plus argument 
comes into play, since later authors explained the possibility of bestowing 
freedom on a slave in the following way: the slave would indeed be receiving a 
freedom which he did not enjoy before, even when the manumitter did not lose 
his own freedom, which would imply that the latter would give something 
which he did not have112. In other words, this line of thought considers that the 
nemo plus argument would be contradicted in the case of manumission. 
According to Odofredus113, this idea – which he qualifies as “childish” – would 
have been introduced by Johannes Bassianus and Azo, but another manuscript 
quoted by Torelli (Bamberg D. II. 6) gives the full responsibility to Azo114. Since 
the opinions of Bassianus on the subject do not present this idea115, and 
considering that Odofredus later in his gloss ascribes the idea specifically to Azo, 
it appears that the nemo plus argument was indeed introduced into this discussion 
                                                 
110  See Torelli, Glosse d’Irnerio (1939), p. 252 n. 1; Glosse di Bulgaro (1959 [1942]), p. 104-105; 
Cortese, La norma giuridica (1962) I, p. 75-78; Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (1967), p. 75-76 
and 280 (§ 477); Schrage, Libertas (1975), p. 76, 78, 81-84. 
111  Placentinus, Summa Institutionum, Mainz 1537, p. 6-7: “Est autem manumissio libertatis, 
qua meo iudicio omnis servus caret, datio; vel secundum alios detectio, nam et frumentum 
facere dicitur is, per quem excutitur”. The problem is discussed again incidentally in the 
context of Inst. 2,8 (p. 30). 
112  The reference to the nemo plus argument in this context seems out of place, but it may 
explained in relation to D. 40,9,19 (Mod. 1 regularum), according to which a slave cannot 
free another slave: “Nulla competit libertas data ab eo, qui postea servus ipse pronuntiatus 
est”. 
113  Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto Veteri (Lyon 1550), f. 7r: “Or signori, dominus Joannes et 
Azo formant hic duas pueriles opiniones. Et prima opinio puerilis est ista: hic dicitur quod 
ille qui manumittit dat libertatem. Ergo aut dat suam libertatem aut alienam: si dat suam 
libertatem, ergo ipse desiit esse liber: si dat alienam illam non potest dare: quia nemo plus 
iuris in alium potest transferre quam in se habeat: ut infra de acquir. re. domi. l. traditio 
[D. 41,1,20pr.] et infra si usus.pe. l. uti frui. [D. 7,6,5pr]”. Odofredus then expresses his 
preference for the opinion according to which the manumission is a mere detectio which 
reveals something which already existed, but afterwards admits that Azo’s opinion – no 
mention of Bassianus is made here – can also be accepted: “Vel potest dici secundum 
Azonem quod ille qui manumittit dat libertatem quam non habet, sicut dicitur in 
usufructu, qui dat usufru. formalem alii quem non habet: ut infra De usufru., l. Quod 
nostrum [D. 7,1,63] et in creditore, ut Institu. Quibus alie. licet vel no. in prin. 
[Inst. 2,8pr.]” Regarding this text see Schrage, Libertas (1975), p. 90-91. 
114  Torelli, Glosse d’Irnerio (1939), p. 252 n. 1. 
115  See Cortese, La norma giuridica (1962) I, p. 77 n. 103; La norma giuridica (1964) II, p. 404-
405; Schrage, Libertas (1975), p. 83-85. 
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by him. Such ideas are in fact to be found in Azo’s Summa Institutionum, as well as 
in his gloss on Inst. 1,5pr. In the first text, Azo deals with the definition of 
manumission not in the commentary to Inst. 1,5pr, but at the end of Inst. 1,2 
(De iure naturali, gentium et civili). When discussing this subject116, Azo reproduces 
firstly the opinion according to which the manumission would be a ‘detectio’, 
quoting D. 41,1,7,7. However, he then declares that the truth is that the 
manumitter grants him freedom, even when it is not his own. Azo then 
enounces this idea by declaring: “Dat enim, quod non habet” (For he gives, what 
he does not have). To close this line of thought, the texts of D. 7,1,63 and 
Inst. 2,8,1 are given as evidence that one may indeed give what one does not 
have. The same opinion is conveyed in a more succinct form in Azo’s gloss to 
Inst. 2,8,1117. 
 Accursius would deal extensively with the problem of the definition of 
manumission in his gloss Datio118 to D. 1,1,4. According to him, if the manumissor 
grants his own freedom, he would become a slave, and if he grants someone 
else’s freedom he would be giving something what he does not have (si alienam, 
quam non erit invenire: ergo quam non habet). Accursius then presents both the 
opinions of Irnerius and Azo – without quoting their names – indicating that the 
manumission can be regarded as a detectio, or that it can be said that he (the 
manumitter) gives what he does not have (Vel dic dat quam non habet ille qui dat). 
To support the latter view, he quotes the exact same texts that Azo had used: 
D. 7,1,63 and Inst. 2,8,1. The only authority quoted in this text is Placentinus. A 
                                                 
116  Azo, Summa Institutionum (Venice 1566), col. 1050: “Manumissiones etiam iuris gentium 
sunt. Est autem manumissio datio libertatis id est detectio, ut dicunt quidam: quia libertas, 
quae est de iure naturali, non potuit auferri, licet fuerit offuscata per ius civile vel gentium. 
Iura enim naturalia sunt immutabilia ut infa. eodem. §. pe. et ff. de acqui. re. do. l. adeo. § 
cum quis. [D. 41,1,7,7] Vel dic vere dat libertatem ille, qui manumittit: licet non suam, sed 
(alii: vel) alienam. Dat enim, quod non habet: sicut in creditore, et in eo, qui constituit 
usumfructum in re sua, ut ff. de usus. l. quod nostrum. [D. 7,1,63] et infra quib. ali. li. in 
prin. [Inst. 2,8,1]” It should be noted that some editions of Azo’s Summa Institutionum read 
‘vel’ instead of ‘sed’ (Speyer 1482; Lyon 1533 f. 355vb), which alters the sense of the 
opinion. On the contradictory evidence regarding the ideas of Azo on this point see 
Schrage, Libertas (1975), p. 86-87. 
117  Azo, gl. Datio to Inst. 1,5pr. (ed. Caprioli et al. [1984]): “Idest detectio, ut D. de 
acquirendo rerum dominio (l.) adeo § cum quis, in fine [D. 41,1,7,7]. Vel secundum 
P(lacentinum) proprie ponitur: nam nullam libertatem servos habere dicit; et sic quis et id 
quod non habet <dat>, ut in usufructu, in creditore <pignoraticio>. Az.” 
118  Accursius, gl. Datio to D. 1,1,4: “Sic ergo qui manumittit, dat libertatem: ergo suam vel 
alienam: si suam, ergo ipse postea non erit liber: si alienam, quam non erit invenire: ergo 
quam non habet. Praeterea cum omnes homines liberi nascantur iure naturali, ergo non dat 
ei libertatem, cum ille liber sit. His duabus rationibus, vel oppositionibus inductus expono 
datio, id est detectio. Nam cum manumitto servuum, detegitur libertas servi. Nam ipse 
semper liber est inspecto iure naturali. Sic qui excutit grana de spicis, non novam speciem 
facit: sed eam quae est, detegit: ut infra de adquir. re. dom. l. adeo. §. cum quis [D. 41,1,7,7]. 
Sic & infra si servu. vin. l. sicuti. §. ii. in fin. [D. 8,5,8] Vel dic dat quam non habet ille qui 
dat: ut in usufru. formali: ut infra de usufru. l. quod nostrum. [D. 7,1,63] & in creditore: ut 
Instit. quib. alien. non licet. §. i. [Inst. 2,8,1] secundum Placentinum”. See on the ideas of 
Accursius Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (1967), p. 77-78; Schrage, Libertas (1975), p. 88-89. 
 
more detailed account on the controversy is given by Accursius in his gloss 
Datio119 to Inst. 1,5pr, were he quotes in the first place the opinion of Irnerius 
according to whom the manumission would be a detectio, and then brings up the 
idea – which he ascribes to Placentinus, Bassianus and Azo – according to which 
the manumitter would be giving the slave a freedom which the latter did not 
have before. Accursius declares that the latter idea could be refuted, since the 
manumitter either gave the slave his own freedom, thereby becoming a slave 
himself, or gave a freedom which he did not have, which would be absurd. 
However, he then declares that it can indeed be said that the manumitter gave 
what he did not have, which actually takes place in several cases (Sed dic quod dat 
quam non habebat, et hoc plerumque contingit quod quis det quod non habet). To support 
this statement, Accursius quotes Inst. 2,8,1 and D. 7,1,63. 
 Bartolus would apply the nemo plus argument in a similar way when 
commenting D. 1,1,4120, where he points out that the freedom given by the 
manumissor cannot be his own – otherwise he would lose his freedom and 
become a slave – nor someone else’s, since no one can give what he does not 
have: “quia nemo dat quod non habet”121. Bartolus would however not take the 
argument any further, and acknowledges that in some cases we may give what is 
not ours (aliquando damus quod non est nostrum) as happens in the case of the 
creditor to whom a pledge has been given122.  
 The great breakthrough in this topic would come in the works of Baldus. His 
contribution on this point owes much to theology and dialectics, which is no 
wonder considering the reputation of this jurist as a leading philosophical mind 
within the school of the commentators123. This inclination to resort to extralegal 
notions would bring about an innovative approach concerning the significance of 
the nemo plus argument in relation to the problem of the nature of manumission. 
                                                 
119  Accursius, gl. Datio to Inst. 1,5pr. (ed. Torelli [1935]): “Idest detectio, secundum 
Yrnerium, sic ff. De acquiren. rer. do., l. Adeo, § Cum quis [in fine §] [D. 41,1,7,7]; vel 
dic secundum Placentinum et Johannem et Azonem, quia dat libertatem quam prius ipse 
servus non habebat. Alias [idest si diceremus dari illam quam antea habebat] non diceretur 
dari, ut infra, De actionibus, § Sic itaque [Inst. 4,6,14]. Sed [opponitur] aut quam habebat 
qui dabat, et sic nulla remanet, cum non habeat nisi unam, aut quam non habebat quod est 
absurdum. Sed dic quod dat quam non habebat, et hoc plerumque contingit quod quis det 
quod non habet: ut supra, Quibus alienare licet vel non, § 1 [Inst. 2,8,1] et ff. De 
usufructu, Quod nostrum. [D. 7,1,63]. Ac.” 
120  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In primam Digesti Veteris partem Commentaria (Turin 1574), f. 7rb. 
121  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In primam Digesti Veteris partem Commentaria (Turin 1574), f. 7rb: 
“Aut ego manumissor do servo libertatem meam, & hoc est falsum, quia remanerem 
servus, aut alienam, & tunc peius: quia nemo dat quod non habet”. 
122  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In primam Digesti Veteris partem Commentaria (Turin 1574), f. 7rb.: 
“Et non obstat quod glossa dicit, quia aliquando damus quod non est nostrum, ut in 
creditore, quando creditor de voluntate debitoris dat ut .i. fam. erc. l. rem pignori 
[D. 10,2,28]”. 
123  Horn, Baldus philosophus (1967), p. 104 ff.; Lange/Kriechbaum, Die Kommentatoren (2007), 
p. 758-765. 
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(De iure naturali, gentium et civili). When discussing this subject116, Azo reproduces 
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Inst. 2,8,1 are given as evidence that one may indeed give what one does not 
have. The same opinion is conveyed in a more succinct form in Azo’s gloss to 
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 Accursius would deal extensively with the problem of the definition of 
manumission in his gloss Datio118 to D. 1,1,4. According to him, if the manumissor 
grants his own freedom, he would become a slave, and if he grants someone 
else’s freedom he would be giving something what he does not have (si alienam, 
quam non erit invenire: ergo quam non habet). Accursius then presents both the 
opinions of Irnerius and Azo – without quoting their names – indicating that the 
manumission can be regarded as a detectio, or that it can be said that he (the 
manumitter) gives what he does not have (Vel dic dat quam non habet ille qui dat). 
To support the latter view, he quotes the exact same texts that Azo had used: 
D. 7,1,63 and Inst. 2,8,1. The only authority quoted in this text is Placentinus. A 
                                                 
116  Azo, Summa Institutionum (Venice 1566), col. 1050: “Manumissiones etiam iuris gentium 
sunt. Est autem manumissio datio libertatis id est detectio, ut dicunt quidam: quia libertas, 
quae est de iure naturali, non potuit auferri, licet fuerit offuscata per ius civile vel gentium. 
Iura enim naturalia sunt immutabilia ut infa. eodem. §. pe. et ff. de acqui. re. do. l. adeo. § 
cum quis. [D. 41,1,7,7] Vel dic vere dat libertatem ille, qui manumittit: licet non suam, sed 
(alii: vel) alienam. Dat enim, quod non habet: sicut in creditore, et in eo, qui constituit 
usumfructum in re sua, ut ff. de usus. l. quod nostrum. [D. 7,1,63] et infra quib. ali. li. in 
prin. [Inst. 2,8,1]” It should be noted that some editions of Azo’s Summa Institutionum read 
‘vel’ instead of ‘sed’ (Speyer 1482; Lyon 1533 f. 355vb), which alters the sense of the 
opinion. On the contradictory evidence regarding the ideas of Azo on this point see 
Schrage, Libertas (1975), p. 86-87. 
117  Azo, gl. Datio to Inst. 1,5pr. (ed. Caprioli et al. [1984]): “Idest detectio, ut D. de 
acquirendo rerum dominio (l.) adeo § cum quis, in fine [D. 41,1,7,7]. Vel secundum 
P(lacentinum) proprie ponitur: nam nullam libertatem servos habere dicit; et sic quis et id 
quod non habet <dat>, ut in usufructu, in creditore <pignoraticio>. Az.” 
118  Accursius, gl. Datio to D. 1,1,4: “Sic ergo qui manumittit, dat libertatem: ergo suam vel 
alienam: si suam, ergo ipse postea non erit liber: si alienam, quam non erit invenire: ergo 
quam non habet. Praeterea cum omnes homines liberi nascantur iure naturali, ergo non dat 
ei libertatem, cum ille liber sit. His duabus rationibus, vel oppositionibus inductus expono 
datio, id est detectio. Nam cum manumitto servuum, detegitur libertas servi. Nam ipse 
semper liber est inspecto iure naturali. Sic qui excutit grana de spicis, non novam speciem 
facit: sed eam quae est, detegit: ut infra de adquir. re. dom. l. adeo. §. cum quis [D. 41,1,7,7]. 
Sic & infra si servu. vin. l. sicuti. §. ii. in fin. [D. 8,5,8] Vel dic dat quam non habet ille qui 
dat: ut in usufru. formali: ut infra de usufru. l. quod nostrum. [D. 7,1,63] & in creditore: ut 
Instit. quib. alien. non licet. §. i. [Inst. 2,8,1] secundum Placentinum”. See on the ideas of 
Accursius Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (1967), p. 77-78; Schrage, Libertas (1975), p. 88-89. 
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creditor to whom a pledge has been given122.  
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contribution on this point owes much to theology and dialectics, which is no 
wonder considering the reputation of this jurist as a leading philosophical mind 
within the school of the commentators123. This inclination to resort to extralegal 
notions would bring about an innovative approach concerning the significance of 
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119  Accursius, gl. Datio to Inst. 1,5pr. (ed. Torelli [1935]): “Idest detectio, secundum 
Yrnerium, sic ff. De acquiren. rer. do., l. Adeo, § Cum quis [in fine §] [D. 41,1,7,7]; vel 
dic secundum Placentinum et Johannem et Azonem, quia dat libertatem quam prius ipse 
servus non habebat. Alias [idest si diceremus dari illam quam antea habebat] non diceretur 
dari, ut infra, De actionibus, § Sic itaque [Inst. 4,6,14]. Sed [opponitur] aut quam habebat 
qui dabat, et sic nulla remanet, cum non habeat nisi unam, aut quam non habebat quod est 
absurdum. Sed dic quod dat quam non habebat, et hoc plerumque contingit quod quis det 
quod non habet: ut supra, Quibus alienare licet vel non, § 1 [Inst. 2,8,1] et ff. De 
usufructu, Quod nostrum. [D. 7,1,63]. Ac.” 
120  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In primam Digesti Veteris partem Commentaria (Turin 1574), f. 7rb. 
121  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In primam Digesti Veteris partem Commentaria (Turin 1574), f. 7rb: 
“Aut ego manumissor do servo libertatem meam, & hoc est falsum, quia remanerem 
servus, aut alienam, & tunc peius: quia nemo dat quod non habet”. 
122  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In primam Digesti Veteris partem Commentaria (Turin 1574), f. 7rb.: 
“Et non obstat quod glossa dicit, quia aliquando damus quod non est nostrum, ut in 
creditore, quando creditor de voluntate debitoris dat ut .i. fam. erc. l. rem pignori 
[D. 10,2,28]”. 
123  Horn, Baldus philosophus (1967), p. 104 ff.; Lange/Kriechbaum, Die Kommentatoren (2007), 
p. 758-765. 
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In his commentary on D. 1,1,4124, Baldus questions once again how someone can 
bestow freedom, and whether this would imply that he gives what he does not 
have125. Regarding the latter problem, Baldus proposes a dual distinction 
regarding the verb ‘to give’ which allows him to deal simultaneously with cases 
from Roman and canon law. On the one hand, ‘to give’ can be understood as ‘to 
confer’, and in this sense it is possible to give what one does not have as long as 
one has the ‘right to confer’ (ius conferendi). As an example of this, Baldus presents 
the case of a bishop, who does not own or possess the benefits he gives, but has 
the ius conferendi. On the other hand, ‘to give’ can mean ‘to transfer’, and in this 
sense Baldus declares that no one can give what he does not have under his 
power or what he does not own. 
 Even more interesting is the colourful commentary of Baldus on C. 6,57,5, 
where he elaborates on the nature of the manumission. Baldus declares that when 
freedom is given, it is actually formed in the freedman, since intellectual entities 
are stamped without resulting in a loss on the person who gives them, just like 
the emperor bestows legitimacy, and just like the sun forms in objects colours 
which it does not have itself126. Through such distinctions and examples – 
particularly that of the formation of colours – Baldus reaches to extra-legal 
notions in order to explain how someone may give what he does not seem have, 
thereby preserving the validity of the nemo plus argument. It is moreover worth 
noting that Baldus’ opinion brings an interpretation of the nemo plus rule which 
covers Roman and canon law. The link between both disciplines is so strong at 
this point that Baldus would quote D. 1,1,4 when discussing the faculties of 
bishops in his commentary to X 1,6,11127. This approach to the nemo plus rule 
would have a visible impact on later jurists, being reproduced almost word for 
word by Angelus Aretinus in his commentary to Inst. 1,5pr128. 
                                                 
124  Baldus de Ubaldis, In primam Digesti Veteris partem Commentaria (Venice 1577), f. 10vb: 
“…id est in iuris ratione: quia nemo dat, quod non habet (…) Tu dic, quod dare sumitur 
dupliciter. Primo modo pro conferre. Secundo modo pro transferre. Si accipitur primo 
modo, quis dat quod non habet. Nam episcopus dat beneficia: tamen non habet ea in 
proprietate, vel in possessione; sed sufficit quod habeat ius conferendi. Secundo modo, 
nemo concedit, quod non habet in potestate, vel proprietate. Et sic non ob. contrarium, 
vel dic, quod habere dicitur dupliciter, uno modo quo ad libertatem arbitrii: et hoc modo 
nemo dat, quod dare non potest. Alio modo quo ad ius formale ipsius rei; et tunc non valet 
argumentatio. Nam si emo a malæfidei possessore, acquiro interdum conditionem 
prescribendi, quam ipse non habet, qui vendit”. 
125  Regarding the ideas of Baldus on manumission see Schrage, Libertas (1975), p. 96-97. 
126  Baldus de Ubaldis, In sextum Codicis librum Commentaria (Venice 1577), f. 193ra: “Et no. 
quod si do tibi libertatem, formo in te libertatem; nam intelligibiles formae imprimuntur, 
et tamen non minuuntur a proprio subiecto informante. Ita Imperator dat legitimitatem, id 
est format in subiecto hanc qualitatem, sicut Sol format quasdam qualitates in materia, quae 
non sunt in sole, ut colores. Et hoc est, quod gl. nesciunt proprie loqui in l. 
manumissiones, ff. de iusti. et iure. [D. 1,1,4]” 
127  Baldus de Ubaldis, Super Decretalibus (Lyon 1564), f. 56rb. 
128  Angelus Aretinus a Gambilionibus, In quatuor Institutionum Iustiniani libros commentaria 
(Venice 1574), f. 22va. It is however noteworthy that already at the beginning of the 16th 
 
 The discussions concerning the grant of a usufruct by the owner and the 
nature of manumission are the most significant cases where extra-legal notions 
were applied by jurists in order to explain the scope of the nemo plus argument. 
In other cases the application of such notions is only apparent. This is the case in 
the gloss of Accursius to C. 10,32,44, where the jurist observes that he who does 
not have learning cannot make another one a learned person129. Such references 
could appear to evoke the application of the nemo plus argument in Plato’s 
Symposium, but it is in fact linked to the uses of the argument in Christian 
writings, as the references given by Accursius show130. 
 The way in which the nemo plus argument was applied to specific problems 
left the door open for a radical reinterpretation of the validity of the argument 
itself. At some point, jurists attempted determine the exact scope of the argument 
by applying considerations from other fields of knowledge, where the nemo plus 
argument was known as well. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the fact 
that the argument is often conveyed in alternative forms by jurists, showing that 
they were familiar with it in other formulations of the kind “nemo dat quod non 
habet”131. The argument even appears to have acquired a certain proverbial value, 
as shown in the quotation of Bartolus of the words “Mal da chi non ha”, inscribed 
in one of the bells of Saint Peter’s Cathedral in Bologna132. The argument 
therefore subsisted with relative independence from its use by legists and 
canonists. It is therefore no wonder that jurists soon felt the need to apply the 
                                                                                                                   
century the discussion on the application of the nemo plus rule in the context of 
manumission was regarded as rather artificial, as it can be seen in the Castigationes inter 
pandectas originales et communes codices of Ludovico Bolognini (1446-1508) concerning 
D. 1,1,4, which are edited by Caprioli, Indagini sul Bolognini (1969), p. 340: “Est igitur 
manumissio liberatio a manu, idest a potestate domini: et sic manumittens non dat ei 
libertatem suam propriam: nam sic ipse efficeretur servus: nec etiam dat alienam, cum sua 
non sit: nec etiam dat quondam aliam libertatem separatam, prout dicebat glo(sa) et alii hic 
omnes post eam, ଢet male etଣ etiam in dicto § primo Insti. de libertinis [Inst. 1,5pr], 
adducendo simile de usufructu formali et de creditore, etc.” It is therefore no wonder that 
the discussion on the nature of the nemo plus rule did not continue to take place in the 
context of manumission. 
129  Accursius, gl. Immunis to C. 10,32,44: “Item not. non facit curialem, qui non est curialis: 
ad quod sup. de haeret. et Ma. l. ii. [C. 1,5,2] nec doctum facit, qui est indoctus: ut in Auth. 
de san. epis. in princ. coll. ix. [Nov. 123,1pr.]” 
130  Baldus, In VII-XI Codicis libros Commentaria (Venice 1577), f. 267va would later add: “No. 
hic gl. Quod malus Doctor non potest facere bonum scholarem”. 
131  Several examples presented above bear witness to this, such as the use of the argument by 
Azo (Summa Institutionum, col. 1050: “Dat enim, quod non habet”) or by Bartholomaeus 
Brixiensis (Gl. Gl. Dare to Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 24: “Arg[umentum]. qui nihil 
habet, nihil dare potest”). Similarly Johannes Andreae, Gl. Nemo potest to Sextus, De reg. 
jur. 79: “quod dicitur, nemo dat quod non habet”. 
132  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In secundam Codicis partem Commentaria (Turin 1574), f. 39ra 
(when commenting C. 6,37,15): “Mal da chi non ha, h[oc]. d[icit]. la campana de San 
Pedro”. It remains mysterious to me why these last words are conveyed in Spanish. See 
moreover Baldus, In sextum Codicis librum Commentaria (Venice 1577), f. 130rb, who 
indicates, when commenting on the same text: “Nemo relinquit, quod non habet. h[oc] 
d[icit]. concor. supra. de don. ante nup. l. si ante. [C. 5,3,8]” 
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In his commentary on D. 1,1,4124, Baldus questions once again how someone can 
bestow freedom, and whether this would imply that he gives what he does not 
have125. Regarding the latter problem, Baldus proposes a dual distinction 
regarding the verb ‘to give’ which allows him to deal simultaneously with cases 
from Roman and canon law. On the one hand, ‘to give’ can be understood as ‘to 
confer’, and in this sense it is possible to give what one does not have as long as 
one has the ‘right to confer’ (ius conferendi). As an example of this, Baldus presents 
the case of a bishop, who does not own or possess the benefits he gives, but has 
the ius conferendi. On the other hand, ‘to give’ can mean ‘to transfer’, and in this 
sense Baldus declares that no one can give what he does not have under his 
power or what he does not own. 
 Even more interesting is the colourful commentary of Baldus on C. 6,57,5, 
where he elaborates on the nature of the manumission. Baldus declares that when 
freedom is given, it is actually formed in the freedman, since intellectual entities 
are stamped without resulting in a loss on the person who gives them, just like 
the emperor bestows legitimacy, and just like the sun forms in objects colours 
which it does not have itself126. Through such distinctions and examples – 
particularly that of the formation of colours – Baldus reaches to extra-legal 
notions in order to explain how someone may give what he does not seem have, 
thereby preserving the validity of the nemo plus argument. It is moreover worth 
noting that Baldus’ opinion brings an interpretation of the nemo plus rule which 
covers Roman and canon law. The link between both disciplines is so strong at 
this point that Baldus would quote D. 1,1,4 when discussing the faculties of 
bishops in his commentary to X 1,6,11127. This approach to the nemo plus rule 
would have a visible impact on later jurists, being reproduced almost word for 
word by Angelus Aretinus in his commentary to Inst. 1,5pr128. 
                                                 
124  Baldus de Ubaldis, In primam Digesti Veteris partem Commentaria (Venice 1577), f. 10vb: 
“…id est in iuris ratione: quia nemo dat, quod non habet (…) Tu dic, quod dare sumitur 
dupliciter. Primo modo pro conferre. Secundo modo pro transferre. Si accipitur primo 
modo, quis dat quod non habet. Nam episcopus dat beneficia: tamen non habet ea in 
proprietate, vel in possessione; sed sufficit quod habeat ius conferendi. Secundo modo, 
nemo concedit, quod non habet in potestate, vel proprietate. Et sic non ob. contrarium, 
vel dic, quod habere dicitur dupliciter, uno modo quo ad libertatem arbitrii: et hoc modo 
nemo dat, quod dare non potest. Alio modo quo ad ius formale ipsius rei; et tunc non valet 
argumentatio. Nam si emo a malæfidei possessore, acquiro interdum conditionem 
prescribendi, quam ipse non habet, qui vendit”. 
125  Regarding the ideas of Baldus on manumission see Schrage, Libertas (1975), p. 96-97. 
126  Baldus de Ubaldis, In sextum Codicis librum Commentaria (Venice 1577), f. 193ra: “Et no. 
quod si do tibi libertatem, formo in te libertatem; nam intelligibiles formae imprimuntur, 
et tamen non minuuntur a proprio subiecto informante. Ita Imperator dat legitimitatem, id 
est format in subiecto hanc qualitatem, sicut Sol format quasdam qualitates in materia, quae 
non sunt in sole, ut colores. Et hoc est, quod gl. nesciunt proprie loqui in l. 
manumissiones, ff. de iusti. et iure. [D. 1,1,4]” 
127  Baldus de Ubaldis, Super Decretalibus (Lyon 1564), f. 56rb. 
128  Angelus Aretinus a Gambilionibus, In quatuor Institutionum Iustiniani libros commentaria 
(Venice 1574), f. 22va. It is however noteworthy that already at the beginning of the 16th 
 
 The discussions concerning the grant of a usufruct by the owner and the 
nature of manumission are the most significant cases where extra-legal notions 
were applied by jurists in order to explain the scope of the nemo plus argument. 
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as shown in the quotation of Bartolus of the words “Mal da chi non ha”, inscribed 
in one of the bells of Saint Peter’s Cathedral in Bologna132. The argument 
therefore subsisted with relative independence from its use by legists and 
canonists. It is therefore no wonder that jurists soon felt the need to apply the 
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notions surrounding this argument when interpreting the nemo plus rule as found 
in Roman and canon law.  
 Also relevant for this process of reinterpretation is the fact that the findings 
made by legists were readily applied in the context of canon law and vice 
versa133. The interaction between legists and canonists would be decisive for the 
interpretation of the nemo plus rule in Roman sources due to the fact that 
canonists were the first ones to offer a more comprehensive reinterpretation of 
the nemo plus rule, which may be explained by the fact that it was less adequate 
for canon law to consider that the nemo plus rule was filled with exceptions than 
it was for Roman law. Paulus de Liazariis († 1356) in particular formulated an 
influential interpretation134 which would be reproduced in the commentaries of 
authors such as Johannes de Imola135 and Panormitanus136, becoming especially 
popular through the latter. This interpretation is based on the notions of 
potentiality and actuality, which are to be found in Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas. According to this new interpretation, the nemo plus argument only 
applies to those things which are not possessed either in actuality or in 
potentiality (quod quis non habet in actu, nec in potentia)137. Accordingly, one may 
be able to give even what is held only in potentiality. Panormitanus cites as 
examples of cases where one gives what he only has in potentiality, that electors 
can choose a bishop despite not being bishops themselves, and that cardinals may 
elect the Pope, without having such dignity themselves. This new interpretation 
is all the more interesting considering that the distinction between having 
something in actuality or in potentiality is equivalent to that of having something 
formaliter and virtualiter, which shows that, although through a different wording, 
the ideas of dialecticians make their way in order to determine the scope of the 
rule. This reinterpretation allows therefore to explain numerous cases which 
would appear to contradict the nemo plus argument as in fact agreeing with it. 
                                                 
133  The link between both disciplines regarding the approach to some regulae iuris is so strong 
that, for instance, Bartolus would rather refer the reader to the commentary of Dinus on 
the equivalent rule in the Liber Sextus instead of offering himself a commentary on 
D. 50,17,54: Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In secundam Digesti Novi partem Commentaria (Turin 
1574), f. 252, lex 55: “Dic, ut no. per Dy. inc. nemo potest plus. extra eo. tit.lib.6”. 
134  That this idea was originally from Paulus de Liazariis is declared by Jason de Mayno, In 
primam Digesti novi partem commentaria (Lyon 1582), f. 8va i.f., reproduced below, and 
Cagnolus, Commentarii in titulum.ff. De Reg. Iur. (Lyon 1559), f. 150r: “Abba. post Paul. de 
Eleaza. in cap. cura. de iur. patron. [X 3,38,11] ea propter cum dominus potentiam 
habeat…”. 
135  Johannes de Imola, Commentaria in librum tertium Decretalium (Venice 1500), f. 196va 
(commenting X 3,21,6).  
136  Panormitanus, Commentaria in Tertium Decretalium Librum (Venice 1591), f. 183rb 
(commenting X 3,38,11): “Dic quod id, quod quis non habet in actu, nec in potentia, non 
potest in alium transferre, sed id, quod habet in potentia, licet non habeat in actu, potest 
transferre. Exemplum in electoribus, qui non habent dignitatem Episcopalem, & tamen 
transferunt in electum, & in Cardinalibus, in Papam”.  
137  Panormitanus, Commentaria in Tertium Decretalium Librum (Venice 1591), f. 183rb. 
 
 The new interpretation of the nemo plus rule made the long list of exceptions 
traditionally grouped around it seem rather out of place, and already in the 15th 
century attempts are made to discard such exceptions. Guillaume Maynier (1420-
1502) in his commentary to D. 50,17,54 declares, like most of his predecessors, 
that the rule has numerous exceptions138. However, the author strives to explain 
many of these cases in a way which does not contradict the nemo plus rule, often 
attempting to make previous jurists appear to be agreeing with his views. 
Accordingly, he explains that the ratio of the alienation by the tutor is that he acts 
as an owner (vice domino), just as the ratio of the alienation performed through a 
procurator is that it is regarded as performed by the principal (per se alienasse 
videtur)139, following Inst. 2,1,42. Maynier also discards explicitly that the pledge 
creditor constitutes an exception to the rule, since he is regarded as acting under 
his authorization and even as a procurator140. Following Bartolus141, he declares that 
neither would the constitution of the usufruct be an exception to the rule, since 
in such a case the owner does not actually (formaliter) have what he gives, but he 
does have it ‘causally’142. Maynier adds here that “he does give what he has, but 
not in the way he has it” (bene dat quod habet, sed non qualiter habet), a formula 
which clearly hints at dialectical distinctions and could even indicate an 
                                                 
138  Maynier, De regulis iuris (Lyon 1545), f. 69rb: “Fallit autem haec regula in multis iuribus, ut 
hic, et ibi notatur per glos. et Doctores”. 
139  Maynier, De regulis iuris (Lyon 1545), f. 69rb: “Primo [fallit] in lege, lex quae tutores. & l. 
fin. C. de admini. tut. [C. 5,37,22 + C. 5,37,28,5] Sed ratio est ibi, quia tutor vice domini 
est. l. interdum. § qui tutelam. ff. de furt. [D. 47,2,57,4]… Item in § nihil. Institu. de 
rerum divi. [Inst. 2,1,42] et ibi secundum gloss. ratio est, quia dominus constituendo 
procuratorem ad alienandum rem, per se alienasse videtur…” The glossa ordinaria declares 
indeed (gl. Nihil to Inst. 2,1,42) “Quod enim quis per alium facit, ipse facere videtur”, but 
does not grant this idea the same scope as Maynier regarding D. 50,17,54. 
140  Maynier, De regulis iuris (Lyon 1545), f. 69rb: “Fallit etiam in creditore. Insti. quibus alie. 
licet. § i. [Inst. 2,8,1] Dicit tamen Bar. quod ibi non est fallentia, quia quando creditor 
alienat, alienare videtur voluntate debitoris, qui obligatione consensit… Item creditor 
videtur vendere tanquam procurator debitoris”. Although Bartolus declares that “creditor 
videtur vendere tanquam procurator debitoris” (In primam Digesti Novi partem Commentaria, 
f. 78ra), he did consider this case to be an exception to the nemo plus, and therefore 
Maynier appears to be forcing the opinion of Bartolus to support his own views, just as he 
does with the glossa ordinaria regarding the case of the procurator. 
141  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In primam Digesti Novi partem Commentaria, f. 78ra (commenting 
D. 41,1,20pr.) 
142  Maynier, De regulis iuris (Lyon 1545), f. 69rb-69va: “Item fallit secundum glos. in usufructu 
formali. l. id quod nostrum ff. de usus. [D. 7,1,63] sed secundum Doctores, illa non est 
proprie fallentia, quia ibi datur id, quod habetur, licet non detur eo modo quo habetur, sed 
aliter: quia ususfructus causalis habetur et datur formaliter… Ideo cum constituit 
usumfructum bene dat quod habet, sed non qualiter habet: nam habet causaliter, et 
constituit formaliter. Ita dicit Albe. secundum Iacob. de Rave. in dicta l. quod nostrum 
[D. 7,1,63]. Et Bartolus in l. traditio ff. de acquir. rerum do. [D. 41,1,20pr] simile notatur 
in l. manumissions ff. de iusti. et iure [D. 1,1,4]”. 
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notions surrounding this argument when interpreting the nemo plus rule as found 
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138  Maynier, De regulis iuris (Lyon 1545), f. 69rb: “Fallit autem haec regula in multis iuribus, ut 
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142  Maynier, De regulis iuris (Lyon 1545), f. 69rb-69va: “Item fallit secundum glos. in usufructu 
formali. l. id quod nostrum ff. de usus. [D. 7,1,63] sed secundum Doctores, illa non est 
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Aristotelian influence143. Moreover, Maynier denies that the delivery by a 
possessor in bad faith – which allows the acquirer in good faith to eventually 
become owner through praescriptio – constitutes an exception to D. 50,17,54, 
since this consequence stems from a legal provision which looks after the position 
of the acquirer144. Through such an analysis, Maynier almost completely frees the 
nemo plus rule from exceptions, leaving as such only the case of the alienation by 
the judge and the case of alluvio. 
 Other authors would experiment with other formulas to explain the scope of 
the nemo plus argument, such as Jason del Mayno when commenting 
D. 29,2,6,5145. In this text, Jason deals with the cases in which someone who 
does not have a particular dignity or office confers it to someone else. He draws 
arguments in favour and against this possibility, having plenty of material from 
previous jurists to pick. Against this possibility, for example, he presents the 
commentary of Baldus on C. 10,32,44. In favour, firstly, the extensive opening 
commentary of Bartolus on C. 12,1 (De Dignitatibus)146, where it is discussed 
which individuals may confer specific dignities and whether they should 
themselves have such dignity. The decisive argument however is drawn from the 
commentary of Panormitanus to X 3,38,11, which satisfactorily explains how 
someone may appear to be giving something that he does not have, an argument 
which Jason reinforces with other texts from Roman and canon law147. Jason 
would apply this doctrine again when commenting D. 39,1,1,6, which deals with 
the novi operis nuntiatio. Bartolus had declared that this text assumes that the 
denouncing party was in possession, and quotes D. 41,1,20pr to support his 
view148. Jason argues that this rule only applies as long as one does not have the 
                                                 
143  The influence may well be indirect, but there seems to be a close connection with the idea 
“Aut non dedit quod non habuit, sed ut non habuit…” (De Sophisticis Elenchis, transl. 
Boethius, Aristoteles Latinus VI 2, p. 44). 
144  Maynier, De regulis iuris (Lyon 1545), f. 69va: “sed ibi proprie non est fallentia, quia illud 
non sequitur ex traditione, sed ex legis dispositione propter titulum et bonam fidem ipsius 
emptoris…” 
145  Jason de Mayno, In primam Infortiati partem commentaria (Lyon 1581), p. 57v-58v. 
146  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In tres Codicis libros Commentaria (Turin 1574), f. 45v-48v, 
particularly f. 47vb. It should be noted that Bartolus does not himself introduce the nemo 
plus argument into this discussion. 
147  Jason de Mayno, In primam Infortiati partem commentaria (Lyon 1581), p. 58ra: “Ad hoc 
respondet do. Abb. in cap. cura in fin. de iure patro. [X 3,38,11] quod illud quod quis non 
habet in actu, nec in potentia, non potest in alium transferre: quia nemo dat quod non 
habet. l. traditio ff. de acquiren. re. do. [D. 41,1,20pr] et l. si universae C. de leg. 
[C. 6,37,15] et cap. quod autem. de iure patro. [X 3,38,5] et cap. Daybertum quaest. 7 
[Decretum Grat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 24]. Sed illud quod quis habet in potentia, licet non habeat in 
actu, bene potest in alium transferre: ut in electoribus & Cardinalibus…” 
148  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In primam Digesti Novi partem Commentaria (Turin 1574), f. 6va: 
“Op. de acqui. re. do. l. traditio. Sol[utio]. intellige si nuncians possidebat”. 
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Aristotelian influence143. Moreover, Maynier denies that the delivery by a 
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the nemo plus argument, such as Jason del Mayno when commenting 
D. 29,2,6,5145. In this text, Jason deals with the cases in which someone who 
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thing actually, habitually or potentially, and quotes in favour of this view the 
doctrine of Paulus de Liazariis on X 3,38,11149. 
 The decisive step in the interpretation of the nemo plus rule by combining the 
approaches from Roman and canon law would be made by Philippus Decius 
(1454-1535), a disciple of Jason, in his commentary on the last title of the 
Digest150. This work was published for the first time in 1521 and became 
extremely popular, being printed 33 times between 1521 and 1608151. Decius 
opens his commentary to D. 50,17,54 by quoting a long list of authorities, both 
from Roman and from canon law, in which the rule is declared or applied, many 
of which refer to cases where someone carries out an act without having the 
necessary authority or dignity152. Afterwards, and with identical detail, Decius 
quotes the long list of exceptions which the rule suffers153. He then makes 
reference to the commentaries of Dinus and Bartolus, reproducing Baldus’ 
opinion on the need to distinguish the meaning of ‘dare’, as well as the support of 
Angelus Aretinus for this view154. However, Decius cautiously confronts these 
views, declaring: “But nevertheless it may be concluded, that the rule is applied 
                                                 
149  Jason de Mayno, In primam Digesti noYi partem commentaria (Lyon 1582), f. 8va i.f.: “… 
regula quae habet, quod quis non potest dare quod non habet l. traditio. infra. de acqui. 
rerum do. procedit quando quis no habet rem nec actu, nec habitu, nec potentia. Sed si 
uno ex istis modis habeam, possum transferre. doctr. est Pau. de Eleaza. in c. cura. de 
iurepat. modo dominus habet potentia ut in re sua possit pati servitutem imponi. ergo illud 
potuit transferre”. 
150  The significance of Decius on this point allows discarding the claims of Stein, Regulae iuris 
(1966), p. 162, according to whom the commentary of Decius would be unoriginal with 
regard to his predecessors.  
151  Lange/Kriechbaum, Die Kommentatoren (2007), p. 880. 
152  Philippus Decius, In tit. ff. de Regulis Iuris (Lyon 1549), p. 224-225, where he mentions 
6e[tus 5,12,79, D. 41,1,20pr, X 4,20,6, X 3,38,5, Decretum *rat. C. 1, q. 7, c. 24, Decretum 
*rat. D. 4 de cons., c. 41, C. 8,53,14, C. 9,47,2, C. 3,3,1, Decretum *rat. D. 62, c. 1, D. 
1,16,4 and C. 6,37,15. 
153  Philippus Decius, In tit. ff. de Regulis Iuris (Lyon 1549), p. 225: “Et limitatur regula non 
habere locum in pluribus casibus: ut not. per glo. hic, & in dicta reg. nemo. & in l. traditio 
& in C.J. de suppl. negli. praela. Nam primo in creditore non habet locum, qui potest 
alienare rem debitoris: Instit. quibus alien. lic. in prin. [Inst. 2,8,1] & in l. non est novum. 
supra de acquiren. rer. domin. [D. 41,1,46] ubi dicitur: non est novum, quod qui 
dominium non habet, alii dominium praebeat, & exemplum ponit in creditore: & idem in 
tutote, & curatore, qui ex causa potest bona pupilli vel adulti alienare. l. lex quae tutores. l. 
fin. C. de administrat. tut. [C. 5,37,22 + C. 5,37,28,5] Idem in procuratore: §. nihil 
autem. Instit. de rer. divisio. [Inst. 2,1,42] Idem in iudice qui adiudicando rem alicui, 
dominium transfert quod ipse non habet. §. fin. instit. de offic. iudic. [Inst. 4,17,4] cum 
simil. ut per glos. hic, & in locis praeallega”. 
154  Philippus Decius, In tit. ff. de Regulis Iuris (Lyon 1549), p. 225: “& in d. Regu. nemo. ubi 
Dyn. ad quem Bar. hic se remittit. Bald. vero in l. manumissions. [D. 1,1,4] circa fin. in 
versi item gloss. supra de iusti. & iure. declarando istam regulam, dicit quod dare sumitur 
dupliciter. Primo, pro conferre: secundo, pro transferre. Primo modo regula non procedit: 
quia episcopus confer beneficia in quibus non habet dominium neque possessionem: sed 
sufficit quod habeat ius conferendi. Secundo modo habet locum regula: quia quis transferre 
non potest quod non habet: & sequitur Angel. Areti. Insti. de libert. in prin. col. ii. 
[Inst. 1,5pr] 
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without distinction” (Sed tamen concludi potest, quod regula indistincte procedat)155. He 
then proceeds to study the cases mentioned before, showing that in fact the rule 
is not broken in any of them. Firstly, the alienation by the creditor of a pledged 
object would take place on behalf of the owner (nomine domini) and according to 
his authorization (et de eius voluntate), quoting Inst. 2,8,1 in favour of this view. 
An identical solution is given in the case of the procurator, tutor and curator, since 
they all act on behalf of the owner (nomine domini faciunt). In all of these cases, the 
owner himself is considered to transfer ownership (Et sic a domino videtur 
dominium transferri). In the case of the bishop and the judge, they can bestow due 
to their dignity (ratione officii) what they do not have, being regarded as having 
what they give through the interpretation of the law. Therefore, whether 
someone ‘has’ or not can be subject to interpretation. Decius then quotes the 
opinion of Panormitanus regarding X 3,38,11, showing how broadly the rule can 
be interpreted. Decius therefore becomes the first author to comment the nemo 
plus rule in a way which systematically presents it as flawless, explaining the cases 
which would appear to contradict the rule in accordance with it. Some medieval 
jurists had in fact claimed that the alienation by a non-owner should be regarded 
as performed by the owner himself, an idea which was firmly rooted in some 
texts, but this idea was never related to the scope of the nemo plus rule. However, 
once the general attitude concerning the validity of the rule changed, it was easy 
to reverse the interpretation of the rule and claim that in all of the cases of 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner there is no exception to the general rule. 
 Despite the fact that Decius presents his interpretation to D. 50,17,54 in a 
way which seeks support mainly in the texts of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, the study 
of previous jurists shows that the main driving force which led to his 
reinterpretation were the developments in the field of dialectics, which to a great 
extent became widespread among legists through the influence of canon law, 
where the existence of exceptions to the rule was less adequate than in Roman 
law. This shows the significance that non-legal disciplines had for the 
interpretation of the nemo plus rule156, and that the acquaintance of jurists with 
                                                 
155  Philippus Decius, In tit. ff. de Regulis Iuris (Lyon 1549), p. 225: “Sed tamen concludi potest, 
quod regula indistincte procedat: quia creditor qui habuit potestatem alienandi, illud facit 
nomine domini, & de eius voluntate, ex quo ita semel voluit & se oligavit: ut probatur in 
§.i. insti. quib. alien. lic. [Inst. 2,8,1] ibi voluntate debitoris intelligitur pignus alienare. Et 
idem in procuratore, tutore & curatore qui nomine domini faciunt. Et sic a domino 
videtur dominium transferri. In episcopo & iudice qui concedunt quod non habent, illud 
est ratione officii, & quo ad interpretationem iuris habere videntur. Et sic dicimus, quod 
quis non potest dare quod non habet, vere vel interpretative secundum iuris dispositionem. 
& Abb[as Panormitanus]. in capitu. curat. in fin. De iure patronat. [X 3,38,11] dicit, quod 
illud quod quis non habet in actu nec potentia, transferri non potest. Sed illud quod quis 
habet in potentia, licet non in actu, potest in alium transferri: ut patet in canonicis, qui 
eligunt episcopum: & cardinalibus, qui eligunt summum Pontificem”. 
156  For the general formation of medieval jurists, particularly regarding dialectics and 
philosophy, see Otte, Dialektik und Jurisprudenz (1971), p. 17-32; Gualazzini, Trivium e 
Quadrivium (1974), p. 17-42; Vervaart, Studies over Nicolaas Everaerts (1994), p. 37-62. 
 
notions from the field of dialectics must at some point have made it inadequate to 
simply set a large list of exceptions to an argument which was approached by 
most authorities at the time as an infallible truth which could be adequately 
explained by making some basic distinctions. 
 
5. Absolute validity of the nemo plus rule since the 16th century 
 
The commentaries on the nemo plus rule after Decius offer a very different 
approach than that of most medieval jurists, following the new ideas of humanist 
scholarship. The long lists of exceptions disappeared from most commentaries157, 
being either drastically reduced to one or two specific cases or transformed into 
an enumeration of apparent exceptions. Already Johannes Ferrarius would 
present the numerous exceptions to the rule in the same way as Decius, i.e. 
explaining how in each case one may understand that the owner does give what 
he has158. Cagnolus159 and Philippus Matthaeus160 also explain in detail the 
different doctrinal opinions regarding the application of the rule, and whether 
someone may in fact give what he does not have. Even more detailed is the 
account of Peckius the Elder, who enumerates eleven exceptions to the rule only 
to carefully discard them one by one161. Donellus would make use of the new 
interpretation of the nemo plus rule to describe a general systematization regarding 
the transfer of ownership. He declares that the delivery can be made by the 
owner or by those who are considered to be the owner at the conveyance162, and 
explicitly discards that the procurator163 or the pledge creditor164 are exceptions to 
                                                 
157  Few authors would still consider that the rule faces numerous exceptions, such as Güntzel, 
De regulis juris (Leipzig 1657), p. 167-168; Müller, Ad Tit. Dig. Ult. De Regulis Juris Antiqui 
(Lepizig/Frankfurt 1685), p. 309-310. 
158  Ferrarius, De regulis iuris (Marburg 1536), 303-304. 
159  Cagnolus, Commentarii in titulum ff. De Reg. Iur. (Lyon 1559), f. 149v-150v. 
160  Philippus Matthaeus, De diversis regulis juris antiqui (Marburg 1607), p. 290-292. 
161  Peckius the Elder, Ad regulas iuris canonici commentaria (Helmstedt 1588), f. 366v-369r. 
162  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 4 (I, col. 732): “Ante 
omnia eum quaerimus, qui possit transferre. In hoc genere sunt duo, dominus rei; &, si 
quis est, qui in hae translatione pro domino habeatur”. 
163  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 9 (I, col. 734): “… 
Non sunt hi quidem domini. Sed nihil interest, inquit Cajus, utrum ipse dominus per se tradat 
alicui rem, an volunate ejus alius. d. L. qua ratione, §. nihil autem [D. 41,1,9,4]. Quo 
significatur, ab his rem transferri non tam ideo, quod domini potestate in eo utantur: quam 
quod videatur ipse dominus tradidisse per alium, cujus opera in ea re utitur”. 
164  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 13 (I, col. 736-737): 
“Non pugnat hoc cum jure superiore, quo negavimus, quemquam plus juris in alium 
transferre, quam ipse habuit; L. nemo plus iuris, D. de reg. jur. [D. 50,17,54] et eum, qui 
dominium in fundo non habuit, ad eum, qui accipit, quidquam transferre. L. traditio, D. de 
acq. rer. dom. [D. 41,1,20pr] Quod enim creditor pignus alienat, facit hoc domini voluntate, 
§. contra, Instit. quib. al. non lic. [Inst. 2,8,1] quoniam pignus hac lege acceperat, ut vendere 
liceret, sive convenerit nominatim, ut liceret, sive non convenerit. Idque appellatio 
pignoris in se continet. d. L. 4. D. de pign. act. [D. 13,7,4]” It should be noted that the 
authorization to alienate is understood to be given in an either explicit or tacit way. 
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the rule, since here the owner himself is considered to perform the delivery. In 
such cases, as well as regarding legal guardians, the non-owner is seen as acting 
‘in place of the owner’ (domini loco)165.  
 The interpreters would rely heavily on the text of Inst. 2,1,42 / D. 41,1,9,4 
to equate the delivery by the owner himself and the delivery by an authorized 
non-owner, which would allow freeing the nemo plus rule from exceptions. The 
textual support for this view is not so evident in cases where the owner does not 
appear explicitly to be giving his authorization, and therefore such cases are often 
forced into the general systematization. Donellus considers that the pledge 
creditor did in fact authorize the alienation, and does not explain how exactly 
legal guardians act domini loco. A similar attitude is found in the very popular 
commentary on D. 50,17 of Bronchorst166, who declares that the delivery by an 
authorized non-owner is the same as that of the owner (Quia perinde est, ac si ipsi 
fecissemus). The same would explain the case of the pledge creditor, since he 
delivers on account of the authorization of the debtor (ex pacto et concessione 
debitoris). Bronchorst then introduces the rest of the cases dealt with by Decius in 
few words, explaining briefly that the tutor and curator are regarded as acting on 
behalf of the owner, and that the bishop confers dignities which he does not have 
on account of his office. A similar explanation of the subject is found in the work 
of Johan van den Sande167. The idea that the rule would face no exceptions 
would be upheld by later scholars, as can be seen in the work of Anaklet 
Reiffenstuel (1641-1703), who discarded any possible objection to the rule as 
presented in Sextus, De reg. jur. 79168. Also the commentary on D. 50,17,54 by 
Jean Baptiste Dantoine is almost exclusively dedicated to explaining in detail how 
all texts which would seem to present an exception to the rule can be explained 
in another way169. Moreover, a dissertation by Kaulfuss and Hommel on the 
                                                 
165  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 15 (I, col. 738). 
166  Bronchorst, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Leiden 1624), p. 137: “Si tamen alicui speciale 
mandatum alienandi, aut libera universorum bonorum administratio a domino permissa sit, 
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ult. Inst. de off. jud. [Inst. 4,17,4] et Episcopus confert beneficia, quae non sunt sua, sed hoc 
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subject has as a starting point the rejection of any possible exception to the nemo 
plus rule170. 
 Despite these very categorical opinions regarding the absolute validity of the 
nemo plus rule, none of the authors just mentioned offers anything similar to the 
elaborate explanations of authors such as Philippus Decius. Maybe this lack of 
detail when dealing with the subject can be explained by the fact that, to a large 
extent, it must have been assumed by the beginning of the 17th century that the 
rule indeed contained none or few exceptions, considering its rational and self-
explanatory nature, and therefore no further arguments were needed when 
defending its validity. In fact already Philippus Decius himself had relied more on 
the evidence he could find in the Justinianic compilation to defend the absolute 
validity of the rule than on the dialectical ideas which led to his interpretation. It 
is therefore no wonder that later scholars would dismiss the reference to 
dialectical notions altogether, as some kind of superfluous medieval reasoning 
which was of little moment from a legal perspective. The only exception to this 
trend is the commentary of Wissenbach (1607-1665), who makes use of 
dialectical distinctions when pointing out that no one can give what he does not 
have actually or virtually (formaliter vel eminenter)171. 
 Regarding the general influence of non-legal sources concerning the nemo 
plus argument, one could expect that the familiarity of humanist legal scholars 
with literary sources from classical Antiquity would bring further interactions 
with dialectics or rhetoric, but the fact is that the references made on this point 
have a minor role, merely reassuring the high status granted to the nemo plus rule. 
Peckius the Elder, for example, when commenting on Sextus, De reg. jur. 79, 
notes that the nemo plus is used by Plato in his Symposium172. Petrus Faber quotes 
Seneca in order to show the rationality of the rule173. Not many years later 
Grotius as well would quote the rule in the wording of Seneca (De beneficiis 
5,12,7) in his De iure praedae174, and only in De iure belli ac pacis would he quote 
                                                 
170  Kaulfuss/Hommel, Dissertationem de eo, quod ipse non habens alteri dare potest (Leipzig 1712), 
p. 10-11. 
171  Wissenbach, In extremum Pandectarum titulum de Diversis Regulis Juris antiqui (Franeker 1661), 
p. 97: “Causa nihil potest dare effectui, quod ipsa non habeat formaliter vel eminenter. 
Axioma est Logicorum”. 
172  Peckius the Elder, Ad regulas iuris canonici commentaria (Helmstedt 1588), f. 365r. 
173  Petrus Faber, Ad Titulum de diversis regulis iuris antiqui (Cologne 1608), p. 249: “Naturalem 
intellectum habet haec regula, quoniam nemo potest (ut apud Senecam legimus) quod no 
habet, dare…” 
174  Grotius, De iure praedae (ed. Hamaker 1868), cap. 15 (p. 340): “Aut qui jus suum aut 
societati, aut alteri cuivis transcribunt, siva aliud quidpiam recipient ejus rei loco, credenda 
sunt vendidisse, sive nihil volunt praetor gratiam, tamen negare non possunt pro suo 
habuisse, quod faciunt alienum. Nemo enim potest quod non habet dare”. (On the other 
hand, those persons who transfer a right either to an organized entity or to an individual, 
must be regarded as having sold that right, if they receive anything in exchange for it; or, 
even if they wish for no payment except gratitude, the still may not deny that they first 
considered as their own that which they are now converting into the property of another. 
For no one can give away what he does not possess [transl. Williams & Zeydel]). 
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CHAPTER 7. SYSTEMATIZATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE 
NEMO PLUS RULE
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Ulpian and Gaius before Seneca175. The use of Seneca – even replacing legal 
sources – may be seen as an attempt to show the rational character of the 
argument, and therefore reinforces the general view on the nemo plus in the 17th 
century. Later authors would also make sporadic references to literary sources. 
Schulting points out the use of the argument by Lactantius and in the Council of 
Carthage when discussing D. 50,17,54176, and Johann Philipp Datt (1654-1722) 
quotes Seneca and Lactantius when bringing up the argument in a legal context, 
without quoting – oddly enough – legal texts177. None of these references, 
however, appear to have introduced innovative considerations in the analysis of 
the nemo plus rule, but seem rather inspired by the learned desire to quote literary 
authorities or to reinforce the idea of rationality of the nemo plus rule. This leads 
to the curious conclusion that the nemo plus argument as used in literary sources 
was more influential among jurists in the Middle Ages than during and after the 
16th century. 
 While most authors enthusiastically defended the absolute validity of the nemo 
plus rule, others were more cautious when considering its scope of application, 
granting at least one or two exceptions to it. Cuiacius, for instance, agrees with 
the general validity of the nemo plus rule, but he does consider that the case of the 
pledge creditor is a true exception to the rule178, which follows the very explicit 
declaration of Ulpian in D. 41,1,46. Petrus Faber also accepted as exceptions 
those texts in which Roman jurists acknowledge that the rule is broken, such as 
D. 41,1,46, D. 7,1,63 and D. 41,2,21179. Similar exceptions are found in the 
                                                 
175  Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis (Aalen 1993), lib. 3, cap. 16, 1 (p. 798): “At quae bello iniusto 
quaeruntur restituenda diximus, nec ab iis tantum qui ceperunt, sed et ab aliis ad quos res 
quoquo modo pervenit. Nemo enim plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habuit, 
aiunt iuris Romani auctores, quod Seneca breviter explicat, nemo potest quod non habet dare”. 
(But things taken in an unjust war, I have already said, are to be restored, not only by the 
immediate captors, but by others also, who shall happen to be possessed of them on any 
account. For nobody can make over to another more right than he has himself, say the 
Roman jurists, which Seneca briefly explains: No man can give what he does not have [transl. 
Tuck, modified]). The notes to the text point out as legal sources D. 9,4,27,1 and 
D. 41,1,20pr. 
176  Schulting, Notae ad titulos digestorum de verborum significatione et regulis juris (Leiden 1799), 
p. 154. 
177  Johann Philipp Datt, De venditione liberorum diatriba (Ulm 1700), p. 111. 
178  Cujacius, Ad diversos titulos Pandectarum (Paris 1658), col. 740: “Quod tamen vitiatur 
quandoque: creditor enim distrahendo pignus dominium transfert quod non habet, l. non 
est novum, sup. de adq. rer. dom. [D. 41,1,46] non tantum ex conventione, sed & contra 
conventionem debitor denuntiatio non reluente pignus.” On a later version of his 
commentary Cuiacius still considers this case as exceptional, but introduces the notion of a 
“tacit intent” when nothing was agreed which challenges this notion (col. 864): “Id tamen 
vitiatur nonnumquam. Nam creditor distrahendo pignus dominium transfer pignoris, quod 
non habet, l. non est novum 46. de adquir. rer. dom. [D. 41,1,46] Cuius rei rationem adfert 
Iustinianus, quia distrahit ex voluntate debitoris, atque nihil mirum, si transfertur 
dominium distrahente eo. Sed creditor potest pignus distrahere contra conventionem: 
scilicet debitore admonito non luente pignus. Verum hoc casu videtur distrahere ex tacita 
voluntate debitoris, cum debitor pignus non luat, quando ei denuntiatum est”. 
179  Petrus Faber, Ad Titulum de diversis regulis iuris antiqui (Cologne 1608), p. 253-254. 
 
writings of Hubrecht van Giffen180 (c. 1534-1604). This caution would be 
reflected in the general writings on the transfer of ownership by authors such as 
Vinnius181 and Heineccius182, according to which not every case of traditio by a 
non-owner is considered as performed by the owner himself, as well as on the 
treatment of D. 50,17,54 specifically by authors such as De Ferrière183. Likewise, 
Pothier acknowledges that the alienation by the creditors of the debtor is an 
exception to the general rule, as D. 41,1,46 would illustrate184. 
 Despite the acknowledgement of certain exceptions to the rule by some 
authors, the general approach was dramatically different in the 16th century than 
that which had been upheld by authors like Accursius. An eloquent proof of this 
evolution can be found in the additions made to the gloss of Accursius in the 17th 
century. Indeed, next to the gloss Datio to Inst. 1,5pr, where it is said “and this 
happens often, that one gives what one does not have” (& hoc plerunque contigit, 
quod quis dat quod non habet), the Lyon edition of 1627 includes an addition which 
categorically refutes this idea by noting that jurists jointly disapprove of it, 
quoting moreover D. 41,1,20pr to support the general validity of the rule185. 
 Remarkable exceptions to this general evolution are the commentaries of 
Raevardus and Godefroy186, who were more concerned with locating the rule in 
its original context by resorting to the methods of the humanists than with 
determining which cases were exceptions to the rule and which were not187. 
Godefroy stresses that the rule dealt with the law of succession, and that 
accordingly it had nothing to do with the problem of who could transfer 
                                                 
180  Van Giffen, Tractatus de diversis regulis juris antiqui (Strasbourg 1607), p. 187. 
181  Vinnius, In quatuor libros Institutionum imperialium commentarius academicus et forensis 
(Amsterdam 1665), lib. II, tit. VIII (p. 252), considers that the alienation by a pledge 
creditor, by a tutor and by a curator, are exceptions to the general rule according to which 
only the owner may transfer ownership, but especially the latter two, since they do not 
derive their faculty from the owner, but from the law (alienandi potestas non a domino, sed 
jure tributa est). 
182  Heineccius, Elementa juris civilis secundum ordinem Institutionum (Venice 1764), §§ 467-468 
(p. 165-166) considers as cases where a non-owner may validly transfer ownership the 
pledge creditor and the tutor. 
183  De Ferrière, Ad titulum Digestorum de regulis juris antiqui commentarius (Paris 1686), p. 251. 
The author is respectful of D. 41,1,46 and D. 7,1,63, declaring that the alienation by the 
pledge creditor and the constitution of usufruct by the owner are exceptions to the general 
rule. Similarly, an 18th century doctoral dissertation by Brouwer, Disputatio juridica 
inauguralis de illis, quibus alienare licet, vel non (Utrecht 1724), p. 12 ff., names the transfer of 
ownership by the pledge creditor as the main example of a valid alienation concluded by a 
non-owner, forming an exception to the nemo plus rule (p. 16). 
184  Pothier, Traité du droit du domaine de propriété (Paris/Orléans 1772), nr. 224 (p. 218-219). 
185  Institutionum libri quatuor (Lyon 1627), col. 31 “Hanc reprobant communiter Doctor. hic 
per regulam l. traditio. ff. de acqu. re. dom. [D. 41,1,20pr]” 
186  See Chapter 6, Section 1 above. 
187  Regarding Godefroy’s approach to the regulae iuris see Stein, Regulae iuris (1966), p. 167-
170. 
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rule. Similarly, an 18th century doctoral dissertation by Brouwer, Disputatio juridica 
inauguralis de illis, quibus alienare licet, vel non (Utrecht 1724), p. 12 ff., names the transfer of 
ownership by the pledge creditor as the main example of a valid alienation concluded by a 
non-owner, forming an exception to the nemo plus rule (p. 16). 
184  Pothier, Traité du droit du domaine de propriété (Paris/Orléans 1772), nr. 224 (p. 218-219). 
185  Institutionum libri quatuor (Lyon 1627), col. 31 “Hanc reprobant communiter Doctor. hic 
per regulam l. traditio. ff. de acqu. re. dom. [D. 41,1,20pr]” 
186  See Chapter 6, Section 1 above. 
187  Regarding Godefroy’s approach to the regulae iuris see Stein, Regulae iuris (1966), p. 167-
170. 
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ownership and on what ground188. Being completely ahead of his time and 
outside of the mainstream, such an opinion remained mostly ignored by his 
contemporaries189. Moreover, Godefroy’s interpretation offers the significant 
practical disadvantage of depriving the nemo plus rule of any systematic value, 
leaving no general rule around which the different cases of alienation by a non-
owner could be enumerated and explained. Since D. 50,17,54 had continued to 
fulfil this useful systematic function since the glossators, it must have appeared 
inconvenient to manage without it overnight. This explains why Petrus Faber, 
some years before Godefroy, while considering that the original context of 
D. 50,17,54 was the law of succession190, did not limit the application of the rule 
to this topic. 
 Two points should be noted regarding the general acceptance of exceptions 
to the regulae iuris. Firstly, the peculiar view of each jurist may be explained to a 
certain extent by their own views on the notion of regulae iuris. As Stein has 
shown, from the 16th century onwards some authors, such as Cuiacius, stressed 
the relative value of the regulae, which would only declare a general truth, while 
other authors approached them as general principles of law which the jurist could 
use for dialectic reasoning191. This may explain why authors such as Cuiacius and 
Pothier were more respectful of approaching the case of the pledge creditor as an 
actual exception to the nemo plus rule – just as D. 41,1,46 explicitly declares – 
while others were keen to prove that even in this case the rule suffered no real 
exception. Secondly, it must be observed that the discussion was only relevant 
from a systematic and dogmatic perspective, but no particular consequence was 
directly attached to it. This is why most authors do not go into much detail to 
explain what makes one case an exception to the rule and the other not, while 
others seem to be completely uninterested in the point. 
 In the case of the nemo plus rule, the discussion regarding the existence of 
exceptions to the rule would also be linked to the general authority and nature 
assigned to it. As shown above, up until the 15th century the rule was simply a 
                                                 
188  Godefroy, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Geneva 1653), p. 244: “Haec cum ita sint, liquet una 
ferme litura expungenda esse, quaecunque ad hanc legem Interpretes commentantur. 
Neque enim id quaeritur, An quaelibet res, quae in iure defuncti iam fuit, ad haeredem 
transmitti possit. Rursum non quaeritur, An eodem semper jure, et cum sua causa, res a 
defuncto in haeredem transferatur. Multo minus quaeritur, An res quandoque a non 
domini, officii ratione, vel juris interpretatione, vel tacita expressave domini voluntate in 
alium transferri possit, quamquam neque illud proprie transferre est: Et in genere non 
quaeritur quis et quid alienare possit, verum quid juris TRANSFERRI transmitti ad alium 
possit. Quare apagesis mihi iam novem fallentias, quae ab Accursio ad hanc regulam 
cumulantur: quae ad hanc regulam seu ejus speciem minime pertinent”. 
189  The opinions of Godefroy are reproduced by other authors sharing the same approach to 
Roman sources, such as Schulting, Notae ad titulos digestorum de verborum significatione et 
regulis juris (Leiden 1799), p. 153-154. 
190  Petrus Faber, Ad Titulum de diversis regulis iuris antiqui (Cologne 1608), p. 249: “Pertinet 
vero proprie ad intestatorum successiones, de quibus loquebatur Ulpianus lib. 46. ad 
edictum, quod ab interpretibus animadversum non fuisse miror”. 
191  Stein, Regulae iuris (1966), p. 162-170. 
 
useful starting point around which numerous exceptions could be grouped. After 
Decius, the nemo plus rule would normally be presented in a much more 
authoritative way, even as a self-evident principle, especially by those authors 
who did not admit exceptions to it. Ferrarius, for example, would paraphrase 
Plautus and declare that drawing more rights than those someone has is like 
asking for water from a pumice-stone192. Petrus Faber declares that this rule 
resides in the ‘natural intellect’193. Donellus would declare that the nemo plus rule 
stems directly from the ratio naturalis194, and he would be consistent with this high 
opinion by discarding every possible exception to the rule. The same applies to 
Bronchorst, who declares the rule to be founded upon natural equity195, while 
Wissenbach considers it to be logical196. Even when some later authors would 
admit the possibility of exceptions, the idea of the nemo plus rule as essentially 
rational, self-evident and equitable would become a commonplace, as may be 
seen in the writings of Güntzel197, Heineccius198 and Pothier199. Moreover, the 
numerous texts reproducing the nemo plus argument within Roman sources 
would often be seen as a confirmation of the universal validity and rationality of 
the rule contained in D. 50,17,54200. Accordingly, the nemo plus rule appeared as 
                                                 
192  Ferrarius, De regulis iuris (Marburg 1536), p. 302: “Recte itaque quod cuius est, sine eius 
facto ad alium non debet transferri. Unde hoc saltem iuris ad alium traduxeris, quod ipse 
habes, ut citius e pumice aquam exegerit quis (ut cum Plauto loquar) quam ex te plus 
iuris”. The paraphrased text corresponds to Plautus, Persa 41-42; Aulularia 297. 
193  Petrus Faber, Ad Titulum de diversis regulis iuris antiqui (Cologne 1608), p. 249: “Naturalem 
intellectum habet haec regula...” 
194  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 5 (I, col. 732): 
“Principio, si hic ex aliena persona res non geritur, eum, qui dat, dominum esse oportet. Si 
non est: ex sua persona dominium non transferet, qui ipse non habuit. Ut enim bene 
regula juris in universum traditur, et ratio ipsa naturalis dictat, nemo plus juris in alium 
transferre potest, quam ipse habet, L. nemo plus juris, D. de regul.jur. [D. 50,17,54]”. 
195  Bronchorst, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Leiden 1624), p. 135: “Quotidiana et usitata haec est 
regula, et ex naturali aequitate suam trahit originem. Natura enim non patitur, ut quis plus 
dare aut transferre possit, quam ipse habeat”. 
196  Wissenbach, In extremum Pandectarum titulum de Diversis Regulis Juris antiqui (Franeker 1661), 
p. 97: “Axioma est Logicorum”. 
197  Güntzel, De regulis juris (Leipzig 1657), p. 165: “Haec regula trahit originem suam ex 
naturali aequitate, siquidem natura non patitur, ut quis plus dare vel transferre possit, quam 
ipse habeat”. 
198  Heineccius, Recitaciones in elementa juris civilis (Bratislava 1773), §§ 378-384 (p. 242) 
expresses that the tradens must be owner in eloquent terms, qualifying as an axiom: 
“Axioma est, tradi res debet a domino. Quum enim, quod quis non habet, alteri dare nequeat: 
quomodo, quaeso, aliquis transferat traditione dominium, quod ipse non habet?” 
199  Pothier, Traité du droit du domaine de propriété (Paris/Orléans 1772), nr. 219 (p. 213): “C’est 
un principe pris dans la nature des choses, que personne ne peut transférer à un autre plus 
de droit dans une chose qu’il n’y en a lui-même: Nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest 
quam ipse haberet. L. 54, ff. de reg. Jur. [D. 50,17,54]” 
200  See e.g. Philippus Matthaeus, De diversis regulis juris antiqui (Marburg 1607), p. 289; 
Bronchorst, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Leiden 1624), p. 135; Peckius the Elder, Ad regulas 
iuris canonici commentaria (Helmstedt 1588), 365v; Güntzel, De regulis juris (Leipzig 1657), 
p. 166-167. Petrus Faber, Ad Titulum de diversis regulis iuris antiqui (Cologne 1608), p. 249: 
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shown, from the 16th century onwards some authors, such as Cuiacius, stressed 
the relative value of the regulae, which would only declare a general truth, while 
other authors approached them as general principles of law which the jurist could 
use for dialectic reasoning191. This may explain why authors such as Cuiacius and 
Pothier were more respectful of approaching the case of the pledge creditor as an 
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while others were keen to prove that even in this case the rule suffered no real 
exception. Secondly, it must be observed that the discussion was only relevant 
from a systematic and dogmatic perspective, but no particular consequence was 
directly attached to it. This is why most authors do not go into much detail to 
explain what makes one case an exception to the rule and the other not, while 
others seem to be completely uninterested in the point. 
 In the case of the nemo plus rule, the discussion regarding the existence of 
exceptions to the rule would also be linked to the general authority and nature 
assigned to it. As shown above, up until the 15th century the rule was simply a 
                                                 
188  Godefroy, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Geneva 1653), p. 244: “Haec cum ita sint, liquet una 
ferme litura expungenda esse, quaecunque ad hanc legem Interpretes commentantur. 
Neque enim id quaeritur, An quaelibet res, quae in iure defuncti iam fuit, ad haeredem 
transmitti possit. Rursum non quaeritur, An eodem semper jure, et cum sua causa, res a 
defuncto in haeredem transferatur. Multo minus quaeritur, An res quandoque a non 
domini, officii ratione, vel juris interpretatione, vel tacita expressave domini voluntate in 
alium transferri possit, quamquam neque illud proprie transferre est: Et in genere non 
quaeritur quis et quid alienare possit, verum quid juris TRANSFERRI transmitti ad alium 
possit. Quare apagesis mihi iam novem fallentias, quae ab Accursio ad hanc regulam 
cumulantur: quae ad hanc regulam seu ejus speciem minime pertinent”. 
189  The opinions of Godefroy are reproduced by other authors sharing the same approach to 
Roman sources, such as Schulting, Notae ad titulos digestorum de verborum significatione et 
regulis juris (Leiden 1799), p. 153-154. 
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useful starting point around which numerous exceptions could be grouped. After 
Decius, the nemo plus rule would normally be presented in a much more 
authoritative way, even as a self-evident principle, especially by those authors 
who did not admit exceptions to it. Ferrarius, for example, would paraphrase 
Plautus and declare that drawing more rights than those someone has is like 
asking for water from a pumice-stone192. Petrus Faber declares that this rule 
resides in the ‘natural intellect’193. Donellus would declare that the nemo plus rule 
stems directly from the ratio naturalis194, and he would be consistent with this high 
opinion by discarding every possible exception to the rule. The same applies to 
Bronchorst, who declares the rule to be founded upon natural equity195, while 
Wissenbach considers it to be logical196. Even when some later authors would 
admit the possibility of exceptions, the idea of the nemo plus rule as essentially 
rational, self-evident and equitable would become a commonplace, as may be 
seen in the writings of Güntzel197, Heineccius198 and Pothier199. Moreover, the 
numerous texts reproducing the nemo plus argument within Roman sources 
would often be seen as a confirmation of the universal validity and rationality of 
the rule contained in D. 50,17,54200. Accordingly, the nemo plus rule appeared as 
                                                 
192  Ferrarius, De regulis iuris (Marburg 1536), p. 302: “Recte itaque quod cuius est, sine eius 
facto ad alium non debet transferri. Unde hoc saltem iuris ad alium traduxeris, quod ipse 
habes, ut citius e pumice aquam exegerit quis (ut cum Plauto loquar) quam ex te plus 
iuris”. The paraphrased text corresponds to Plautus, Persa 41-42; Aulularia 297. 
193  Petrus Faber, Ad Titulum de diversis regulis iuris antiqui (Cologne 1608), p. 249: “Naturalem 
intellectum habet haec regula...” 
194  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 5 (I, col. 732): 
“Principio, si hic ex aliena persona res non geritur, eum, qui dat, dominum esse oportet. Si 
non est: ex sua persona dominium non transferet, qui ipse non habuit. Ut enim bene 
regula juris in universum traditur, et ratio ipsa naturalis dictat, nemo plus juris in alium 
transferre potest, quam ipse habet, L. nemo plus juris, D. de regul.jur. [D. 50,17,54]”. 
195  Bronchorst, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Leiden 1624), p. 135: “Quotidiana et usitata haec est 
regula, et ex naturali aequitate suam trahit originem. Natura enim non patitur, ut quis plus 
dare aut transferre possit, quam ipse habeat”. 
196  Wissenbach, In extremum Pandectarum titulum de Diversis Regulis Juris antiqui (Franeker 1661), 
p. 97: “Axioma est Logicorum”. 
197  Güntzel, De regulis juris (Leipzig 1657), p. 165: “Haec regula trahit originem suam ex 
naturali aequitate, siquidem natura non patitur, ut quis plus dare vel transferre possit, quam 
ipse habeat”. 
198  Heineccius, Recitaciones in elementa juris civilis (Bratislava 1773), §§ 378-384 (p. 242) 
expresses that the tradens must be owner in eloquent terms, qualifying as an axiom: 
“Axioma est, tradi res debet a domino. Quum enim, quod quis non habet, alteri dare nequeat: 
quomodo, quaeso, aliquis transferat traditione dominium, quod ipse non habet?” 
199  Pothier, Traité du droit du domaine de propriété (Paris/Orléans 1772), nr. 219 (p. 213): “C’est 
un principe pris dans la nature des choses, que personne ne peut transférer à un autre plus 
de droit dans une chose qu’il n’y en a lui-même: Nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest 
quam ipse haberet. L. 54, ff. de reg. Jur. [D. 50,17,54]” 
200  See e.g. Philippus Matthaeus, De diversis regulis juris antiqui (Marburg 1607), p. 289; 
Bronchorst, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Leiden 1624), p. 135; Peckius the Elder, Ad regulas 
iuris canonici commentaria (Helmstedt 1588), 365v; Güntzel, De regulis juris (Leipzig 1657), 
p. 166-167. Petrus Faber, Ad Titulum de diversis regulis iuris antiqui (Cologne 1608), p. 249: 
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the fundamental starting point to obtain a coherent legal outcome within the law 
of property201.  
 The idea of the intrinsic rationality and validity of the rule would resist the 
test of time and even be emphasised by later authors. Already in the 19th century 
García Goyena would still declare that “these rules [D. 50,17,54, and Siete 
Partidas 7,34,12] are so clear, so simple and of such evident equity, that any 
commentary about them would be superfluous”202. At this point it becomes clear 
why many Roman law scholars since the 19th century approached the nemo plus 
rule as absolutely valid from the start203. This interpretation is not derived directly 
from the sources of Roman law, being rather projected on them as a 
consequence of the long evolution which the rule had to undergo under the ius 
commune. The survival of an idea of infallibility among modern Roman law 
scholars shows to what extent they were influenced by the learned tradition 
developed around the rule. Interestingly enough, modern scholars became more 
concerned with proving the post-classical character of the rule than with revising 
the views that earlier jurists had built around Roman texts. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that the absolute validity granted to the nemo plus 
rule since the 16th century led jurists to apply it in an authoritative way in the 
most varied contexts, and not only within the law of property. Already before 
this time jurists had often applied this rule to various problems, as happened 
when discussing the nature of the manumission204. From the 16th century, the 
nemo plus is viewed more as an infallible truth than as a starting point for legal 
reasoning, and therefore it is applied in the most varied contexts as a decisive 
argument. Already the wide formula of Sextus, De reg. jur. 79 gave way for a 
wider application of the argument, and we find Adriaan Florensz – who would 
later become Pope Adrian VI – at the beginning of the 16th century applying the 
nemo plus rule to determine the faculties of judges205. Later in the 16th century we 
find Donellus making abundant use of the nemo plus rule in the most diverse 
                                                                                                                   
“…cuius vis etiam per totum fere ius civile fusa est”; Kaulfuss & Hommel, Dissertationem de 
eo, quod ipse non habens alteri dare potest (Leipzig 1712), p. 7 and 10. 
201  See e.g. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (Paris 1829), ad D. 19,4,2. 
202  García Goyena, Reglas del derecho romano (1841), p. 75: “Estas reglas son tan claras, tan 
sencillas y de tan notoria equidad, que todo comentario sobre ellas sería superfluo”. 
203  See Chapter 6, Section 1 above. 
204  See also D. 26,2,6,5, commented by Jason de Mayno, In primam Infortiati partem commentaria 
(Lyon 1581), f. 58r, where the nemo plus argument is applied to the acquisition of an 
inheritance, as well as C. 6,57,5, commented by Baldus de Ubaldis, In sextum Codicis librum 
Commentaria (Venice 1577), f. 193ra, where it is applied to discuss the condition of the 
illegitimate children of illustrious women. 
205  Adrian VI, Questiones quotlibetice (Leuven 1515), quaestio 6 articulus 3 (h) (f. 57): “Ex 
hominibus vero non potest ad hoc auctoritatem habere quum non possunt homines plus 
iuris transferre quam eis competere dinoscatur iuxta regulam nemo plus. de re. iu. li. sex. 
[Sextus, De reg. jur. 79]”. This text is studied by Chorus, Het geweten van de strafrechter 
(2014), p. 52, whom I thank for his kind indication regarding the use of the nemo plus rule 
by Adrian VI. 
 
contexts, such as the faculties of the princeps206, manumission207, the acceptance of 
an inheritance208, the cession of rights209, the faculties of the judge210, to name just 
a few. Such a broad use agrees with Donellus’ view on the rule as dictated by the 
ratio naturalis, which naturally grants it a broader scope of application than that of 
a mere general rule. Grotius would later make use of the nemo plus argument 
within his De iure praedae211 and in De iure belli ac pacis212, dealing in both cases 
with the ownership of the prize of war. Since the idea according to which the 
nemo plus rule reproduced a basic rational truth continued to gain ground in the 
centuries to come, the application of the rule in the form of a principle would 
become common in legal scholarship213, an evolution which is still to be seen 
nowadays, as will be shown below. 
 
6. Nemo dat quod non habet in the Common law 
 
While in continental Europe the nemo plus argument was normally approached 
with regard to the regulae iuris of the Digest and the Liber Sextus, in Common 
law jurisdictions we often find this argument conveyed in an alternative way 
through the formula ‘nemo dat quod non habet’. Scholars often regard this rule – 
which we could name here the ‘nemo dat rule’ – to exist from time immemorial, 
which immediately poses the question concerning whether jurists in this legal 
system experienced a different interplay between legal and literary sources, 
particularly since the formula ‘nemo dat quod non habet’ bears a close resemblance 
to some of the formulations of the argument among dialecticians. Would this 
alternative formula imply that literary sources had a different impact in the 
Common law than in the Civil law? Which authority should be identified 
behind this rule? Despite the relevance of this point, little information is to be 
found concerning the origins and evolution of the nemo dat rule. Since the issue 
may throw some light on the dialogue between legal and literary sources, as well 
as on the fate of the nemo plus argument in legal writings, this small section is 
                                                 
206  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 1, cap. 15, § 12 (I, col. 126). 
207  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 2, cap. 13, § 2 (I, col. 262). 
208  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 6, cap. 24, § 25 (II, col. 259). 
209  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 8, cap. 19, § 32 (II, col. 882). This 
text insists moreover on the intrinsic rationality of the solution which agrees with this rule: 
“Quomodo igitur cedant creditores eas actiones, quas non habent? Id quidem neque 
natura, neque juris ratio, et regula concedit. L. nemo plus. D. de reg. jur. [D. 50,17,54]” 
210  Donellus, Commentarii in selectos quosdam titulos Digestorum (Macerata 1833), ad D. 42,1,13,1 
and D. 45,1,72pr (II, col. 214 and 1239). 
211  Grotius, De iure praedae (ed. Hamaker 1868), cap. 15 (p. 340).  
212  Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis (Aalen 1993), lib. 3, cap. 16, 1 (p. 798). 
213  See other applications of the nemo plus argument outside its usual context in: Peckius the 
Elder, Ad regulas iuris canonici commentaria (Helmstedt 1588), f. 366r; Güntzel, De regulis juris 
(Leipzig 1657), p. 166; Kaulfuss & Hommel, Dissertationem de eo, quod ipse non habens alteri 
dare potest (Leipzig 1712), p. 11-13. 
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contexts, such as the faculties of the princeps206, manumission207, the acceptance of 
an inheritance208, the cession of rights209, the faculties of the judge210, to name just 
a few. Such a broad use agrees with Donellus’ view on the rule as dictated by the 
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6. Nemo dat quod non habet in the Common law 
 
While in continental Europe the nemo plus argument was normally approached 
with regard to the regulae iuris of the Digest and the Liber Sextus, in Common 
law jurisdictions we often find this argument conveyed in an alternative way 
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206  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 1, cap. 15, § 12 (I, col. 126). 
207  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 2, cap. 13, § 2 (I, col. 262). 
208  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 6, cap. 24, § 25 (II, col. 259). 
209  Donellus, Commentarius de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 8, cap. 19, § 32 (II, col. 882). This 
text insists moreover on the intrinsic rationality of the solution which agrees with this rule: 
“Quomodo igitur cedant creditores eas actiones, quas non habent? Id quidem neque 
natura, neque juris ratio, et regula concedit. L. nemo plus. D. de reg. jur. [D. 50,17,54]” 
210  Donellus, Commentarii in selectos quosdam titulos Digestorum (Macerata 1833), ad D. 42,1,13,1 
and D. 45,1,72pr (II, col. 214 and 1239). 
211  Grotius, De iure praedae (ed. Hamaker 1868), cap. 15 (p. 340).  
212  Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis (Aalen 1993), lib. 3, cap. 16, 1 (p. 798). 
213  See other applications of the nemo plus argument outside its usual context in: Peckius the 
Elder, Ad regulas iuris canonici commentaria (Helmstedt 1588), f. 366r; Güntzel, De regulis juris 
(Leipzig 1657), p. 166; Kaulfuss & Hommel, Dissertationem de eo, quod ipse non habens alteri 
dare potest (Leipzig 1712), p. 11-13. 
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dedicated to tackling the subject, despite the fact that the current work does not 
generally deal with the Common law. 
 The development of the nemo dat rule in the Common law offers completely 
different features to those of the nemo plus rule of the Civil law. Jurists in 
continental Europe would traditionally have a reference point in D. 50,17,54, a 
general rule around which different constructions were made. As shown above, 
already in the time of the glossators the rule fulfiled a significant systematic role, 
being a starting point for legal reasoning around which exceptional cases were 
organized. The Digest, however, did not occupy the same position of privilege in 
the Common law, and Ulpian’s nemo plus rule did not become a reference point 
for legal systematization. Accordingly, one can only find sporadic references to 
the nemo plus argument in English legal sources. In the course of this research the 
oldest references which have been identified on the subject correspond to the 
works of Bracton, who makes use of the argument in several contexts, including 
the manumission214, the gift of a felon215, the gift over someone else’s property216, 
the gift made to a bondsman217, the gift made by a bondsman under the potestas 
of his lord218, the traditio219 and particular exceptiones220. Other texts in Bracton do 
                                                 
214  Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (ed. Woodbine 1922) II, p. 28: “Sed dic vere 
quod libertatem dat qui manumittit, licet non suam sed alienam. Dat enim quod non 
habet, sicut videtur in creditore, qui usum fructum constituit in re non sua” (But say that 
he who manumits does properly give liberty, though he does not give his own but 
another’s, for one may give what he does not have, as is apparent in the case of a creditor, 
who [may alienate a pledge though the thing is not his, and in that of one who] constitutes 
a usufruct in his property [transl. Thorne]). For the addition to the text see Kantorowicz, 
Bractonian problems (1941), p. 85-86. 
215  Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (ed. Woodbine 1922) II, p. 100: “Nec 
succedit dominus capitalis ratione eschaetae nisi in universum ius quo dille habuit cui 
succedit, et unde cum ille qui dimisit non posset firmarium de iure eicere si feloniam non 
commisisset, pari ratione nec ille qui plus iuris non habet quam ille qui dimisit”. 
216  Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (ed. Woodbine 1922) II, p. 103: “Sed quid 
dicetur de eo qui nullam omnino seisinam habuit nec aliquam iuris scintillam? Si 
donationem fecerit de re quam alius tenet per se ipsum vel per alium nomine suo, non 
faciet rem accipientis cum ipse nihil teneat, quia non potest plus iuris ad alium transferre 
quam ipse haberet: nec plus valebit ista donatio quam valeret si aliquis transitum faciens per 
aliquod manerium, ab aliquo possessum, diceret socio suo viatori, Do tibi tale manerium quod 
talis possidet, quod nihil aliud esset dicere quam dare ei plenam pugnatam ex nihilo”. 
217  Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (ed. Woodbine 1922) II, p. 86: “Item esto 
quod servo facta sit donatio a domino, ut praedictum est, pro homagio et servitio et cum 
manumissione vel sine, vel per id quod tantundem valet ut praedictum est, et ille idem 
dominus alii dederit homagia et servitia eorum: quaero an talis illos eicere et disseisire 
possit cum non sit ibi factum suum nec feoffamentum. Et vero est quod non potest, non 
magis quam ille qui donationem fecit, quia cum loco eius succedat, non potest plus iuris 
clamare quam ille posset cui succedit…” 
218  Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (ed. Woodbine 1922) II, p. 88: “De servitio 
autem restat quaerendum, et sic constat quod qui sub potestate alterius fuerit dare poterit. 
Sed qualiter hoc, cum ipse qui ab aliis possidetur nihil possidere possit? Ergo videtur quod 
nihil dare possit, quia non potest quis dare quod non habet, et nisi fuerit in possessione rei 
dandae. Respondeo, dare potest qui seisinam habuerit qualemcumque, et servus dare 
 
not convey the argument itself, but use a language which shows that the author 
had the nemo plus in mind221. Some of these references have a close connection 
with Roman legal sources, and particularly the text dealing with the gift of 
someone else’s property, which almost literally reproduces the nemo plus rule of 
D. 50,17,54 (quia non potest plus iuris ad alium transferre quam ipse haberet). The text 
dealing with traditio as well bears great resemblance to that of D. 41,1,20pr. 
Other texts make a freer use of the nemo plus argument, but it can still be traced 
back to continental law. The link is particularly clear in the text which describes 
the manumission, where the formula used to convey the argument (Dat enim, 
quod non habet) is identical to that of Azo222, and Bracton even uses the same 
examples when dealing with this matter: the pledge of the creditor and the 
usufruct given by the owner. Bracton therefore does not stick to one specific 
formula when quoting the nemo plus argument, and does not bother to quote the 
Roman texts from which some of its versions are taken. This would in turn lead 
to a disconnection between the argument and its original source (D. 50,17,54) 
among English jurists, which disguises the fact that continental law had a key role 
in the reception of the nemo plus argument in the Common law. 
 The significant role of Bracton in the development of the Common law 
inevitably led to the reproduction of the nemo plus argument in later works. 
Already the 13th century Fleta seu commentarius juris Anglicani applies the argument 
in the chapter De Traditionibus et Usucapionibus223, which closely follows the work 
of Bracton. At around the same time we find the argument in the Britton – a text 
also strongly influenced by Bracton – when dealing with gifts and deliveries224. 
The nemo plus argument, however, did not immediately find its place within the 
                                                                                                                   
potest, et quandoque irritari poterit donatio et quandoque non, secundum rationem 
praemissam”. 
219 Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (ed. Woodbine 1922) II, p. 126-127: “Item 
videndum quid transferat qui tradit. Et sciendum quod transfert ad eum qui accipit quod 
est apud eum qui tradit… et totum tradendo statim totum transfert ad donatarium. Si 
autem totum non habuerit, statim transfert id quod habet. … Si autem omnino nihil 
habuerit qui tradit nec aliquam seisinam, ad eum qui accipit nihil transfert, quia dare et 
transferre non potest nec tradere id quod non habet”.  
220  Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (ed. Woodbine 1942) IV, p. 341: “Cum 
autem tenens visum habuerit vel quod tantundem valet, scire poterit utrum petenti 
respondere teneatur et ad breve suum vel non teneatur, secundum quod tenuerit totam 
rem nomine proprio vel alieno, vel nihil inde tenuerit vel non nisi eius partem, quia si 
totam non tenuerit amittere non potest quod non habet...” 
221  E.g. Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (ed. Woodbine 1940) III, p. 30: “Qui 
licet ius non habeat, tamen eo quod in possessione est, plus iuris haber propter seisinam 
quam ille qui est extra possessionem, qui nihil iuris habet, et eo maxime quia si ille qui ius 
habet numquam petat, sic poterit terra semper remanere cum disseisitore vel intrusore”. 
222  Azo, Summa Institutionum (Venice 1566), col. 1050, quoted above. 
223  Fleta seu commentarius juris Anglicani (ed. Seldon 1685), p. 201 (lib. 3, cap. 15, § 8): “Nemo 
enim dare potest quod non habet…” 
224  Britton (ed. Nichols 1865) I, p. 268 (lib. 2, cap. 9, § 14): “… et serroit la resoun 
alouwable, pur ceo qe nul ne poit doner ceo qe il ne ad nient…” (And this reason would 
be allowable, inasmuch as no one can give that which he hath not… [transl. Nichols]). 
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transferre non potest nec tradere id quod non habet”.  
220  Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (ed. Woodbine 1942) IV, p. 341: “Cum 
autem tenens visum habuerit vel quod tantundem valet, scire poterit utrum petenti 
respondere teneatur et ad breve suum vel non teneatur, secundum quod tenuerit totam 
rem nomine proprio vel alieno, vel nihil inde tenuerit vel non nisi eius partem, quia si 
totam non tenuerit amittere non potest quod non habet...” 
221  E.g. Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (ed. Woodbine 1940) III, p. 30: “Qui 
licet ius non habeat, tamen eo quod in possessione est, plus iuris haber propter seisinam 
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223  Fleta seu commentarius juris Anglicani (ed. Seldon 1685), p. 201 (lib. 3, cap. 15, § 8): “Nemo 
enim dare potest quod non habet…” 
224  Britton (ed. Nichols 1865) I, p. 268 (lib. 2, cap. 9, § 14): “… et serroit la resoun 
alouwable, pur ceo qe nul ne poit doner ceo qe il ne ad nient…” (And this reason would 
be allowable, inasmuch as no one can give that which he hath not… [transl. Nichols]). 
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Common law, and only isolated references to it can be found in the following 
centuries. For example, John Wycliffe225 (c. 1331-1384) makes use of it within a 
legal context, and David Jenkins, writing in the 17th century, reports an old case 
in which the argument is applied226. The argument, however, is absent from the 
great works on legal maxims developed since the 16th century in England, such as 
Bacon’s ‘Maxims of Equity’. The argument played therefore only a discreet role 
in juristic writings. In the 17th century the nemo plus rule is applied in certain 
cases, but its use appears to be incidental, without relying on a particular doctrine 
around it227. The nemo plus rule of the Digest had in any case a wider circulation 
than the nemo dat rule, which is only recorded by Branch in 1753, who quotes 
Jenkins, using however a rather different wording228. 
 The nemo plus argument in general only acquired a systematic value after the 
18th century, when it became progressively accepted across Europe that in some 
cases a transferee may acquire ownership over an asset obtained from an 
unauthorized non-owner. In England it was accepted that the transferee would 
become owner as long as he was in good faith and in an open market, and 
therefore Blackstone, when discussing the transfer of ownership by sale, presents 
the basic distinction on the topic: “… [I] shall consider their force and effect [of 
the contracts of sale and barter], in the first place where the vendor hath in 
himself, and secondly where he hath not, the property of the thing sold”229. This 
and other cases in which ownership was acquired from a non-owner appeared to 
be exceptional, and a general rule in the form of a maxim was lacking at the 
beginning of the 19th century in England. The delimitation of a general rule and 
its exceptions would become all the more urgent after the Factors Acts of 1823 
and 1825 introduced the first statutory regulations according to which ownership 
could be transferred by a non-owner in particular cases230. Already in 1832 the 
nemo plus argument was rendered in vernacular by Lord Justice Bosanquet, in a 
case regarding the acquisition of chattels from a bailee in which it was declared 
that the latter could not confer a better title than that which he had231. Some of 
                                                 
225  Wycliffe, De dominio civile (London 1885), p. 27: “Iterum, nemo dat quod non habet, sed 
nec testes nec iudices civiles habent ius civilitatis ad bonum quod iudicant, ergo non dant 
ius illi pro quo iudicant… creatura non potest quidquam dare alteri nisi ipsum prius 
habuerit”.  
226  Jenkins, Eight centuries of law reports (London 1885), p. 268 (sixth century, case 41, p. 250): 
“Jus alienum vendit, dat quod non habet”. 
227  For example, the rule is mentioned by Gentleman of the Middle Temple, The Grounds and 
Rudiments of Law and Equity (1751), p. 223-224, where a handful of applications are 
recorded, giving the impression of a rather free and unsystematic application of the 
argument. 
228  E.g. Branch, Principia Legis et Aequitatis (1753 [1824]), p. 89: “Nemo dat qui non habet. 
Jenk. Cent. 250. – No one gives who possesses not”. 
229  Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford 1775), book 2, ch. 3, p. 447. 
230  See on this subject Thomas, Factors Acts (2011), p. 151-187. 
231  Shelley v Ford (1832) 5 Car. & P. 313; 172 ER 991: “[The bailee] had only a limited 
interest in it; he, therefore, when he sold it, could give the defendant no better title that he 
 
the first attempts to enunciate a general rule in Latin borrowed the nemo plus rule 
from the Civil law232, but eventually the more ‘autochthonous’ nemo dat rule 
prevailed in juristic writings and legal decisions233. By the end of the century the 
rule was completely consolidated, being laid down in the Sale of Goods Act 
1893234, and appearing in the first edition of Black’s Law Dictionary in the Latin 
formula “nemo dare potest quod non habet”, which was presented as stemming from 
the Fleta or from the Centuries of Jenkins235. 
 This evolution shows that the nemo dat rule only acquired a significant place 
within the Common law when it was awarded a systematic value as a starting 
point around which various exceptions could be grouped. The nemo dat rule has 
in fact almost no substantive value in itself in the Common law, being barely 
commented upon and often presented as self-evident, while the main focus is laid 
on the exceptions it experiences. Accordingly, no attempt has been made to free 
the rule from its exceptions, since these make the rule meaningful. The rule has 
been laid down in the statutory provisions of several Common law countries 
which are in force even nowadays236, and where it still fulfils this significant 
systematic function, being moreover an intensely commented dogmatic topic237.  
 The evolution described here shows that the reception of the nemo plus 
argument within the Common law was directly affected by Continental legal 
scholarship, and mainly through the influence that Azo had on Bracton. Since 
this initial contact, however, there have not been significant influences between 
Common law and Civil law jurisdictions regarding the significance granted to 
                                                                                                                   
had got himself”. See on this decision Zwalve, On attornment and assignment (2014), p. 813-
814. 
232  E.g. Kent, Commentaries on American Law (1848) II, § 324: “… the general principle 
applicable to the law of personal property throughout civilized Europe is, that nemo plus 
juris in alium transferre potest quam ipse habet. This is a maxim of the common and of the civil 
law…”. In England, Broom, A selection of legal maxims (1852), p. 303-305 (§§ 352-354) 
only presents the rule non dat qui non habet in his third edition, alongside the nemo plus rule 
and rather eclipsed by the latter.  
233  Among the legal decisions, particularly clear is Whistler v. Forster (1863) 14 CB (NS) 248, 
257; 143 ER 441, 445 (Willes J): “The general rule of law is undoubted, that no one can 
transfer a better title than he himself possesses: Nemo dat quod non habet”. 
234  Sale of Goods Act 1893 section 21(1): “Subject to the provisions of this Act, where goods 
are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the 
authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods 
than the seller had…” 
235  Black, A law dictionary (1891), p. 809: “Nemo dare potest quod non habet. No man can 
give that which he has not. Fleta, lib. 3, C. 15, § 8; Nemo dat qui non habet. He who 
hath not cannot give. Jenk. Cent. 250; Broom, Max. 499n; 6 C. B. (N.S.) 478”. 
236  E.g. in England, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 section 21(1): “Subject to this Act, where 
goods are sold by a person who is not their owner, and who does not sell them under the 
authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods 
than the seller had...” In the United States the UCC § 2-403(1): “A purchaser of goods 
acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser 
of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased”. 
237  For a comparative approach to this subject see the recent dissertation of Thomas, Rule 
nemo dat (2009), as well as Zwalve, Hoofdstukken Privaatrecht (2006), p. 359 ff. 
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than the nemo dat rule, which is only recorded by Branch in 1753, who quotes 
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 The nemo plus argument in general only acquired a systematic value after the 
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case regarding the acquisition of chattels from a bailee in which it was declared 
that the latter could not confer a better title than that which he had231. Some of 
                                                 
225  Wycliffe, De dominio civile (London 1885), p. 27: “Iterum, nemo dat quod non habet, sed 
nec testes nec iudices civiles habent ius civilitatis ad bonum quod iudicant, ergo non dant 
ius illi pro quo iudicant… creatura non potest quidquam dare alteri nisi ipsum prius 
habuerit”.  
226  Jenkins, Eight centuries of law reports (London 1885), p. 268 (sixth century, case 41, p. 250): 
“Jus alienum vendit, dat quod non habet”. 
227  For example, the rule is mentioned by Gentleman of the Middle Temple, The Grounds and 
Rudiments of Law and Equity (1751), p. 223-224, where a handful of applications are 
recorded, giving the impression of a rather free and unsystematic application of the 
argument. 
228  E.g. Branch, Principia Legis et Aequitatis (1753 [1824]), p. 89: “Nemo dat qui non habet. 
Jenk. Cent. 250. – No one gives who possesses not”. 
229  Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford 1775), book 2, ch. 3, p. 447. 
230  See on this subject Thomas, Factors Acts (2011), p. 151-187. 
231  Shelley v Ford (1832) 5 Car. & P. 313; 172 ER 991: “[The bailee] had only a limited 
interest in it; he, therefore, when he sold it, could give the defendant no better title that he 
 
the first attempts to enunciate a general rule in Latin borrowed the nemo plus rule 
from the Civil law232, but eventually the more ‘autochthonous’ nemo dat rule 
prevailed in juristic writings and legal decisions233. By the end of the century the 
rule was completely consolidated, being laid down in the Sale of Goods Act 
1893234, and appearing in the first edition of Black’s Law Dictionary in the Latin 
formula “nemo dare potest quod non habet”, which was presented as stemming from 
the Fleta or from the Centuries of Jenkins235. 
 This evolution shows that the nemo dat rule only acquired a significant place 
within the Common law when it was awarded a systematic value as a starting 
point around which various exceptions could be grouped. The nemo dat rule has 
in fact almost no substantive value in itself in the Common law, being barely 
commented upon and often presented as self-evident, while the main focus is laid 
on the exceptions it experiences. Accordingly, no attempt has been made to free 
the rule from its exceptions, since these make the rule meaningful. The rule has 
been laid down in the statutory provisions of several Common law countries 
which are in force even nowadays236, and where it still fulfils this significant 
systematic function, being moreover an intensely commented dogmatic topic237.  
 The evolution described here shows that the reception of the nemo plus 
argument within the Common law was directly affected by Continental legal 
scholarship, and mainly through the influence that Azo had on Bracton. Since 
this initial contact, however, there have not been significant influences between 
Common law and Civil law jurisdictions regarding the significance granted to 
                                                                                                                   
had got himself”. See on this decision Zwalve, On attornment and assignment (2014), p. 813-
814. 
232  E.g. Kent, Commentaries on American Law (1848) II, § 324: “… the general principle 
applicable to the law of personal property throughout civilized Europe is, that nemo plus 
juris in alium transferre potest quam ipse habet. This is a maxim of the common and of the civil 
law…”. In England, Broom, A selection of legal maxims (1852), p. 303-305 (§§ 352-354) 
only presents the rule non dat qui non habet in his third edition, alongside the nemo plus rule 
and rather eclipsed by the latter.  
233  Among the legal decisions, particularly clear is Whistler v. Forster (1863) 14 CB (NS) 248, 
257; 143 ER 441, 445 (Willes J): “The general rule of law is undoubted, that no one can 
transfer a better title than he himself possesses: Nemo dat quod non habet”. 
234  Sale of Goods Act 1893 section 21(1): “Subject to the provisions of this Act, where goods 
are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the 
authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods 
than the seller had…” 
235  Black, A law dictionary (1891), p. 809: “Nemo dare potest quod non habet. No man can 
give that which he has not. Fleta, lib. 3, C. 15, § 8; Nemo dat qui non habet. He who 
hath not cannot give. Jenk. Cent. 250; Broom, Max. 499n; 6 C. B. (N.S.) 478”. 
236  E.g. in England, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 section 21(1): “Subject to this Act, where 
goods are sold by a person who is not their owner, and who does not sell them under the 
authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods 
than the seller had...” In the United States the UCC § 2-403(1): “A purchaser of goods 
acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser 
of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased”. 
237  For a comparative approach to this subject see the recent dissertation of Thomas, Rule 
nemo dat (2009), as well as Zwalve, Hoofdstukken Privaatrecht (2006), p. 359 ff. 
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this argument, beside the attempts to use the nemo plus rule of the Digest in the 
18th and 19th centuries as a general rule regarding the acquisition in good faith by 
a non-owner in England. The nemo dat rule eventually acquired a systematic 
value of its own, different from that which the nemo plus rule had in the 
continental ius commune. This becomes clear by the fact that the nature of the 
exceptions grouped around both rules was completely different: while most of 
the cases analysed under the nemo plus rule in Continental law – first as 
exceptions, then only as apparent exceptions – had to do with the transfer of 
ownership by an authorized non-owner, the exceptions grouped in the Common 
law around the nemo dat rule refer only to cases where an acquirer becomes 
owner due to exceptional circumstances despite having acquired from an 
unauthorized non-owner. Nonetheless, the nemo plus rule would acquire a similar 
significance in Civil law jurisdictions in the course of the 19th century, as will be 
shown in the following section. 
 
7. Significance of the nemo plus rule in Civil law jurisdictions 
 
a. The nemo plus rule in the codifications 
 
With the promulgation of modern civil codes, the regulae iuris lost most of their 
practical appeal, and therefore the literary genre of commenting the last title of 
the Digest disappeared in the course of the 19th century. This does not imply that 
the different regulae were instantly forgotten, and in the case of the nemo plus rule 
we even find examples of its reception in modern legislation through texts which 
adapt and translate Ulpian’s rule. Examples of this reception can be found in the 
ABGB238 (1811), the Dutch Mortgage Law of 1851239, the Chilean Civil Code240 
(1856) and the old Argentinian Civil Code241 (1869). 
 Despite the cases in which the rule is formally laid down in modern 
legislations, the elaborate systematic structures built around D. 50,17,54 were 
                                                 
238  ABGB (1811) § 442: “… Überhaupt kann niemand einem anderen mehr Recht abtreten, 
als er selbst hat” (… In general no one can cede to another a greater right than he himself 
has). 
239  Hypotheekwet (1851), art. 109: “De overdrager draagt aan de verkrijger slechts de 
eigendom en de rechten over die hijzelf op het overgedragene bezat…” (The transferor 
gives the transferee only the ownership and the rights which he himself had on the 
delivered object…). 
240  Chilean Civil Code (1856), art. 682: “Si el tradente no es el verdadero dueño de la cosa 
que se entrega por él o a su nombre, no se adquieren por medio de la tradición otros 
derechos que los transmisibles del mismo tradente sobre la cosa entregada” (If the transferor 
is not the real owner of the thing delivered by himself or on behalf of him, the delivery 
does not grant other rights than those which he could transfer over the delivered object). 
This article is also found in the Civil Code of Ecuador (art. 698) and Colombia (art. 752). 
241  Argentinian Civil Code (1870) art. 3270: “Nadie puede transmitir a otro sobre un objeto, 
un derecho mejor o más extenso que el que gozaba…” (No one can transfer to another a 
better or greater right over an object than that which he enjoyed…). 
 
forgotten in most jurisdictions. The nemo plus rule would continue to be used as 
an authoritative starting point for legal reasoning, but its systematic function 
concerning the transfer of ownership by a non-owner was generally abandoned. 
Since the new codes offered specific rules concerning the transfer of ownership 
by an authorized non-owner, it was no longer necessary to resort to the nemo plus 
rule in order to offer a systematization for the faculty to dispose. Occasionally 
scholars discuss, when dealing with the transfer of ownership by an authorized 
non-owner, whether these cases can be seen as an exception to the nemo plus rule 
or not242. However, most authors do not attempt to offer a systematization of this 
subject based on the nemo plus rule.  
 An interesting exception to the general fate of the nemo plus rule is to be seen 
in Chile, were the traditional systematic role of the nemo plus rule as free from 
exceptions made its way into the Civil Code (1856). According to Chilean 
scholars, in those cases where a non-owner transfers ownership, the delivery 
should be regarded as performed by the owner himself, which means that the 
nemo plus rule has no exceptions. The context for the reception of this notion 
was the intention of Andrés Bello, the author of the code, to lay down a system 
of transfer of ownership which would resemble more that of Roman and 
Castilian law than that of the French Civil Code. Bello had studied the writings 
of Vinnius and Heineccius, but when designing a system of transfer of ownership 
the strongest influence came from Pothier’s Traité du droit du domaine, which 
Bello quotes on several occasions in the preliminary works on this topic243. In the 
final version of the Chilean Civil Code, art. 670 states that delivery (tradición) 
consists in the conveyance performed by the owner (la entrega que el dueño hace), 
and art. 671 governs the delivery performed by the owner or by someone else on 
behalf of him. Bello draws heavily on the ideas of Pothier when describing the 
delivery by a non-owner, making it clear that in all such cases the delivery must 
be regarded as performed by the owner himself. This regulation had a direct 
impact on the way interpreters approached the nemo plus rule. Luis Claro Solar 
(1857-1945), one of the most influential commentators of the Chilean Civil 
Code, would declare that the delivery could only transfer ownership if performed 
by the owner, an idea which he traces back to D. 50,17,54 and D. 41,1,20pr244. 
Claro Solar would then explain how every delivery performed by a non-owner 
should be understood as done by the owner himself, quoting D. 41,1,9,4 to 
support this notion245. The nemo plus therefore retained a systematic function 
                                                 
242  See e.g. for Austria: Faber, National Report Austria (2008), p. 59. For the Netherlands: Pitlo, 
Zakenrecht (1965), p. 183; Groefsema, Bevoegd beschikken (1993), p. 32-34. For South 
Africa: Carey Miller, The Acquisition (1986), p. 120. Van Vliet, Transfer of movables (2000), 
p. 28 also approaches the rule in this way under a broad comparative perspective. 
243  E.g. Bello, Código Civil (1981) I, p. 457 (art. 670); p. 458 (art. 671); p. 459 (art. 674); 
p. 460 (art. 675); p. 461 (art. 676 and 677). 
244  Claro Solar, Explicaciones (1932) VII, p. 256-257. 
245  Claro Solar, Explicaciones (1932) VII, p. 257: “No es necesario, sin embargo, que sea el 
mismo propietario de la cosa quien efectúe la tradición; pues basta que otra persona lo haga 
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of Vinnius and Heineccius, but when designing a system of transfer of ownership 
the strongest influence came from Pothier’s Traité du droit du domaine, which 
Bello quotes on several occasions in the preliminary works on this topic243. In the 
final version of the Chilean Civil Code, art. 670 states that delivery (tradición) 
consists in the conveyance performed by the owner (la entrega que el dueño hace), 
and art. 671 governs the delivery performed by the owner or by someone else on 
behalf of him. Bello draws heavily on the ideas of Pothier when describing the 
delivery by a non-owner, making it clear that in all such cases the delivery must 
be regarded as performed by the owner himself. This regulation had a direct 
impact on the way interpreters approached the nemo plus rule. Luis Claro Solar 
(1857-1945), one of the most influential commentators of the Chilean Civil 
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242  See e.g. for Austria: Faber, National Report Austria (2008), p. 59. For the Netherlands: Pitlo, 
Zakenrecht (1965), p. 183; Groefsema, Bevoegd beschikken (1993), p. 32-34. For South 
Africa: Carey Miller, The Acquisition (1986), p. 120. Van Vliet, Transfer of movables (2000), 
p. 28 also approaches the rule in this way under a broad comparative perspective. 
243  E.g. Bello, Código Civil (1981) I, p. 457 (art. 670); p. 458 (art. 671); p. 459 (art. 674); 
p. 460 (art. 675); p. 461 (art. 676 and 677). 
244  Claro Solar, Explicaciones (1932) VII, p. 256-257. 
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mismo propietario de la cosa quien efectúe la tradición; pues basta que otra persona lo haga 
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regarding the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in Chile, and its validity is 
generally upheld by scholars246. It should moreover be observed that similar rules 
governing the transfer of ownership by a non-owner are to be found in other 
Latin American jurisdictions which adopted the Civil Code of Andrés Bello or 
were influenced by it, as can be seen in the Civil Codes of Ecuador (art. 687), El 
Salvador (art. 652), Honduras (art. 698), Colombia (art. 741) and Uruguay (art. 
769 and 775). 
 
b. Acquisition in good faith as an exception to the rule 
 
The loss of importance of the nemo plus rule was not only triggered by the fact 
that its systematic function was replaced in most jurisdictions when dealing with 
the transfer of ownership by an authorized owner, but also due to the 
consolidation of mechanisms which intended to safeguard legal certainty, and 
particularly the protection of the acquirer in good faith. This implied that in 
many cases an acquirer who received an object from an unauthorized non-owner 
would nonetheless become owner, thereby undermining the general validity of 
the nemo plus rule. The protection of the acquirer in good faith began to 
consolidate in Western Europe in the course of the Middle Ages through the 
influence of rules of Germanic law. Particularly important in this regard was the 
rule Hand wahre Hand, according to which the owner could not reclaim an object 
from a third person if the latter had received it from someone entrusted by the 
owner with the tenancy of it247. The consolidation of the protection of the 
acquirer in good faith must have been favoured by the long periods to acquire by 
usucapion or praescriptio – which could reach up to 40 years – since this could 
arise uncertainty as to the ownership of traded goods. It is therefore no wonder 
that the protection of the acquirer in good faith was still considered in the 19th 
century to favour legal certainty in commercial transactions, which is why 
various modern Civil Codes laid down provisions on this point regarding 
movable property. Particularly influential in this regard was the rule “possession 
vaut titre” of art. 2279 – now art. 2276 – of the French Civil Code248. Similar 
rules are found in later civil codes249, although the extent of the protection 
                                                                                                                   
con su consentimiento o en su representación y a su nombre. Nihil autem interest utrum ipse 
dominus per se tradat alicui rem, an voluntate ejus aliquis”. Claro Solar applies this idea also to 
explain the cases in which a non-owner is not authorized by the owner, but acts as his 
legal representative (p. 258-260). 
246  See moreover Gaete, La tradición (1992), p. 67-69; Barrientos, Tradición (2003), p. 68 ff. 
247  See Von Lübtow, Hand wahre Hand (1955), p. 177 ff.; Miquel, Hand wahre Hand (1979), 
p. 227-320. 
248  See on this rule Salomons, Good Faith Acquisition (2011), p. 1070-1071. 
249  See e.g. old Dutch BW (1838), art. 2014; old Argentinian Civil Code (1871), art. 3271; 
Spanish Civil Code (1889), art. 464; German Civil Code (1900), §§ 932 and 935; Italian 
Civil Code (1942), art. 1153; New Dutch BW (1992) art. 3:86. On the acquisition in 
good faith in modern codifications see Von Lübtow, Hand wahre Hand (1955), p. 194; 
Harke, Vertrag und Eigentumserwerb (2013), p. 86-93. 
 
ultimately granted to the acquirer in good faith can vary significantly in each of 
them, depending on the conditions laid down for the protection of the acquirer.  
 The rules protecting the acquirer in good faith were soon regarded as the 
main exception to the nemo plus rule. Accordingly, this rule assumed in most 
Civil law jurisdictions a similar systematic role to that which the nemo dat rule 
had in the Common law, namely that of an empty general rule which serves as a 
contrast to the cases in which an acquirer would instantly acquire ownership, 
despite having acquired from an unauthorized non-owner. The scope of the rules 
protecting the subjective good faith of the acquirer will determine the practical 
significance of the nemo plus rule. For instance, Christian Baldus considers that 
the nemo plus rule is not admitted in the BGB on account of the provisions of 
§ 932 regarding the acquisition in good faith250. Dutch legal scholars also 
emphasize that the main objection to the nemo plus rule is the acquisition of 
ownership by a good faith purchaser as prescribed in BW art. 3:86 and 3:88251. 
Similar claims are to be found in other jurisdictions, such as Argentina252, 
Austria253, Belgium254, Poland255, Spain256 or Switzerland257. On the other hand, 
the nemo plus rule will have a broader scope of applications in those jurisdictions 
which grant a limited protection to the acquirer in good faith258. Accordingly, 
the development of the protection of the acquirer in good faith granted the nemo 
plus rule since the 19th century a completely different role to that which it 
enjoyed among the jurists of the ius commune, who hardly ever dealt with the 
acquisition in good faith in the context of this rule.  
 The protection of the acquirer in good faith has a decisive practical 
significance in order to determine whether the acquirer will become owner. 
Nonetheless, from a strictly dogmatic perspective, this problem is unrelated to the 
analysis of the legal grounds of the faculty to dispose of the non-owner. In fact, 
the problem of the protection of the acquirer in good faith only arises when the 
transferor did not have the potestas alienandi259. It is for this reason that the 
provisions protecting good faith have been brought up within the present 
                                                 
250  Baldus, Iure gentium adquirere (1998), p. 112-113. 
251  Asser/Mijnssen/De Haan, 3-I (1992), p. 188 (nr. 293); De Witte, Nemo plus beginsel 
(1993), p. 89-90; Fesevur, Goederenrechtelijke colleges (2005), p. 93; Lokin, Prota (2012), 
p. 110, 153-154; Snijders/Rank-Berenschot, Goederenrecht (2012), p. 304 (nr. 362). 
252  The old Argentinian Civil Code (1869), art. 3271 explicitly declares that the rules 
protecting the purchaser in good faith are an exception to the nemo plus rule as laid down 
in art. 3270. See on this provision Álvarez, Nemo plus iuris (2006), p. 6-10. 
253  Faber, National Report Austria (2008), p. 148. 
254  Jansen, Nemo plus (2009), p. 434-435. 
255  Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 80-82. 
256  González/Soto, National Report Spain (2011), p. 634. 
257  Koller, Nemo plus (1990), p. 323-331; Steinauer, Les droits réels (2012) II, p. 310 (nr. 2105-
2017). 
258  This is for instance the case of Scotland: Reid et al., Law of property (1996), p. 540 ff. 
(nr. 669 ff.); Carey Miller et al., National Report Scotland (2009), p. 317, 370-377, 416. 
259  See on this point Mengoni, Gli acquisti (1968), p. 9-11. 
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246  See moreover Gaete, La tradición (1992), p. 67-69; Barrientos, Tradición (2003), p. 68 ff. 
247  See Von Lübtow, Hand wahre Hand (1955), p. 177 ff.; Miquel, Hand wahre Hand (1979), 
p. 227-320. 
248  See on this rule Salomons, Good Faith Acquisition (2011), p. 1070-1071. 
249  See e.g. old Dutch BW (1838), art. 2014; old Argentinian Civil Code (1871), art. 3271; 
Spanish Civil Code (1889), art. 464; German Civil Code (1900), §§ 932 and 935; Italian 
Civil Code (1942), art. 1153; New Dutch BW (1992) art. 3:86. On the acquisition in 
good faith in modern codifications see Von Lübtow, Hand wahre Hand (1955), p. 194; 
Harke, Vertrag und Eigentumserwerb (2013), p. 86-93. 
 
ultimately granted to the acquirer in good faith can vary significantly in each of 
them, depending on the conditions laid down for the protection of the acquirer.  
 The rules protecting the acquirer in good faith were soon regarded as the 
main exception to the nemo plus rule. Accordingly, this rule assumed in most 
Civil law jurisdictions a similar systematic role to that which the nemo dat rule 
had in the Common law, namely that of an empty general rule which serves as a 
contrast to the cases in which an acquirer would instantly acquire ownership, 
despite having acquired from an unauthorized non-owner. The scope of the rules 
protecting the subjective good faith of the acquirer will determine the practical 
significance of the nemo plus rule. For instance, Christian Baldus considers that 
the nemo plus rule is not admitted in the BGB on account of the provisions of 
§ 932 regarding the acquisition in good faith250. Dutch legal scholars also 
emphasize that the main objection to the nemo plus rule is the acquisition of 
ownership by a good faith purchaser as prescribed in BW art. 3:86 and 3:88251. 
Similar claims are to be found in other jurisdictions, such as Argentina252, 
Austria253, Belgium254, Poland255, Spain256 or Switzerland257. On the other hand, 
the nemo plus rule will have a broader scope of applications in those jurisdictions 
which grant a limited protection to the acquirer in good faith258. Accordingly, 
the development of the protection of the acquirer in good faith granted the nemo 
plus rule since the 19th century a completely different role to that which it 
enjoyed among the jurists of the ius commune, who hardly ever dealt with the 
acquisition in good faith in the context of this rule.  
 The protection of the acquirer in good faith has a decisive practical 
significance in order to determine whether the acquirer will become owner. 
Nonetheless, from a strictly dogmatic perspective, this problem is unrelated to the 
analysis of the legal grounds of the faculty to dispose of the non-owner. In fact, 
the problem of the protection of the acquirer in good faith only arises when the 
transferor did not have the potestas alienandi259. It is for this reason that the 
provisions protecting good faith have been brought up within the present 
                                                 
250  Baldus, Iure gentium adquirere (1998), p. 112-113. 
251  Asser/Mijnssen/De Haan, 3-I (1992), p. 188 (nr. 293); De Witte, Nemo plus beginsel 
(1993), p. 89-90; Fesevur, Goederenrechtelijke colleges (2005), p. 93; Lokin, Prota (2012), 
p. 110, 153-154; Snijders/Rank-Berenschot, Goederenrecht (2012), p. 304 (nr. 362). 
252  The old Argentinian Civil Code (1869), art. 3271 explicitly declares that the rules 
protecting the purchaser in good faith are an exception to the nemo plus rule as laid down 
in art. 3270. See on this provision Álvarez, Nemo plus iuris (2006), p. 6-10. 
253  Faber, National Report Austria (2008), p. 148. 
254  Jansen, Nemo plus (2009), p. 434-435. 
255  Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 80-82. 
256  González/Soto, National Report Spain (2011), p. 634. 
257  Koller, Nemo plus (1990), p. 323-331; Steinauer, Les droits réels (2012) II, p. 310 (nr. 2105-
2017). 
258  This is for instance the case of Scotland: Reid et al., Law of property (1996), p. 540 ff. 
(nr. 669 ff.); Carey Miller et al., National Report Scotland (2009), p. 317, 370-377, 416. 
259  See on this point Mengoni, Gli acquisti (1968), p. 9-11. 
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research simply to discuss the scope of the nemo plus rule, having no further 
significance. The nemo plus rule is one of the few points in which both subjects 
meet, since this rule was traditionally used by jurists of the ius commune as a 
reference point to approach the problem of the potestas alienandi, being however 
used nowadays mostly with regard to the protection of the good faith. 
 
c. Modern significance of the nemo plus rule 
 
While the nemo plus rule lost in most jurisdictions its systematic significance with 
regard to the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, it is worth noting that it 
nonetheless remained an authoritative starting point for legal reasoning regarding 
the cases where an unauthorized non-owner delivers an object, since normally 
the transferor will not be able to grant a better right than that which the principal 
has260. However, the exact significance of the rule in the context of the law of 
property is often controverted261, which is why the interpreter should be careful 
when deriving specific consequences directly from it. 
 While the basic area of application of the rule remains the transfer of 
ownership, the broad terms of the nemo plus have led to it being applied within 
the most varied contexts and even outside private law, including international 
law262, EU law263, constitutional law264 or the intellectual property in the 
cyberspace265. Scholars usually rely on the allegedly logical and rational character 
of the rule to derive various legal consequences in different contexts, which is a 
heritage of the dominant approach to the rule up to the 18th century266. 
                                                 
260  See e.g. for Belgium: Jansen, Nemo plus (2009), p. 434-444. For Germany: Hellwig, Wesen 
(1901), p. 103. For the Netherlands: Hoetink, Nemo plus iuris (1935), p. 474-491; Meijers, 
Toelichting (1955) II, p. 378 (point 4); Asser/Mijnssen/De Haan, 3-I (1992), p. 187-188 
(nr. 293); De Witte, Nemo plus beginsel (1993), p. 90 ff.; Potjewijd, Bekrachtiging (2002), 
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Pitlo/Reehuis/Heisterkamp, Goederenrecht (2012), nr. 95 and 141; Mollema, Het bepertke 
recht (2013), p. 193. For Poland: Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 65. For Scotland: 
Reid et al., Law of property (1996), p. 540-541 (nr. 669). For South Africa: Carey Miller, 
The Acquisition (1986), p. 118. For Spain: Miquel, Causa (2009), p. 170. For Switzerland: 
Steinauer, Les droits réels (2012) II, p. 310 (nr. 2105). For a broad European perspective: 
Von Bar/Clive, DCFR (2010) V, p. 4431; Lurger/Faber, PEL Acq. Own. (2011), p. 459. 
261  See e.g. for the Netherlands: Snijders/Rank-Berenschot, Goederenrecht (2012), p. 47 (nr. 
66); Mollema, Het bepertke recht (2013), p. 131-133, 184-185, 215-216, 220-221. 
262  For the value of the nemo plus rule as a valuable principle of international law see Bos, A 
methodology of international law (1984), p. 5-6 and 73.  
263  De Visser, Nemo plus (2014), p. 443-451. 
264  Longchamps, Nemo plus iuris (2015), p. 65-66. 
265  See e.g. Franken, Nemo plus… (2001), p. 17-18. 
266 In the Netherlands see Hoetink, Nemo plus iuris (1935), p. 475 who considered that this rule 
“applies still today as an unavoidable and logical requirement to which every positive law 
has to submit” (nog heden ten dage geldt als een onomkoombare, want logische, eis 
waaraan elk positief recht zich heeft te onderwerpen). Mengoni, Gli acquisti (1968), p. 3 
would declare similarly: “…il principio «nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam 
ipse haberet», inteso come assioma logico, come applicazione del princpio logico di non 
 
However, such general claims should not be made lightly. As shown above, the 
application of the nemo plus argument in the legal world can lead to unacceptable 
conclusions, particularly due to the ambiguity of general terms such as ‘have’ and 
‘give’. The usefulness of the nemo plus rule in modern legal science resides in its 
systematic role as a starting point for legal reasoning, the content of which varies 
in different jurisdictions. To separate the rule from its systematic context leaves 
nothing but a very general and fallible statement. Accordingly, the interpreter 
should not rely on a certain ‘inner reasonableness’ of the rule when seeking its 
application in innovative contexts, but rather grant a specific scope of application 
to the nemo plus rule depending on the peculiar characteristics of a specific legal 
field. 
 
  
                                                                                                                   
contraddizione, e in quanto tale insuscettibile di eccezioni…”, quoting the monographic 
work of Carlin. This statement is however toned down later in p. 4-7. 
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Chapter 8. From voluntas domini to contemplatio domini: 
direct representation and potestas alienandi 
 
The study of the evolution of the nemo plus rule in the previous chapter showed 
the significance which this aphorism had in the systematization of the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner during the ius commune up to the 19th century. 
However, as shown in the last section, the systematic relevance of this rule 
regarding the problem of the potestas alienandi drastically decreased since the 19th 
century. At around the same time, the doctrine of direct representation gradually 
gained a key systematic position with regard to the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner. As it will be shown in this chapter, the doctrine of direct 
representation originally fulfilled only a significant role within the law of 
obligations, but it gradually made its way into the law of property. Regarding the 
transfer of ownership in particular, scholars soon considered the doctrine of direct 
representation in itself as the legal basis to explain how a non-owner could 
dispose of an object of the principal. Accordingly, the voluntas domini gradually 
ceased to play a decisive role in most jurisdictions when determining the legal 
grounds for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. The following pages 
describe the rising importance of the doctrine of direct representation with regard 
to the transfer of ownership. The outlook offered is by no means exhaustive, but 
merely attempts to depict some general trends which are to be found among 
various jurisdictions, in order to offer a critical insight into the convenience of 
resorting to the doctrine of direct representation as an immediate legal basis for 
the transfer of ownership. The final section of this chapter will be dedicated to 
determine whether the existence of different systems for transferring ownership 
has influenced the systematization of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in 
general or the significance of direct representation in particular.  
 
1. Ius commune and the legal grounds for the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner until the 19th century 
 
a. Basic grounds for the potestas alienandi under the ius commune. 
 
The basic notions concerning the transfer of ownership by a non-owner did not 
undergo radical changes until the 19th century. In the previous chapter it was 
shown that the scope granted to the nemo plus rule varied significantly in the 
course of time, but this remained almost exclusively a scholastic discussion. 
Concerning the legal grounds for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, 
there were no radical innovations until the 19th century. This can be explained by 
the fact that the general guidelines concerning this subject follow quite 
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consistently the Roman sources: as long as a non-owner is authorized by the 
owner or by the law, ownership will be validly transferred. 
 The cases where the delivery was performed voluntate domino offered fewer 
problems to medieval scholars, since Roman sources were particularly clear when 
indicating that the delivery authorized by the owner would amount to a delivery 
performed by the owner himself. We find therefore numerous texts where the 
significance of the owner’s authorization for the delivery is emphasized1. Some 
jurists even included the case of the traditio voluntate domini among other cases 
where the condition of the owner is made worse by another person acting with 
his consent2, an approach which stems directly from the sources. The distinctive 
features of the cases where the delivery takes place voluntate domini even led 
scholars to deal with them separately from those in which there is no such 
authorization3. It is particularly noteworthy that jurists did not distinguish 
different legal grounds concerning the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
There was for instance no general distinction made between the delivery 
performed iussu domini and that performed voluntate domini4, which some modern 
scholars identify in Roman sources5. No distinction either was made regarding 
whether the person authorized was a sui iuris or alieni iuris, which are often dealt 
with jointly by medieval jurists when discussing the transfer of ownership6.  
 While medieval scholars share a common general approach to the significance 
of the voluntas domini at the delivery, other aspects of the transfer of ownership by 
an authorized non-owner were more controversial. It was for instanced discussed 
what the exact significance of the libera administratio bonorum was, as well as the 
scope of the powers of the procurator7. Despite such differences, the general 
                                                 
1  See e.g. Accursius, gl. Nemo alieno to D. 50,17,123pr; Bracton, De Legibus et 
Consuetudinibus Angliae (ed. Woodbine 1922) II, p. 124-130; Bernardus Parmensis, 
gl. Consentire to X 4,20,6; Siete Partidas 7,34,35 i.f. 
2  E.g. Accursius, gl. Nihil to Inst. 2,1,42: “Quod enim quis per alium facit, ipse facere 
videtur: ut ff. de vi, et vi ar l. i. § deiecisse [D. 43,16,1,12] et infra, de iniur. § non solum. 
[Inst. 4,4,11] et ff. de de iniur. l. item apud § fecisse [D. 47,10,15,8]”. See also gl. Voluntate 
to D. 41,1,9,4: “Quia qui per alium, & c. ut. et infra de vi et vi armata l. prima. § deiecisse 
[D. 43,16,1,12]…”. 
3  See e.g. the Azonian gl. to Inst. 2,8pr in Caprioli et al., Glosse preaccursiane II (2004), 
p. 168: “Dominia acquiruntur traditione, quam seguitur alienatio cum voluntas domini rata 
habenda est. Set quia quandoque et non dominus alienare potest et dominus non potest, 
idea hunc titulum hic ponit. Az.” 
4  See e.g. Accursius, gl. Voluntate to D. 39,5,9,2, where he distinguishes in general between 
iussum and mandatum, without making any particular distinction for the transfer of 
ownership. See moreover Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto Novo (Lyon 1552), f. 32va, 
when commenting D. 39,5,9,2. 
5  Chapter 2, Section 5 above. 
6  Azo, Summa Codicis (Venice 1566), col. 431: “Item ratione officii privati, ut procurator, 
filiusfamilias & servus”. 
7  Azo, Summa Institutionum (Venice 1566), col. 1071 and Accursius in gl. Libera to 
D. 41,1,9,4, gl. Praestabit to D. 6,1,41,1 and gl. Libera to Inst. 2,1,43 report a scholarly 
discussion involving Martinus Gosia, who distinguished between the procurator totorum 
bonorum and the procurator universorum bonorum regarding the transfer of ownership, 
 
picture regarding the validity of the alienation voluntate domini is largely uniform 
among medieval scholars.  
 While it was perfectly clear that the voluntas domini was the legal basis for the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner in a number of cases, there are other 
situations which were usually described negatively through the indication of the 
lack of such authorization8. On the borderline we find the pledge creditor, who 
was considered by most medieval scholars as a case where ownership was not 
transferred voluntate domini9. Decisive in this regard was the fact that Justinian 
both in D. 41,1,46 and in Inst. 2,8,1, presented the alienation by a pledge 
creditor as an exceptional figure, which led some jurists to distinguish it from 
regular cases where the delivery was authorized. Other scholars were less 
interested in making a clear distinction on the subject and left unsolved the 
problem of whether the delivery in this case should be considered to take place 
ex pacto or ex lege10. Along with the pledge creditor, scholars included other cases 
where the transfer of ownership could not be regarded as taking place voluntate 
domini. This was particularly the case regarding the alienation performed by legal 
guardians, but also problems regarding to the sphere of public law were dealt 
with along the regular situations where a non-owner would validly transfer 
ownership11. This was for instance the case regarding some public authorities, 
who under certain circumstances could confiscate and subsequently alienate 
private property. Also the judge would fall under this category, since he could 
adjudicate property which was not his own.  
 The 16th century brought along new developments from the perspective of 
the systematization of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, offering a more 
abstract approach on the subject. Already from medieval times it was not unusual 
                                                                                                                   
distinction which is not accepted by these authors. On the general faculties of the procurator 
totorum bonorum see the gloss to Inst. 2,1,43 in Caprioli et al., Glosse preaccursiane II (2004), 
p. 88. 
8  Azo, Summa Institutionum (Venice 1566), col. 1071: “Sed et per non dominum quandoque 
transfertur dominium, et etiam contra domini voluntatem: ut per tutorem, vel curatorem, 
et per iudicem et per quasi censitorem (ut per flumen) et per creditorem, et per 
principem”. 
9  Accursius, gl. Voluntate to D. 41,1,9,4: “…Item quandoque etiam sine voluntate domini, 
ut creditor…” 
10  Azo, Summa Codicis (Venice 1566), col. 431 considers that the pledge creditor transfers 
ownership “vel ex pacto, vel ex lege alienare potest”, while in Summa Institutionum (Venice 
1566), col. 1071 he includes it among the cases where ownership is transferred “contra 
domini voluntatem”. In the Azonian gl. to Inst. 2,8pr edited by Caprioli et al., Glosse 
preaccursiane II (2004), p. 168 the alienation is moreover approached in this case as not 
taking place voluntate domini. 
11  Wilhelmus de Cabriano, Casus Codicis (ed. Wallinga 2005), p. 317, commenting C. 4,51,1: 
“Potest autem munitus esse vel publico iure vel privato: publico ut tutoris et executoris, 
privato ut mandatarii et creditoris…”; Azo, Summa Codicis (Venice 1566), col. 431: “Item 
iudicis ratione officii publici, et executores eorum. Item censitores, ut Insti. de offi. iud. § 
ult. [Inst. 4,17,7] & ff. de acquiren. re. domi. l. ergo. § alluvio [D. 41,1,30,3]”. See 
moreover Caprioli et al., Glosse preaccursiane II (2004), p. 169; Accursius, gl. Nemo and Ex 
officio to C. 4,51,6; Siete Partidas 5,5,51-53. 
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[D. 43,16,1,12]…”. 
3  See e.g. the Azonian gl. to Inst. 2,8pr in Caprioli et al., Glosse preaccursiane II (2004), 
p. 168: “Dominia acquiruntur traditione, quam seguitur alienatio cum voluntas domini rata 
habenda est. Set quia quandoque et non dominus alienare potest et dominus non potest, 
idea hunc titulum hic ponit. Az.” 
4  See e.g. Accursius, gl. Voluntate to D. 39,5,9,2, where he distinguishes in general between 
iussum and mandatum, without making any particular distinction for the transfer of 
ownership. See moreover Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto Novo (Lyon 1552), f. 32va, 
when commenting D. 39,5,9,2. 
5  Chapter 2, Section 5 above. 
6  Azo, Summa Codicis (Venice 1566), col. 431: “Item ratione officii privati, ut procurator, 
filiusfamilias & servus”. 
7  Azo, Summa Institutionum (Venice 1566), col. 1071 and Accursius in gl. Libera to 
D. 41,1,9,4, gl. Praestabit to D. 6,1,41,1 and gl. Libera to Inst. 2,1,43 report a scholarly 
discussion involving Martinus Gosia, who distinguished between the procurator totorum 
bonorum and the procurator universorum bonorum regarding the transfer of ownership, 
 
picture regarding the validity of the alienation voluntate domini is largely uniform 
among medieval scholars.  
 While it was perfectly clear that the voluntas domini was the legal basis for the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner in a number of cases, there are other 
situations which were usually described negatively through the indication of the 
lack of such authorization8. On the borderline we find the pledge creditor, who 
was considered by most medieval scholars as a case where ownership was not 
transferred voluntate domini9. Decisive in this regard was the fact that Justinian 
both in D. 41,1,46 and in Inst. 2,8,1, presented the alienation by a pledge 
creditor as an exceptional figure, which led some jurists to distinguish it from 
regular cases where the delivery was authorized. Other scholars were less 
interested in making a clear distinction on the subject and left unsolved the 
problem of whether the delivery in this case should be considered to take place 
ex pacto or ex lege10. Along with the pledge creditor, scholars included other cases 
where the transfer of ownership could not be regarded as taking place voluntate 
domini. This was particularly the case regarding the alienation performed by legal 
guardians, but also problems regarding to the sphere of public law were dealt 
with along the regular situations where a non-owner would validly transfer 
ownership11. This was for instance the case regarding some public authorities, 
who under certain circumstances could confiscate and subsequently alienate 
private property. Also the judge would fall under this category, since he could 
adjudicate property which was not his own.  
 The 16th century brought along new developments from the perspective of 
the systematization of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, offering a more 
abstract approach on the subject. Already from medieval times it was not unusual 
                                                                                                                   
distinction which is not accepted by these authors. On the general faculties of the procurator 
totorum bonorum see the gloss to Inst. 2,1,43 in Caprioli et al., Glosse preaccursiane II (2004), 
p. 88. 
8  Azo, Summa Institutionum (Venice 1566), col. 1071: “Sed et per non dominum quandoque 
transfertur dominium, et etiam contra domini voluntatem: ut per tutorem, vel curatorem, 
et per iudicem et per quasi censitorem (ut per flumen) et per creditorem, et per 
principem”. 
9  Accursius, gl. Voluntate to D. 41,1,9,4: “…Item quandoque etiam sine voluntate domini, 
ut creditor…” 
10  Azo, Summa Codicis (Venice 1566), col. 431 considers that the pledge creditor transfers 
ownership “vel ex pacto, vel ex lege alienare potest”, while in Summa Institutionum (Venice 
1566), col. 1071 he includes it among the cases where ownership is transferred “contra 
domini voluntatem”. In the Azonian gl. to Inst. 2,8pr edited by Caprioli et al., Glosse 
preaccursiane II (2004), p. 168 the alienation is moreover approached in this case as not 
taking place voluntate domini. 
11  Wilhelmus de Cabriano, Casus Codicis (ed. Wallinga 2005), p. 317, commenting C. 4,51,1: 
“Potest autem munitus esse vel publico iure vel privato: publico ut tutoris et executoris, 
privato ut mandatarii et creditoris…”; Azo, Summa Codicis (Venice 1566), col. 431: “Item 
iudicis ratione officii publici, et executores eorum. Item censitores, ut Insti. de offi. iud. § 
ult. [Inst. 4,17,7] & ff. de acquiren. re. domi. l. ergo. § alluvio [D. 41,1,30,3]”. See 
moreover Caprioli et al., Glosse preaccursiane II (2004), p. 169; Accursius, gl. Nemo and Ex 
officio to C. 4,51,6; Siete Partidas 5,5,51-53. 
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to find authors referring to the different cases of potestas alienandi by using a 
comprehensive wording: for instance, Accursius refers to the ‘ius distrahendi’12, 
and Philippus Decius discusses the potestas alienandi of the pledge creditor13. This 
latter expression is closely linked to the wording used in Inst. 2,8pr, and it is no 
wonder to find it in use by Donellus, who in his Commentarii de iure civili14 
describes among the requirements to transfer ownership that the transferor must 
have the potestas rei transferendae. Donellus would offer a more systematic 
arrangement of the different cases of potestas rei transferendae from that of his 
predecessors, having as a starting point that the delivery can be performed by the 
owner and by those who are held to be the owner at the conveyance15. Donellus 
explains that normally the owner will transfer ownership, quoting a number of 
texts to support this statement, and among them the nemo plus rule – both in 
D. 50,17,54 and D. 41,1,20 – which he considers to stem from the ratio 
naturalis16. Later he explains that not only the owner can transfer ownership, and 
that in some cases a non-owner acts as an owner, which he divides in two 
categories: some take the owner’s place because the owner wants so – and in this 
case he includes the procurator and the creditor pignoris – while others take his place 
by the virtue of law17. This basic distinction is in general terms adequate to 
describe the Roman sources, which is why it has been adopted in this work as 
well18. The author then stresses the importance of the owner’s authorization in 
order to explain the transfer of ownership by the procurator, quoting D. 41,1,9,419. 
Afterwards, he briefly studies the problem of the creditor pignoris, whom he does 
not consider to constitute an exception to the nemo plus rule, since the creditor 
would transfer ownership following the owner’s intent, quoting Inst. 2,8,1 to 
                                                 
12  Accursius, gl. Nemo to C. 4,51,6: “Casus. Si ream meam tibi non obligatam, vel non 
habens ius distrahendi, puta ratione officii, distraxisti: mihi non praeiudicasti”. 
13  Philippus Decius, In tit. ff. de Regulis Iuris (Lyon 1549), p. 225. 
14  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15 (I, col. 729 ff.). 
15  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 4 (I, col. 732): “Ante 
omnia eum quaerimus, qui possit transferre. In hoc genere sunt duo, dominus rei; &, si 
quis est, qui in hae translatione pro domino habeatur”. 
16  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 5 (I, col. 732): 
“Principio, si hic ex aliena persona res non geritur, eum, qui dat, dominum esse oportet. Si 
non est: ex sua persona dominium non transferet, qui ipse non habuit. Ut enim bene 
regula juris in universum traditur, & ratio ipsa naturalis dictat, nemo plus juris in alium 
transferre potest, quam ipse habet, L. nemo plus juris, D. de regul. jur. …”. 
17  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 8 (I, col. 733-734): “Sed 
non solius domini hoc jus est. Sunt in hac re, qui, cum domini non sint, nihilominus 
domini vice fungantur. Quorum duo sunt genera. Quidam domini loco sunt domini 
voluntante: quidam iure. Domini voluntante duo: procurator, & creditor in pignore”. 
18  Chapter 1, Section 4(a) above. 
19  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 9 (I, col. 734): “… Non 
sunt hi quidem domini. Sed nihil interest, inquit Cajus, utrum ipse dominus per se tradat alicui 
rem, an volunate ejus alius. D. L. qua ratione, §. nihil autem. Quo significatur, ab his rem 
transferri non tam ideo, quod domini potestate in eo utantur: quam quod videatur ipse 
dominus tradidisse per alium, cujus opera in ea re utitur”. 
 
support this opinion20. Finally, Donellus deals with the cases in which the non-
owner may transfer ownership by virtue of the law, mentioning the tutores and 
curatores, who according to him have the right to act on behalf of the owner (pro 
domino or domini loco)21. 
 The general approach to the ground of the faculty to dispose would endure 
few changes during the following centuries. We find for instance that several 
jurists use general expressions such as ‘potestas alienandi’ to refer to the different 
cases where a non-owner may transfer ownership, as well as to the problem of 
whether the owner may transfer ownership himself22. This notion also finds 
different equivalents in vernacular languages23. More importantly, jurists would 
normally refer to the voluntas domini as the main ground for the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner, which would occasionally be distinguished from 
those cases where the faculty to dispose stems from the law24. The only 
differences in this regard would consist in distinguishing exactly in which cases 
did the delivery take place voluntate domini, a point which was particularly 
controversial regarding the situation of the pledge creditor25. 
                                                 
20  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 13 (I, col. 736): “Non 
pugnat hoc cum jure superiore, quo negavimus, quemquam plus juris in alium transferre, 
quam ipse habuit; L. nemo plus iuris, D. de reg. jur. & eum, qui dominium in fundo non 
habuit, ad eum, qui accipit, quidquam transferre. L. traditio, D. de acq. rer. dom. Quod enim 
creditor pignus alienat, facit hoc domini voluntate, §. contra, Instit. quib. al. non lic. quoniam 
pignus hac lege acceperat, ut vendere liceret, sive convenerit nominatim, ut liceret, sive 
non convenerit. Idque appellatio pignoris in se continet. d. L. 4. D. de pign. act.” It should 
be noted that again this authorization is understood to be given in an either explicit or tacit 
way. 
21  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 14-15 (I, col. 737-738). 
22  E.g. Vinnius, In quatuor libros Institutionum commentarius (Amsterdam 1665), ad Inst. 2,8,1 
(p. 252); Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, (Paris 1829), ad D. 41,1,35 (IV, p. 108).  
23  Similar expressions can be found in Roman-Dutch law: Grotius, Inleidinge (ed. Dovring et 
al. 1965), 2,5,3 (p. 62) refers to the “macht… om iet door levering te mogen vervremden” 
(the power to alienate something through delivery); Huber, Heedendaegse Rechts-geleertheyt 
(Leeuwarden 1686), p. 148 (2.9.5) indicates as an independent requirement for the transfer 
of ownership the “macht om te vervreemden” (the power to alienate). In Germany, 
Puchta, Pandekten (1848), p. 212 (§ 148) demands for the transfer of ownership the 
“Fähigkeit des Trandenten Eigenthum zu übertragen”, quoting D. 41,1,20pr and 
D. 41,1,9,4. 
24  Grotius, Inleidinge (ed. Dovring et al. 1965), 2,5,15 (p. 64); Vinnius, Jurisprudentiae contractae 
(Rotterdam 1664), cap. 20 (p. 53); Vinnius, In quatuor libros Institutionum commentarius 
(Amsterdam 1665), ad Inst. 2,8,1 (p. 252); Van Leeuwen, Het Rooms-Hollands-regt 
(Amsterdam 1698), 2,7,5 (p. 126); Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (Paris 1829), ad 
D. 6,1,17 (I, p. 557) and D. 6,1,20 (p. 558); ad D. 41,1,35 (IV, p. 108-109); Pothier, Traité 
du droit du domaine (Paris/Orléans 1772), nr. 218-222 (p. 212-217). 
25  Among those authors who consider that the pledge creditor acts voluntate domini we find: 
Bronchorst, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Leiden 1624), p. 137 (ad D. 50,17,54); Vinnius, 
Jurisprudentiae contractae (Rotterdam 1664), cap. 20 (p. 53); Pothier, Traité du droit du 
domaine (Paris/Orléans 1772), nr. 224 (p. 218-219) distinguishes the case of the pledge 
creditor who sells following the agreement of the debtor and the case where the alienation 
is carried out by the judge. 
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describe the Roman sources, which is why it has been adopted in this work as 
well18. The author then stresses the importance of the owner’s authorization in 
order to explain the transfer of ownership by the procurator, quoting D. 41,1,9,419. 
Afterwards, he briefly studies the problem of the creditor pignoris, whom he does 
not consider to constitute an exception to the nemo plus rule, since the creditor 
would transfer ownership following the owner’s intent, quoting Inst. 2,8,1 to 
                                                 
12  Accursius, gl. Nemo to C. 4,51,6: “Casus. Si ream meam tibi non obligatam, vel non 
habens ius distrahendi, puta ratione officii, distraxisti: mihi non praeiudicasti”. 
13  Philippus Decius, In tit. ff. de Regulis Iuris (Lyon 1549), p. 225. 
14  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15 (I, col. 729 ff.). 
15  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 4 (I, col. 732): “Ante 
omnia eum quaerimus, qui possit transferre. In hoc genere sunt duo, dominus rei; &, si 
quis est, qui in hae translatione pro domino habeatur”. 
16  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 5 (I, col. 732): 
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voluntante: quidam iure. Domini voluntante duo: procurator, & creditor in pignore”. 
18  Chapter 1, Section 4(a) above. 
19  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 9 (I, col. 734): “… Non 
sunt hi quidem domini. Sed nihil interest, inquit Cajus, utrum ipse dominus per se tradat alicui 
rem, an volunate ejus alius. D. L. qua ratione, §. nihil autem. Quo significatur, ab his rem 
transferri non tam ideo, quod domini potestate in eo utantur: quam quod videatur ipse 
dominus tradidisse per alium, cujus opera in ea re utitur”. 
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owner may transfer ownership by virtue of the law, mentioning the tutores and 
curatores, who according to him have the right to act on behalf of the owner (pro 
domino or domini loco)21. 
 The general approach to the ground of the faculty to dispose would endure 
few changes during the following centuries. We find for instance that several 
jurists use general expressions such as ‘potestas alienandi’ to refer to the different 
cases where a non-owner may transfer ownership, as well as to the problem of 
whether the owner may transfer ownership himself22. This notion also finds 
different equivalents in vernacular languages23. More importantly, jurists would 
normally refer to the voluntas domini as the main ground for the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner, which would occasionally be distinguished from 
those cases where the faculty to dispose stems from the law24. The only 
differences in this regard would consist in distinguishing exactly in which cases 
did the delivery take place voluntate domini, a point which was particularly 
controversial regarding the situation of the pledge creditor25. 
                                                 
20  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 13 (I, col. 736): “Non 
pugnat hoc cum jure superiore, quo negavimus, quemquam plus juris in alium transferre, 
quam ipse habuit; L. nemo plus iuris, D. de reg. jur. & eum, qui dominium in fundo non 
habuit, ad eum, qui accipit, quidquam transferre. L. traditio, D. de acq. rer. dom. Quod enim 
creditor pignus alienat, facit hoc domini voluntate, §. contra, Instit. quib. al. non lic. quoniam 
pignus hac lege acceperat, ut vendere liceret, sive convenerit nominatim, ut liceret, sive 
non convenerit. Idque appellatio pignoris in se continet. d. L. 4. D. de pign. act.” It should 
be noted that again this authorization is understood to be given in an either explicit or tacit 
way. 
21  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 14-15 (I, col. 737-738). 
22  E.g. Vinnius, In quatuor libros Institutionum commentarius (Amsterdam 1665), ad Inst. 2,8,1 
(p. 252); Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, (Paris 1829), ad D. 41,1,35 (IV, p. 108).  
23  Similar expressions can be found in Roman-Dutch law: Grotius, Inleidinge (ed. Dovring et 
al. 1965), 2,5,3 (p. 62) refers to the “macht… om iet door levering te mogen vervremden” 
(the power to alienate something through delivery); Huber, Heedendaegse Rechts-geleertheyt 
(Leeuwarden 1686), p. 148 (2.9.5) indicates as an independent requirement for the transfer 
of ownership the “macht om te vervreemden” (the power to alienate). In Germany, 
Puchta, Pandekten (1848), p. 212 (§ 148) demands for the transfer of ownership the 
“Fähigkeit des Trandenten Eigenthum zu übertragen”, quoting D. 41,1,20pr and 
D. 41,1,9,4. 
24  Grotius, Inleidinge (ed. Dovring et al. 1965), 2,5,15 (p. 64); Vinnius, Jurisprudentiae contractae 
(Rotterdam 1664), cap. 20 (p. 53); Vinnius, In quatuor libros Institutionum commentarius 
(Amsterdam 1665), ad Inst. 2,8,1 (p. 252); Van Leeuwen, Het Rooms-Hollands-regt 
(Amsterdam 1698), 2,7,5 (p. 126); Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (Paris 1829), ad 
D. 6,1,17 (I, p. 557) and D. 6,1,20 (p. 558); ad D. 41,1,35 (IV, p. 108-109); Pothier, Traité 
du droit du domaine (Paris/Orléans 1772), nr. 218-222 (p. 212-217). 
25  Among those authors who consider that the pledge creditor acts voluntate domini we find: 
Bronchorst, De Diversis Regulis Iuris (Leiden 1624), p. 137 (ad D. 50,17,54); Vinnius, 
Jurisprudentiae contractae (Rotterdam 1664), cap. 20 (p. 53); Pothier, Traité du droit du 
domaine (Paris/Orléans 1772), nr. 224 (p. 218-219) distinguishes the case of the pledge 
creditor who sells following the agreement of the debtor and the case where the alienation 
is carried out by the judge. 
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 It is interesting to note at this point that the problem of the faculty to dispose 
was related to the general theory of subjective rights in the works of Vitoria 
(1535-1600), one of the main jurists behind the development of this concept. 
When discussing whether ownership falls under the notion of ius26, Vitoria 
claimed that the right to dispose can be separated from ownership, as happens 
when ownership is transferred by a procurator27. Suárez (1548-1617) would later 
offer other interesting considerations on this point, since he distinguished the 
right itself from the voluntas or concessio domini, by which an individual would be 
regarded as exercising the right of the owner28. While these constructions are 
interesting for the development of the theory of subjective rights, it is 
noteworthy that later scholars were not keen to adopt them when approaching 
the potestas alienandi as such. There was in fact little controversy regarding the 
general rules governing the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, which is why 
there was no need to resort to special theories in order to explain how an 
authorized non-owner could perform the traditio. Only towards the end of the 
19th century would scholars face the need to resort to the notion of subjective 
rights, which was precisely due to the lack of clarity which they found regarding 
the legal basis for the faculty to dispose nomine proprio, as it will be shown 
below29. 
 
b. Irrelevance of the contemplatio domini for the transfer of ownership until the 18th 
century. 
 
The general notions regarding the ground of the potestas alienandi used by the 
jurists of the ius commune agree to a large extent with that of Roman jurists, 
considering that the voluntas of the owner was the element which attracted the 
most attention when determining whether a non-owner could transfer 
ownership or not. Next to the situations in which the voluntas domini was 
decisive, the authors of the ius commune would moreover deal with those cases 
where the authorization followed ex lege. The fact that the legal grounds for the 
                                                 
26  See on this point Avelino Folgado, Derecho subjetivo (1960), p. 229-230; Guzmán, Derecho 
como facultad (2009), p. 182-188. 
27  Molina, De Iustitia et Iure (Mainz 1659), Tract. 2, disp. 3, nr. 5 (I, p. 37): “Tertio, potest 
quis conferre procuratori suo, ut amico in bonum amici ius, tum ad utendum re sua 
omnibus modis, quibus ipse uti potest, tum etiam ad illam alienandum, et consumendum, 
retento sibi dominio, interim dum rem non consumit aut alienat: ergo ius ad utendum re 
aliqua, et ad illam alienandum, et consumendum, distinctum quid est a dominio, quod in 
eo praecise est positum, quod res sit sua simpliciter”. 
28  Suárez, De statu religionis (Lyon 1625), lib. 8, cap. 5, n. 12 (III, p. 400): “…longe enim 
diversum est habere proprium ius, quod est habere aliquale dominium, aut habere tantum 
licentiam a domino, quod revera nullum dominium est…” ; n. 29 (p. 405): “…Nam ius 
proprie dictum solum esse censemus illud, quod inest homini, tanquam proprium, quove 
suo nomine operari potest (…)”. For the ideas of Suárez on this point see Avelino Folgado, 
Derecho subjetivo (1960), p. 230. 
29  Chapter 8, Section 4(a) below. 
 
potestas alienandi at the time of the ius commune did not depart from the guidelines 
given by Roman jurists can be seen in the fact that the contemplatio domini played 
no decisive role to determine the transfer of ownership. As will be shown in the 
following sections, this element would become decisive in the course of the 19th 
century, when under the influence of the doctrine of direct representation the 
main element which jurists would take into account when considering the legal 
grounds for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner was whether the delivery 
took place on behalf of the owner or not. Before that time, the contemplatio 
domini played no decisive role in determining the legal grounds for the delivery 
by a non-owner. To act nomine alieno could be relevant in the context of the law 
of obligations30 in order to determine the personal relationships which arise 
between the parties, where the distinction between a procurator and a nuntius31 
could be decisive. Some authors observe on the other hand that the gift 
performed nomine alieno will be regarded as done by the principal32, but this 
problem is not directly linked to the legal grounds of the delivery itself. It is 
moreover worth noting that jurists did not consider that there was a general 
prohibition to act on behalf of another person. This can be seen from the 
commentaries to the regula iuris of D. 50,17,123pr, where scholars ignored the 
literal terms of the prohibition “nemo alieno nomine lege agere potest” and simply 
understood that, under certain conditions, it was indeed possible for someone to 
act on behalf of another person, especially if the latter granted his consent33. 
 Regarding the traditio in particular, only incidentally do we find any reference 
to the contemplatio domini of the non-owner. It is for instance common to find 
such references regarding specific cases where it plays a relevant role for the bona 
fides of the acquirer34, just as it happens in classical Roman law. In some cases, the 
problem of the contemplatio domini at the delivery is either granted no particular 
relevance, or simply linked with that of the voluntas domini35. It is also 
occasionally pointed out that the non-owner could not act as if the thing was his 
own36, thereby referring to the objective limits which rule his acts rather than the 
                                                 
30  Azo, Brocardica (Basel 1567), p. 498: “Quod facit quis alieno nomine, vel tanquam alius, 
ipse facere non videtur”; p. 500: “Potest quis agere tanquam alius, non tanquam ipse”. 
31  See e.g. Azo, Summa Codicis (Venice 1566), col. 430; Hänel, Dissensiones dominorum (1834), 
§ 256 (p. 428-429). 
32  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In primam Digesti Novi partem Commentaria (Turin 1574), ad 
D. 39,5,9,2 (f. 60vb). 
33  Accursius, gl. Nemo alieno to D. 50,17,123pr: “Nullus in rebus alienis administrandis, vel 
causis agendis ex lege, accipit potestatem, nisi domini consensus accesserit…” See also 
Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto Novo (Lyon 1552), ad D. 50,17,123pr (f. 200ra). 
34  See e.g. Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto Novo (Lyon 1552), f. 74rb, commenting 
D. 41,4,14; Siete Partidas 5,5,54; Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In primam Digesti Novi partem 
Commentaria (Turin 1574), f. 113va, commenting D. 41,4,14. 
35  Accursius, gl. Suo nomine to D. 46,3,17; Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto Novo (Lyon 1552), 
f. 32va, commenting D. 39,5,9,2; f. 198v.b, commenting D. 50,17,180. 
36  E.g. Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Macerata 1831), lib. 18, cap. 12, § 15 (V, col. 221): 
“Hactenus autem illis mandatum, et ex mandato hactenus eorum potestas est, ut ipsi agant, 
non ut vice sua alium dent”. 
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 It is interesting to note at this point that the problem of the faculty to dispose 
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19th century would scholars face the need to resort to the notion of subjective 
rights, which was precisely due to the lack of clarity which they found regarding 
the legal basis for the faculty to dispose nomine proprio, as it will be shown 
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26  See on this point Avelino Folgado, Derecho subjetivo (1960), p. 229-230; Guzmán, Derecho 
como facultad (2009), p. 182-188. 
27  Molina, De Iustitia et Iure (Mainz 1659), Tract. 2, disp. 3, nr. 5 (I, p. 37): “Tertio, potest 
quis conferre procuratori suo, ut amico in bonum amici ius, tum ad utendum re sua 
omnibus modis, quibus ipse uti potest, tum etiam ad illam alienandum, et consumendum, 
retento sibi dominio, interim dum rem non consumit aut alienat: ergo ius ad utendum re 
aliqua, et ad illam alienandum, et consumendum, distinctum quid est a dominio, quod in 
eo praecise est positum, quod res sit sua simpliciter”. 
28  Suárez, De statu religionis (Lyon 1625), lib. 8, cap. 5, n. 12 (III, p. 400): “…longe enim 
diversum est habere proprium ius, quod est habere aliquale dominium, aut habere tantum 
licentiam a domino, quod revera nullum dominium est…” ; n. 29 (p. 405): “…Nam ius 
proprie dictum solum esse censemus illud, quod inest homini, tanquam proprium, quove 
suo nomine operari potest (…)”. For the ideas of Suárez on this point see Avelino Folgado, 
Derecho subjetivo (1960), p. 230. 
29  Chapter 8, Section 4(a) below. 
 
potestas alienandi at the time of the ius commune did not depart from the guidelines 
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act on behalf of another person, especially if the latter granted his consent33. 
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occasionally pointed out that the non-owner could not act as if the thing was his 
own36, thereby referring to the objective limits which rule his acts rather than the 
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contemplatio domini. In other cases it is indicated that legal guardians37 must act on 
behalf of the owner, an idea which is already to be found in texts of Roman law 
dealing with the administration of the tutor or curator38. This indication does not 
however seem to have far-reaching consequences. Pothier, for instance, mentions 
that legal guardians must act in the name of the owner (en son nom), but when 
dealing with the case analysed by Javolenus in D. 39,5,25 – where the non-
owner makes a gift nomine proprio after being told to do it nomine alieno – he 
observes that the delivery did not transfer ownership because it was not 
performed in accordance with the owner’s authorization39.  
 Despite the fact that the contemplatio domini only plays a secondary role for the 
transfer of ownership in the works of most authors, it is nonetheless worth noting 
that sometimes this element is granted a particular significance. For instance, 
Accursius considers that a gift performed nomine proprio would involve two gifts – 
one from the owner to the agent and another from the agent to the donatee – 
while otherwise we would be facing one single gift40. The contemplatio domini at 
the delivery seems to play on the other hand a much more pervasive role in the 
work of Philippus Decius, who in his commentary to D. 50,17,54 presents 
different non-owners transferring ownership nomine domini41, even when he does 
not explain exactly what the significance of acting on behalf of the owner is. 
Similar indications are also to be found in other works42, but nowhere is a clear 
distinction made between the general significance of delivering nomine alieno and 
nomine proprio.  
                                                 
37  Pothier, Traité du droit du domaine (Paris/Orléans 1772), nr. 222 (p. 216). 
38  See Chapter 3, Section 2 above. 
39  Pothier, Traité du droit du domaine (Paris/Orléans 1772), nr. 223 (p. 217): “Javolenus décide 
que suivant la subtilité du Droit, elle ne l’a pas transférée ; la tradition n’ayant pas été faite 
par le propriétaire de la chose, puisqu’elle n’a pas été faite en mon nom, & que j’en étois le 
propriétaire, ni même du consentement du propriétaire ; car j’ai bien voulu qu’on la 
donnât, & qu’on en fît la tradition en mon nom ; mais je n’ai pas consenti à la tradition 
que vous faites en votre nom…” This was the traditional interpretation of the text, as 
shown in: Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto Novo (Lyon 1552), f. 34va; Bartolus de 
Saxoferrato, In primam Digesti Novi partem Commentaria (Turin 1574), f. 65v. 
40  Accursius, gl. Nomine tuo to D. 39,5,9,2: “hic tamen duae donationes sunt: superiori casu 
una: ut supra eod. l. ii. § cum vero [D. 39,5,2,2]” 
41  Philippus Decius, In tit. ff. de Regulis Iuris (Lyon 1549), p. 225: “…creditor qui habuit 
potestatem alienandi, illud facit nomine domini, & de eius voluntate… Et idem in 
procuratore, tutore & curatore qui nomine domini faciunt. Et sic a domino videtur 
dominium transferri”. 
42  Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (ed. Woodbine 1922) II, p. 103: “Si 
donationem fecerit de re quam alius tenet per se ipsum vel per alium nomine suo, non 
faciet rem accipientis cum ipse nihil teneat, quia non potest plus iuris ad alium transferre 
quam ipse haberet…”. Also Brouwer, Disputatio juridica inauguralis de illis, quibus alienare 
licet, vel non (Utrecht 1724), p. 16, discussing the transfer of ownership by the pledge 
creditor: “Neque obstat, quod nemo potest plus iuris in alium transferre, quam ipse habet, 
l. 34 d. R.J. [D. 50,17,54]. Resp. haec regula verissima est quando quis agit suo proprio 
nomine, sed non obtinet, quando quis agit nomine alterius, veluti tanquam procurator, iam 
vero creditor vendens pignus,e st quodammodo procurator debitoris, eiusque vices et 
personam sustinet”.  
 
 While jurists occasionally granted a particular significance to the contemplatio 
domini in the context of the traditio, it is worth noting that the progressive 
development of the doctrine of direct representation was initially completely 
unrelated to the problem of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. As 
already indicated, the doctrine of direct representation began to fulfil a relevant 
role regarding the transfer of ownership by a non-owner only in the course of 
the 19th century. The situation was of course different regarding the law of 
obligations, where the doctrine of direct representation emerged in order to fill a 
void within Roman sources. As shown above, Roman law never developed a 
true doctrine of direct representation, which implies that the agent was personally 
bound to the third party regarding the agreements he concluded, and that only 
eventually could the principal be made responsible for the contract43. Since the 
rediscovery of the Corpus Iuris, an increasing need was felt in everyday 
commercial life to bind the principal directly when his agent concluded contracts 
on his behalf, which led to the acknowledgment of forms of direct 
representation. This evolution was seen as conflicting with the alteri stipulari rule, 
the significance of which was progressively questioned from the time of the 
Glossators and up to the 19th century44. Particularly relevant in this evolution was 
Grotius, who distinguished the problem of the contracts in favour of a third party 
and the problem of direct representation, and considered the latter to be valid by 
highlighting the importance of the will of the contracting parties in the formation 
of the contract45. Later authors would develop the main features of direct 
representation, namely that: (1) the agent directly binds the principal; (2) the 
agent must have acted in the name of the principal; (3) and the principal is not 
only an additional debtor but he is liable in place of the agent46. 
 Despite the increasingly elaborate doctrines allowing an agent to directly bind 
a principal, by the 18th century there was no doctrine of ‘direct representation’ as 
such, and in fact the terminology surrounding this point remained rather vague. 
Nonetheless, one may find elaborate accounts explaining exactly how a third 
person could validly conclude an agreement on behalf of someone else. 
Particularly detailed in this regard is the work of Pothier, who in his Traité des 
obligations dedicates considerable attention to the subject47. The author starts by 
claiming that the alteri stipulari rule only applies to those cases when someone acts 
on behalf of himself, which in fact deprives it from having any significance. This 
in turn implies that, whenever someone acts on behalf of another person, the 
                                                 
43  See Chapter 1, Section 1 above. 
44  For a general outlook on the evolution of direct representation since the glossators see 
Müller, Die Entwicklung (1969), p. 29 ff.; Zimmermann, Law of Obligations (1996), p. 41-
45, 54-58. 
45  Grotius, De Iure Belli ac Pacis (Aalen 1993), lib. 2, cap. 11, § 18: “quia consensus potest et 
per ministrum interponi ac significari. Velle enim censeor quod in alterius voluntate posui, 
si et ille velit”. 
46  Zimmermann, Law of Obligations (1996), p. 56-57. 
47  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 74-84 (p. 42-45). 
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43  See Chapter 1, Section 1 above. 
44  For a general outlook on the evolution of direct representation since the glossators see 
Müller, Die Entwicklung (1969), p. 29 ff.; Zimmermann, Law of Obligations (1996), p. 41-
45, 54-58. 
45  Grotius, De Iure Belli ac Pacis (Aalen 1993), lib. 2, cap. 11, § 18: “quia consensus potest et 
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47  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 74-84 (p. 42-45). 
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contract is in fact regarded as concluded by the person on whose behalf the agent 
acts48. He applies this doctrine to the contracts concluded by legal guardians such 
as tutores and curatores, but also those agreements concluded by a procureur 
(procurator). Pothier then makes clear that the contract concluded by the 
representative will only bind the principal if the agent does not exceed the 
faculties bestowed upon him, unless the owner is willing to ratify the act49. He 
also points out that the procureur must show the authorization granted by the 
principal to conclude the contract, which implies a protection for the contracting 
third party since no further agreements between the principal and the agent can 
be brought up in order to determine the scope of the faculties of the agent50. The 
other contracting party will for the same reason also be protected in case he did 
not know about the revocation of the authorization or the death of the 
principal51. Pothier moreover points out that the difference between the cases in 
which the agent concludes the contract in his own name and in the name of the 
principal is that in the latter case the principal is the party to the contract, while if 
the contract is concluded by an agent nomine proprio the principal can only be 
made liable through an actio exercitoria or institoria52. These rules are moreover 
applied to the partner who concludes a contract on behalf of the company and to 
the wife for the contracts concluded by her husband53. This detailed regulation 
shows that many of the features of the doctrine of direct representation had a 
clear outline already in the 18th century. 
 While the doctrine of direct representation expanded within the law of 
obligations, there was however no analogous development within property law. 
The analysis of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in particular 
experienced almost no changes, since the voluntas domini continued to be 
regarded in most cases as the decisive element to determine whether ownership 
was transferred or not by the non-owner, along with the existence of legal 
provisions authorizing someone to transfer ownership over someone else’s 
property. This is why Grotius, for instance, while contributing to the 
development of the doctrine of direct representation within the law of 
obligations, would in the context of the transfer of ownership simply require the 
                                                 
48  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 74 (p. 42): “Ce que nous avons dit jusqu’à 
présent, « que nous ne pouvions rien stipuler ni promettre que pour nous-mêmes, et non 
pour un autre », s’entend en ce sens que nous ne le pouvons, lorsque nous contractons en 
notre nom : mais nous pouvons prêter notre ministère à une autre personne afin de 
contracter pour elle, de stipuler et de promettre pour elle ; et, en ce cas, n’est pas 
proprement nous qui contractons, mais c’est cette personne qui contracte par notre 
ministère”. 
49  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 75-78 (p. 42-43). 
50  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 79 (p. 43). 
51  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 80-81 (p. 44). 
52  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 82 (p. 44-45). 
53  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 83-84 (p. 45). 
 
authorization of the owner for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner54. The 
initial irrelevance of the doctrine of direct representation for the transfer of 
ownership can be explained by the fact that there were no general dogmatic 
objections against the delivery by a non-owner. Accordingly, the new doctrine 
was only needed to overcome the limitations imposed by Roman law in the 
context of the law of obligations, but had no role to fulfill in the context of the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
 
c. Iusta causa traditionis, animus transferendi and potestas alienandi under the ius 
commune. 
 
It has been shown above that the existence of a voluntas domini in the context of 
the potestas alienandi was compatible with the essentially causal transfer system of 
Roman law55. In other words, the decisive importance of the iusta causa traditionis 
for the transfer of ownership did not imply that any further intent of the owner 
was irrelevant, and in fact Roman jurists did require the authorization of the 
owner at the time of the delivery when it was performed by a non-owner. One 
may however wonder whether the jurists of the ius commune confused the 
problem of the intent at the iusta causa traditionis with the voluntas domini in the 
context of the potestas alienandi, or whether the analysis of the animus transferendi 
dominii encompassed this latter problem. However, an analysis of the different 
opinions of medieval scholars does not suggest that their different approaches to 
the relevance of the iusta causa traditionis had any impact in the way they dealt 
with the voluntas domini at the delivery by a non-owner. Modern scholars have 
identified a significant number of opinions which could be labelled as ‘abstract’ or 
‘causal’ among glossators and commentators, including whether a causa putativa 
may be enough to transfer ownership, or the significance of the agreement of the 
parties at the time of the delivery56. Despite the different views which can be 
identified on this point, it should be noted that such controversies had no direct 
impact on the significance or systematization of the traditio voluntate domini57. This 
continued to be a decisive element to determine the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner, and was never systematized as a sub-topic of the iusta causa traditionis 
or the animus transferendi dominii. 
                                                 
54  Grotius, Inleidinge (ed. Dovring et al. 1965), 2,5,15 (p. 64): “De levering mag geschieden 
door den eighenaer zelf of door sijne ghemachtigde”. The text is translated in the 
following way by Lee, The jurisprudence (1953) I, p. 99: “Delivery may be made by the 
owner or by his agent”. Concerning the transfer of ownership by a non-owner based on a 
legal provision, see Grotius, Inleidinge (ed. Dovring et al. 1965), 2,5,17-18 (p. 65). 
55  Chapter 2, Section 6(a) above. 
56  See Dondorp et al., Levering (1991), p. 31 ff.; Van Vliet, Iusta causa traditionis (2003), p. 342 
ff.; Zwalve, Hoofdstukken (2006), p. 244-249; Miquel, Causa (2009), p. 69 ff. On the 
opinions of Bulgarus see moreover Wallinga, Los casus codicis (2005), p. 150, who sheds 
new light on the subject through the examination of the writings of Wilhelmus de 
Cabriano. 
57  See Chapter 8, Section 1(a) above. 
IUS COMMUNE AND THE LEGAL GROUNDS FOR THE TRANSFER OF 
OWNERSHIP BY A NON-OWNER UNTIL THE 19TH CENTURY
381
 
378 
contract is in fact regarded as concluded by the person on whose behalf the agent 
acts48. He applies this doctrine to the contracts concluded by legal guardians such 
as tutores and curatores, but also those agreements concluded by a procureur 
(procurator). Pothier then makes clear that the contract concluded by the 
representative will only bind the principal if the agent does not exceed the 
faculties bestowed upon him, unless the owner is willing to ratify the act49. He 
also points out that the procureur must show the authorization granted by the 
principal to conclude the contract, which implies a protection for the contracting 
third party since no further agreements between the principal and the agent can 
be brought up in order to determine the scope of the faculties of the agent50. The 
other contracting party will for the same reason also be protected in case he did 
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the wife for the contracts concluded by her husband53. This detailed regulation 
shows that many of the features of the doctrine of direct representation had a 
clear outline already in the 18th century. 
 While the doctrine of direct representation expanded within the law of 
obligations, there was however no analogous development within property law. 
The analysis of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in particular 
experienced almost no changes, since the voluntas domini continued to be 
regarded in most cases as the decisive element to determine whether ownership 
was transferred or not by the non-owner, along with the existence of legal 
provisions authorizing someone to transfer ownership over someone else’s 
property. This is why Grotius, for instance, while contributing to the 
development of the doctrine of direct representation within the law of 
obligations, would in the context of the transfer of ownership simply require the 
                                                 
48  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 74 (p. 42): “Ce que nous avons dit jusqu’à 
présent, « que nous ne pouvions rien stipuler ni promettre que pour nous-mêmes, et non 
pour un autre », s’entend en ce sens que nous ne le pouvons, lorsque nous contractons en 
notre nom : mais nous pouvons prêter notre ministère à une autre personne afin de 
contracter pour elle, de stipuler et de promettre pour elle ; et, en ce cas, n’est pas 
proprement nous qui contractons, mais c’est cette personne qui contracte par notre 
ministère”. 
49  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 75-78 (p. 42-43). 
50  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 79 (p. 43). 
51  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 80-81 (p. 44). 
52  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 82 (p. 44-45). 
53  Pothier, Traité des obligations (Paris 1861), nr. 83-84 (p. 45). 
 
authorization of the owner for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner54. The 
initial irrelevance of the doctrine of direct representation for the transfer of 
ownership can be explained by the fact that there were no general dogmatic 
objections against the delivery by a non-owner. Accordingly, the new doctrine 
was only needed to overcome the limitations imposed by Roman law in the 
context of the law of obligations, but had no role to fulfill in the context of the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
 
c. Iusta causa traditionis, animus transferendi and potestas alienandi under the ius 
commune. 
 
It has been shown above that the existence of a voluntas domini in the context of 
the potestas alienandi was compatible with the essentially causal transfer system of 
Roman law55. In other words, the decisive importance of the iusta causa traditionis 
for the transfer of ownership did not imply that any further intent of the owner 
was irrelevant, and in fact Roman jurists did require the authorization of the 
owner at the time of the delivery when it was performed by a non-owner. One 
may however wonder whether the jurists of the ius commune confused the 
problem of the intent at the iusta causa traditionis with the voluntas domini in the 
context of the potestas alienandi, or whether the analysis of the animus transferendi 
dominii encompassed this latter problem. However, an analysis of the different 
opinions of medieval scholars does not suggest that their different approaches to 
the relevance of the iusta causa traditionis had any impact in the way they dealt 
with the voluntas domini at the delivery by a non-owner. Modern scholars have 
identified a significant number of opinions which could be labelled as ‘abstract’ or 
‘causal’ among glossators and commentators, including whether a causa putativa 
may be enough to transfer ownership, or the significance of the agreement of the 
parties at the time of the delivery56. Despite the different views which can be 
identified on this point, it should be noted that such controversies had no direct 
impact on the significance or systematization of the traditio voluntate domini57. This 
continued to be a decisive element to determine the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner, and was never systematized as a sub-topic of the iusta causa traditionis 
or the animus transferendi dominii. 
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 From the 16th century onwards jurists were increasingly concerned with 
offering a more complete systematization regarding the requirements for the 
transfer of ownership. However, even in this context we see that jurists draw no 
direct link between the problem of the iusta causa traditionis and the voluntas 
domini which enables the non-owner to transfer ownership. Both problems are 
indeed neatly kept apart by Donellus in his Commentarii de iure civili58, who 
distinguishes that, in order to transfer ownership, the transferor must be able to 
transfer ownership (potestas rei transferendae), to have the intent to do so 
(transferendi voluntas) and to perform the delivery59. Moreover, when dealing with 
the potestas alienandi, Donellus mentions that a non-owner can transfer ownership 
if he acts voluntate domini60. Accordingly, even when some of the opinions of 
Donellus concerning the transfer of ownership by traditio have been considered to 
agree with an abstract transfer system61 – inspiring in fact the views of Savigny – 
there does not seem to be any link between the evolving views on the iusta causa 
traditionis and the role of the voluntas domini at the delivery by a non-owner. Later 
authors would also keep both problems apart62. Particularly illustrative at this 
regard is Pothier, who lists as the requirements for the transfer ownership by 
delivery: (1) that the transferor is the owner, or is authorized by the owner; (2) 
that the transferor is not affected by a prohibition to dispose; (3) a title for the 
delivery, either real or putative; and (4) an agreement of the parties at the 
delivery63. This systematization shows that the problem of the authorization to 
dispose is not discussed under the analysis of the iusta causa traditionis – 
requirement nr. 3 – or the animus transferendi dominii – requirement nr. 4 – but 
rather as part of the general problem of the faculty to dispose. Similar 
constructions are even to be found in the early 19th century. In the Netherlands, 
                                                 
58  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15 (I, col. 729 ff.). 
59  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 3 (I, col. 731): “In dante 
tria necessaria ad transferendum. Primum, ut possit jure transferre: secundum, ut velit; 
tertium, ut quod potest, & vult, id ita transferat, quod fit traditione. Ita in summa in dante 
tria haec spectanda sunt, potestas rei transferendae; transferendi voluntas; &, quae ista 
perficit, traditio”. 
60  Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 8 (I, col. 742-744). 
61  Van Vliet, Transfer of movables (2000), p. 179-181. See in particular Donellus, Commentarii 
de iure civili (Rome 1828), lib. 4, cap. 15, § 9 (I, col. 733-734). 
62  See e.g. Grotius, Inleidinge (ed. Dovring et al. 1965), 2,5,2 and 2,5,15; Vinnius, 
Jurisprudentiae contractae (Rotterdam 1664), cap. 20 (p. 53); Huber, Heedendaegse Rechts-
geleertheyt (Leeuwarden 1686), 2,9 (p. 147); Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (Paris 1829), 
ad D. 41,1,35 (IV, p. 108-109); Heineccius, Elementa Iuris Civilis Secundum Ordinem 
Institutionum (Venice 1764), §§ 380-384 (p. 137-139); Heineccius, Elementa Juris Civilis 
secundum ordinem Pandectarum (Utrecht 1772), §§ 192-195 (p. 156-157); Heineccius, 
Recitationes in elementa juris civilis (Bratislava 1773), §§ 379-384 (p. 241-243). 
63  Pothier, Traité du droit du domaine (Paris/Orléans 1772), nr. 218 (p. 212): “Il faut, 1°. que 
celui qui fait à quelqu’un la tradition d’une chose, en soit le propriétaire, ou la fasse du 
consentement du propriétaire. Il faut, 2°. Que ce propriétaire qui fait la tradition ou qui la 
consent, soit capable d’aliéner. 3°. Il faut que la tradition soit faite en vertu d’un titre vrai 
ou du moins putatif, de nature à transférer la propriété. 4°. Il faut enfin le consentement 
des parties…” 
 
for instance, the 1807/1808 Draft Code for Holland by Van der Linden64 
established as the first requirement for the transfer of ownership by delivery “that 
it [the delivery] is performed by the owner of the asset, or by someone else with 
his authorization”65, an idea which was preserved with almost the exact same 
words in the adapted version of the French Civil Codes promulgated in the 
Netherlands in 180966. Apart from this requirement, Van der Linden required 
separately for the transfer of ownership by delivery both a proper title and that 
the delivery was performed with the intent to transfer ownership67, requirements 
which made their way into the Wetboek Napoleon of 1809 (art. 589)68. This shows 
that the analysis of the authorization to dispose given by the owner was still 
approached independently from the iusta causa traditionis and the animus 
transferendi dominii. 
 
2. Direct representation and potestas alienandi in German scholarship 
until the BGB 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, the development of the doctrine of direct 
representation originally did not bring any direct consequences for the analysis of 
the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. There was no need to resort to such 
doctrine, since Roman law provided clear rules regarding the potestas alienandi of 
non-owners. Nonetheless, the historical reconstruction of the evolution of direct 
representation in Roman sources given by Mühlenbruch and Savigny69 brought a 
radical change in this regard, due to the fact that they considered that the cases of 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner described in the sources were in fact cases 
of direct representation. This doctrine had important consequences for the study 
of Roman law, as shown in Part I of this work, but it was also decisive for the 
study of modern private law due to the fact that, from that time onwards, the 
                                                 
64  Among the recent literature on Joannes van der Linden and his Draft see Wallinga, Joannes 
van der Linden (2010), p. 563-568, who moreover studies the significance of this work for 
the subsequent Wetboek Napoleon of 1809 by analysing the provisions on the law of delict 
(p. 568-577). 
65  Van der Linden, Ontwerp BW 1807/1808 (1967), p. 80, art. 23: “Om traditie of levering 
bestaanbaar te doen zijn, is het nodig: a. Dat zij gedaan worde door den Eigenaar van het 
Goed, of door een ander met zijne toestemming…” The article also requires (letter b) that 
the transferor must have the faculty to transfer ownership, which would therefore seem to 
make reference to the absence of prohibitions to dispose. Also in the context of pledge 
(p. 84, art. 4) the project refers to the authorization (toestemming) of the owner. 
66  Wetboek Napoleon ingerigt voor het Koningrijk Holland (1809), art. 589: “Om levering 
bestaanbaar te doen zijn, is het noodig: 1°. Dat zij gedaan worde door den eigenaar van het 
goed, of door een ander met zijne toestemming…” 
67  Van der Linden, Ontwerp BW 1807/1808 (1967), p. 80, art. 23: “Om traditie of levering 
bestaanbaar te doen zijn, is het nodig: (…) c. Dat zij gedaan worde op grond van verkoop, 
of van eenigen anderen titel, die geschikt is om eigendom overtedragen. d. Dat zij gedaan 
worden met het blijkbaar oogmerk, den eigendom te doen overgaan”. 
68  See on this text Bergervoet, Goederenrechtelijke overeenkomst (2009), p. 37. 
69  See Chapter 1, Section 1 above. 
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 From the 16th century onwards jurists were increasingly concerned with 
offering a more complete systematization regarding the requirements for the 
transfer of ownership. However, even in this context we see that jurists draw no 
direct link between the problem of the iusta causa traditionis and the voluntas 
domini which enables the non-owner to transfer ownership. Both problems are 
indeed neatly kept apart by Donellus in his Commentarii de iure civili58, who 
distinguishes that, in order to transfer ownership, the transferor must be able to 
transfer ownership (potestas rei transferendae), to have the intent to do so 
(transferendi voluntas) and to perform the delivery59. Moreover, when dealing with 
the potestas alienandi, Donellus mentions that a non-owner can transfer ownership 
if he acts voluntate domini60. Accordingly, even when some of the opinions of 
Donellus concerning the transfer of ownership by traditio have been considered to 
agree with an abstract transfer system61 – inspiring in fact the views of Savigny – 
there does not seem to be any link between the evolving views on the iusta causa 
traditionis and the role of the voluntas domini at the delivery by a non-owner. Later 
authors would also keep both problems apart62. Particularly illustrative at this 
regard is Pothier, who lists as the requirements for the transfer ownership by 
delivery: (1) that the transferor is the owner, or is authorized by the owner; (2) 
that the transferor is not affected by a prohibition to dispose; (3) a title for the 
delivery, either real or putative; and (4) an agreement of the parties at the 
delivery63. This systematization shows that the problem of the authorization to 
dispose is not discussed under the analysis of the iusta causa traditionis – 
requirement nr. 3 – or the animus transferendi dominii – requirement nr. 4 – but 
rather as part of the general problem of the faculty to dispose. Similar 
constructions are even to be found in the early 19th century. In the Netherlands, 
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for instance, the 1807/1808 Draft Code for Holland by Van der Linden64 
established as the first requirement for the transfer of ownership by delivery “that 
it [the delivery] is performed by the owner of the asset, or by someone else with 
his authorization”65, an idea which was preserved with almost the exact same 
words in the adapted version of the French Civil Codes promulgated in the 
Netherlands in 180966. Apart from this requirement, Van der Linden required 
separately for the transfer of ownership by delivery both a proper title and that 
the delivery was performed with the intent to transfer ownership67, requirements 
which made their way into the Wetboek Napoleon of 1809 (art. 589)68. This shows 
that the analysis of the authorization to dispose given by the owner was still 
approached independently from the iusta causa traditionis and the animus 
transferendi dominii. 
 
2. Direct representation and potestas alienandi in German scholarship 
until the BGB 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, the development of the doctrine of direct 
representation originally did not bring any direct consequences for the analysis of 
the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. There was no need to resort to such 
doctrine, since Roman law provided clear rules regarding the potestas alienandi of 
non-owners. Nonetheless, the historical reconstruction of the evolution of direct 
representation in Roman sources given by Mühlenbruch and Savigny69 brought a 
radical change in this regard, due to the fact that they considered that the cases of 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner described in the sources were in fact cases 
of direct representation. This doctrine had important consequences for the study 
of Roman law, as shown in Part I of this work, but it was also decisive for the 
study of modern private law due to the fact that, from that time onwards, the 
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transfer of ownership by a non-owner was approached under the theoretical 
framework of the doctrine of direct representation. 
 After the works of Mühlenbruch and Savigny, scholars vividly discussed the 
significance of Stellvertretung in the context of the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner70. It is however noteworthy that no one objected the idea of resorting to 
this notion in the context of the law of property in the first place. This 
phenomenon may be explained due to the vague features which the notion of 
direct representation still had during part of the 19th century. For instance, the 
contemplatio domini was in fact not unanimously seen as a decisive element identify 
the existence of Stellvertretung, and in fact Exner considered that a non-owner 
who delivered or acquired as a Stellvertreter did not necessarily have to act nomine 
alieno71. Accordingly, for German scholars the term Stellvertreter must have seem 
simply the most adequate to describe the situation of a non-owner who delivers 
an object of the principal, without pretending to attach a very specific technical 
meaning to it.  
 Since the doctrine of direct representation became progressively elaborate, the 
authors who considered that direct representation necessarily involved the 
contemplatio domini soon felt the need to provide an equally clear dogmatic 
framework for those acts which were concluded by an agent who did not act on 
behalf of the principal. The problem was particularly complex regarding the cases 
in which a non-owner carried out nomine proprio a legal act which involved a 
patrimonial loss for the owner, as was the case regarding the transfer of 
ownership. To explain how ownership could be transferred when the non-
owner acted nomine proprio – as happens in the sale by a commission agent – the 
notion of Ermächtigung (authorization) was developed. Jhering72 is often credited 
with having offered a clear distinction between Stellvertretung and Ermächtigung73, 
but previous authors already had developed the basic points of this distinction74. 
Be it as it may, scholars found in these notions a dogmatic framework to explain 
a series of cases where an individual directly affected the legal sphere of another 
one without acting as his direct representative, and particularly the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner nomine proprio75. It could therefore seem as if the 
German Ermächtigung was a revitalized version of the reference to the voluntas 
domini in Roman law76, but the great difference is that the Ermächtigung only 
governs cases of indirect representation, i.e. when the non-owner acts nomine 
                                                 
70  See e.g. Jhering, Mitwirkung I (1857), p. 303 ff.; Von Scheurl, Zur Verhandlung (1858), p. 3 
ff.; Exner, Rechtserwerb durch Tradition (1867), p. 125 ff.; Hellmann, Stellvertretung (1882), 
p. 111-112; Bekker, Pandektenrecht (1889) II, p. 212 note i (§ 106). 
71  Exner, Rechtserwerb durch Tradition (1867), p. 128; p. 135 n. 36; p. 139 n. 46. 
72  Jhering, Mitwirkung II (1858), p. 75 ff., 131 ff. 
73  E.g. Schlossmann, Stellvertretung (1900) I, p. 295 (§ 27). 
74  See e.g. Wächter, Handbuch (1842) II, p. 684-685 n. 2 (§ 89). 
75  Bekker, Pandektenrecht (1889) II, p. 210-219 (§ 106); Lenel, Stellvertretung und Vollmacht 
(1896), p. 9-13; Windscheid, Pandektenrecht (1900) I, p. 358-360 (§ 81). 
76  See e.g. Hellmann, Stellvertretung (1882), p. 111-112. 
 
proprio. For alienations performed by a non-owner nomine alieno, the ground of 
the transfer of ownership in German scholarship was the doctrine of 
Stellvertretung. Accordingly, German scholars maintained a clear distinction 
between two different legal grounds for the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner77: on the one hand, whenever the non-owner delivers nomine alieno – 
regardless of whether he was authorized to do so by the owner or by a legal 
provision – ownership would be transferred under the framework of the doctrine 
of direct representation (Stellvertretung); on the other hand, when the non-owner 
delivers nomine proprio, the more specific doctrine of Ermächtigung will serve as the 
legal basis for the transfer of ownership78. This systematization was however not 
always perfectly clear, and for instance Bekker dealt both with the delivery 
nomine alieno and nomine proprio under the general notion of Ermächtigung79.  
 The developments which took place in the 19th century made their way to 
the German BGB, which in §§ 164-181 laid down the rules concerning 
Stellvertretung and Vollmacht. The transfer of ownership by a non-owner 
delivering nomine domini was understood to fall within these provisions, which is 
why the commissioners of the code considered that a separate paragraph had to 
be laid down for the situations where the delivery took place nomine proprio, as 
was the case regarding the sale by commission agents80. This led to the insertion 
of § 185, which explicitly declares that a non-owner can validly transfer 
ownership if he performs the delivery with the consent of the owner81. Nothing 
is said in this provision concerning the contemplatio domini, but it has always been 
clear that this text only applies to the transfer of ownership which is performed 
nomine proprio, outside the boundaries of direct representation82. Since the 
promulgation of the BGB, German scholars have upheld the basic distinction 
between Stellvertretung in general – or Vollmacht in particular – and Ermächtigung as 
different grounds for the faculty to dispose of the non-owner, thereby preserving 
them as two different legal grounds for the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner83. Nonetheless, there have been dissenting opinions. Bekker insisted in his 
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idea of bringing the notion of Vollmacht under the general concept of 
Ermächtigung when approaching the transfer of ownership84, but this view found 
no subscribers. Other authors would instead bring the notions of Stellvertretung 
and Ermächtigung under the concept of Einwilligung85. These constructions had the 
advantage of offering a common set of rules for both problems, but most jurists 
were not interested in this goal, developing instead separate sets of rules for the 
most frequent forms of Ermächtigung86, among which the Verfügungsermächtigung 
(authorization to dispose) is arguably the most controversial. 
 
3. Unequal impact of the doctrine of direct representation in property 
law 
 
a. European impact. 
 
The ideas of German scholarship concerning the main features of the doctrine of 
direct representation had a deep impact across Europe, since they offered a 
detailed approach to the legal relations arising between principal, agent and the 
third party, including the problem of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner 
acting on behalf of the owner. Under the German influence, it became suddenly 
clear that the transfer of ownership by a non-owner would fall under the 
doctrine of direct representation as long as the delivery took place in the name of 
the owner. This in turn meant that a special legal basis had to be identified for 
those cases of delivery by a non-owner acting nomine proprio. The German 
codifier laid down a particular provision – BGB § 185 (1) – to explain how 
ownership could be transferred, but most European jurisdictions lacked an 
analogous provision, which set scholars on the quest to find a clear legal basis to 
explain how ownership is transferred in such cases87. While it remains largely 
unclear up to this day what the exact rules for the transfer of ownership by an 
indirect representative are, most European scholars are in any case certain that 
there are two different legal grounds for the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner depending on whether the alienation is concluded in the context of direct 
or indirect representation, thereby subscribing to the basic German distinction 
between Stellvertretung and Ermächtigung. This dogmatic framework is to be found 
                                                                                                                   
(1915), p. 10; Ladwig, Verfügung (1916), p. 6-7; Ludewig, Ermächtigung (1922), p. 1 ff., 55-
56; Siebert, Treuhandverhältnis (1933), p. 253-254; Müller-Freienfels, Die Vertretung (1955), 
p. 98-103; Raich, Ermächtigung (1962), p. 8-20; Thiele, Zustimmungen (1966), p. 146-156; 
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(2015), § 185 nr. 2 and 21. 
84  Bekker, Sprachliches und Sachliches (1905), p. 8-9. 
85  Ladwig, Verfügung (1916), p. 6-7; Stoll, Die Ermächtigung (1935), p. 33. 
86  Finkenauer, §§ 182-185 (2003), p. 970. 
87  See on this point Chapter 8, Section 4 below.  
 
not only among delivery-based systems – such as Austria88, the Netherlands89, 
Spain90 or Switzerland91 – but also in consensual transfer systems – such as 
Belgium92, France93, Italy94 and Portugal95. The distinction between two different 
legal grounds for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner became therefore a 
common feature of European legal scholarship, and even made its way into the 
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). On the one hand, DCFR II. – 
6:105 governs the cases in which the acts of the agent will directly affect the 
principal in the context of direct representation. On the other hand, DCFR VIII. 
– 2:101(1)(c) determines that ownership will be transferred if “the transferor has 
the right or authority to transfer the ownership”. While these provisions are not 
particularly expressive on their own of the distinction between Stellvertretung and 
Ermächtigung – quite like the BGB itself – the comments on the DCFR explicitly 
declare that the idea of “authority to transfer ownership” refers only to the 
delivery performed by an indirect representative, such as a commission agent, 
while the delivery on behalf of the owner would be governed by the rules on 
direct representation96. This explains why DCFR VIII. – 2:302 (2)97 discusses, 
under the section of “Special Constellations”, the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner acting as an indirect representative, providing thus a rule equivalent to 
that of BGB § 185 (1) so that it is perfectly clear that ownership can also be 
transferred in the context of indirect representation98. 
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b. Latin American jurisdictions, and particularly Chile. 
 
While the sharp distinction between rules governing the transfer of ownership in 
cases of direct and indirect representation became completely dominant in 
Europe, it is worth noting that other jurisdictions did not follow this path, due to 
the fact that they never approached direct representation as an immediate legal 
basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. A first eloquent example in 
this regard is to be found in Latin American legal systems, particularly through 
the decisive influence of the Chilean Civil Code (1856). This codification, 
written by the Venezuelan Andrés Bello, is particularly interesting on this point 
due to the detailed regulations concerning the transfer of ownership, which 
attempted to lay down a transfer system which was faithful to Roman and 
Castilian law99. When it comes to the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, it is 
worth noting that while Bello does make a reference to the institution of direct 
representation, he did not present direct representation as the legal basis in itself 
for the transfer of ownership. The basic rules on the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner were laid down in art. 671, which defines the transferor (tradente) as 
the person who transfers ownership over the object delivered by himself or in his 
name (a su nombre)100. The reference to the contemplatio domini could seem to 
indicate that this is a decisive element for the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner. However, in art. 671(2) we are told that the non-owner can transfer 
ownership in the context of the contract of mandate or as a legal representative, 
while art. 671(3) explicitly applies this idea to the forced alienations concluded by 
a judge101. The doctrine of direct representation never appears on its own as a 
ground for the transfer of ownership, and in fact art. 671(4) simply indicates that 
the delivery done by an authorized agent in the context of a contract of mandate 
will be regarded as performed by the owner102. Considering that art. 2151 
explicitly declared that the contract of mandate could be carried out in the name 
of the principal or not103, it becomes clear that the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner will be regarded as performed by the owner whether the delivery is 
performed nomine alieno or nomine proprio. This explains why Bello did not simply 
leave the problem of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner to the general 
                                                 
99  See on this point Bello, Código Civil (1981) I, p. 455. 
100  Chilean Civil Code (1856), art. 671(1): “Se llama tradente la persona que por la tradición 
transfiere el dominio de la cosa entregada por el o a su nombre…”  
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103  Chilean Civil Code (1856), art. 2151: “El mandatario puede, en el ejercicio de su cargo, 
contratar a su propio nombre o al del mandante; si contrata a su propio nombre, no obliga 
respecto de terceros al mandante”. 
 
rules on direct representation of art. 1448104, but instead laid down a particular 
article which governs the faculty to dispose within the general provisions for the 
transfer of ownership by delivery. This is a completely different systematic 
approach from that which the German BGB would later adopt, since in this code 
the rules on Stellvertretung and Ermächtigung are to be found within the Allgemeiner 
Teil, while the rules regarding the transfer of ownership of §§ 925 ff. are silent 
regarding the transfer of ownership by an authorized non-owner.  
 Since the doctrine of direct representation is not presented in the Chilean 
Civil Code as a ground for the transfer of ownership on its own, there is no need 
to identify a separate legal basis for the alienation concluded nomine proprio by a 
non-owner. This has spared scholars from the complications which this problem 
has raised in Europe. In fact, the interpreters of the code would emphasize the 
importance of the consent of the owner for the delivery by a non-owner, while 
the contemplatio domini appears only relevant for the delivery by legal 
representatives. This is why Claro Solar, one of the interpreters of the Code, 
would draw a direct link between art. 671 and D. 41,1,9,4, since in both cases 
the voluntas domini appears to be decisive to determine whether ownership is 
transferred105.  
 The ideas of Bello would have a decisive influence in different Latin 
American jurisdictions due to the impact of his Code, which was adopted by 
several other nations. Accordingly, the rules concerning the transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner are also to be found in the Civil Codes of Ecuador (art. 687), el 
Salvador (art. 652), Honduras (art. 698) and Colombia (art. 741). The Code of 
Bello also influenced other Civil Codes on this point, such as that of Uruguay 
(1868), which declares in art. 769 that the delivery must be performed by the 
owner or his representative (por el dueño o su representante), which could appear to 
grant a central role to the direct representation at the delivery by a non-owner. 
However, art. 775 (2) discusses the problem of the delivery which has not been 
made or consented by the owner (no ha sido hecha o consentida por el verdadero 
dueño), which shows that the consent of the owner is the decisive element to 
determine the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
 The influence of the Code of Bello in several Latin American jurisdictions has 
rendered unnecessary any distinction equivalent to that made by German scholars 
between Stellvertretung and Ermächtigung106. It is moreover worth noting that in 
some legal systems where the rules on the transfer of ownership by a non-owner 
                                                 
104  Chilean Civil Code (1856), art. 1448: “Lo que una persona ejecuta a nombre de otra, 
estando facultada por ella o por la ley para representarla, produce respecto del representado 
iguales efectos que si hubiese contratado él mismo”. 
105  Claro Solar, Explicaciones (1932) VII, p. 257: “No es necesario, sin embargo, que sea el 
mismo propietario de la cosa quien efectúe la tradición; pues basta que otra persona lo haga 
con su consentimiento o en su representación y a su nombre. Nihil autem interest utrum ipse 
dominus per se tradat alicui rem, an voluntate ejus aliquis”. 
106  Concerning the Latin American jurisdictions which adopted the French transfer system see 
Guzmán, La tradición (2015), p. 338-339. 
UNEQUAL IMPACT OF THE DOCTRINE OF DIRECT REPRESENTATION 
IN PROPERTY LAW
389
 
386 
b. Latin American jurisdictions, and particularly Chile. 
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101  Chilean Civil Code (1856), art. 671: “(2) Pueden entregar y recibir a nombre del dueño 
sus mandatarios, o sus representantes legales. (3) En las ventas forzadas que se hacen por 
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trasfiere es el tradente, y el juez su representante legal”. 
102  Chilean Civil Code (1856), art. 671(4): “La tradición hecha por o a un mandatario 
debidamente autorizado, se entiende hecha por o a el respectivo mandante”. 
103  Chilean Civil Code (1856), art. 2151: “El mandatario puede, en el ejercicio de su cargo, 
contratar a su propio nombre o al del mandante; si contrata a su propio nombre, no obliga 
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were not so clearly laid down, scholars avoided in any case to introduce sharp 
distinctions based on the significance of the contemplatio domini. For instance, 
while the old Argentinian Civil Code (1869) prescribed in general terms that 
possession could only be transferred with the consent of the owner107, 
Argentinian scholars developed with independence to this rule the notion of 
legitimacy (legitimación) to discuss the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, 
covering in a uniform way the cases of both direct and indirect representation108. 
This notion made its way into the new Civil Code109, preventing future 
misunderstandings on the point. Other Latin American jurisdictions were 
however directly influenced by the developments in Europe. This was the case in 
Mexico, where scholars imported the discussion concerning the legal grounds for 
the transfer of ownership by an indirect representative under the idea that direct 
representation in itself is a legal basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner110. 
 The rules concerning the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in several 
Latin American jurisdictions show a different evolution to that experienced by 
European legal systems, since direct representation is not presented as a legal basis 
on its own for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, and therefore there is 
no basic distinction on the point which corresponds to that of Stellvertretung and 
Ermächtigung.  
 
c. Mixed jurisdictions. 
 
Leaving aside the analysis of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in Latin 
America, there are some mixed jurisdictions were direct representation is not 
approached on its own as a legal basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner. This is for instance the case of South Africa, where the basic distinctions 
of Roman-Dutch law have continued to play a central role regarding the transfer 
of ownership by a non-owner. Accordingly, the only decisive element to 
determine if ownership is transferred or not by a non-owner is whether he is 
authorized to do so by the owner or by a legal provision111. South African legal 
scholars have not been forced to identify an independent legal basis for the 
transfer of ownership nomine alieno, but have remained loyal to the basic 
guidelines of the ius commune regarding the potestas alienandi. Similarly, Scottish 
                                                 
107  Argentinian Civil Code (1869), art. 2381: “La posesión de las cosas muebles se toma 
únicamente por la tradición entre personas capaces, consintiendo el actual poseedor en la 
transmisión de la posesión”. See also art. 2382. 
108  López de Zavalía, Teoría (1997), p. 250-251; Lorenzetti, Tratado (1999) II, p. 159-161. 
109  New Argentinian Civil Code (2014), art. 1892 (6): “Para que el título y el modo sean 
suficientes para adquirir un derecho real, sus otorgantes deben ser capaces y estar 
legitimados al efecto”. 
110  Barrera, Representación voluntaria (1967), p. 34-38; Salazar, La venta (2011), p. 261-262. 
111  Carey Miller, The Acquisition (1986), p. 118-120, 324; Badenhorst/Pienaar/Mostert, Law of 
Property (2006), p. 73. 
 
authors have upheld that it is decisive for the transfer of ownership by an agent 
that he is authorized to do so112. Whether the agent discloses who the principal is 
does not feature as a decisive element to determine the legal grounds of the 
alienation, although it may be relevant for other purposes113. Accordingly, the 
case of the delivery performed nomine alieno has not led to any problems in 
Scottish private law114. 
 The fact that South African and Scottish scholars have not identified two 
different legal grounds for the transfer of ownership depending on the contemplatio 
domini is explained due to the influence of the Common law institution of 
agency115, where the doctrine of undisclosed agency leaves no room for a sharp 
distinction between direct and indirect representation. Such terms are in fact 
alien to the English legal system, where an agent acting nomine proprio may 
nonetheless directly bind the principal116. The main element to determine the 
consequences following from the acts of the agent is that he does not exceed the 
authority granted to him. This explains why mixed jurisdictions which have not 
adhered to the doctrine of direct representation – as modelled by German 
scholarship – have maintained the traditional reference to the authorization of the 
owner as the ground for the validity of the delivery by a non-owner. This in turn 
implies that, in the context of the transfer of ownership, the agent who acts 
nomine proprio is not a problematic and unsystematic figure. This seems to be the 
case in Louisiana as well117, where the doctrine of undisclosed agency has also 
been applied in matters of property law118. Accordingly, the uniform approach in 
mixed jurisdictions to different cases of agency, which focuses on the existence of 
authority rather than on the contemplatio domini, has spared jurists in these latitudes 
from the complications arising from the direct application of the doctrine of 
direct representation to the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
 
                                                 
112  Reid et al., Law of property (1996), p. 541-542 (nr. 670). 
113  Gloag/Candlish Henderson, Law of Scotland (1995), p. 367 (nr. 22.21), commenting the 
contracts concluded by someone openly acting as an agent but without disclosing who the 
principal is: “In the case of goods in the auction room he [the auctioneer] impliedly 
undertakes to deliver them, but not that the purchaser will obtain a good title”. 
114  Carey Miller et al., National Report Scotland (2009), p. 381-385. 
115  For the influence of the English law of agency in mixed jurisdictions see 
Verhagen/Macgregor, Agency (2012), p. 57-58. Concerning South Africa and Scotland, see 
Gloag/Candlish Henderson, Law of Scotland (1995), p. 364-368; Forte/van Niekerk, Agency 
(2004), p. 240-270; Macgregor, Agency (2006), p. 135-150; Carey Miller et al., National 
Report Scotland (2009), p. 383-384. 
116  Verhagen/Macgregor, Agency (2012), p. 54-57. 
117  Regarding the law of agency in Louisiana see North, Qui facit (1998), p. 279-326; 
Holmes/Symeonides, Representation (1999), p. 1087-1159. 
118  See North, Qui facit (1998), p. 296-297; Holmes/Symeonides, Representation (1999), 
p. 1139-1140, regarding a case of acquisition of property (Sentell v. Richardson). 
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112  Reid et al., Law of property (1996), p. 541-542 (nr. 670). 
113  Gloag/Candlish Henderson, Law of Scotland (1995), p. 367 (nr. 22.21), commenting the 
contracts concluded by someone openly acting as an agent but without disclosing who the 
principal is: “In the case of goods in the auction room he [the auctioneer] impliedly 
undertakes to deliver them, but not that the purchaser will obtain a good title”. 
114  Carey Miller et al., National Report Scotland (2009), p. 381-385. 
115  For the influence of the English law of agency in mixed jurisdictions see 
Verhagen/Macgregor, Agency (2012), p. 57-58. Concerning South Africa and Scotland, see 
Gloag/Candlish Henderson, Law of Scotland (1995), p. 364-368; Forte/van Niekerk, Agency 
(2004), p. 240-270; Macgregor, Agency (2006), p. 135-150; Carey Miller et al., National 
Report Scotland (2009), p. 383-384. 
116  Verhagen/Macgregor, Agency (2012), p. 54-57. 
117  Regarding the law of agency in Louisiana see North, Qui facit (1998), p. 279-326; 
Holmes/Symeonides, Representation (1999), p. 1087-1159. 
118  See North, Qui facit (1998), p. 296-297; Holmes/Symeonides, Representation (1999), 
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4. Stellvertretung and Ermächtigung: dogmatic and practical challenges 
 
a. Indirect representation and the transfer of ownership, a modern enigma. 
 
The distinction which became widespread in Europe between the cases of direct 
and indirect representation as two different legal grounds for the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner brought along a series of dogmatic and practical 
problems which had not troubled the jurists until the 19th century. The main 
reason for this development is that, for the first time, the contemplatio domini 
appeared as a decisive element in order to distinguish two different legal grounds 
for the passing of ownership. This presented scholars the challenge of 
determining the rules governing each different group of cases. Regarding the 
transfer of ownership in the context of direct representation, the delivery nomine 
alieno seemed to fall quite naturally under the general rules developed during the 
19th century for this legal institution. The situation was rather different regarding 
the delivery in the context of indirect representation, where there was no clear 
legal basis to explain how ownership could be transferred by a non-owner. The 
discussion soon focused around the problem of subjective rights, and particularly 
around the question of whether the faculty to transfer ownership – which could 
be exercised by the owner or by a non-owner – should be considered as part of 
the ownership which was transferred. A particularly famous explanation was 
offered in this point by Thon119, who claimed that the faculty to dispose was 
independent from the ownership which was transferred. According to this 
author, it was not possible to consider the faculty to dispose, which was an 
element that leads to the transfer of ownership, to be at the same time part of the 
right which is transferred. Thon illustrated this idea by claiming that if someone 
casts a stone, one cannot say that the stone gave the strength to cast it; instead, 
the faculty to throw it was in the agent, and not in the object which was 
thrown120. This construction would therefore explain how it was possible for 
someone different than the owner to exercise the faculty to dispose121. 
 It is worth recalling at this point that already Vitoria and Suárez had related 
the problem of the faculty to dispose with the notion of subjective rights, but 
that their ideas on the subject remained largely ignored by scholars dealing with 
the potestas alienandi122. There was in fact no practical need to resort to such 
constructions, considering that the rules governing the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner were not a controverted subject during the 16th century. It is 
therefore eloquent that the relationship between both problems would surface 
again in the course of the 19th century, the reason being precisely the lack of 
clarity concerning the legal basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner 
                                                 
119  Thon, Rechtsnorm (1878), p. 325 ff. 
120  Thon, Rechtsnorm (1878), p. 328. 
121  Thon, Rechtsnorm (1878), p. 329-333. 
122  See Chapter 8, Section 1(a) above. 
 
acting nomine proprio. In this context, resorting to the idea of subjective rights 
seemed to offer a basic legal framework to explain a group of cases which 
appeared to be otherwise difficult to systematize.  
 While jurists gradually provided a basic legal framework for the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner outside the cases of direct representation through the 
discussion on the content of subjective rights, the German codifier considered 
that it was in any case necessary to lay down a specific rule governing such cases. 
Otherwise, it would appear that there was no legal basis for the transfer of 
ownership in cases such as that of commission agents. Other systems had no 
particular provision on the subject, which led scholars to question whether 
ownership could be transferred at all by a non-owner acting as an indirect 
representative. The question was of course particularly urgent in those legal 
systems where there was no specific provision on the subject, but even among 
German scholars the theoretical niceties regarding the Verfügungsermächtigung were 
far from clear. A similar problem took place in the Netherlands under the new 
BW, where the preparatory works clearly stated that a non-owner acting nomine 
proprio could transfer ownership123. Nonetheless, it remained unclear how exactly 
did the passing of ownership take place. In other words, even if in some 
jurisdictions it was perfectly clear that an authorized indirect representative could 
transfer ownership, this case remained a rather unsystematic exception to the 
general rules of direct representation which was difficult to explain. A proper 
theoretical framework had to be found for this problem, which led to an 
abundant literature across Europe dealing with the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner acting nomine proprio124. 
 The discussion on the nature of the faculty to dispose has to a large extent a 
theoretical nature, featuring lengthy scholarly debates on the legal nature of the 
faculty to dispose and particularly its relation with the notion of subjective rights 
                                                 
123  Meijers, Toelichting (1954) I, p. 220, commenting art. 3.4.2.5. 
124  See for Austria, see: Bydlinksi, Der Inhalt (1967), p. 356. For Belgium: De Visscher, Jus 
abutendi (1913), p. 337-350; Van Gerven, Handels- en economisch recht 1.B (1989), p. 495 
(nr. 518); Samoy, Middellijke vertegenwoordiging (2005), p. 322-329; Jansen, Nemo plus 
(2009), p. 443; Del Corral, Leveringsplicht (2013), p. 370-377. For France: Guiho, Actes de 
disposition (1954), p. 1-37; Lotti, Droit de disposer (1999). For Germany: Ludewig, 
Ermächtigung (1922), p. 74 ff.; Raape, Zustimmung und Verfügung (1923), p. 257-296; Doris, 
Ermächtigung (1974), p. 35 ff.; Börner, Stellvertretung und Verfügung (1984), p. 409-419; 
Flume, Das Rechtsgeschäft (1992) II, p. 901 ff. For Italy: Settesoldi, Il mandato (2000), 
p. 205-209. For the Netherlands: Van Meer, De eigendomsovergang (1930); Nève, Hoe 
verkrijgt (1974), p. 70-71; Groefsema, Bevoegd beschikken (1993), p. 17-57; Smits, Opdracht 
(1994), p. 494; Aertsen, Lastgeving tot verkoop (1997), p. 453-463; Meijer, Middellijke 
vertegenwoordiging (1999), p. 194-196; Van Vliet, Transfer of movables (2000), p. 155-156; 
Bartels, Titel van overdracht (2004), p. 57-63, 117-120; Peter, Levering (2007), p. 95-129. 
For Spain: Villavicencio, Facultad de disposición (1950), p. 1025-1056; Jordano, Mandato para 
enajenar (1951), p. 1458-1498; Diéguez, Eficacia real (2006). For Switzerland: Droin, La 
représentation (1956), p. 63-72. 
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transfer of ownership in the context of direct representation, the delivery nomine 
alieno seemed to fall quite naturally under the general rules developed during the 
19th century for this legal institution. The situation was rather different regarding 
the delivery in the context of indirect representation, where there was no clear 
legal basis to explain how ownership could be transferred by a non-owner. The 
discussion soon focused around the problem of subjective rights, and particularly 
around the question of whether the faculty to transfer ownership – which could 
be exercised by the owner or by a non-owner – should be considered as part of 
the ownership which was transferred. A particularly famous explanation was 
offered in this point by Thon119, who claimed that the faculty to dispose was 
independent from the ownership which was transferred. According to this 
author, it was not possible to consider the faculty to dispose, which was an 
element that leads to the transfer of ownership, to be at the same time part of the 
right which is transferred. Thon illustrated this idea by claiming that if someone 
casts a stone, one cannot say that the stone gave the strength to cast it; instead, 
the faculty to throw it was in the agent, and not in the object which was 
thrown120. This construction would therefore explain how it was possible for 
someone different than the owner to exercise the faculty to dispose121. 
 It is worth recalling at this point that already Vitoria and Suárez had related 
the problem of the faculty to dispose with the notion of subjective rights, but 
that their ideas on the subject remained largely ignored by scholars dealing with 
the potestas alienandi122. There was in fact no practical need to resort to such 
constructions, considering that the rules governing the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner were not a controverted subject during the 16th century. It is 
therefore eloquent that the relationship between both problems would surface 
again in the course of the 19th century, the reason being precisely the lack of 
clarity concerning the legal basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner 
                                                 
119  Thon, Rechtsnorm (1878), p. 325 ff. 
120  Thon, Rechtsnorm (1878), p. 328. 
121  Thon, Rechtsnorm (1878), p. 329-333. 
122  See Chapter 8, Section 1(a) above. 
 
acting nomine proprio. In this context, resorting to the idea of subjective rights 
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jurisdictions it was perfectly clear that an authorized indirect representative could 
transfer ownership, this case remained a rather unsystematic exception to the 
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 The discussion on the nature of the faculty to dispose has to a large extent a 
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123  Meijers, Toelichting (1954) I, p. 220, commenting art. 3.4.2.5. 
124  See for Austria, see: Bydlinksi, Der Inhalt (1967), p. 356. For Belgium: De Visscher, Jus 
abutendi (1913), p. 337-350; Van Gerven, Handels- en economisch recht 1.B (1989), p. 495 
(nr. 518); Samoy, Middellijke vertegenwoordiging (2005), p. 322-329; Jansen, Nemo plus 
(2009), p. 443; Del Corral, Leveringsplicht (2013), p. 370-377. For France: Guiho, Actes de 
disposition (1954), p. 1-37; Lotti, Droit de disposer (1999). For Germany: Ludewig, 
Ermächtigung (1922), p. 74 ff.; Raape, Zustimmung und Verfügung (1923), p. 257-296; Doris, 
Ermächtigung (1974), p. 35 ff.; Börner, Stellvertretung und Verfügung (1984), p. 409-419; 
Flume, Das Rechtsgeschäft (1992) II, p. 901 ff. For Italy: Settesoldi, Il mandato (2000), 
p. 205-209. For the Netherlands: Van Meer, De eigendomsovergang (1930); Nève, Hoe 
verkrijgt (1974), p. 70-71; Groefsema, Bevoegd beschikken (1993), p. 17-57; Smits, Opdracht 
(1994), p. 494; Aertsen, Lastgeving tot verkoop (1997), p. 453-463; Meijer, Middellijke 
vertegenwoordiging (1999), p. 194-196; Van Vliet, Transfer of movables (2000), p. 155-156; 
Bartels, Titel van overdracht (2004), p. 57-63, 117-120; Peter, Levering (2007), p. 95-129. 
For Spain: Villavicencio, Facultad de disposición (1950), p. 1025-1056; Jordano, Mandato para 
enajenar (1951), p. 1458-1498; Diéguez, Eficacia real (2006). For Switzerland: Droin, La 
représentation (1956), p. 63-72. 
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and with the ownership of the object125. Most authors wonder in particular 
whether the non-owner can be regarded as exercising the faculty to dispose, or 
whether he is somehow exercising the right of the owner to dispose of his own 
property despite not being his direct representative. Despite the theoretical terms 
of such considerations, some aspects of this controversy bear very concrete 
practical consequences. Particularly relevant is that some scholars do not admit 
that a non-owner could directly transfer an object belonging to someone else 
when delivering nomine alieno, since this would go against several basic principles 
of private law. Accordingly, it is claimed that the only way in which ownership 
could be transferred in this case was if the non-owner had become owner of the 
delivered thing in the first place, even for one moment126. Under this 
conception, the owner would be regarded as providing ownership to the 
transferor so that the latter could carry out the delivery. Other scholars, on the 
other hand, claim that it is indeed possible for a non-owner to directly transfer 
ownership without becoming owner himself127. This substantive difference in the 
approach to the transfer of owner by a non-owner can of course lead to 
completely different outcomes when discussing a particular case. For instance, if 
the owner loses his faculty to dispose by death or any other reason after 
                                                 
125  See for Belgium: De Visscher, Jus abutendi (1913), p. 337-350; Jansen, 
Beschikkingsonbevoegdheid (2009), p. 47 ff. For France: Lotti, Droit de disposer (1999), p. 166 
ff.; Tosi, Acte translatif (2006), p. 189 ff. For Germany: Ludewig, Ermächtigung (1922), p. 31 
ff.; Raape, Zustimmung und Verfügung (1923), p. 275-276; Jahr, Begriff des Eigentums (1984), 
p. 71 ff.; Larenz/Wolf, Allgemeiner Teil (2004), p. 412 (§ 23 number 38). For the 
Netherlands: Meijers, De algemene begrippen (1948), p. 85; Groefsema, Bevoegd beschikken 
(1993), p. 29-32; van der Grinten, Lastgeving (1993), p. 32 (nr. 28); Aertsen, Lastgeving tot 
verkoop (1997), p. 454; Potjewijd, Bekrachtiging (2002), p. 31-32; Asser/Kortmann, 2-I 
(2004), p. 159-160 (nr. 136); Peter, Levering (2007), p. 106 ff. ; Mollema, Het bepertke recht 
(2013), p. 98, 131 ff. For Spain: Miquel, Causa (2009), p. 168-169. For Switzerland: Van 
de Sandt, L’acte de disposition (2000), p. 172-173. 
126  Van Meer, De eigendomsovergang (1930), p. 24-46; Carraro, Il mandato (1947), p. 67-108; 
Jordano, Mandato para enajenar (1951), p. 1458-1498; Mengoni, Gli acquisti (1968), p. 7-8; 
Van der Grinten, AA 22 (1973), p. 567-571; Kleijn, NJ 1974/346, p. 936-938; Nève, Hoe 
verkrijgt (1974), p. 70-71; Asser/Van der Grinten, 2-I (1990), p. 118-120 (n. 134-135); 
Foëx, National Report Switzerland (2011), p. 206-207. An account of the scholarship and 
legal decisions holding this view is offered by Gremmels, Treuhand (1936), p. 37 ff.; 
Diéguez, Eficacia real (2006), p. 41-46.  
127  Cariota Ferrara, I negozi (1936), p. 53-54; Asser/Scholten/Bregstein, 2-I (1959), p. 79; 
Pessoa Jorge, O mandato (1961), p. 320-357; Barrera, Representación voluntaria (1967), p. 35-
36; Mengoni, Gli acquisti (1968), p. 7-10; Brahn, Problemen (1974), p. 20-21; Brahn, De 
beschikkingsbevoegdheid (1974), p. 267-270; Zwitser, Rond art. 1376 BW (1984), p. 133-134; 
Van Gerven, Handels- en economisch recht 1.B (1989), p. 495 (nr. 518); Asser/Mijnssen/De 
Haan, 3-I (1992), p. 140-141 (nr. 227); Hofstetter, Mandat (1994), p. 193; Aertsen, 
Lastgeving tot verkoop (1997), p. 456-457; Dirix, De rechtsverhouding (2002), p. 100-101, 106; 
Asser/Kortmann, 2-I (2004), p. 158-160 (nr. 136); Diéguez, Eficacia real (2006), p. 46-47, 
170-171; Peter, Levering (2007), p. 103 ff.; Faber, National Report Austria (2008), p. 118; 
Jansen, Nemo plus (2009), p. 444; Becker, Vente aux enchères (2011), p. 72-73, 117-118, 
254; Pitlo/Reehuis/Heisterkamp, Goederenrecht (2012), p. 242-243 (nr. 300); Bayreuther, 
§§ 182-185 (2015), § 185 nr. 22. 
 
authorizing the transfer of ownership, the delivery concluded by the transferor 
will have different consequences depending on the model which is chosen: if the 
transferor is regarded as a fiduciary owner, it would appear that he could validly 
transfer ownership, while in the opposite case his faculty to transfer would 
disappear along with that of the owner. Similar difficulties would also arise if it 
was the transferor himself who lost the power to dispose over his own assets due 
to death, bankruptcy or other cause128.  
 It may be argued that the problem discussed here is not statistically very 
relevant. After all, it will only come into discussion in those cases in which 
ownership is transferred by a non-owner who does not act on behalf of the 
owner, and only if there are no rules protecting the acquirer on account of his 
good faith. Nonetheless, this problem has been important enough to bring 
uncertainty regarding the rules governing the transfer of ownership in various 
everyday transactions. A remarkable example can be seen in a relatively recent 
decision of the Dutch Supreme Court concerning the so-called “Mesdag II” 
case129, where an art dealer acting nomine proprio sold a painting of artist Hendrik 
Mesdag for an inferior price to that authorized by its owner. Since this was a case 
of indirect representation, all the controversies regarding the legal grounds of the 
alienation were brought up during the trial, where it was ultimately decided by 
the Hoge Raad that the seller was not entitled to transfer ownership under these 
conditions, and therefore ownership had never been transferred. Despite this 
recent decision, much remained unsaid concerning the exact legal nature of such 
alienation, therefore leaving the room open for future misunderstandings on this 
point. 
 
b. Convenience of excluding direct representation as a separate legal basis for the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
 
While most European jurisdictions have struggled with identifying a clear legal 
basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in the context of indirect 
representation, this problem is completely avoided in those jurisdictions where 
direct representation does not appear on its own to be a legal basis for the transfer 
of ownership, since in such systems the alienation nomine proprio does not appear 
                                                 
128  This problem led to the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court “Nationaal 
Grondbezit/Kamphuis”, 08-06-1973, NJ 1974/346, which led to some of the differences 
of opinion recorded in the previous notes. On the loss of the faculty to dispose of the 
owner or the transferor before the delivery see Asser/Mijnssen/De Haan, 3-I (1992), 
p. 188-189 (nr. 294); van Boom, Bevoegd beschikken (1994), p. 865-866; Hofstetter, Mandat 
(1994), p. 45-46; Aertsen, Lastgeving tot verkoop (1997), p. 458; Rodríguez Pinto, La cláusula 
(2000), p. 167-175; Potjewijd, Bekrachtiging (2002), p. 9; Barrientos, Comentario (2003), 
p. 273-278; Samoy, Middellijke vertegenwoordiging (2005), p. 329 ff.; Peter, Levering (2007), 
p. 98-99, 113-114; Foëx, National Report Switzerland (2011), p. 207; 
Pitlo/Reehuis/Heisterkamp, Goederenrecht (2012), p. 242-243 (nr. 300). 
129  Hoge Raad 14/01/2011, NJ 2012/88, commented by Wenting, Beschikking (2011), p. 315-
319; Spath, Derdenbescherming (2011), p. 576-585. 
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property despite not being his direct representative. Despite the theoretical terms 
of such considerations, some aspects of this controversy bear very concrete 
practical consequences. Particularly relevant is that some scholars do not admit 
that a non-owner could directly transfer an object belonging to someone else 
when delivering nomine alieno, since this would go against several basic principles 
of private law. Accordingly, it is claimed that the only way in which ownership 
could be transferred in this case was if the non-owner had become owner of the 
delivered thing in the first place, even for one moment126. Under this 
conception, the owner would be regarded as providing ownership to the 
transferor so that the latter could carry out the delivery. Other scholars, on the 
other hand, claim that it is indeed possible for a non-owner to directly transfer 
ownership without becoming owner himself127. This substantive difference in the 
approach to the transfer of owner by a non-owner can of course lead to 
completely different outcomes when discussing a particular case. For instance, if 
the owner loses his faculty to dispose by death or any other reason after 
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decision of the Dutch Supreme Court concerning the so-called “Mesdag II” 
case129, where an art dealer acting nomine proprio sold a painting of artist Hendrik 
Mesdag for an inferior price to that authorized by its owner. Since this was a case 
of indirect representation, all the controversies regarding the legal grounds of the 
alienation were brought up during the trial, where it was ultimately decided by 
the Hoge Raad that the seller was not entitled to transfer ownership under these 
conditions, and therefore ownership had never been transferred. Despite this 
recent decision, much remained unsaid concerning the exact legal nature of such 
alienation, therefore leaving the room open for future misunderstandings on this 
point. 
 
b. Convenience of excluding direct representation as a separate legal basis for the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
 
While most European jurisdictions have struggled with identifying a clear legal 
basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in the context of indirect 
representation, this problem is completely avoided in those jurisdictions where 
direct representation does not appear on its own to be a legal basis for the transfer 
of ownership, since in such systems the alienation nomine proprio does not appear 
                                                 
128  This problem led to the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court “Nationaal 
Grondbezit/Kamphuis”, 08-06-1973, NJ 1974/346, which led to some of the differences 
of opinion recorded in the previous notes. On the loss of the faculty to dispose of the 
owner or the transferor before the delivery see Asser/Mijnssen/De Haan, 3-I (1992), 
p. 188-189 (nr. 294); van Boom, Bevoegd beschikken (1994), p. 865-866; Hofstetter, Mandat 
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319; Spath, Derdenbescherming (2011), p. 576-585. 
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as a systematically awkward case. This is for instance the case of South Africa, 
Scotland and Chile. It could therefore seem convenient to exclude the doctrine 
of direct representation from the analysis of the transfer of ownership in the first 
place. Indeed, the application of the doctrine of direct representation as an 
immediate legal basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner is a relatively 
recent development which is only based in a faulty approach to Roman sources, 
and from which there follow no advantages. As shown above130, the doctrine of 
direct representation was not applied to the transfer of ownership because there 
was any need for it, but rather on account of vague dogmatic standpoints 
concerning the historical evolution of direct representation. Before the 19th 
century, the contemplatio domini played no decisive role in determining the legal 
basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, the attention being focused 
on the existence of an authorization by the owner or by legal provisions. Only 
the shift in the focus from the voluntas domini to the problem of the contemplatio 
domini led to the appearance of a group of cases which seemed awkward and 
difficult to systematize, due to the fact that they fell outside the limits of direct 
representation. Accordingly, the extension of the doctrine of direct 
representation to the problem of the transfer of ownership seems not only 
unnecessary in the first place, but it moreover leads to inconvenient results.  
 Perhaps one of the main problems of applying the rules of direct 
representation to the transfer of ownership is that it is often not clear whether the 
rules on direct representation should be applied or not, especially since 
determining whether the delivery is concluded on behalf of the principal can be 
blurry in the context of the transfer of ownership. Already regarding the general 
theory of direct representation there are a number of situations where it is 
intensely discussed whether we face a case of direct representation or not, and 
whether the agent can be seen as acting in the name of the principal131. This is 
particularly the case regarding those situations in which an agent acts as such but 
on behalf of an undisclosed principal132. In fact, from a comparative perspective 
one of the most controversial aspects surrounding the doctrine of direct 
representation has been the sharp distinction between the consequences 
following from cases of direct and indirect representation, considering that other 
legal systems do not grant such decisive significance to the fact of whether the 
principal is disclosed or not. This is the case in Common law systems, where the 
                                                 
130  Chapter 8, Section 3. 
131  See on this point Siber, Verfügungsgeschäfte (1915), p. 33; Flume, Das Rechtsgeschäft (1992) 
II, p. 761 ff.; Haak/Zwitser, Opdracht (2003), p. 68 ff.; Diéguez, Eficacia real (2006), p. 37, 
59-64; Von Bar/Clive, DCFR (2010) I, p. 427; Becker, Vente aux enchères (2011), p. 89 ff. 
132  This problem is often approached through the doctrine of the ‘Geschäft für den, den es 
angeht’. Flume, Das Rechtsgeschäft (1992) II, p. 765 ff., analyses this problem in the context 
of the acquisition of property as well (p. 767-769). This kind of cases are also studied in the 
context of the transfer of ownership by Siber, Verfügungsgeschäfte (1915), p. 10; Peter, 
Levering (2007), p. 100-103; Becker, Vente aux enchères (2011), p. 97 ff., 118-119. 
 
doctrine of undisclosed agency allows an agent who does not act on behalf of the 
principal to produce direct effects with regard to him133. 
 The reason why it is particularly difficult to distinguish between direct and 
indirect representation in the context of the delivery by a non-owner is that the 
contemplatio domini does not play in the transfer of ownership the role it has in the 
law of obligations, where it is decisive to determine which are the parties bound 
to the agreement. If a contract is concluded between two parties, most Civil law 
jurisdictions would not admit that one of them suddenly presents another 
individual, who had remained hidden until then, as party to the agreement. On 
the other hand, regarding the transfer of ownership, it is perfectly possible that a 
non-owner concludes a contract of sale, binding himself to its fulfilment, despite 
the fact that the object sold belongs to another person and the acquirer knows 
about it134. In fact, in most delivery-based systems a non-owner may validly 
conclude a sale over someone else’s property. The awareness that the object sold 
does not belong to the seller will normally be a relevant piece of information for 
the other party, but it does not seem to justify a completely different legal basis 
for the alienation by a non-owner. This shows that the contemplatio domini only 
plays a truly decisive role in the context of the law of obligations, being a 
secondary element for the transfer of ownership135. It appears therefore that the 
intervention of the non-owner could be conceptually distinguished for the 
purpose of the law of obligations and the law of property: in the first case, it is 
decisive, in order to determine the party bound to the agreement, whether the 
agent acts on behalf of the owner or not, while regarding the transfer of 
ownership it is only relevant whether he has the faculty to dispose at the time of 
the delivery.  
 Several scholars in European jurisdictions have advocated for dogmatic 
constructions which may bridge the sharp distinctions between direct and 
indirect representation in the context of the transfer of ownership136. It has often 
been claimed that in the context of the law of property it is not decisive for the 
                                                 
133  For a broad comparative perspective on this point see Meijer, Middellijke vertegenwoordiging 
(1999), p. 80 ff.; North, Qui facit (1998), p. 282 ff.; Verhagen/Macgregor, Agency (2012), 
p. 53-62. It is worth noting that the rules on agency of the Unidroit Principles (art. 2.2.1) 
apply equally “whether the agent acts in its own name or in that of the principal”. The 
same can be said about the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods 
(1983), art. 1(4). 
134  Wieling, Drittwirkungen (1993), p. 245-246. 
135  Asser/Scholten/Bregstein, 2-I (1959), p. 79; Zwitser, Rond art. 1376 BW (1984), p. 111, 
113, 116, 132-133; Zwitser, De verspersoonlijking (1992), p. 480-482; Haak/Zwitser, 
Opdracht (2003), p. 79; Peter, Levering (2007), p. 119. Flume, Das Rechtsgeschäft (1992) II, 
p. 768 shows that in German case law the acquisition of ownership in the context of the 
Geschäft für den, den es angeht is possible when it was indifferent to the person transferring 
ownership who the acquirer was. 
136  See e.g. Müller-Freienfels, Die Vertretung (1955), p. 100-103. At a more general level, 
Schlossmann, Stellvertretung (1900) I, p. 81 ff. has criticized the basic division between 
direct and indirect representation, explicitly mentioning the problem of the commission 
agent (I, p. 94; II, p. 322). 
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as a systematically awkward case. This is for instance the case of South Africa, 
Scotland and Chile. It could therefore seem convenient to exclude the doctrine 
of direct representation from the analysis of the transfer of ownership in the first 
place. Indeed, the application of the doctrine of direct representation as an 
immediate legal basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner is a relatively 
recent development which is only based in a faulty approach to Roman sources, 
and from which there follow no advantages. As shown above130, the doctrine of 
direct representation was not applied to the transfer of ownership because there 
was any need for it, but rather on account of vague dogmatic standpoints 
concerning the historical evolution of direct representation. Before the 19th 
century, the contemplatio domini played no decisive role in determining the legal 
basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, the attention being focused 
on the existence of an authorization by the owner or by legal provisions. Only 
the shift in the focus from the voluntas domini to the problem of the contemplatio 
domini led to the appearance of a group of cases which seemed awkward and 
difficult to systematize, due to the fact that they fell outside the limits of direct 
representation. Accordingly, the extension of the doctrine of direct 
representation to the problem of the transfer of ownership seems not only 
unnecessary in the first place, but it moreover leads to inconvenient results.  
 Perhaps one of the main problems of applying the rules of direct 
representation to the transfer of ownership is that it is often not clear whether the 
rules on direct representation should be applied or not, especially since 
determining whether the delivery is concluded on behalf of the principal can be 
blurry in the context of the transfer of ownership. Already regarding the general 
theory of direct representation there are a number of situations where it is 
intensely discussed whether we face a case of direct representation or not, and 
whether the agent can be seen as acting in the name of the principal131. This is 
particularly the case regarding those situations in which an agent acts as such but 
on behalf of an undisclosed principal132. In fact, from a comparative perspective 
one of the most controversial aspects surrounding the doctrine of direct 
representation has been the sharp distinction between the consequences 
following from cases of direct and indirect representation, considering that other 
legal systems do not grant such decisive significance to the fact of whether the 
principal is disclosed or not. This is the case in Common law systems, where the 
                                                 
130  Chapter 8, Section 3. 
131  See on this point Siber, Verfügungsgeschäfte (1915), p. 33; Flume, Das Rechtsgeschäft (1992) 
II, p. 761 ff.; Haak/Zwitser, Opdracht (2003), p. 68 ff.; Diéguez, Eficacia real (2006), p. 37, 
59-64; Von Bar/Clive, DCFR (2010) I, p. 427; Becker, Vente aux enchères (2011), p. 89 ff. 
132  This problem is often approached through the doctrine of the ‘Geschäft für den, den es 
angeht’. Flume, Das Rechtsgeschäft (1992) II, p. 765 ff., analyses this problem in the context 
of the acquisition of property as well (p. 767-769). This kind of cases are also studied in the 
context of the transfer of ownership by Siber, Verfügungsgeschäfte (1915), p. 10; Peter, 
Levering (2007), p. 100-103; Becker, Vente aux enchères (2011), p. 97 ff., 118-119. 
 
doctrine of undisclosed agency allows an agent who does not act on behalf of the 
principal to produce direct effects with regard to him133. 
 The reason why it is particularly difficult to distinguish between direct and 
indirect representation in the context of the delivery by a non-owner is that the 
contemplatio domini does not play in the transfer of ownership the role it has in the 
law of obligations, where it is decisive to determine which are the parties bound 
to the agreement. If a contract is concluded between two parties, most Civil law 
jurisdictions would not admit that one of them suddenly presents another 
individual, who had remained hidden until then, as party to the agreement. On 
the other hand, regarding the transfer of ownership, it is perfectly possible that a 
non-owner concludes a contract of sale, binding himself to its fulfilment, despite 
the fact that the object sold belongs to another person and the acquirer knows 
about it134. In fact, in most delivery-based systems a non-owner may validly 
conclude a sale over someone else’s property. The awareness that the object sold 
does not belong to the seller will normally be a relevant piece of information for 
the other party, but it does not seem to justify a completely different legal basis 
for the alienation by a non-owner. This shows that the contemplatio domini only 
plays a truly decisive role in the context of the law of obligations, being a 
secondary element for the transfer of ownership135. It appears therefore that the 
intervention of the non-owner could be conceptually distinguished for the 
purpose of the law of obligations and the law of property: in the first case, it is 
decisive, in order to determine the party bound to the agreement, whether the 
agent acts on behalf of the owner or not, while regarding the transfer of 
ownership it is only relevant whether he has the faculty to dispose at the time of 
the delivery.  
 Several scholars in European jurisdictions have advocated for dogmatic 
constructions which may bridge the sharp distinctions between direct and 
indirect representation in the context of the transfer of ownership136. It has often 
been claimed that in the context of the law of property it is not decisive for the 
                                                 
133  For a broad comparative perspective on this point see Meijer, Middellijke vertegenwoordiging 
(1999), p. 80 ff.; North, Qui facit (1998), p. 282 ff.; Verhagen/Macgregor, Agency (2012), 
p. 53-62. It is worth noting that the rules on agency of the Unidroit Principles (art. 2.2.1) 
apply equally “whether the agent acts in its own name or in that of the principal”. The 
same can be said about the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods 
(1983), art. 1(4). 
134  Wieling, Drittwirkungen (1993), p. 245-246. 
135  Asser/Scholten/Bregstein, 2-I (1959), p. 79; Zwitser, Rond art. 1376 BW (1984), p. 111, 
113, 116, 132-133; Zwitser, De verspersoonlijking (1992), p. 480-482; Haak/Zwitser, 
Opdracht (2003), p. 79; Peter, Levering (2007), p. 119. Flume, Das Rechtsgeschäft (1992) II, 
p. 768 shows that in German case law the acquisition of ownership in the context of the 
Geschäft für den, den es angeht is possible when it was indifferent to the person transferring 
ownership who the acquirer was. 
136  See e.g. Müller-Freienfels, Die Vertretung (1955), p. 100-103. At a more general level, 
Schlossmann, Stellvertretung (1900) I, p. 81 ff. has criticized the basic division between 
direct and indirect representation, explicitly mentioning the problem of the commission 
agent (I, p. 94; II, p. 322). 
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application of the doctrine of direct representation whether the agent acts on 
behalf of the owner or not, and therefore the non-owner who transfers nomine 
proprio should be nonetheless regarded to transfer ownership in the context of 
direct representation137. In the Netherlands, Zwitser has coined in this regard the 
notion of a ‘representation of the law of property’ (zakenrechtelijke vertegen-
woordiging)138, a concept which is also found in France and Belgium under the 
label represéntation réelle139. Other authors have attempted similar eclectic 
constructions which may bridge the traditional concepts in order to offer a more 
coherent outlook on the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. Also in the 
Netherlands, Pitlo claims that the commission agent is an indirect representative 
regarding the law of obligations, but a direct representative regarding the law of 
property140, while Beekhuis considers that the alienation in this case can be 
explained as a ‘tacit authorization’ (stilzwijgende volmacht) to conclude the real 
agreement with the third party141. Such ideas show the uneasy fit of the doctrine 
of direct representation in the context of the law of property and the subsequent 
attempt of scholars to overcome the odd consequences that follow from it. A 
different approach was taken in Germany by Dölle, who instead of bringing all 
cases under the framework of the doctrine of direct representation, recommends 
a third category besides that of direct and indirect representation, namely that of 
‘neutral acts’ (Neutrales Handeln)142. This notion would apply to those cases of 
administration over a specific group of assets (Sondervermögen), regarding which 
the person of the owner does not have a decisive role to play. This would be for 
instance the case of the administrator of a bankrupt society or an inheritance. In 
such cases the decisive element is that the administration falls over the respective 
patrimony, and not who the person of the owner is. This is why Dölle indicated 
that this administration is not subject-related (personsbezogen) but rather object-
related (objektsbezogen)143. This shows once more the inadequacy of attending to 
the contemplatio domini as a decisive element in the context of the transfer of 
ownership. Finally, it is worth noting that the Swiss legislator also moderated the 
traditional doctrines in the Swiss Code of Obligations, which grants the same 
                                                 
137  Asser/Scholten/Bregstein, 2-I (1959), p. 76, 79-80; Zwitser, Rond art. 1376 BW (1984), 
p. 111, 113, 132; Wieling, Drittwirkungen (1993), p. 245-246. 
138  Zwitser, Rond art. 1376 BW (1984), p. 113, 115; Zwitser, De verspersoonlijking (1992), 
p. 480-482; Haak/Zwitser, Opdracht (2003), p. 80-81. This notion was later adopted by 
Peter, Levering (2007), p. 110 ff. 
139  See for references Samoy, Middellijke vertegenwoordiging (2005), p. 324. 
140  Pitlo, Het systeem (1981), p. 219: “Verbintenisrechtelijk is B dus wel middellijk 
vertegenwoordiger, maar zakenrechtelijk is hij onmiddellijk vertegenwoordiger”.  
141  Asser/Beekhuis I (1985), p. 150 (nr. 243).  
142  Dölle, Neutrales Handeln (1951), p. 268-288. This theory is followed in Belgium by Van 
Gerven, Een verwaarloosde vorm (1964), p. 179 ff. Instead, Flume, Das Rechtsgeschäft (1992) 
II, p. 781 ff. considers that these cases should fall under the theory of direct representation. 
143  It is worth noting that Flume, Das Rechtsgeschäft (1992) II, p. 143, 904 describes the 
difference between Stellvertretung and Ermächtigung by considering that the former is 
personenbezogen, while the latter is gegenstandsbezogen. 
 
consequences of direct representation to those acts concluded by an undisclosed 
agent when it is indifferent to the other party with whom is he concluding an 
agreement144. 
 It could be argued that by laying down some clear rules on the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner nomine proprio most problems could be avoided. For 
example, the commentaries to the DCFR explicitly show that ownership can be 
transferred directly from the owner to the acquirer through the delivery of an 
indirect representative145. While the further clarity on this point may contribute 
to avoid some common practical problems, the existence of two different legal 
grounds for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner brings along other 
dogmatic and practical problems, which will be reviewed in the following pages. 
 The fact that the boundaries for the application of the rules of direct 
representation can be rather vague concerning the transfer of ownership is to be 
seen in the fact that it is usually not clear for scholars themselves which rules 
should govern particular cases. This becomes evident by the fact that scholars 
dealing with the alienations concluded by legal guardians, by the pledge or 
mortgage creditor, by the administrator of a bankrupt society or in the context of 
an auction, will commonly differ as to whether each of them should be 
approached as cases of Stellvertretung or Ermächtigung146. Choosing for one legal 
basis or the other is particularly arbitrary in these situations, especially since the 
problem of the contemplatio domini will often be of no significance147. In fact, 
Dölle’s category of ‘neutral acts’ concerns mainly cases in which an individual has 
legal powers of administration, but where the element of the contemplatio domini 
plays no significant role. In his opinion, it is incorrect to frame cases such as that 
of the administrator of a bankrupt society either under the category of direct or 
                                                 
144  Code civil suisse livre cinquième, Droit des obligations (1912), art. 32(2): “Lorsque au moment 
de la conclusion du contrat le représentant ne s’est pas fait connaître comme tel, le 
représenté ne devient directement créancier ou débiteur que si celui avec lequel il 
contracte devait inférer des circonstances qu’il existait un rapport de représentation, ou s’il 
lui était indifférent de traiter avec l’un ou l’autre”. 
145  Von Bar/Clive, DCFR (2010) V, p. 4757 ff.; Lurger/Faber, PEL Acq. Own. (2011), 
p. 819-820. 
146  See e.g. Oertmann, Der Dinglichkeitsbegriff (1892), p. 452; Hellwig, Wesen (1901), p. 99; 
Guiho, Actes de disposition (1954), p. 4; Mengoni, Gli acquisti (1968), p. 5 n. 5; Zwitser, 
Rond art. 1376 BW (1984), p. 114-115; Jahr, Begriff des Eigentums (1984), p. 70-71; 
Groefsema, Bevoegd beschikken (1993), p. 24-25, 28; Van Vliet, Transfer of movables (2000), 
p. 155; Van de Sandt, L’acte de disposition (2000), p. 174-175, 180; Potjewijd, Bekrachtiging 
(2002), p. 32; Haak/Zwitser, Opdracht (2003), p. 85-86; Asser/Kortmann, 2-I (2004), 
p. 158 (nr. 135); Bartels, Titel van overdracht (2004), p. 60 n. 140; Salomons, National Report 
the Netherlands (2011), p. 55; Foëx, National Report Switzerland (2011), p. 201; 
Asser/Bartels/van Mierlo, 3-4 (2013), p. 209 (nr. 234); Asser/Tjong Tjin Tai, 7-4 (2014), 
p. 218 (nr. 251). Concerning legal representatives, according to the commentaries to 
DCFR VIII. – 2:101(1)(c) in Von Bar/Clive, DCFR (2010) V, p. 4431 the transfer of 
ownership by someone who is authorized by the law will fall under the rules of book VIII, 
but the reason of this choice remaining however hidden. 
147  It is worth noting that in Louisiana legal representatives may either act on behalf of the 
principal or not. See Holmes/Symeonides, Representation (1999), p. 1100-1101. 
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application of the doctrine of direct representation whether the agent acts on 
behalf of the owner or not, and therefore the non-owner who transfers nomine 
proprio should be nonetheless regarded to transfer ownership in the context of 
direct representation137. In the Netherlands, Zwitser has coined in this regard the 
notion of a ‘representation of the law of property’ (zakenrechtelijke vertegen-
woordiging)138, a concept which is also found in France and Belgium under the 
label represéntation réelle139. Other authors have attempted similar eclectic 
constructions which may bridge the traditional concepts in order to offer a more 
coherent outlook on the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. Also in the 
Netherlands, Pitlo claims that the commission agent is an indirect representative 
regarding the law of obligations, but a direct representative regarding the law of 
property140, while Beekhuis considers that the alienation in this case can be 
explained as a ‘tacit authorization’ (stilzwijgende volmacht) to conclude the real 
agreement with the third party141. Such ideas show the uneasy fit of the doctrine 
of direct representation in the context of the law of property and the subsequent 
attempt of scholars to overcome the odd consequences that follow from it. A 
different approach was taken in Germany by Dölle, who instead of bringing all 
cases under the framework of the doctrine of direct representation, recommends 
a third category besides that of direct and indirect representation, namely that of 
‘neutral acts’ (Neutrales Handeln)142. This notion would apply to those cases of 
administration over a specific group of assets (Sondervermögen), regarding which 
the person of the owner does not have a decisive role to play. This would be for 
instance the case of the administrator of a bankrupt society or an inheritance. In 
such cases the decisive element is that the administration falls over the respective 
patrimony, and not who the person of the owner is. This is why Dölle indicated 
that this administration is not subject-related (personsbezogen) but rather object-
related (objektsbezogen)143. This shows once more the inadequacy of attending to 
the contemplatio domini as a decisive element in the context of the transfer of 
ownership. Finally, it is worth noting that the Swiss legislator also moderated the 
traditional doctrines in the Swiss Code of Obligations, which grants the same 
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consequences of direct representation to those acts concluded by an undisclosed 
agent when it is indifferent to the other party with whom is he concluding an 
agreement144. 
 It could be argued that by laying down some clear rules on the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner nomine proprio most problems could be avoided. For 
example, the commentaries to the DCFR explicitly show that ownership can be 
transferred directly from the owner to the acquirer through the delivery of an 
indirect representative145. While the further clarity on this point may contribute 
to avoid some common practical problems, the existence of two different legal 
grounds for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner brings along other 
dogmatic and practical problems, which will be reviewed in the following pages. 
 The fact that the boundaries for the application of the rules of direct 
representation can be rather vague concerning the transfer of ownership is to be 
seen in the fact that it is usually not clear for scholars themselves which rules 
should govern particular cases. This becomes evident by the fact that scholars 
dealing with the alienations concluded by legal guardians, by the pledge or 
mortgage creditor, by the administrator of a bankrupt society or in the context of 
an auction, will commonly differ as to whether each of them should be 
approached as cases of Stellvertretung or Ermächtigung146. Choosing for one legal 
basis or the other is particularly arbitrary in these situations, especially since the 
problem of the contemplatio domini will often be of no significance147. In fact, 
Dölle’s category of ‘neutral acts’ concerns mainly cases in which an individual has 
legal powers of administration, but where the element of the contemplatio domini 
plays no significant role. In his opinion, it is incorrect to frame cases such as that 
of the administrator of a bankrupt society either under the category of direct or 
                                                 
144  Code civil suisse livre cinquième, Droit des obligations (1912), art. 32(2): “Lorsque au moment 
de la conclusion du contrat le représentant ne s’est pas fait connaître comme tel, le 
représenté ne devient directement créancier ou débiteur que si celui avec lequel il 
contracte devait inférer des circonstances qu’il existait un rapport de représentation, ou s’il 
lui était indifférent de traiter avec l’un ou l’autre”. 
145  Von Bar/Clive, DCFR (2010) V, p. 4757 ff.; Lurger/Faber, PEL Acq. Own. (2011), 
p. 819-820. 
146  See e.g. Oertmann, Der Dinglichkeitsbegriff (1892), p. 452; Hellwig, Wesen (1901), p. 99; 
Guiho, Actes de disposition (1954), p. 4; Mengoni, Gli acquisti (1968), p. 5 n. 5; Zwitser, 
Rond art. 1376 BW (1984), p. 114-115; Jahr, Begriff des Eigentums (1984), p. 70-71; 
Groefsema, Bevoegd beschikken (1993), p. 24-25, 28; Van Vliet, Transfer of movables (2000), 
p. 155; Van de Sandt, L’acte de disposition (2000), p. 174-175, 180; Potjewijd, Bekrachtiging 
(2002), p. 32; Haak/Zwitser, Opdracht (2003), p. 85-86; Asser/Kortmann, 2-I (2004), 
p. 158 (nr. 135); Bartels, Titel van overdracht (2004), p. 60 n. 140; Salomons, National Report 
the Netherlands (2011), p. 55; Foëx, National Report Switzerland (2011), p. 201; 
Asser/Bartels/van Mierlo, 3-4 (2013), p. 209 (nr. 234); Asser/Tjong Tjin Tai, 7-4 (2014), 
p. 218 (nr. 251). Concerning legal representatives, according to the commentaries to 
DCFR VIII. – 2:101(1)(c) in Von Bar/Clive, DCFR (2010) V, p. 4431 the transfer of 
ownership by someone who is authorized by the law will fall under the rules of book VIII, 
but the reason of this choice remaining however hidden. 
147  It is worth noting that in Louisiana legal representatives may either act on behalf of the 
principal or not. See Holmes/Symeonides, Representation (1999), p. 1100-1101. 
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indirect representation148. It could be claimed that in some of these cases it is not 
relevant to determine what the legal basis of the transfer of ownership is, 
particularly in those situations that have a detailed legal regulation, such as legal 
guardians. Nonetheless, this ambiguity leaves the door open for 
misunderstandings when resorting to general rules, which is why it is by all 
means convenient to have clarity regarding the legal grounds for the transfer of 
ownership. 
 The distinction between cases of direct and indirect representation – and 
consequently between the alienation in the context of Stellvertretung or 
Ermächtigung –is all the more problematic since there are two separate sets of rules 
governing the transfer of ownership in each of these cases. For instance, the BGB 
has separate provisions governing the ratification of legal acts for the case of 
Stellvertretung (§ 177) and Einwilligung (§ 184)149, an example which is followed by 
the new Dutch BW in arts. 3:69 and 3:58150. Moreover, it is unanimously agreed 
by Dutch scholars that the provisions protecting the acquirer in good faith in 
BW 3:86 will only apply for those cases where a non-owner acts on his own 
name, while the general rules on direct representation would govern those cases 
in which the purported agent does not have the authority he claims151. Such an 
interpretation inevitably exacerbates the differences in the rules governing direct 
and indirect representation in the context of the transfer of ownership. This kind 
of dual regulations is also to be found in the DCFR, which lays down different 
sets of rules for the protection of the contracting third party152 and for the 
ratification of unauthorized acts153. The existence of two separate sets of rules can 
easily lead to inconvenient results, not only because of the blurry line dividing 
direct and indirect representation – especially in the context of the law of 
property – but also because there can be specific provisions which may only be 
prescribed for one of these forms of representation. It is worth noting at this 
point that the rules on direct representation are normally better defined than 
those on Ermächtigung. Scholars have attempted to remedy this situation by 
                                                 
148  Dölle, Neutrales Handeln (1951), p. 272-273. Similarly, some authors even approach such 
cases on their own: Reehuis, Overdracht (2010), p. 27-28; Pitlo/Reehuis/ Heisterkamp, 
Goederenrecht (2012), p. 115 (nr. 142). 
149  See on these provisions Finkenauer, Rückwirkung der Genehmigung (2003), p. 282-314. 
150  Potjewijd, Bekrachtiging (2002), p. 22-25; Zwalve, Bekrachtiging (2003), p. 30-32; Peter, 
Levering (2007), p. 173. 
 151  See for the Netherlands Asser/Van der Grinten, 2-I (1990), nr. 17; Ernes, Onbevoegde 
vertegenwoordiging (2000), p. 162; Asser/Kortmann, 2-I (2004) nr. 13; Reehuis, Overdracht 
(2010), nr. 27; Snijders/Rank-Berenschot, Goederenrecht (2012), p. 304 (nr. 361); 
Pitlo/Reehuis/Heisterkamp, Goederenrecht (2012), nr. 161. 
152  DCFR II. – 6:107 governs the case of an individual who acts as a representative without 
having authority, while DCFR VIII. – 3:101 contains the rules regarding the protection of 
the acquirer in good faith. 
153  DCFR II. – 6:111 governs the ratification in the context of direct representation, while 
DCFR VIII. – 2:102 gives rules for the ratification in the context of the transfer of 
ownership. 
 
discussing whether the rules governing the problem of direct representation can 
be applied by way of analogy to the cases of Ermächtigung154.  
 The examination of the comparative evidence shows that the existence of two 
different legal grounds for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner leads to a 
series of dogmatic and practical problems. This suggests that it would be more 
convenient to eliminate the sharp distinction between Stellvertretung and 
Ermächtigung as two different legal grounds for the transfer of ownership. The 
particular formula used to attain this result depends ultimately of the peculiar 
features of each legal system. For instance, one could exclude direct 
representation from the analysis of the transfer of ownership, or consider that the 
contemplatio domini does not play such a decisive role in the context of the transfer 
of ownership to determine the application of this institution. The scholar has 
much freedom at this point, especially considering the lack of clear statutory 
provisions governing this subject in the most Civil law jurisdictions.  
 
c. Relevance of the contemplatio domini for the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner. 
 
The historical and comparative study offered above shows that the main reason 
why most Civil law systems have struggled with the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner acting nomine proprio is because of the overarching validity granted to 
the doctrine of direct representation by German scholarship within the law of 
property. In the previous section it was argued that the contemplatio domini should 
not be approached as a decisive element to determine whether ownership is 
transferred by a non-owner, or at any rate to identify a different ground for the 
transfer of ownership. Despite all of this, the contemplatio domini should be taken 
into account for particular purposes in the context of the transfer of ownership by 
a non-owner. Particularly important in this regard is to consider whether the 
non-owner disclosed who the owner was in order to determine the good faith of 
the acquirer155. In fact, in certain contexts the transferee cannot be regarded to 
acquire in good faith if he does not inquire into the ownership of the thing 
acquired and the link between the owner and the transferor, which is particularly 
the case if he has a reason to doubt the faculty to dispose of the transferor. 
Otherwise the protection of the acquirer in good faith would have an excessive 
scope, since it would be enough in order to become owner to acquire from 
someone who claims to be authorized to dispose by an unidentified owner, even 
when he did not provide any information concerning the powers granted to him. 
 It could appear contradictory to expect that a person who acquires from an 
indirect agent should inquire into the link between the owner/principal and the 
                                                 
154  See on this point Jakobs/Schubert, Beratung AT II (1984), p. 961 (§ 185); Carraro, Il 
mandato (1947), p. 2-4; Finkenauer, §§ 182-185 (2003), p. 967-968; Diéguez, Eficacia real 
(2006), p. 190-195. 
155  This was also the case in Roman law, as seen in Chapter 2, Section 5 above. 
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ownership. 
 The distinction between cases of direct and indirect representation – and 
consequently between the alienation in the context of Stellvertretung or 
Ermächtigung –is all the more problematic since there are two separate sets of rules 
governing the transfer of ownership in each of these cases. For instance, the BGB 
has separate provisions governing the ratification of legal acts for the case of 
Stellvertretung (§ 177) and Einwilligung (§ 184)149, an example which is followed by 
the new Dutch BW in arts. 3:69 and 3:58150. Moreover, it is unanimously agreed 
by Dutch scholars that the provisions protecting the acquirer in good faith in 
BW 3:86 will only apply for those cases where a non-owner acts on his own 
name, while the general rules on direct representation would govern those cases 
in which the purported agent does not have the authority he claims151. Such an 
interpretation inevitably exacerbates the differences in the rules governing direct 
and indirect representation in the context of the transfer of ownership. This kind 
of dual regulations is also to be found in the DCFR, which lays down different 
sets of rules for the protection of the contracting third party152 and for the 
ratification of unauthorized acts153. The existence of two separate sets of rules can 
easily lead to inconvenient results, not only because of the blurry line dividing 
direct and indirect representation – especially in the context of the law of 
property – but also because there can be specific provisions which may only be 
prescribed for one of these forms of representation. It is worth noting at this 
point that the rules on direct representation are normally better defined than 
those on Ermächtigung. Scholars have attempted to remedy this situation by 
                                                 
148  Dölle, Neutrales Handeln (1951), p. 272-273. Similarly, some authors even approach such 
cases on their own: Reehuis, Overdracht (2010), p. 27-28; Pitlo/Reehuis/ Heisterkamp, 
Goederenrecht (2012), p. 115 (nr. 142). 
149  See on these provisions Finkenauer, Rückwirkung der Genehmigung (2003), p. 282-314. 
150  Potjewijd, Bekrachtiging (2002), p. 22-25; Zwalve, Bekrachtiging (2003), p. 30-32; Peter, 
Levering (2007), p. 173. 
 151  See for the Netherlands Asser/Van der Grinten, 2-I (1990), nr. 17; Ernes, Onbevoegde 
vertegenwoordiging (2000), p. 162; Asser/Kortmann, 2-I (2004) nr. 13; Reehuis, Overdracht 
(2010), nr. 27; Snijders/Rank-Berenschot, Goederenrecht (2012), p. 304 (nr. 361); 
Pitlo/Reehuis/Heisterkamp, Goederenrecht (2012), nr. 161. 
152  DCFR II. – 6:107 governs the case of an individual who acts as a representative without 
having authority, while DCFR VIII. – 3:101 contains the rules regarding the protection of 
the acquirer in good faith. 
153  DCFR II. – 6:111 governs the ratification in the context of direct representation, while 
DCFR VIII. – 2:102 gives rules for the ratification in the context of the transfer of 
ownership. 
 
discussing whether the rules governing the problem of direct representation can 
be applied by way of analogy to the cases of Ermächtigung154.  
 The examination of the comparative evidence shows that the existence of two 
different legal grounds for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner leads to a 
series of dogmatic and practical problems. This suggests that it would be more 
convenient to eliminate the sharp distinction between Stellvertretung and 
Ermächtigung as two different legal grounds for the transfer of ownership. The 
particular formula used to attain this result depends ultimately of the peculiar 
features of each legal system. For instance, one could exclude direct 
representation from the analysis of the transfer of ownership, or consider that the 
contemplatio domini does not play such a decisive role in the context of the transfer 
of ownership to determine the application of this institution. The scholar has 
much freedom at this point, especially considering the lack of clear statutory 
provisions governing this subject in the most Civil law jurisdictions.  
 
c. Relevance of the contemplatio domini for the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner. 
 
The historical and comparative study offered above shows that the main reason 
why most Civil law systems have struggled with the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner acting nomine proprio is because of the overarching validity granted to 
the doctrine of direct representation by German scholarship within the law of 
property. In the previous section it was argued that the contemplatio domini should 
not be approached as a decisive element to determine whether ownership is 
transferred by a non-owner, or at any rate to identify a different ground for the 
transfer of ownership. Despite all of this, the contemplatio domini should be taken 
into account for particular purposes in the context of the transfer of ownership by 
a non-owner. Particularly important in this regard is to consider whether the 
non-owner disclosed who the owner was in order to determine the good faith of 
the acquirer155. In fact, in certain contexts the transferee cannot be regarded to 
acquire in good faith if he does not inquire into the ownership of the thing 
acquired and the link between the owner and the transferor, which is particularly 
the case if he has a reason to doubt the faculty to dispose of the transferor. 
Otherwise the protection of the acquirer in good faith would have an excessive 
scope, since it would be enough in order to become owner to acquire from 
someone who claims to be authorized to dispose by an unidentified owner, even 
when he did not provide any information concerning the powers granted to him. 
 It could appear contradictory to expect that a person who acquires from an 
indirect agent should inquire into the link between the owner/principal and the 
                                                 
154  See on this point Jakobs/Schubert, Beratung AT II (1984), p. 961 (§ 185); Carraro, Il 
mandato (1947), p. 2-4; Finkenauer, §§ 182-185 (2003), p. 967-968; Diéguez, Eficacia real 
(2006), p. 190-195. 
155  This was also the case in Roman law, as seen in Chapter 2, Section 5 above. 
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transferor/agent, since precisely what distinguishes indirect representation is that 
the person of the owner is not disclosed. There is however no such 
contradiction. It is one thing not to disclose who the real owner is – a common 
feature in transactions involving works of art156 – but it is a completely different 
one not to reveal the terms of the authorization of the owner, which is why the 
acquirer cannot be regarded to be in good faith if he does not inquire on the 
faculties of the transferor in case he has a reason to doubt157. The underlying idea, 
which is shared in many jurisdictions, is that the good faith of the acquirer is 
excluded not only if he knew that the transferor was not entitled to dispose, but 
also if he should have known it158. This criterion introduces a certain duty to 
inquire into the faculty to dispose of the transferor if there is room for doubt159. 
Having this general framework, it is however difficult to draw a clear dividing 
line between those cases in which this duty must be observed. For example, in 
the context of important transactions it will hardly ever be acceptable not to 
disclose the terms of the authorization of the owner160. In other words, in certain 
transactions it cannot be indifferent for the acquirer to know the powers of the 
transferor161. Moreover, there are a series of factual elements that are 
incompatible with the good faith of the acquirer, such as paying a price which 
was too low, or buying from a person who can hardly be regarded as being 
authorized to dispose over a particular object162. 
 The contemplatio domini is also relevant in the context of the transfer of 
ownership of goods which are inscribed in public registers, as happens with 
immovable property163. Modern scholars have discussed in particular whether it is 
                                                 
156  See Becker, Vente aux enchères (2011), p. 95. 
157  This is why the Dutch Supreme Court in the above-mentioned decision “Mesdag II” 
considered that the acquirer who should have doubted on the faculties of the transferor 
could not invoke the provisions protecting the acquirer in good faith. Lenel, Stellvertretung 
und Vollmacht (1896), p. 13 seems to go too far when claiming: “Der dritte Erwerber 
seinerseits hat kein berechtigtes Interesse daran, zu wissen, auf welchen Thatsachen die 
Dispositionsbefugnis seines Veräußerers beruht”. 
158  See e.g. Asser/Van der Grinten, 2-I (1990), nr. 114; Asser/Kortmann, 2-I (2004) nr. 118; 
Faber, National Report Austria (2008), p. 41-42; Carey Miller et al., National Report Scotland 
(2009), p. 423; Salomons, National Report the Netherlands (2011), p. 112-113; Foëx, 
National Report Switzerland (2011), p. 223-224; Pitlo/Reehuis/Heisterkamp, Goederenrecht 
(2012), p. 125-128 (nr. 153-154) ff.; Asser/Bartels/van Mierlo, 3-4 (2013), p. 401-402 
(nr. 419-420). 
159  See on this point Tjittes/van Wechem, Kroniek (2011), p. 923. The content of the good 
faith in this context is also discussed by Jansen, Nemo plus (2009), p. 443-444. 
160  It is in view of this consideration that Swiss scholars limit the scope of application of the 
above-quoted art. 32(2) of the Code des Obligations to minor everyday transactions. See 
Becker, Vente aux enchères (2011), p. 93-95. 
161  Peter, Levering (2007), p. 102. 
162  Cfr. for the Netherlands Nève, Hoe verkrijgt (1974), p. 71. For Switzerland: Becker, Vente 
aux enchères (2011), p. 94. 
163  This problem is intensely discussed in the Netherlands. In favour of his possibility: 
Groefsema, Bevoegd beschikken (1993), p. 40; Smits, Opdracht (1994), p. 493-494; Bartels, 
Titel van overdracht (2004), p. 61-62. Against it van Boom, Bevoegd beschikken (1994), 
 
compatible with the modern systems of registration to admit the transfer of 
ownership by an indirect representative, who will be a different individual than 
that on whose name the object is registered. The normal conclusion is to exclude 
this possibility on account of the serious blow which it would mean to the public 
registers.  
 The study of the content of the good faith of the acquirer and the transfer of 
ownership over registered goods shows that the contemplatio domini may play a 
role when approaching the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. However, the 
secondary importance of this element by no means justifies establishing separate 
legal grounds based on whether ownership is delivered on behalf of the owner or 
not. 
 
5. The faculty to dispose in different systems of transfer of ownership 
 
a. Consensual transfer systems. 
 
It has been shown above that the way in which the iusta causa traditionis and the 
potestas alienandi were approached until the 18th century shows no interaction 
between both elements when drawing a general systematization of the transfer of 
ownership164. Moreover, the analysis of modern legal systems indicates that the 
general distinction of two different legal grounds for the transfer of ownership in 
the case of direct and indirect representation made its way into different 
European legal systems, regardless of the particular system of transfer of 
ownership which they had. In other words, while the distinction was 
dogmatically developed in Germany, which has an abstract and delivery-based 
transfer system, other jurisdictions would adopt these guidelines despite having 
causal or consensual transfer systems. This raises the question concerning the 
significance of the existence of different transfer systems for the analysis of the 
faculty to dispose. The evolution presented so far could indicate that the 
existence of different transfer systems is irrelevant for the analysis of the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner, considering that jurisdictions having different 
transfer systems approached direct representation as an immediate legal basis for 
the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. Accordingly, the central issue appears 
to be whether direct representation is directly applied to the law of property or 
not. There are however reasons to doubt this conclusion. There are in fact some 
jurisdictions where the doctrine of direct representation seems to be unavoidable 
when discussing the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. This is particularly 
the case in consensual transfer systems, where the agreement of the parties at the 
                                                                                                                   
p. 865-866; Aertsen, Lastgeving tot verkoop (1997), p. 459-462; Meijer, Middellijke 
vertegenwoordiging (1999), p. 196-198. Concerning the problem of ratification see Potjewijd, 
Bekrachtiging (2002), p. 35-38. The problem is also discussed in other jurisdictions. See e.g 
Pessoa Jorge, O mandato (1961), p. 367; Mengoni, Gli acquisti (1968), p. 8 n. 7. 
164  Chapter 8, Section 1(c) above. 
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contract is enough to transfer ownership. Merging into a single act the contract 
and the transfer of ownership brought along immediate consequences for the 
traditional structure of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. Among these, 
one of the most significant was that the sale performed by a non-owner was 
declared invalid165. In traditional delivery-based systems it was acceptable to 
consider the sale of a res aliena as valid, since ownership would not be transferred 
at the moment of the delivery. Now that contract and transfer of ownership 
became identified, it did not seem possible to uphold such a distinction. 
Therefore, the problem of the validity of the contract and the faculty to dispose 
were brought together.  
 The intimate relation between the validity of the title and the faculty to 
dispose of the non-owner in consensual transfer systems implies that even at a 
conceptual level it may be too challenging to identify them as two different 
requirements for the transfer of ownership, since the lack of the faculty to dispose 
will instantly render the title void166. Within a consensual transfer system it is 
indeed accurate to say that a defect in the faculty to dispose of the non-owner 
will prevent the formation of a valid title for the transfer of ownership. It appears 
therefore that the consensual transfer system has inevitably a direct impact on the 
conceptual framework of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner.  
 While the intimate link between the validity of the iusta causa and the 
problem of potestas alienandi in consensual transfer systems explains the legal 
outcome of a delivery performed by an unauthorized non-owner, the legal 
grounds for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner are the same as those to be 
found in other jurisdictions. This can be seen from the fact that consensual 
transfer systems have also adhered to the basic distinction between the transfer of 
ownership in the context of direct and indirect representation. One could 
perhaps claim that the main peculiarity of consensual transfer systems is that the 
doctrine of direct representation is more intuitively linked to the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner, since the conclusion of a binding contract by an 
agent would coincide with the passing of ownership. Nonetheless, the transfer of 
ownership can also take place directly – at least according to most scholars167 – 
through an indirect representative, which shows that there is no inseparable link 
between direct representation and the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in 
                                                 
165  See e.g. Code Civil art. 1599: “La vente de la chose d’autrui est nulle : elle peut donner lieu 
à des dommages-intérêts lorsque l’acheteur a ignoré que la chose fût à autrui”. Fenet, 
Travaux préparatoires (1827), XIV, p. 14 reproduces the opinions of some of the jurists 
discussing the subject. Tronchet, for instance, declares that “il est ridicule de vendre la chose 
d’autrui”, and Berlier qualifies such sale as “indubitablement nulle”. Portalis would use equally 
categorical words to describe this circumstance (p. 118). See on the formation of this 
doctrine Petronio, Vendita (1991), p. 169-195. 
166  Nonetheless Jansen, Beschikkingsonbevoegdheid (2009), p. 43 considers that in the consensual 
transfer system a distinction should be made between the problem of the faculty to dispose 
and the validity of the title. 
167  See Chapter 8, Section 1 above. 
 
consensual transfer systems. Accordingly, the structure of consensual transfer 
systems does not seem to have any fundamental impact on the legal grounds for 
the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
 
b. Abstract transfer system and faculty to dispose in Germany. 
 
It has been highlighted until now that Savigny brought about a decisive change 
when approaching the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, since he framed 
this situation under the doctrine of direct representation. One may at this point 
wonder whether the development by Savigny of an abstract transfer system had 
any relation with his approach to the problem of the potestas alienandi. For the 
abstract transfer system, the agreement at the moment of the delivery is decisive 
for the transfer of ownership. Since the agreement takes place at the delivery, 
while the voluntas domini at the delivery grants the non-owner the potestas 
alienandi, one may wonder whether both elements interacted or even merged 
within the new transfer system. Miquel has indeed claimed that there was a 
fundamental interaction between both problems, which is to be found in the 
very beginning of Savigny’s dinglicher Vertrag. The ground for this assertion is that, 
by the time Savigny was developing his theories on the subject, large parts of the 
Codex Veronensis containing the Institutes of Gaius remained illegible. This meant 
that Savigny, when analysing the requirements to transfer ownership in Gai 2,20 
as presented in Lachmann’s edition of 1841168, could not read the final phrase “si 
modo ego eius dominus sim”169. According to Miquel, this omission would have led 
Savigny to relate the agreement at the causa in this text with the voluntas domini 
which is referred to by Gaius in D. 41,1,9,3170. This in turn would have led 
Savigny to conclude that the iusta causa traditionis was a mere indication of the 
intent of the parties, and what was really decisive was the agreement to transfer 
ownership at the delivery. However, according to the Miquel, such an 
interpretation would confuse two different problems, since D. 41,1,9,3 would 
not deal with the iusta causa traditionis, but rather with the potestas alienandi, as can 
be seen from the subsequent fragment (D. 41,1,9,4)171. Miquel thus claims that 
Savigny could not properly determine the significance of Gai 2,20 and 
D. 41,1,9,3 because he was not able to read the final phrase of the former text. If 
he had been able to do so, he would have realized that D. 41,1,9,3 dealt with a 
problem of potestas alienandi, and had nothing to do with the iusta causa traditionis. 
                                                 
168  Lachmann, Gaii Institutionum (1841), p. 60: “§ 20. Itaque si tibi vestem, vel aurum, vel 
argentum tradidero, sive ex venditionis causa, sive ex donationis, sive quavis alia ex causa, 
tua fit ea res si - - - - - -” 
169  Miquel, Savigny y el nacimiento (2003), p. 5758. 
170  D. 41,1,9,3 (Gai. 2 rer. cott.): “Hae quoque res, quae traditione nostrae fiunt, iure gentium 
nobis adquiruntur: nihil enim tam conveniens est naturali aequitati quam voluntatem 
domini volentis rem suam in alium transferre ratam haberi”. 
171  Miquel, Savigny y el nacimiento (2003), p. 5762-5763. This claim was previously made in 
Miquel, Exceptio rei voluntate (1988), p. 676. 
THE FACULTY TO DISPOSE IN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF TRANSFER 
OF OWNERSHIP
405
 
402 
contract is enough to transfer ownership. Merging into a single act the contract 
and the transfer of ownership brought along immediate consequences for the 
traditional structure of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. Among these, 
one of the most significant was that the sale performed by a non-owner was 
declared invalid165. In traditional delivery-based systems it was acceptable to 
consider the sale of a res aliena as valid, since ownership would not be transferred 
at the moment of the delivery. Now that contract and transfer of ownership 
became identified, it did not seem possible to uphold such a distinction. 
Therefore, the problem of the validity of the contract and the faculty to dispose 
were brought together.  
 The intimate relation between the validity of the title and the faculty to 
dispose of the non-owner in consensual transfer systems implies that even at a 
conceptual level it may be too challenging to identify them as two different 
requirements for the transfer of ownership, since the lack of the faculty to dispose 
will instantly render the title void166. Within a consensual transfer system it is 
indeed accurate to say that a defect in the faculty to dispose of the non-owner 
will prevent the formation of a valid title for the transfer of ownership. It appears 
therefore that the consensual transfer system has inevitably a direct impact on the 
conceptual framework of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner.  
 While the intimate link between the validity of the iusta causa and the 
problem of potestas alienandi in consensual transfer systems explains the legal 
outcome of a delivery performed by an unauthorized non-owner, the legal 
grounds for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner are the same as those to be 
found in other jurisdictions. This can be seen from the fact that consensual 
transfer systems have also adhered to the basic distinction between the transfer of 
ownership in the context of direct and indirect representation. One could 
perhaps claim that the main peculiarity of consensual transfer systems is that the 
doctrine of direct representation is more intuitively linked to the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner, since the conclusion of a binding contract by an 
agent would coincide with the passing of ownership. Nonetheless, the transfer of 
ownership can also take place directly – at least according to most scholars167 – 
through an indirect representative, which shows that there is no inseparable link 
between direct representation and the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in 
                                                 
165  See e.g. Code Civil art. 1599: “La vente de la chose d’autrui est nulle : elle peut donner lieu 
à des dommages-intérêts lorsque l’acheteur a ignoré que la chose fût à autrui”. Fenet, 
Travaux préparatoires (1827), XIV, p. 14 reproduces the opinions of some of the jurists 
discussing the subject. Tronchet, for instance, declares that “il est ridicule de vendre la chose 
d’autrui”, and Berlier qualifies such sale as “indubitablement nulle”. Portalis would use equally 
categorical words to describe this circumstance (p. 118). See on the formation of this 
doctrine Petronio, Vendita (1991), p. 169-195. 
166  Nonetheless Jansen, Beschikkingsonbevoegdheid (2009), p. 43 considers that in the consensual 
transfer system a distinction should be made between the problem of the faculty to dispose 
and the validity of the title. 
167  See Chapter 8, Section 1 above. 
 
consensual transfer systems. Accordingly, the structure of consensual transfer 
systems does not seem to have any fundamental impact on the legal grounds for 
the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
 
b. Abstract transfer system and faculty to dispose in Germany. 
 
It has been highlighted until now that Savigny brought about a decisive change 
when approaching the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, since he framed 
this situation under the doctrine of direct representation. One may at this point 
wonder whether the development by Savigny of an abstract transfer system had 
any relation with his approach to the problem of the potestas alienandi. For the 
abstract transfer system, the agreement at the moment of the delivery is decisive 
for the transfer of ownership. Since the agreement takes place at the delivery, 
while the voluntas domini at the delivery grants the non-owner the potestas 
alienandi, one may wonder whether both elements interacted or even merged 
within the new transfer system. Miquel has indeed claimed that there was a 
fundamental interaction between both problems, which is to be found in the 
very beginning of Savigny’s dinglicher Vertrag. The ground for this assertion is that, 
by the time Savigny was developing his theories on the subject, large parts of the 
Codex Veronensis containing the Institutes of Gaius remained illegible. This meant 
that Savigny, when analysing the requirements to transfer ownership in Gai 2,20 
as presented in Lachmann’s edition of 1841168, could not read the final phrase “si 
modo ego eius dominus sim”169. According to Miquel, this omission would have led 
Savigny to relate the agreement at the causa in this text with the voluntas domini 
which is referred to by Gaius in D. 41,1,9,3170. This in turn would have led 
Savigny to conclude that the iusta causa traditionis was a mere indication of the 
intent of the parties, and what was really decisive was the agreement to transfer 
ownership at the delivery. However, according to the Miquel, such an 
interpretation would confuse two different problems, since D. 41,1,9,3 would 
not deal with the iusta causa traditionis, but rather with the potestas alienandi, as can 
be seen from the subsequent fragment (D. 41,1,9,4)171. Miquel thus claims that 
Savigny could not properly determine the significance of Gai 2,20 and 
D. 41,1,9,3 because he was not able to read the final phrase of the former text. If 
he had been able to do so, he would have realized that D. 41,1,9,3 dealt with a 
problem of potestas alienandi, and had nothing to do with the iusta causa traditionis. 
                                                 
168  Lachmann, Gaii Institutionum (1841), p. 60: “§ 20. Itaque si tibi vestem, vel aurum, vel 
argentum tradidero, sive ex venditionis causa, sive ex donationis, sive quavis alia ex causa, 
tua fit ea res si - - - - - -” 
169  Miquel, Savigny y el nacimiento (2003), p. 5758. 
170  D. 41,1,9,3 (Gai. 2 rer. cott.): “Hae quoque res, quae traditione nostrae fiunt, iure gentium 
nobis adquiruntur: nihil enim tam conveniens est naturali aequitati quam voluntatem 
domini volentis rem suam in alium transferre ratam haberi”. 
171  Miquel, Savigny y el nacimiento (2003), p. 5762-5763. This claim was previously made in 
Miquel, Exceptio rei voluntate (1988), p. 676. 
CHAPTER 8. FROM VOLUNTAS DOMINI TO CONTEMPLATIO DOMINI: 
DIRECT REPRESENTATION AND POTESTAS ALIENANDI
406
 
404 
Accordingly, Miquel considers that one can identify a confusion between the 
iusta causa traditionis and the potestas alienandi in the very origins of Savigny’s 
dinglicher Vertrag. 
 While Miquel’s analysis is very innovative, it is not entirely convincing. In the 
first place, he approaches the Roman delivery in a strictly ‘causal’ key, leading 
him to assume that D. 41,1,9,3 cannot possibly grant a general significance to the 
agreement at the delivery, but instead merely refers to the problem of the potestas 
alienandi. This text was already studied above172, where it was shown that it 
indeed does not indicate that the intent of the owner at the delivery is always 
relevant, but that it can nonetheless be meaningful in some contexts. One of the 
situations in which this intent is relevant is the potestas alienandi, where the 
voluntas domini at the time of the delivery enables the passing of ownership, as 
shown in D. 41,1,9,4. This is however not the only context where the voluntas 
domini can be relevant at the delivery, as Miquel assumes, which can be seen by 
reading the subsequent texts, where this voluntas is relevant to determine the 
effects of the traditio ficta (D. 41,1,9,5-6) and of the acquisition of ownership over 
abandoned and jettisoned objects (D. 41,1,9,7-8). Accordingly, while D. 41,1,9,3 
should not be regarded as presenting an abstract transfer system contrary to that 
of Gai 2,20, one cannot limit it simply to the problem of the potestas alienandi of 
an authorized non-owner, which is one among various applications of the 
voluntas domini within the traditio. Savigny may well have granted a significance to 
this voluntas which contradicts the causal transfer system of classical Roman law, 
but this interpretation does not entail – as Miquel thinks – a confusion between 
the iusta causa traditionis and the potestas alienandi.  
 Another element which conspires against the claims of Miquel is that the 
German abstract transfer system does not confuse or merge the agreement at the 
delivery with the authorization of the owner to transfer ownership. If Savigny 
did in fact confuse the problem of the iusta causa traditionis and the potestas 
alienandi, one could in fact expect that the dinglicher Vertrag would at the same 
time absorb from a systematic perspective the authorization of the owner to 
transfer ownership, particularly since in both cases one would be dealing with the 
voluntas domini. However, Savigny never really confused both problems. When 
developing his ideas on the structure of the transfer of ownership, not once does 
he bring any reference to the voluntas domini at the potestas alienandi to support his 
conclusions173. This latter element is instead approached within his analysis of the 
Stellvertretung174, which shows that Savigny located the voluntas domini at the 
delivery by a non-owner under an entirely different conceptual framework. 
Miquel may accordingly be underestimating the German jurist when claiming 
that he confused the iusta causa traditionis and the potestas alienandi. The distinction 
between the problem of the agreement at the delivery and the authorization of 
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the owner to deliver was moreover upheld among subsequent German 
scholarship, which is why the problem of the faculty to dispose is approached 
under the notions of Stellvertretung and Ermächtigung (§§ 161-181 and 185) and 
not under the notion of the dinglicher Vertrag (§§ 925 and 929). It seems therefore 
that there was no decisive interaction between the problems of the iusta causa 
traditionis and the potestas alienandi under the abstract transfer system175, mainly 
because the problem of the authorization to dispose was discussed under a 
different systematic framework than that of the real agreement. 
 While there is no fundamental influence of the abstract transfer system on the 
analysis of the legal basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, it is 
worth noting that there is a certain interplay between both problems when 
analysing the physical delivery by a non-owner after the dinglicher Vertrag has been 
concluded. The problem in this situation is that it is often argued that the 
physical transfer of possession following the dinglicher Vertrag can be considered a 
legal act (Rechtsgeschäft) subject to the general rules of the Allgemeiner Teil, being 
rather a mere Realakt regarding which the will plays no decisive role176. This 
implies that if an agent only has to perform the physical delivery of possession, 
this act cannot be governed by the rules on direct representation, which has led 
German scholars to develop an independent concept for the transfer of possession 
through an agent, who is regarded in this situation to act as a Besitzdiener177. 
According to this notion, the Besitzdiener is not an actual possessor, but rather 
exercises the possession of the principal – the Besitzherr – and therefore when the 
delivery takes place the possession is regarded to pass directly from the principal 
to the acquirer. This has led to a rather awkward situation in which three 
different concepts have to be used to explain the delivery by a non-owner: 
Stellvertretung when ownership is transferred by a non-owner nomine alieno; 
Ermächtigung when ownership is transferred by a non-owner nomine proprio; 
finally, when possession is transferred by an agent, we would be dealing with a 
Besitzdiener. This additional distinction involves as well discussing which rules 
would govern the delivery by a Besitzdiener178. All of this shows that the 
discussion on whether a particular intent is involved at the delivery of possession 
– and therefore whether it may be qualified as a legal act or not – has borne 
direct consequences for a group of cases, leading to the creation of a particular 
notion to explain the delivery by a non-owner in this case. The intricate 
construction of the Besitzdiener has been criticized by Van Vliet, who considers 
that the conceptual difficulties on the point could be avoided if one 
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177  See on this notion Flume, Das Rechtsgeschäft (1992) II, p. 750; Van Vliet, Transfer of 
movables (2000), p. 68-71; Witt, Rechtsfigur des Besitzdieners (2001), p. 165-201. 
178  See on this point Witt, Rechtsfigur des Besitzdieners (2001), p. 165-201. 
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acknowledges that the delivery itself is a legal act where the intent of the parties 
has a relevant role to play179.  
 The study of the German abstract transfer system shows that there is no 
fundamental confusion between the problem of the faculty to dispose and the real 
agreement. Savigny never considered that the authorization given to a non-
owner in order to transfer ownership should be approached in the context of the 
dinglicher Vertrag. Both problems also found an independent theoretical 
framework in the BGB, where the voluntas domini is either approached as a 
problem of Stellvertretung or Ermächtigung. It would therefore appear that the 
decisive role of the dinglicher Vertrag for the transfer of ownership had no direct 
impact in the general systematization of the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner. The only point where both problems interact concerns the case of the 
mere physical delivery by a non-owner, due to the fact that such situation is 
considered to fall outside the provisions governing legal acts, which is why the 
figure of the Besitzdiener had to be introduced in order to provide a legal basis to 
explain the transfer of ownership in such case. 
 
c. Animus transferendi dominii and voluntas domini in causal delivery-based transfer 
systems. 
 
The study of both Roman law and the ius commune has shown that the voluntas 
domini granted to the non-owner in order to perform the delivery has a place of 
its own in causal delivery-based transfer systems180. In other words, the 
significance of the iusta causa traditionis for the transfer of ownership does not 
exclude the fact that the authorization given by the owner at the time of the 
delivery has a role of its own in order to determine the faculty to dispose of the 
non-owner. In fact, the voluntas domini in the context of the potestas alienandi 
traditionally has experienced almost no interaction with the animus transferendi 
dominii which is sometimes required for the transfer of ownership. Nonetheless, 
scholars in causal delivery-based transfer systems since the 20th century have often 
discussed whether the agreement at the time of the delivery has any role to play 
for the transfer of ownership. This in turn poses the question of whether this 
controversy affected the significance of the authorization given by the owner for 
the transfer of ownership through another person. 
 In the course of the 20th century it was often disputed in causal delivery-based 
transfer systems whether a separate agreement or intent should take place at the 
delivery in order to transfer ownership. In jurisdictions where this element is laid 
down in legal provisions it is of course more common for scholars to identify this 
intent as an individual requirement for the transfer of ownership. For instance, 
most Chilean scholars claim that the delivery is a bilateral legal act for which the 
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180  See Chapter 2, Section 6 and Chapter 8, Section 1(c) above. 
 
consent of both parties is needed181, an idea which agrees with the very explicit 
significance given by the Civil Code to the agreement at the time of the delivery. 
In those causal transfer systems where the provisions regarding delivery were not 
so explicit the issue was largely debated, as was the case in the Netherlands182, 
Switzerland183 and Austria184. While there are several authors in different 
jurisdictions who grant a certain place to the agreement at the delivery in the 
context of a causal transfer system185, others have opted for a more radical 
distinction between abstract and causal systems, according to which the 
agreement at the delivery can only play a role within an abstract and not within a 
causal transfer system186. The latter opinion shares the same basic approach to the 
transfer of ownership as that which is to be found among some Roman law 
scholars, who consider that the need for a iusta causa traditionis excludes that the 
animus transferendi dominii can be truly relevant in classical Roman law187. In fact, 
some of the scholars who defend this point of view in Roman law have also 
brought it up when discussing the transfer of ownership in modern private law. 
This is for instance the case of Miquel, who considered that it was not possible to 
require in Spanish law at the same time a iusta causa traditionis and an intent or 
agreement at the delivery, and that doing so would be a futile attempt to 
reconcile two opposite views regarding the iusta causa traditionis188. Lokin also 
discarded the need for an agreement at the delivery in the Dutch causal system, 
claiming that this is an element which only had a proper place in an abstract 
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(2011), p. 1015-1016; Salomons, National Report the Netherlands (2011), p. 80-81; 
Steinauer, Les droits réels (2012) II, p. 309 (nr. 2013 ff.); Snijders/Rank-Berenschot, 
Goederenrecht (2012), p. 278-283 (nr. 325-328); Hijma/Olthof, Compendium (2014), 
nr. 115. 
186  Bydlinski, Eigentumsübertragung (1973), p. 1027; Den Dulk, Zakelijke overeenkomst (1979), 
p. 18-19, 104; Huijgen, Rechtszekerheid (1997), p. 11; Bergervoet, Goederenrechtelijke 
overeenkomst (2009), p. 55-57; Reehuis, Overdracht (2010), p. 59-60; Pitlo/Reehuis/ 
Heisterkamp, Goederenrecht (2012), p. 104-108 (nr. 131-134). 
187  Chapter 2, Section 6(a) above. 
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los manuales y tratados de Derecho romano y de Derecho civil cuando señalan como 
requisitos de la tradición los siguientes: 1) entrega; 2) iusta causa; 3) concorde voluntad de 
las partes de transmitir y adquirir el dominio. Hay en ese tercer requisito un intento estéril 
de conciliar dos interpretaciones opuestas de la iusta causa traditionis”. 
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causal system189. The problem is also discussed in Chile, where the Civil Code of 
1856 laid down a causal system of delivery which at the same time demands in 
particular cases a certain intent or agreement of the parties at the delivery. 
According to Guzmán, demanding such an agreement at the delivery is a 
mistake, since it contradicts the causal system adopted by the Code190. 
 While the point remains controversial in most of the above-mentioned 
European jurisdictions, the drafters of the DCFR made no reference to an 
agreement between the parties at the moment of the transfer of ownership 
(DCFR VIII. – 2:101). This was a conscious decision of the drafters, as can be 
seen in the comments to the DCFR191, since it was considered that a real 
agreement at the delivery is a dispensable notion within a causal transfer 
system192. 
 Despite the controversy regarding the importance of the agreement at the 
time of the delivery in causal delivery-based transfer systems, it is worth noting 
that this problem had no decisive impact concerning the existence of an 
authorization which a non-owner must have at the time of the delivery. The 
main reason for this is that, traditionally, this authorization has not been studied 
under the problem of the agreement at the delivery, but rather under different 
dogmatic categories. In most Civil law systems this conceptual independence has 
been favoured by the introduction of the notions of Stellvertretung and 
Ermächtigung – or their local equivalents – which means that the problem of the 
authorization of the owner at the delivery is framed under the problem of direct 
– or indirect – representation, independently from the discussion on the real 
agreement at the delivery. On the other hand, in those systems where direct 
representation is not an immediate legal basis for the transfer of ownership, the 
authorization of the owner is normally approached within the general analysis of 
the faculty to dispose. All of this implies that the discussion concerning the 
existence and significance of the real agreement at the delivery has not led to the 
exclusion of the authorization to dispose of the owner at the delivery as a 
relevant element for the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. This can be seen 
                                                 
189  Lokin, Traditio (1971), p. 131-132. Bergervoet, Goederenrechtelijke overeenkomst (2009), p. 63 
shares this view, claiming that the real agreement within the Dutch causal transfer system 
suffers from a “serious identify problem”, being truly necessary only in an abstract transfer 
system. 
190  Guzmán, DPR (2013) I, p. 649: “El Código Civil de Chile, de 1855, siguió al Derecho 
romano clásico rigurosamente, y exigió un ‘título adquisitivo del dominio’ que justifique la 
entrega, pero cometió el error, al definir la tradición, de incluir en ella una ‘intención de 
transferir’ y una ‘intención de adquirir’ (artículo 670), influido por Pothier, sin reparar en 
que así incurría en contradicción con el criterio causalista que paralelamente adoptaba”. 
191  Von Bar/Clive, DCFR (2010) V, p. 4384, 4417 ff.; Lurger/Faber, PEL Acq. Own. (2011), 
p. 444-452. 
192  Von Bar/Clive, DCFR (2010) V, p. 4417: “The concept of a real agreement is not 
logically indispensable. The underlying entitlement to transfer does not need an additional 
contract to become effective in property law…” Similarly Lurger/Faber, PEL Acq. Own. 
(2011), p. 445-446. 
 
in the DCFR, where despite the irrelevance of the real agreement within the 
causal transfer system, DCFR VIII. – 2:101 (c) requires for the transfer of 
ownership that “the transferor has the right or authority to transfer the 
ownership”, the notion of authority being in this context linked in particular 
with that of Ermächtigung. Accordingly, even in a legal body which deliberately 
attempts to exclude the relevance of any agreement or intent at the delivery, the 
intent of the owner in the context of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner 
continues to play a relevant role.  
 Despite the fact that in most legal systems the discussion concerning the real 
agreement at the delivery has not been decisive to determine the significance of 
the authorization of the owner at the delivery concluded by a non-owner, it is 
worth noting that in some jurisdictions there has been a certain systematic 
interplay between both problems. At some point scholars realized that admitting 
an independent significance to the intent of the owner at the delivery could be 
related to the problem of the structure of the transfer of ownership by delivery 
and the role of the real agreement, leading to different constructions to explain 
this phenomenon. This has been the case in the Netherlands, where part of the 
scholars have been keen to approach the authorization granted by the owner to 
an indirect representative in order to deliver as part of a ‘compound title’ 
(samengestelde titel), which implies that the title of the delivery would actually be 
formed by two different agreements which intertwine: the authorization to 
deliver the object, given by the owner to the transferor, and the agreement 
concluded between transferor and the acquirer193. Accordingly, if any of these 
elements fail, the title for the transfer of ownership would be incomplete an 
ownership would not be transferred. Under this notion, the problem of the 
authorization at the delivery is therefore approached as part of the requirement of 
a title to dispose, and not as an independent authorization. This construction was 
enthusiastically received by some Dutch scholars, and Potjewijd even applies it to 
approach the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in Roman law194. Zwalve in 
particular claims that this construction is more adequate to the Dutch causal 
transfer system, where the German doctrine of Ermächtigung has no role to play 
considering that the delivery can only be regarded as an independent legal act in 
an abstract transfer system195. It seems however that the theory of the 
samengestelde titel is not the most suitable to approach the transfer of ownership by 
a non-owner in a causal delivery-based transfer system. The main dogmatic 
                                                 
193  Hartkamp, Het begrip leveringstitel (1974), p. 395-398; Zwitser, Rond art. 1376 BW (1984), 
p. 110-111; Groefsema, Bevoegd beschikken (1993), p. 40; Aertsen, Lastgeving tot verkoop 
(1997), p. 456; Potjewijd, Bekrachtiging (2002), p. 29-31; Peter, Levering (2007), p. 110 ff.; 
Salomons, National Report the Netherlands (2011), p. 84. 
194  See Chapter 2, Section 6(a) above.  
195  Zwalve, Bekrachtiging (2003), p. 16-17, 30-31, being followed on this point by Peter, 
Levering (2007), p. 111. Also Potjewijd, Bekrachtiging (2002), p. 33 claims that there is a 
fundamental difference at this point between the Dutch causal transfer system and the 
German abstract system, and that the ‘samengestelde titel’ only has a place in the former one. 
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objection against it is that it confuses the problem of potestas alienandi with that of 
the iusta causa traditionis, since it ultimately reduces the problem of the 
authorization to dispose to the requirement of the valid title. This confusion 
between the different requirements to transfer ownership is what leads Bartels to 
reject the idea of a samengestelde titel in the context of the transfer of ownership by 
an authorized non-owner196. This author stresses that Potjewijd is drawn to adopt 
this construction because he denies that the non-owner may properly confer the 
faculty to dispose to the non-owner, which inevitably leads to approach the 
problem under discussion as a problem of the title197. In the case of Zwalve, the 
driving force for subscribing to the samengestelde titel is to exclude the significance 
of an independent intent at the delivery, thereby avoiding what seems to be a 
German construction, under which the delivery would appear to be an 
independent legal act. The excessive zeal to eliminate what is perceived as an 
undue foreign influence leads however to exclude the voluntas domini as an 
independent element to determine the potestas alienandi, as if this authorization 
was incompatible with a causal transfer system. 
 Chile is another jurisdiction where there has been an interplay between the 
discussion on the real agreement and the authorization to transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner. As already mentioned, it is a widespread opinion among 
Chilean scholars that the delivery should be regarded as a bilateral legal act, 
which has led to assume that all the general rules which govern the validity of 
legal acts –particularly those concerning the agreement of the parties – should be 
applied to the delivery as well. In the context of the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner, this has often led to judicial decisions declaring that the lack of 
consent of the owner at the delivery – e.g. in case he dies – would render the 
delivery ‘void’ (nula absolutamente) due to the fact that the consent of the parties is 
an essential element for the validity of any legal act198. Some scholars have 
frowned upon such a construction, which has been regarded as completely alien 
to the causal transfer system laid down in the Code199. It has been argued that this 
would involve a departure from the causal transfer system which the codifier 
tried to adopt based on classical Roman law, and that the whole idea of an 
agreement at the delivery would be a construction of German Pandectism which 
has no place in the Chilean Civil Code.  
 The criticism of Chilean scholars regarding the significance of the voluntas 
domini at the delivery by a non-owner is by no means accurate from a historical 
                                                 
196  Bartels, Titel van overdracht (2004), p. 118-119, 242-243. Hartkamp, Samengestelde 
overdrachtstitel (2004), nr. 3 i.f. subscribes to Bartels’ position on this point. 
197  Bartels, Titel van overdracht (2004), p. 119, commenting Potjewijd, Bekrachtiging (2002), 
p. 31-32. 
198  Corte Suprema, 13/07/1999, commented by Rodríguez Pinto, La cláusula (2000), p. 167-
175; Corte Suprema, 25/01/2001, commented – along with the previous decision – by 
Barrientos, Comentario (2003), p. 273-278. 
199  Guzmán, Contribución (1992), p. 251-257; Barrientos, Comentario (2003), p. 273-278; Soza, 
Tradición (2003), p. 287-305; Guzmán, Donaciones (2005), p. 180-184. 
 
perspective, considering that the voluntas domini played a role at the delivery 
already in Roman law and throughout the ius commune, and that it was this 
tradition which made its way into Bello’s Civil Code. The outcome prescribed 
by Chilean courts – i.e. that ownership will not be transferred if there is no 
authorization at the time of the delivery – is therefore in agreement with the 
transfer system of Roman law and the ius commune. The only awkward thing 
about these decisions is that they claim that ownership would not be transferred 
because of the lack of an essential element for any legal act, namely the consent 
of the parties. This idea involves a direct application to the transfer of ownership 
of the rules governing legal acts in general. It could be argued that there is in 
principle nothing wrong with applying some of the rules governing legal acts to 
the transfer of ownership by delivery. Savigny did in fact bring the delivery under 
the general rules for the validity of agreements even before he approached it in 
an abstract way200, and later scholars would discuss the consequences of the 
delivery under the problem of the ‘validity’ of legal acts201. The Chilean Civil 
Code itself refers in different articles to the ‘validity’ (validez) of the delivery – 
e.g. art. 672-678 – and Guzmán agrees that the delivery itself can be affected by 
mistake, duress or fraud, just like any other legal act where the intent of the 
parties has a role to play202. There has been controversy in other jurisdictions as 
well as to the scope of application to the delivery of the general rules governing 
legal acts, especially regarding its validity203. The problem of the direct 
application of this general rules is that the outcome prescribed by them – namely 
the ‘nullification’ of the act – is rather out of place in the context of the transfer 
of ownership in delivery-based, where the lack of one of the requirements for 
the delivery will simply be that ownership is not transferred. This is particularly 
true considering that there is a factual element – the transfer of possession – 
which cannot simply be ‘nullified’. It seems therefore more correct to understand 
that, in the context of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, the absence of 
the voluntas domini does not render the delivery ‘void’, but merely prevents the 
transfer of ownership from taking place. In other words, it is not necessary to 
resort to general notions governing the consent in legal acts if there is a specific 
consequence linked to the lack of authorization of the owner at the delivery. 
Apart from this conceptual clarification, there is nothing essentially wrong with 
the decisions of Chilean courts concerning the legal outcome prescribed for the 
absence of authorization at the delivery.  
                                                 
200  Savigny, System (1840) III, nr. 141 (p. 315-316). 
201  See e.g. Windscheid, Pandektenrecht (1900) I, p. 358 (§ 81); McGuire, National Report 
Germany (2011), p. 92. 
202  Guzmán, Contribución (1992), p. 254. 
203  See e.g. Reid et al., Law of property (1996), p. 489-491 (nr. 614-617); Peter, Levering 
(2007), p. 20, 32; Miquel, Causa (2009), p. 165-166; Foëx, National Report Switzerland 
(2011), p. 200. 
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 A final example of interaction between the real agreement at the delivery and 
the authorization to dispose can be found in Austria, where the notion of the 
Besitzdiener was adopted from German law204. The reason behind this innovation 
was the same as that given by German scholars, namely that the mere factual 
transfer of possession could not be regarded as a Rechtsgeschäft205, which is why the 
general rules regarding Stellvertretung – or Ermächtigung – could not be applied to 
it. 
 The study of the causal delivery-based transfer systems shows that there was 
no fundamental influence between the discussion on the significance of the real 
agreement and the significance given to authorization given by the owner for the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner. The main reason for this is that this 
authorization traditionally has had a systematic framework of its own, which in 
most European jurisdictions is the doctrine of direct – and indirect – 
representation. Accordingly, while scholars in causal transfer systems often discard 
the general significance of the animus transferendi dominii at the delivery, this 
controversy has had no general impact on the approach to the authorization 
given by the owner to the transfer of ownership. Nonetheless, there has been a 
certain interplay between both problems in some jurisdictions, which in some 
cases revolves around the question of whether the general provisions governing 
the legal act can be applied to the authorization given by the owner or to the 
delivery performed by the non-owner. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
204  See Faber, National Report Austria (2008), p. 38-39, 81. 
205  See on this point Faber, National Report Austria (2008), p. 61. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The study of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner confronts the legal 
historian with the difficult task of distinguishing between what the sources tell us 
and what previous generations of scholars have claimed to see in the sources. 
This is particularly true regarding the process of systematization and abstraction of 
the sources of Roman law which took place during the 19th century, which has 
influenced the modern understanding of classical sources to such an extent that 
scholars often cannot manage without the conceptual structures left behind by 
the so-called Pandectists. Moreover, the familiarity with such structures for the 
modern scholar is all the greater considering that much of the conceptual 
background of Civil law jurisdictions stems from the work of this legal school. In 
this context, it becomes difficult to distinguish to what extent the use of 
anachronistic notions is acceptable to describe Roman sources. On the one hand, 
they may appear as convenient shortcuts that can bring under a common idea a 
number of different cases. On the other hand, these accurate notions may result 
utterly alien to Roman legal thought, thereby distorting the approach to the 
sources. This is indeed the consequence of analysing the problem of the potestas 
alienandi through the more general concept of ‘direct representation’, to which 
legal scholars have resorted since the 19th century in order to offer a common 
approach to the different cases in which the position of a principal is directly 
affected by the acts of another individual.  
 The concept of ‘direct representation’ is inadequate to approach Roman 
sources in general and the potestas alienandi in particular. One of the main 
problems surrounding this notion is that scholars have traditionally described the 
evolution of intermediation in Roman law through the vague idea of a primitive 
ban on direct representation. In this sense, a handful of texts have been regarded 
as part of a general ban which would have covered all legal relations, while the 
significant amount of texts according to which one person could perform acts 
which would directly affect another one have been approached as later 
developments, being mere exceptions to the primitive prohibition. Such an 
interpretation has moreover been favoured by the vague outline which scholars 
have given to the notion of ‘direct representation’ within Roman law, which 
makes it often unclear what was exactly forbidden in pre-classical law and what 
were the exceptions to the prohibition. 
 Instead of approaching the sources through a vague reconstruction involving a 
notion which the Romans never developed, it seems more convenient to 
identify some general trends regarding more specific groups of cases. It is for 
instance recurrent among Roman sources that an individual may perform acts 
which improve the position of another one without being authorized to do so, 
while acts which involve a patrimonial loss for another individual will need to be 
authorized by him. Under this latter group one may include in general those 
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204  See Faber, National Report Austria (2008), p. 38-39, 81. 
205  See on this point Faber, National Report Austria (2008), p. 61. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
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ban on direct representation. In this sense, a handful of texts have been regarded 
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interpretation has moreover been favoured by the vague outline which scholars 
have given to the notion of ‘direct representation’ within Roman law, which 
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were the exceptions to the prohibition. 
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notion which the Romans never developed, it seems more convenient to 
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cases where a non-owner transfers ownership over someone else’s property, 
which is an act that in itself involves a patrimonial loss for the owner. 
Considering that this case shares a common feature with other cases of 
patrimonial loss performed by a non-owner, it is moreover possible to identify 
some common patterns with other problems, including the manumission or the 
pledge through a non-owner. 
 Despite the use in the sources of terms such as ‘potestas alienandi’ or ‘ius 
vendendi’ to describe the different cases in which a non-owner may transfer 
ownership, one should not approach this problem as an abstract requirement for 
the transfer of ownership. Instead, Roman jurists normally have as a starting point 
that the transfer of ownership must be performed by the owner himself, 
approaching those cases where a non-owner is able to do so as exceptions to the 
rule. This does not however imply that there were no common features among 
these ‘exceptional’ cases, since one may in fact identify two main legal grounds 
according to which ownership is transferred by a non-owner: the authorization 
by the owner (voluntas domini) and the existence of a legal provision authorizing 
someone different than the owner to transfer ownership. The voluntas domini will 
be the common criterion to determine whether ownership is transferred when 
the owner authorizes the delivery, without being decisive what particular relation 
linked the owner and the person following his instructions, who may be a sui 
iuris or an alieni iuris. The only case where the legal basis seems to be actually 
different concerns the delivery by a slave or son-in-power who has the libera 
administratio peculii, since the intent of the owner will play no role in this context. 
It is moreover worth pointing out that, while the effects of the transfer of 
ownership voluntate domini are sanctioned by the ius civile – granting Quiritary 
ownership to the acquirer – Roman jurists developed a rich case law in order to 
determine when the non-owner could be regarded as acting voluntate domini, 
deriving for instance particular consequences for the cases of death, revocation or 
ratification. The scope of the authorization was also brought under the attention 
of jurists, particularly when the owner granted very general faculties of 
administration and when the agent abused of a very broad faculty to dispose.  
 The other large group of cases where a non-owner could validly transfer 
ownership involves those individuals who were authorized by a legal provision to 
transfer ownership over someone else’s assets. This was particularly the case of 
legal guardians, regarding whom we have the largest amount of information. 
While the voluntas domini played no role in the alienation, jurists developed an 
equally rich case law around the notion of administratio, which should govern the 
acts of the legal guardian, allowing him to grant Quiritary ownership to the 
acquirer as well. 
 The delivery by a non-owner which did not take place voluntate domini or 
administrationis causa would in principle fall under the notion of furtum, which 
would prevent the acquisition of ownership through usucapion by rendering the 
delivered thing a res inhabilis to that effect. Nonetheless, this prohibition did not 
 
have such far-reaching consequences as is usually thought, due to the fact that the 
intention of the person performing the delivery was usually decisive to configure 
the theft. Also noteworthy is that, despite the use by Roman jurists of rather 
flexible and versatile notions to determine the validity of the transfer of 
ownership, the praetor usually had an active role in modifying the normal 
outcomes prescribed by the ius civile, leading to a rich case law which included 
among other remedies the actio Publiciana, the exceptio rei venditae et traditae and the 
exceptio doli. 
 The current work revisits some of the more widespread preconceptions 
regarding the potestas alienandi through a source-oriented analysis. It is for 
instance clear from the study of the classical sources that the possibility to transfer 
ownership by a non-owner was no innovation introduced by jurists as an 
exception to a primitive ban on direct representation, particularly considering 
that the transfer of ownership took place according to the ius civile. Scholars have 
attempted to bypass the evidence on this point by pointing out that in the case of 
the alienation carried out by legal guardians, these should be regarded as having 
ownership over the delivered goods. However, the evidence in favour of such a 
claim is almost non-existent, and at any rate it is clear that already at an early 
stage legal guardians would appear transferring ownership as non-owners of the 
delivered goods. It appears therefore that scholars have often been too keen to 
explain the sources in a way that makes them agree with the theory of the 
primitive ban on direct representation. This is also to be seen in the approach to 
formal modes of transferring ownership, which according to the traditional 
reconstruction of the evolution of direct representation could not be carried out 
by a non-owner on account of the fact that they were formal acts belonging to 
the ius civile. While the suppression by Justinian of these acts leaves little evidence 
on the subject, there is nonetheless compelling evidence regarding the case of the 
mancipatio by slaves and by legal guardians, which indicates that it was indeed 
possible, at least for these individuals, to transfer ownership in this way. 
Concerning the in iure cessio, the limitations concerning procedural representation 
do not seem to have affected this mode of transferring ownership. This was also 
the case of the manumissio vindicta, which explains the numerous references 
within the sources where a son-in-power frees a slave voluntate patris. The general 
rules governing the potestas alienandi regarding formal ways of transferring 
ownership appear therefore to have agreed to a large extent with those governing 
the traditio. 
 The sources also show that the contemplatio domini did not play a decisive role 
concerning the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. In any case, it is clear that 
Roman jurists did not draw a general distinction for the legal basis of the potestas 
alienandi between those cases where the non-owner acts nomine alieno and nomine 
proprio. This distinction could only play an incidental role, as happens when the 
voluntas domini involved that the delivery should take place nomine alieno or 
nomine proprio. The contemplatio domini could also be relevant when determining 
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While the voluntas domini played no role in the alienation, jurists developed an 
equally rich case law around the notion of administratio, which should govern the 
acts of the legal guardian, allowing him to grant Quiritary ownership to the 
acquirer as well. 
 The delivery by a non-owner which did not take place voluntate domini or 
administrationis causa would in principle fall under the notion of furtum, which 
would prevent the acquisition of ownership through usucapion by rendering the 
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exception to a primitive ban on direct representation, particularly considering 
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attempted to bypass the evidence on this point by pointing out that in the case of 
the alienation carried out by legal guardians, these should be regarded as having 
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by a non-owner on account of the fact that they were formal acts belonging to 
the ius civile. While the suppression by Justinian of these acts leaves little evidence 
on the subject, there is nonetheless compelling evidence regarding the case of the 
mancipatio by slaves and by legal guardians, which indicates that it was indeed 
possible, at least for these individuals, to transfer ownership in this way. 
Concerning the in iure cessio, the limitations concerning procedural representation 
do not seem to have affected this mode of transferring ownership. This was also 
the case of the manumissio vindicta, which explains the numerous references 
within the sources where a son-in-power frees a slave voluntate patris. The general 
rules governing the potestas alienandi regarding formal ways of transferring 
ownership appear therefore to have agreed to a large extent with those governing 
the traditio. 
 The sources also show that the contemplatio domini did not play a decisive role 
concerning the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. In any case, it is clear that 
Roman jurists did not draw a general distinction for the legal basis of the potestas 
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proprio. This distinction could only play an incidental role, as happens when the 
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the content of the good faith of the acquirer for the usucapion, since the 
transferor could have claimed to have been authorized by the owner. It remains 
therefore clear that there was no equivalent in the Roman sources between the 
modern distinctions concerning the delivery by a direct representative and by an 
indirect representative. Moreover, it is worth noting that there was no general 
obstacle in Roman law for a non-owner to deliver nomine alieno. Whether some 
of the features of Roman law can be subsumed under modern legal categories is 
completely irrelevant to determine the significance of such acts in Antiquity. 
 Another problem which has been revisited in the current work is the 
significance of the voluntas domini within the general structure of the transfer of 
ownership by traditio. This particular problem is not directly related to the 
development of direct representation in the sources, but rather with the 
consequences that scholars derive from the idea that the transfer of ownership by 
traditio in classical Roman law would have corresponded to a causal transfer 
system. While this notion is accurate to the extent that the iusta causa traditionis 
was indeed a requirement for the transfer of ownership, one should avoid 
assuming that there is no other intent which can play a relevant role for the 
delivery. Already the fact that the voluntas domini can play a decisive role to 
determine the consequences of a traditio by a non-owner shows that the intent of 
the owner is not altogether irrelevant at the moment of the delivery. The 
significance of the voluntas domini at the delivery is particularly visible in certain 
cases of error in dominio. Scholars should therefore refrain from seeking a strictly 
causal transfer system in Roman sources, particularly since the notions of a causal 
or abstract system of delivery are completely alien to the sources. The same 
observation can be made regarding most modern causal transfer systems, where 
jurists are often too keen to discard any significance of the intent at the delivery, 
since this is normally identified with an abstract transfer system. Despite such 
views, the authorization given by the owner at the delivery remains relevant in 
causal transfer systems, and therefore it should be acknowledged that some forms 
of intent or agreement at the delivery do play a role within these systems as well.  
 The analysis of both literary and legal sources also provides a fresh approach to 
the significance of the nemo plus rule. According to the traditional view, this rule 
would originally be only truly applicable to formal ways of transferring 
ownership, regarding which the ban on direct representation would prevent the 
intervention of a non-owner. Since it was proven in the course of the research 
that a non-owner could indeed perform the mancipatio or the in iure cessio, the 
rule had to be reassessed. It becomes clear in the first place, through the study of 
non-legal sources, that the general idea according to which ‘no one can give 
what he does not have’ was not regarded as an absolute truth. On the contrary, it 
had its origins within dialectics, where it was usually used within eristic 
reasoning, leading to a detailed analysis of it by Aristotle. The argument became a 
commonplace in the course of time, maintaining in any case a significant role 
among dialecticians and rhetoricians. Roman jurists adopted the argument, which 
 
they applied to a wide range of situations, but without granting it a particular 
legal significance of its own. In some cases it is used as a conclusive argument to 
support a legal outcome, in which case the influence of rhetoric can be seen. In 
other situations, however, the nemo plus argument appears as a mere reference 
point, its validity even being openly contradicted. It becomes therefore clear that 
classical jurists did not identify in Ulpian’s nemo plus rule a perfectly valid 
statement governing the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, but approached 
it instead merely as a valid starting point which could face several exceptions. 
Only in Justinianic times does it appear that the compilers granted this rule a 
certain systematic significance regarding the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner, since they considered that in most cases the delivery should be regarded 
as performed by the owner himself. 
 While the nemo plus rule did not have in itself a relevant systematic function 
in classical Roman law regarding the transfer of ownership by a non-owner, it 
did play a key role in the way jurists since the time of the glossators approached 
the cases of potestas alienandi. This idea provided a basic thumb rule around which 
medieval jurists gathered exceptional cases where a non-owner could be seen as 
giving what was not his own. Initially, jurists simply approached the nemo plus as 
a general rule which was full of exceptions, but gradually this view was revised, 
due to the influence of the understanding of the rule developed in medieval 
dialectics. This new interpretation became dominant in the 16th century and 
remained so until the 19th century, during which period the delivery concluded 
by a non-owner with potestas alienandi was regarded as actually performed by the 
owner himself – and therefore not as an exception to the nemo plus rule. This 
systematic function disappeared from most jurisdictions in the course of the 19th 
century, and since then the nemo plus rule has remained mostly as a starting point 
for legal reasoning. 
 Despite the evolving significance granted to the nemo plus rule, the legal 
grounds according to which a non-owner could transfer ownership remained 
largely untouched. Scholars of the ius commune normally drew a distinction 
between those cases where the non-owner delivered voluntate domini and those 
where he was authorized by the law to transfer ownership, which can be seen as 
generally agreeing with the approach of Roman jurists. This changed 
dramatically in the course of the 19th century due to the developments which 
took place regarding the doctrine of direct representation. Initially, the new ideas 
on this point concerned almost exclusively the law of obligations, where the alteri 
stipulari rule had to be overcome. The expansion of the doctrine of direct 
representation into the law of property took a decisive step through the work of 
German scholarship, which developed a general reconstruction to explain the 
evolution of direct representation in historical perspective. According to this 
theory, Roman law initially banned all acts which could fall under this notion, 
including the celebration of contracts and the acquisition of ownership through 
an agent, as well as the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. This historical 
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causal transfer systems, and therefore it should be acknowledged that some forms 
of intent or agreement at the delivery do play a role within these systems as well.  
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would originally be only truly applicable to formal ways of transferring 
ownership, regarding which the ban on direct representation would prevent the 
intervention of a non-owner. Since it was proven in the course of the research 
that a non-owner could indeed perform the mancipatio or the in iure cessio, the 
rule had to be reassessed. It becomes clear in the first place, through the study of 
non-legal sources, that the general idea according to which ‘no one can give 
what he does not have’ was not regarded as an absolute truth. On the contrary, it 
had its origins within dialectics, where it was usually used within eristic 
reasoning, leading to a detailed analysis of it by Aristotle. The argument became a 
commonplace in the course of time, maintaining in any case a significant role 
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century, and since then the nemo plus rule has remained mostly as a starting point 
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largely untouched. Scholars of the ius commune normally drew a distinction 
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where he was authorized by the law to transfer ownership, which can be seen as 
generally agreeing with the approach of Roman jurists. This changed 
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on this point concerned almost exclusively the law of obligations, where the alteri 
stipulari rule had to be overcome. The expansion of the doctrine of direct 
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including the celebration of contracts and the acquisition of ownership through 
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model brought accordingly the problem of the potestas alienandi under the general 
problem of the ‘direct representation’, despite the fact that there was no actual 
need to apply this doctrine as a legal basis for the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner, considering that until that time there was no obstacle in the sources 
against this form of intermediation. 
 The new approach towards the problem of the potestas alienandi influenced the 
way in which subsequent generations of legal scholars would view this problem 
in Roman law, introducing therefore a deeply anachronistic starting point to deal 
with the classical sources. The consequences were equally decisive for the analysis 
of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner in modern Private law, due to the 
fact that the legal grounds according to which ownership passed were 
dramatically modified. The traditional distinction between cases where the 
potestas alienandi followed either from the voluntas domini or from the law now 
became obsolete in most Civil law systems. Instead, the decisive element to 
determine whether ownership was transferred was the compliance with the 
requirements of direct representation. This in turn made it particularly 
troublesome in many jurisdictions to determine whether ownership could be 
transferred by a non-owner acting nomine proprio, since in that case he could not 
be regarded to act as a direct representative. This sharp distinction between the 
legal grounds of alienations performed nomine proprio and nomine alieno is largely 
unjustified if one considers that in the context of the transfer of ownership the 
contemplatio domini does not play such a decisive role as it does in the context of 
the law of obligations. It is therefore no wonder that already several scholars have 
attempted to abolish the practical consequences of this distinction and offer a 
common set of rules for both groups of cases. 
 The evolution of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner since the Middle 
ages shows that 19th century German scholarship signals a turning point which 
has dramatically influenced the way in which this problem is approached both by 
legal historians and by scholars dealing with modern private law. The views on 
this subject have proven all the more difficult to revise due to the fact that the 
systematic structure built under the notion of direct representation seemed 
equally valid to describe Roman sources and modern private law. This implies at 
the same time that Roman law scholars would not see anything fundamentally 
incorrect in the new systematization, while jurists dealing with the private law of 
Civil law jurisdictions would feel that direct representation was a legal basis for 
the transfer of ownership developed by Roman jurists. Despite this view, the 
truth is that the introduction of the idea of direct representation to describe the 
evolution of intermediation in Roman law has greatly distorted the analysis of 
classical sources, which is particularly clear in the context of the potestas alienandi. 
This is why the legal scholar is best advised to avoid deriving any consequences 
regarding the transfer of ownership by a non-owner from the traditional 
reconstructions concerning the evolution of direct representation in Roman law, 
and particularly the idea that pre-classical Roman law knew a general ban in this 
 
regard. The awareness of the anachronisms which the notion of direct 
representation introduced into the study of Roman law is the only way to allow 
the scholar to attain a truly source-oriented approach the problem of the potestas 
alienandi. 
 Modern private law scholars are also warned against the temptation of relying 
uncritically on the notion of direct representation when approaching the problem 
of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. Historic evidence shows that only 
in the last two centuries did this approach become dominant, and that before that 
time there were perfectly clear legal grounds for the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner. The expansion of the doctrine of direct representation into the law 
of property took place due to the rather vague outline of this doctrine during 
part of the 19th century. It is moreover worth noting that even after that time, 
not every Civil law system grants the same significance to the doctrine of direct 
representation within property law. The awareness on this point is essential in 
order to avoid some of the most undesirable consequences that have followed 
from the immediate application of the doctrine of direct representation to 
determine the legal grounds of the faculty to dispose, which is particularly the 
case regarding the sharp distinction between the conveyances which take place 
nomine alieno and nomine proprio. This does not necessarily imply banning direct 
representation from the law of property. One may however wonder whether it is 
convenient to uphold the overarching significance of the rules of direct 
representation in property law, considering that a more elemental set of rules 
concerning the authorization of the owner in general could offer a more 
coherent outlook on the point. This claim is not intended merely as a plea for 
the return to dogmatic structures which are closer to those of Roman law, but 
rather as an attempt to eliminate inconsistencies which emerged from the 
defective approach to classical sources by those scholars who shaped private law 
as we know it nowadays. 
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Summary 
 
The present research offers a broad outlook on the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner, based on the reassessment of some dogmatic starting points which 
have not been critically tested by previous scholarship. The key issue which runs 
through most of the study is the use of the notion of direct representation, which 
has traditionally been applied to describe the evolution of the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner in Roman law, but also to offer a systematization on 
this subject in most European Civil law jurisdictions. This concept gained a 
central importance for the purpose of the present study in the 19th century, when 
German jurists framed the transfer of ownership by a non-owner under the 
doctrine of direct representation. At that time this notion had still a rather vague 
outline, and in some jurisdictions it was controversial whether it was possible for 
an agent to directly bind his principal by acting on his behalf. Roman law seemed 
contrary to a doctrine of direct representation, since it offered some general rules 
forbidding to stipulate on behalf of another person (alteri stipulari nemo potest) or to 
acquire through a person outside the family (per extraneam personam nobis adquiri 
non posse). Based on provisions such as these, German jurists offered a historical 
reconstruction of the evolution of direct representation, according to which 
Roman law would have originally held a general ban on direct representation 
that was only partially overcome in the course of time. In this context, the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner was seen as one of the exceptions 
developed to this primitive prohibition. Savigny would develop these ideas and 
grant them a very practical angle by claiming that direct representation should be 
admitted without restrictions in modern law, since the provisions in Roman law 
forbidding direct representation would apply almost exclusively to primitive acts 
of the old ius civile. This reconstruction of the evolution of direct representation 
had a twofold effect for the understanding of the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner. Regarding the study of Roman law, on the one hand, it was understood 
that the possibility for a non-owner to transfer ownership was only introduced at 
a later stage of development, as part of the progressive abandonment of the 
primitive prohibition on direct representation – a theory which found its greatest 
advocate in Ludwig Mitteis. Concerning modern private law, on the other hand, 
it implied framing the problem of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner 
under the doctrine of direct representation. 
 The first – and most extensive – part of the present study is dedicated to 
Roman law. Chapter 1 offers an outline of the development of the theory of a 
primitive prohibition on direct representation in Roman law, showing that there 
are no grounds to claim that such a prohibition would affect every legal act. This 
theory faces in fact a fundamental methodological objection, namely that it 
applies the modern notion of direct representation to describe ancient legal 
institutions, which ultimately offers a uniform approach over various problems 
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which were dealt with individually by classical jurists. Particularly regarding the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner, the theory of a primitive ban on direct 
representation finds no clear support in the sources. Accordingly, an attempt is 
made to determine the conceptual guidelines which Roman jurists used when 
approaching the problem of the potestas alienandi, as well as the significance of the 
study of cases of patrimonial loss or gain performed by a third person. This 
analysis reveals that most forms of patrimonial loss carried out by a person 
different than the owner have comparable basic rules. Nonetheless, the 
differences between them justify approaching the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner on its own. The cases in which someone obtains a patrimonial gain from 
the acts of another person, such as the acquisition of ownership or the payment 
of debts, are based on radically different principles, and therefore no analogies can 
be drawn between such problems and the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. 
 The study of some elemental texts dealing with the potestas alienandi shows 
that the basic starting point in Roman law is that ownership will be transferred as 
long as the owner performs the delivery. Roman jurists would, however, list a 
series of exceptional cases in which a non-owner could validly transfer 
ownership. In a first group of cases the owner’s authorization (voluntas domini) is 
the basic element to determine whether ownership is transferred, as it happens in 
the transfer of ownership by a procurator. In a second group of cases the potestas 
alienandi is based on a legal provision which grants a non-owner the 
administration over someone else’s assets. Jurists sometimes struggle to determine 
in particular cases whether the delivery should be seen as performed voluntate 
domini, as happens in the case of the pledge creditor.  
 Chapter 2 deals exclusively with the cases where the voluntas domini serves as 
the basis for the potestas alienandi, which form a vast and complex case law. 
Contrary to the general theories on the evolution of direct representation, the 
owner’s authorization appears to have been relevant for the transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner already for the old ius civile. Accordingly, the acquirer could gain 
Quiritary ownership from an authorized non-owner. This does not imply that 
the owner’s authorization is a static element; on the contrary, jurists would 
develop innovative interpretations regarding the exact significance of this 
voluntas. The role granted by Roman jurists to the owner’s authorization has 
however been neglected by modern scholarship. This can be explained by the 
influence of the theories on direct representation in Roman law, which presented 
the transfer of ownership by a non-owner as a late innovation, as well as by the 
fact that modern scholars have often been suspicious of subjective elements 
involving a specific affectus or voluntas, particularly in the context of the traditio. 
The significance of the owner’s authorization is to be seen in the solutions 
governing various problems, including the revocation of the authorization, the 
death of the owner or his ratification of an act concluded by someone else. The 
rules on theft also bear witness to the key role of this authorization, since the 
delivery concluded without it (invito domino) will be considered to be theftuous. 
 
Nonetheless, it is essential for the theft to take place that the person performing 
the delivery positively knows that he is acting against the owner’s intent. 
 The voluntas domini serves as the legal basis for the transfer of ownership in a 
significant number of cases, including those where there is no underlying 
contractual relationship between owner and transferor, as happens when the 
delivery is performed by an authorized slave or son-in-power. Accordingly, there 
is a considerable variety of terms used to indicate the owner’s authorization. In 
most cases the compliance with the owner’s instructions would be easily 
determined, but Roman jurists developed a number of rules to establish the 
content of this authorization when it was given in very broad terms. This offers a 
rich case law concerning the powers of the procurator and the limits imposed by 
the bona fides. 
 While Roman sources show the central position of the voluntas domini in the 
context of the potestas alienandi, modern scholars have often considered instead 
that the contemplatio domini was a key element to determine the legal grounds of 
the transfer of ownership. This view is to a large extent inspired by the 
application of the notion of direct representation to approach Roman sources. 
Moreover, the rules concerning the acquisition of ownership have been applied 
by way of analogy in order to make a distinction between the delivery in the 
name of the owner (nomine domini) and in the name of the transferor (nomine 
proprio). An analysis of the texts regarding the traditio by a non-owner shows, 
however, that the contemplatio domini was only relevant when discussing the good 
faith of the acquirer, and that it was not used to determine two different legal 
grounds for the potestas alienandi – as it is the case in modern private law. 
 The significance of a voluntas domini at the delivery does not conflict with the 
causal structure of the Roman system of transfer of ownership. Scholars have 
often been too zealous in offering a strictly causal model of transfer of ownership 
in Roman law, which would exclude any separate intent at the delivery from 
that given in the iusta causa traditionis. Nonetheless, the sources grant the voluntas 
domini at the delivery a significant role in various contexts, and particularly when 
discussing the potestas alienandi. This does not contradict the key role of the iusta 
causa traditionis, but simply implies that in certain cases the intent at the delivery 
will have decisive consequences for the transfer of ownership. Particularly 
relevant at this point is the problem of the mistake concerning the ownership 
over the delivered goods (error in dominio), which has often been considered 
irrelevant by modern scholars, since it would seem to contradict the causal 
structure of the traditio by attending to a particular intent at the delivery. 
Contrary to this belief, the sources show that Roman jurists progressively 
acknowledged the significance of such a mistake by attending to the importance 
of the voluntas domini at the delivery. 
 Chapter 3 studies the cases in which the potestas alienandi is based on a legal 
provision, and particularly the alienations performed by legal guardians. Such 
problems provide an extensive case law, which is however less complex and 
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elaborate than that regarding the traditio voluntate domini. The basic criterion is 
that the legal guardian will be able to transfer ownership as long as he complies 
with the legal provisions governing his administration. It is worth noting that the 
alienation must take place administrationis causa, i.e. consisting in an administration 
which serves the best interest of the owner. 
 The study of the transfer of ownership by legal guardians has been decisively 
influenced by the general theories on the evolution of direct representation in 
Roman law. Since most scholars claim that Roman law forbade direct 
representation at a primitive stage, it has often been assumed that legal guardians 
could only transfer bonitary ownership. Such an assertion has been supported by 
specific texts discussing praetorian defences protecting the acquirer who obtained 
an object from a legal guardian. Nonetheless, these defences refer specifically to 
the traditio of a res mancipi, and the sources show that the delivery by a legal 
guardian will have the same consequences as that performed by the owner 
himself. Other scholars derived a different consequence from the theories on the 
evolution of direct representation, claiming that legal guardians could in fact 
transfer Quiritary ownership, but only because they would be considered owners 
themselves, at least at an early stage. Such a theory, however, finds little support 
in the sources, and can be better understood as an alternative explanation to a 
problem which, in the eyes of modern scholars, would resemble too much a case 
of direct representation to be admitted by the old ius civile.  
 Chapter 4 analyses the role of the praetorian defences granted in the context 
of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. A broad analysis shows that, while 
the praetor granted various remedies to protect the position of the acquirer when 
the owner’s authorization gave place to controversy – including the actio 
Publiciana (rescissoria), the exceptio “si non auctor meus ex voluntate tua vendidit”, the 
exceptio rei venditae et traditae and the exceptio doli – they apply only to specific 
situations. The authorized non-owner performing the traditio would normally be 
able to transfer Quiritary ownership, and the praetor intervened only when the 
application of the rules following from the ius civile led to unfair results. There is 
accordingly no ground to hold that an authorized non-owner could only provide 
praetorian ownership – an assertion particularly widespread among those who 
regard the transfer of ownership by a non-owner as a later innovation. 
 Chapter 5 deals with the transfer of ownership by a non-owner through 
mancipatio and in iure cessio. Scholars have discussed for centuries whether the 
mancipatio could be performed by an authorized non-owner, but the debate was 
rekindled after it was claimed that the actus legitimi could not admit direct 
representation, since they belonged to the old ius civile. This study shows that 
there is only weak evidence for the existence of such a prohibition concerning 
these modes of transferring ownership, and that most authors who have held such 
an opinion have relied on the existence of a primitive prohibition of 
representation in Roman law. Concerning the mancipatio, the study focuses on 
the cases where the fiducia cannot be applied, since this institution would make it 
 
difficult to determine whether the transfer of ownership took place by an 
authorized non-owner or by an actual owner fiduciae causa. Accordingly, the 
chapter focuses on the transfer of ownership by an authorized slave and by a legal 
guardian, regarding whom the sources strongly suggest the possibility of a valid 
mancipatio. Similarly, the archaic character of the in iure cessio does not seem to 
have stood in the way of a valid transfer of ownership by an authorized non-
owner. In fact, the sources offer numerous cases in which a non-owner performs 
the manumissio vindicta – a form of manumission strongly related to the in iure 
cessio. This would suggest that the impossibility of procedural representation 
affecting the old legis actiones was not extended to the legal acts which were 
modelled after them. All of this shows that the formal modes of transferring 
ownership were not affected by any kind of prohibition on direct representation. 
 Chapter 6 focuses exclusively on the nemo plus rule, which is often 
approached as a fundamental guideline regarding the transfer of ownership by a 
non-owner. Scholars have claimed that a rule which excludes the validity of acts 
performed by a non-owner could only be referred to formal acts of the ius civile, 
since this would be a corollary of the prohibition on direct representation. 
According to this view, the rule could only have an absolute validity concerning 
formal modes of transferring ownership. This would not be the case regarding 
the traditio, where ownership could indeed be transferred by a non-owner. An 
analysis of the intellectual background of this rule reveals, however, a very 
different outlook, since Roman jurists do not seem to have been concerned in 
the first place with the absolute validity of this rule. The argument that “no one 
can give what he does not have” finds its origins in the field of dialectics, where 
it was presented as a typical statement which could lead to fallacious reasoning. 
Eventually the argument became a commonplace in Antiquity, and probably 
made its way into Roman law as a rhetorical topos. Roman jurists applied this 
idea in a rather loose way to different contexts, mainly to enhance a particular 
point, but never granted it an absolute validity or a dogmatic significance of its 
own. Regarding the transfer of ownership, it merely served as a broad general 
rule, but it did not exclude that a non-owner could transfer ownership. The rule 
was accordingly equally applicable to approach both formal and informal acts for 
transferring ownership. It becomes therefore clear that the scope of this rule was 
largely unrelated to the alleged primitive prohibition of direct representation. 
Only in the time of Justinian would jurists attempt to grant this rule a systematic 
significance of its own in the context of the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner, by claiming that every transfer of ownership by a non-owner could be 
actually regarded as performed by the owner himself. 
 While the nemo plus rule had a modest systematic significance in classical 
Roman law, it occupied a key position among jurists since the 12th century when 
approaching the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. Accordingly, Chapter 7 
analyses the reception of the nemo plus rule, thereby opening the second part of 
this research. This rule was originally approached by glossators and commentators 
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 While the nemo plus rule had a modest systematic significance in classical 
Roman law, it occupied a key position among jurists since the 12th century when 
approaching the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. Accordingly, Chapter 7 
analyses the reception of the nemo plus rule, thereby opening the second part of 
this research. This rule was originally approached by glossators and commentators 
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as a very general guideline, around which countless exceptions could be 
gathered. This circumstance by itself located the rule in the centre of the analysis 
of the transfer of ownership by a non-owner. This interpretation, however, did 
not agree with the approach given to the rule by theologians and dialecticians, 
who granted it an absolute validity. These views gradually made their way into 
legal writings, and by the 16th century jurists had explained every case which 
seemed to contradict the nemo plus rule as an apparent exception, thereby 
granting it an absolute validity. This interpretation would become dominant until 
the 19th century, serving as a main starting point to understand how the transfer 
of ownership by a non-owner would take place. With the promulgation of 
modern civil codes the rule lost its systematic significance regarding the transfer 
of ownership by an authorized non-owner in most Civil law jurisdictions. Since 
that time, the nemo plus rule has mainly served as the general starting point when 
discussing the acquisition of ownership by an acquirer in good faith, which is the 
same fate experienced by the nemo dat rule of the Common law. 
 Chapter 8 describes the drastic paradigm shift which the notion of direct 
representation introduced when discussing the transfer of ownership by a non-
owner. This evolution shows that the historical reconstruction of the evolution 
of direct representation in Roman sources offered by German jurists in the 19th 
century not only was decisive for the analysis of the potestas alienandi in Roman 
law, but also brought along radical changes for modern private law. Until the 18th 
century, the transfer of ownership by a non-owner followed to a large extent the 
main guidelines offered by Roman law, and particularly that ownership could be 
validly transferred as long as the delivery was performed according to the 
authorization of the owner (voluntate domini) or a legal provision. In this context, 
the contemplatio domini played no decisive role in determining the legal grounds 
for the transfer of ownership. This may explain why the development of the 
doctrine of direct representation initially had no impact regarding the potestas 
alienandi: there was in fact no need to resort to a new theory in order to explain 
how a non-owner could transfer ownership. All of this changed when German 
jurists in the 19th century framed the transfer of ownership by a non-owner under 
the general problem of direct representation. This development was not triggered 
by practical considerations, since there was no controversy at that time regarding 
the possibility to transfer ownership through a non-owner. Instead, the problem 
of the transfer of ownership was brought under the doctrine of direct 
representation, following the general reconstruction of the evolution of direct 
representation in Roman sources.  
 The application of the doctrine of direct representation as a legal basis for the 
transfer of ownership by a non-owner became widespread among European Civil 
law jurisdictions. Since the contemplatio domini has been traditionally regarded as 
an essential element of the doctrine of direct representation, the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner nomine domini had to be radically distinguished from 
the delivery nomine proprio, i.e. in the context of indirect representation. This left 
 
scholars with the task of determining the legal basis for the transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner who delivered in his own name – a question which had never 
troubled jurists before the 19th century. Other jurisdictions, however, did not 
grant the contemplatio domini such a decisive significance when determining the 
legal basis for the transfer of ownership. This latter approach seems more 
convenient both from a dogmatic and from a practical perspective. The 
contemplatio domini only acquired a key relevance when the transfer of ownership 
by a non-owner was framed under the doctrine of direct representation through 
a historically inaccurate reconstruction of the evolution of Roman law. It was in 
this context that it was necessary to develop two different sets of rules depending 
on whether the delivery was performed in the name of the owner or not. 
Moreover, the boundaries between both cases are often unclear. The contemplatio 
domini should accordingly be taken into account in particular contexts – e.g. 
when approaching the good faith of the acquirer – but not to identify two 
completely different legal grounds for the transfer of ownership. Finally, it is 
worth noting that the application of the doctrine of direct representation to the 
transfer of ownership took place regardless of the existence of different transfer 
systems – causal or abstract, consensual or delivery-based – although the 
significance granted to the agreement at the delivery did play a role when 
approaching certain problems concerning the owner’s consent to the transfer of 
ownership by a non-owner. 
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Samenvatting1 
 
Het hier gepresenteerde onderzoek biedt een algemeen overzicht van de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar gebaseerd op een nieuwe evaluatie 
van sommige dogmatische uitgangspunten, die niet kritisch tegen het licht 
gehouden zijn in eerder wetenschappelijk onderzoek. De belangrijkste notie hier 
is het gebruik van het begrip ‘directe vertegenwoordiging’ dat traditioneel wordt 
gebruikt bij de beschrijving van de evolutie van de eigendomsoverdracht door 
een niet-eigenaar in het Romeinse recht, maar ook een systematisch uitgangs-
punt is in de meeste op het Romeinse recht gebaseerde Europese rechtsstelsels. 
Dit concept verkreeg een centrale positie voor dit onderwerp in de 19e eeuw, 
toen Duitse juristen de eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar uitsluitend 
bezagen vanuit het perspectief van de directe vertegenwoordiging. In die tijd was 
de notie van directe vertegenwoordiging nog tamelijk weinig omlijnd en in 
sommige rechtsstelsels was het betwist of het mogelijk was voor de vertegen-
woordiger om de opdrachtgever rechtstreeks te binden. Het Romeinse recht 
scheen tegen een dergelijke mogelijkheid te pleiten, omdat het een paar 
algemene regels bevat die de stipulatie ten behoeve van een ander verboden (alteri 
stipulari nemo potest) of de eigendomsverkrijging via iemand van buiten de familie 
onmogelijk verklaarde (per extraneam personam nobis adquiri non posse). Uitgaande 
van deze beginselen hebben Duitse juristen een historische reconstructie van de 
evolutie van directe vertegenwoordiging gepresenteerd, volgens welke in het 
Romeinse recht een verbod op directe vertegenwoordiging gold, dat slechts in 
de loop van de tijd werd gemitigeerd. In deze context werd de eigendoms-
overdracht door een niet-eigenaar beschouwd als een van de uitzonderingen op 
dit oorspronkelijke verbod. Savigny zou deze ideeën ontwikkelen en een 
praktische betekenis geven door te beweren dat directe vertegenwoordiging 
zonder beperkingen in het moderne recht zou moeten worden toegelaten, omdat 
de bepalingen in het Romeinse recht die directe vertegenwoordiging verboden 
alleen betrekking zouden hebben gehad op de rechtshandelingen van het oude 
ius civile. Deze reconstructie van de evolutie van directe vertegenwoordiging had 
een dubbele werking bij het begrijpen van de eigendomsoverdracht door een 
niet-eigenaar. Enerzijds werd met betrekking tot de bestudering van het 
Romeinse recht de opvatting gemeengoed dat de mogelijkheid voor een niet-
eigenaar om eigendom over te dragen pas in een later ontwikkelingsstadium 
werd geïntroduceerd, als onderdeel van het geleidelijk loslaten van het verbod op 
directe vertegenwoordiging – een theorie die het duidelijkst werd verwoord 
door Ludwig Mitteis. Anderzijds werd met betrekking tot het moderne recht de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar geheel gezien in het licht van de 
leer van de directe vertegenwoordiging.  
                                                 
1  Ik dank mijn promotores voor hun hulp bij het vervaardigen van deze Nederlandse vertaling. 
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 Het eerste – en meest uitgebreide – deel van het hier gepresenteerde 
onderzoek gaat over het Romeinse recht. Hoofdstuk 1 biedt een overzicht van 
de ontwikkeling van de theorie van een oorspronkelijk verbod op directe 
vertegenwoordiging in het Romeinse recht, waaruit het duidelijk wordt dat er 
geen bewijs bestaat voor de bewering dat een dergelijk verbod iedere 
rechtshandeling zou betreffen. Deze leer werd geconfronteerd met een essentieel 
methodologisch bezwaar, namelijk dat ze gebruik maakt van de notie van directe 
vertegenwoordiging om oude juridische instellingen te beschrijven, wat 
uiteindelijk leidt tot een uniforme benadering van diverse problemen die door de 
klassieke juristen individueel benaderd werden. Vooral voor het geval van 
eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar vindt de notie van een oorspronke-
lijk verbod op directe vertegenwoordiging geen steun in de bronnen. Daarom 
wordt een poging gedaan om te bepalen welke conceptuele richtlijnen wel door 
de Romeinse juristen gebruikt werden bij de benadering van de potestas alienandi, 
evenals het belang van de gevallen waarin de eigenaar verrijkt of verarmd wordt 
door de handelingen van een derde. Dit onderzoek toont aan dat de meeste 
gevallen waarin een eigenaar armer wordt door de handelingen van een derde 
vergelijkbare regels hebben. Niettemin rechtvaardigen de verschillen tussen de 
diverse gevallen een afzonderlijke benadering van de eigendomsoverdracht door 
een niet-eigenaar. De gevallen waarin iemand verrijkt wordt door de 
handelingen van een derde, zoals in het geval van eigendomsverkrijging of 
betaling van schulden, zijn gebaseerd op volledig afwijkende principes, en 
daarom kunnen er geen analogieën bestaan tussen zulke problemen en de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar. 
 De bestudering van sommige elementaire teksten over de postestas alienandi 
toont aan dat het uitgangspunt in het Romeinse recht is dat eigendom wordt 
overgedragen zolang de levering door de eigenaar verricht wordt. De Romeinse 
juristen zouden niettemin een aantal uitzonderlijke gevallen opsommen waarin 
een niet-eigenaar zou kunnen vervreemden. Voor een eerste groep van gevallen 
wordt de toestemming van de eigenaar (voluntas domini) het beslissende element 
om de eigendomsoverdracht te bepalen, zoals gebeurt bij de eigendoms-
overdracht door een procurator. Bij een tweede groep van gevallen is de potestas 
alienandi gebaseerd op wetsbepalingen die het beheer van iemands vermogen aan 
een niet-eigenaar verlenen. Soms is het onduidelijk voor de juristen of de 
levering in een bepaalde geval gezien moet worden als gedaan voluntate domini of 
niet, zoals het gebeurt in het geval van de pandcrediteur. 
 Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt uitsluitend de gevallen waarin de voluntas domini de 
grondslag is voor de potestas alienandi, die een uitgebreide en gecompliceerde 
jurisprudentie vormen. In tegenstelling tot de algemene theorieën rond de 
ontwikkeling van directe vertegenwoordiging, blijkt de toestemming van de 
eigenaar beslissend te zijn geweest reeds voor het oude ius civile. Dientengevolge 
kon de verkrijger Quiritische eigendom verwerven van een bevoegde niet-
eigenaar. Dit betekent niet dat de toestemming van de eigenaar een statische 
 
notie is; integendeel, de juristen zouden vindingrijke interpretaties over het 
bereik van deze voluntas ontwikkelen. Toch hebben moderne auteurs de 
betekenis van de toestemming van de eigenaar in het Romeinse recht 
veronachtzaamd. Dit volgt waarschijnlijk uit de invloed van de ideeën rond de 
evolutie van directe vertegenwoordiging in het Romeinse recht, die de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar als een latere ontwikkeling 
voorstelden. Ook het wantrouwen van moderne auteurs rond subjectieve 
elementen zoals een bepaalde affectus of voluntas, vooral in het kader van de 
traditio, heeft waarschijnlijk een rol gespeeld. De betekenis van de toestemming 
van de eigenaar is te zien bij de oplossingen van verschillende problemen, zoals 
de herroeping van de toestemming, de dood van de eigenaar of de bekrachtiging 
van een handeling die door iemand anders was verricht. De regels rond diefstal 
tonen ook de centrale rol van deze toestemming, aangezien de ongeoorloofde 
levering (invito domino) wordt beschouwd als diefstal. Niettemin, diefstal kan 
alleen plaats vinden als de niet-eigenaar die de levering verricht met zekerheid 
wist dat hij handelde tegen de wil van de eigenaar. 
 De voluntas domini dient als de juridische grondslag voor de eigendoms-
overdracht in verschillende gevallen, waaronder diegene waarin er geen 
onderliggende contractuele relatie bestaat tussen eigenaar en vervreemder, zoals 
gebeurt wanneer de levering wordt verricht door een geautoriseerde slaaf of 
zoon. Daarom bestond er een behoorlijke terminologische verscheidenheid die 
de toestemming van de eigenaar aanduidde. In de meeste gevallen is de 
gehoorzaamheid aan de voorschriften van de eigenaar makkelijk te bepalen, maar 
de Romeinse juristen hebben een aantal regels ontwikkeld om het bereik van de 
toestemming vast te stellen wanneer die in te ruime termen werd gegeven. Dit 
levert een rijke jurisprudentie op omtrent de bevoegdheden van de procurator en 
de beperkingen die uit de bona fides volgen.  
 Terwijl de Romeinse bronnen de centrale rol van de voluntas domini in het 
kader van de potestas alienandi vertonen, hebben de moderne auteurs dikwijls de 
contemplatio domini beschouwd als een beslissend element om de juridische 
grondslag van de eigendomsoverdracht te bepalen. Deze opvatting wordt 
grotendeels geïnspireerd door de toepassing van de notie van directe vertegen-
woordiging in de benadering van de Romeinse bronnen. Bovendien, de regels 
omtrent de eigendomsverkrijging worden vaak analogisch toegepast om de 
levering namens de eigenaar (nomine domini) te onderscheiden van de levering op 
eigen naam (nomine proprio). Niettemin laat de bestudering van de teksten 
omtrent de traditio door een niet-eigenaar zien dat de contemplatio domini alleen 
van belang was voor het bepalen van de goede trouw van de verkrijger, en dat ze 
niet werd gebruikt om twee verschillende juridische grondslagen te 
onderscheiden voor de potestas alienandi – zoals wel het geval is in het moderne 
privaatrecht. 
 De betekenis van een voluntas domini bij de levering is niet tegenstrijdig met 
de causale structuur van het Romeinse stelsel van eigendomsoverdracht. De 
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betaling van schulden, zijn gebaseerd op volledig afwijkende principes, en 
daarom kunnen er geen analogieën bestaan tussen zulke problemen en de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar. 
 De bestudering van sommige elementaire teksten over de postestas alienandi 
toont aan dat het uitgangspunt in het Romeinse recht is dat eigendom wordt 
overgedragen zolang de levering door de eigenaar verricht wordt. De Romeinse 
juristen zouden niettemin een aantal uitzonderlijke gevallen opsommen waarin 
een niet-eigenaar zou kunnen vervreemden. Voor een eerste groep van gevallen 
wordt de toestemming van de eigenaar (voluntas domini) het beslissende element 
om de eigendomsoverdracht te bepalen, zoals gebeurt bij de eigendoms-
overdracht door een procurator. Bij een tweede groep van gevallen is de potestas 
alienandi gebaseerd op wetsbepalingen die het beheer van iemands vermogen aan 
een niet-eigenaar verlenen. Soms is het onduidelijk voor de juristen of de 
levering in een bepaalde geval gezien moet worden als gedaan voluntate domini of 
niet, zoals het gebeurt in het geval van de pandcrediteur. 
 Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt uitsluitend de gevallen waarin de voluntas domini de 
grondslag is voor de potestas alienandi, die een uitgebreide en gecompliceerde 
jurisprudentie vormen. In tegenstelling tot de algemene theorieën rond de 
ontwikkeling van directe vertegenwoordiging, blijkt de toestemming van de 
eigenaar beslissend te zijn geweest reeds voor het oude ius civile. Dientengevolge 
kon de verkrijger Quiritische eigendom verwerven van een bevoegde niet-
eigenaar. Dit betekent niet dat de toestemming van de eigenaar een statische 
 
notie is; integendeel, de juristen zouden vindingrijke interpretaties over het 
bereik van deze voluntas ontwikkelen. Toch hebben moderne auteurs de 
betekenis van de toestemming van de eigenaar in het Romeinse recht 
veronachtzaamd. Dit volgt waarschijnlijk uit de invloed van de ideeën rond de 
evolutie van directe vertegenwoordiging in het Romeinse recht, die de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar als een latere ontwikkeling 
voorstelden. Ook het wantrouwen van moderne auteurs rond subjectieve 
elementen zoals een bepaalde affectus of voluntas, vooral in het kader van de 
traditio, heeft waarschijnlijk een rol gespeeld. De betekenis van de toestemming 
van de eigenaar is te zien bij de oplossingen van verschillende problemen, zoals 
de herroeping van de toestemming, de dood van de eigenaar of de bekrachtiging 
van een handeling die door iemand anders was verricht. De regels rond diefstal 
tonen ook de centrale rol van deze toestemming, aangezien de ongeoorloofde 
levering (invito domino) wordt beschouwd als diefstal. Niettemin, diefstal kan 
alleen plaats vinden als de niet-eigenaar die de levering verricht met zekerheid 
wist dat hij handelde tegen de wil van de eigenaar. 
 De voluntas domini dient als de juridische grondslag voor de eigendoms-
overdracht in verschillende gevallen, waaronder diegene waarin er geen 
onderliggende contractuele relatie bestaat tussen eigenaar en vervreemder, zoals 
gebeurt wanneer de levering wordt verricht door een geautoriseerde slaaf of 
zoon. Daarom bestond er een behoorlijke terminologische verscheidenheid die 
de toestemming van de eigenaar aanduidde. In de meeste gevallen is de 
gehoorzaamheid aan de voorschriften van de eigenaar makkelijk te bepalen, maar 
de Romeinse juristen hebben een aantal regels ontwikkeld om het bereik van de 
toestemming vast te stellen wanneer die in te ruime termen werd gegeven. Dit 
levert een rijke jurisprudentie op omtrent de bevoegdheden van de procurator en 
de beperkingen die uit de bona fides volgen.  
 Terwijl de Romeinse bronnen de centrale rol van de voluntas domini in het 
kader van de potestas alienandi vertonen, hebben de moderne auteurs dikwijls de 
contemplatio domini beschouwd als een beslissend element om de juridische 
grondslag van de eigendomsoverdracht te bepalen. Deze opvatting wordt 
grotendeels geïnspireerd door de toepassing van de notie van directe vertegen-
woordiging in de benadering van de Romeinse bronnen. Bovendien, de regels 
omtrent de eigendomsverkrijging worden vaak analogisch toegepast om de 
levering namens de eigenaar (nomine domini) te onderscheiden van de levering op 
eigen naam (nomine proprio). Niettemin laat de bestudering van de teksten 
omtrent de traditio door een niet-eigenaar zien dat de contemplatio domini alleen 
van belang was voor het bepalen van de goede trouw van de verkrijger, en dat ze 
niet werd gebruikt om twee verschillende juridische grondslagen te 
onderscheiden voor de potestas alienandi – zoals wel het geval is in het moderne 
privaatrecht. 
 De betekenis van een voluntas domini bij de levering is niet tegenstrijdig met 
de causale structuur van het Romeinse stelsel van eigendomsoverdracht. De 
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meeste auteurs zijn vaak te streng geweest in de beschrijving van een strikt 
causaal stelsel van eigendomsoverdracht in het Romeinse recht, dat iedere 
onafhankelijke wil bij de levering naast de iusta causa traditionis zou uitsluiten. 
Daarentegen kennen de bronnen de voluntas domini bij de levering in 
verschillende contexten een belangrijke rol toe, met name bij de bespreking van 
de potestas alienandi. Dit is niet tegenstrijdig met de centrale rol van de iusta causa 
traditionis, maar het betekent alleen dat in sommige gevallen de wil bij de levering 
beslissende gevolgen zal hebben voor de eigendomsoverdracht. Van bijzonder 
belang op dit punt is het probleem van dwaling over de eigendom van de 
geleverde goederen (error in dominio), die door moderne auteurs vaak als irrelevant 
wordt beschouwd, aangezien het strijdig lijkt te zijn met de causale structuur van 
traditio om aandacht toe te trekken naar een bepaalde wil bij de levering. 
Desalniettemin laten de bronnen zien dat de Romeinse juristen het belang van zo 
een dwaling langzamerhand erkend hebben op basis van de betekenis van de 
voluntas domini bij de levering. 
 Hoofdstuk 3 handelt de gevallen waarin de potestas alienandi gebaseerd is op 
een wetsbepaling, en vooral de vervreemding door een wettelijke beheerder. 
Zulke gevallen leveren een rjike jurisprudentie op, hoewel die minder complex 
en uitvoerig is dan die welke betrekking heeft op de traditio voluntate domini. De 
fundamentele maatstaf is dat de wettelijke beheerder de eigendom zal kunnen 
vervreemden zolang hij zich houdt aan de wetsbepalingen die zijn bewind 
bepalen. Het is opmerkelijk dat de beschikking moet plaatsvinden administrationis 
causa, oftewel op een manier die het belang van de eigenaar bevordert. 
 De bestudering van de eigendomsoverdracht door een wettelijke beheerder is 
op een beslissende manier beïnvloed door de algemene theorieën over de 
ontwikkeling van directe vertegenwoordiging in het Romeinse recht. Aangezien 
de meeste auteurs beweren dat het Romeinse recht een oorspronkelijk verbod op 
directe vertegenwoordiging kende, wordt vaak aangenomen dat wettelijke 
beheerders alleen maar bonitarische eigendom konden verschaffen. Deze stelling 
wordt ondersteund door bepaalde teksten over de bescherming door de praetor 
in gevallen waarin een zaak van een wettelijke beheerder verkregen wordt. 
Niettemin is deze bescherming alleen van toepassing in het geval van de traditio 
van een res mancipi, en de bronnen laten zien dat de levering door een wettelijke 
beheerder dezelfde gevolgen heeft als die welke door de eigenaar zelf wordt 
verricht. Andere auteurs hebben verschillende gevolgen uit de theorieën rond de 
ontwikkeling van directe vertegenwoordiging in het Romeinse recht afgeleid, 
namelijk dat wettelijke beheerders Quiritische eigendom wel konden 
overdragen, maar alleen omdat zijzelf als eigenaren beschouwd zouden moeten 
worden, althans in vroegere stadia. Een dergelijke theorie vindt niettemin weinig 
steun in de bronnen, en kan beter beschouwd worden als een alternatieve 
verklaring voor een probleem dat, in de ogen van moderne auteurs, te veel zou 
lijken op een geval van directe vertegenwoordiging om toegelaten te zijn door 
het oude ius civile. 
 
 Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert de rol van de praetorische bescherming in het kader 
van de eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar. Een breed onderzoek toont 
aan dat, terwijl de praetor verschillende rechtsmiddelen toekende om de positie 
van de verkrijger te beschermen wanneer de wil van de eigenaar omstreden was 
– waaronder de actio Publiciana (rescissoria), de exceptio “si non auctor meus ex 
voluntate tua vendidit”, de exceptio rei venditae et traditae en de exceptio doli –, deze 
alleen in bepaalde omstandigheden worden toegepast. De geautoriseerde niet-
eigenaar die de traditio verrichte zou normaal gesproken de Quiritische eigendom 
kunnen verschaffen, en de praetor zou alleen ingrijpen wanneer de regels van het 
ius civile tot onbillijke gevolgen leidden. Er is dus geen steun voor de bewering 
dat een geautoriseerde niet-eigenaar alleen praetorische eigendom kon verschaf-
fen – een stelling die vooral verbreid is onder diegenen die de eigendoms-
overdracht door een niet-eigenaar beschouwen als een latere ontwikkeling. 
 Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt de eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar in 
gevallen van mancipatio en in iure cessio. Academici hebben eeuwenlang gesproken 
over de mogelijkheid dat een niet-eigenaar de mancipatio kon verrichten, maar de 
discussie werd aangewakkerd toen men beweerde dat de actus legitimi geen directe 
vertegenwoordiging konden toelaten, omdat ze behoorden tot het oude ius civile. 
Dit onderzoek laat zien dat er slechts zwak bewijs is voor het bestaan van een 
dergelijk verbod met betrekking tot deze wijzen van eigendomsverkrijging, en 
dat de meeste auteurs die deze opvatting hebben gehandhaafd zich baseren op het 
bestaan van een zeer oud verbod op directe vertegenwoordiging in het 
Romeinse recht. Wat de mancipatio betreft, dit onderzoek richt de aandacht op de 
gevallen waarin de fiducia niet kon worden toegepast, aangezien dat leerstuk het 
vaak moeilijk maakt te onderscheiden of de eigendomsoverdracht werd verricht 
door een geautoriseerde niet-eigenaar of door een echte eigenaar fiduciae causa. 
Dientengevolge concentreert zich dit hoofdstuk op de eigendomsoverdracht 
door een geautoriseerde slaaf of wettelijk beheerder, ten aanzien van wie de 
bronnen er sterk op duiden dat de mancipatio op rechtsgeldige wijze verricht kon 
worden. Op dezelfde wijze blijkt het archaïsche karakter van de in iure cessio geen 
belemmering te zijn geweest voor een geldige eigendomsoverdracht door een 
geautoriseerde niet-eigenaar. In feite laten de bronnen talrijke gevallen zien 
waarin een niet-eigenaar de manumissio vindicta – een wijze van vrijlating die 
nauw verwant is met de in iure cessio – verrichtte. Dit suggereert dat het verbod 
op procesvertegenwoordiging van de oude legis actiones zich niet uitstrekte naar 
de rechtshandelingen die naar hun gelijkenis werden gevormd. Dit alles toont aan 
dat de formele wijzen van eigendomsoverdracht niet door een vorm van verbod 
op directe vertegenwoordiging aangetast waren. 
 Hoofdstuk 6 wordt gewijd aan de nemo plus regel, die vaak wordt beschouwd 
als een fundamentele maatstaf met betrekking tot de eigendomsoverdracht door 
een niet-eigenaar. Academici beweren dat een regel die de geldigheid van 
handelingen door een niet-eigenaar uitsluit alleen kon verwijzen naar de formele 
handelingen van het ius civile, want dit zou een gevolg zijn van het verbod op 
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meeste auteurs zijn vaak te streng geweest in de beschrijving van een strikt 
causaal stelsel van eigendomsoverdracht in het Romeinse recht, dat iedere 
onafhankelijke wil bij de levering naast de iusta causa traditionis zou uitsluiten. 
Daarentegen kennen de bronnen de voluntas domini bij de levering in 
verschillende contexten een belangrijke rol toe, met name bij de bespreking van 
de potestas alienandi. Dit is niet tegenstrijdig met de centrale rol van de iusta causa 
traditionis, maar het betekent alleen dat in sommige gevallen de wil bij de levering 
beslissende gevolgen zal hebben voor de eigendomsoverdracht. Van bijzonder 
belang op dit punt is het probleem van dwaling over de eigendom van de 
geleverde goederen (error in dominio), die door moderne auteurs vaak als irrelevant 
wordt beschouwd, aangezien het strijdig lijkt te zijn met de causale structuur van 
traditio om aandacht toe te trekken naar een bepaalde wil bij de levering. 
Desalniettemin laten de bronnen zien dat de Romeinse juristen het belang van zo 
een dwaling langzamerhand erkend hebben op basis van de betekenis van de 
voluntas domini bij de levering. 
 Hoofdstuk 3 handelt de gevallen waarin de potestas alienandi gebaseerd is op 
een wetsbepaling, en vooral de vervreemding door een wettelijke beheerder. 
Zulke gevallen leveren een rjike jurisprudentie op, hoewel die minder complex 
en uitvoerig is dan die welke betrekking heeft op de traditio voluntate domini. De 
fundamentele maatstaf is dat de wettelijke beheerder de eigendom zal kunnen 
vervreemden zolang hij zich houdt aan de wetsbepalingen die zijn bewind 
bepalen. Het is opmerkelijk dat de beschikking moet plaatsvinden administrationis 
causa, oftewel op een manier die het belang van de eigenaar bevordert. 
 De bestudering van de eigendomsoverdracht door een wettelijke beheerder is 
op een beslissende manier beïnvloed door de algemene theorieën over de 
ontwikkeling van directe vertegenwoordiging in het Romeinse recht. Aangezien 
de meeste auteurs beweren dat het Romeinse recht een oorspronkelijk verbod op 
directe vertegenwoordiging kende, wordt vaak aangenomen dat wettelijke 
beheerders alleen maar bonitarische eigendom konden verschaffen. Deze stelling 
wordt ondersteund door bepaalde teksten over de bescherming door de praetor 
in gevallen waarin een zaak van een wettelijke beheerder verkregen wordt. 
Niettemin is deze bescherming alleen van toepassing in het geval van de traditio 
van een res mancipi, en de bronnen laten zien dat de levering door een wettelijke 
beheerder dezelfde gevolgen heeft als die welke door de eigenaar zelf wordt 
verricht. Andere auteurs hebben verschillende gevolgen uit de theorieën rond de 
ontwikkeling van directe vertegenwoordiging in het Romeinse recht afgeleid, 
namelijk dat wettelijke beheerders Quiritische eigendom wel konden 
overdragen, maar alleen omdat zijzelf als eigenaren beschouwd zouden moeten 
worden, althans in vroegere stadia. Een dergelijke theorie vindt niettemin weinig 
steun in de bronnen, en kan beter beschouwd worden als een alternatieve 
verklaring voor een probleem dat, in de ogen van moderne auteurs, te veel zou 
lijken op een geval van directe vertegenwoordiging om toegelaten te zijn door 
het oude ius civile. 
 
 Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert de rol van de praetorische bescherming in het kader 
van de eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar. Een breed onderzoek toont 
aan dat, terwijl de praetor verschillende rechtsmiddelen toekende om de positie 
van de verkrijger te beschermen wanneer de wil van de eigenaar omstreden was 
– waaronder de actio Publiciana (rescissoria), de exceptio “si non auctor meus ex 
voluntate tua vendidit”, de exceptio rei venditae et traditae en de exceptio doli –, deze 
alleen in bepaalde omstandigheden worden toegepast. De geautoriseerde niet-
eigenaar die de traditio verrichte zou normaal gesproken de Quiritische eigendom 
kunnen verschaffen, en de praetor zou alleen ingrijpen wanneer de regels van het 
ius civile tot onbillijke gevolgen leidden. Er is dus geen steun voor de bewering 
dat een geautoriseerde niet-eigenaar alleen praetorische eigendom kon verschaf-
fen – een stelling die vooral verbreid is onder diegenen die de eigendoms-
overdracht door een niet-eigenaar beschouwen als een latere ontwikkeling. 
 Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt de eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar in 
gevallen van mancipatio en in iure cessio. Academici hebben eeuwenlang gesproken 
over de mogelijkheid dat een niet-eigenaar de mancipatio kon verrichten, maar de 
discussie werd aangewakkerd toen men beweerde dat de actus legitimi geen directe 
vertegenwoordiging konden toelaten, omdat ze behoorden tot het oude ius civile. 
Dit onderzoek laat zien dat er slechts zwak bewijs is voor het bestaan van een 
dergelijk verbod met betrekking tot deze wijzen van eigendomsverkrijging, en 
dat de meeste auteurs die deze opvatting hebben gehandhaafd zich baseren op het 
bestaan van een zeer oud verbod op directe vertegenwoordiging in het 
Romeinse recht. Wat de mancipatio betreft, dit onderzoek richt de aandacht op de 
gevallen waarin de fiducia niet kon worden toegepast, aangezien dat leerstuk het 
vaak moeilijk maakt te onderscheiden of de eigendomsoverdracht werd verricht 
door een geautoriseerde niet-eigenaar of door een echte eigenaar fiduciae causa. 
Dientengevolge concentreert zich dit hoofdstuk op de eigendomsoverdracht 
door een geautoriseerde slaaf of wettelijk beheerder, ten aanzien van wie de 
bronnen er sterk op duiden dat de mancipatio op rechtsgeldige wijze verricht kon 
worden. Op dezelfde wijze blijkt het archaïsche karakter van de in iure cessio geen 
belemmering te zijn geweest voor een geldige eigendomsoverdracht door een 
geautoriseerde niet-eigenaar. In feite laten de bronnen talrijke gevallen zien 
waarin een niet-eigenaar de manumissio vindicta – een wijze van vrijlating die 
nauw verwant is met de in iure cessio – verrichtte. Dit suggereert dat het verbod 
op procesvertegenwoordiging van de oude legis actiones zich niet uitstrekte naar 
de rechtshandelingen die naar hun gelijkenis werden gevormd. Dit alles toont aan 
dat de formele wijzen van eigendomsoverdracht niet door een vorm van verbod 
op directe vertegenwoordiging aangetast waren. 
 Hoofdstuk 6 wordt gewijd aan de nemo plus regel, die vaak wordt beschouwd 
als een fundamentele maatstaf met betrekking tot de eigendomsoverdracht door 
een niet-eigenaar. Academici beweren dat een regel die de geldigheid van 
handelingen door een niet-eigenaar uitsluit alleen kon verwijzen naar de formele 
handelingen van het ius civile, want dit zou een gevolg zijn van het verbod op 
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directe vertegenwoordiging. Volgens deze opvatting kon de regel alleen 
onvoorwaardelijk gelden met betrekking tot de formele wijzen van eigendoms-
overdracht. Dit zou niet het geval van de traditio zijn, waarin eigendom inderdaad 
door een niet-eigenaar kon worden overgedragen. Niettemin onthult de 
bestudering van de intellectuele achtergrond van deze regel een heel andere visie, 
want Romeinse juristen lijken niet in de eerste plaats bezig te zijn geweest met 
de onvoorwaardelijke geldigheid van deze regel. Het argument dat “niemand kan 
geven wat hij niet heeft” vindt zijn oorsprong op het gebied van de dialektiek, 
waar het naar voren was gebracht als een typische stelling die naar misleidende 
redeneringen kon voeren. Uiteindelijk zou het argument een gemeenplaats 
worden in de Oudheid, en waarschijnlijk is het in het Romeinse recht als een 
retorische topos doorgedrongen. Romeinse juristen hebben dit idee op een losse 
manier in verschillende contexten gebruikt, vooral om steun te bieden voor een 
bepaald punt, maar ze hebben het nooit als onvoorwaardelijk geldig beschouwd 
of er een eigen dogmatische betekenis aan gegeven. Wat de eigendoms-
overdracht betreft, dient het als een ruime algemene regel, maar het sloot niet uit 
dat een niet-eigenaar eigendom kon overdragen. De regel was derhalve evenzeer 
van toepassing voor formele én informele wijzen van eigendomsoverdracht. Het 
wordt dus duidelijk dat het toepassingsgebied van deze regel grotendeels 
onafhankelijk was van het zogenaamde verbod op directe vertegenwoordiging. 
Alleen in de tijd van Justinianus zouden de juristen aan deze regel een eigen 
systematische betekenis geven in het kader van de eigendomsoverdracht door een 
niet-eigenaar, door te beweren dat elke eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-
eigenaar eigenlijk beschouwd kon worden als door de eigenaar zelf verricht. 
 Terwijl de nemo plus regel een bescheiden systematische betekenis had in het 
klassieke Romeinse recht, nam zij een centrale rol in onder juristen sinds de 12de 
eeuw in het kader van de eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar. Daarom 
bestudeert hoofdstuk 7 de receptie van de nemo plus regel, waarmee het tweede 
deel van dit onderzoek wordt geopend. Deze regel werd oorspronkelijk door de 
Glossatoren en Commentatoren als een zeer ruime maatstaf beschouwd, 
waaronder men talloze uitzonderingen samen kon brengen. Deze omstandigheid 
bracht op zichzelf de regel naar het centrum van de bestudering van de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar. Deze uitleg was echter strijdig met 
de benadering van de regel door theologen en dialectici, die de regel als 
onvoorwaardelijk geldig beschouwden. Deze opvatting is langzamerhand in 
juridisch geschriften doorgedrongen, en tegen de 16de eeuw hadden de juristen 
elk geval dat tegenstrijdig bleek te zijn met de nemo plus regel als een 
schijnuitzondering uitgelegd, waardoor deze onvoorwaardelijke gelding kreeg. 
Deze interpretatie zou tot de 19de eeuw heersend blijven, en diende als een 
centraal uitgangspunt om te begrijpen hoe de eigendomsoverdracht door een 
niet-eigenaar plaatsvond. Met de afkondiging van de moderne burgerlijke 
wetboeken verloor de regel zijn systematische betekenis met betrekking tot de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een geautoriseerde niet-eigenaar in de meeste op het 
 
Romeinse recht gebaseerde Europese rechtsstelsels. Sinds die tijd heeft de nemo 
plus regel vooral als een ruim uitgangspunt gediend voor de bestudering van de 
eigendomsverkrijging door iemand die te goeder trouw is. De nemo dat regel 
heeft in de Common law hetzelfde lot ondergaan. 
 Hoofdstuk 8 beschrijft de radicale paradigmaverschuiving die de notie van 
directe vertegenwoordiging meebracht voor de bestudering van de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar. Deze ontwikkeling toont aan dat 
de historische beschrijving van de evolutie van directe vertegenwoordiging in de 
Romeinse bronnen, die door de Duitse juristen in de 19de eeuw was 
ontwikkeld, niet alleen beslissend was voor de bestudering van de potestas 
alienandi in het Romeinse recht, maar ook radicale veranderingen voor het 
moderne privaatrecht mee bracht. Tot de 18de eeuw volgde de eigendoms-
overdracht door een niet-eigenaar grotendeels de centrale richtlijnen die het 
Romeinse recht had aangeboden, en met name dat eigendom alleen verschaft 
kon worden op een geldige manier als de levering plaatsvond conform de 
toestemming van de eigenaar (voluntate domini) of volgens een wetsbepaling. In 
dit kader speelde de contemplatio domini geen beslissende rol om de juridische 
grondslag van de eigendomsoverdracht te bepalen. Dit zou verklaren waarom de 
ontwikkeling van de leer van directe vertegenwoordiging oorspronkelijk geen 
invloed had met betrekking tot de potestas alienandi: het was in feite niet nodig 
om een beroep op een nieuwe leer te doen om te verklaren hoe een niet-
eigenaar eigendom kon vervreemden. Dit alles veranderde toen de Duitse 
juristen in de 19de eeuw de eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar onder 
het algemene probleem van directe vertegenwoordiging plaatsten. Deze 
ontwikkeling was niet door praktische beschouwingen gedreven, aangezien er in 
die tijd geen polemiek was rond de mogelijkheid om eigendom door een niet-
eigenaar over te laten dragen. In plaats daarvan werd het probleem van de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar onder de leer van directe 
vertegenwoordiging gebracht op basis van de beschrijving van de ontwikkeling 
van directe vertegenwoordiging in de Romeinse bronnen. 
 De toepassing van de leer van directe vertegenwoordiging als juridische 
grondslag van de eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar werd tussen de op 
het Romeinse recht gebaseerde Europese rechtsstelsels verspreid. Aangezien dat 
de contemplatio domini traditioneel is aangenomen als een essentieel bestanddeel 
van de leer van directe vertegenwoordiging, moest de eigendomsoverdracht door 
een niet-eigenaar nomine domini onderscheiden worden van de levering nomine 
proprio, oftewel in het kader van indirecte vertegenwoordiging. Dit gaf academici 
de taak om te bepalen wat de juridische grondslag was voor de eigendoms-
overdracht van een niet-eigenaar die op zijn eigen naam leverde – een kwestie 
die voor de 19de eeuw de juristen geen zorgen gebaard had. Andere jurisdicties 
gaven de contemplatio domini evenwel niet zo’n beslissende rol bij het bepalen van 
de juridische grondslag van de eigendomsoverdracht. Deze laatste benadering lijkt 
vanuit en dogmatische en een praktische perspectief meer geschikt te zijn. De 
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directe vertegenwoordiging. Volgens deze opvatting kon de regel alleen 
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waaronder men talloze uitzonderingen samen kon brengen. Deze omstandigheid 
bracht op zichzelf de regel naar het centrum van de bestudering van de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar. Deze uitleg was echter strijdig met 
de benadering van de regel door theologen en dialectici, die de regel als 
onvoorwaardelijk geldig beschouwden. Deze opvatting is langzamerhand in 
juridisch geschriften doorgedrongen, en tegen de 16de eeuw hadden de juristen 
elk geval dat tegenstrijdig bleek te zijn met de nemo plus regel als een 
schijnuitzondering uitgelegd, waardoor deze onvoorwaardelijke gelding kreeg. 
Deze interpretatie zou tot de 19de eeuw heersend blijven, en diende als een 
centraal uitgangspunt om te begrijpen hoe de eigendomsoverdracht door een 
niet-eigenaar plaatsvond. Met de afkondiging van de moderne burgerlijke 
wetboeken verloor de regel zijn systematische betekenis met betrekking tot de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een geautoriseerde niet-eigenaar in de meeste op het 
 
Romeinse recht gebaseerde Europese rechtsstelsels. Sinds die tijd heeft de nemo 
plus regel vooral als een ruim uitgangspunt gediend voor de bestudering van de 
eigendomsverkrijging door iemand die te goeder trouw is. De nemo dat regel 
heeft in de Common law hetzelfde lot ondergaan. 
 Hoofdstuk 8 beschrijft de radicale paradigmaverschuiving die de notie van 
directe vertegenwoordiging meebracht voor de bestudering van de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar. Deze ontwikkeling toont aan dat 
de historische beschrijving van de evolutie van directe vertegenwoordiging in de 
Romeinse bronnen, die door de Duitse juristen in de 19de eeuw was 
ontwikkeld, niet alleen beslissend was voor de bestudering van de potestas 
alienandi in het Romeinse recht, maar ook radicale veranderingen voor het 
moderne privaatrecht mee bracht. Tot de 18de eeuw volgde de eigendoms-
overdracht door een niet-eigenaar grotendeels de centrale richtlijnen die het 
Romeinse recht had aangeboden, en met name dat eigendom alleen verschaft 
kon worden op een geldige manier als de levering plaatsvond conform de 
toestemming van de eigenaar (voluntate domini) of volgens een wetsbepaling. In 
dit kader speelde de contemplatio domini geen beslissende rol om de juridische 
grondslag van de eigendomsoverdracht te bepalen. Dit zou verklaren waarom de 
ontwikkeling van de leer van directe vertegenwoordiging oorspronkelijk geen 
invloed had met betrekking tot de potestas alienandi: het was in feite niet nodig 
om een beroep op een nieuwe leer te doen om te verklaren hoe een niet-
eigenaar eigendom kon vervreemden. Dit alles veranderde toen de Duitse 
juristen in de 19de eeuw de eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar onder 
het algemene probleem van directe vertegenwoordiging plaatsten. Deze 
ontwikkeling was niet door praktische beschouwingen gedreven, aangezien er in 
die tijd geen polemiek was rond de mogelijkheid om eigendom door een niet-
eigenaar over te laten dragen. In plaats daarvan werd het probleem van de 
eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar onder de leer van directe 
vertegenwoordiging gebracht op basis van de beschrijving van de ontwikkeling 
van directe vertegenwoordiging in de Romeinse bronnen. 
 De toepassing van de leer van directe vertegenwoordiging als juridische 
grondslag van de eigendomsoverdracht door een niet-eigenaar werd tussen de op 
het Romeinse recht gebaseerde Europese rechtsstelsels verspreid. Aangezien dat 
de contemplatio domini traditioneel is aangenomen als een essentieel bestanddeel 
van de leer van directe vertegenwoordiging, moest de eigendomsoverdracht door 
een niet-eigenaar nomine domini onderscheiden worden van de levering nomine 
proprio, oftewel in het kader van indirecte vertegenwoordiging. Dit gaf academici 
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contemplatio domini kreeg pas een centrale betekenis toen de eigendomsoverdracht 
door een niet-eigenaar onder de leer van directe vertegenwoordiging werd 
gebracht door een historisch onnauwkeurige beschrijving van de ontwikkeling 
van het Romeinse recht. In dit kader werd het noodzakelijk om twee 
verschillende stelsels van regels te ontwikkelen, al naar gelang de levering wel of 
niet in de naam van de eigenaar verricht was. Bovendien zijn de grenzen tussen 
beide gevallen vaak onduidelijk. De contemplatio domini zou dus in bepaalde 
gevallen in acht genomen worden – bijvoorbeeld bij de bestudering van de 
goede trouw van de verkrijger – maar niet om twee verschillende juridische 
grondslagen voor de eigendomsoverdracht te bepalen. Ten slotte is het 
opmerkelijk dat de toepassing van de leer van directe vertegenwoordiging op de 
eigendomsoverdracht plaatsvond ongeacht het bestaan van verschillende stelsels 
van vervreemding – causale of abstracte, consensuele of leverings-gebaseerde – 
hoewel de betekenis die wordt verleend aan de toestemming bij de levering wel 
een rol speelde bij de benadering van sommige problemen rond de toestemming 
van de eigenaar om eigendom door een niet-eigenaar over te laten dragen. 
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